Editor's Note

When it comes to arms control, things are not always what they appear at first blush.

Many observers were heartened this summer when one of President George W. Bush’s top nuclear aides announced plans to cut the nuclear stockpile “almost in half” by 2012. But there is less to the announcement than meets the eye. As Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen spell out in this month’s cover story, the cuts in some ways do not represent a significant improvement over those proposed by the Clinton administration seven years ago, even though the threat of a nuclear confrontation with Russia has receded further. Norris and Kristensen argue that these plans could in truth pave the way for a new nuclear arsenal.

Similarly, few Americans would quarrel with the need to defend the country better against the threat that terrorists might get their hands on biological weapons. Politicians certainly see the need—funds for biodefense activities have grown 30-fold since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Yet, as Jonathan Tucker points out, the way that the Bush administration is structuring one biodefense program—biological threat assessment—could actually make it more likely that terrorists could threaten the United States with novel biological agents for which there are no vaccines or other defenses.

Victor Zaborsky notes that it was once laughable to think that China might join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). After all, China was regularly sanctioned by the U.S. government for carrying out such trade. But Zaborsky says that China has been making strides in controlling its exports and the United States and other members are more likely to see further progress by letting China join the MTCR, rather than keeping it out.

Readers have always been able to count on Arms Control Today’s news reports to get the real story. This month’s issue is no exception: Wade Boese summarizes the views of Bush and Senator John Kerry on arms control issues. Paul Kerr delves into recent concerns about Iran’s and South Korea’s nuclear programs.

In another installment of our new “Looking Back ” section, Damien LaVera examines a low point in the decades-long effort to secure a permanent nuclear test ban: the U.S. Senate’s October 1999 rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Yet, even here, there is more to the story. As I note in an article from Vienna this issue, even without the entry into force of the treaty, the preparatory commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is developing an infrastructure that can keep tabs on potential nuclear tests anywhere in the world.