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– Frank von Hippel
Co-Director of Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
June 1, 2018
Negotiations on North Korean High-Level Visit End Without Resolution
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Matthew Rice


IN THE FIRST TRIP CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS to hammer out details for a high-level North Korean visit to Washington and to address U.S. concerns about Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, delegations led by U.S. Ambassador Charles Kartman and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan met in New York from March 7 to 15. This third round of talks, which built on previous negotiations in Berlin in November and January, ended without details on a future visit having been settled but with a commitment from North Korea to schedule further discussions on the topic.

That no date was set for the visit came as a disappointment after a senior State Department official expressed optimism March 3 for a positive conclusion to the talks and anticipated the arrival of a North Korean official in "about a month." The official said that the major issues remaining to be resolved include minor scheduling issues and the crafting of a U.S.-North Korean joint statement detailing progress in the bilateral relationship. With further meetings needed but not yet scheduled, the visit is likely to be pushed back. Kim officially accepted the U.S. invitation for a high-level Washington visit in January.

During the talks, Ambassador Michael Sheehan, State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, met with his North Korean counterpart to discuss measures necessary for the removal of North Korea from the State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism, which includes, among others, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. According to a senior State Department official, in order to be removed from the list, Pyongyang must take several steps, including expelling members of the Japanese Red Army from North Korea and issuing a strong public statement condemning acts of terror worldwide.

While the State Department remained confident that the North Korean government will go through with the visit, Chu Chang Jun, the North Korean ambassador to China, claimed that removal from the terrorist list was a precondition to a high-level visit. "We cannot visit the United States with the cap of a terrorist," he said March 28.

The North Korean delegation also confirmed its agreement to a second U.S. visit to Kumchang-ni, the site of suspected nuclear weapons-related activities, in May. U.S. officials first inspected the site in May 1999 and found no evidence of nuclear activity or that North Korea had violated the 1994 Agreed Framework. (See ACT, April/May 1999.)

 

Agreed Framework Funding

U.S. funding of the Agreed Framework remained on track when, on February 24, President Clinton exercised his waiver authority to authorize the disbursement of $15 million to support the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization's delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.

Congress requires that the president make several certifications before funds may be released to the organization: that North Korea remains in compliance with the Agreed Framework; that implementation of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is progressing; that steps have been taken to increase dialogue between North and South Korea; that North Korea has not diverted U.S. assistance (food or fuel oil) to military purposes; and that North Korea is not seeking to produce fissile material.

Clinton certified the first three conditions but waived the last two, deeming it "vital to the national security interests of the United States." Asked why the president could not certify the other conditions, Wendy Sherman, counselor to the Department of State, testified March 16 before the House International Relations Committee that the administration believed that North Korea might be diverting small amounts of U.S. assistance. Concerning the production of fissile material, she said, "The way that that certification is written, it goes to the intention of North Korea. And to tell you quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, having sat across from North Koreans, it's very hard to conceive of what their intentions are."