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How a Limited National Missile Defense Would Impact the ABM Treaty
Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis
Preliminary Architecture for C-1/C-2/C-3 NMD Systems
| C-1 Configuration1 | C-2 Configuration2 | C-3 Configuration3 | |
| Number of Interceptors Deployed in Alaska | 20-100 | 100 | 125 |
| Number of Interceptors Deployed in North Dakota | 0 | 0 | 125 |
| Upgraded Early-Warning Radars | Beale (CA); Clear (AK); Cape Cod (MA); Fylingdales (England); Thule (Greenland) | Beale; Clear; Cape Cod; Fylingdales; Thule | Beale; Clear; Cape Cod; Fylingdales; Thule; South Korea |
| X-Band Radars | Shemya (Aleutians, AK) | Shemya; Clear; Fylingdales; Thule | Shemya; Beale; Clear; Cape Cod; Fylingdales; Thule; South Korea; Grand Forks (ND); Hawaii |
| SBIRS-Low? | No | Yes | Yes |
Source: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
1. C-1 (capability-1) system is defined as defense against a "few, simple" warheads, where "few" referes to five or fewer warheads.
2. C-2 (capability-2) system is defined as defense against a "few, complex" warheads.
3. C-3 (capability-3) system is defined as defense against "many, complex" warheads.
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