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– Lisa Beyer
Bloomberg News
August 27, 2018
Iran, IAEA Still Far Apart on Nuclear Program
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Paul Kerr


A June 14 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors is unlikely to end the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programs, despite a “joint action plan” agreed to by both sides in April and Iran’s recent statements that it wants the meeting to resolve the matter.

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi said May 8 that Iran and the IAEA should resolve outstanding issues between them so that a “final solution” can be reached at the meeting.

But IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, who is preparing a final report for the board on whether Iran has followed through on its safeguards agreement with the agency, told CNN May 16 that “the jury is still out” on whether Iran’s nuclear programs are “exclusively for peaceful purposes” and that Iran should be “more forthcoming” in cooperating with the IAEA’s ongoing investigation. (See ACT, May 2004.)

Under the joint action plan reached between Iran and the IAEA, Iran pledged to provide the agency with detailed information about its gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program by the end of April and to deliver by mid-May a declaration required by the additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Tehran has submitted the former but not the latter, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hamid-Reza Assefi told reporters May 16.

Safeguards agreements authorize the IAEA to verify that states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are not diverting civilian nuclear activities to military purposes. The additional protocol requires Iran to provide significantly more information about its nuclear activities to the IAEA than its original safeguards agreement and provides the agency with more authority to verify the declaration. Iran has signed the agreement and has pledged to act as if it were in force until it is approved by the Majlis, Iran’s parliament. (See ACT, January/February 2004.)

The April pledge was Iran’s most recent promise to cooperate with the IAEA, which has been investigating allegations made public in August 2002 that Iran was pursuing clandestine nuclear activities. The IAEA board has adopted several resolutions urging Iran to cooperate, most recently in March, and is still seeking Iran’s full cooperation in providing information about its nuclear programs.

As part of an October agreement with the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, Iran agreed to suspend activities related to its uranium-enrichment programs. Tehran announced that it had completed the suspension in April. Tehran also agreed in October to conclude an additional protocol and cooperate with the agency’s investigation.

Iran’s centrifuge programs have caused the most concern. Gas centrifuges have civilian uses, but can also produce highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

After the board condemned Iran for violating its safeguards agreement by secretly testing centrifuges with nuclear material, agency inspectors found additional evidence suggesting that Iran has undertaken other undisclosed enrichment activities and conducted work on a more advanced type of centrifuge. (See ACT, March 2004.)

ElBaradei said in a May 14 speech at the Council on Foreign Relations that the agency does not yet have “proof” that Iran has “enriched uranium to the military level.”

Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf told Arms Control Today May 13 that “Iran is still moving in the direction of a nuclear weapons capability” and that the United States has “good reason” to believe Iran is not complying with its additional protocol (see page 14). Wolf did not elaborate, except to say that this belief is not based on intelligence information.

Further complicating the matter, ElBaradei’s report may not provide a complete picture of Iran’s nuclear activities because test results from samples taken from some inspected facilities may not be available in time for the report. Department of State officials have blamed the delay on Iran’s March decision to postpone a visit by IAEA inspectors. (See ACT, April 2004.)

Washington is still mulling over its strategy for the IAEA board meeting. A State Department official interviewed May 17 stated that the United States will “probably” want the board to adopt a resolution condemning Iran’s behavior. The U.S. position on the content of such a resolution will depend on the “detail and tone” of ElBaradei’s report, which will be influential in “shaping the views of other board members,” the State Department official said.

The United States has previously said the board should declare Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement—a finding that requires the board to refer the matter to the UN Security Council. The United States has failed once to persuade the board to declare Iran in noncompliance.

Washington may instead encourage the IAEA board to say it “cannot verify” Iran’s suspension of its centrifuge program because of the country’s demonstrated ability to manufacture relevant components at various locations throughout the country, a State Department official said last month.

Wolf did not say what the United States wants the Security Council to do in the event Iran is referred for noncompliance, nor would he comment on a possible U.S. response in the event that the Security Council fails to act.