Press Contact: Peter Crail, Research Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102
Diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue have produced several proposals for a negotiated settlement. Thus far, none of those proposals have gained acceptance from all of the involved parties and efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program continue.
Tehran has devised several such proposals, some of which included provisions to initially limit operations at its key nuclear facilities and implement transparency measures for its nuclear activities. (See ACT, June 2006.) France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran a number of proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations from 2003-2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 as part of a format known as the “P5+1”—in reference to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany—offering similar comprehensive proposals to Iran. The P5+1 have described their negotiations with Tehran regarding these proposals as one track of a “dual track strategy” to address Iran’s nuclear program. The second track consists of Security Council resolutions which impose sanctions on Iran and demand that it suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as well as construction of a heavy water reactor.1 The West fears that Iran might enrich uranium to high levels necessary for use in nuclear weapons, or reprocess spent nuclear fuel to acquire plutonium for weapons.
Spring 2003 Proposal
According to Tim Guldimann, former Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Iran issued a proposal to the United States in May 2003 calling for negotiations on a variety of contentious issues between the two countries. The document listed a number of agenda items that the two countries would negotiate and proposed the creation of three parallel working groups to carry out negotiations on disarmament, regional security, and economic cooperation. Key among the agenda items were:
- Relief of all U.S. sanctions on Iran
- Cooperation to stabilize Iraq
- Full transparency over Iran’s nuclear program, including the Additional Protocol
- Cooperation against terrorist organizations, particularly the Mujahedin-e Khalq and al-Qaeda
- Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land for peace” declaration on Israel/Palestine
- Iran’s full access to peaceful nuclear technology, as well as chemical and bio-technology
The Bush administration dismissed the proposal in favor of other approaches towards Iran.
EU3-Iran Proposals
Several months later, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom agreed to discuss with Iran a range of nuclear, security, and economic issues as long as Tehran suspended work on its uranium enrichment program and cooperated fully with an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, that agreement unraveled the following year when Tehran continued work on uranium conversion, the precursor to enrichment. Iran then agreed with the EU3 in November 2004 to implement a more stringent suspension. Negotiations between the two sides began shortly afterward. (See ACT, December 2004.)
Iran presented four proposals during the course of these negotiations. In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, the proposals covered subjects such as Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations, regional security issues, and economic cooperation.
The Iranian proposals were as follows:
January 17, 2005 This Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran Political and Security Working Group outlined commitments on both sides in general terms, including:
- An Iranian commitment not to pursue weapons of mass destruction
- A rejection of any attacks, threats of attack, or sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facilities
- Cooperation on combating terrorism, including intensifying the exchange of information and the denial of safe havens
- Regional security cooperation, including on Iraq and Afghanistan
- Cooperation on strategic trade controls and the EU removal of restrictions on transfers of conventional arms and dual use goods to Iran
The Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran steering committee in March provided greater detail into the “objective guarantees” Iran was willing to discuss regarding its nuclear program, including:
- Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol and continuous on-site inspections at key facilities
- Limiting the expansion of Iran’s enrichment program and a policy declaration of no reprocessing
- Immediately converting all enriched uranium to fuel rods
- An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe
- Iran’s guaranteed access to advanced nuclear technology along with contracts for the construction of nuclear plants in Iran by the EU
- Normalizing Iran’s status under G8 export controls
In April Iran’s proposal repeated some of the items in the March proposal, but focused more on short-term confidence-building measures than long term resolutions. Its key terms included:
- Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol
- A policy declaration of no reprocessing by Iran
- Continued enrichment suspension for six months
- Establishment of joint task forces on counter-terrorism and export control
- An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe
Iranian Message from Hassan Rowhani, then-Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In his statement Rohani proposes:
- An agreement on initial limitations on uranium enrichment at Natanz
- Negotiations for the full-scale operation of Natanz
- Arrangements to import material for uranium conversion and the export of UF6
- Negotiation of an “optimized” IAEA monitoring mechanism for Natanz
In August 2005 the three European countries presented their own comprehensive proposal for a long-term agreement, outlining the following:
- Arrangements for the assured supply of low enriched uranium for any light water reactors constructed in Iran
- Establishing a buffer store of nuclear fuel located in a third country
- A commitment by Iran not to pursue fuel cycle technologies, reviewable after 10 years
- A legally binding commitment by Iran not to withdraw from the NPT and Iran’s adoption of the Additional Protocol
- Arrangements for Iran to return spent nuclear fuel to supplier countries
- EU recognition of Iran as a long-term source of fossil fuel energy
- EU-Iran cooperation in a variety of political-security areas, including Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, and drug trafficking
Iran rejected that proposal days later, claiming that it did not recognize Iran’s right to enrichment. Tehran proceeded with uranium conversion, breaking the suspension agreement with the EU3 and ending negotiations.
In order to support Iran’s talks with the EU, Russia proposed to Iran in October 2005 that Tehran share ownership of a uranium-enrichment plant located in Russia. (See ACT, November 2005.) Following months of discussions on that proposal, Iran ultimately rejected it in March 2006.
P5+1 Proposals
China, Russia, and the United States joined the three EU3 countries in June 2006 to offer another proposal for comprehensive negotiations with Iran. (See ACT, September 2006.) The proposal mirrored some of the previous offers for negotiations and included the following key points:
- Iran’s suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
- The establishment of a mechanism to review this moratorium
- Iran’s resumption of the Additional Protocol
- The provision of state-of-the-art light water reactors to Iran through joint projects, along with nuclear fuel guarantees and a 5-year buffer stock of fuel
- Suspension of the discussion of Iran’s nuclear program in the UN Security Council
- Cooperation on civil aviation, telecommunications, high-technology, and agriculture, and other areas, between the United States, EU, and Iran
Tehran responded to this proposal in August 2006. It rejected the terms of the proposal due to its requirement that Iran suspend its enrichment-related activities, but noted that the proposal contained “useful foundations and capacities for comprehensive and long-term cooperation between the two sides.” It did not, however, identify what those useful foundations were.
In March 2008, the P5+1 agreed to “repackage” the June 2006 proposal in order to specify some of the benefits that they would offer Iran as part of a long-term agreement on its nuclear program and to better demonstrate the nature of those benefits to the Iranian public. This agreement to revise the 2006 proposal coincided with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1803, the third UN sanctions resolution on Iran. (See ACT, April 2008)
Before that package was formally submitted to Iran, however, Tehran issued its own proposal to the six-country group. (See ACT, June 2008). While the Iranian proposal also called for comprehensive negotiations leading to cooperation on nuclear energy, and political and economic concerns, it offered very few details regarding the steps Iran would take to resolve concerns related to its nuclear program. Some of its key provisions were:
- “Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world-including Iran”
- Improved IAEA supervision “in different states”
- Cooperation on nuclear safety and physical protection
- Cooperation on export controls
- Cooperation on regional security and global economic issues
The P5+1 group presented their revised package during a June 2008 meeting in Tehran which included participants from five of the six countries, excluding the United States. (See ACT, July/August 2008). During the meeting, the six-countries relayed an understanding that preliminary talks could begin under a six-week “freeze-for-freeze” period in which Iran would halt the expansion of its enrichment program while the six countries would agree not to pursue additional sanctions against Tehran. The proposal also entailed:
- The 2006 package remains on the table
- Consideration of nuclear energy R&D and treatment of Iran’s nuclear program as any other NPT non-nuclear-weapons state once confidence is restored
- Technological and financial assistance for Iran’s nuclear energy program
- Reaffirmation of the UN Charter obligation to refrain from the use and threat of use of force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter
- Cooperation on Afghanistan, including drug-trafficking, refugee return, reconstruction, and border controls
- Steps towards normalizing economic and trade relations, including support for WTO membership for Iran
- Further details on the prospect for cooperation on agriculture, the environment and infrastructure, civil aviation, and social development and humanitarian issues
Representatives of the six-country group, including the United States for the first time, followed up the June meeting with a meeting in July 2008 in Geneva. At the meeting, Iran issued a non-paper proposing a process for negotiations, highlighting that such discussions would be “based on the commonalities of the two packages” issued by Iran and the P5+1 group in May and June. Both the P5+1 and Iranian proposals called for political, economic, and security cooperation but the Iranian proposal did not address steps that Tehran would take in regard to its nuclear program. The Geneva discussions were inconclusive. (See ACT, September 2008)
Following the election of U.S. President Barack Obama, who sought to abandon the previous U.S. policy requiring Iran to fulfill UN Security Council demands to suspend nuclear fuel cycle activities prior to negotiations, the P5+1 sought to renew their negotiations with Iran. They issued a statement in April 2009 in which the other five countries welcomed “the new direction of U.S. policy towards Iran,” formally inviting Iran to talks once again. (See ACT, May 2009)
Iran did not respond to that invitation until that September, when Tehran issued a revised proposal. Although that proposal repeated several of the provisions of the one Iran issued in 2008, it did not include a section on the nuclear issue. Instead, the proposal covered the following:
- Cooperation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and piracy
- UN and Security Council reform
- The codification of rights for the use of space
- Promoting a “rule-based” and “equitable” IAEA oversight function
- Promoting NPT universality and WMD nonproliferation
1. To date, the UN Security Council has adopted five resolutions in response to Iran’s nuclear program. The council first demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities with the adoption of resolution 1696 in July 2006. The following three resolutions, 1737 adopted in December 2006, 1747 adopted in March 2007, and 1803 adopted in March 2008, imposed incremental sanctions on Iranian persons and entities believed to have been involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. The council adopfted the latest resolution, 1835, in September 2008, and reiterated the demands made in resolution 1696 without imposing additional sanctions.