Weapons in Space?
- Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option
- Programs to Watch
- False Alarm on Foreign Capabilities
- National Space Policy: Evolution by Stealth?
Weapons in the Heavens:
A Radical and Reckless Option
Of all the risky “transformation” initiatives championed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the one receiving the least media attention is the weaponization of space. Shortly before arriving for his second tour at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld chaired a commission calling for the U.S. government to vigorously pursue “the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.”
The Air Force is now actively implementing Rumsfeld’s wishes. As General Lance Lord, commander of U.S. Air Force Space Command, explained, “We must establish and maintain space superiority. Modern warfare demands it. Our nation expects it. Simply put, it’s the American way of fighting.”
Rumsfeld’s transformation in U.S. military space policy is driven by worst-case assumptions that the weaponization of space is inevitable; that conflict follows commerce in space, as on the ground; and that the United States must not wait to suffer a “Space Pearl Harbor.” Yet, the countries most capable of developing such weapons, such as Russia and China, have professed strong interest in avoiding the weaponization of space. The Bush administration has refused negotiations on this subject.
If Rumsfeld’s plans to weaponize space are carried to fruition, America’s armed forces, economy, and diplomacy will face far greater burdens, while controls over proliferation would be weakened further. Although everybody loses if the heavens become a shooting gallery, no nation loses more than the United States, which is the primary beneficiary of satellites for military and commercial purposes.
If the United States leads the way in flight-testing and deploying new anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, other states will surely follow suit because they have too much to lose by allowing the Pentagon sole rights to space warfare. U.S. programs will cost more and be far more sophisticated than the ASAT weapons of potential adversaries, who will opt to kill satellites cheaply and crudely. The resulting competition would endanger U.S. troops that depend on satellites to an unprecedented degree for battlefield intelligence, communication, and targeting to win quickly and with a minimum of casualties.
Space warfare would have far-reaching adverse effects for global commerce, especially commercial transactions and telecommunication services that use satellites. Worldwide space industry revenues now total almost $110 billion a year, $40 billion of which go to U.S. companies. These numbers do not begin to illuminate how much disruption would occur in the event of space warfare. For a glimpse of what could transpire, the failure of a Galaxy IV satellite in May 1998 is instructive. Eighty-nine percent of all U.S. pagers used by 45 million customers became inoperative, and direct broadcast transmissions, financial transactions, and gas station pumps were also affected.
Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation. ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia’s hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan. The Bush administration’s plans would also further alienate America’s friends and allies, which, with the possible exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The fabric of international controls over weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush administration’s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized.
This highly destabilizing and dangerous scenario can be avoided, as there is no pressing need to weaponize space and many compelling reasons to avoid doing so. If space becomes another realm for the flight-testing and deployment of weapons, there will be no sanctuary in space and no assurance that essential satellites will be available when needed for military missions and global commerce. Acting on worst-case assumptions often can increase this likelihood. Crafting a space assurance posture, including a hedging strategy in the event that others cheat, offers more potential benefits and lower risks than turning the heavens into a shooting gallery.
Charting a Dangerous Course
During the Cold War, no weapons were deployed in space, and the last test of an ASAT weapon occurred almost two decades ago, in 1985. This record of restraint reflects international norms and widespread public sentiment to keep space free of weapons. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty calls on the exploration and use of outer space to be conducted “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries” and mandates that space may not be subject to “national appropriation” by any means. Why, then, would space warriors now seek to chart a different and far more dangerous course? If the weaponization of space were inevitable, it would have occurred decades ago when Washington and Moscow competed intensively in other domains. Indeed, the record of restraint since the Cold War ended suggests that the Outer Space Treaty’s injunctions against placing weapons of mass destruction in space could be broadened if they are championed by the United States, China, and Russia.
The prediction that warfare follows commerce and that the burgeoning of space-aided commerce will produce hostilities is also suspect. To the contrary, most of the world’s strife takes place in poor regions. Space-aided commerce occurs primarily between nations with advanced commercial sectors, which generally have peaceful relations. Moreover, commercial space activities are often collaborative undertakings where risks and costs are shared. No nation that has invested heavily in space-aided commerce stands to gain if these orbital planes are endangered by space weapons debris or space mines. Any country that flight-tests, deploys, or uses space weapons threatens the activities of all other space-faring nations.
A third argument for weaponizing space rests on the unparalleled position that the United States now enjoys in terrestrial warfare. Consequently, the Rumsfeld Commission and space warriors argue that weaker nations will carry out surprise attacks in space to neutralize U.S. nuclear war-fighting advantages. The best way to secure U.S. interests, the proponents say, is to transition from superiority to dominance.
Worries about a surprise attack in space cannot be written off, but there are far easier, less traceable, and more painful ways for America’s enemies to engage in asymmetric warfare than by attacking U.S. satellites. Weapons in space and weapons on Earth specifically designed to neutralize or destroy objects in space are being pursued for another reason as well: to help U.S. armed forces win quickly and with a minimum of casualties. This rationale only makes sense if America’s adversaries will refrain from fighting back in space. If they return fire, however, U.S. troops are likely to be punished rather than helped because of their greater reliance on satellites.
Similarly, the clear preference of U.S. space warriors is to use nondestructive techniques that disorient, dazzle, or disable an adversary’s satellites without producing debris that could destroy the space shuttle, the international space station, and satellites. America’s weaker foes, however, have far less incentive to be so fastidious about debris in their approach to space warfare. States possessing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles could explode a nuclear weapon in space to wreak havoc on satellites.
Hair Trigger in the Heavens
To prevent adversaries from shooting back, the United States would need to know exactly where all threatening space objects are located, to neutralize them without producing debris that can damage U.S. or allied space objects, and to target and defeat all ground-based military activities that could join the fight in space. In other words, successful space warfare mandates pre-emptive strikes and a preventive war in space as well as on the ground. War plans and execution often go awry here on Earth. It takes enormous hubris to believe that space warfare would be any different. If ASAT and space-based, ground-attack weapons are flight-tested and deployed, space warriors will have succeeded in the dubious achievement of replicating the hair-trigger nuclear postures that plagued humankind during the Cold War. Armageddon nuclear postures continue to this day, with thousands of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons ready to be launched in minutes to incinerate opposing forces, command and control nodes, and other targets, some of which happen to be located within large metropolitan areas. If the heavens were weaponized, these nuclear postures would be reinforced and elevated into space.
U.S. space warriors now have a doctrine and plans for counterspace operations, but they do not have a credible plan to stop inadvertent or uncontrolled escalation once the shooting starts. Like U.S. war-fighting scenarios, there is a huge chasm between plans and consequences, in which requirements for escalation dominance make uncontrolled escalation far more likely. A pre-emptive strike in space on a nation that possesses nuclear weapons would invite the gravest possible consequences. Attacks on satellites that provide early warning and other critical military support functions would most likely be viewed either as a surrogate or as a prelude to attacks on nuclear forces.
Even if space weapons are not used, their flight-testing or presence overhead, capable of impairing a country’s ability to see, hear, navigate, detect impending danger, and fight, would have profound implications for international relations. The medium of space is not country-specific. The placement of space weapons in low-Earth orbit will be of concern to any country over which the space weapon passes or could pass with orbital adjustments.
Washington policymakers do not talk often or publicly about space warfare, and China and Russia continue to seek improved ties to the United States. There is, however, considerable awareness in Moscow and Beijing about the Pentagon’s plans and deep skepticism that the Pentagon’s interest in space warfare is directed solely at states such as North Korea and Iran. Instead, the Air Force’s new counterspace doctrine is widely viewed in the broader context of the Bush administration’s endorsement of pre-emptive strikes and preventive wars, open-ended national missile defense deployments, and the integration of improved broad-area surveillance and conventional deep-strike capabilities alongside U.S. nuclear forces, which remain on high states of alert.
If U.S. counterspace programs proceed, Russia and China can be expected to forge closer ties, pursuing joint diplomatic initiatives to prevent the weaponization of space, alongside military research and development programs to counter U.S. military options. Instead of engaging in a Cold War-like nuclear arms race with Washington, Moscow and Beijing will compete asymmetrically, using less elaborate and expensive techniques, such as by trailing expensive U.S. space weapons and satellites with cheap space mines.
A Better Alternative: Space Assurance
Instead of weaponizing space, a “space assurance” posture would offer a greater likelihood that essential U.S. satellites will be available when needed. Adopting a space assurance posture above all requires the avoidance of dangerous military activities in space, including flight tests that simulate attacks against satellites and the deployment of ASAT and space weapons. Space assurance has many other mutually reinforcing components. One basic element is to maintain superior U.S. conventional military capabilities. Potential adversaries must understand clearly that if they damage, or destroy U.S. satellites, they will not alter the outcome of battle. Rather, they will only suffer more casualties by impairing satellites that improve targeting and reduce collateral damage.
A second key element of space assurance is increased situational awareness in space so U.S. military leaders can quickly identify developments that could cause potential harm to satellites. This includes improved monitoring capabilities for objects in space, whether small satellites operated by foreign nations or space debris. A corollary requirement to improved situational awareness is improved intelligence capabilities relating to the space programs of potential adversaries.
The more U.S. officials know or can find out about space-related activities of potential adversaries, the more they can strengthen deterrence against unwelcome surprises. Another way to strengthen deterrence would be to adopt a hedging strategy against the initiation by others of space warfare flight tests and deployments. One key aspect of a hedging strategy is already in place. In extremis, the United States could use long-range ballistic missiles and lasers designed for other missions to disable or kill satellites. These residual, or latent, space warfare capabilities, which are growing with the advent of missile defense interceptors, have long existed. Rather than leading inexorably to the flight-testing and deployment of weapons specifically designed for space warfare, they have served as an insurance policy while deterring unwelcome surprises.
Additional hedges can be taken in the form of research and development programs that stop short of flight-testing. Potential adversaries can be expected to be working on their own space warfare initiatives behind closed doors, as is now the case with the United States. Ongoing research and development programs would shorten the timelines of flight-testing new initiatives if potential adversaries do not emulate U.S. restraint. Not every research and development program is worthy of support, however, particularly kinetic-kill programs that generate space debris.
An essential element of space assurance is the strengthening of existing norms against the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons. Many norms for responsible space-faring nations already exist, including prohibiting the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space under the aforementioned Outer Space Treaty, helping astronauts in distress, registering space objects, accepting liability for damage caused by national endeavors in space, and acknowledging that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries and humankind.
The scope of existing norms needs to be expanded if space assurance is to be reinforced. Traditionally, the forum in which international norms are codified is the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. This 65-nation body operates by consensus, however, and at best requires many years to reach agreement on treaty texts, which might then be stalled further in the process of ratification, as is now the case with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This reason is not sufficient to block or reject negotiations in the CD relating to the prevention of space weapons, but it does suggest the wisdom of reinforcing existing norms in quicker ways.
The development of a code of conduct establishing agreed “rules of the road” for responsible space-faring nations can expedite international efforts to prevent the weaponization of space. Many codes of conduct already exist in the form of bilateral or multilateral executive agreements. During the Cold War, the United States entered into executive agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent dangerous military practices at sea, on the ground, and in the air. The Bush administration champions codes of conduct to prevent ballistic missile proliferation and terrorism. A similar approach could reinforce space assurance.
The U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) accord, signed in 1972, has served as a model for comparable agreements signed by more than 30 other sea-faring nations. The INCSEA agreement established important rules, including pledges to avoid collisions at sea, the use of blinding light to illuminate the bridges of passing ships, and interference in the “formations” of the other party. Washington and Moscow subsequently signed the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (PDMA) agreement in 1989. The PDMA agreement covers, among other dangerous military activities, “interfering with command and control networks in a manner that could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party.” It establishes procedures to deal with boundary incursions and permits the designation of “special caution areas.”
Space also deserves “rules of the road” to help prevent incidents and dangerous military activities. Such a code of conduct would include provisions against simulated attacks; the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons; dangerous maneuvers in space, except those for rescue, repair, and other peaceful purposes; and commercial interference, as well as requirements to mitigate space debris.
The definitions of space warfare, the scope of agreed constraints, and the ability to monitor them have plagued every prior initiative in this field. They will also bedevil efforts to craft a code of conduct. Nonetheless, this effort is worth pursuing. The risks associated with pursuing a code of conduct for responsible space-faring nations are minimal compared to the risks of flight-testing and deploying space weapons.
The weaponization of space was avoided during the Cold War, even though both superpowers jockeyed for military advantage on virtually every other front. Space weaponry can also be avoided now, when the United States enjoys unparalleled agenda-setting powers. Existing norms against weaponizing space can be strengthened if Washington exercises restraint, adopts prudent hedges, and joins others in diplomatic efforts to pursue space assurance. The time is ripe to reinforce existing norms in space that have greatly benefited space-aided commerce, scientific exploration, and the U.S. armed forces.
1. “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization,” January 11, 2000, p. xii (hereinafter Rumsfeld Commission report).
2. General Lance W. Lord, “Keynote Address to the National Space and Missile Materials Symposium,” Seattle, June 22, 2004.
3. Rumsfeld Commission report, p. 100.
4. Office of Space Commercialization, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Trends in Space Commerce,” June 2001.
5. Mike Mills, “Satellite Glitch Cuts Off Data Flow,” The Washington Post, May 21, 1998.
6. The term “space assurance” was proposed by Douglas Necessary, who participated in a study group convened by the Henry L. Stimson Center to assess U.S. military space policy. For an elaboration of this concept, see Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).
7. See, for example, Rumsfeld Commission report and United States Space Command, “Vision for 2020,” August 1997.
8. A recent Federation of American Scientists study, “Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space,” greatly underestimated the debris problem created by space warfare by focusing mainly on ballistic missile intercepts in low-Earth orbit that create the fewest problems relating to debris. For a more comprehensive and realistic view of the problem, see Theresa Hitchens, “Space Debris: Next Steps” (presentation, Geneva, March 24-25, 2004), found at http://www.cdi.org.
9. For more on the problem of space mines, see Richard L. Garwin, “Space Weapons: Not Yet” (paper presented at the Pugwash Workshop on Preserving the Non-Weaponization of Space, May 22-24, 2003), found at http://fas.org/RLG/030522-space.pdf.
10. With the help of others, the Henry L. Stimson Center’s Space Security Project has drafted a model code of conduct for responsible space-faring nations. See “A Model Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Incidents and Dangerous Military Practices in Outer Space,” found at http://www.stimson.org/wos/?SN=WS20040830709.
Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, is the author of Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space with Christopher Clary (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and editor of Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
The Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, which Donald Rumsfeld chaired until his nomination as Secretary of Defense, warned of a coming “Space Pearl Harbor.” During congressional testimony in 2002, Rumsfeld repeated the warning:
“Today,” Rumsfeld allowed, “no nation has the capability to wreak such havoc.” He added, however, that the United States “must make sure no one can. Our goal is not to bring war into space, but rather defend against those who would.”
In congressional testimony and official reports during 2003 and 2004, the Defense Department claimed that China was developing killer microsatellites based largely on a January 2001 Hong Kong newspaper article. The article claimed China had developed and tested a “killer” microsatellite described as a “parasitic” microsatellite that could attach itself to and disrupt U.S. military satellites.
In recent years, Pentagon advocacy for pursuing a strategy of “space control” that includes war-fighting “in, from and through space” has reached a fever pitch. Top Pentagon and Air Force space officials have repeatedly testified to Congress and made public speeches about the need for the U.S. military to establish “space dominance” to counter enemies of the future. Some officials, such as General Lance Lord, chief of Air Force Space Command, have even declared that “war in space has begun.”
What remains uncertain, however, is whether such a strategy actually has been politically endorsed at the White House level and is consistent with national space policy.
Officially, the National Space Policy promulgated by President Bill Clinton in 1996 still stands, a policy that had previously been interpreted as eschewing the deployment of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and weapons in orbit, reflecting more than 40 years of informal restraint both by Republican and Democratic administrations.
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice in 2002 launched a review of space policy, but that review is still pending. Indeed, in the four years since the inauguration of President George W. Bush, no new public documents that explain overarching administration (or Department of Defense) policy toward space weapons have been released. The single new policy paper relating to the issue was approved at Pentagon level, “DoD Policy on Space Control,” signed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in January 2001. That policy, however, is classified as secret.
Meanwhile, there has been a steady trickle of lower-level military planning and doctrine documents that seem to codify U.S. intentions to develop, deploy, and eventually use space weapons. The most recent is the Air Force’s Aug. 2 “Counterspace Operations Doctrine.” This precedent-setting document outlines Air Force guidelines for conducting ASAT operations, possibly pre-emptively, against satellite systems being used by enemies, whether they be dedicated military satellites; those with primarily commercial functions; or those owned and/or operated by third parties, whether governments or commercial entities.
Another document published in August by the Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly sets out operational guidelines for coordinating space operations across the services, including those to destroy enemy satellites and space systems.
The situation begs a number of questions: What exactly is U.S. policy on the weaponization of space? Is the United States now determined unilaterally to break the taboo against arming the heavens that has stood since the dawn of the space age? Has such a policy and strategy been blessed, either formally or informally with a wink and a nod, by the White House? Is the Pentagon or Air Force simply trying to take advantage of a policy vacuum by rushing to quietly implement a more aggressive approach to military space?
One possible conclusion from reading the tea leaves, however, is that the White House and Pentagon are engaged in a clever political effort to avoid a controversial public argument on space weapons by reinterpreting Clinton-era policy or practice behind closed doors, that is, to reorient U.S. space policy in secret.
True, the Clinton policy itself is less than clear on the issue of space weapons and is open to a number of interpretations. Although it stresses the peaceful uses of space and downplays military applications, it also leaves the door open for the employment of ASATs for national security reasons. For example, the policy states that U.S. national security space activities should assure “that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space” and should “[counter], if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes.” It later states that, “[c]onsistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.”
Although vague, the 1996 policy was widely interpreted at the time as stressing a deterrent approach, while refraining from any first deployment of ASAT systems or space-based weapons for striking targets on earth. In other words, one could read the Clinton policy as based on a belief that space control could be achieved without weapons. It should be noted that this reading of the Clinton policy would also be consistent with the historical approach to military space first laid out by the Eisenhower administration, according to Air Force sources.
In fact, the Clinton administration was viewed as politically hostile even to the development of space weapons, particularly those that could be seen as having offensive attributes. Clinton canceled a number of research and development programs that would have crossed the line toward weaponizing space, including the space-based Global Protection Against Limited Strike program that evolved under President George H. W. Bush from President Ronald Reagan’s more ambitious “Star Wars” project; the Air Force’s planned military Spaceplane; NASA’s Clementine II satellite experiment designed in part as a proof of concept for space-based missile defense; and the Army’s Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite Weapon. By contrast, the Bush administration has allowed a wide array of space weapons-related technology developments to go forward at the Pentagon (see sidebar). Meanwhile, the Air Force’s most recent vision for its future force structure includes a number of ASAT and space strike weapons such as the Ground-Based Laser, the Air-Launched ASAT Missile, the Space-Based Radio Frequency Weapon, and Hypervelocity Rod Bundles.
“There was a while in the 1990s when we couldn’t say ‘space control’—we couldn’t talk about it,” Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, then-commander of the U.S. Space Command and U.S. Air Force Space Command, was quoted in May 2002 by Jane’s International Defence Review.
Air Force and Space Command planning documents dating from the Clinton era, such as the Space Command’s 1998 “Long Range Plan,” are as equivocal as the National Space Policy itself, reflecting long-standing service efforts to press the edge of the envelope regarding space weapons. At the same time, they also can be read as reflecting the military’s view that nothing from the Clinton administration authorized the development and deployment of offensive systems designed to “negate” enemy assets in space or of space-based weapons to hit terrestrial targets.
On negation, the Long Range Plan states that “[t]he United States will need to develop national policies supporting space warfare, weapons development and employment, and rules of engagement,” later adding as a recommendation that Space Command “advocate national policy and legislation to support negation.” This seems to indicate that Space Command (dominated by Air Force officials) did not believe it had such policy or legislative authorization.
On space-based weapons for global strike (i.e., aimed at terrestrial targets), the document is much more blunt. It states that, “[a]t present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with national policy.”
Fast forward to today. The most recent Air Force planning document, the “Strategic Master Plan for FY 06 and Beyond” published in October 2003, maintains that national space policy actually requires the development and “deployment as needed” of “negation” capabilities to counter enemy space assets. It goes on seemingly to move the goalposts on when a presidential decision would be required. Although the Clinton policy can be read as requiring a presidential approval for deployment, the Air Force now insists presidential approval is not required for deployment but only to approve actual use of ASAT systems.
Current Air Force officials argue that the “employment” threshold was also applicable during the Clinton era as well, but there are reasons to question the logic of this interpretation. For one thing, since the use of ASAT systems would be an act of war, it is obvious it would require a White House decision, thus making the concept of an employment threshold moot. Further, the Strategic Master Plan itself is seemingly contradictory on the issue. For example, the caveat regarding “deployment as needed” raises the question of at what level the determination of need is to be made.
With regard to space-based strike weapons, rather than repeat the Long Range Plan’s assertion that such systems are “not consistent with national policy,” the Strategic Master Plan states that such weapons are allowable under international law but that “our nation’s leadership will decide whether or not to pursue the development and deployment.”
Fortunately, the shifting language on space warfare used by the Air Force and Pentagon leaders has not gone completely unnoticed. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees, concerned about the lack of clarity regarding military space policy, included a clause in their conference agreement on the fiscal year 2005 Defense Department budget bill to require the Pentagon to provide Congress with an “extensive” review of national space policy. This report will provide lawmakers with a first opportunity for input on this critical national and international security issue. As a unilateral move by the United States to deploy space weapons would come fraught with a variety of risks to national and global security, it is about time there was a public debate.
1. “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization,” January 11, 2001, p. xvi (Executive Summary).
2. “Lord: Space Command Focusing on Maintaining Space Superiority,” Inside the Air Force, January 30, 2004, p. 9.
3. “Counterspace Operations,” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, August 2, 2004, found at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf.
4. “Joint Doctrine for Space Operations,” Joint Publication 3-14, August 9, 2004, found at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.
5. National Science and Technology Council, The White House, “Fact Sheet: National Space Policy,” September 19, 1996, found at http://www.ostp.gov/NSTC/html/fs/fs-5.html (emphasis added).
6. John E. Hyten, “A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War? Dealing With the Inevitable Conflict in Space,” Air & Space Power Journal 16, no. 3 (Fall 2002), found at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NXL/is_3_16/ai_94269862/print.
7. Bill Sweetman, Jane’s International Defence Review (May 2002): 45.
8. “The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan,” November 2003, p. D3, found at http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf.
9. Sweetman, “USAF Plots Return to Space.”
10. U.S. Space Command, “Long Range Plan Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020,” April 1998, chap. 5, p. 10.
11. Ibid., chap. 5, p. 11.
12. Ibid., chap. 6, p. 2.
13. Air Force Space Command, “Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond,” October 1, 2003, p. 35, found at http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/library/AFSPCPAOffice/Final%2006%20SMP--Signed!v1.1.pdf.
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