New Details on Administration's Nuclear Posture Review Emerge
A leaked version of the Bush administration's classified nuclear
posture review reportedly lists seven countries against which the
United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons and outlines
a broad range of circumstances under which it could do so.
Mandated by Congress to clarify U.S. "nuclear deterrence policy
and strategy…for the next 5 to 10 years," the nuclear
posture review, produced by the Pentagon in consultation with the
Energy Department, was publicly unveiled at a January 9 briefing,
but substantial portions of the report remain classified. The full
document was obtained by The Los Angeles Times and The
New York Times and first reported March 9.
According to those reports, the review states that "greater
flexibility" in nuclear forces and planning is needed to maintain
a "credible deterrent" against adversaries "whose
values and calculations of risk and loss may be very different from
and more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries."
While the reports shed new light on the Bush administration's nuclear
plans, the document does not appear to represent a substantive departure
from Clinton administration policies on the use of nuclear weapons.
Despite press reports characterizing the review as a break with
policy outlined in the previous review, conducted in 1994, former
Clinton administration officials said that the review appears to
represent only a modest shift in emphasis.
Secretary of State Colin Powell rebutted criticism that the Bush
review had lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons
in March 12 testimony before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee,
saying, "There is no way to read that document and come to
the conclusion that the United States will be more likely or will
more quickly go to the use of nuclear weapons."
On March 13, President George W. Bush added, "The reason one
has a nuclear arsenal is to serve as a deterrence…. We've got
all options on the table because we want to make it very clear to
nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons
of mass destruction against us or our allies or friends."
Discussing "requirements for nuclear strike capabilities,"
the report lists North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria as "among
the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or
unexpected contingencies." Two former Clinton officials indicated
that, although the 1994 nuclear posture review addressed the problem
of "rogue states," it concluded that the threat they posed
did not warrant significant changes in U.S. nuclear forces or policies.
The Bush review also indicates that the United States should be
prepared to use nuclear weapons against China, citing "a combination
of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing
modernization of its nuclear and non-nuclear forces."
Finally, although the review repeats Bush administration assertions
that Russia is no longer an enemy, it says the United States must
be prepared for nuclear contingencies with Russia and notes that
if "U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the
future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and
posture." Ultimately, the review concludes that nuclear conflict
with Russia is "plausible" but "not expected."
The nuclear posture set forth by the 1994 review was based on Russia's
large nuclear arsenal. But despite Bush administration statements
that a threat from Moscow is no longer driving U.S. strategy, Russia
still appears to be the key consideration in assessing U.S. nuclear
forces and policies, as demonstrated by the administration's decision
to maintain a large strategic arsenal and substantial reserve forces.
President Bush has said that the United States will reduce its
operationally deployed forces to 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads
by 2012. An informed source indicated in early March that the administration
has decided that by 2012, the United States should deploy the upper
limit of that range and maintain an additional 2,400 reserve strategic
warheads in operational condition, all of which could be deployed
within three years. The administration also intends to stockpile
additional strategic warheads in non-operational condition.
The policy of maintaining substantial warhead reserves while reducing
the deployed arsenal was established by the 1994 review.
Press reports indicate that the review delineates three types of
situations in which nuclear weapons might be used. They could be
employed "against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack";
they could be used "in retaliation for attack with nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons"; or they could be used "in
the event of surprising military developments." Three specific
contingencies the review reportedly discusses are "an Iraqi
attack on Israel or its neighbors or a North Korean attack on South
Korea or a military confrontation [with China] over the status of
Taiwan."
An official involved with the 1994 review indicated that the inclusion
of such contingencies in the review is not novel, saying the 1994
review had specifically discussed nuclear contingency plans involving
North Korea and also China as a result of a crisis over Taiwan.
But the official also speculated that the administration appeared
to be seeking to "enhance deterrence" by adopting a slightly
less veiled retaliatory stance toward possible attacks by non-nuclear-weapon
states.
The review also reportedly calls for the development of new types
of "[nuclear] warheads that reduce collateral damage"
as well as "possible modifications to existing weapons to provide
additional yield flexibility." The review specifically cites
the need to improve "earth-penetrating weapons," designed
to threaten hardened and deeply buried targets like command-and-control
and weapons storage bunkers. An existing weapon designed to threaten
such targets, the air-dropped B61-11 bomb, is described in the review
has having only a limited "ground-penetration capability."
That weapon was developed as a result of a similar call for new
capabilities in the 1994 review and deployed in late 1997. (See
ACT,
March 1997.)
Asked at the January 9 briefing on the posture review if the Bush
administration planned to develop new nuclear weapons, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch
said, "At this point, there are no recommendations in the report
about developing new nuclear weapons." But Crouch subsequently
qualified that statement, saying, "We are trying to look at
a number of initiatives," including modifying existing nuclear
weapons to give them "greater capability against…hard
targets and deeply buried targets."
Using nuclear weapons against any of the five "rogue states"
reportedly identified in the review would violate a longstanding
U.S. pledge, termed "negative security assurances," not
to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons
and are members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A
senior official called the administration's adherence to that policy
into doubt last month, but State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
subsequently reiterated the policy in a February 22 briefing. (See
ACT,
March 2002.)
However, consistent with statements by officials from previous
administrations, Boucher qualified the pledge, saying that if a
weapon of mass destruction were used against the United States,
"We will not rule out any specific type of military response."
Still, absent an attack with a weapon of mass destruction, using
nuclear weapons against any of the five states, all of which are
members of the NPT, would violate the declaration.
The leaks generated little reaction from key U.S. allies but strong
critiques from nations listed as potential targets by the review.
"There is a feeling that the document was written during the
Cold War," Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said March
13. "We think this does not agree with the spirit of our relations,"
Ivanov said, calling on the administration to clarify its position.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said March 11, "Like
many other countries, China is deeply shocked by this report"
and called on the United States to explain its policies, the official
Xinhua News Agency reported. Former Iranian President Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, a key centrist figure in Iranian politics, accused
the United States of intimidation, saying, "America thinks
that if a military threat looms large over the heads of these seven
countries, they will give up their logical demands," according
to the official Islamic Republic News Agency.
And North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency carried a
March 13 statement from a foreign ministry spokesman saying, "Now
that nuclear lunatics are in office in the White House, we are compelled
to examine all agreements with the U.S." Following up with
a vague threat, the statement reads, "In case the U.S. plan
for a nuclear attack on the DPRK turns out to be true, the DPRK
will have no option but to take a substantial countermeasure against
it, not bound to any DPRK-U.S. agreement," an apparent reference
to the 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea committed
to dismantling its nuclear weapons program.
In the United States, lawmaker Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)
voiced support for the policies in a March 10 television appearance,
saying they would cause "renegade nations" like Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea to "think twice about the willingness
of the United States to take action to defend our people and our
values and our allies." Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), meanwhile,
said March 12 that the report represented a "profound shift…in
our thinking about arms control" and suggested that it might
expand the potential uses of nuclear weapons.
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