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"ACA's journal, Arms Control Today, remains the best in the market. Well focused. Solidly researched. Prudent."

– Hans Blix
Former IAEA Director-General
Global Missile Proliferation: June 2001

Twenty-eight states besides the five de jure nuclear-weapon states possess ballistic missiles.  However, fewer than 10 have the capability to indigenously develop or maintain their missiles, and only five—India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea—have produced or flight-tested missiles with ranges over 1,000 kilometers. The majority of other states with ballistic missiles possess short-range Scuds or SS-21s inherited or purchased from the Soviet Union. According to the CIA, Russia, China, and North Korea are the largest suppliers of ballistic missile-related goods, technology, and expertise.

 

The North Korean and Iranian missile programs are frequently cited as being of concern to the United States and as the rationale for the development of a U.S. national missile defense. Iran most recently tested a variant of the Shahab-3 in September 2000 and continues to develop its medium-range missiles. North Korea flight-tested a 2,000-kilometer-range Taepo Dong-1 in August 1998 but has pledged not to conduct any further flight tests while negotiating with the United States on ending its missile program and exports.


For more information, contact Alex Wagner

COUNTRY SYSTEM STATUS RANGE/PAYLOAD1 SOURCE2
Afghanistan Scud-B Operational 300 km/1,000 kg USSR
Armenia Scud-B Operational 300 km/1,000 kg Russia
Azerbaijan Scud-B Operational 300 km/1,000 kg USSR
Bahrain ATACMS To Be Delivered 8/2002  165 km/560 kg USA
Belarus SS-21
Scud-B
Operational
Operational
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
USSR
USSR
Bulgaria3 Scud-B
SS-23
Operational
Operational
300 km/1,000 kg
500 km/ 450 kg
USSR
USSR
Egypt Scud-B
Project-T
Scud-C
Vector
Operational
Operational
Operational
Development
300 km/1,000 kg
450 km/985 kg
550 km/600 kg
685 km/450 kg
USSR
Domestic/DPRK
DPRK
Domestic/DPRK
Georgia Scud-B Operational 300 km/1,000 kg USSR
Greece ATACMS Operational 165 km/560 kg USA
India4 Prithvi-1
Prithvi-2
Dhanush
Sagarika (SLCM?)
Agni-1
Agni-2
Agni-3
Surya
Operational
Operational
Tested/Development
Development
Prototype Only
Serial Production?
Development
Development
150 km/1,000 kg
250 km/500 kg
350 km/1,000 kg
350 km/500 kg
1,500 km/1,000 kg
2,000 km/1,000 kg
3,000-5,500 km/? kg
5,500+ km/2,000 kg
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Domestic/Russia
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Domestic/Russia
Iran Mushak-120
CSS-8
Mushak-160
Scud-B
Scud-C
Shahab-3
Shahab-4
Shahab-5
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Tested/Development
Development
Concept Stage
130 km/150 kg
150 km/190 kg
160 km/~500 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
550 km/600 kg
1,300 km/700 kg
2,000 km/1,000 kg
3,000-5,500 km/1,000 kg
Domestic/China
China
Domestic/China
Libya/DPRK
DPRK
Domestic/DPRK/Russia
Domestic/DPRK/Russia
Domestic/Russia
Iraq5 Ababil-100
Al Samoud
Scud-B
Al Hussein
Al Abbas
Development
Tested/Development
Destroyed
Destroyed
Destroyed
100-150 km/300 kg
150 km/300 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
600-650 km/500 kg
900 km/300 kg
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
USSR
Domestic/USSR
Domestic/USSR
Israel Lance
Jericho-1
Jericho-2
Jericho-3
Operational
Operational
Operational
Development
130 km/450 kg
500 km/500 kg
1,500 km/1,000 kg
2,500 km/1,000 kg
USA
Domestic/France
Domestic/France
Domestic
Kazakhstan Tochka-U (SS-21) Operational 120 km/480 kg USSR
Libya Al Fatah
Scud-B
Scud-C
Nodong-1
Tested/Development
Operational
Potential Acquisition
Potential Acquisition
200 km/500 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
550 km/600 kg
1,300 km/750 kg
Domestic Production
USSR
DPRK
DPRK
North Korea (DPRK) Scud-B
Scud-C variant
Nodong-1
Nodong-2
Taepo Dong-1
Taepo Dong-2
Operational
Operational
Operational
Development
Tested/Development
Development
300 km/1,000 kg
550 km/700 kg
1,300 km/750 kg
1,500 km/770 kg
2,000 km/1,000 kg
5,000-6,000 km/1,000 kg
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Domestic Production
Pakistan Hatf-1
M-11
Hatf-2
Hatf-3
(M-11 Derivative)
Tarmuk
(M-11 Derivative)
Shaheen-1
Ghauri-1
Shaheen-2
Ghaznavi
Ghauri-2
Operational
Operational
Program Canceled?
Development
 
Development
 
Tested/Development
Tested/Development
Development
Development
Tested/Development
80-100 km/500 kg
280 km/800 kg
300 km/500 kg
300 km/500 kg
 
300 km/800 kg
 
750 km/500 kg
1,300+ km/700 kg
2,000 km/? kg
2,000 km/? kg
2,300 km/700 kg
Domestic Production
China
Domestic/China
Domestic/China
 
Domestic/China
 
Domestic/China
Domestic/DPRK
Domestic/DPRK
Domestic Production
Domestic/DPRK
Saudi Arabia CSS-2 Operational 2,800 km/2,150 kg China
Slovakia SS-21
Scud-B
Operational
Operational
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
USSR
USSR
South Korea ATACMS
NHK-1
NHK-2
Operational
Operational
Not Yet Deployed
165 km/560 kg
180 km/500 kg
260 km/450 kg
USA
USA
USA
Syria SS-21
Scud-B
Scud-C
Scud-D
Operational
Operational
Operational
Tested/Development
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
500 km/600 kg
750 km/200 kg
USSR
Domestic/USSR
Domestic/DPRK
Domestic/DPRK
Taiwan Ching Feng
Tien Chi
Operational
Development
130 km/270 kg
300 km/500 kg
Domestic/USA/Israel?
Domestic Production
Turkey ATACMS Operational 165 km/560 kg USA
Turkmenistan Scud-B Operational 300 km/1,000 kg USSR
Ukraine SS-21
Scud-B
Operational
Operational
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
USSR
USSR
United Arab Emirates Scud-B Operational 300 km/1,000 kg USSR
Vietnam Scud-B Operational 300 km/1,000 kg USSR
Yemen SS-21
Scud-B
Operational
Operational
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
USSR
USSR


Missile Ranges
SRBM Short-range ballistic missile (<1,000 km)
MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile (1,000-3,000 km)
IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile (3,000-5,500 km)
ICBM Intercontinetal ballistic missile (5,500+ km)



1. The ranges and payloads, given in kilometers (km) and kilograms (kg), respectively, are estimates based on unclassified sources. However, these numbers do not reflect either the missiles’ maximum range or their heaviest possible payload. Equipping a missile with a lighter payload would increase its range, and likewise a heavier payload would decrease it.

2. Eight states formerly part of or allied with the Soviet Union retain the Soviet SS-21 and Scud-B missiles. Additionally, according to the CIA, Russian and Chinese technological and material support remains critical to any continued development of Iranian and Pakistani missile programs. A February 2001 CIA report notes that “despite overall improvements” in curtailing missile assistance, Russian entities continue to “supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya.” The report says that Russia’s assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile program is “substantial,” particularly in accelerating Iranian development of the Shahab-3. Although China has pledged to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime’s prohibition on the transfer of complete missile systems, the CIA contends that continued Chinese assistance is critical to both Pakistan’s rapid movement toward serial production of solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and development of the two-stage Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile.

3. Bulgaria is believed to retain eight SS-23 intermediate-range missiles. According to Ambassador Steven Steiner, U.S. representative to the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission, the U.S. government has determined that the Soviet Union “negotiated in bad faith” by failing to notify the United States of the transfer of the missiles to Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia at the time of the treaty’s negotiation. As a result, those missiles were not accounted for in the treaty’s prohibitions. Steiner said that the United States has been engaging Bulgaria—which possesses the last remaining SS-23s in Europe—in discussions aimed at dismantling the missiles and that he is “optimistic” that they will “eventually” be eliminated.

4. The status of India’s Agni-2 remains unclear. The Indian Foreign Ministry announced that the Agni-2 had reached its “final operational configuration” after its apparently successful test in January 2001. Indian press reports also cite Indian officials claiming that the missile is ready to enter “serial production” and will be “inducted” in 2001 into India’s arsenal.

5. Iraq’s missiles with ranges in excess of 150 kilometers, as well as Iraq ’s capability to develop and produce them, were to be destroyed as part of the settlement that ended the Persian Gulf War. In December 1992, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) claimed to have destroyed all of Iraq’s proscribed ballistic missiles as well as items related to their production and development. However, in October 1996, UNSCOM admitted that “in the missile area, Iraq has still not fully accounted for all proscribed weapons, items, and capabilities.” In a 2001 report, the Department of Defense notes, “Iraq likely retains a limited number of launchers and Scud-variant SRBMs…as well as the components and manufacturing means to assemble and produce others [in anticipation of] the reestablishment of a long-range ballistic missile force.”

 


 

Sources:

 

Central Intelligence Agency,
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 20 June 2000,
February 2001;

Department of Defense,
Proliferation: Threat and Response,
January 2001;

National Air Intelligence Center:
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,
September 2000;

Arms Control Association; International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance: 2000-2001;

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nonproliferation Project:
World Missile Chart;

Federation of American Scientists.