This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that Pakistan subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of Pakistan, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member. Pakistani entities have been sanctioned by the United States for engaging in trade involving missiles and missile technologies controlled by the regime.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member. Pakistan is prohibited from importing key nuclear materials and technologies from the 45 group members because Islamabad does not subject its entire nuclear enterprise to safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: No, Pakistan has not negotiated such an agreement.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant. A senior U.S. official indicated to Arms Control Today that the initiative does not target transfers to and from Pakistan because it is a U.S. ally.[2]

UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Pakistan has filed the requested report on its activities to fulfill the resolution and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
No government has alleged that Pakistan is violating its Biological Weapons Convention commitments. Islamabad has not filed a voluntary BWC confidence-building declaration.

Chemical Weapons:
Pakistan did not declare possessing any chemical weapons when it joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Pakistan remains in good standing under the treaty.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: Pakistan has an active ballistic missile program and has flight-tested and deployed nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The system with the longest estimated range that has been flight-tested is the solid-fueled Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6), which has a range of about 2,000 kilometers. Islamabad has also been developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with very short ranges to be used on the battlefield against Indian conventional forces. Pakistan’s program has benefited from missile and technology transfers from China and North Korea.

• Cruise Missiles: Pakistan been developing both ground- and air-launched cruise missile nuclear delivery systems. Its ground-launched system, the Babur (Haft-7), has a range of 700 kilometers, according to the Pakistani military. Pakistan has also tested the Ra'ad (Hatf-8) air-launched cruise missile system, with a range of 350 kilometers. The Pakistani military claims that both systems are highly accurate and have “stealth capabilities.”

Nuclear Weapons:

Pakistan is estimated as having an arsenal of about 100 warheads and is assessed to be expanding its arsenal faster than any other country. Each year, Pakistan produces enough fissile material for 10-21 nuclear weapons. [3] Islamabad is also expanding its production capacity by building additional nuclear facilities, including two heavy water reactors at its Khushab nuclear site that would effectively double the amount of plutonium Pakistan produces for weapons when they are operational. Pakistan is currently estimated to possess approximately 2.6 tons of highly enriched uranium and 100 kilograms of weapons plutonium. [4]

Available delivery vehicles include ground-launched ballistic missiles and dual-use fighter aircraft, reportedly including U.S.-origin F-16A/B fighter jets. The planes were not transferred for the purpose of delivering nuclear bombs, but Pakistan is believed to have modified the planes for that mission. Pakistani nuclear weapons are reportedly stored disassembled, and are not co-located with their delivery systems.

Pakistan has pledged no first use against non-nuclear weapons states, but has not ruled out the possible first use of nuclear weapons against India. Although Pakistani officials have claimed that nuclear weapons would be used only as a matter of last resort in such a conflict with India, Islamabad’s development of battlefield nuclear weapons to counter Indian conventional forces raises questions as to how central Pakistani nuclear weapons are in its security doctrine.

Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program began in the early 1970s and was spurred on by India’s first nuclear test in 1974. The effort was aided by the theft of nuclear technology and know-how from the European company URENCO by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who became a leading figure in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons establishment. Khan is also believed to have received a nuclear weapon design from China. Although U.S. intelligence was aware of Pakistan’s illicit program, the United States continued to provide military assistance and foreign aid to Islamabad up until 1990 when President George H. W. Bush decided that he could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. U.S. sanctions related to Pakistan’s nuclear program were dropped after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when the United States decided to pursue closer relations with Pakistan as part of the U.S. declared “war on terror.”

Pakistan has conducted two public nuclear weapon tests, although one of those involved five simultaneous explosions. The first test occurred May 28, 1998, and the last took place May 30, 1998. In 1990, China is believed to have tested a Pakistani derivative of the nuclear design Beijing allegedly gave to Khan.

Due to severe political instability from extremist groups in Pakistan, there is unease regarding the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, materials, and facilities from both insurgent threats and insider collusion. However, both Pakistani and U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that Pakistani nuclear assets are secure from such threats.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Pakistan is one of the top conventional arms purchasers in the developing world, concluding roughly $12.5 billion in arms sales between 2002 and 2009. [5] The Pentagon reports that from 2002-2010 the total U.S. military sale agreements with Pakistan were worth approximately $5.4 billion. [6] Those agreements included a purchase of 18 new F-16C/D combat aircraft from the United States (17 have been delivered as of January 2011).

Proliferation Record

Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan developed a black market network of suppliers to procure technology and know-how for Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program and then transformed that network into a supply chain for other states. Iran, Libya, and North Korea were all clients and other states might have been as well. After the interception of one of his shipments to Libya in October 2003, Khan appeared on Pakistani television in February 2004 and confessed to running the network, which transferred items ranging from centrifuges to bomb designs.

The Pakistani government denied any complicity in or knowledge of the network and confined Khan to house arrest. Although reportedly serving as an intermediary to foreign governments, the Pakistani government has not made Khan available to direct interviews by other states. General concern exists that remnants of the network might still be functioning.

Pakistan instituted new export control laws following the public exposure of Khan’s network.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

Pakistan has concluded bilateral confidence-building measures with India. After their tit-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, the two rivals volunteered to abstain from nuclear testing. They also have established a hotline to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war and agreed to exchange advance notifications of ballistic missile flight tests.

Pakistan has blocked the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament. Islamabad has insisted that an FMCT must cover existing stocks of fissile material due to concerns about India's current stockpile, and is preventing the body from reaching consensus on an agenda that would allow negotiations on the treaty to begin.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass and Erin Corcoran.

ENDNOTES

1. Pakistan has not agreed to an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

2. Wade Boese, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton,” Arms Control Today, December 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/PSI.

3. Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2011.

4. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2010, http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr10.pdf

5. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002-2009, Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41403.pdf.

6. K. Alan Kronstadt, Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001, Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakarms.pdf.

This profile details which major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of North Korea, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member, and has frequently exported missiles and related materials.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: None.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540: North Korea has not filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolution.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
Pyongyang is believed to maintain a biological weapons capability. The United States intelligence community continues to judge that North Korea has a biotechnology infrasutrcture to support such a capability, and has a munitions production capacity that could be used to weaponinze biological weapons agents. [1]

Chemical Weapons:
North Korea is widely reported to possess a large arsenal of chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, and sarin agents. According to U.S. military estimates, North Korea “can deploy missiles with chemical warheads.”[2]

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: North Korea is actively expanding its ballistic missile arsenal and allegedly working toward developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It initially relied upon assistance from the Soviet Union and China to develop its arsenal, but North Korea is now a chief exporter of ballistic missile systems and technology. The North Korean military currently deploys short-range Scud and medium-range missiles. Since 1998, North Korea has conducted three tests of missiles beyond medium range. The sole test of its two-stage intermediate-range Taepo Dong-1, intended to place a satelliote in orbit, failed in August 1998. The Taepo Dong-1 is believed to have merely served as a missile technology test-bed. The inaugural flight test of North Korea’s longest-range missile, the Taepo Dong-2, ended in failure about 40 seconds after launch on July 5, 2006. In April 2009, the Taepo Dong-2 missile was tested again. The first stage of the missile traveled approximately 270km before falling into the Sea of Japan. The remaining stages and the payload landed in the Pacific Ocean, though the intent was for the satellite payload to be launched into space. The international community has largely deemed this test to be a failure. The Taepo Dong-2 is believed to be capable of reaching the United States "if developed as an ICBM." [3]



• Cruise Missiles: North Korean is believed to possess and continues to develop anti-ship cruise missiles derived from the Chinese CSSC-3 Silkworm/Seersucker designs.

Nuclear Weapons:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered in 1992 that North Korea had diverted plutonium from its civilian program. The resulting crisis eventually yielded the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, in which North Korea committed to freezing its plutonium-based weapons program at Yongbyon in exchange for two light-water reactors and other forms of energy assistance.

The Agreed Framework collapsed after the United States accused North Korea of cheating on the arrangement. U.S. intelligence increasingly had suspected North Korea of pursuing a uranium-enrichment program as an alternative path to nuclear weapons, thereby violating the agreement’s spirit, as well as that of an earlier Korean peninsula denuclearization agreement (see “Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities” below). U.S. officials say that North Korean negotiators admitted to having such a covert program when challenged October 2002 on the issue. North Korean officials, however, have denied that alleged admission and continue to deny ever pursuing an uranium-enrichment program.

The Korean Economic Development Organization (KEDO), the multilateral body created to provide energy assistance to North Korea under the Agreed Framework, halted its energy aid to North Korea in November 2002. A year and one month later, KEDO suspended construction of the two light-water reactors.

North Korea ordered IAEA inspectors to leave the country Dec. 27, 2002, and announced its withdrawal from the NPT Jan. 10, 2003. In response, the IAEA referred the case to the UN Security Council. In August 2003, Russia, China, Japan, the United States, and the two Koreas also launched a multilateral diplomatic process, known as the six-party talks.

The talks initially failed to resolve the disputes, and on Feb. 10, 2005, North Korea announced that it had assembled nuclear warheads. In September 2005, the six-party talks realized its first major success with the adoption of a joint statement in which North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs and return to the NPT. The talks faltered shortly after. On Oct. 9, 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. The UN Security Council responded by adopting resolution 1718, enacting a variety of multilateral sanctions and demanding that Pyongyang return to the NPT.

On Feb. 13, 2007, the six-party participants agreed to an action plan detailing initial steps to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement. That action plan included shutting down North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor in return for energy aid. Using the Yongbyon facilities, North Korea is thought to have produced sufficient plutonium to assemble 6-12 nuclear devices.

The six parties concluded a follow-up agreement to the Feb. 13 action plan on Oct. 3, 2007. In that later agreement, North Korea agreed to disable its plutonium-production program at Yongbyon and provide a full accounting of all nuclear activities. In exchange for these actions, North Korea received the remaining energy aid pledged in the Feb. 13 agreement. The United States also committed to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and to stop applying the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act against Pyongyang.

North Korea’s failed April 2009 satellite launch was met with a United Nations Security Council condemnation and a demand that North Korea not conduct any further launches using ballistic missile technology. The North Korea responded strongly to this condemnation, withdrawing from the six party talks and declaring an intention to restart plutonium production.

North Korea then conducted its second nuclear test on June 25, 2009 with the underground detonation of a nuclear device estimated to have a yield of 2 to 6 kilotons. The UN Security Council responded with Resolution 1874, which intensified sanctions on Pyongyang. This resolution also called for UN Member States to inspect and seize North Korean cargo suspected of being in violation of the sanctions.

In November 2010, North Korea unveiled a large uranium-enrichment plant to former officials and academics from the United States. The plant contained approximately 2,000 gas centrifuges that were claimed to be operating and producing low-enriched uranium (LEU) for a light-water reactor (LWR) that North Korea is constructing. This plant is estimated to be capable of producing two metric tons of LEU each year, enough to fuel the LWR reactor under construction, or to produce 40 kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) – enough for one to two nuclear weapons.

Proliferation Record

North Korea has been a key supplier of missiles and missile technology to countries in the developing world, particularly in politically unstable regions such as the Middle East and South Asia. [4] Such transfers are believed to be one of Pyongyang’s primary sources of hard currency. In the past, its missile-related exports have gone to countries such as Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. Although clientele for North Korea's missile exports appear to have dwindled in recent years due to U.S. pressure and UN sanctions, Iran and Syria remain customers of North Korean missile assistance, and in recent years, Pyongyang is believed to have provided missile cooperation to Burma.

North Korea has also been engaged in nuclear proliferation. In April 2008, the U.S. intelligence community revealed that a Syrian facility destroyed in 2007 was assessed to have been a nuclear reactor under construction with North Korean assistance. [5] The reactor design is believed to have been based on North Korea’s 5 megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. A May 24, 2011 IAEA report said that the facility “was very likely a nuclear reactor.” Pyongyang is also believed to have shipped uranium hexafluoride to Libya in 2000 for that country’s nuclear weapons program. [6]

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

In December 1991, the two Koreas signed a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the declaration, both countries agreed not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” The parties also agreed to mutual inspections for verification, which have not been implemented.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass and Erin Corcoran.

ENDNOTES

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2010, http://www.dni.gov/reports/20110208_report_wmd.pdf.

2. Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, March 5, 2002.

3. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/NASIC2009.pdf.

4. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2010, http://www.dni.gov/reports/20110208_report_wmd.pdf.

5. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's Involvement, April 24, 2008, http://www.dni.gov/interviews/20080424_interview.pdf.

6. Olli Heinonen, "North Korea's Nucldear Enrichment: Capabilities and Consequences," 38 North Website, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21153/north_koreas_nuclear_enrichment.html.

This profile details which major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that Iran subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of Iran, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed an additional protocol on Dec. 18, 2003. Iran submitted an initial declaration consistent with the protocol in 2004 and abided by the protocol for a brief period despite the fact that it has not entered into force. But in February 2006 Iran ended its voluntary implementation in response to adoption of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution referring Tehran to the UN Security Council. The IAEA and UN Security Council have since called on Iran to ratify and implement the measure.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Iran has filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolution.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
The United States maintains that Iran’s biotechnology infrastructure gives it the ability to produce at least small quantities of biological weapons agents for offensive purposes. According to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report, Iran has previously conducted offensive biological weapons agent research and development and continues to seek dual-use biotechnology, which may support legitimate biotechnology activities, an offensive biological weapons program, or both. [1] U.S. officials have accused Iran of “probably” pursuing an offensive biological weapons capability in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. [2] Iran denies that allegation.

Chemical Weapons:
Having suffered chemical weapon attacks during its eight-year war with Iraq, Iranian officials frequently speak about the dangers such arms pose. The United States, however, has sanctioned companies for providing dual-use chemicals to Iran.  An unclassified U.S. intelligence report says that “Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare agents” as well as the ability “of weaponizing [chemical weapons] agents in a variety of delivery systems.” [3] Although an option exists for states-parties to request a challenge inspection of alleged weapons sites under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention, no state-party, including the United States, has called for such an inspection in Iran.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: Iran is the only country not in possession of nuclear weapons to have produced or flight-tested ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. The Iranian missile program is largely based on North Korean and Russian designs and has benefited from Chinese technical assistance. Iran has one of the largest deployed ballistic missile forces in the Middle East, with some missiles capable of covering ranges up to 2,000 kilometers. Iran’s most sophisticated operational ballistic missile is the liquid-fueled Shahab-3, which has a range of about 1,300 kilometers. Iran has made progress in developing and testing solid fueled missile technologies, which could significantly increase the mobility of Iran’s missile force. Since November of 2008, Iran has conducted a number of test-launches of a two-stage solid fuel-propelled missile, the Sajjil-2, which has a reported range of about 2,000 kilometers. [4] Iran has also developed a two stage, liquid-fueled, space launch vehicle, the Safir and placed a small satellite in orbit, the Omid, using this system Feb. 2, 2009. In June 2011, the Safir space launch vehicle was used again to place a small image-collecting satellite, the Rasad, into orbit. A larger space launch vehicle, the Simorgh, is also believed to be in development.

• Cruise Missiles: Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko confirmed in 2005 that Iran illegally procured six Kh-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine four years earlier. The Kh-55 is an air-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. Iran also has acquired a variety of Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles. In March 2010 Iran announced the development of a new cruise missile, the Nasr-1, claimed to be capable of destroying warships and military targets up to 3,000 tons.

Nuclear Weapons:
During the latter half of 2002, the IAEA began investigating two secret Iranian nuclear facilities, a heavy-water production plant near Arak and a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility near Natanz. Since that time, the agency has discovered a series of clandestine nuclear activities, some of which violated Iran’s safeguards agreement with the agency. Much of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program is based on equipment and designs acquired through former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan’s secret supply network.

After the revelations of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched negotiations with Iran to address international concerns about the intent and scope of its nuclear program. These negotiations collapsed in 2005. Subsequently, the IAEA Board of Governors declared Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations and referred the matter to the UN Security Council. In 2006, China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program. The six-country bloc is generally known as the P5-1, comprising the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany.

Since 2006, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment-related activities and cooperate fully with the IAEA investigation. In response to Iran’s refusal to comply with these demands, the council has introduced four rounds of sanctions targeting Iranian entities and individuals believed to be involved in Iran’s proliferation-related activities.

Iran continues to expand its uranium enrichment program and has not fully disclosed the extent of its nuclear-related activities. It relies on a variant of Pakistan's P-1 centrifuge, which is known to be crash-prone and unreliable. Iran has been developing more advanced designs capable of enriching uranium three times faster. In September 2009, the revelation of a secret nuclear facility under construction near Qom deepened international suspicions about Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. Iran has also refused to provide the IAEA with timely design information and access to nuclear facilities and persons or discuss outstanding concerns regarding a potential military dimension to its nuclear program.

In an unclassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released Dec. 3, 2007, the U.S. intelligence community concluded with “high confidence” that Iran had “halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003” and expressed “moderate confidence” that the program had not been restarted. [5] The 2007 NIE defined “nuclear weapons program” as weapons design and weaponization activities, as well as covert uranium conversion and enrichment work. Since that time, Western intelligence agencies have reportedly assessed that Iran has resumed research related to weaponization, but has still not restarted all of the weapons-related activities shelved in 2003. An update of the 2007 NIE finished in 2011 appears to have maintained many of its core conclusions. Iran has consistently rejected allegations that it is pursuing nuclear weapons.

In October of 2009, Russia, France and the United States negotiated a draft agreement with Iran to transfer a portion of Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country in exchange for fuel for a rector that produces medical isotopes. Widely referred to as the fuel swap deal, the agreement fell through when Iran tried to amend the terms of the LEU transfer. During 2010 Iran scaled-up a portion of its uranium enrichment from 4 percent to 20 percent, the level required for the medical reactor fuel. An effort by Brazil and Turkey to mediate a similar arrangement in May of 2010 was met with skepticism by the United States, Russia, and France who expressed doubts over the terms of the announcement as well as its timing. The P5+1 group has continued its diplomatic efforts with Iran. Iranian officials announced in June 2011, that Iran would triple the production rate of 20 percent-enriched uranium using more advanced centrifuges, and relocate production to the Fordow enrichment plant near Qom.

In May 2011, Iran’s first nuclear power reactor at its Bushehr plant began operations. This light-water reactor does not produce weapon-grade plutonium, but its operation does raise concerns regarding Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
In a September 2010 arms trade report, the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that Iranian weapons purchases have largely focused on air defense systems, presumably to protect their territory and nuclear sites from possible U.S. or Israeli air attack. In September of 2010, Russia announced that it was canceling the 2007 sale of the S-300 air defense missile systems following the introduction of the UN arms embargo.

Proliferation Record

In 2000, Iran exported rockets and several ballistic missile components to Libya. It also has been accused of violating a Security Council resolution barring arms transfers to the anti-Israel militia Hezbollah operating in Lebanon. A 2007 UN Security Council resolution bars Iran from selling conventional arms and prohibits any country from importing arms from Iran. According to a 2011 UN Panel report, Iran has also continued to export conventional arms in violation of this resolution. The Panel report said that there was no evidence of Iran receiving payment for such transfers, and that they likely occurred as part of efforts by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to increase its influence in various regions.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

Iran was one of the first states to formally call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, joining with Egypt to propose the goal to the UN General Assembly in 1974.

During the 1996 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Iran proposed an amendment to the convention to expressly prohibit the use of biological weapons.

Beginning in 1999, Iran sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution establishing an intermittent panel of governmental experts to consider the issue of missiles “in all its aspects.” The panel, which held three sessions in 2001-2002, 2004, and 2007-2008, has explored several topics, including missile proliferation, missile defenses, and confidence-building measures. Meanwhile, Iran has elected not to participate in the voluntary Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which calls upon states to provide pre-launch notifications of their missiles and to annually report on their missile holdings.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass, Alfred Nurja, and Erin Corcoran.

ENDNOTES

1. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January-31 December 2004, http://www.dni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf.

2. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation John C. Rood’s presentation to the Sixth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, November 20, 2006, http://geneva.usmission.gov/Press2006/2011Rood.html.

3. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_721_Report.pdf

4. Crail, Peter, "Progress Seen in Iranian Missile Test," Arms Control Today, June 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/IranMissile

5. National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007,http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that Russia subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of Russia, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member, but Russia claims to adhere to the group’s rules and control list.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed in 2000, the protocol entered into force on October 16, 2007.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Co-founder with the United States.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: Russia has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member, but Russia claims to adhere to the group’s rules and control list.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed in 2000, entered into force in 2007.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Co-founder with the United States.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: Russia has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
Despite ratifying the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Soviet Union apparently maintained an extensive offensive germ weapons program, including research into plague, anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, glanders, and hemorrhagic fever. In an August 2005 report, the U.S. Department of State asserted that “the United States is concerned that Russia maintains a mature offensive [biological weapons] program.” [3] The report noted that “a substantial amount of dual-use research conducted in recent years has legitimate biodefense applicability, but also could be used to further an offensive program.” Russia has disputed the allegations.

In its 2010 compliance report, the State Department said that it had no indications that Russian activities “were conducted for purposes inconsistent with the BWC.” However, it also stated that it could not confirm that Russia had fulfilled its obligations under the BWC. [4]

Chemical Weapons:
Upon entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia declared that it possessed approximately 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the largest amount in the world. As of July 2010, Russia had destroyed roughly 48 percent of this stockpile, and is required under the CWC to eliminate the rest by 2012. However, Russia has stated that it will miss this deadline and is currently aiming to complete elimination by 2015.

A dispute lingers over whether Russia has fully declared all of its chemical weapons-related facilities and past production. The State Department’s 2010 compliance report stated that it was “unable to ascertain whether Russia’s CWC declaration is complete.”

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: Russia has an extensive, albeit aging, force of silo- and mobile-land based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). As of July 2010, Russia has 369 ICBMs of four different types. These missiles are capable of carrying a total of up to 1,247 warheads.

Russia also maintains 160 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that date back to the Soviet period. These missiles can carry up to 576 nuclear warheads. Moscow, however, is working to develop a new SLBM called the Bulava. Russian leaders also vaguely say they are developing other missile-related systems, such as a hypersonic glide vehicle, that will be capable of penetrating anti-missile systems, which the United States is developing and deploying.

Under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Moscow is barred from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Russia has abided by this prohibition, but the Kremlin also has suggested it might withdraw from the accord because its neighbors are acquiring types of missiles that are forbidden to Russia. In October 2007, the United States and Russia called upon other countries to forswear missiles banned by the INF Treaty.

• Cruise Missiles: The Russian military possesses three types of air-launched cruise missiles and two submarine-launched cruise missile systems.

Nuclear Weapons:
Estimates of Russia’s total nuclear forces, including tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, vary greatly. According to the Federation of American Scientists, Russia currently possesses roughly 2,600 deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 2,050 tactical weapons, plus another 8,000 or so warheads in reserve.

Under Russia’s standing Military Doctrine, published in February 2010, “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to aggression against the Russian Federation that utilizes conventional weapons that threatens the very existence of the state.”

All told, the Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear tests. The first test occurred Aug. 29, 1949, and the last test took place Oct. 24, 1990. Russia has not conducted any tests since it inherited the Soviet Union’s nuclear stockpile following the Soviet breakup.

Russia has publicly declared that it no longer produces fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for weapons purposes. The Kremlin announced a halt to HEU production for weapons in 1989 and the cessation of plutonium production for weapons in 1994. As with Russia’s warhead stockpile, there is a great deal of uncertainty about its holdings of fissile material. One independent 2009 report estimates that Russia has roughly 750 metric tons of HEU, though it notes that this figure could be wrong by as much as 300 metric tons due to lack of information. In addition, Russia has an estimated 120 to 170 metric tons of plutonium stockpiled for weapons. [5]

Along with the United States, Russia is implementing a program to downblend 500 metric tons of Russian excess HEU into reactor fuel unsuitable for bombs. That project is scheduled to be completed in 2013. As of June 2009, 367 of those 500 tons have been eliminated. In addition, under a separate agreement with the United States, Russia is committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium. The project was delayed for several years, but in April 2010 the two nations signed a protocol that amended and updated the 2000 agreement. Both countries now aim to begin disposition in 2018.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Russia trails only the United States in supplying conventional arms abroad. Between 2002 and 2009, Russia committed to selling approximately $74 billion in weapons to other states. [6] The leading long-term purchasers of Russian arms are India and China. In addition, in 2006 Algeria and Venezuela sealed multi-billion dollar weapons deals with Russia. Russian arms sales to Venezuela increased further in 2009, after Russia agreed to loan $2.2 billion to Venezuela for the purchase of tanks and advanced anti-aircraft missiles. Western governments have often criticized Russia for not being discriminating enough in its arms transactions, citing the dramatic increase in sales to Venezuela, in addition to transfers to Iran and Sudan.

Proliferation Record

The United States and independent analyses have long cited Russia as a key supplier of nuclear- and missile-related goods and technology to a variety of countries, including states of proliferation concern such as Iran and Syria. In response, the United States often levied sanctions on Russian entities believed to be involved in such proliferation activities. [7] Beginning in the mid-2000s, however, the number and frequency of Russian entities placed under U.S. proliferation sanctions declined, possibly as a result of increasing Russian commitment to controlling sensitive exports. Moreover, in recent years, U.S. officials have also cited Russian cooperation addressing proliferation concerns, in particular Iran. [8] In spite of this cooperation, Russia still remains a source of illicit sensitive technology, particularly in regard to missile proliferation. According to a 2010 State Department Report,  Russian entities “continued to supply sensitive missile-related items, technology, and expertise to several programs of concern” from 20004-2008. [9] The report added, however, that “available information” did not indicate that Russia “acted inconsistently with the MTCR.”

The vast former Soviet biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons complexes, including their former scientists, are also seen as a potential source of arms, materials, and know-how for other regimes or non-state actors. Consequently, the United States and other countries have many programs dedicated to mitigating this potential threat by helping Russia, as well as other former Soviet states, secure or destroy facilities, materials, and weapon systems, as well as gainfully employ former scientists in non-arms related work.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

In 2002, the United States and Russia concluded the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Under SORT, the two countries are supposed to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by Dec. 31, 2012. However, the treaty expires that same day, freeing up both countries to expand their arsenals afterwards if they so choose. In February 2009, the U.S. government completed its reductions to 2,200 strategic deployed weapons, meeting the upper limit under SORT over three years early.

In addition, SORT did not include verification measures. Instead, it relied on the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’s (START) verification regime, which provided for the United States and Russia to exchange information, visit, and monitor each other’s nuclear weapons complexes. START expired in December 2009.

In April 2010, the United States and Russia signed a successor to the original START accord. The new treaty, known as New START, would require that both sides reduce their arsenals to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons within seven years of the treaty’s entry into force. In addition, it would restore many of the verification measures from the original START accord. As of yet, the treaty has not been ratified in either the U.S. or Russian legislatures.

The Russian government officially suspended its implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on December 12, 2008. Moscow contends that NATO countries, led by the United States, are unjustifiably delaying ratification of the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty and thereby endangering Russian security. NATO members have stated that they will not ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty until Russia withdraws its military forces from Georgia and Moldova; the Kremlin contends that these issues should not be linked. Meanwhile, Russia continues to implement another European security instrument, the Open Skies Treaty, which facilitates unarmed reconnaissance flights over the territories of all states-parties.

The Russian government has signed and ratified protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin America and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. It has signed but not ratified the protocol for the African zone. It has neither signed nor ratified the protocols for the Central Asian and Southeast Asian zones.

At the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD), Russia has supported negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) and a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Russia and China jointly submitted the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) to the CD on February 12, 2008. Under the Bush administration, the United States opposed any negotiation on an outer space treaty and dropped its support for an “effectively verifiable” FMCT, which prevented the CD from forming a work plan. The Obama administration changed this policy, and has actively pursued the negotiation of a verifiable FMCT. These efforts resulted in the adoption of a work plan at the CD on May 28, 2009 which included discussions of both an FMCT and a PPWT. Despite some initial progress, negotiations on these issues broke down – principally due to Pakistan – and show no immediate prospect for improvement.

Within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Russia has resisted a U.S.-sponsored initiative to negotiate restrictions on the use of anti-vehicle landmines, but reluctantly consented to CCW negotiations on cluster munitions. Moscow has declined to participate in a Norwegian-led effort outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians.” In addition, Russia has showed little enthusiasm for negotiating a United Nations treaty to establish standards for the international arms trade.

Russia supports creation of and has offered to host an international nuclear fuel bank to help persuade countries to forgo development of their own national nuclear fuel production capabilities, which also could be used to produce nuclear-bomb material.

-Updated by Scoville Fellow Rob Golan-Vilella

ENDNOTES

1. Russia has not ratified Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It also has not approved an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

2. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2009, October 2009, 1,253 pp. According to this report, Russia was one of only two states to use antipersonnel land mines in 2008-2009, the other being Myanmar.

3. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” August 2005, 108 pp.

4. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2010, 95 pp.

5. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report, 2009, September 2009, 178 pp.

6. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002-2009, Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, 84 pp.

7. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15231.htm

8. Nikitin, Mary Beth, U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 9, 2010.

9. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2010, 95 pp.

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that the United States subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of the United States, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed in 1998, entered into force in January 2009.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Co-founder with Russia.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Founder.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: The United States has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
In the early 1970s, the United States destroyed its entire stockpile of biological weapons, which had been developed between 1943 and 1969. In recent years, the United States has steeply increased funding for biodefense programs, which some independent analysts argue could also lend themselves to offensive weapons research and development. [4]

In 2001, the Bush administration  opposed and killed an effort dating back to 1995 to augment the Biological Weapons Convention with a legally binding verification protocol. U.S. officials said the protocol would be too burdensome on legitimate governments and private biodefense programs, while at the same time failing to deter cheaters. The Obama administration has not changed this basic position.

Chemical Weapons:
Behind Russia, the United States declared the second-largest stockpile of chemical agents. In October 2010, the United States announced that it had destroyed 24,488 tons of chemical materials, representing 80% of its original stockpile. However, due to environmental concerns requiring that materials at certain facilities be neutralized rather than incinerated, the United States does not expect to complete destruction until 2021, nine years after the Chemical Weapons Convention deadline.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: As of April 2010, the United States possesses 450 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), with three warheads deployed on each. In its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released that same month, the Obama administration announced its plans to “de-MIRV” the existing missiles so that each will carry only one warhead.

The United States’ other long-range missile system is the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The U.S. Navy currently has fourteen Ohio-class submarines, 12  of which are  outfitted with 24 Trident II  SLBMs.

Under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States is barred from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In October 2007, the United States and Russia called upon other countries to forswear missiles banned by the INF Treaty.

• Cruise Missiles: The United States deploys ship-, submarine-, and air-launched cruise missiles. The Harpoon missile is an anti-ship system, while the Tomahawk, which can be armed with a nuclear warhead, is a land-attack missile. In 2010, the United States announced that it would retire all Tomahawk missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. The United States is currently in the process of retiring its nuclear-armed AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles and trimming its fleet of AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, which can be armed with conventional or nuclear payloads, to 528 missiles.

Nuclear Weapons:
In President Barack Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague, he declared that it was the policy of the United States “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

In May 2010, for the first time, the U.S. government revealed the size of its nuclear stockpile. It announced that, as of September 30, 2009, it possessed 5,113 nuclear warheads, including tactical, strategic, and nondeployed weapons. This total does not include retired warheads that are awaiting dismantlement, which are estimated to be about 4,500 warheads.

In the 2010 NPR, the United States announced that it “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” It reserved the right to make any adjustments to this assurance “that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat.” It was not prepared to make a declaration that the “sole purpose” of its nuclear weapons was to deter a nuclear attack, but added that it would “work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.”

The United States has conducted 1,030 total nuclear tests, which is more than any other state—indeed, it’s more than all other states combined. The first test occurred July 16, 1945, and the most recent test took place Sept. 23, 1992.

The United States is the only nation to have used nuclear weapons against another country, dropping two bombs (one apiece) on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The United States has publicly declared that it no longer produces fissile material for weapons purposes. The United States halted the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons in 1964 and ceased plutonium separation for weapons in 1992. Current U.S. fissile stockpiles for weapons total about 54 declared metric tons of plutonium and 250 declared metric tons of HEU. [5] Under an agreement finalized in 2000 with Russia, the United States is committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium. The project was delayed for several years, but in April 2010 the United States and Russia signed a protocol that amended and updated the 2000 agreement. Both countries now aim to begin actual disposition in 2018.

In April 2010, the United States hosted the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC. Participants included 47 countries, 38 of which were represented at the head of state or head of government level, and the heads of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Union. At the summit, the participants unanimously adopted the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material in the next four years.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the world’s preeminent conventional arms seller. A 2009 Congressional Research Service study reported that, over the previous eight years, the United States agreed to $166.3 billion in global arms sales. This is more than double that of the second-largest exporter, Russia, which agreed to arms sales worth $74 billion over the same time period. [6]

Proliferation Record

A close relationship exists between the U.S. and British nuclear weapons programs, including U.S. supply of the Trident SLBM to the United Kingdom.

The United States is also the only nation known to station its nuclear weapons in other countries. Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey all host U.S. tactical nuclear gravity bombs as part of NATO nuclear sharing agreements. These estimated 200 weapons remain under U.S. custody during peacetime, but some could be released to U.S. allies for delivery in times of war.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

In 2002, the United States and Russia concluded the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Under SORT, the two countries agreed to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by Dec. 31, 2012. However, the treaty expires that same day, freeing up both countries to expand their arsenals afterwards if they so choose. In February 2009, the U.S. government completed its reductions to 2,200 strategic deployed weapons, meeting the upper limit under SORT over three years early.

In addition, SORT did not include verification measures. Instead, it relied on the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’s (START) verification regime, which provided for the United States and Russia to exchange information, visit, and monitor each other’s nuclear weapons complexes. START expired in December 2009.

In April 2010, the United States and Russia signed a successor to the original START accord. The new treaty, known as New START, would require that both sides reduce their arsenals to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons within seven years of the treaty’s entry into force. In addition, it would restore many of the verification measures from the original START accord. As of yet, the treaty has not been ratified in either the U.S. or Russian legislatures.

The United States is party to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, but not to the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty. The United States has led NATO in demanding that Russia withdraw its remaining military forces from Georgia and Moldova as a condition for ratification of the Adapted Treaty, which would replace the original treaty’s bloc and regional arms limits with national weapon ceilings.

The United States is also party to another European security instrument, the Open Skies Treaty, which facilitates unarmed reconnaissance flights over the territories of all states-parties.

The United States has signed and ratified protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin American nuclear-weapon free zone treaty. It has signed but not ratified similar protocols to the African and South Pacific zones. It has not signed the protocols for the Central Asian or Southeast Asian zones.

The United States has been a leading proponent of negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD). During the Bush administration, however, the United States dropped its support for seeking an “effectively verifiable” cutoff, claiming that a verification regime would be time-consuming to negotiate, costly to implement, and ultimately imperfect, potentially impinging on the national security interests of law-abiding states while not deterring determined cheaters. This contributed to the deadlock at the CD, which was unable to agree on an agenda throughout the entirety of the Bush administration’s tenure. In 2009, the Obama administration affirmed its support for a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty. However, Pakistan has since prevented negotiations from beginning on such a treaty, and as of this writing the stalemate at the CD continues.

Within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the United States has joined with many other countries to promote new restrictions on the use of anti-vehicle mines, but that effort has been blocked by China, Pakistan, and Russia. The United States announced in June 2007 that it was dropping its opposition to negotiations by CCW states on restricting cluster munitions. But the United States said it has no position on the potential outcome of the negotiations except that an agreement should “protect civilians while taking into account security requirements.” The United States has declined to join a Norwegian-led effort outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty to ban cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians.”

In 2009, the United States declared its support for an arms trade treaty “that contains the highest possible, legally binding standards for the international transfer of conventional weapons.” [7]

Although the United States has elected not to join the Ottawa Mine Ban Convention, the United States is not known to have used antipersonnel landmines since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 2004, the United States announced that it would phase out the use of any type of mine lacking self-destruct or self-deactivation features. Washington has also led the world in financial contributions to global demining efforts.

In July 2005, the United States launched an initiative with India to repeal most U.S. and multilateral civilian nuclear trade restrictions on India. In 2006, the U.S. Congress amended its own domestic legislation to allow nuclear trade with India to proceed. The two governments later concluded a “123 Agreement,” which was approved by Congress and signed into law in October 2008. The previous month, India received a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. However, nuclear trade between the two nations has yet to formally proceed.

The United States led a 2003 invasion of Iraq citing its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. No evidence has been discovered to support these allegations.

-Updated by Scoville Fellow Rob Golan-Vilella.

ENDNOTES

1. The Senate could vote on the treaty again. The George W. Bush administration did not support the treaty. Since taking office, President Obama has repeatedly pledged to secure the Senate’s advice and consent on the treaty, but no action has been taken thus far.

2. The United States has not ratified Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons, Protocol IV on Blinding Lasers, and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It also has not approved an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, July 2006, 1,236 pp.

4. Roffey, Roger, Hart, John, and Kuhlau, Frida, “Crucial Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists,” Arms Control Today, September 2006, p. 17.

5. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report, 2009, September 2009, 178 pp.

6. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002-2009, Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, 84 pp.

7. Clinton, Hillary Rodham, “U.S. Support for an Arms Trade Treaty,” October 14, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130573.htm.

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that China subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of China, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member, but China in 2004 applied for membership. Beijing’s bid has not won the necessary consensus approval of the group because the United States and some other countries continue to find fault with Chinese missile and technology exports.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Yes, entered into force in 2002.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: China has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
China contends it is in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention despite U.S. allegations asserting the contrary. U.S. State Department compliance assessment reports have said that China possessed an offensive biological weapons capability prior to joining the BWC in 1984 and note that Chinese declarations under the treaty have not documented such a program, or indicated the destruction of remaining biological munitions. [3]

Chemical Weapons:
China has declared that it has destroyed all chemical weapon agent production facilities and solely conducts defensive chemical warfare research. The United States, however, has indicated that there is uncertainty as to whether China has fully declared its past chemical weapons activities. [4]

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: China has developed and deployed short- to long-range ballistic missiles. Conventional-armed short-range ballistic missiles make up the greatest portion of China’s missile force. As of October 2006, Beijing had deployed approximately 900 of those systems opposite Taiwan, and, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, is adding approximately 100 additional missiles each year.[5]


Meanwhile, China over the past two decades appears generally content with a minimal force of nuclear-armed ICBMs, deploying approximately 20 such missiles with the capability of striking the entire United States. China, however, is working to modernize this force with the development of the solid-fuel DF-31A ICBM, and the U.S. government contends the Chinese force could double or triple within several years.

China also is pursuing a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-2, to presumably equip a new class of submarines, the Jin-class (Type 094), that China has started to launch.[6] The predecessors of these systems, the JL-1 missile and Xia-class submarine, appear not to have been mated together or operationally deployed.[7]

Cruise Missiles: China has been actively developing cruise missiles with foreign assistance, primarily from Russia. It already possesses nearly a dozen varieties of anti-ship missiles, such as the Russian-made SS-N-22, and is pursuing land-attack cruise missiles.[8]

Nuclear Weapons:
China maintains strict secrecy on the size of its nuclear arsenal, but independent estimates generally range between 100 and 200 warheads.[9] In an April 2004 statement, China claimed that it “possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal” of the five recognized NPT nuclear-weapon states.

China is the sole nuclear-weapon state to declare publicly that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Beijing has emphasized that this vow stands “at any time or under any circumstances.”

China conducted 45 nuclear tests. The first test occurred Oct. 16, 1964, and the last test took place July 29, 1996.

Although China has not publicly declared a halt to the production of fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, general speculation is that Beijing has stopped. One independent estimate calculates that China has accumulated as much as 25 metric tons of HEU and six metric tons of plutonium for weapons.[10]

Conventional Weapons Trade:
China is a key country in the global arms trade. It is a leading buyer of advanced conventional weapons, particularly from Russia, and a supplier of less advanced arms, such as small arms and light weapons, to poorer countries. Most Chinese clients are in Africa and Asia. From 1999 to 2006, China agreed to buy $17 billion in arms, while concluding contracts to export $10.8 billion in weapons.[11]

Proliferation Record

China’s proliferation record has been less than exemplary. Most notably, China aided Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia also have been identified as Chinese proliferation recipients. As of June 2007, the George W. Bush administration had imposed more sanctions on Chinese entities than those of any other country. All told, the administration levied 78 separate sanctions on a total of 32 Chinese entities.

Still, China’s proliferation activities have diminished over the past several years. Indeed, Nuclear Supplier Group members, including the United States, saw enough improvement in China’s nuclear export behavior that they extended membership to China in 2004. At the same time, many of those same governments have refused China’s bid to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, citing continuing concerns about Chinese missile and missile technology transactions.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

China has signed protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin America, South Pacific, and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. China has not signed the protocols for the Central Asian and Southeast Asian zones. Nonetheless, Beijing stated in April 2004 that it “undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against…nuclear-weapon-free zones.”

At the 65-member Conference on Disarmament, China expresses support for negotiation of an “effectively verifiable” fissile material cutoff treaty while declaring its top priority to be the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Chinese insistence that the conference take some action on the outer space issue in parallel with any negotiations on a cutoff treaty and the U.S. opposition to that approach has stalemated the conference over the past several years. In 2003, China said it would accept discussions on outer space rather than formal negotiations but that formulation remained unacceptable to the United States. China, however, did not agree to a 2007 compromise formula, including talks on outer space, that the United States said it would not oppose.

At another Geneva forum, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), China joined with Pakistan and Russia to block an initiative to negotiate restrictions on the use of anti-vehicle mines. But Beijing went along with consensus in November 2007 to begin CCW negotiations on cluster munitions. China, however, is not participating in a separate Norwegian-led effort to negotiate a treaty to ban cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians.”

China has played a key role in hosting and helping mediate the so-called six-party process to achieve North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. On Iran, China has resisted U.S. and European pressure to increase sanctions on Tehran for its continuing nuclear activities.

-Researched and prepared by Scarlet Kim and Alex Bollfrass.

ENDNOTES

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that the United Kingdom subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of the United Kingdom, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Yes, entered into force in 2004.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: The United Kingdom has filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
The United Kingdom had an active biological warfare program from 1936 to 1956. As part of that program, the United Kingdom weaponized anthrax and researched plague, typhoid fever, and botulinum toxin. Today, the British government operates an extensive and sophisticated defensive program that includes research on potentially offensive pathogens.

Chemical Weapons:
Pakistan did not declare possessing any chemical weapons when it joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Pakistan remains in good standing under the treaty.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: The United Kingdom maintains one type of ballistic missile system in its arsenal for delivering nuclear warheads. That missile is the U.S.-origin Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missile, which has an estimated range of roughly 7,400 kilometers.



• Cruise Missiles: The United Kingdom possesses two air-launched land-attack cruise missile systems, the PGM-500 and PGM-2000. The latter can carry a heavier payload.

Nuclear Weapons:
In December 2006, the United Kingdom announced plans to reduce its deployed force of approximately 200 strategic nuclear warheads to less than 160. The government also declared that the reserve stockpile, the size of which is secret, will be trimmed by 20 percent.

British nuclear warheads are only deployed on submarines. Currently, the government maintains four Vanguard-class submarines, which are projected to start reaching the end of their service lives in the early 2020s. The government has initiated a process to develop a new class of submarines to potentially carry British nuclear warheads until about mid-century.

The British government’s standard practice is to have only one submarine on routine patrol at any given time. The government claims the missiles aboard the submarine are not on alert and that launching a missile would take several days of preparation.

In May 2000, the British government reaffirmed a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT subject to certain conditions regarding their behavior and alliances. London refuses to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons, but has stated that it would only employ such arms in self-defense and “even then only in extreme circumstances.”

The United Kingdom has conducted 45 nuclear weapon tests. The first test occurred Oct. 3, 1952, and the last took place Nov. 26, 1991.

In April 1995, the British government declared that it no longer produces fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for weapons purposes. The government has declared that its military stockpile consists of 3.5 metric tons of plutonium and 17.4 metric tons of HEU.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
The United Kingdom is a key arms exporter. In 2007, the British government volunteered to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms that in 2006 the United Kingdom had exported two tanks, 37 armored combat vehicles, eight attack helicopters and one missile system, as well as more than 359,000 small arms and light weapons. In a September 2007 arms trade report, the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that the United Kingdom had agreed to $3.1 billion in new arms export deals in 2006.[2]

The United Kingdom is spearheading an initiative to negotiate an arms trade treaty to establish standards for global arms exports. The United Nations in 2008 is convening a group of governmental experts to explore the feasibility of such an instrument.

Proliferation Record

Although a leading supplier of conventional weapons to other states, the United Kingdom is not known to have deliberately or significantly contributed to the spread of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons to other states.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

The British government has signed protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin American, South Pacific, and African nuclear-weapon-free zones. London has not done so for the Southeast Asian or Central Asian zones.

The United Kingdom is a state-party to the Open Skies Treaty, which enables unarmed reconnaissance flights over all states-parties territories, and has signed the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. London, along with other western capitals, is refusing to ratify the latter agreement until Russia fulfills commitments to withdraw its military forces from Georgia and Moldova.

London further supports the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament. Although the British government previously endorsed an “effectively verifiable” cutoff, it has backed off promoting that objective after the United States in 2004 declared it no longer supported that goal.

The United Kingdom is participating in a Norwegian-led effort to negotiate a treaty to ban cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians,” and it also supports concluding an instrument on cluster munitions through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

The United Kingdom joined the United States in invading Iraq in 2003 citing its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. No evidence has been discovered to support these allegations.

London has engaged in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear activities, which the United Kingdom suspects are intended to develop nuclear weapons. The British government supports ratcheting up sanctions on Iran to persuade it to halt certain activities, particularly uranium enrichment.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

ENDNOTES

1. The United Kingdom has not ratified Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

2. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2007, 92 pp.

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that Israel subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of Israel, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member, but Israel has committed to maintaining export controls consistent with the regime.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member. Israel is prohibited from importing key nuclear materials and technologies from the 45 group members because Israel does not subject its entire nuclear enterprise to safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member, but Israel has pledged its “adherence to the principles” of the arrangement.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: No, Israel has not negotiated such an agreement.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: Israel has filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
The Israeli government operates an extensive and sophisticated biodefense program. It has not made public pronouncements on its biological weapons policy nor signed the Biological Weapons Convention, which is widely interpreted as an indication that Israel has some offensive capabilities.

Chemical Weapons:
Israel has signed, but not ratified, the Chemical Weapons Convention. Although the status of its formerly extensive offensive weapons program and stockpile is unknown, there is no doubt that Israel is active in defensive research. Russian intelligence claimed in 1993 that “Israel has a store of chemical weapons of its own manufacture... [and] is capable of producing toxic substances of all types, including nerve-paralyzing, blister-producing and temporarily incapacitating substances and so forth.”[2]

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: Israel fields an arsenal of nuclear-capable Jericho missiles, which are based on French technology and road- and rail-mobile. The Jericho-1 was first deployed in the early 1970s and the 1,500 kilometer-range Jericho-2 followed in 1990. Israel’s space-launch capability indicates it could develop a missile with intercontinental reach.



• Cruise Missiles: Israel has purchased U.S.-origin Harpoon cruise missiles with a range of 120 kilometers. Reports suggest that Israel has modified the Harpoon system to deliver nuclear payloads.[3] It also is believed to have indigenously developed a submarine-launched cruise missile system with a range of up to 900 kilometers.

Nuclear Weapons:
Israel is suspected of having a nuclear arsenal ranging from 75 to 200 nuclear warheads, although it has never officially acknowledged possessing such arms or demonstrated its capability through a nuclear test. Israel officially maintains that it “will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.”

In addition to its Jericho missiles, Israel maintains a fleet of nuclear-capable fighter combat aircraft, including U.S.-origin F-16s and F-15s. Independent analysts also believe Israel’s Dolphin-class submarines have been outfitted to deliver nuclear weapons.

How much plutonium Israel has produced is unknown. One independent analyst calculates the amount as roughly 600 kilograms.[4] It is assumed by some analysts that Israel has a uranium-enrichment program, although there is not enough evidence to support a credible estimate of how much highly enriched uranium Israel might have produced.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Israel has been an important and leading arms client of the United States, but Israel also is stepping up its arms sales abroad. In the process, Israel upset the United States by transferring certain weapons and technologies, including spare parts for unmanned aerial vehicles, to China. Israel and the United States signed a secret memorandum in August 2005 aimed at restricting certain Israeli exports to other countries.[5]

Israel is the one of a few Middle East states that has consistently volunteered its annual arms export and import data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

In January 2007, the United States made a preliminary finding that Israel might have violated the use terms of imported U.S. arms, specifically cluster munitions. In a summer 2006 conflict with Hezbollah guerillas located in southern Lebanon, Israel employed U.S.-origin cluster munitions, which are reportedly authorized exclusively for use against clear military targets. Allegations were made that Israel used the weapons more indiscriminately. The United States had suspended cluster munitions exports to Israel for several years during the 1980s because of a finding that Israel had misused the weapons.

Proliferation Record

Israel is not known to have deliberately or significantly contributed to the spread of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons to other states, although the extent of Israel’s involvement in South Africa’s previously secret, now abandoned, nuclear weapons program is uncertain.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

On June 7, 1981, Israeli planes bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor, which Israel charged would contribute to an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. That attack did not halt the secret Iraqi nuclear weapons program, which was not exposed and dismantled until the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Israel has not threatened to block negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament, but Israeli leaders have voiced reservations about the initiative.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

ENDNOTES

1. Israel has not ratified Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It also has not approved an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

2. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993.

3. Boese, Wade, “Israel Allegedly Fielding Sea-based Nuclear Missiles,” Arms Control Today, November 2003, p. 26.

4. Albright, David, “Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 30, 2005.

5. Pomper, Miles, “U.S., Israel Reach China Arms Deal,” Arms Control Today, September 2005, p. 34.

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that India subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of India, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member, but India pledged in July 2005 to adhere to the regime’s guidelines.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member, but India vowed to “harmonize” its export controls with those advocated by the voluntary 45-member group. India is prohibited from importing key nuclear materials and technologies from group members because New Delhi does not subject its entire nuclear enterprise to safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: No, but India pledged in July 2005 to negotiate and sign such an agreement.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant. A senior U.S. official indicated to Arms Control Today that the initiative does not target Indian transfers because it is a U.S. ally.[2]

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: India has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and offered to host IAEA courses on physical security of nuclear facilities.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
The Indian biotechnology private sector is highly sophisticated and the government conducts defensive biological weapons research. No evidence points to an offensive weapons program.

Chemical Weapons:
India has destroyed over half of its declared 1,055 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles. India’s destruction deadline is April 2009. Indian industry exports precursor and dual-use chemicals and the armed forces operate an active chemical weapons defense program.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: India has an active and advanced ballistic missile sector, which has produced a nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missile that is in service. Nuclear-capable medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles are also under development and have been flight-tested.  The Agni-3, which has an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers, is the longest-range missile successfully flight-tested. Consistent reports exist that India intends to convert a space launch vehicle into an intercontinental-range ballistic missile, the Surya.[3]



• Cruise Missiles: India has worked with Russia to produce the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile. The missile, which can be launched from aircraft, ships, or a mobile ground vehicle, has an estimated range of roughly 300 kilometers—the threshold range of missiles that Missile Technology Control Regime members are supposed to exercise restraint in exporting. India and Russia say they plan to market the missile for export.

Nuclear Weapons:
India is estimated as having an arsenal of up to 100 warheads, although it is unclear how many warheads might be fully assembled.[4] India is working to expand its fleet of ground-launched ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and has fighter aircraft that can perform this mission. The Indian government is also developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles that can be launched from surface ships and submarines.

Indian officials say the development of their nuclear stockpile is based on maintaining a “credible minimum deterrent.” Although India stated in January 2003 that it would not use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such arms and declared that nuclear weapons would only be used to retaliate against a nuclear attack, the government reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical weapons attacks.

India has conducted 3 nuclear weapon tests, although it claimed its first test was a “peaceful” nuclear explosion. In addition, one test involved two simultaneous explosions and another involved three synchronized blasts. The first test occurred May 18, 1974, and the last took place May 13, 1998.

India continues to produce fissile material for weapons purposes and refused to cease such production as part of a proposed U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation deal. New Delhi has approximately 500 kilograms of plutonium available for nuclear weapons and up to another 11.5 metric tons of reactor grade plutonium in spent fuel, which could be reprocessed for weapons use.[5] Some analysts estimate that India could increase its production of fissile material for weapons if it succeeds in securing foreign nuclear fuel shipments because such a move would free up more Indian domestic resources currently divided between the military and civilian sector for building bombs.[6] Only four of India’s 22 existing or under construction nuclear reactors are currently under IAEA safeguards.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
India is a leading buyer of conventional arms. Between 1999 and 2006, India totaled $22.4 billion in arms sales agreements, according to a 2007 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service. That total made India first among all developing arms buyers during that period.[7]

Proliferation Record

India’s first nuclear test was of a device derived partially from Canadian and U.S. exports designated for peaceful purposes. That test spurred the United States and several other countries to create the Nuclear Suppliers Group to more severely restrict global nuclear trade.

The George W. Bush adminstration has sanctioned several Indian entities for transferring technologies and know-how to Iraq and Iran that could contribute to chemical or biological weapons programs. Independent analysts also allege that India’s procurement system for its own nuclear programs could leak or reveal nuclear know-how to other states or non-state actors.[8]

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

India has concluded bilateral confidence-building measures with Pakistan. After their tit-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, the two rivals volunteered to abstain from nuclear testing. They also have established a hotline to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war and agreed to exchange advance notifications of ballistic missile flight tests.

At the 65-member Conference on Disarmament, India favors negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty that is “effectively verifiable,” which is a condition opposed by the United States. At that Geneva forum and elsewhere, India has consistently called for general nuclear disarmament by all states.

In March 2006, India pledged to subject more of its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards as part of a U.S.-Indian initiative to exempt India from current U.S. and multilateral nuclear trade restrictions. India has yet to negotiate the required safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which is a necessary condition for the overall U.S.-Indian effort to advance. The Indian government has not initiated negotiations with the IAEA because of opposition from some Indian lawmakers, who charge the U.S.-Indian deal will erode India’s ability to make independent foreign policy and impinge on its nuclear weapons program.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

ENDNOTES

1. Embassy of India, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/embassy_non_proliferation.htm.

2. Boese, Wade, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton,” Arms Control Today, December 2003, p. 37.

3. Speier, Richard, “U.S. Space Aid to India: On a “Glide Path” to ICBM Trouble?” Arms Control Today, March 2006, p. 13.

4. Natural Resources Defense Council, “India’s Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 74.

5. Mian, Zia, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M. V. Ramana, Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal, International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006, 36 pp.

6. Ibid.

7. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2007, 92 pp.

8. Albright, David, and Basu, Susan, Neither a Determined Proliferator Nor a Responsible Nuclear State: India’s Record Needs Scrutiny, Institute for Science and International Security, April 5, 2006, 4 pp.

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that France subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of France, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Yes, entered into force in 2004.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: France has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
Little is known about past French biological weapons activities, which reportedly included research on anthrax, botulinum toxin, cholera, ricin, rinderpest, and salmonella.[1] France is not suspected of having a current offensive biological weapons program.

Chemical Weapons:
France produced an arsenal of mustard gas and phosgene prior to World War II, but did not use them during the war. Afterward, France resumed offensive chemical weapons research and testing but quit these efforts in the late 1960s and destroyed its stockpile prior to 1988.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: In 1996, France decided to eliminate its nuclear-armed land-based ballistic missiles, leaving it with only submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). France is currently developing the M51 SLBM to replace older SLBMs outfitting France’s four ballistic missile submarines.



• Cruise Missiles: France has both conventional and nuclear-armed cruise missiles. The nuclear version is the Air-Sol-Moyenne Portée (ASMP). France has transferred cruise missiles to other countries, including the French-British Black Shaheen missile, a version of the Scalp cruise missile, to the United Arab Emirates.

Nuclear Weapons:
France is estimated to have approximately 350 nuclear warheads, most of which are designed for delivery by SLBMs. The other warheads would outfit the ASMP missiles carried by Mirage 2000N and Super Étendard planes.

France reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. It has reaffirmed a 1995 pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT. At the same time, French President Jacques Chirac suggested in January 2006 that nuclear weapons would be an option for responding to states that conduct “terrorist” or any type of weapon of mass destruction attack against France.

France conducted 210 nuclear tests. The first test occurred Feb. 13, 1960, and the last test took place Jan. 27, 1996.

Chirac announced in February 1996 that France no longer produced fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for weapons purposes. He also vowed that France would dismantle its fissile material production facilities for arms. France is estimated to have approximately 30 metric tons of HEU and five metric tons of plutonium for weapons purposes.[2]

Conventional Weapons Trade:
France is a major conventional weapons exporter. A September 2007 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service found that only the United States and Russia surpassed France in global arms sales between 1999 and 2006. France tallied $26.9 billion in arms agreements for that period, while the United States and Russia completed transactions worth $123.5 billion and $54.3 billion, respectively.[3]

Proliferation Record

In 1957, France signed a major nuclear cooperation agreement with Israel even though it was generally understood that Israel was interested in potentially developing a nuclear arsenal. France halted the agreement in 1960.

France built the Osiraq reactor in Iraq despite warnings from other governments that the reactor might be used to support a secret Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Paris declined to rebuild the reactor after Israel bombed the plant in 1981.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

France has signed protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin America, South Pacific, and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. France has not signed the protocols for the Central Asian and Southeast Asian zones.

The French government supports negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament.

France is a state-party to the Open Skies Treaty, which enables unarmed reconnaissance flights over all states-parties territories, and has signed the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Paris, along with other western capitals, is refusing to ratify the latter agreement until Russia fulfills commitments to withdraw its military forces from Georgia and Moldova.

France is participating in a Norwegian-led effort to negotiate a treaty to ban cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians,” and supported launching negotiations on cluster munitions through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Paris has engaged in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear activities, which France suspects are intended to develop nuclear weapons. France supports ratcheting up sanctions on Iran to persuade it to halt certain activities, particularly uranium enrichment.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

ENDNOTES

1. Lepick, Olivier, “French Activities Related to Biological Warfare, 1919-45,” Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945,” Geissler, Erhard, and van Courtland Mood, John Ellis, eds., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999.

2. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report, 2007, October 2007, 164 pp.

3. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2007, 92 pp.