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"...the Arms Control Association [does] so much to keep the focus on the issues so important to everyone here, to hold our leaders accountable to inspire creative thinking and to press for change. So we are grateful for your leadership and for the unyielding dedication to global nuclear security."

– Lord Des Browne
Vice Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative
October 20, 2014
How a Limited National Missile Defense Would Impact the ABM Treaty

Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis

Preliminary Architecture for C-1/C-2/C-3 NMD Systems

  C-1 Configuration1 C-2 Configuration2 C-3 Configuration3
Number of Interceptors Deployed in Alaska 20-100 100 125
Number of Interceptors Deployed in North Dakota 0 0 125
Upgraded Early-Warning Radars Beale (CA); Clear (AK); Cape Cod (MA); Fylingdales (England); Thule (Greenland) Beale; Clear; Cape Cod; Fylingdales; Thule Beale; Clear; Cape Cod; Fylingdales; Thule; South Korea
X-Band Radars Shemya (Aleutians, AK) Shemya; Clear; Fylingdales; Thule Shemya; Beale; Clear; Cape Cod; Fylingdales; Thule; South Korea; Grand Forks (ND); Hawaii
SBIRS-Low? No Yes Yes

Source: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

1. C-1 (capability-1) system is defined as defense against a "few, simple" warheads, where "few" referes to five or fewer warheads.

2. C-2 (capability-2) system is defined as defense against a "few, complex" warheads.

3. C-3 (capability-3) system is defined as defense against "many, complex" warheads.