Country Resources
Another U.S. aerial military strike on Iran, as President Trump said today he is considering, would not advance the goal of blocking Iran’s potential pathways to acquire nuclear weapons if its leaders were to decide to do so.
Another U.S. aerial military strike on Iran, as President Trump said today he is considering, would not advance the goal of blocking Iran’s potential pathways to acquire nuclear weapons if its leaders were to decide to do so.
Another U.S. aerial military strike on Iran, as President Trump said today he is considering, would not advance the goal of blocking Iran’s potential pathways to acquire nuclear weapons if its leaders were to decide to do so.
Following the Feb. 5 expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), President Donald Trump and senior administration officials say the United States seeks multilateral talks that involve Russia as well as China as a means to make progress on nuclear arms control and risk reduction.
Following the Feb. 5 expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), President Donald Trump and senior administration officials say the United States seeks multilateral talks that involve Russia as well as China as a means to make progress on nuclear arms control and risk reduction.
Following the Feb. 5 expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), President Donald Trump and senior administration officials say the United States seeks multilateral talks that involve Russia as well as China as a means to make progress on nuclear arms control and risk reduction.
Following the Feb. 5 expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), President Donald Trump and senior administration officials say the United States seeks multilateral talks that involve Russia as well as China as a means to make progress on nuclear arms control and risk reduction.
When the Trump administration announced a joint declaration on U.S. nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia in November 2025, the White House claimed the proposed deal would lead to a “decades-long multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership” with benefits to American nuclear companies. But U.S. officials dodged key questions about the nonproliferation obligations Saudi Arabia—a country that has openly threatened to develop nuclear weapons if Iran does—will be subject to under the proposed agreement.
When the Trump administration announced a joint declaration on U.S. nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia in November 2025, the White House claimed the proposed deal would lead to a “decades-long multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership” with benefits to American nuclear companies. But U.S. officials dodged key questions about the nonproliferation obligations Saudi Arabia—a country that has openly threatened to develop nuclear weapons if Iran does—will be subject to under the proposed agreement.
When the Trump administration announced a joint declaration on U.S. nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia in November 2025, the White House claimed the proposed deal would lead to a “decades-long multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership” with benefits to American nuclear companies. But U.S. officials dodged key questions about the nonproliferation obligations Saudi Arabia—a country that has openly threatened to develop nuclear weapons if Iran does—will be subject to under the proposed agreement.
When the Trump administration announced a joint declaration on U.S. nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia in November 2025, the White House claimed the proposed deal would lead to a “decades-long multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership” with benefits to American nuclear companies. But U.S. officials dodged key questions about the nonproliferation obligations Saudi Arabia—a country that has openly threatened to develop nuclear weapons if Iran does—will be subject to under the proposed agreement.
For the first time in many decades, there are no legally-binding limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and there are no active negotiations to establish new nuclear arms control constraints. A post-New START nuclear weapons buildup is now possible but is by no means inevitable.
For the first time in many decades, there are no legally-binding limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and there are no active negotiations to establish new nuclear arms control constraints. A post-New START nuclear weapons buildup is now possible but is by no means inevitable.
In February 2025, the Arms Control Association signed on to the US Cluster Munitions Coalition statement opposing the US purchase of cluster munitions from Israel.