Editor's Note

The Bush administration has succeeded since taking office in forcing a new debate on the role of verification in arms control. Propelled by skeptics such as John Bolton, then undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, the administration has, among other steps, rejected a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and negotiated nuclear arms reductions with Russia without verification provisions. In the view of these officials, verification rules do not restrain cheaters but do unnecessarily burden trustworthy states.

Several of our authors this month grapple with the consequences. In our cover story, Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent call for a new strategic arms control agreement. The 1991 START agreement has provided the verification backbone for current U.S.-Russian efforts at slashing weapons arsenals, but it is due to expire in 2009. A new pact, they write, would bolster bilateral disarmament efforts and a relationship undergoing considerable turmoil.

The administration’s opposition to a BWC protocol at the treaty’s 2001-2002 review conference has effectively blocked discussion about it since. Trevor Findlay writes that prospects for reviving such a far-reaching protocol anytime soon are slim, but he sees a growing likelihood that member-states will approve a series of smaller quasi-verification measures at this fall’s review conference.

The conference could also endorse codes of conducts for scientists engaged in research that could lead to biological weapons. In the scientific community, such codes are fairly commonplace as a means of more formally stating generally agreed-on acceptable behavior. As Roger Roffey, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau point out, however, such a code is sorely lacking for scientists who engage in biodefense research.

Our news section this month examines a joint series of nuclear initiatives announced by Putin and President George W. Bush, the impasse at the recent UN conference on small arms, and whether the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program can be revived after that country’s provocative missile tests.

In our “Looking Back” section this month, James Goodby reflects on the landmark 1986 U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit and its lessons for today. At that summit, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came close to agreeing to rid the world of all ballistic missiles and even aired the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether. Although falling short of the goal, the summit provided the groundwork for other agreements, including START. Perhaps it is time to trust and verify again.