Securing WMD Expertise: Lessons Learned From Iraq

Peter D. Smallwood and William T. Liimatainen

December 26, 2011, marks the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was cause for celebrations in the West, but also for grave concern because it unleashed enormous security challenges. Vast stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the materials to make them suddenly were at risk, potentially available for theft or sale to the highest bidder.

The United States responded quickly by enacting legislation sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) that laid the foundation for the country’s cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs.[1] These programs quickly grew into a multiagency effort involving the departments of Defense, Energy, State, and others, now spending about $1.7 billion annually.[2] CTR programs have achieved an impressive record of WMD materials secured or destroyed.[3]

The world has changed greatly during these past two decades, complicating efforts to secure remaining Cold War WMD materials and posing new threats in new places. Calls by scholars and policymakers to revise CTR programs have been growing in recent years.[4] The National Academy of Sciences recently completed an extensive study, recommending a major reorganization of the programs, which the academy dubbed CTR 2.0.[5] CTR programs have been adapting, but much more needs to be done to fulfill President Barack Obama’s 2009 commitment to secure all nuclear materials in four years, let alone protect against the full range of WMD threats.[6]

The production of weapons of mass destruction requires expertise as well as materials; efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD expertise often are characterized as scientist redirection because they redirect the scientists’ skills and expertise to productive civilian applications. Redirection and other engagement programs have been a component of CTR programs since its beginning, albeit with the smallest share of CTR funding and personnel.[7] These programs have difficulty securing adequate political support, in part because the work does not yield the immediate, tangible “scorecard” accomplishments that come from securing WMD materials.

However, the materials for many chemical and biological weapons are so prevalent that controlling WMD expertise is the best hope for nonproliferation. Malevolent state or nonstate actors can re-create WMD materials if they have the appropriate expertise. Even for nuclear weapons, countries that pursue uranium bombs from domestic sources may be limited by the expertise required for enrichment. Thus, securing WMD materials is a tactical response. Securing WMD expertise is more of a strategic activity because it deals with the ability to make WMD materials. Therefore, CTR 2.0 should include a greater emphasis on redirection.

The vast majority of redirection funding has been spent on the scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union, but there are significant, ongoing efforts to redirect former WMD scientists and engineers in Iraq. (The lack of WMD stockpiles in Iraq should not distract observers from the fact that Saddam Hussein had an elaborate program to retain WMD experts, as discussed below.) Efforts to redirect Iraqi scientists began in 2003 under extraordinary circumstances that were very different from those in the former Soviet states.

Important lessons can be learned from the redirection program in Iraq, and those lessons are made clearer by contrasting the Iraqi program with the ones in the former Soviet states, which have been analyzed more extensively. The extreme differences in security and political conditions provide useful, widely separated points on the spectrum of possible conditions confronting future redirection programs. As explained below, conditions in the former Soviet states were relatively safe, and physical and bureaucratic infrastructures of those states were relatively intact. The opposite was true in Iraq. This article focuses on the start-up of the Iraqi program—the most difficult stage, where delays compound the risk of proliferation.

Future redirection programs are likely to fall somewhere between these two examples on the spectrum of possible political and security challenges. It is impossible to predict when or where the next opportunities for redirection will arise, but possibilities for redirection in Iran and North Korea have been discussed actively since at least 2004.[8] Opportunities could arise in Cuba, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, or Venezuela or in unanticipated places, such as Libya in 2003. The speed with which the Arab Spring has spread throughout the Middle East underlines the need to be prepared to act. Programs need to be flexible, agile, and ready to execute on short notice. To help prepare for these possibilities, lessons learned from the redirection effort in Iraq should be built into plans for CTR 2.0.

Iraq’s Orphaned WMD Experts

Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq invested heavily in developing the full spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, producing and using chemical weapons and conducting research for biological and nuclear weapons. After that war, Iraq was subjected to sanctions and UN-led inspections. Under great international pressure, Hussein’s regime apparently ceased WMD production and disposed of its stockpiles some years before the 2003 invasion, with the notable exception of its missile program. However, Iraq retained its cadre of WMD scientists and engineers, primarily in the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). Although the IAEC’s connection to weapons of mass destruction is obvious, the MIC’s role requires explanation.[9]

The MIC was a consortium of dozens of state-owned companies with both military and civilian functions. For example, the Tariq chemical company purported to produce pesticides for local and regional markets. There is little evidence that it produced chemical weapons in the years immediately prior to the 2003 invasion, but the company played a key role in Iraq’s chemical weapons program in the 1980s and early 1990s. Many of Iraq’s known chemical weapons experts were still employed there in 2003. This provided a mechanism for giving the experts prestigious rank and salary in the Iraqi civil service and kept them under government control. The experts would be needed to restart chemical weapons programs, which was their plan once international sanctions were relaxed. By 2003 most Iraqi WMD experts were discreetly employed in companies of the MIC, with others housed in the IAEC, ministries, and universities.

After the invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued Orders 2 and 75, disbanding the IAEC and “realigning” the companies of the MIC. Although most IAEC employees and some MIC employees were absorbed later by the newly created Ministry of Science and Technology, roughly 50,000 MIC employees were transferred to the Ministry of Finance, where they received little compensation and essentially were idled. They lost their rank, status, income, and direction; they were stranded. The vast majority of the 50,000 had been involved in nonmilitary or conventional weapons manufacturing with no WMD backgrounds, yet most Iraqi WMD experts were among them. Moreover, under CPA Order 1, many IAEC and MIC senior employees, including senior WMD experts, had been banned from any government employment for being high-ranking members of the Ba’ath Party.[10]

Postinvasion investigations revealed that much of Iraq’s WMD expertise was dated and probably of little value to developed countries with active WMD programs. However, the expertise was certainly of value to countries aspiring to develop WMD capabilities and especially to nonstate actors. Insurgents in Iraq were actively looking for Iraq’s WMD experts almost from the beginning of the insurgency and continued that effort for years.[11] In 2006 the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq called on Iraqi WMD experts to join the fight by developing and testing biological weapons: “We are in dire need of you. The field of Jihad can satisfy your scientific ambitions and the large American bases are good places to test your unconventional weapons.”[12] It would have been a great risk to leave WMD experts without direction or financial support in that environment.

Different Environment in Iraq

The goals for redirection in the former Soviet Union and Iraq were the same: to prevent the proliferation of WMD expertise from stranded WMD scientists and engineers and to shift them to civilian work. The environment, however, was completely different. In the former Soviet states, the physical infrastructure for WMD research, development, and production remained intact, providing experts with places to work if the facilities and personnel could be transitioned to peaceful research activities. In Iraq, the chaotic looting of 2003 destroyed the physical infrastructure of most of the MIC, along with much of the rest of the country’s economic infrastructure. The thoroughness of the destruction was astonishing. Equipment was stolen or vandalized beyond repair; furniture was stolen; light fixtures, doors, windows, and even electrical wiring were ripped from the walls. Government research facilities, MIC factories, and even university laboratories all met similar fates. If Iraqi WMD experts were to be employed in civilian work, their places of work would have to be rebuilt, almost from scratch.

The same story can be told for bureaucratic infrastructure. The central government of the Soviet Union fell, but the rest of the command structure remained in place. Most of the hierarchy of technicians and assistants, senior scientists, project managers, and executive directors of the WMD facilities remained on duty, awaiting direction (and pay). Those in leadership positions had little to fear and much to gain from cooperation with the Americans. In contrast, the entire bureaucratic hierarchy in Iraq was shattered; initially, no one was in charge. Many Iraqi WMD experts were unemployed, financially insecure, and frightened. Many wondered if U.S. redirection officials were there to help them or imprison them. Working with the Americans only raised their profile with the insurgents, and indeed, some were threatened and even killed.[13]

Finally, simply identifying WMD experts was far more difficult in Iraq. The Iraqi government had engaged in a shell game with its WMD experts for years prior to the invasion. To comply with UN mandates, the government established the National Monitoring Directorate, which created a list of approximately 500 WMD experts and provided it to UN inspectors. This list was both incomplete and padded with non-WMD personnel.[14] Even Iraqi officials probably did not have a complete list of names, let alone contact information.

Starting the Program in Iraq

Planning for redirection in Iraq began in earnest in 2003, led by the deputy director of the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction (now called the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction). After intense interagency discussions, it was agreed that the effort to find new employment for Iraqi scientists and engineers would focus less on scientific research and more on jobs that contributed to rebuilding Iraq. By December 2003, the State Department had approval for its plans, $2 million in immediate funding, and indications that another $20 million in follow-up funding was likely.[15] In January 2004, the deputy director and two U.S. scientists traveled to Baghdad to set up the IraqiInternationalCenter for Science and Industry. Loosely modeled on the International Science and TechnologyCenters in Russia and Ukraine, the science center was to be the vehicle for engaging Iraqi scientists with previous ties to WMD programs and redirecting their expertise to peaceful work. Given the poor state of Iraqi infrastructure, it was hoped that Iraqis participating in the redirection program would support reconstruction goals. Reducing the potential for proliferation by getting some of Iraq’s best minds involved in rebuilding their country seemed to be a win for all participating parties.

U.S. redirection officials operating in Baghdad faced many challenges. They arrived in Baghdad without a field office, and they knew little about Iraq’s scientific community and the identities of those who had previously worked in WMD programs. Neither the U.S. Department of Defense nor the CPA (which functioned as a division of that department) had much enthusiasm for the State Department’s redirection program. Their cooperation with the redirection officials was limited, with the exception of extraordinary support from a few individuals. Infrastructure associated with Iraq’s banking sector was essentially nonexistent; simply moving funds into the country was a difficult, time-consuming task.

Despite these challenges, by the time the CPA transferred authority to the Iraqi Transitional Government in June 2004, redirection officials had established the science center office outside the heavily guarded Green Zone and hired an Iraqi staff, including a senior MIC administrator. About a dozen of Iraq’s most senior scientists, most with WMD connections, formed an advisory committee to recruit and vet new members for the center and review their proposals. The former head of the monitoring directorate, who had extensive knowledge of Iraq’s WMD personnel, was recruited to join the center. An additional 40 WMD experts were recruited, vetted, and accepted as members.

Members of the center received a stipend and were encouraged to develop proposals using their technical expertise for civilian development. Early expectations were that $37.5 million from the Development Fund for Iraq (formerly the Oil for Food program) would be made available to fund the best proposals, serving as Iraq’s contribution to redirection. It was hoped that these scientists would be able to establish businesses and hire additional personnel with previous ties to WMD programs. Some proposals were very large, such as restarting pesticide factories or establishing water treatment plants. Others were relatively small, such as rehabilitating a materials research laboratory at an Iraqi university.

The first executive director of the center (one of the authors of this paper) arrived in August 2004. He and his staff began a series of workshops to help members update their basic skills (for example, most of them were unfamiliar with the Internet, and very few had experience in writing proposals) and expand their networks to search for employment opportunities. Over the next year, membership grew beyond 120. With assistance from the director, two dozen members were hired by Iraqi ministries for their technical skills, and a few were hired by Iraqi universities.

The majority of the members, however, remained unemployed. The $37.5 million from the development fund never materialized, nor did the $20 million in follow-on funding from the U.S. government. Therefore, none of the large-scale proposals could be funded, which strained the members’ trust in the program. The insurgency grew rapidly during that year, increasing the sense of danger felt by members and limiting the U.S. staff’s mobility. Many members were too frightened to pursue government or private work, preferring to remain as inconspicuous as possible, supported by their stipend from the center. The redirection program held on as well as it could over the next few years as security deteriorated.

More recently, the Iraqi redirection program has evolved and greatly improved. The science center has been phased out, along with the stipends. The Iraqi Scientist Engagement Program has taken its place. In 2009 it began expanding to include many more scientists and engineers, with more opportunities for research grants and fellowships, but five years is a very long time for WMD experts to wait for a program to assist them. Delays in securing WMD expertise can be more dangerous than comparable delays in securing WMD materials. Materials do not get impatient or disillusioned, nor do they worry about providing for their families.

Lessons Learned

The experience in Iraq demonstrates that in setting up future redirection programs, the overriding concerns should be to make them more agile, flexible, and easy to establish on short notice and to do so as inexpensively as possible. Despite White House plans to request more CTR funding, recent budget battles make it clear that all discretionary programs will have to be very lean.

Specific lessons to address these concerns emerge from the Iraqi experience:

Establish a Reserve Team. For most of the first year of operations, the redirection program in Iraq was run by only one staff member, located at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad with supervisory and support staff in Washington. In addition to his responsibilities with the redirection program, this person also carried out other duties for the U.S. mission in Iraq. As the critical objective at that time was to establish good relations with the WMD experts and relevant Iraqi government officials, the lack of staff hampered the program at its outset. It takes time to make these connections, especially in cultures where trust is established only through personal contact. Unfortunately, the tasks of getting the WMD experts paid when the banking system was not yet functional, securing the science center, and maintaining basic logistical support were at least a full-time job.

In the first six months of the program, there was an unplanned staffing gap of two months, where initial staff had departed and the new executive director had yet to arrive. During the gap, relationships cooled, program information and materials were lost, and the confidence of the Iraqi WMD experts waned. The gap occurred because CTR officials simply did not have the staff necessary to run the program; staff and financial resources then were stretched further by the unexpected, urgent start-up of a similar redirection program in Libya. Key staff members had to be recruited. Recruitment, vetting, and security clearances take time, extending the time WMD experts are left stranded and exposed. Future redirection programs are likely to face similar delays and hindrances unless the responsible offices have more staff to deploy.

Admittedly, maintaining additional staff with appropriate scientific backgrounds for potential future needs can be expensive. There are ways to minimize the costs, notably by recruiting and maintaining a core cadre of reserve staff for redirection. The cadre should be composed of respected scientists who are fully employed elsewhere (academia, the private sector, or the Energy Department and other U.S. government agencies), but are ready to take temporary leave when called up. CTR personnel should meet quarterly with the reserve staff to guide their study of current and potential redirection missions and familiarize them with the necessary bureaucratic and administrative procedures. Because the goal is to prepare a reserve staff for unplanned contingencies, such efforts should commence immediately. People from unexpected occupations are willing to take on such duties if they are made aware of the need.[16]

Establish a Reserve Budget. Discretionary money spent by the U.S. government usually is restricted to specific fiscal years. Under the best scenarios, it takes at least 18 to 24 months from the time an agency submits a formal request for additional funds to the time it can begin spending those funds. This was true even for requests for additional funding for development and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.[17]

Recognizing that two years is too long to wait to deal with orphaned WMD materials, the U.S. Congress created the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). This fund’s mandate is to spend money on unanticipated, urgent nonproliferation and disarmament needs. It therefore has “no-year” money (meaning that the money can be held in reserve and does not have to be spent in a given fiscal year) and broad “notwithstanding” authority to spend money in places where U.S. law otherwise bans U.S. assistance. (It can be applied notwithstanding these other restrictions. For example, money could be spent from the NDF to assist a country in destroying missiles, even if that country does not meet U.S. human rights requirements for financial aid.) The initial funding for the Iraq redirection effort came from the NDF, based on the urgent, unanticipated nature of the project.

Nevertheless, redirection is a poor fit for the NDF, which is designed to deal with short-term projects that produce immediate, tangible results. The archetypal NDF project is the discovery of nuclear materials in an abandoned military warehouse in a poor country, with the country agreeing to have the U.S. remove the materials.[18] The NDF is designed to provide the funds to hire teams with appropriate training and logistical support to remove those materials as rapidly as possible. Redirection efforts are necessarily long term and fundamentally less tangible.

Nevertheless, redirection efforts may be needed on similarly short notice. If a central government falls, the WMD experts lose their supervision and support immediately. Efforts to safeguard dangerous WMD expertise should not be delayed for the months or years normally required to secure funding.

Therefore, redirection should have a separate budget with no-year money and notwithstanding authority. It would differ from the NDF in providing initial funding for long-term projects. Projects funded from this redirection budget then should transition within three years to the normal congressional budget process and scrutiny.

Designate a Leader for Redirection Programs. Historically, redirection was led by the State Department, although other departments have had redirection programs. In Iraq, by the end of 2003, several redirection programs were proposed, discussed, and in various stages of implementation. These programs were not well coordinated with one another. In addition to the State Department’s program (started with $2 million in emergency funding from the NDF), the Energy Department initiated a program to engage Iraqi scientists, and the Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State had another program. The Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), a U.S.-based nonprofit, reportedly was starting another program out of its own internal funds. As noted above, the CPA had budgeted $37.5 million; that money was for the incoming Iraqi government to spend on retention and redirection of the WMD scientists through the creation of the Iraqi Nonproliferation Programs Foundation (INPF). The CPA budget for Iraq listed additional funds for other programs to retain and redirect Iraqi WMD experts and indicated follow-on funding of $20 million per year for 2005 and 2006.[19] It was reported in the media at the time that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had asked or would be asking for $20 million to continue funding the redirection program.[20] The general perception at the time was that the U.S. redirection effort was well funded.

The reality was very different. The effort to allocate the $37.5 million to the INPF or any other redirection program failed. The Energy Department did implement its program eventually, but it took years to start and was criticized by some for spending too much of its money in the United States instead of on Iraqi experts in Iraq.[21] The CRDF began to play its vital role in redirecting Iraqi experts in 2004, but the money for the group’s activities came from the State Department’s initial $2 million emergency fund. There was no new funding for the Iraq redirection program in the White House budget requests to Congress for the first few years, in part because of the mistaken impression that the program was well funded from the above-named sources. The number of different programs with overlapping goals contributed to the confusion.

Therefore, one office should be clearly designated as the leader for all U.S. WMD redirection activities, with sufficient authority to coordinate programs across departments. If there had been one lead office that spoke for redirection in Iraq (including budget requests), confusion could have been minimized. Similar problems have been reported for the entire CTR program, and plans for CTR 2.0 call for consolidating leadership of the U.S. CTR effort under one senior official with an office in the White House or a seat on the National Security Council or both.[22] The leader for redirection should report to the overall leader of CTR programs.

Looking Forward

Some may argue that the lessons from redirection in Iraq are not applicable to future CTR programs because the situation was unique. Only a few months ago, most analysts would have said that the United States and its allies are unlikely to use military force to bring about regime change in the foreseeable future. Yet, at this writing, NATO is bombing government assets in the capital of Libya. Governments in Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria face great internal challenges; clearly, fundamental change can unfold quickly and unpredictably. Any of these countries could see the rise of a new government that is open to redirection even while armed opposition to the new government continues.

One can argue that redirection should not be attempted in places where active insurgencies or other instabilities place personnel at risk and hamper operations. Yet, the very circumstances that create risks for redirection staff also increase the risks of native WMD experts being threatened or co-opted by bad actors. Unfortunately, many of the likely scenarios in which redirection will be most needed are the very ones in which it will be most difficult.

The changes recommended in this article also can be used to address the long-term challenges that come with redirection programs. It may take years to train WMD experts in new skills, and they possibly could be co-opted or coerced into returning to their previous weapons work, even years later. Therefore, in most cases these programs will need to be sustained for many years. The redirection programs in the former Soviet Union and Iraq have been criticized for failing to have clear exit plans or for assuming full government funding in perpetuity.

One of the functions of the reserve team should be to develop strategies for long-term sustainability or exit plans. The hope in Iraq and Soviet redirection has been that the experts find employment in the private sector, contributing to the reconstruction and development of their countries. The reserve team should recruit successful members of the private sector from the United States and, if possible, current and expatriate citizens of the target countries. The team should be charged with developing recommendations for the long-term sustainability of redirection plans, such as tax incentives for private sector investment businesses that make use of former WMD experts.

Seize the Moment

Although this is a difficult time to ask for more resources for any government program, the timing may be favorable for U.S. redirection programs. While he was a senator, Obama became well versed in the dangers of WMD proliferation, working closely with Lugar to master the issues. His plan to secure all loose nuclear materials within four years demonstrates his commitment to fighting WMD proliferation. In this same time frame, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has called for more funding and more staff for the State Department, even while warning his staff that the Defense Department cannot continue on its recent trajectory of growth. This level of interdepartmental support is extraordinary. Coupled with Obama’s commitment to nonproliferation goals and the calls for updating nonproliferation programs into CTR 2.0, this interdepartmental cooperation opens a unique opportunity to garner the modest increases in support necessary for the United States to expand its redirection and scientist engagement programs. If one accepts the premise that human expertise in WMD science and technology is as dangerous in the long run as WMD materials, then the U.S. government needs to improve its capacity for securing WMD expertise. As the United States updates and expands its nonproliferation programs into CTR 2.0, it should consider these recommendations to allow for rapid establishment of effective redirection programs anywhere the needs and opportunities arise.


Peter D. Smallwood is an associate professor of biology at the University of Richmond. From 2004 to 2005, he served as executive director of the redirection program for Iraqi scientists and engineers who had been working in programs to produce weapons of mass destruction. William T. Liimatainen was a 2009 Department of Defense research fellow who studied post-2003 events in Iraq as they related to the country’s Military Industrialization Commission. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the U.S. government or any of its agencies.


1. Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Public Law 228, 102nd Cong., 1st sess. (November 27, 1991).

2. Bonnie Jenkins, “Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Historical Perspective,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2011.

3. Nunn-Lugar Scorecard:

4. James E. Goodby et al., “Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, September 2004; Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration,” GAO-05-157, January 2005; Robert A. Robinson, “DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist in Russia and Other Countries,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, January 2008.

5. NationalAcademy of Sciences (NAS), “Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction,” 2009.

6. Kenneth N. Luongo, “Loose Nukes in New Neighborhoods: The Next Generation of Proliferation Prevention,” Arms Control Today, May 2009; Bonnie Jenkins, “Adapting to the Times: The Evolution of U.S. Threat Reduction Programs,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2011.

7. Brian D. Finlay, Elizabeth Turpen, and Frederick Kellert, “Manufacturing Possibility: Expanding Resources to Meet Global Challenges, Promote Economic Development, Support Innovation, and Prevent Proliferation,” StimsonCenter, April 2008.

8. Goodby et al., “Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era.”

9. For information on Iraq’s WMD program, the role of the MIC, and the value of Iraqi WMD experts, see “The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” September 30, 2004. The report is often known as the Duelfer report, and the group that prepared it is known as the Iraq Survey Group.

10. Texts of the Orders of the Coalition Provisional Authority,

11. David E. Mosher and John V. Parachini, “Rereading the Duelfer Report,” International Herald Tribune, November 15, 2004,

12. John Gibson, “Al Qaeda Leader Calls for Scientists,” Fox News, September 28, 2006.

13. David Kay, “Statement on the Interim Progress Report of the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” October 2, 2003; Sammy Salama and Cameron Hunter, “Iraq’s WMD Scientists in the Crossfire,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 2006.

14. UN News Center, “Iraq Gives UN List of Scientists Involved in Producing Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 28, 2002.

15. Richard Boucher, “Redirection of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Experts,” December 18, 2003, (U.S. Department of State press statement); Richard Stone, “Nonproliferation: New Initiatives Reach Out to Iraq’s Scientific Elite,” Science, March 12, 2004, p. 1594.

16. Edward W. Lempinen, ed., “AAAS S&T Policy Fellows Risk Their Lives to Rebuild Iraq,” Science, August 26, 2005, p. 1336.

17. Ronald E. Neumann, The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009).

18. Philipp C. Bleek, “Project Vinca: Lessons for Securing Civil Nuclear Material Stockpiles,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2003, pp. 1-23.

19. Michael Roston, “Redirection of WMD Scientists in Iraq and Libya: A Status Report,” RANSAC Policy Update, April 2004.

20. Christina Asquith, “A $20 Million Carrot to Keep WMD Scientists in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, December 22, 2003.

21. Robinson, “DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist in Russia and Other Countries.”

22. GAO, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Program to Assist Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed,” GAO-08-189, December 2007; NAS, “Global Security Engagement.”