Editor's Note

As director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei has the unenviable position of serving simultaneously in several, often conflicting roles: an investigator tracking down nuclear cheats; a diplomat trying to preserve peace among IAEA member states; and a booster aiming to promote the nuclear industry. Given that he is dealing with some of the world’s most sensitive issues, it is not surprising that not everybody is pleased with his performance.

In a new Arms Control Today interview, ElBaradei provides his views on ways to strengthen the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The Egyptian diplomat, who this year is seeking a third term as director-general of the Vienna-based IAEA over opposition from the United States, is a central figure in the ongoing effort to contain Iran’s nuclear program and the renewed debate about how to establish new limits on dual-use nuclear technology.

The interview is part of our third installment in a continuing series of articles examining the challenges confronting the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the run-up to the seventh NPT Review Conference in May.

Leonard Weiss addresses the proliferation challenges posed by the black market nuclear network created by Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan. He details how decisions by the United States and other Western countries led them to prioritize other foreign policy goals ahead of nonproliferation, allowing Khan to obtain nuclear technology for Pakistan and then distribute it to other countries, including Iran and Libya. Weiss argues that the Bush administration is making the same mistake now: by placing too much priority on winning Pakistan’s cooperation in the hunt for al Qaeda, it has compromised its ability to investigate and dismantle Khan’s network.

David Cortright and George A. Lopez examine what tools can be used most effectively to reinforce nonproliferation rules and standards. They note that the Bush administration has largely relied on two coercive instruments—force and sanctions—to threaten or punish countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. But they argue that positive incentives are often more effective in changing a country’s proliferation behavior, especially when they are coupled with the threat of sanctions.

The debate over whether the arms control and nonproliferation systems can be adapted to meet today’s new security challenges has been particularly fierce in the last decade. John Steinbruner reviews a new book, The Future of Arms Control, which seeks to assess how arms control can be adapted to work in the current political climate. Our news section also includes special coverage on President George W. Bush’s federal budget request, with particular attention paid to missile defense, nuclear weapons funding, and programs to safeguard or destroy dangerous weapons overseas.