Login/Logout

*
*  
“It will take all of us working together – government officials, and diplomats, academic experts, and scientists, activists, and organizers – to come up with new and innovative approaches to strengthen transparency and predictability, reduce risk, and forge the next generation of arms control agreements.”
– Wendy Sherman
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
June 2, 2022
PressRoom

Iran’s Heavy-Water Reactor: A Plutonium Bomb Factory

Sections:

Body: 
Printer Friendly

Note for Reporters by Robert J. Einhorn
November 9, 2006

Contacts:

  • Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
    Phone: (202) 775-3257
  • Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
    Phone: (202) 463-8270 x107

Later this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors will address Iran’s request for technical assistance from the agency to help ensure safety at its heavy-water production facility at Arak. The request sounds innocuous enough. But the origins of Iran’s Arak project should give board members pause.

Iran’s efforts to acquire a large, 40-megawatt heavy water-moderated “research” reactor are not new. During the 1990s, Iran secretly approached at least four nuclear suppliers and sought to purchase such a reactor. Suspicious of Iran’s motives, the governments all turned down the request.

It is not surprising that Iran’s desire to buy a large heavy-water reactor set off alarm bells. Before centrifuge technology for enriching uranium became available from the black market network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, the plutonium route using heavy-water reactors was the dependable choice for aspiring nuclear-weapon states.

It is not by coincidence that India’s Cirrus reactor, Pakistan’s Khushab reactor, and Israel’s Dimona reactor are all large, heavy-water reactors. Fueled by natural uranium, these reactors don’t require their owners to go the trouble of obtaining enriched uranium fuel—either by making it indigenously or buying safeguarded enriched uranium from abroad. Moreover, when reprocessed, fuel rods irradiated in such reactors yield high-quality, weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea’s infamous 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, while moderated with graphite rather than heavy water, is also fueled with natural uranium. All of these reactors are excellent plutonium bomb factories. That’s why they were acquired.

When the Arak reactor is completed, which the Iranians say could happen as early as 2009, it will be capable of producing enough plutonium for about two bombs a year.

While Iran was turned down in its attempts to buy a complete 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor, it eventually got the technical assistance from abroad necessary to build its own reactor. That is what is being constructed today in Arak.

Iran says its reactor at Arak will be used to produce isotopes for peaceful purposes. Are large, heavy water-moderated reactors needed to conduct legitimate scientific research and produce isotopes for medical, agricultural, and industrial purposes? The answer is no. Much smaller, light-water research reactors are fully satisfactory for the kinds of applications Iran says it is interested in.

Could the reactor Iran is constructing at Arak actually be used to produce isotopes for peaceful purposes? Yes it could. A 12-inch hunting knife also could be used to spread jam on your toast in the morning.

It is noteworthy that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom offered to replace Iran’s 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor with a light-water research reactor. Iran was not interested in that offer.

In promoting its request for IAEA technical assistance for Arak, Iran will undoubtedly play its “right to peaceful uses” card, claiming especially to non aligned states that Western powers are again seeking to deny Iran its rights. But if Iran is genuinely interested in using a research reactor for peaceful purposes, why didn’t it accept or even discuss the European offer?

Considering that Iran’s planned civil nuclear power program is based on light-water technology, it is highly suspicious in the eyes of most experts that Tehran has opted for a heavy-water production facility and a heavy-water “research” reactor. If Iran’s power program were based on heavy-water technology, as is Canada’s program, then producing heavy water indigenously and going the heavy water route for a research reactor would make some sense. But given Iran’s declared civil power plans, its choices at Arak only raise eyebrows.

Recognizing their vulnerability on this point, Iranians once claimed that they were exploring with the Canadians the option of acquiring heavy-water power reactors. However, Canadian authorities told the Department of State that they were unaware that any such discussions had taken place, either with Canadian governmental or industry officials.

The unsettling implications of Iran acquiring and operating a heavy-water reactor have not been lost on the IAEA board, which more than once has called on Iran not to proceed with its heavy-water program at Arak. Iran has ignored the board’s requests.

Iran apparently is requesting IAEA assistance in the safety area, recognizing that requests to make facilities safer are usually hard to turn down. But the issue before the board is not safety; it is whether Iran should proceed with a project that the board itself has regarded with suspicion and called on Iran to suspend.

At its meeting starting November 23, the IAEA board should again call on Iran to suspend both its heavy-water production facility and the heavy-water reactor. It should not approve technical assistance for Arak that would give legitimacy to a project conceived long ago as providing Iran another route to a nuclear weapons capability.

Robert J. Einhorn, currently at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation from 1999 to 2001.

Country Resources:

Technical Analysis of Oct. 9 North Korean Nuclear Test Now Available in Arms Control Today

Sections:

Body: 
For Immediate Release: October 19, 2006

Press Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107 and Miles Pomper, (202) 463-8270 x108

(Washington, D.C.): On Oct. 9, North Korea announced that it had carried out an underground nuclear test. An independent analysis of the test based on publicly available information by two of the world's leading nuclear weapons physics experts, Richard L. Garwin and Frank von Hippel is now available on the Arms Control Association's web site.

In their article, which will appear in the forthcoming issue of Arms Control Today, the authors judge, on the basis of publicly available data, that the yield of the explosion was below 1 kiloton (TNT equivalent). The authors write that "while the test did not succeed as planned, North Korea might have been testing a lower-yield design than many commentators have assumed. This imperfect test may well lead North Korea to test again."

# # #

The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting effective arms control policies. ACA publishes the monthly journal
Arms Control Today.

Country Resources:

Subject Resources:

Next Steps on North Korea: Recommendations from the Arms Control Association

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: October 13, 2006

Press Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107; Paul Kerr, (202) 463-8270 x102

(Washington, D.C.): In a detailed address on North Korea's declared nuclear test, the executive director of the nonpartisan Arms Control Association said that North Korea's apparent nuclear test explosion "constitutes one of the greatest nonproliferation policy failures in the history of the nuclear age because it was a preventable outcome. It is past time to adjust course in order to minimize the damage."

In his October 11 address to a symposium organized by the Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS), Kimball said, "U.S., Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and South Korean leaders need to come to grips with the fact that a 'business as usual' reiteration of previous calls for North Korea to return to the six-party talks and tighter sanctions on the already isolated regime will not work."

"The UN Security Council needs to act in a manner that makes clear that Pyongyang's nuclear test is out of bounds," Kimball argued. "To do so, Security Council member states should authorize appropriate punitive sanctions to go into effect only if North Korea formally refuses to rejoin the six-party talks by a certain date or makes further statements threatening nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches," he suggested.

"But it is naive to think that punitive international or national sanctions alone will reverse North Korea's course or force the collapse of the regime," Kimball noted. "In fact, it is more likely that additional sanctions will harden North Korea's position, especially if China and South Korea do not support and implement the proscribed actions and if the United States does not, in some way or another, appear to try to meet North Korea's stated concerns," Kimball said.

"To break the current action-reaction cycle, President Bush needs to adjust his failed strategy and announce that senior U.S. officials are prepared to meet anywhere, anytime in a bilateral setting with North Korean officials to resolve issues of concern so long as North Korea also agrees to return to the six-party talks and refrains from further nuclear or missile tests. At the same time, negotiations cannot succeed if North Korea maintains its threat to conduct additional tests," Kimball stressed.

"President Bush has been misled into believing that direct negotiations with an enemy is reward for bad behavior and that previous efforts during the Clinton years did not work. The Agreed Framework was the result of bilateral negotiations supported by U.S. allies and the effort clearly succeeded in preventing North Korea from producing plutonium for eight-plus years. The right package can still lead North Korea to denuclearize over time. The September 19, 2005 six-party Joint Statement provides the blueprint," Kimball said.

Policymakers cannot afford to overlook the importance of resolving the U.S.-North Korean dispute about the September 2005 Treasury Department action to freeze North Korean financial assets linked to North Korean government agencies and front companies engaged in illicit activities, Kimball noted. "Meetings with North Korean officials to resolve the matter in a business-like manner would increase the possibility that more urgent talks on nuclear weapons issues can resume," Kimball recommended.

"North Korean money laundering activities deserve to be shut down, but U.S. officials have mistakenly thought the financial sanctions would increase bargaining leverage on nuclear issues with North Korea. Instead, they have helped derail the diplomatic process," Kimball said.

Kimball also said that it is not only important to clarify the costs of defiance for North Korea, but also to clarify the benefits of cooperation and compliance. Kimball recommended that "the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea should quickly develop a coordinated and detailed proposal outlining which actions they would be prepared to take with respect to implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement if North Korea agrees to verifiably freeze plutonium production."

"A halt to plutonium production is the first step toward containing the North's program and capping the supply of its arsenal and the possible sale of bomb material to other states or to terrorist organizations," he said.

"The North Korean nuclear crisis is just one of several developments that make it clear that the nonproliferation system needs to be strengthened and updated, not abandoned or ignored," Kimball noted. "Leading states must not only work together to develop a more effective diplomatic approach on North Korea, but they must also implement tougher international safeguards on all nuclear programs, establish better controls on the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, secure a global halt to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and take new steps to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons," Kimball said.

The full text of Kimball's remarks on North Korea are available online. For more information on the Arms Control Association’s plan to strengthen the nonproliferation system, please see www.NPT2005.org

Additional ACA resources on North Korea, including a chronology and series of Arms Control Today news reports detailing the long-running crisis, are available on ACA's North Korea country resource page.

# # #

The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting effective arms control policies.

Country Resources:

Nuclear Forensics Article Featured in Arms Control Today

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: October 11, 2006

Press Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107 and Miles Pomper, (202) 463-8270 x108

(Washington, D.C.): North Korea’s claimed nuclear test this week has sparked renewed interest in nuclear forensics, a series of scientific techniques used to accurately identify the source of the nuclear bomb or material used to make a nuclear explosion. Two nuclear experts make the case for developing an enhanced and expanded nuclear forensics capability in the current issue of Arms Control Today, which is published by the independent and nonpartisan Arms Control Association.

Nuclear forensics has long been part of the U.S. toolkit, but could become far more critical in providing “extended deterrence” in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack. Knowing that their deadly wares could be traced back to them and fearing the likely severe consequences, potential proliferators might think twice about dealing with terrorists.

Today, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius called on the United States to pursue a “crash program” on nuclear forensics. In their Arms Control Today article earlier this month, William Dunlop and Harold Smith support the concept, but argue that bilateral or international forensic capabilities would best serve U.S. and global security interests. Dunlop is a semi-retired scientist from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. Currently at the University of California at Berkeley, Smith is a nuclear physicist and a former assistant to Secretary of Defense William Perry for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs.

Determining the source of the nuclear bomb or material used in a terrorist attack is vital, according to the two experts. An accurate finding “would help in restoring confidence to populations fearful of additional detonations and provide governments with evidence to pursue and find the perpetrators and eliminate further threats,” they write.

In what would clearly be an extremely tense and distrustful post-attack atmosphere, the authors contend, “the credibility of the nuclear forensic information would be significantly enhanced if provided or corroborated through a multinational or at least bilateral nuclear forensic team.” Dunlop and Smith recommend that the initial steps toward creating such a team begin with the United States and Russia.

The article, “Who Did It? Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism,” is currently available on the Arms Control Association’s web site. A sidebar to the article provides an easy-to-follow explanation on how scientists can determine the nature of a nuclear explosion and potentially pinpoint from what material or arsenal it originated.

# # #

The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting effective arms control policies. ACA publishes the monthly journal Arms Control Today.

 

Arms Control Association Condemns North Korean Nuclear Test Threat; Experts Call for More Effective, Energetic U.S. Diplomacy

Sections:

Body: 
For Immediate Release: October 4, 2006

Press Contacts: Paul Kerr, (202) 463-8270 x102; Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

(Washington, D.C.) A day after North Korea's foreign ministry released a statement threatening that Pyongyang would conduct a nuclear test explosion at some point in the future, experts from the nonpartisan Arms Control Association called for more energetic U.S. and international diplomacy to prevent a further escalation of the long-running impasse over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

"North Korea's threat of a nuclear weapon test explosion is out of bounds and extremely counterproductive," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

"At the same time, North Korea's nuclear test threat underscores that current policies designed to curb its nuclear weapons program have failed to achieve their potential and that a new and more energetic diplomatic approach is needed, and fast," Kimball said.

A little more than one year ago, six countries, including North Korea, agreed to a comprehensive joint statement stipulating goals and principles for a step-by-step, action-for-action plan to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula in a verifiable manner and move toward normalized relations. Even before North Korea's nuclear test threat, the six-party process was near collapse due to inflexibility and inaction on the part of leaders in Pyongyang and in Washington. No follow-up talks are currently scheduled among the six participants: China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and North Korea.

"A dangerous situation has been allowed to get worse. It is essential that top U.S. diplomats clarify Washington's willingness to negotiate directly with their North Korean counterparts in the context of the six-party process or other fora to implement the September 2005 Joint Framework Agreement for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," suggested Amb. Robert Gallucci, a member of the ACA Board of Directors.

Since November 2005, Washington and Pyongyang have been at odds over the substance and sequencing of the steps outlined in the Joint Framework. Pyongyang blames the breakdown mainly on U.S. efforts to crack down on illicit North Korean financial transactions and extract concessions in the six-party talks. The United States says it must take action against money laundering and that Pyongyang's complaints are but a cynical excuse to avoid returning to the six-party talks. In July, North Korea test-fired several ballistic missiles and the United States and Japan responded by pushing a resolution (1695) through the UN Security Council that, among other things, calls on North Korea to return to six-party talks.

"The six-party negotiations have not worked because there have been no real negotiations. Bilateral talks were a good idea before North Korea's test threat and they could still help jumpstart the process and lead to a de-escalation of tensions," Gallucci said. "Concerns that this approach would undermine the role of regional players, including South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, are misplaced because these states would be regularly consulted by Washington," he noted.

Late last month, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow indicated a slight shift in the U.S. position on resuming talks. In an interview with Yonhap News Agency Vershbow said there was a possibility for a face-to-face meeting between U.S. and North Korean negotiators to resolve the nuclear crisis if North Korea would also agree to return to the six-party talks.

"Clearly, it is far less likely that talks on the nuclear issue will produce useful results if the North maintains its threat to test a nuclear weapon. At the same time, it is unlikely that the situation will improve if Washington insists the six-party process is the only path forward," added Gallucci, who was the U.S. negotiator during the first North Korean nuclear crisis from 1993-1994. That earlier crisis was resolved through direct talks with North Korea and led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea verifiably halted plutonium production through 2002.

"It is more important than ever for President Bush to speak directly with Chinese President Hu, as well as other leaders in the region, to urge them to use what influence they may have to persuade North Korea to temper its behavior and return to the negotiating table," said Lee Feinstein, ACA Board member and former Principal Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State. "To date, China has been unwilling to exert what economic or political leverage it may have over North Korea," Feinstein said.

Feinstein also suggested, "Secretary of State Rice should convene a meeting of the foreign ministers of South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia to work out a new joint strategy to break the impasse." After meeting on the North Korean issue today, the UN Security Council is reportedly divided about how to respond.

"Other states that have considered or pursued nuclear weapons but later foresaken them, such as Brazil, South Africa, and Ukraine, could also play a helpful role by urging North Korea to step back from the nuclear brink," Feinstein stated.

"It would also be useful for U.S. and North Korean officials to meet in a business-like fashion to resolve concerns about illegal conterfeiting of U.S. currency in order to help smooth the way for the resumption of more important talks on denuclearization," said Paul Kerr, ACA Research Analyst on the North Korean nuclear program.

The latest crisis began unfolding back in the fall of 2002 when the United States confronted North Korean diplomats about a covert uranium enrichment effort, which was a violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. In November 2002, fuel oil shipments to North Korea (as called for under the Agreed Framework) were terminated by Washington and its partners. North Korea retaliated by ejecting International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from its nuclear complex, renewing plutonium production, and announcing that it was withdrawing from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Today, North Korea continues to produce plutonium for its suspected nuclear weapons program and may have as much as 6-12 bombs worth of fissile material.

"U.S. leaders must interpret the latest North Korean threat as an opportunity for resuming constructive dialogue on the basis of the agreed principles for disarmament outlined last year," recommended Kerr. "If the President and Secretary of State fail to seize the diplomatic initiative now, a bad situation will get worse," Kerr said.

ACA recently held a press conference on the North Korean nuclear challenge, featuring Congressman Jim Leach (R-Iowa), James Kelly, and Dan Poneman. A full transcript of the event is available online. Other material and information on North Korea is available on ACA's North Korea country resources page.

# # #

The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting effective arms control policies. ACA publishes the monthly journal Arms Control Today.

Country Resources:

Arms Control Association Urges Action on Test Ban Treaty; Congressional Members, International Community Speak Out

Sections:

Body: 
For Immediate Release: September 22, 2006

Press Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

Ten years ago this week, United Nations member-states overwhelmingly endorsed and later opened for signature the longest-sought, hardest-fought nuclear arms control treaty: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Today, despite widespread support for the CTBT and a de facto global nuclear-test moratorium, the treaty still has not entered into force.

The conclusion of the treaty in 1996 stands as one of the greatest accomplishments of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation movement. To date, a total of 176 states have signed the CTBT and 135 have ratified the accord. The CTBT prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." The treaty would simultaneously help constrain the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, curb proliferation, advance disarmament, and de-legitimize nuclear weapons.

"Unfortunately, the Bush administration and governments of nine other test ban rogue states refuse or have failed to approve the treaty, thus preventing the accord from becoming legally binding," noted Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a long-time proponent of the CTBT. The CTBT requires ratification by a select group of 44 states before it can formally enter into force; 34 of the 44 have done so.

At the United Nations in New York this week, a group of 59 Foreign Ministers, led by those from Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, and the Netherlands, marked the 10 anniversary of the CTBT with a joint statement calling on other states to sign and ratify the treaty to allow its entry into force. (See a PDF version of the statement.)

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also called on member-states to show greater urgency as he highlighted the consequences of further delays. "Although there is an international norm against nuclear testing and continuing moratoria on testing, I am concerned that the treaty has yet to enter into force. Indeed, no one can guarantee that nuclear testing might one day resume, particularly when the modernization of weapons continues," Annan said in a message to a ministerial meeting on the treaty.

In Washington, there remains a large reservoir of support for the CTBT. Next week, Reps. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) and Jim Leach (R-Iowa) will introduce a resolution calling on the Senate to reconsider and give its advice and consent to the ratification of the CTBT.

Republican presidential hopefuls Sens. John McCain (Ariz.) and Chuck Hagel (Neb.) noted back in 1999 that the Senate can and should reconsider the CTBT. "A clear majority of the Senate have not given up hope of finding common ground in our quest for a sound and secure ban on nuclear testing," Hagel wrote in The New York Times.

The CTBT remains on the executive calendar of the Senate despite the highly partisan Senate debate and vote against the treaty in October 1999. President Bill Clinton's September 24, 1996 signature on the CTBT also means that the United States is legally-bound not to violate the "object or purpose" of the treaty (i.e. conduct a test blast).

"The United States holds the key to changing the dynamics on the CTBT. The Bush administration's opposition to the CTBT makes little sense for the United States. There is no requirement for new warheads that would necessitate renewed U.S. testing and there is no other technical reason to resume nuclear testing," noted Kimball. "Absent U.S. ratification and CTBT entry into force, Washington risks that other states may test and denies itself and the world the monitoring and verification benefits of the CTBT's on-site inspection authority," Kimball argued.

In June, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix urged immediate action on the CTBT. The international panel, which included former Secretary of Defense William Perry, called on the United States "to reconsider its position and proceed to ratify the treaty, recognizing that its ratification would trigger other required ratifications."

Other signatory states that must also ratify the treaty before it can enter into force are China, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Israel. India, North Korea, and Pakistan must also sign and ratify the accord for it to take effect.

"Ratification of the CTBT will not by itself stop nuclear proliferation. But stopping nuclear proliferation is not possible without the CTBT. The United States should return to its traditional role as a test ban advocate and renew action toward a permanent and verifiable global nuclear test ban," Kimball said.

# # #

The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting effective arms control policies. ACA publishes the monthly journal Arms Control Today.

Experts Urge Senate to Fix Flaws in U.S.-Indian Nuclear Proposal

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: September 12, 2006

Press Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

(Washington, D.C.) In a letter delivered to Senate offices today, a group of 16 nuclear nonproliferation experts called upon lawmakers to remedy serious flaws plaguing the controversial July 2005 U.S.-Indian nuclear trade proposal. The letter urges lawmakers to strive to “further offset the adverse effects of the arrangement on U.S. nonproliferation and security objectives.”

The Senate might vote on legislation to advance the nuclear trade pact later this month. The House passed a similar measure in July and the two chambers must reconcile their separate versions into a final bill.

The legislation is required because Congress instituted laws restricting nuclear trade with India after it conducted a 1974 nuclear test using U.S. and Canadian nuclear imports designated for peaceful purposes only. The Bush administration and New Delhi are pressing Congress to enact as lenient of terms as possible for exempting India from these restrictions, but the experts are encouraging lawmakers to adopt and uphold measures essential for U.S. security and nonproliferation.

One of the experts’ chief recommendations is the addition of a determination that U.S. civil nuclear trade does not in any way assist or encourage India’s nuclear weapons program. The authors also call upon lawmakers to prohibit the U.S. government from continuing nuclear assistance or facilitating foreign nuclear exports to India if the Indian government or Indian entities break existing nonproliferation commitments and practices.

The experts further recommend that legislators should restrict full U.S. nuclear trade until India joins the five original nuclear-weapon states in stopping the production of fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons or subscribes to a multilateral fissile production cutoff agreement.

“We believe these measures are necessary because India has neither joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, nor accepted safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities, and India’s nonproliferation policy is not fully consistent with the nonproliferation practices and responsibilities expected of the original nuclear-weapon states,” wrote the experts.

As part of the proposed deal, India has pledged to accept safeguards on only eight additional “civilian” nuclear facilities by 2014. Current and future military-related nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing plants, and weapons fabrication facilities would remain unsafeguarded. Safeguards are measures that aim to deter and detect the diversion of civilian nuclear materials and technologies to weapons purposes.

The experts note that “partial IAEA safeguards would do nothing to prevent the continued production of fissile material for weapons in unsafeguarded facilities.” Furthermore, “foreign supplies of nuclear fuel to India could assist India’s bomb program by freeing-up its existing limited capacity to support the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons,” they wrote. The full text of the letter is available at http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20060912_India_Ltr_Congress.pdf.

For more information and resources on the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, see the Arms Control Association’s special resource page on the subject at http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/india.

# # #

The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting effective arms control policies. ACA publishes the monthly journal Arms Control Today.

Country Resources:

Arms Control Association Applauds Central Asian States for Forswearing Nuclear Arms

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: September 8, 2006

Press Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107 and Wade Boese, (202) 463-8270 x104

(Washington, D.C.) Today, five former Soviet republics committed themselves to never acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, or testing nuclear weapons by signing a treaty to create a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. The nonpartisan, independent Arms Control Association (ACA) welcomed the move as a positive step forward in reinforcing a beleaguered nuclear nonproliferation regime and advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Central Asia used to house part of the sprawling Soviet nuclear weapons complex. But now Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have broken with this nuclear past by signing the free zone pact at a former Soviet nuclear testing site, Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. Negotiations on the agreement started in 1997.

“Despite being surrounded by nuclear-armed neighbors, these five states have courageously and correctly concluded that nuclear weapons are not necessary for their future security,” declared ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball. “All states clinging or aspiring to nuclear weapons should heed this principled example and take their own steps to revive the lackluster nuclear disarmament process, which is the only sure way of protecting all countries against nuclear terror,” he urged.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States declined to attend the signing ceremony today because of some reservations they have with the treaty text. “While the agreement may not be perfect, governments with legitimate concerns should find constructive ways to address them rather than acting in ways that cast aspersions on a laudable accomplishment,” ACA Research Director Wade Boese stated.

The Central Asian zone will be the fifth such arrangement. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba) have also banded together to create nuclear-weapon-free zones. Mongolia has also outlawed nuclear weapons on its territory and all countries are prohibited from stationing nuclear weapons in Antarctica, on the seabed, and in outer space.

For more information on nuclear-weapon-free zones and nonproliferation, please visit the Association’s nuclear proliferation resource page at http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/nup/, which includes an Arms Control Today article by Leonard Spector and Aubrie Ohlde of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) on the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Their colleagues at CNS have also published a September 5 paper on the history and current status of the Central Asian zone, which is available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060905.htm.

# # #

The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting effective arms control policies. ACA publishes the monthly journal Arms Control Today.

Subject Resources:

Arms Control Association Posts Iranian Nuclear Proposals

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: August 15, 2006

Press Contact: Paul Kerr, (202) 463-8270 x102

(Washington, D.C.): The independent, nonpartisan Arms Control Association has posted on its web site five Iranian proposals to resolve international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. These documents, some of which have not been published previously, provide new insights into Iran’s negotiating positions and objectives during the past three years.

“These documents describe the extent to which Iran was willing to compromise on its nuclear program,” said Paul Kerr, the Association’s nonproliferation research analyst. He added, “They also illustrate the particular issues of importance to Tehran.”

Following the 2002 exposure of clandestine Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran sent Washington a proposal the following spring aimed at reducing hostility and easing suspicions between the two governments. But, according to press reports, the Bush administration dismissed the offer, which is now available on the Association’s Web site.

Although France, Germany, and the United Kingdom persuaded Iran to suspend work on its gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program in October 2003, their subsequent diplomatic efforts foundered, partly because Tehran continued work on some aspects of the program. Iran says it wants to enrich uranium for use as fuel in nuclear power reactors, but the enrichment process can also be used to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

Negotiations with the three European countries received a boost in November 2004 when Iran agreed to implement a more stringent uranium enrichment suspension. In the talks that followed, Iran presented four proposals that not only addressed Iran’s nuclear program, but also covered other important subjects such as regional security issues, economic cooperation, and Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations. These proposals also are available on the Association’s Web site.

In August 2005, Tehran broke its suspension after rejecting a European proposal that called on Iran to cease its enrichment program in return for a range of security, technical, and economic incentives. Tehran is now considering a revised proposal, which the Europeans presented this past June. That proposal is also supported by China, Russia, and the United States.

All of the proposals discussed above, as well as other information on Iran’s nuclear program, are available at the Association’s Iran country resource page at: http://www.armscontrol.org/country/iran/.

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

 

Country Resources:

Impact of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal on India's Fissile Production Capacity

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: July 26, 2006

Media Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, 202-463-8270 ext 107

Today the House of Representatives is scheduled to vote on proposed legislation for renewed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation (H.R. 5682).

One of the central issues about the proposal is how the supply of U.S. and other foreign nuclear fuel to safeguarded India nuclear power reactors would allow India to use more of its existing domestic supply of uranium for the purpose of producing fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons.

Not only would such indirect assistance of India's bomb program run counter to the United States' own nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments, it could foster greater nuclear arms competition with Pakistan and China.

This has led Reps. Howard Berman and Ellen Tauscher to propose an amendment to H.R. 5682 that would require India to join the five recognized nuclear weapon-states in a fissile material production cutoff before the United States provides nuclear fuel to India. It is why Rep. Brad Sherman and Rep. Jeff Fortenberry have introduced separate amendments aimed at ensuring that U.S. nuclear assistance does not indirectly facilitate an increase in India's nuclear bomb material production rate.

Myths

Some proponents of the nuclear deal have countered by claiming that India has large reserves of uranium already and that India's nuclear bomb program is not now constrained by its domestic uranium stockpile. They claim that U.S. and other foreign nuclear fuel supplies would not facilitate increased bomb material production by India and would only help relieve India's shortage of nuclear fuel for nuclear energy production. Not true.

Realities

There is no debate that India has "uranium reserves." The fact is that India has been unable to exploit these reserves to the extent that advocates for the nuclear deal have claimed. As a result, India would be hard pressed to maintain, let alone increase, the rate of production of fissile material for weapons while expanding its nuclear energy output, unless it can significantly expand domestic uranium mining and milling, and/or get access to the international nuclear fuel market.

India currently produces about 300 tons of uranium annually, which is almost two-thirds of what is needed to run its current heavy-water power reactors, support its production of highly enriched uranium for its nuclear submarine program and its current weapons grade plutonium production rate (enough for approx. 6-10 bombs per year). It has had to rely on stocks of previously mined and processed uranium to meet the shortfall. The addition of new reactors in the near future will increase the total demand for uranium beyond projected increases in domestic uranium production.

Simply put, India's production of weapons grade plutonium is currently constrained by the requirements of its nuclear power reactors on its limited domestic supply of natural uranium.

This is why K. Subrahmanyam, the former head of the National Security Advisory Board, wrote that:

  • "Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible nuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India's advantage to categorize as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refueled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons grade plutonium production." (K Subrahmanyam, "India and the Nuclear Deal," Times of India, December 12, 2005.)

This is why an Indian official "close to the prime minister" told the British Broadcasting Corporation:

  • "The truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear program". (Sanjeev Srivastava, "Indian P.M. Feels Political Heat," British Broadcasting Corporation, July 26 2005.

Bottom Line

Absent a decision by New Delhi to halt to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the proposed U.S.-Indian nuclear trade deal would allow India not only to continue but also to potentially accelerate the buildup of its stockpile of nuclear weapons materials.

There are several scenarios that could allow India to utilize foreign nuclear fuel supplies to help it increase fissile material production for weapons purposes from its current annual rate of 6-10 bombs worth of material to several dozen per year.

For instance, if India builds a new plutonium-production reactor (as it is reportedly planning to do) or decides to use one or more of the eight existing heavy water reactors that would be excluded from IAEA safeguards to augment its two existing military plutonium production reactors (CIRUS and Dhruva), the additional increased consumption of domestic uranium supplies for plutonium production would be compensated for by access to imported uranium for safeguarded power reactors.

And, if India no longer needs to rely on domestic uranium to fuel its power reactors, it could also expand its small-scale centrifuge enrichment program to make highly enriched uranium to support nuclear weapons production.

Congress should consider these realities as it enters the debate on the H.R. 5682 and act accordingly.

For further analysis on this subject, see: "Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the U.S. India nuclear deal," Draft report for the International Panel on Fissile Materials, July 11, 2006.

For more resources, documents, statements, and the text and reports of the legislation, see the Arms Control Association's web site and ACA's special resource page on the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal.

 

Country Resources:

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - PressRoom