"Though we have acheived progress, our work is not over. That is why I support the mission of the Arms Control Association. It is, quite simply, the most effective and important organization working in the field today." 

– Larry Weiler
Former U.S.-Russian arms control negotiator
August 7, 2018
European Security

The Debate Over NATO Expansion: A Critique of the Clinton Administration's Responses to Key Questions

With the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled to begin hearings October 7 on NATO's planned expansion, the debate over the rationale, implications and wisdom of the alliance's decision to enlarge is now formally underway. On September 10, the Clinton administration provided written responses to questions on U.S. NATO policy contained in a June 25 letter to President Clinton from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R TX) and 19 Senate colleagues. Following the release of the administration's responses, a number of former U.S. officials and foreign policy experts, who earlier had signed an open letter to President Clinton opposing NATO's move eastward, released a critique of the responses. (See ACT, June/July 1997.) The authors of the critique (Jonathan Dean, Susan Eisenhower, Michael Mandelbaum, Jack Mendelsohn, Richard McCormack, John Rhinelander and John Steinbruner) plan to submit their comments to the full Senate sometime in October. Printed below are the questions contained in Senator Hutchison's letter, the administration's responses to the questions and a critique of each response.

1. What is the military threat that NATO expansion is designed to counter? How does expansion increase the security of Europe and the American people?

Administration's Response: Europe's security is a vital American interest, as we have seen through two world wars and the Cold War. Over the past half century, NATO has been our primary shield to protect that interest. With the Cold War over, NATO remains the foundation of trans Atlantic security. A larger, stronger NATO that includes Europe's new democracies will be even better able to provide for Europe's security and make America safer. It will help deter future threats, expand our collective defense capability to address traditional and non traditional security challenges and secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe. It is a key part of our strategy to build an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe for the first time in history.

NATO's very existence is an important reason its current members and prospective new members face no imminent threat of attack. By adding new members to its strength, the world's most effective deterrent force will be even better able to prevent conflict from arising in the first place.

Enlargement will help NATO address the security challenges that do arise. It will make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member states. In addition, rogue states, the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds continue to threaten trans Atlantic security—as we know from Bosnia. A larger, increasingly cohesive community of trans Atlantic states able to combine their security resources will be better able to address whatever contingencies arise.

Enlargement will help guard against non traditional security threats from outside Europe that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and long range delivery systems. None of us can deal effectively with such threats alone. Enlargement will help broaden and intensify multinational coordination through NATO—one of our most effective instruments to counter these problems.

The alliance must be prepared for other contingencies, including the possibility that Russia could abandon democracy and return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although we see such a turn as unlikely. Through our policy of engaging Russia we seek to provide strong incentives to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with its neighbors. These efforts, combined with the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of democratic and peaceful development.

Finally, enlargement will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line. For 50 years, NATO has helped prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy and create stable environment for prosperity. Each previous instance of enlargement—Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982—strengthened democracy and stability within the new member states and added to the alliance countries committed to defend the trans Atlantic community. Now, enlargement can do for Europe's East what it did for the West. Already, the prospect of membership has helped consolidate democracy in Central Europe, strengthen free market reform and encourage NATO aspirants to settle disputes with their neighbors.

Critique: The administration admits NATO faces "no imminent threat of attack" [emphasis added], and claims a larger NATO will be "better able to prevent conflict from arising in the first place" and better able to address "rogue states, the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds," such as Bosnia. The administration does not explain how NATO might actually accomplish this. Would a larger NATO have prevented Bosnia or Chechnya or Nagorno Karabakh? Does the administration mean that, at a time when we are wavering in our commitment to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the United States would be more willing to lead a larger NATO into additional peacekeeping activities? The Bosnia experience suggests that expanding NATO will not affect the willingness or reluctance of national capitals to deal with "ethnic, racial and religious" problems.

The administration argues that expansion "will help guard against non traditional security threats from outside Europe that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long range delivery systems." NATO expansion is irrelevant to the spread of WMD and ballistic missiles outside of Europe, whereas cooperation with Russia on such issues as arms control, arms sales and dealings with "rogue" states is clearly critical. NATO expansion actually makes more complicated the problem of "guarding" against external threats should they arise. An expanded NATO will have more area to defend, static resources to defend it with and will require a major modernization program to integrate outdated, Soviet trained militaries.

The administration then notes that the alliance must be prepared for "the possibility that Russia could...return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although we see such a turn as unlikely." [Emphasis added.] The administration claims that "our policy of engaging Russia...the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of democratic and peaceful development." In reality, NATO enlargement has undercut Russian democrats, hampered efforts to reduce and make more secure Russia's nuclear arsenal, and made President Boris Yeltsin's political life much more difficult. The Founding Act has been equally controversial; it has been vigorously attacked by the right in the United States (for providing too much influence to Russia) and in Russia (for not providing Russia with enough influence), and its basic meaning is in dispute.

The administration's final point is that NATO expansion "will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line." [Emphasis added.] A military alliance is not the preferred means for extending democracy in Central Europe—that task should fall to the European Union (EU). But that organization, primarily for economic reasons, has identified potential new members but is not expected to extend them membership until at least the middle of the next decade. NATO can do little, if anything, to affect the political processes in its potential new members; those are more dependent on economic (privatizing, markets, aid) and social developments (standard of living, freedom of expression, civil rights). It is worth recalling that the Marshall Plan, not NATO, helped Germany become economically strong and politically stable.

If, as the administration claims, NATO is a democratizing influence, then presumably Russia should be among the first nations invited to join. Finally, NATO expansion will not "erase" Stalin's dividing line—it was lifted by the collapse of communism. But NATO expansion could well draw another line in Central Europe, between the "ins" and the "outs," with far reaching implications.

2. How will NATO expansion strengthen stability in Europe when the nations that face the greatest potential threats to their own security, including the Baltic states and several other nations, will not be included in the first NATO expansion?

Administration's Response: NATO enlargement will enhance stability throughout Europe and improve the security of all Europe's democracies, not just those admitted first. This is true for a number of reasons.

First, NATO enlargement is not a one time event, but a process that will continue after the first round. The Madrid communique specifically notes that NATO will "maintain an open door to the admission of additional alliance members in the future." States that are credible candidates for future admission to the alliance will benefit from the knowledge that the alliance is attentive to their security.

Second, NATO is taking a range of direct steps to improve the security of states that will not be initially admitted, from enhancements to the Partnership for Peace program to creation of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and the completion of a NATO Ukraine Charter.

Finally, as it has in the past, NATO will continue to promote stability and cooperation beyond the borders of its members. The prospect of enlargement has already prompted major progress in resolving disputes and tensions within Central and Eastern Europe, and encouraged many of the new democracies to contribute in tangible ways to promoting long term security, as seen by their participation in the NATO led Stabilization Force in Bosnia.

Enlargement had to start with the strongest candidates or else it would not have started at all. The Baltic states understand that NATO enlargement, as a process which extends stability toward their own borders, increases their security even though they have not yet been invited to become alliance members. They have expressed support for our policy and have publicly endorsed the decisions taken at the Madrid summit. Ukrainian leaders have taken a similar position, seeing the presence of prospective NATO members on their western borders as a contribution to Ukraine's long term security.

Critique: If NATO expansion is not a one time event, but an open door, then the United States and its allies will eventually be obligated, for example:

to defend the Baltics from an external threat (that is, Russia), a commitment that can only be carried out by the substantial deployment of troops backed up by threat of the use of nuclear weapons. (Neither policy has been discussed by the administration.);

to protect Ukraine, whose population is one third Russian, from Russia; and

to intervene between Romania and Hungary, whose ethnic quarrels have a very long history.

Moreover, Russia has made it absolutely clear that it considers unacceptable the admission to NATO of any former Soviet republic and that such a move would render the Founding Act a dead letter. Thus, if the Baltics or Ukraine are actually incorporated into NATO (and Russia is not), we risk re militarizing Europe.

Consequently, if the United States were to press to bring the Baltics into NATO, it is almost certain that our major European allies would not support that stark a challenge to Moscow. The allies have already indicated they prefer to seek the admission of Slovenia and Romania to NATO.

As a result, the United States has endorsed an "open door" policy through which only a few additional states are likely to enter. But the issue of Baltic state membership will remain the focus of active controversy inside the alliance and between the alliance and Russia.

3. Are we creating a new dividing line that will breed instability and friction in Europe?

Administration's Response: No. We are erasing the old, artificial dividing line and fostering integration and partnership in its place. Because NATO enlargement has been designed as an ongoing process rather than a one time event, states not initially invited into the alliance have no reason to believe they are permanently excluded. On the contrary, the Madrid summit sent a direct message to them that any European democracy remains eligible for membership, and that the NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process of enlargement before the end of this decade. Moreover, the alliance's outreach to the East—through the Partnership for Peace, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO Russia and NATO Ukraine relationships—is designed precisely to promote an undivided European security system and ensure that no new dividing lines are created.

Virtually all neighbors of those states invited to become members, including states that have not applied for membership, support the alliance's enlargement. Indeed, after Madrid the president and Secretaries Albright and Cohen were met with enthusiastic crowds and warm receptions in Romania, Slovenia, the Baltics, Ukraine and other states in the region that will not be in the first round of new members.

One reason for the lack of tension between states that will and will not initially be admitted to the alliance is that NATO has no offensive aims or record of aggression. Moreover, states in the region understand that the distinction between those invited and not invited for membership is based on various objective factors—such as a state's present ability to contribute to NATO's military and strategic goals, and the depth and durability of its democratic and military reforms. The distinction between those invited and not invited is unlike the arbitrary line that would divide Europe if NATO stood still and declined to enlarge. And those not invited understand they have a stake in the successful integration of the first new members, whose success will contribute to the overall process.

That is why the bigger danger of instability and friction would come from a failure to enlarge NATO. That course would represent an abandonment of NATO's founding principle, reaffirmed by allied leaders at their 1994 and 1997 summits, that alliance remains open "to any other European State in a position to...contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." A failure to enlarge would set Stalin's dividing line in stone, and subject Europe's new democracies to double jeopardy—punished first by being under Soviet domination, and punished again by being barred from membership in NATO for reasons that have nothing to do with present day circumstances. With the process of enlargement that NATO has begun, no European democracy is permanently excluded; without NATO enlargement, every new European democracy would be permanently excluded.

Critique: If the "open door" process stumbles, which is likely, there will be another dividing line in Europe—actually two lines—between the NATO "ins" and the NATO "outs," and between NATO and Russia. Membership cannot be selectively extended and then defined as creating an undivided Europe.

If expansion continues—and that is a very big if—then the main dividing line in Europe will be between NATO and Russia and relations between them will in all likelihood be confrontational.

If Russia is brought into NATO, which no one—least of all Moscow—believes will happen, NATO will be so fundamentally changed that none of these arguments will be relevant.

It is unclear how "a bigger danger of instability and friction" could come from not enlarging NATO. The reality is just the reverse: The biggest danger to Europe would come if enlargement drives Russia away from the West, away from democratization, away from continuing its involvement in nuclear and conventional arms control, and into a confrontational policy.

In any case, failure to expand NATO would not set Stalin's dividing line in stone. That dividing line no longer exists: Germany has been united; the Warsaw Pact is no more; the Baltics, Ukraine and Belarus are independent; Russia accepts NATO's presence; and "no imminent threat" exists. Now is the time for the alliance to encourage the abandonment of any adherence to Stalin's dividing line rather than create a new division.

If the new democracies are being punished by the West, it is by the failure of the European Union to integrate them into the existing pan European economic and political structures, not by the failure of NATO to integrate their military forces into the alliance.

4. Under Article V of the treaty, NATO's security guarantees will extend to all new NATO members. U.S. troops will be committed to respond to conflicts involving any of the new member nations of Central Europe. Is a border dispute involving one or several of the new NATO members so vital a national security threat to the United States that we are willing to risk American lives?

Administration's Response: Article V states that members will consider an attack against one to be an attack against all. It does not define what actions would constitute "an attack" or prejudge what alliance decisions might then be made in such circumstances. Member states, acting in accordance with established constitutional processes, are required to exercise individual and collective judgment over this question.

While it is not possible to delineate in advance what NATO's response would be to a "border dispute" involving a NATO member, we do know that NATO enlargement makes such disputes less likely by creating an incentive—namely, membership in or partnership with NATO—for countries to resolve their problems peacefully. Already, we have seen 10 major accords in the region settling old border and ethnic disputes: Each of these achievements was driven, at least in part, by the desires of the states involved to demonstrate their credentials for membership in NATO and, more broadly, for fuller integration into the Western community of liberal democracies. These accords include:

The 1991 Border Agreement between Poland and Germany;

The 1991 Good Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty between Poland and Germany;

The 1992 Good Neighborly Relations and Mutual Cooperation Treaty between Poland and Ukraine;

The 1994 Good Neighborly Relations and Military Cooperation Agreement between Poland and Lithuania;

The 1996 Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between Hungary and Slovakia;

The 1996 Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement between Hungary and Slovenia;

The 1996 Bilateral Friendship Treaty between Hungary and Romania;

The 1996 Associate Agreement with the European Union between Slovenia and Italy;

The 1997 Joint Declaration on Czech German Bilateral Relations;

The 1997 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Romania and Ukraine.

It is important to remember that no NATO nation has ever been attacked, and during its half century of existence NATO has never once had to fire a shot in anger in order to fulfill the security guarantees in the Washington Treaty of 1949. Bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will make it less likely, not more likely, that American troops might be drawn into another war in Europe.

Critique: Joining NATO may be an incentive for peaceably solving problems with other members, but even that argument has been sorely tested by Greece and Turkey (which have not gone to war, but neither have they resolved their dispute over Cyprus). The question is more applicable to disputes between NATO and non NATO nations, such as Hungary and Romania over minorities in Transylvania or Romania and Ukraine over Bukovina. Clearly, the potential for encountering border disputes increases as NATO moves east. But such disputes, unless they involve Russia, are not likely to pose a vital security threat to the alliance and therefore NATO will be very reluctant—if not politically unable—to intervene. As a result, an expanded NATO is just as likely to be stuck with an old set of unresolved problems on its agenda than it is to create new incentives for their resolution.

In any case, the administration does not answer the last part of Senator Hutchison's question at all—whether these disputes are so vital to U.S. security that we would risk our troops. Instead, they list a number of friendship and cooperation treaties in Central Europe—including at least three concluded before NATO expansion was even announced—as evidence NATO expansion has brought a new standard of international conduct to the region.

Despite these treaties, local distrust of neighbors still runs high and deep in Central and Eastern Europe. In its September 1996 report on public opinion on NATO enlargement, the U.S. Information Agency showed that 55 percent of Hungarians polled had "unfavorable" opinions toward Romanians, and 42 percent of Romanians (and the same percentage of Slovaks) had unfavorable opinions of Hungarians.

5. The nations of Central Europe have a long history of border, ethnic, nationalist and religious disputes. What guidelines will NATO establish to resolve these types of disputes or other problems that may well arise among the new member nations? What would be the impact of extending coverage of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to them?

Administration's Response: The process of NATO enlargement will make such disputes less likely and increase the chances that they will be peacefully resolved. While the alliance's core mission is collective defense, NATO's normal operation also functions as a conflict prevention mechanism. In part, this is because states must settle disputes with their neighbors as a precondition for entry into NATO. The three states NATO has decided to invite to begin accession talks—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—already have settled all outstanding border and ethnic disputes with their neighbors.

Once states join NATO, their ongoing participation in the alliance will give them a powerful incentive to resolve any future problems with their neighbors peacefully. Constant consultation in the North Atlantic Council and other NATO structures will provide members with a means to resolve any disputes. For this and other reasons, NATO has tended to moderate those tensions that do arise among its members, such as between Greece and Turkey.

While it is true that there have been many strands of conflict within Central and East European history, it would be a mistake to think of this condition as either unique or immutable. Western Europe also had a long history of border, ethnic, nationalist and religious disputes, and none of these flared during the half century of NATO's existence—in part, because NATO has helped its members transcend them. There is nothing in the historical record to suggest that current Central and East European disputes are more deep rooted or violent than, say, past disputes between France and Germany.

If disputes ever were to occur within Central and Eastern Europe, once again the alliance and its members would need to exercise their judgment on a case by case basis in formulating the appropriate response. NATO has never operated through mechanistic guidelines, and it should not.

The benefits that would accrue to these states would be the same that have accrued to all other members of NATO: enhanced security and the assurance of U.S. commitment to their security. The supreme guarantee of the security of the allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States. During the Cold War, U.S. nuclear forces provided the principal means by which NATO deterred conventional and nuclear attack by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Despite the absence of an overwhelming threat today, they still fulfill an essential role in preserving peace and preventing coercion of any kind.

Critique: After arguing earlier that expanding NATO will help "counter aggression against its member states," the administration in the response to this question backs away and notes, correctly, that no preordained response exists for dealing with disputes in Central and Eastern Europe. But it is very misleading to suggest that "all outstanding border and ethnic disputes" have been settled.

The administration also makes the case against "historicism," noting that while "there have been many strands of conflict within Central and Eastern Europe, it would be a mistake to think of this condition as either unique or immutable." A valid argument, of course, but the same analysis should then apply to the possibility for democratization and liberalization in Russia.

It is true that France and Germany have been reconciled after 85 years and three disastrous wars. But this fundamental change stemmed from Germany's close association after World War II with its "traditional" enemies, not from its exclusion from European institutions. If Franco German relations set the precedent for how to change a "unique or immutable" condition, then NATO should incorporate, not isolate, Russia.

The basic question is not whether the states of Central Europe can rise above their history, but whether it strengthens NATO or weakens it and whether it is the U.S. interest to have this historical drama played out within the alliance or apart from it.

The administration's response also entirely ignores the effects that NATO expansion would have on the disposition of nuclear weapons. A NATO commitment to defend countries directly bordering on Russia would have a significant effect on nuclear weapons deployments, including tactical nuclear weapons whose overall management is of particularly serious concern. Most immediately, Russia would predictably increase its reliance on these weapons as a counterweight to NATO's unquestionably superior conventional force capabilities. Over the longer term, NATO itself might be driven in this direction in response to Russia's reaction and to any significant future investment in Russia's own conventional forces. The dangers inherent in these interactions have the potential to swamp any of the claimed benefits of NATO expansion.

6. In the administration's February 1997 "Report to Congress on the Enlargement of NATO," you assumed that the United States would pay only 15 percent of the direct enlargement costs, with the new members paying 35 percent of the bill, and the current (non U.S.) members paying 50 percent. Will the new members or the current members pay these amounts? Will you make the cost sharing agreement part of the expansion negotiations? If not how will yours and future administrations handle shortfalls?

Administration's Response: The cost estimates in the administration's February 1997 report to Congress relied in part on standard NATO cost sharing arrangements. Under these procedures, each country pays the cost of maintaining its own national military. The February report assumed that countries would pay for their own direct enlargement enhancements, except for those programs that would qualify for common funding. As a result, the Department of Defense estimated that about 40 percent of direct enlargement enhancements could be nationally funded and 60 percent could be common funded. Out of a total estimated cost of $9 billion to $12 billion, this would mean that new members would pay for approximately 35 percent ($3 billion to $4.5 billion total through 2009, or about $230 million to $350 million per year) of direct enlargement enhancements; current (non U.S.) members would pay about 50 percent ($4.5 billion to $5.5 billion over the period, or around $350 million to $425 million per year); and the United States would pay its 24 percent share of the common funded enhancements (about 15 percent of the total direct enlargement bill, or approximately $1.5 billion to $2 billion over the 2000 to 2009 timeframe), averaging between $150 million and $200 million per year.

In addition to the direct costs of enlargement, individual allies will need to continue to improve their capabilities for force projection, consistent with their commitments under the alliance's new strategic concept adopted in 1991. Force projection capabilities will take on increased importance as NATO enlarges, in view of the allies' conclusion that the defense of new members' territory will be based primarily on reinforcement in times of danger rather than through the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Because the United States already possesses substantial force projection capabilities, the United States will not bear a significant portion of this category of costs. We will continue, through the NATO collective force planning process, to encourage our European allies to continue to develop their force projection capabilities.

Past estimates of enlargement costs, including those produced by the administration, have necessarily been notional. Now that NATO has decided which states to invite to begin accession talks, it will be possible to assess more precisely their security needs and assets, and to define the implications for NATO's budgets. This process will begin immediately and will be tied closely to the accession process. While each of the three invited states has indicated its willingness to contribute to the NATO funded and national costs of membership, the accession talks will help to clarify those obligations and commitments.

Enlargement will not be cost free. However, it is affordable for both current and prospective members. In light of the enormous benefits which enlargement will bring to both Europe and the United States, it represents extraordinary value for the money.

Critique: The administration's response is disingenuously worded so that the reader concludes that "out of a total estimated cost of $9 billion to $12 billion" the United States would pay no more than $1.5 billion to $2 billion over the first 10 years. The February report actually estimates that the total costs of NATO expansion will be between $27 billion and $35 billion, of which the U.S. share, $1.5 billion to $2 billion by the administration's calculations, would be no more than 6 percent.

The administration's cost study was reportedly based on at most four countries joining NATO but eight are actually in line: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the first tranche; then Slovenia, Romania and the three Baltic states (all have been named in the NATO communique issued at the Madrid summit.) Moreover, the administration's cost estimates assume no new troop deployments. But forces would have to be deployed forward if NATO intends to guarantee the security of the Baltics.

The leaders of Britain, France and Germany, our key NATO allies, declared after the Madrid summit either that they do not intend to pay 1 cent for NATO expansion or that they expect their defense budgets to shrink. The new member states, which under the administration's most optimistic projections will have to spend $10 billion to $13 billion from 1997 to 2009, simply do not have the money for modernization. For Hungary, the $900 million cost of 30 new fighter planes must come out of a government budget that totalled $21 billion in 1995.

It is almost certain that NATO expansion will precipitate a bitter row over sharing the defense burden among the allies. In the end, either the United States will pay most of the expansion costs or NATO will be saddled with second class militaries until well into the next century.

7. Many of us view the principal threat confronting the 12 nations seeking NATO membership as less a military threat than a struggle for economic stability. Fierce competition exists among these 12 states. By conferring NATO membership on a few nations now, those nations will have a distinct advantage over their neighbors in the competition to attract new business and foreign investment. This type of economic competition and imbalance could well breed friction and instability in Central Europe. Will NATO be obligated to step in and resolve the very conflicts that could be caused by the NATO selection process? Would European Union membership be a better option to achieve the economic stability NATO aspirants are seeking?

Administration's Response: Economic challenges do remain critical for Central and East European states. Most of these states need to advance and deepen aspects of reform—from privatization, to improved regulatory regimes, to efforts against corruption. This is one reason we support enlargement of the European Union to include Central and East European states.

While the role of the EU is critical, there is no reason to insist on a choice between EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. Both are important. Both make independent contributions to European prosperity and security. EU enlargement alone, however, is not sufficient to secure our nation's security interests in post Cold War Europe. Unlike NATO, the EU lacks a military capability. Military capability remains the heart of NATO's strength and continues to be needed to preserve European security.

As free markets take root in Central and Eastern Europe, it is certainly reasonable to expect that economic competition among the region's states will intensify, just as it has in Western Europe and other parts of the world. There is no historical evidence, however, that would suggest NATO membership will become a meaningful distinction in economic competition within Central and Eastern Europe. NATO membership was never used over the past half century to draw foreign investment from, say, Sweden to Norway.

What matters most to firms and investors are economic fundamentals. Central and East European states will attract business through privatization, sound management of their budgets and money supply, and efforts to create a talented workforce and reduced unemployment. For those European states that are economically less developed today, the right answer for them is to deepen such reforms, and the prospect of NATO membership gives them some additional incentive to do so. In addition, NATO enlargement, together with closer security cooperation through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, will help stability take root throughout Central and Eastern Europe—in member states and non member states alike—making all of its countries more attractive to investors. Conversely, a failure of NATO to enlarge could undermine the business climate for the entire region. While firms are unlikely to invest in a country solely because it is a NATO member, they might well invest less heavily in a region such as Central and Eastern Europe if its security future were called into question.

Critique: The administration admits that "the role of the EU is critical" and that such economic fundamentals as "sound management of...budgets and money supply" matter most in attracting investment. In fact, EU membership is the most logical means of assuring continuing economic and political reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and EU enlargement negotiations will begin next year with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These countries will probably ultimately enter the EU, even though the EU has not been in a rush to offer membership to these countries because of the cost (in agricultural and infrastructure support) and the constraints placed on EU member budgets by the Maastricht criteria for a common currency.

The administration's call for "sound budget management" rings hollow when its own cost projections for expansion place a multi billion dollar defense burden (about 37 percent of the total cost) on the new members. The potential new members have themselves cut way back on their defense expenditures to provide for social welfare and capital investment: the Czech Republic's defense expenditures are running at one fifth those of Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s and the defense budgets of Hungary and Poland have taken similar cuts (one sixth and one fifth, respectively).

In brief, this is a poor time to oblige these three countries, which are struggling to modernize, stabilize and humanize their economies and societies, and to prepare for EU membership, to increase their defense expenditures in order to carry out a modernization program which the administration estimates will cost $10 billion and other analyses conclude will be considerably higher. NATO membership will, in fact, make countries less attractive to investors if their budgets are stressed by the demands of NATO modernization and if they lose the support of international financial institutions.

8. Does NATO membership by the new Eastern European democracies force them to spend money for arms, when expenditures for the infrastructure critical to economic growth are more pressing?

Administration's Response: The new NATO members will need to invest in order to upgrade their militaries. But these states were already planning to make substantial improvements in their militaries, quite apart from their possible membership in NATO. These investments were needed because these states emerged from the Warsaw Pact with military forces that were poorly structured and inadequately equipped for modern warfare. The impact of NATO membership will not be so much to increase Central and East European defense budgets as to ensure that anticipated increases result in greater compatibility with NATO defense plans and equipment.

Moreover, alliances save money over the long term. Many leaders in the region have said their states might well spend more on their militaries if they were not included in NATO, because then they would feel less secure outside the alliance's collective defense structure. States that have remained outside of NATO in the past have not necessarily enjoyed lower defense budgets. Sweden, for example, has higher per capita defense expenditures than many of its NATO neighbors.

Central and East European countries will face difficult decisions between defense and domestic spending, as does the United States and all of our current allies. Yet the necessary investments needed to participate in the alliance do not need to take place overnight. The Defense Department's analysis foresees a gradual process of modernization, with new members attaining a "mature capability" over a period of about a decade. Moreover, projected real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in Central and Eastern Europe as high as 4 to 5 percent suggest that the new members will be able to make needed defense investments without damaging their domestic economies and social efforts. In fact, the Defense Department has urged these countries to concentrate first on personnel, training, communications, logistics and infrastructure improvement needed to make them compatible with NATO before devoting large sums to purchase new weapons systems.

Critique: The major nations of Western Europe are having difficulty sustaining their domestic economies and social efforts, and have made it absolutely clear they do not intend to increase their spending for NATO enlargement. The Czech Republic and Poland already equal or exceed the rates of NATO's European members for military expenditures as percentage of gross national product (GNP) and percentage of central government expenditures (CGE). The administration is, at best, unrealistic when it claims that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have much larger economic and social needs, can make additional investments in defense "without damag[e]." Secretary of Defense William Cohen has said that "the bulk of the costs will be borne by the three new member countries. They...will have to measure up. There is no free lunch."1

Paying the enlargement bill will not be easy for the new members. With per capita GNPs of under $10,000, the Czech Republic and Poland (but not Hungary) are already spending at or above the rate of current NATO members. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,2 in 1995:

NATO Europe had $184 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.4 percent of GNP and 5.6 percent of CGE;

the Czech Republic had $2.4 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.8 percent of its GNP and 6.9 percent of CGE;

Hungary had $1 billion of military expenditures which represented 1.5 percent of GNP and 4.6 percent of CGE; and

Poland had $4.8 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.3 percent of GNP and 5.4 percent of CGE.

9. Do Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have the military capabilities to make a positive contribution to the security of NATO, or will they be net consumers of security for the foreseeable future?

Administration's Response: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all take significant steps to reform their militaries, upgrade their military capabilities, and contribute to European security beyond their borders. The Defense Department estimates that they can achieve a "mature capability" within about a decade after joining the alliance. The new members will be expected to contribute to the range of NATO security functions and missions.

Even today, the three states bring significant assets to NATO's security work. Together, they bring over 300,000 troops to the alliance. All three have firmly established civilian control of their militaries. Their initial defense reform efforts have focused on low cost, high return enhancements to interoperability to allow effective near term security contributions. Over time, they will increase their ability to operate with NATO forces in their own countries and elsewhere.

Moreover, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have demonstrated their readiness to contribute to security beyond their borders. Both Poland and the Czech Republic contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition. Poland has been a leader in its region, helping Lithuania and Ukraine develop their armed forces and creating joint units with both countries. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic now provide over 1500 troops to the NATO led [SFOR] mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, and Hungary provides the base from which U.S. forces deploy into Bosnia. Through individual efforts and participation in numerous Partnership for Peace exercises, the three states have begun to improve their abilities to work with NATO forces.

Each of the states will need to pursue an active and sustained program of reform and modernization in order to achieve a higher level of NATO interoperability and broader military capabilities over the next decade. Leaders from all three states have stated their willingness to do so and have demonstrated that their countries will become net security producers over time as full members of NATO.

Critique: While the administration claimed earlier that expanding NATO will make it stronger, in the response to question eight it notes that "these states emerged from the Warsaw Pact with military forces that were poorly structured and inadequately equipped for modern warfare." The administration also notes that it will take at least a decade for the military forces of the new members to achieve a "mature capability."

Unless the United States is prepared to foot most of the bill, it is certain that modernization of the forces of these three countries will take longer than a decade. In addition, since the administration claims the NATO expansion process is an "open door," much greater costs will be associated with some of the potential second tranche members such as Romania and the Baltics, (not to mention Ukraine).

Thus, for the foreseeable future, NATO expansion is likely to stress the alliance by adding sub standard forces and increasing the amount of territory and length of borders to defend. On the other hand, some would argue that, with the possible exception of Germany, most of the members of NATO are already "consumers" of security and adding three to eight more nations will not alter this condition.

10. When one looks at the threats to American national security interests, foremost among these is Russia's substantial nuclear arsenal. Considerable progress has been made to lessen nuclear tensions through dramatic arms reductions in the past decade. And, for the moment, the current leadership in Russia is becoming reconciled to the likelihood of NATO expansion. But what of tomorrow's Russian leaders? By expanding eastward, are we not creating an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions and perhaps even develop an early first use nuclear policy?

Administration's Response: The objective of our trans Atlantic security policy is an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. NATO enlargement is an important part of that strategy. So is our effort to support the development of a Russia that is democratic, prosperous, at peace with its neighbors, and cooperating with us and other states on a range of security challenges, including mutual reductions in our nuclear arsenals. So also is our effort, which bore fruit in May in the signing of the NATO Russia Founding Act, to institutionalize a broad and cooperative relationship between the alliance and Russia.

President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO enlargement, reflecting in part a lingering misperception among many Russian political leaders that the alliance poses a threat to Russia's security. That is an issue on which we have decided to disagree, while working together to manage that disagreement. But, judging by the evidence, it is unlikely that NATO enlargement will undermine Russian reform or strengthen Russian hardliners. Those who suggest this would be the case see Russian democracy as far more fragile than has proven the reality over the last few years. NATO enlargement is not a significant concern for most of the Russian public, which understandably remains far more concerned about wages, pensions, corruption and other domestic issues.

Over the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, Russian reform and security cooperation have continued to advance. President Yeltsin was re elected. He brought new officials into the government who are committed to economic modernization and integration with Western and global structures. He brought in a new defense minister who supports the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty. At the Helsinki summit in March, President Yeltsin agreed to press for Duma ratification of START II, and to pursue a START III treaty with further reductions once START II has entered into force. And of course, Russia joined with NATO in May to conclude the Founding Act. Indeed, as NATO enlargement has gone forward, Russia has drawn closer to the West.

These recent positive developments call into question the theory that NATO enlargement erodes Russian reform and security cooperation. In any case, it would be counterproductive to make our NATO policies hostage to Duma intransigence on START II. Doing so would send a message to the Duma that we will hold up NATO enlargement as long as they hold up START II. In that case, we likely would get neither.

Critique: The administration recognizes that "President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO enlargement," but it rather off handedly dismisses Russian opposition as based on a "misperception" of NATO as posing a threat to Russia's security. The origins of this "misperception" about NATO expansion are left unanalyzed by the administration, but they are not difficult to discern. The administration itself points out that enlargement would "make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member states." And one of the principal, and undisguised, reasons the Central and Eastern European countries seek to join NATO is protection against aggression by Russia.

Another possible source of this Russian "misperception" about NATO expansion is the administration position that "the alliance must be prepared for...the possibility that Russia could abandon democracy and return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period." Although the administration, to its credit, considers this possibility to be "unlikely," other well known political figures, such as Henry Kissinger, argue that NATO expansion must be undertaken to "encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders."3 [Emphasis added.]

It is too early to tell whether NATO expansion has "created an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions," but expansion has certainly delayed Duma ratification of START II. It has also negatively affected the views of the Russian political elites on long term prospects for arms control. And expansion has complicated Yeltsin's political fortunes and made it much more difficult for the reformers to deal with the nationalists and communists. Indeed, Yeltsin has already made it absolutely clear that, although he signed the Founding act—which Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of Russia's Communist Party called "a complete and unconditional surrender"—he is "categorically against" NATO offering membership to any former Soviet republic and has threatened that such a move would "fully undermine" relations with Russia.

The administration's response to this question ducks the issue of nuclear use entirely. The fact is, NATO expansion comes at a moment when Russia, sensing its deteriorating security situation, has abandoned its long standing nuclear "no first use" policy and is in the midst of a debate over whether, given the deplorable state of its conventional forces, its lack of budgetary resources and NATO's creep toward its borders, it should increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. In the worst case, Russian re emphasis on nuclear weapons could well be mirrored eventually by NATO policies.

11. What have we given up in terms of NATO's own freedom of action to deploy forces throughout the expanded area of the alliance in order to obtain Russian acquiescence to the expansion plan?

Administration's Response: The NATO Russia Founding Act was not an effort to buy Russian acquiescence to enlargement. It was instead driven by our judgment—and that of the alliance—that a robust NATO Russia relationship could make an important contribution toward the goal of a peaceful and undivided Europe.

The Founding Act institutionalizes this relationship and provides the basis for increased cooperation. At the same time, NATO equities remain fully protected. The North Atlantic Council remains the supreme decision making body of the alliance. The Founding Act, in establishing a Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia, provides for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, joint decision making and action. The Founding Act is equally clear, however, that NATO retains its independence of decision making and action at all times. The Permanent Joint Council offers Russia a forum in which to express its views and, where possible, to facilitate cooperation between NATO and Russia. But there is not now and will not be a Russian veto over NATO decisions or any restriction on NATO's freedom of action.

If Russia adopts a constructive approach to its relationship with NATO, there is enormous potential for cooperation on a wide range of issue, from non proliferation to humanitarian assistance. If Russia chooses not to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Founding Act, no impediment has been created. NATO retains its strength, autonomy and ability to act.

Nothing in the Founding Act restricts NATO's ability to station troops, deploy weapons or carry out any of its missions. The final section of the act contains restatements of unilateral NATO policy that existed prior to the Founding Act about how the alliance intends to act "in the current and foreseeable security environment." In its 1995 enlargement study, NATO concluded that enlargement did not require a change to the alliance's nuclear posture; on this basis, NATO declared in December 1996 that NATO members "have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy." The Founding Act also restates NATO's March 1997 unilateral declaration that it "will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Moreover, none of NATO's unilateral statements regarding military policy cited in the Founding Act restricts the alliance's ability to conduct exercises, establish headquarters or build and maintain infrastructure. Indeed, the Founding Act acknowledges that NATO will "have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with [these] tasks," given that NATO's strategy now revolves around the ability of states to receive reinforcements.

The Founding Act reflects alliance policy in the current and foreseeable security environment. Should we see an unexpected change for the worse, NATO retains the prerogative to reconsider its policies with regard to nuclear and conventional deployments, and the Founding Act would in no way constrain that. It is our hope and expectation, however, that the recent very positive trends within Europe will continue and that the Founding Act will provide a vehicle for greatly expanded cooperation between NATO and Russia.

Critique: The administration response is accurate as far as it goes. It fails, however, to acknowledge that a number of ambiguities surround the Founding Act. Specifically, there is obviously a difference of views between officials and observers in Washington and Moscow over whether the act is legally binding or not, whether it gives Russia a "voice" or a "veto" within NATO, and whether it has "bought off" Russia for just the first tranche of three new alliance members or whether it represents a go ahead for NATO's "open door" expansion policy throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

In the long term, Russian "acquiescence" to the first tranche of NATO expansion depends on how these ambiguities are resolved. Russia is not likely to acquiesce to the "open door," however. Thus, with or without the Founding Act, NATO expansion is putting us on a track toward isolating Russia and orienting its foreign, domestic and security policy in an unfavorable and unaccommodating direction.


1. See Susanne M. Schafer, "Cohen Cautions NATO's New Trio," The Washington Times, October 3, 1997, p. A15.

2. See "Table I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1985 1995," World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, ACDA: Washington, DC, July 1997, pp. 49 98.

3. See Jesse Helms, "New Members, Not New Missions," The Wall Street Journal Europe, July 9, 1997.

The Post Cold War Settlement in Europe: A Triumph of Arms Control

Michael Mandelbaum

On March 26, Michael Mandelbaum, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, addressed the annual luncheon meeting of the Arms Control Association (ACA). Mandelbaum, who is also director of the Project on East West Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations, spoke on the impact of arms control advances on European security. As one of the leading critics of NATO enlargement, he focused on the implications of the expansion policy for future arms control agreements. Mandelbaum delivered his remarks only days after the Helsinki summit meeting between President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Mandelbaum has written and edited several books on U.S. foreign policy, including The Dawn of Peace in Europe (Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), and has taught at the U.S. Naval Academy and Harvard University. Mandelbaum earned a B.A. from Yale University, an M.A. from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. The text is an edited version of his luncheon speech.

If a cure for cancer were discovered, what would be the response? There would be admiration for the discoverers and celebration of the discovery. It would be a great, triumphal public event.

For the political equivalent of cancer, a cure has been discovered. The greatest scourge of our century is war. The worst and most destructive wars—World Wars I and II—have begun and been fought in the heart of Europe. The Cold War began and ended there. The danger of a major war in Europe was the central obsession of the American government for much of the 20th century, and rightly so. But that danger is now at its lowest level in decades, perhaps in all of Europe's modern history.

What is the reason for this? What is the equivalent, for war in Europe, of a cure for cancer? It is, among other things, arms control. The post Cold War settlement now in place in Europe is a triumph of arms control. That statement raises three questions. First, how and why could this statement be true? Second, if it is true, why has this achievement been so little appreciated? And third, why does it matter whether this achievement is appreciated?

In my book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, I argue that there is a new security order in place in Europe, one that differs from the two most familiar ways of organizing security: balance of power politics and world government. Balance of power politics has been the source of such stability as Europe has enjoyed for most of its recorded history, including during the Cold War years. World government is a utopian dream that has been envisioned and advocated but never implemented, and that might not be a source of celebration if it were implemented, which it almost surely will not be.

The theme of The Dawn of Peace in Europe is that, in the wake of the Cold War, Europe has established a third method for achieving security, which I call common security and that owes something to the concept of cooperative security that was developed at the Brookings Institution. Within this common security regime, Europe is still made up of sovereign states. There is no supranational authority. The states of Europe are still armed. But peace in Europe does not depend—as it has for most of Europe's recorded history—on a finely balanced hostility between and among the most powerful European nations. The new common security order has dramatically reduced both the incentives and the capabilities for war.

The incentives have been reduced by the great political changes of 1989 and 1991. It is important to understand the events of those years as not only liberating the people involved, from whom the yoke of communism was lifted, but also as reducing substantially the threat of war. Communism itself, and the imperial domination that came with it in Europe, were standing causes of war. As long as communism and a communist European empire lasted, those oppressed would struggle to break free and those of us who were already free would struggle against the threat that communism posed.

Not only the end of communism, but also the beginnings of democracy contributed to peace in Europe. For democracy is associated with peace. There is, of course, no iron law that democracies are necessarily and always peaceful. And the most problematical country in Europe for the purposes of European security, Russia, is not fully democratic. Nonetheless, there has been since 1989 and 1991, a marked and remarkable surge of democratization across formerly communist Europe, and that contributes to the unprecedentedly peaceful character of relations between and among sovereign states there.

The military capabilities of the countries of Europe are also less threatening now than in the past, and this has been accomplished by arms control. Specifically, it has been accomplished by the remarkable series of accords that were signed beginning with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces [INF] agreement of December 1987, and culminating with the START II accord of January 1993. These arms control agreements are similar in appearance to those of the earlier part of the Cold War, but as I argue in The Dawn of Peace in Europe, they differ in content in two truly revolutionary ways.

First, the later series of arms reduction agreements is characterized by "defense dominance." That is, they have reshaped military arsenals to make them more useful for defense than for offense in the case of conventional forces, and more useful for deterrence than for actual war fighting in the case of nuclear armaments. Country "X" will be concerned, of course, about the capabilities of its neighbor, Country "Y" no matter what "Y" says about its own intentions. Country "X" will be least concerned about Country "Y" if Country "Y" has no weapons at all. But the nations of Europe have not laid down their arms completely, and are unlikely to do so.

The next best circumstance, from the point of view of peace, is if Country "X" does not feel threatened by the armaments of Country "Y" because those armaments are suitable for self defense and not for attack. That is now the status quo in Europe thanks to arms control.

Country "X" will also want to know that Country "Y" is abiding by the limits to which it has agreed, and that what Country "Y" is actually doing with the armaments that it legally has is not threatening. The later arms control in Europe fulfills both conditions. The 1987 to 1993 agreements, that is, provide for both "static" and "operational" arms control.

The second revolutionary feature of the post 1987 arms agreements, both conventional and nuclear, is that they establish transparency. That is all the countries of Europe and North America now can know what armaments all the other states have, what they are doing with them, and whether they are violating the agreed limits—and they can know this at all times. This is an important development.

Verification did not, of course, begin in 1987. "Verifiability" has been a necessary condition for almost all arms control accords into which the United States has entered since 1945. The issue of verification has been a major theme of the nuclear age. Verification would be available even without formal agreements, through what have come to be known as "national technical means"—that is, satellites.

But verification under the auspices of the later arms agreements is more comprehensive and more intrusive than what was available previously and what would be available in the absence of these agreements. And it is significant that verification is mandated by treaty. This makes violations plainly illegal, which means that it is more likely that countries that detect violations by others will act on them. The reason surprise attacks succeed, as Richard Betts has written, is not that the country being attacked lacks warning, but rather that it lacks the political will to respond. It is easier to muster the requisite political will when the violation is unambiguously illegal. Under the later series of arms control agreements, this would be the case.

To summarize: A balance of power system rests on deterrence. A world government, should it ever exist, would rest on unchallenged authority. Common security, however, the system of security now in place in Europe, rests on confidence. The entire system of security—including changes of regime, changes of borders and changes in the military balance—can be seen as one large confidence building measure. Together, these measures have generated more confidence than ever before in modern history that there will be no war in Europe, and for good reason. Where security is concerned, Europe now enjoys the best of all possible worlds.

This is surely cause for celebration: yet it is not being celebrated. Why's this so? I believe that the sweeping, comprehensive—indeed, revolutionary—arms control accords now in place have been overlooked for the same reason that made them possible in the first place.

Historically, arms control has been tied to, has depended on and has been subsumed by international politics. Arms control is, to use a term common in social science, a dependent variable, and the independent variable on which it has depended has been the status of East West relations. For most of the Cold War, East West relations were hostile and frozen. They were marked by disagreement on fundamental issues. Neither side would budge on these issues and neither dared try to budge the other, which would have been extremely dangerous.

In this context, early arms control took on a symbolic role. It was a form of reassurance. It demonstrated that both sides understood the dangers of the nuclear age and would keep their rivalry within bounds. Arms control in the 1970s and in the 1980s did not, could not, indeed was not intended to, end the East West rivalry. Because this was so, arms accords affected the instruments of that rivalry, namely, armaments—with the notable exception the ABM Treaty—only marginally.

If the effects on actual deployments were marginal, arms control was still important because the rivalry that it addressed was a real one. Arms control riveted the eyes of the world because the world needed reassurance about the rivalry between the two great nuclear powers. Peace rested on prudence, not on the absence of any reason to go to war. Arms control did not cause the prudence that preserved the peace, but it did signal that both sides would practice that prudence.

Then, with the changes set in motion by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the political differences at the core of the East West rivalry disappeared. They disappeared because the Soviet Union gave up the goals to which the West had been opposed. This was the meaning of 1989 and 1991. Under these new political circumstances, the role of arms control changed. It was no longer marginal to actual military deployments; it became central. It was no longer a symbolic but, rather, a substantive matter. Instead of making small adjustments to large arsenals for political effects, arms control came to involve the wholesale restructuring of armaments on both sides with sweeping military effects.

These revolutionary changes in arms control, however, were little noticed because of the absence of political conflict between East and West, which, as I've suggested, was precisely what made them possible in the first place. People turned out to be uninterested in what happens to weapons they do not expect or fear will be used against them. That, I believe, is the reason for the lack of appreciation for what is a remarkable historic achievement.

Yet, both American political parties have reason not only for interest but for pride in what has been achieved. Democrats, after all, were the champions of arms control in the 1970s and 1980s. They considered it central to East West relations. But now that they are in power, they seem to have all but forgotten about arms agreements that exceed in scope what were once their fondest wishes.

Republicans tended to be skeptical about arms control in the latter stages of the Cold War. Indeed, President Ronald Reagan entered office opposed to it, claiming that it was "bad medicine." He said that, had he been in charge in the 1970s, where negotiations with Moscow were concerned he would have done things differently. And in office he proceeded to do things differently. The current accords—the ones to which first the Soviet Union and then Russia agreed—were designed in and by his administration, based on its criticisms of what had gone wrong previously. The post 1987 arms treaties are, in effect, Republican agreements and are among the most important diplomatic achievements in the history of the United States.

If the common security regime now in place endures, the arms treaties will be the pillars of the post Cold War order, even as the Marshall Plan and NATO were the pillars of the West's Cold War policy. This is no small achievement. Yet, these agreements get less respect than they deserve. But this raises the third question I mentioned at the outset: Does this lack of interest really matter? After all, these treaties have been negotiated and signed. Those that have been implemented are doing their work. It is a historical commonplace that what once seemed miraculous quickly becomes routine. The world does not celebrate Jonas Salk's birthday, despite the importance of the Salk vaccine for polio. Every day, millions of people unthinkingly cross bridges, the construction of which was once regarded as an engineering miracle. That's progress. Isn't this true of arms control as well?

Unfortunately, it is not quite true. The significance of these achievements does matter because the achievements are not secure. They are not irreversible. Indeed, I believe they are threatened by the prospect of NATO expansion to Central Europe. They are threatened in two ways.

First, the arms treaties are threatened. For example, START II, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons aimed at the United States and is therefore of some interest to Americans, has been held hostage in the Russian Parliament, the Duma, to the prospect of NATO expansion. In Helsinki in March, President Yeltsin promised to try to get the Duma to ratify this treaty. He's promised this before.

There is an even larger problem with NATO expansion. It puts the entire post Cold War settlement, in which the post 1987 arms agreements are embedded, in jeopardy. That settlement is extraordinarily favorable to the United States. It was tailored to our specifications. The liberation of Eastern Europe in 1989 was something we had demanded since 1945. Indeed, the liberation of Eastern Europe removed the basic cause of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was an event so favorable to the West that we never imagined that it was possible. And it is crucial that all of these changes were voluntary; first the Soviet Union and then Russia agreed to them. Thus, the post Cold War settlement has a certain legitimacy in Russian eyes. Because this settlement is so extraordinarily favorable to us, that legitimacy is a priceless asset for the West. But with NATO expansion we are in danger of squandering it.

The post Cold War settlement rests on three principles, all of which NATO expansion would violate. The first is the principle of consensus, according to which changes will be made with the acquiescence of everyone. NATO expansion, however, is the first major change in the security architecture of Europe to be made over the objections of Russia.

The second principle underlying the post Cold War settlement is inclusion, meaning that Russia will be welcomed into the international community in general, and into specific international organizations to the extent that it is willing and able to join them. But NATO expansion is an act of exclusion. It draws a new line of division in Europe where none existed before, and places Russia—and not only Russia—on the far side of that line.

The third principle is embedded both in the common security order as a whole and in the arms treaties that are so important to it: transparency. NATO expansion is the opposite of transparent. The American government has asserted that expansion will be open ended and that there will be further expansions after the first one, but it has refused to say where, when, or by what criteria this further expansion will take place.

What is the danger in all this? It is not that Russia will be able to stop the expansion. Russia is too weak to do so. Nor, I think, is there an immediate danger that the Russians will break out of the constraints of the arms treaties that they have signed. They're too poor to do that now. Rather, the danger that NATO expansion poses to the post Cold War settlement arises over the long term. The risk is that in the eyes of the Russian political class—and therefore ultimately in the eyes of ordinary Russians—NATO expansion will delegitimate the entire settlement, and make it a central goal of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century to overturn what has been put in place.

This is not, to say the least, a desirable outcome. If it should come to pass—if we should return to a Europe of military blocs, balances of power and political hostility—no doubt the United States and its allies could hold their own. We could once again deter Russia if we had to. But this would not necessarily be easy, it would not necessarily be cheap, and it would certainly not be free of risk. One thing, however, it certainly would be: If, 25 years from now, we look back at this period as a turning point, the moment when the common security order dissolved and Europe returned to the kind of balance of power arrangements so familiar in history, one point will be beyond dispute: this need not have happened.


Questions and Answers

Q: In one of the joint statements from the Helsinki summit, President Clinton cites the unprecedented progress in arms control during the past four years. Is it really unprecedented? Are we making more progress now than we made four years before?

Mandelbaum: From a historical perspective, the years from 1987 to 1993 constitute the great period of arms control. The task of this administration was and is to build on and consolidate what was achieved then. It has certainly made an effort to do so, but NATO expansion will hinder, not consolidate, it.

Q: If at one end of the spectrum you have world government, I assume that on the opposite end there is anarchy, and in between balance of power. In your remarks, you didn't mention collective security. Is there a difference between common security and collective security?

Mandelbaum: As Humpty Dumpty said, a word means what I choose it to mean; no more, no less. In The Dawn of Peace in Europe, I define collective security in such a way that it doesn't belong on that spectrum. By my definition it refers to two things: alliances, which are perfectly compatible with a balance of power and were at the core of the balance during the Cold War; and a regional or world police force, in which countries band together to deal with trouble spots. I devote a chapter to this subject in The Dawn of Peace in Europe.

Such a police force, I argue in that chapter, is undoubtedly desirable, but it is not feasible. The political will to pay a significant price to calm trouble spots around the globe is lacking in the United States and in other countries that might contribute to such a force.

Q: Administration officials are saying that NATO enlargement is a done deal, and I know you don't agree. They also say that attempts to block enlargement will destroy U.S. leadership in the world and particularly in Europe. Can you respond to both these points?

Mandelbaum: It is certainly not too late to stop NATO expansion unless the Constitution of the United States has been repealed. The Constitution provides that the Senate must ratify treaties by a two thirds majority.

As for the argument that terrible consequences would follow if expansion were stopped—an argument that will drown out all others if NATO does formally opt to invite new members this summer—this is an artifact of the Cold War. It has a certain resonance because it had a certain plausibility during the Cold War, which created a set of conditions that no longer exists.

Then, the United States was confronting a militant, militarized, hostile adversary around the world. It was reasonable to fear that pulling back in one area would invite aggression elsewhere. This was, after all, the reason the U.S. fought in Korea. The Korean Peninsula was of no strategic significance to the United States in 1950, but President Truman and his advisers believed that a failure to respond in Korea would produce trouble in Europe. This was also the reason for standing firm in West Berlin—an enclave that was militarily indefensible except by nuclear weapons. It was the reason for fighting—possibly even after 1968—in Vietnam.

Whatever one may think of the way this argument was applied during the Cold War, at least it had some plausibility. There was, after all, a Cold War. There was a Soviet Union. Now there is neither. So the question arises: What would be the consequences of stopping expansion now? What would be the consequences of postponing the decision, of taking another course? Is it really imaginable that the Soviet army would be in West Berlin the next day? There is no Soviet army; there is no divided Berlin. The world is now safe for the United States to admit and correct its mistakes in foreign policy. This is a mistake. We ought to admit it and then correct it.

Q: The thrust of your argument is that Russia is going to, with NATO expansion, set as its goal for the next century the overthrow of the post Cold War settlement. Assuming NATO enlargement stops short of drawing in the republics of the former Soviet Union, even in Russian eyes, won't the forces of economic growth and expansion be much more powerful forces in shaping Russia's long term views of its security and foreign policy goals?

Mandelbaum: I would hope that this would happen. But your premise is that NATO will not expand to the former Soviet republics. However, this administration has already effectively promised that expansion to some former Soviet republics—notably the Baltic states—will take place. Those former Soviet republics believe that they have been promised eventual NATO membership, in which case the danger of a nationalist backlash in Russia would be greater.

There are many powerful forces at work in Russia and on Russia, pushing Russia toward the kind of internal organization and international conduct that is desirable. NATO expansion to Central Europe would not necessarily and automatically override these forces. But expansion lends support to countervailing forces.

Q: If NATO expansion is such a bad idea, what is the right idea for including the Eastern and Western European security objectives, and what is the right future for NATO?

Mandelbaum: A number of second and third order issues in European security ought to be addressed. Further reductions in nuclear and non nuclear arms are desirable. Kaliningrad ought to be demilitarized. The independence of Belarus ought to be put on a formal basis. But the basic structure of the optimal European security order is, I believe, in place. What will improve it is something that by definition cannot be rushed: time. Over time the security order will become more normal, more deeply rooted and more legitimate.

As for the future of NATO, I believe it ought to be maintained. It is important to have an American commitment to Europe for modified versions of the original reasons: "To keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out and to keep the Germans down." We need NATO to relieve the Germans of the need to conduct an independent security policy, something that the Germans themselves do not wish to do. In addition, NATO ought to be sustained because if things go wrong in Russia, as they might, the Atlantic alliance would form the basis of an opposing coalition, just as it did during the Cold War. But if things do go wrong in Russia, they won't go wrong in a hurry. The Russians won't be in a position to threaten anybody for years; there will be plenty of advance warning.

How many troops are now needed in Europe? That depends on the magnitude of the threat. Now it is not great. If all goes well, it will diminish further over time. In that case it would be possible to bring troop levels down further. At some point, under the best case scenario, no American troops would remain in Europe. In that case NATO would have reverted to what it was intended to be in the first place: a guarantee pact. What began simply as a treaty, only became an integrated military force on the European continent in response to the outbreak of the Korean War.

Moreover, I believe that there is enough political support in the United States to sustain the NATO we need. But I do not believe that there will be domestic political support to sustain an expanded NATO which is not needed.

Indeed, if there is a backlash in the United States against the costs of an expanded NATO—and those costs, in political and economic terms, are likely to be considerably higher than the administration is claiming—it will call into question not just simply NATO expansion but the American commitment to Europe itself.

Q: If Russia views NATO as an alliance that opposes it, would European security be vastly increased by allowing Russia also to join NATO? Why are we precluding Russia from joining NATO?

Mandelbaum: I'm lukewarm, at best, to the idea of including Russia in NATO, but the prospect now seems to me less implausible than it once did, for four reasons. First, it is a better idea than the one this administration is proposing to carry out. Second, it preserves one of the fundamental principles on which the Cold War was ended: inclusion. Third, it might give the United States some leverage on the issue that matters most to us: Russian nuclear weapons. If Russia were part of NATO, it would be easier to reduce and control weapons that can strike North America. Fourth, if NATO does expand to Central Europe, it will then face three choices: to stay where it is, thus establishing in perpetuity a "grey zone" between NATO and Russia, the countries of which—Ukraine and the three Baltic states—would thereby become vulnerable in a number of ways; to expand to include this grey zone, which the Russians have suggested they would regard as akin to an act of war; or to expand to include Russia itself. Under those circumstances, the last option might be the least worst one.

Q: If the administration were to turn around and all of the sudden say: "Fine, no more NATO expansion," or if the Madrid summit were to be canceled, what do we tell those countries that have now had false expectations of protection under the NATO umbrella?

Mandelbaum: The countries that are expecting admission aren't threatened. None has a border with Russia. So none would be in a worse position where its security is concerned.

I also think it's a myth that there is powerful sentiment in favor of joining NATO in the prospective new member states. This is true of Poland; none of the surveys of opinion that I have seen show very much public enthusiasm in the Czech Republic or in Hungary. If membership in a Western international organization is necessary for the well being of these countries, the proper organization for them to join is the European Union, not NATO.

Q: What combination of inside politics and appeal to American public opinion do you see as most likely to bring about a change in the administration's policy on NATO expansion, and in what time frame?

Mandelbaum: There are deep reservations about NATO expansion in the foreign policy community and among those few members of Congress who follow the issue closely. I also believe that, to the extent that this issue is publicly discussed, support drops away. This is one of those issues about which people, when they first hear about it, think, "Oh, that's a good idea. Let's take them in." Then, when the details and the contingencies and the dangers are probed, support plummets.

The further the debate goes, the more unease there's going to be, which is why I believe that the administration will increasingly fall back on the argument: "It's too late. Maybe we made a mistake, but you—the Congress and the public—have to back us up because if you don't the whole world will collapse." But this argument, too, is specious.

Joint Statements of the Helsinki Summit

Joint Statement on Parameters On Future Reductions In Nuclear Forces

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The Start I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear weapon free. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

Once Start II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a Start III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.

Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long range sea launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

Joint Statement Concerning The Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1995 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

The scale of deployment—in number and geographic scope—of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.

The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 28, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty¾the obligation not to give non ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode¾the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher velocity TMD systems.

Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land based and air based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The elements for the agreement on higher velocity TMD systems are:

The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.

The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.

The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.

Joint U.S. Russian Statement On European Security

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S. Russian relationship in recent years.

Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, meets the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.

They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision making. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision making and action on security issues of common concern.

The Presidents noted that the NATO Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.

The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any destabilizing build up of forces in different regions of Europe.

The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.

The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.

Joint U.S Russian Statement On Chemical Weapons

President Clinton and President Yeltsin discussed issues relating to the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. They stressed the commitment of the United States and Russia to full and effective accomplishment of the tasks and objectives of the convention.

The Presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries. President Clinton expressed his determination that the United States be a party when the Convention enters into force in April of this year, and is strongly urging prompt Senate action. President Yeltsin noted that the Convention had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation for prompt ratification.

Mindful of their special role and responsibility in the matter of chemical disarmament, the United States and Russia understand that their participation in the Convention is important to its effective implementation and universality.

The Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Parties will continue cooperation between them in chemical disarmament.

The United States will seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed.

For more information contact Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr. or Jack Mendelsohn

'Scope and Parameters' of CFE Adaptation

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'Scope and Parameters' of CFE Adaptation

OSCE Summit Stresses Cooperation; CFE States Set Out Adaptation Plan

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Belarus Completes Transfer of Nuclear Warheads to Russia

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Arms Control and Military Stability In the Balkans

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