Iran and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) met on July 25 in Istanbul, the first nuclear talks since Israel attacked Iran on June 13.
In a July 25 post on X, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazam Gharibabadi wrote that both sides brought “specific ideas” to the meeting and that the talks, which included nuclear and sanctions issues, were “serious, frank and detailed.” He said talks would continue, but the E3 and Iran have little time to make progress.
Prior to the Istanbul meeting, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said that the European powers will move to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran at the end of August if there is no concrete progress on a nuclear deal.
The E3 can restore UN measures that were modified under the 2015 nuclear deal using a process outlined in Resolution 2231 that cannot be blocked. The E3 would need to trigger snapback 30 days before the mechanism expires in October. In addition to restoring UN sanctions, Iran would face nuclear restrictions, including a prohibition on enrichment, if the E3 invokes snapback.
Barrot said the E3 are looking for a “firm, tangible commitment from Iran.” He did not provide details on what specific steps Tehran would need to take to stave off the reimposition of UN sanctions, but it is likely the E3 will push for Iran to resume cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as part of a package that would also extend the snapback mechanism. Iran suspended cooperation with the agency on July 2 in response to the U.S. and Israeli strikes against its nuclear program (see below for details).
Iran has threatened to the withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if the E3 triggers snapback. Iran can legally withdraw from the NPT and may face less blowback if Tehran takes that step now, after its safeguarded nuclear facilities were illegally attacked. Iranian officials have also threatened to take steps that could destabilize the region in response to snapback. Iran will not show the same restraint it has in the past, Gharababadi said.
Although neither China nor Russia could block snapback, it is unclear if either state will be willing to enforce reimposed UN Security Council measures. During a meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on July 16, Yi said China will support Iran in “resisting power politics and bullying acts” and “defending its legitimate rights.” Yi also expressed China’s opposition to threats of force and support for nuclear dialogue.
Although Gharababadi said it is premature to discuss extending snapback with the E3, he did not appear to rule it out completely ahead of the July 25 meeting. He said the E3 and Iran need to discuss the issue and steps to avoid complicating the current situation.
Extending snapback as part of a package that includes the resumption of inspections could create the time and space to negotiate a broader deal, which will be more technically challenging due to the Israeli and U.S. strikes. Any new deal will likely need additional monitoring mechanisms to take into account the challenges of accounting for Iran's stockpiles of enriched uranium and centrifuges after the strikes.
Tehran is also looking for guarantees before resuming negotiations with Washington.
Araghchi said that Tehran wants a “firm guarantee” that the United States will not attack Iran before restarting talks. The June 13 Israeli strikes occurred two days before the United States and Iran were scheduled to hold a sixth round of negotiations.
Prior to the talks with the E3, Gharibabadi said that Washington would need to take steps toward “rebuilding Iran’s trust” and recognize Iran’s nuclear rights before restarting talks.
Speaking to reporters at the UN on July 23, he said that both Iran and the United States need to be committed to “win-win” solutions and willing to compromise.
It is not clear if U.S. President Donald Trump is willing to make such a commitment or compromise to reach a deal.
Trump expressed some support for reaching a deal after the strikes, but said on July 16 the United States is “in no rush” to resume talks because Iran’s nuclear facilities were “obliterated” by U.S. and Israeli strikes.
He said on July 11 that he “can’t imagine” bombing Iran again, but later threatened to target the nuclear program again if Iran restarts nuclear activities. He told reporters on July 28 that Iran was sending “very bad signals” and that if Iran restarts its nuclear program the United States will “wipe it out.” —KELSEY DAVENPORT, director for nonproliferation policy
If the United States and Iran do resume talks, it appears that uranium enrichment will remain a key sticking point. Post-strikes, both the United States and Iran are doubling down on their positions regarding enrichment: Tehran demanding that its right to enrichment be respected, and Washington is demanding that Iran forgo enrichment in any deal.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Fox News that Iran is not currently enriching uranium due to the damage to its facilities, but it “cannot give up enrichment.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian also continues to emphasize that Iran will “categorically reject pressure and denial of our legal rights,” including the right to enrichment. Furthermore, recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights, including enrichment, is one of the conditions that must be met for Iran to resume IAEA cooperation, under a July 2 law passed in response to the strikes (see below for more on the law).
The NPT declares it is the “inalienable right” of all states to develop nuclear programs for peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards, but does not specify if uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, the two technologies used to produce fissile materials used in nuclear weapons, are included within the rights specified under Article IV. Iran, like other NPT members, interprets Article IV as inclusive of uranium enrichment and maintains that it will not give up its right to enrich under any nuclear agreement. The United States, in contrast, asserts that the NPT Article IV does not include the right to enrich.
The United States sent mixed messages on its approach to uranium enrichment prior to the June 13 Israeli strikes, but appears to be doubling down on demanding that Iran forgo uranium enrichment after bombing the country's enrichment facilities.
Since the strikes, President Donald Trump has suggested that the United States will pursue zero enrichment in any new talks with Iran. Secretary of State and interim National Security Advisor Marco Rubio said on June 22 that Iran should agree to zero enrichment. Trump also appears less inclined to compromise after the strikes and has threatened on July 28 to bomb Iran again if it restarts certain nuclear activities.
Zero enrichment, however, is unnecessary for an effective nuclear agreement and continuing to demand that Iran forgo enrichment in a deal could complicate the resumption of talks.
In response to Trump’s July 28 comments, Araghchi reiterated that Iran does not respond to pressure or threats and will not give up its right to enrich uranium. Iran requires domestic enrichment for fueling its civil nuclear program, which includes medical purposes, he said.
Iran currently has near-zero need for domestically produced enriched uranium, but does see enrichment as a source of pride and assurance of reactor fuel supply. Currently, Iran’s only power reactor at Bushehr is fueled by Russia. Russia also delivered fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor in May 2025, but Iran can fuel that reactor domestically and has expressed its intention to do so. Iran would have produced fuel for the unfinished reactor at the Arak site, but that reactor was damaged by Israeli strikes.
In addition to the civil program, it is likely that Iran seeks to retain uranium enrichment as a source of leverage if the United States reneges on a future deal or to preserve the option to weaponize its nuclear program to deter future attacks.
For more on the Iranian and U.S. positions on enrichment during the negotiations earlier this year, see the Arms Control Association’s issue brief, Zero Enrichment: An Unnecessary, Unrealistic Objective to Prevent an Iranian Bomb.
US Assesses Damage from Strikes
The U.S. and Israeli strikes set Iran’s nuclear program back 1-2 years, according to an assessment from the Pentagon. The assessed setback of 1-2 years is significantly longer than a previous intelligence assessment issued days after the June 21 U.S. strikes, which said that Iran’s program was only set back by months.
Officials familiar with the assessment told The Washington Post that the U.S. strike on the Fordow uranium enrichment facility “seems to have succeeded” in collapsing the site. Fordow was a deeply buried facility where Iran produced the majority of its 60 percent enriched uranium. The United States struck the facility with 12 massive ordinance penetrators (MOP), the largest conventional bomb in the U.S. arsenal. The New York Times reported that officials said it would take at least two years for Iran to resume enrichment at Fordow.
It is less clear how much damage was inflicted on the Natanz uranium enrichment complex and the Esfahan complex, according to the assessment. Both the United States and Israel struck those sites, but they were not likely “dealt a knockout blow” by the bombings an official told The Washington Post.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, already told members of Congress that the United States did not use the MOP on Esfahan because the facility was too deeply buried. The U.S. strikes focused on collapsing access to underground areas at that complex where it is likely that Iran stored 60 percent enriched uranium. Those stockpiles likely survived the strikes, according to officials.
Israeli strikes on Esfahan focused on specific facilities and appear to have destroyed Iran’s uranium conversion facilities, including the processing facility for producing metal and converting uranium into the gas form used for enrichment. Uranium metal is necessary for a bomb, but it is likely that Iran could reconstitute that capability relatively quickly.
The Natanz enrichment complex sustained enough damage that centrifuges are likely inoperable, according to the U.S. assessment but parts of the facility remain intact. The IAEA offered a similar assessment of the damage to Natanz.
Without access to the sites to determine what was destroyed, it is challenging to assess how quickly Iran could resume enrichment or rebuild some of the destroyed facilities. It is unclear if the Pentagon’s 1-2 year setback refers to restoring the destroyed sites, or Iran’s ability to return to the threshold of nuclear weapons. Iran, for instance, would not need to completely restore Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan to resume enrichment and return to the threshold of nuclear weapons. If even a portion of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium and centrifuges survived the attack, Iran could build back more quickly.
IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said the strikes caused “severe” damage, but the infrastructure is not totally destroyed. Grossi said in a July 29 interview with CBS that Iran could begin enriching uranium again in a “matter of months.”
For a more detailed discussion of the damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities and the implications for Iran’s proliferation risk, see the Arms Control Association’s July 9 Issue Brief, Iran’s Nuclear Program After the Strikes: What’s Left and What’s Next?
Iran Prohibits IAEA Cooperation
President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a law suspending Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency until certain conditions are met.
The law, which passed the Majles 221-0 on June 25, entered into effect on July 2. It prohibits Iran from implementing its legally required safeguards agreement under the NPT or providing any data to the IAEA about the nuclear program until the Supreme National Security Council confirms that Iran’s national sovereignty and the security of its nuclear facilities and personnel will be guaranteed and that its rights under Article IV of the NPT are respected, including the right to domestic enrichment. Article IV guarantees non-nuclear weapon states the right to develop nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. Article III requires that states implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Seyyed Mahmoud Nabavian, deputy head of the Majles National Security Commission, said Iran remains committed to the NPT but can no longer trust the IAEA. He accused the IAEA of providing information about Iran’s nuclear program to Israel.
Following the passage of the law, the IAEA inspectors in Iran left the country. Inspectors remained in Iran after the June 13 attacks, but had no access to the nuclear facilities.
Pezeshkian also said that Iran’s trust in the IAEA is broken and said that the agency’s failure to condemn the attacks on Iran’s safeguarded nuclear sites was a key motivation for passing the law.
Grossi did condemn attacks on nuclear facilities but did not specifically call out the United States and Israel.
Following the passage of the law, Grossi said that IAEA monitoring is “indispensable” and said it was of “crucial importance” for the agency to discuss with Iran the modalities for resuming inspections.
In a June 30 statement, the E3 called on Iran to “immediately resume full cooperation in line with its legally binding obligations” and take steps to “ensure the safety and security of IAEA personnel.”
Despite the law, Iran’s Foreign Ministry said on July 28 that the IAEA will visit Iran for talks “within the next two weeks.” Grossi told reporters on July 25 that the agency had proposed talks on the “modalities as to how to restart or begin” inspections and that he was “encouraged” that Iran agreed to discussions.
Grossi said the IAEA has not received any information from Iran regarding the stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent. He said there will be a “serious problem” if the IAEA cannot resume inspections soon.
In Case You Missed It...
James Acton, There’s More Than One Way to Build a Bomb, Foreign Policy, July 25
Ellie Geranmayeh, Snap out of it: Europe, Iran and nuclear negotiations, European Council on Foreign Relations, July 21
A Three-point Plan for Consolidating the Israel-U.S.-Iran Ceasefire, International Crisis Group, July 21
Kelsey Davenport, Iran’s Nuclear Program After the Strikes: What’s Left and What’s Next?, Arms Control Association, July 9
Jamie Kwong, The Implications of the Iran Nuclear Crisis Could Stretch Far Beyond Tehran, Emissary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 9
Eric Brewer and Scott Roecker, Iran’s Collapse Could Cause a Nuclear Security Nightmare, Foreign Policy, July 9