“What's really strikes me about ACA is the potential to shape the next generation of leaders on arms control and nuclear policy. This is something I witnessed firsthand as someone who was introduced to the field through ACA.”
Issue Briefs
ACA Issue Briefs provide rapid reaction to breaking arms control events and analyze key nuclear/chemical/biological/conventional arms issues. They are available for quotation by the media.
The U.S. decision to join Israel’s strikes on Iran’s safeguarded nuclear facilities while negotiations on a nuclear agreement were ongoing dealt a serious blow to U.S. efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. The premature use of force set back Iran’s nuclear program temporarily, but risks pushing Tehran closer to nuclear weapons in the long term. The U.S. strikes also complicate the diplomatic efforts that are still necessary to reach an effective, verifiable nuclear deal.
To reach an effective non-proliferation deal with Iran, the U.S must abandon zero enrichment of uranium as a requirement. Unless Trump is willing to show more flexibility and realism regarding the future of Iran’s nuclear activities, the United States will miss another opportunity to address Iran's growing proliferation risk.
President Donald Trump's missile defense executive order calls for a new architecture for homeland ballistic and cruise missile defense and outlines a policy shift toward defending or deterring “any foreign aerial attack on the Homeland.”
The long-running Iranian nuclear crisis is reaching a tipping point. Since his re-election in November, U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently expressed support for reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran, but his administration’s rhetoric toward Tehran sends mixed signals about U.S. diplomatic intentions.
Tehran’s recent acceleration of proliferation-sensitive activities increases the risk that the United States or Israel perceive its actions as a step toward weaponization, which could trigger military action or prompt Washington to ratchet up economic and political pressure on Iran even further.
The widespread deployment of autonomous weapons systems and the integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear command, control, and communications systems pose novel threats to strategic stability that are not addressed by existing U.S. and multilateral initiatives to mitigate the dangers of artificial intelligence.
U.S. presidential leadership may be the most important factor in whether the risk of nuclear arms racing, proliferation, and war will rise or fall in the years ahead.
The CANWFZ is designed to reinforce the global nuclear nonproliferation system and safeguard the security of five key central Asian states that were once part of the Soviet Union and that now lie in the shadows of nuclear-armed Russia and China.
It has been just five years since the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was concluded in 2017, but the agreement is already helping to bolster the international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture.
The nuclear dimensions of the war on Ukraine underscore the fact that outdated nuclear deterrence policies create unacceptable risks. To eliminate the danger, we must actively reinforce the legal prohibitions and norms against nuclear weapons use and press for effective disarmament diplomacy.