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UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea

Press Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, 202-463-8270 ex. 102.

March 2013

The United Nations Security Council has adopted three major resolutions that sanction North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program and call on Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program “in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner" and refrain from ballistic missile tests. The first two resolutions were passed shortly after North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. The third came a month after North Korea successfully launched a satellite on Dec. 12, 2012. North Korea is prohibited from such launches under previous UN Security Council Resolutions because the technology in a satellite launch vehicle is directly applicable to ballistic missile development.  

All three resolutions were passed unanimously by the Security Council under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter.  While legally binding, states are prohibited from using force to carry out the obligations of the resolutions.  The resolutions call upon North Korea to rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it acceded to in 1985 but withdrew from in 2003 after U.S. allegations that the country was pursuing an illegal uranium enrichment program.  The Security Council also has called for North Korea to return to negotiations in the Six-Party Talks, negotiations between South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, that aim to peacefully dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  Talks began in 2003 but little real progress was made until February 2007 when negotiators reached an agreement with North Korea to shut down its nuclear program in exchange for humanitarian aid. However, progress on this front broke down in 2009 when North Korea completely withdrew from the talks in response to international condemnation of its attempt to launch a satellite in April 2009.

To this date, UN Security Council resolutions have been largely unsuccessful in preventing North Korea from advancing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, although the sanctions have slowed development in these areas. The United Nations continues to closely monitor these programs.  The 1718 Committee was established by Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2006 to oversee implementation and enforcement of sanctions against North Korea.  A Panel of Experts produces regular reports to the Security Council on the status of the sanctions and enforcement.  In the May 2012 report, the committee found that “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues actively to defy the measures in the resolutions” and that “the resolutions have not caused [North Korea] to halt its banned activities” (Report of the Panel of Experts, 2012).

Security Council Resolution 1718

Resolution 1718 was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on October 14, 2006.  The resolution was passed under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter.  The resolution was adopted in the wake of North Korea’s October 9, 2006 nuclear test.  The blast had an estimated explosive force of less than one kiloton and some radioactive output was detected. Many experts suggested the devise may have partially misfired.

Resolution 1718’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 1718 prohibits North Korea from conducting future nuclear tests or launching a ballistic missile.  It calls for the country to suspend its ballistic missile program and to completely abandon efforts to pursue a nuclear weapon. The resolution included a range of sanctions designed to prevent North Korea from continuing to develop these programs.

The resolution urged North Korea’s immediate return to the negotiating table for multilateral talks regarding its nuclear weapons program.

Resolution 1718’s Sanctions

UNSCR 1718 banned a range of imports and exports to North Korea and imposed an asset freeze and travel ban on persons involved in the country’s nuclear program.  This trade ban included “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.”  The resolution also prohibited imports of luxury goods to the country.

Large-scale arms, nuclear technology, and related training on nuclear weapons development were prohibited from being provided to North Korea.  All states were to cooperate in inspecting cargo suspected of trafficking nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons into the country.  In practice, not all states supported this and China, an ally of North Korea, did not inspect cargo to and from the country and continued to support the North Korean regime.

Sanctions limiting trade and instituting travel bans also were included.  Stipulations required states to freeze the assets of individuals suspected of being involved with North Korea’s nuclear program.  Special provisions were included that allowed money transfers and travel ban exemptions for humanitarian purposes to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Resolution 1718’s Monitoring Mechanisms

The resolution established a committee composed of the 15 current members of the UNSC to function as a monitoring body to review and adjust the imposed sanctions and violations of the sanctions.  The body was to provide a report every 90 days.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1718

A full copy can be found at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718(2006).

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking  measures under its Article 41,

1. Condemns the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006 in flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1695 (2006), as well as of the statement of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), including that such a test would bring universal condemnation of the international community and would represent a clear threat to international peace and security;

2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile;

3. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. Demands further that the DPRK return to the Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and  underlines the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

5. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching;

6. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;

8. Decides that:  (a) All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(i) Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 12 below (the Committee);

(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their provisions also taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction related programmes;

(iii) Luxury goods;

(b) The DPRK shall cease the export of all items covered in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;

(c) All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above;

(d) All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK’s nuclear-related, other weapons of mass  destruction-related and ballistic missile related programmes ...;

(f) In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this paragraph, and thereby preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials, all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary;

9. Decides that the provisions of paragraph 8 (d) above do not apply to financial or other assets or resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for  payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges …;

10. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (e) above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

12. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

(a) To seek from all States, in particular those producing or possessing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraph 8 (a) above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraph 8 of this resolution;

(g) To report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above;

13.  Welcomes and encourages further the efforts by all States concerned to intensify their diplomatic efforts, to refrain from any actions that might aggravate S/RES/1718 (2006)06-57207  5 tension and to facilitate the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, with a view to the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, to achieve the verifiable  denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

14. Calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and to work towards the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States;

17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Security Council Resolution 1874

Resolution 1874 was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on June 12, 2009.  It was passed under Chapter VII, Article 41, like Resolution 1718, and imposed further sanctions on North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear program.  The resolution was passed in  response to North Korea’s underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009, which was “in violation and flagrant disregard” of the previous Security Council Resolution from 2006.

Resolution 1874’s Principal Provisions

The resolution strengthened previous measures against the North Korean weapons development program by tightening sanctions on additional goods, persons, and entities.  Sanctions were expanded on arms exports and imports and member states were encouraged to inspect and destroy any cargo found within their territory en route to or from North Korea suspected of violating the arms embargo.

The Security Council again called upon North Korea to return to negotiating, especially through the Six Party talks with South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the US.  The resolution also called for North Korea to rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Resolution 1874’s Sanctions

Resolution 1874 strengthened sanctions stipulated in Resolution 1718.  It expanded the arms embargo by banning all imports and exports of weapons, excluding small arms, and stipulated that a state must notify the Security Council before selling arms to North Korea.

It also authorized states to inspect North Korean cargo within their territory on land, sea, and air suspected of being involved in the country’s weapons development program.  Seized cargo suspected of being connected with North Korea’s nuclear program was to be destroyed and the Security Council was to be notified.

Financial assistance to the regime was also limited.  Financial transfers that could be used to aid North Korea’s weapons development were prohibited.  Member states were also not allowed to enter into loans with the country unless for explicitly humanitarian purposes.

Resolution 1874’s Monitoring Mechanisms

The Secretary-General was asked to set up a seven-member expert panel to assist the sanctions committee in enforcing the resolution and monitor implementation.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1874

A full copy can be found here: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1874(2009).

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), and the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);

2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology;

3. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

4. Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006);

5. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;

6. Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States Parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States Parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

7. Calls upon all Member States to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), including with respect to designations made by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (“the Committee”) pursuant to the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);

8. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities,  shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;

9. Decides that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel;

11. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent  with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

17. Decides that Member States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution …;

19. Calls upon all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization, and also calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments;

22. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution and thereafter upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of this resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of this resolution;

26. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to seven experts (“Panel of Experts”), acting under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006) and the functions specified in paragraph 25 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyze information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution; and (d) provide an interim report on its work to the Council no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

29. Calls upon the DPRK to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest date;

30. Supports peaceful dialogue, calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six Party Talks without precondition …;

34. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Security Council Resolution 2087

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2087 on January 22, 2013 after a successful North Korea satellite launch.  The December 12, 2012 launch was a clear violation of previous resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) that prohibited any further development of technology applicable to North Korea’s nuclear or ballistic weapons programs.

Resolution 2087’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 2087 condemned North Korea’s satellite launch and recalled the previous sanctions imposed against the country’s weapons development programs.  It urged compliance with these resolutions and promised to take further action if the country refused to cooperate or conducted another nuclear test.

The resolution recalled North Korea’s obligations to completely abandon its nuclear programs in a verifiable and irreversible way and to cooperate with IAEA authorities in these efforts.  It also called for other states to “remain vigilant” in monitoring individuals and entities associated with the North Korean regime.

The resolution demanded that the country halt any future nuclear tests and promised “determination to take significant action” if it failed to comply.  It again called for North Korea to rejoin the Six-Party talks.

Resolution 2087’s Sanctions

Resolution 2087 strengthened the sanctions included in Resolutions 1718 and 1874.  Measures were included that clarified a state’s right to seize and destroy material suspected of heading to or from North Korea for purposes of weapons development or research.  It also reiterated travel bans on persons suspected of involvement with North Korea’s nuclear program.

Resolution 2087’s Monitoring Mechanisms

No new monitoring mechanisms were included in Resolution 2087.  States were called upon to continue their duties imposed by Resolutions 1917 and 1874 and to continue inspecting cargo suspected of being involved in North Korea’s weapons program.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 2087

A full copy can be found here: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2087(2013).

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), as well as the statements of its President of  6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Recognizing the freedom of all States to explore and use outer space in accordance with international law, including restrictions imposed by relevant Security Council resolutions,

1. Condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

2. Demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

3. Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile  technology, nuclear test or any further provocation;

4. Reaffirms its current sanctions measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

6.  Recalls paragraph 18 of resolution 1874 (2009), and calls upon Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance  in this regard, including monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial institutions, and other entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad) with or on behalf of financial institutions in the DPRK, or of those that act on behalf or at the direction of DPRK financial institutions,  including their branches, representatives, agents and subsidiaries abroad;

8. Recalls paragraph 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), recalls further that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and this resolution, and further clarifies that methods for States to dispose include, but are not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another State other than the originating or destination States for disposal;

9. Clarifies that the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) prohibit the transfer of any items if a State relevant to a transaction has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer;

12. Deplores the violations of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) …;

15. Reaffirms its support to the Six Party Talks,  calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia;

16. Calls upon all Member States to implement fully their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Security Council Resolution 2094

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2094 on March 7, 2013 in response to North Korea’s third nuclear test on February 12.  The third test was strongly condemned in the international arena.  North Korea called the test a direct response to Resolution 2087 of January 2013.  North Korea’s latest test was a flagrant violation of previous Security Council resolutions and the international norm against nuclear testing.

Resolution 2094’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 2094 condemned North Korea’s third nuclear test and its continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs.  It is the fifth Security Council resolution against North Korea since 2006 that sanctions the regime for continuing to pursue these programs.

The resolution aims to make it more difficult for North Korea to make further progress in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by hindering its access to hard cash and technological equipment needed to build weapons and pursue uranium enrichment.  It also called for states to inspect and detain any suspected cargo or shipments to or from North Korea that transit through their territory, if the cargo is suspected to contain bulk cash or material that could be used in a nuclear program. States also were directed to enhance vigilance over North Korea’s diplomatic personnel.

The resolution also called again on North Korea to honor its obligations to completely abandon its nuclear programs in a verifiable and irreversible way and to cooperate with IAEA authorities in these efforts.  It again prohibited the DPRK from conducting any further launches, tests, or other provocations.  It expressed concern that North Korea’s nuclear tests and further provocations were a threat to nonproliferation efforts in the region and threatened international peace and security.  The resolution called for a resumption of the Six-Party Talks and for the implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement.

Resolution 2094’s Sanctions

New financial sanctions targeted blocking the access of the Kim regime to bulk cash transfers, preventing illicit DPRK activities, and restricting ties to international banking systems.  The resolution urged states to use guidance from the Financial Action Task Force to limit North Korea’s access to finances that could be used for proliferation purposes.

Resolution 2094 also strengthened existing sanctions, expanded the scope of materials covered, and increased measures for states to enforce and monitor the implementation of sanctions and the transshipment of materials to or from North Korea through their territories.

The resolution named an additional three individuals to be subject to travel bans and asset freezes and identified two entities for asset freezes that were determined to be involved in North Korea’s nuclear program.  It also expanded the list of prohibited imports of luxury goods to North Korea, to include jewelry, yachts, luxury cars, and racing cars.

Resolution 2094’s Monitoring Mechanisms

No new monitoring mechanisms were included in Resolution 2094 but additional measures were provided to states to implement and monitor the sanctions imposed against North Korea.  Members of the committee on sanctions were called upon to update the list of sanctioned goods, entities, and individuals annually and report back to the Security Council. Additionally, the resolution extended the mandate of the panel of experts that assesses implementation of UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea through April 2014.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 2094

A full copy can be found at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2094(2013).

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41, S/RES/2094 (2013)

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of the Council’s relevant resolutions;

2. Decides that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any other provocation;

3. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;

4. Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

5. Condemns all the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment, notes that all such activities are in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities and shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403);

6. Reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

7. Reaffirms that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) apply to items prohibited by paragraphs 8 (a) (i), 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), decides that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) also apply to paragraphs 20 and 22 of this resolution, and notes that these measures apply also to brokering or other intermediary services, including when arranging for the provision, maintenance or use of prohibited items in other States or the supply, sale or transfer to or exports from other States;

8. Decides further that measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annexes I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to any individuals or entities acting on the behalf or at the direction of the individuals and entities that have already been designated, to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means;

9. Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

10. Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and the exemptions set forth in paragraph 10 of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any individual whom a State determines is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or individuals assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 S/RES/2094 (2013) (2013), and this resolution, and further decides that, if such an individual is a DPRK national, then States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law…;

11. Decides that Member States shall, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution…;

12. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, and also calls upon States to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

13. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, and other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution;

14. Expresses concern that transfers to the DPRK of bulk cash may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution…;

15. Decides that all Member States shall not provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes…;

16. Decides that all States shall inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

17. Decides that, if any vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009), all States shall deny such a vessel entry to their ports, unless entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, and decides further that any State that has been refused by a vessel to allow an inspection shall promptly report the incident to the Committee;

18. Calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing;

19. Requests all States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of DPRK aircraft or vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

20. Decides that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;

21. Directs the Committee to review and update the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013) no later than twelve months from the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter, and decides that, if the Committee has not acted to update this information by then, the Security Council will complete action to update within an additional thirty days;

22. Calls upon and allows all States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, and directs the Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding the proper implementation of this provision;

23. Reaffirms the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and clarifies that the term “luxury goods” includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;

24. Calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

29. Recalls the creation, pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), of a Panel of Experts, under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the tasks provided for by that paragraph, decides to extend until 7 April 2014 the Panel’s mandate…;

31. Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;

34. Reaffirms its support to the Six-Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

36. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;

37. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

-Researched by Alexandra Schmitt.

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