U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
Under the treaty, the five parties semiannually exchange memorandum of understanding (MOU) data providing numbers, types, and locations of accountable strategic nuclear weapons and their associated delivery vehicles. The tables below compare the number of START-accountable deployed warheads declared in the initial September 1990 MOU with data from the January 2000 MOU, demonstrating the progress the parties have made in nuclear force reductions to date. —For more information, contact Philipp C. Bleek.
U.S. Strategic Forces:
Warheads by Delivery System1
| September 1990 | January 2000 | |
| ICBMs | ||
| MX | 500 | 500 |
| Minuteman III | 1,500 | 1,908 |
| Minuteman II | 450 | 1 |
| Total | 2,450 | 2,409 |
| SLBMs | ||
| Poseidon (C-3) | 1,920 | 320 |
| Trident I (C-4) | 3,072 | 1,536 |
| Trident II (D-5) | 768 | 1,920 |
| Total | 5,760 | 3,776 |
| Bombers | ||
| B-52 (ALCM) | 1,968 | 1,420 |
| B-52 (Non-ALCM) | 290 | 47 |
| B-1 | 95 | 91 |
| B-2 | 0 | 20 |
| Total | 2,353 | 1,578 |
| Total Warheads | 10,563 | 7,763 |
Soviet/Russian Strategic Forces:
Warheads by Delivery System1
| September 19902 | January 20003 | |
| ICBMs | ||
| SS-11 | 326 | 0 |
| SS-13 | 40 | 0 |
| SS-17 | 188 | 0 |
| SS-18 | 3,080 | 1,800 |
| SS-19 | 1,800 | 900 |
| SS-24 (silo) | 560 | 100 |
| SS-24 (rail) | 330 | 360 |
| SS-25 | 288 | 360 |
| SS-27 (silo)4 | — | 20 |
| SS-27 (road)4 | — | 0 |
| Total | 6,612 | 3,540 |
| SLBMs | ||
| SS-N-6 | 192 | 0 |
| SS-N-8 | 280 | 64 |
| SS-N-17 | 12 | 0 |
| SS-N-18 | 672 | 624 |
| SS-N-20 | 1,200 | 1,200 |
| SS-N-23 | 448 | 448 |
| Total | 2,804 | 2,336 |
| Bombers | ||
| Bear (ALCM) | 672 | 528 |
| Bear (Non-ALCM) | 63 | 4 |
| Blackjack | 120 | 64 |
| Total | 855 | 596 |
| Total Warheads | 10,271 | 6,472 |
Strategic Forces on Non-Russian Territory1
| Belarus | Kazakhstan | Ukraine | |
| ICBMs | 0 | 0 | 270 (SS-24) |
| SLBMs | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bombers | 0 | 0 | 136 (Bear) 120 (Blackjack) |
| Total | 0 | 0 | 526 |
NOTES
1. Warhead attributions are based on START I counting rules. This results in bombers having fewer warheads attributed to them than they actually carry. Even though all nuclear warheads from Ukraine have been transported to Russia, they remain START-accountable until their associated delivery systems have been destroyed. [Back to Table 1 , 2 or 3]2. Includes weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. [Back to Table]
3. Weapons in Russia only. [Back to Table]
4. Also known as the TOPOL-M or RS-12M Variant 2 ICBM. [Back to Table]
Sources: START I Memorandum of Understanding, September 1, 1990; START I Memorandum of Understanding, January 31, 2000; ACA.
My Account
ACA In The News
Letter to the Editor | Getting a global, nuclear NavyWashington Post
May 5, 2013
Why Chemical Weapons Have Been A Red Line Since World War I
National Public Radio
May 1, 2013
Building New Ballistic Missile Subs Could Demand Smaller Fleet, Navy Says
Global Security Newswire
May 1, 2013
Syria chemical weapons: Where did they come from?
The Christian Science Monitor
April 26, 2013
U.S. Gets "B-" for Anti-Nuclear Efforts
Global Security Newswire
April 25, 2013
US Gun Lobby Targets International Arms Treaty
Voice of America
April 25, 2013








