NOTES
1. William J. Perry and John P. Abizaid, U.S. Institute of Peace, “Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future,” July 31, 2014, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR_0.pdf.
2. Tom Z. Collina, “White House Reviewing Nuclear Budget,” Arms Control Today, September 2014, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/News/White-House-Reviewing-Nuclear-Budget%20.
3. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, Sept. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/us-ramping-up-major-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html
4. The $355 billion estimate includes strategic delivery systems and nuclear warheads as well as command, control, communications, and early-warning systems. It does not include environmental, arms control, nonproliferation or missile defense costs, which would add $215 billion to the total. Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023,” December 2013, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/12-19-2013-NuclearForces.pdf. For the estimate of $1 trillion, see Wolfsthal, Lewis, and Quint, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad,” January 2014. http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/140107_trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad.pdf
5. Todd Harrison, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, “Analysis of the FY 2015 Defense Budget,” September 2014, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2014/09/analysis-of-the-fy2015-defense-budget/
6. Department of State, “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” Fact Sheet, April 29, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225555.pdf.
7. Department of State, Op. Cit.
8. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2014, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/1/85.full.pdf+html.
9. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance,”New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Fact Sheet, October 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/232561.pdf.
10. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013,” http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.
11. Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” July 31, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf.
12. U.S. Navy, “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2014,” http://projects.militarytimes.com/pdfs/USN-Plan-FY2014.pdf
13. CRS, Op. Cit.
14. Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan,” October 2013, pp. 23-24, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44655-Shipbuilding.pdf.
15. Christopher Castelli, “New Nuclear Subs Will Cost $347 Billion to Acquire, Operate,” defensenewsstand.com, February 16, 2011.
16. Tom Z. Collina, “Nuclear Sub Costs Complicate Navy Plans,” Arms Control Today, June 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5796.
17. U.S. Navy, “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2015,” pp. 6-7, http://www.scribd.com/doc/232915975/FY2015-30yr-Shipbuilding-Plan.
18. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Kendall: Budget Gimmicks Won’t Fix Nuclear Deterrent,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2014, http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/kendall-budget-gimmicks-wont-fix-nuclear-deterrent/
19. Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2014 to 2023,” November 2013, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44715-OptionsForReducingDeficit-3.pdf.
20. Colin Clark, “OMB Plan to Slice SSBN-X Won’t Save Dough, DoD Says,” Breaking Defense, November 16, 2011, http://breakingdefense.com/2011/11/omb-plan-to-slice-ssbn-x-fleet-wont-save-dough-dod-says/.
21. Adm. Richard Breckinridge, Director of Undersea Warfare, remarks before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower, September 12, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20130912/101281/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-BreckenridgeR-20130912.pdf
22. Tom Z. Collina, “Pentagon Considers New Nuclear Cuts,” Arms Control Today, December 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_12/Pentagon_Considers_New_Nuclear_Cuts.
23. Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, “Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” July 18, 2005, http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/trident_conversion.htm5.
24. CBO, November 2013, Op Cit. pp. 72.
25. Statement of General C.R. Kehler, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before the House Armed Services Committee, March 5, 2013, www.stratcom.mil/files/2013-03-05-posture.pdf.
26. Stew Magnuson, “Budget Pressures Seen as Biggest Risk to Long Range Bomber Program,” National Defense Magazine, September 2013, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/September/pages/ BudgetPressures SeenasBiggestRisktoLongRangeBomberProgram.aspx.
27. United States Air Force, “Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2014-2043,” May 2013, http://breakingdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/06/DoD-Aircraft-Report-to-Congress-.pdf.
28. This number assumes that 100 percent of the B52H and the LRSB are attributed to the nuclear mission. CBO, December 2013, Op. Cit. pp. 13.
29. CBO, November 2013, Op. Cit. pp. 72.
30. Office of Management and Budget, “Terminations, Reductions, and Savings: FY2010 U.S. Budget,” March 24 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/trs.pdf.
31. Gabe Sarosta, “Long-Range Standoff Missile Development Pushed Back By Three Years,” Insidedefense.com, September 14, 2014.
32. Gen. Martin A. Dempsy (USA), FY15 Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 5, 2014, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wilson_03-05-14.pdf
33. Department of Defense, “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States,” June 12, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf.
34. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” report, July 11, 2013, http://www.afisr.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130710-054.pdf
35. Steven Miller, Steven Ho, Department of Defense, “CAPE Independent Cost Assessment B61 LEP,” July 13, 2012, http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/CAPE-ICA-for-B61-LEP-July-2012.pdf.
36. Department of Energy, “Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan FY2014,” June 2013, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/06-13-inlinefiles/FY14SSMP_2.pdf.
37. Aaron Mehta, “Former USAF Chief of Staff: Move Away From Nuclear F-35,” Defense News, January 17, 2014, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140117/DEFREG02/301170028/Former-USAF-Chief-Staff-Move-Away-From-Nuclear-F-35.
38. Jason Simpson, “Kehler: Air Force Investigating Minuteman III Follow-On System,” Inside the Air Force, October 8, 2009.
39. James Drew, Inside the Air Force, “STRATCOM: GBSD Will Be New, Flexible Minuteman III Replacement,” Sept. 26, 2014.
40. Lauren Caston, et. al., RAND Project Air Force, “The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force,” 2014, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1210/RAND_MG1210.sum.pdf.
41. Stimson Center, “Strategic Agility: Strong National Defense for Today’s Global and Fiscal Realities,” September 2013, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Strategic_Agility_Report.pdf.
42. SSMP, FY2014, Op. Cit.
43. Todd Jacobson, “Former LLNL Director: ‘3+2’ Warhead Strategy Unlikely to be Realized,” Nuclear Security and Deterrence Monitor, Vol. 18, No. 13, March 28, 2014, http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/NSDM_28Mar2014.html.
44. Department of Energy, “Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, FY2015,” April 2014, pp. iv., http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/2014-04-11%20FY15SSMP_FINAL_4-10-2014.pdf.
45. ibid. pp. 1-3.
46. Insensitive high explosives help to reduce the risk of plutonium dispersal. The risk of an accidental nuclear explosion is already very low.
47. The W87 warhead is too big to fit on the Trident II D5 SLBM, so only the primary would be used.
48. Undersecretary of the Navy Robert Work, “Navy Perspective of W78/W88-1 Life Extension Program Phase 6.2 Analysis of Alternatives/Feasibility Study,” Internal memorandum to the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, September 12, 2012, http://www.trivalleycares.org/new/W78_88LEP_Navy_Memo_9-27-12.pdf.
49. ibid.
50. Testimony of Admiral C.D. Haney, Commander, CENTCOM, before the Senate Armed Service Committee, February 27, 2014, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Haney_02-27-14.pdf.
51. Nuclear Employment Strategy (NES), Op. Cit.
52. Department of State, START Fact Sheet, Op. Cit.
53. NES, Op. Cit.
54. Includes active and inactive warheads, strategic and tactical. Does not include thousands of retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. Department of State, “Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” Fact Sheet, May 3, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf.
55. ibid.
56. George W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom and an Exchange With Reporters,” transcript, November 7, 2001, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63649&st=nuclear&st1=reduction.
57. NES, Op. Cit., pp. 6.
58. Department of Defense, Report on the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation Pursuant to Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, p. 7, obtained by the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act on Sept. 20, 2012, http://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/DOD2012_RussianNukes.pdf.
59. Actual numbers are higher due to treaty counting rules that do not fully count weapons deployed on long-range bombers.
60. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Fact Sheet, October 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c39906.htm
61. Steven Pifer, “Accelerate New START Implementation” Up Front, October 8, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/10/08-accelerate-new-start-implementation.
62. NES, Op. Cit. pp. 3.
63. Agence France-Presse, “Russian warheads fueling half of US nuclear power” The Denver Post, October 9, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_24273507/russian-warheads-fueling-half-us-nuclear-power.
64. NES, Op. Cit. pp. 2.
65. Jim Miller, remarks at Capitol Hill Breakfast Forum, transcript, July 17, 2013, http://secure.afa.org/HBS/transcripts/2013/July%2017%20-%20Miller2.pdf.
66. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April, 2010, pp. 7, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.
67. William Drozdiak, “Missile Shield Eroding U.S. Arms Control Goals,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2000.
68. Sen. Bob Corker and Sen. Jim Inhofe, “‘Nuclear Zero’ Offers Nothing Worth Having,” The Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324503204578318673840264416.html.
69. Thom Shanker, “Senator Urges Bigger Cuts to Nuclear Arsenal,” The New York Times, June 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/us/politics/senator-levin-urges-bigger-cuts-to-nuclear-arsenal.html.
70. Max Bergmann, “Colin Powell: ‘Nuclear Weapons Are Useless’,” Think Progress, January 27, 2010, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2010/01/27/175869/colin-powell-nuclear-weapons-are-useless/.
71. Annual China Report, Op. Cit.
72. Statement of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), 8th Ministerial Meeting, Hiroshima, April 12, 2014. The NPDI includes the countries of Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
73. Daryl G. Kimball and Tom Z. Collina, “Nuclear Weapons: Less Is More,” Arms Control Association Issue Brief, Volume 3, Issue 10, July 9, 2012, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5423.
74. Global Zero, “Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture,” May 2012, http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf.
75. International Security Advisory Board, “Options for Implementing Additional Nuclear Forces Reductions,” November 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/isab/201191.htm#a
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