Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria

Updated: April 2013

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that Syria subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of Syria, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Syria has not negotiated such an agreement.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: Syria has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons: Syria signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, but has not ratified the treaty. In July 2012, a spokesman for the Syrian Foreign Ministry confirmed that the country possesses biological warfare materials, but little is known about the extent of the arsenal. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence annual report on the acquisition of materials related to WMD production in 2011 confirms that the country’s biotechnical infrastructure could support the development of biological weapons.[1]

Chemical Weapons: Syria remains one of six countries that has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. Two countries, Israel and Myanmar, have signed but not completed ratification. Syria is believed to possess hundreds of tons of mustard gas, blister agents, and nerve agents, which could include sarin and the agent VX. In July 2012, the Syrian government publically acknowledged the existence of its chemical stockpile for the first time. The spokesman said Syria would only use such weapons in the event of foreign intervention in the armed conflict between the government and domestic opposition forces. According to a 2011 report to Congress, on the acquisition of technology relating to WMDs, the National Director of Intelligence said that Syria has had a chemical weapons program for many years and its stockpile is deliverable by “aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, and artillery rockets.”[2] It is dependent, however, on foreign sources for key elements of its program.

On March 21, 2013, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon announced that the United Nations would begin an investigation into alleged uses of chemical weapons at the request of the Syrian authorities. He requested the full cooperation of all parties involved and said that any party responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.

In an April 25, 2013 letter from the White House to Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.), said that the nerve agent sarin may have been used “on a small scale” in Syria but that the United States cannot confirm “how exposure occurred and under what conditions” because the “chain of custody” for the evidence, which included “physiological samples,” is “not clear.” Further investigation is needed, the letter said.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: Syria’s ballistic missile arsenal is comprised primarily of short-range liquid-fueled Scud B and C missiles that have ranges of 300 and 500 km, respectively. A 700 km range Scud D missile is currently under development. These missiles are likely able to deliver chemical weapons.[3] The Syrian military also deploys a 120 km solid-fueled SS-21. While shorter in range than the Scuds, this missile is more accurate. Syria, however, probably does not have the capability to produce solid-fueled motors for these missiles indigenously.  While Syria’s domestic capability to produce liquid-fueled ballistic missiles is improving, it still relies on foreign suppliers, such as Iran and North Korea, for key technology. Reportedly, in the late 1980s, Syria attempted to buy more accurate missiles from China, but there are conflicting reports as to whether or not Beijing ever delivered the weapons.

• Cruise Missiles: Syria is known to possess several highly accurate anti-ship cruise missiles that could carry chemical warheads; the Sepal and several variants of the Styx.[4] Less is known about a land-attack cruise missile capability.

Nuclear Weapons:

Syria currently does not possess nuclear weapons or fissile material stockpiles that could be utilized for a nuclear weapons program, although it has long publicly expressed interest in developing a nuclear power program and covertly pursued building a reactor. It is widely assumed that Syria cooperated with North Korea to build a reactor that could produce plutonium for weapons. An Israeli airstrike destroyed the Dair al Zour facility near Al Kibar in 2007 before it became operational. Syria claims that the destroyed site was not a nuclear facility. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) currently is investigating allegations of undeclared Syrian nuclear activity.

In June 2011, in a report to the IAEA Board of Governors, the agency concluded that Syria should have declared the construction of the Dair al Zour facility to the IAEA. This conclusion was reached without an actual inspection of the site because Syria had continually denied the IAEA’s request to visit the destroyed facility. The agency relied on satellite and radar imagery to make its conclusions.[5] Based on the report, the Board of Governors determined that Syria was in non-compliance with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and sent their conclusions to the UN Security Council.

Syria does possess a Chinese supplied research reactor that is currently under IAEA safeguards.

Conventional Weapons Trade:

Syria’s primary conventional weapons suppliers are Russia and China. According to a 2011 Congressional Research Service Report, between 2003-2010, Syria’s total conventional arms purchases equaled $1.7 billion, with $1.2 billion coming from Russia and $300 million from China.[6]

Under diplomatic pressure by Western countries, in July 2012, Russia agreed not to deliver new weapons to Syria while armed conflict between the military and opposition forces is ongoing and the political situation is unstable. The Russian government specified then that it would not supply the Yak-130 aircraft, although the contract was already signed.[7]

Proliferation Record

Given Syria’s increasing domestic capability to produce ballistic missiles with little foreign assistance and their suspected ties with terrorist organizations, the United States has expressed concern that the country could pose a risk for proliferating its ballistic missiles and technology to others. In 2003, Syria was estimated to produce as many as 30 Scud C missiles per year.[8] It is widely held that Syria acts as a transit country for Iranian armaments to the Shia militant group, Hezbollah, which operates out of southern Lebanon.[9] Israel also accused Syria of supplying Hezbollah with Scud missiles, although this has not been confirmed.[10] Given the current armed conflict in Syria, the international community also is concerned that advanced conventional armaments or chemical weapons could be knowingly or unknowingly trafficked out of the country to nonstate actors.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

In 2010, Syria was one of two countries that abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution that urged the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to begin negotiations on “a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, or Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).[11] At the 2012 Conference on Disarmament, Syria advocated against negotiating a FMCT, stating that the issue was not ready for negotiations, and that the CD should instead focus on nuclear disarmament.

The United States and other countries are actively seeking to prevent Syria from continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction capabilities. In 2005, the United States added Syria to the Iran Nonproliferation Act, legislation designed to prevent Iran from obtaining technology related to weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and other conventional armaments.

Researched and prepared by Kelsey Davenport and Lauren Weiss.

1. Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Cover 1 January to 31 December 2011.” January, 2012.

2. Ibid.

3. Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004.

4. "Syria: Country Profile,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2012.

5. Ibid.

6. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2003-2010, Congressional Research Service, September 22, 2011.

7. “Russia suspends new arms shipments to Syria,” CNN, July 9, 2012.  http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/09/world/meast/syria-unrest/

8. Anthony Cordesman, "If it's Syria: Syrian Military Forces and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies," 15 April 2003, p. 7, www.csis.org.

9. Jeremy Sharp and Christine Blanchard, “Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Responses,” Congressional Research Service, July 12, 2012.

10. Amoz Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “Syria is shipping Scud missiles to Hezbollah,” Haaretz, July 5, 2012.

11. United Nations General Assembly 65/65. Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 8 December 2010. http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7094332.57579803.html