“It will take all of us working together – government officials, and diplomats, academic experts, and scientists, activists, and organizers – to come up with new and innovative approaches to strengthen transparency and predictability, reduce risk, and forge the next generation of arms control agreements.”
– Wendy Sherman
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
June 2, 2022
Arms Control Today

'Rolling Text' for BWC Protocol Introduced

On July 14, members of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) began their second meeting of the year in Geneva with a "rolling text" for a verification protocol ready for negotiations and a number of difficult issues still on their agenda.

The AHG, which will meet through August 1, has a mandate to consider appropriate measures to improve compliance with and strengthen the treaty's provisions. The BWC requires the 140 states-parties not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire biological agents other than for defensive or peaceful purposes. It has been repeatedly criticized for its lack of an enforcement regime.

The chairman of the AHG, Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary, presented the rolling text in early June, based on the work of four "Friends of the Chair" committees. The document was hailed by negotiators as a significant step toward completion of the compliance protocol. However, as presented, many pages of the rolling text and even entire articles, such as the one describing the organization that will oversee verification, are blank.

In early July, Toth identified four major issues that would be discussed at the Geneva meeting: determining the modalities and procedures for on-site inspections; delineating the contents of data declarations; defining terms and criteria relevant to protocol issues; and resolving conflicts over export controls and the peaceful exchange of technical information, a source of ongoing contention between industrialized states and developing countries.

Donald Mahley, head of the U.S. delegation to the AHG, said July 15, the most critical national security issue during negotiations will center on compliance inspections, with an emphasis on safeguarding commercial proprietary information. The final AHG meeting of the year is scheduled for September 15 to October 3.

CFE Parties Agree on 'Basic Elements' For Negotiating Adaptation Accord


Wade Boese

ON JULY 23, THE 30 states-parties to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty agreed on a document outlining the "basic elements" for adapting the accord to the post-Cold War environment, with the goal of achieving a "significant lowering" in the total amount of conventional weaponry allowed under the treaty. Some key issues and details remain unresolved, but the framework is now in place for negotiations that are scheduled to begin in September in the Vienna-based Joint Consultative Group, the treaty's implementing body.

The original CFE Treaty imposes equal numerical limits on NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries (later joined by seven former Soviet republics) in five categories of heavy weapons—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—deployed and stored between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. CFE parties have agreed to replace the bloc-to-bloc structure with a system of national and territorial ceilings. The concentric zones established by the treaty, which place sub-limits on the amount of ground-based treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in the center of Europe, will be eliminated and replaced by territorial limits, (comprising the sum of national and foreign stationed forces) for each state.

Prior to the opening of the adaptation negotiations, each CFE party will, "in the spirit of restraint," declare a national ceiling for TLE that may equal but not exceed its current entitlements. NATO has already pledged to significantly reduce the level of the aggregate limits on its 16 members. Russia has said it will consider reducing its entitlements to its current holdings—a level approximately 3,000 items less than its entitlements. Because many states are below their entitlements (NATO, for example, currently holds about 20,000 items less than what is permitted by the treaty), moderately lowering the ceilings may not result in actual weapons reductions, but it will diminish the potential for future buildups.

Among the outstanding issues facing negotiators is how to deal with TLE that is currently stored. The original treaty restricts the amount of ground-based TLE that can be deployed with active units and requires the excess TLE to be placed in Designated Permanent Storage Sites. Russia has argued for the elimination of the storage requirement, reflecting the fact that Russia, whose TLE holdings are higher than the allowed active deployment levels, has much more TLE in storage than NATO. Russia proposes transferring all stored equipment to active units and insists the parties committed to this action in the "Final Document" of the May 1996 CFE Treaty Review Conference. NATO has proposed two options: maintain the stored and active categories for ground-based TLE, or eliminate storage allotments by destroying at least 80 percent of stored TLE and moving the remainder to active units.

The adaptation talks will also address the issue of exceptions to the territorial limits. CFE parties have agreed to work on drafting provisions allowing states to temporarily exceed territorial limits (with the express consent of the host) in the case of temporary deployments, notified military exercises and "missions in support of peace," mandated by the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, the "definition, modalities, transparency, and verification" for such exceptions must still be negotiated.

In a statement attached to the "basic elements" document, NATO insisted that the territorial ceilings should only apply to ground-based TLE. Though Russia has consistently sought to apply these limits to attack helicopters and combat aircraft, a U.S. official said territorial limits on air power are unlikely because of the precedent set by the existing CFE Treaty, which does not limit air power in the sub-zones.


Regional Restraints

The CFE parties have also agreed to explore the possible development of regional restraints on ground-based TLE. NATO earlier had proposed setting the new territorial ceilings of Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia's Kaliningrad military district, Slovakia, and Ukrainian territory (outside of the "flank" zone) at levels equal to current entitlements. This would require their future national limits to fall below entitlements to accommodate any nonnational forces that might be stationed on their territories. Though the proposal was intended to assuage Russian concerns regarding NATO expansion, Moscow has resisted placing any limitations on Kaliningrad. The parties will discuss this issue and other possible sub-ceilings in the adaptation talks.

Despite their decision to eliminate the treaty's zonal configuration, CFE parties have agreed to retain the "substance" of Article V (as modified by the recent "Flank-Document"), which established specific limitations on ground-based TLE in the northern and southern flanks of Europe. NATO interprets "substance" as the "numerical limitations, geographic scope, scheduled dates, and transparency measures" prescribed in the Flank Document. Russia has said the flank issue will require further work.

Verification and provisions for reallocating or revising national and territorial limits under the adapted treaty were also deferred. Information exchanges, inspection quotas and the transferring of equipment between parties, which are currently based on a bloc structure, must now be adapted to reflect the interests of 30 parties.

Negotiators hope to complete an adaptation agreement by April 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are expected to formally join NATO.

Clinton Set to Submit CTBT to Senate; Japan Ratifies


Craig Cerniello

ON JULY 8, JAPAN became the first country to formally ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty among the 44 states whose ratification is necessary before it can enter into force. Two days later, Britain became the first of the five declared nuclear-weapon states—all of which signed the treaty when it opened for signature on September 24, 1996—to begin the ratification process. The Clinton administration has not yet submitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Japan deposited its instrument of ratification with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the depositary of the treaty. As of mid-July, 144 states had signed the treaty and three others had ratified (Fiji, Qatar and Uzbekistan). The CTB Treaty cannot enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by the five declared nuclear-weapon states, the three "threshold" states (India, Israel and Pakistan) and 36 other states that are participating members of the UN Conference on Disarmament and recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power and/or research reactors. All 44 key states have signed the treaty with the exception of India, North Korea and Pakistan. India has repeatedly said it will not sign the treaty in its present form; Pakistan maintains that it will not sign unless India does.

In an effort to break this logjam, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda, during his July 21-23 visit to Islamabad, urged Pakistan to unilaterally sign the CTB Treaty. Not surprisingly, Pakistani President Farooq Leghari told Ikeda that "it is not possible for Pakistan to make unilateral commitments without simultaneous pledges by India to respect regional and international obligations." The Japanese foreign minister also was unable to convince India to sign the treaty during his July 23-25 visit to New Delhi.

On July 10, the British government introduced legislation for CTB ratification in the House of Lords, which may consider any amendments or conditions to the legislation and then decide whether to approve it by a simple majority vote. If approved by the House of Lords, the House of Commons must also approve the treaty before legislation is submitted to the queen for final approval. Some observers expect Britain to complete the ratification process by the end of 1997.

Action by the United States may not be far behind. Senior Clinton administration officials have indicated that the treaty will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in the near future, probably in early September when Congress returns from its August recess. Although achieving Senate approval of the CTB is likely to be difficult, the prospects for ratification improved on July 15 when Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM)—a key Republican voice in the nuclear test ban debate—said that he is "leaning strongly" in support of the treaty.

NMD Sensor Test Successful

After two aborted test attempts in midJanuary and subsequent delays, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) on June 24 conducted the first flight test of an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle sensor for the Clinton administration's national missile defense (NMD) program. BMDO has characterized the test as successful based on the available data thus far.

According to BMDO, the test sought to assess the ability of the sensor, which was developed by Boeing North American, to track and identify objects in outer space—not to intercept a ballistic missile target. The test involved a modified Minuteman II ICBM carrying simulated targets and launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and a payload launch vehicle (which contained the sensor) launched from Kwajalein Missile Range in the central Pacific Ocean.

Under its so-called "3-plus-3" program, the Clinton administration is developing the initial elements of an NMD system by 2000, at which time it will evaluate the long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States and have the option of deploying such a system by 2003 if necessary. If the threat does not warrant NMD deployment in 2000, the administration will continue the development of its NMD system while maintaining a rolling three-year deployment capability. The next NMD flight test, scheduled for January 1998, will evaluate a competing sensor built by Hughes Aircraft. Thereafter, two NMD intercept attempts are planned for 1998 followed by an integrated system test in 1999.

Rokhlin Warns Yeltsin on State of Nuclear Forces

In late-June, General Lev Rokhlin, chairman of the Russian Duma's Defense Committee, cautioned that Russia's strategic nuclear forces are not being properly maintained and are "doomed to extinction." Rokhlin's warning sharply contrasts with recent statements made by several high-level Russian officials, including Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and newly appointed Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who maintain that Russia's nuclear command and control system is safe and reliable. The warning came in an open letter to President Boris Yeltsin and members of Russia's armed forces, in which Rokhlin blasted Yeltsin's government for attempting to institute large-scale military reforms.

Meanwhile, on July 8, Russia flight-tested its single-warhead SS-27 ICBM (designated in Moscow as the Topol-M) for the fourth time. The missile, which will have both mobile and silo-based variants, is now ready for serial production and is expected to be deployed by the end of the year. Commenting on the significance of the test, which was conducted at the Plesetsk test range, General Vladimir Yakovlev, the new commander-in-chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, said, "Today it is possible to say that in the 21st century Russia will remain in the ranks of the leading nuclear states, thereby helping to guarantee strategic stability in the whole world." The single-warhead SS-25 and follow-on SS-27 will comprise the backbone of the Russian ICBM force if START II is fully implemented.

June/July 1997 Bibliography


Compiled by James Perez


1996: Disarmament at a Critical Juncture: Panel discussions organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, New York: United Nations, 1997, 141 pp. Ph: (212) 6875340, Email: [email protected]

Price, Richard M. The Chemical Weapons Taboo, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997, 233 pp.

von Hippel, Frank. "Paring Down the Arsenal," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, pp. 3340.



Deen, Thalif. "New Center Aims to Raise UN Profile on Disarming," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p. 6.

Stern, Jessica. "Preventive Defense," The Washington Post, June 23, 1997, p. A19.

Yumin, Hu. "The Situation and Prospects of the Nuclear Disarmament," International Strategic Studies, April 1997, pp. 10-18.


PostCold War Conflict Deterrence, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997, 227 pp. Ph: (202) 334-3313, (800) 624-6242


Blanche, Ed. "Iraq Heads for Collision With UN Over Weapons," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, p. 15.

Crossette, Barbara. "Iraqis Still Defying Arms Ban, Departing UN Official Says," The New York Times, June 25, 1997, p. A1.

McFate, Patricia Bliss, F. Ronald Cleminson, Sidney N. Graybeal and George R. Lindsey. Verification in a Global Context: The Establishment of a United Nations Center for Information, Training and Analysis (CITA), Arms Control Verification Studies No. 7, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996, 44 pp.

Reid, Robert H. "Iraq Blocks UN Teams," The Washington Times, June 14, 1997, p. A7.



"Duma Won't Sign Arms Pact, Russian Says," The Baltimore Sun, July 7, 1997, p. 16.

Nunn, Sam and Bruce Blair. "From Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Safety," The Washington Post, June 22, 1997, p. C1.

Thomson, David B. The START Treaties: Implementation and Status, CISA, Los Alamos, LA-UR-97-2045, May 1997, 42 pp.

Weiner, Tim. "Panel Urges Deep Cuts in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals," The New York Times, June 18, 1997.



Starr, Barbara. "Stalemate on Scuds' As Latest U.S.-Kiev Talks Fail," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p.3.

Waller, Douglas. "The Secret Missile Deal," Time, June 30, 1997, p. 58.



McMahon, Scott. "NMD Can Provide Stability," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 17.


Boman, Shelly and Duncan Clarke. "U.S. Should Put Aid for Israel's Arrow Back in Quiver," Defense News, June 23, 1997, p. 17.

Ebata, Kensuke. "Japan Puts Off Decision on Missile Defence Plan," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 18, 1997, p. 15.



Baker, John C. NonProliferation Incentives for Russia and Ukraine, Adelphi Paper 309, New York: IISS, 1997, 91 pp.

Gerth, Jeff. "Export Limits On Computers Are Rejected," The New York Times, July 11, 1997, p. 9.

Gertz, Bill. "U.S. Names Buyers of Arms That Are Developing Nukes," The Washington Times, July 1, 1997, p. A5.

NonProliferation Agreements, Arrangements and Responses, Andrew Latham, ed., Toronto: York University, 1997, 242 pp. Ph: (416) 7365156, Email: [email protected]

Navarrom, Mireya. "2 Lithuanians, Arrested in Miami, Are Accused of Bid to Sell Soviet Nuclear Weapons," The New York Times, July 1, 1997, p. A15.

Opall, Barbara. "U.S. Lawmakers Deride Export Scofflaw List," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 3.

Ravo, Nick. "Two Men in Iraq Export Case Are Found Not Guilty by Jury," The New York Times, July 16, 1997, p. A18.

Rensselaer, Lee. "Smuggling Update," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, May/June 1997, pp. 52-56.

Rodan, Steve. "Supercomputer Dispute With Israel Shows Vagueness in U.S. Export Law," Defense News, June 30July 6, p. 3.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Administration Concerned About Russia's Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," The Washington Post, July 3, 1997, p. A7.

Weiner, Tim. "China Is Top Supplier to Nations Seeking Powerful, Banned Arms," The New York Times, July 3, 1997, p. 8.


Sanders, Ben. "The NPT Steps Into the Future: The Preparatory Committee and the Enhanced Review Process," Disarmament Diplomacy, May 1997, pp. 5-8.



Anselmo, Joseph C. "Dangers Mount Despite Cooperative Efforts," Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 23, 1997, pp. 47-50.

Bukharin, Oleg. "Disquiet on the Eastern Front," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, pp. 41-46.

Griffiths, Franklyn. MOX Experience: The Disposition of Excess Russian and U.S. Weapons Plutonium in Canada, University of Toronto, July 1997, 80 pp. Ph. (416) 978-7417.

Scott, William B. "Classification Sensitivities Slow Weapon Dismantlement," Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 23, 1997, pp. 45-46.

Scott, William B. "Scientists Jointly Focus on Safeguarding Stockpile," Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 23, 1997, pp. 36-43.



Broad, William J. "Hans A. Bethe: He Lit Nuclear Fire; Now He Would Douse It," The New York Times, June 17, 1997, p. C1.

Scott, William B. "Admission of 1979 Nuclear Test Finally Validates Vela Data," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 21, 1997, p. 33.

"U.S. Conducts Nuclear Material Tests," The Washington Post, July 3, 1997, p. A13.


Landay, Jonathan S. "Banned Forever? New Push on Nuclear Tests," The Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1997, p. 3.

McKinzie, Matthew. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Issues and Answers, Cornell University Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper #21, June 1997, 141 pp.

Walsh, Mark. "Supercomputer Faces Nuke Arms Safety Test," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 13.



Barber, Ben. "White House Close to Ending Arms Ban," The Washington Times, June 17, 1997, p. A1.

"Brazillian Gun Buy Stalled by U.S. Export Law," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, p. 6.

Carter, Jimmy. "U.S. Must Take Lead to Ban Land Mines," The Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1997, p. 18.

Gerth, Jeff and Tim Weiner. "Arms Makers See a Bonanza In Selling NATO Expansion," The New York Times, June 29, 1997, p. A1.

Lancaster, John. "U.S. Role as Arms Merchant to Kuwait Faces Challenge by China," The Washington Post, July 15, 1997, p. A14.

Lippman, Thomas W. "Revised Treaty Is Outlined for Europe Forces," The Washington Post, July 24, 1997, p. A1.

Mesler, Bill. "NATO's New Arms Bazaar," The Nation, July 21, 1997, pp. 24-26.

Porteus, Holly. "JCS Members, CINCs Issue Letter Opposing Landmine Ban Legislation," Inside the Pentagon, July 17, 1997, p. 1.

Practical Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April 1997, 61 pp.

Ramos-Horta, Jose. "Deadly Arms Sales," The Washington Times, July 23, 1997, p. A17.

Seffers, George I. "Pentagon May Resist Effort to Ban Antipersonnel Mines," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 11.

Towle, Michael D. "Defense Contractors Woo Old Foes," The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 18. 1997, p. 6.

Whelan, Lawrence. "Armscor Explores Idea of Selling to Turkey," Jane's Intelligence & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, July 1997, p. 11.



Baynham, Simon. "Ratification Helps Credibility of CWC," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, July 1997, p. 2.

"India Permits Arms Inspection," The Washington Post, June 27, 1997, p. A30.

Maze, Rick. "Pentagon Ups Number of Troops Exposed to Toxic Weapons in Persian Gulf," Army Times July 21, 1997, p. 2.

Shenon, Philip. "Studies on Gulf War Illnesses Are Faulted," The New York Times, June 15, 1997, p. A18.

Vartabedian, Ralph. "Army Chemical Incinerator Is Unsafe, 3rd Official Says," The Los Angeles Times, June 25, 1997, p. 5.

Weston, Michael. "Giving Teeth to the Biological Weapons Convention," NATO Review, May-June 1997, pp. 33-35.




Drozdiak, William. "NATO and Russia Launch Joint Panel On Security Issues: New Council Holds First Session After Solving Leadership Dispute," The Washington Post, July 19, 1997, p. A15.

Hoffman, David, "Ex-General Warns That Extinction' Is Destiny of Russia's Nuclear Forces," The Washington Post, June 26, 1997, p. A27.

Khripunov, Igor. "Have Guns, Will Travel," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, pp. 47-51.

Priest, Dana. "Ukraine Savors New Ties With NATO," The Washington Post, July 14, 1997, p.A15.

Sieff, Martin. "Ukraine's President Seeks Anchor to West," The Washington Times, July 20, 1997, p. A1.


Apple, R.W., Jr. "On NATO Coup, Russia's Shadow," The New York Times, July 9, 1997, p. A8.

Blacker, Coit, Vladimir Kuznetsov and Jack Mendelsohn. "The Question of NATO Expansion: A Panel Discussion," The Commonwealth, June 30, 1997, pp. 2-11.

Cooper, Mary H. "Expanding NATO," CQ Researcher, May 16, 1997, pp. 435-450.

Countdown to Madrid: Public Opinion on NATO Enlargement, United States Information Agency, June 1997, 20 pp. Ph: (202) 619-4490, Email: [email protected]

Dobbs, Michael and John F. Harris. "France Balks at Paying Share of NATO Expansion Costs," The Washington Post, July 10, 1997, p. A1.

Drozdiak, William and John F. Harris. "NATO Invites 3 Former Foes to Join," The Washington Post, July 9, 1997, p. A1.

Kay, Sean and Judith Yaphe. "Turkey's International Affairs: Shaping the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Number 122, July 1997, 4pp.

Mandelbaum, Michael. NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century, The Center for Political and Strategic Studies, June 1997, 36 pp. Ph. (301) 652-8181, Email: [email protected]

Marshall, Tyler. "In Letter, Experts Decry NATO Expansion," The Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1997, p. A4.

Nebehay , Stephanie. "Geneva Delegates Agree to Tackle Land Mines as a Separate Issue," The Washington Times, June 27, 1997, p. A15.

Rogers, Marc. "Challenges Loom Beyond Enlargement for NATO," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, p. 19.

Rogov, Sergey M. Russia and NATO's Enlargement: The Search for a Compromise at the Helsinki Summit, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, May 1997, 37 pp.

Sieff, Martin. "Rejected Slovenia May Close to West," The Washington Times, July 15, 1997, p. A1.

Starr, Barbara. "New NATO Members To Plan Fighters Together," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p. 4.

Tigner, Brooks. "NATO Hopefuls Want Promises for Round Two," Defense News, July 713, 1997, p. 1.

Vinch, Chuck. "Lawmakers Question Expansion of NATO," European Stars & Stripes, July 18, 1997, p.1.

Warner, John and Kay Bailey Hutchison. "The Missing NATO Debate," The Washington Post, July 24, 1997, p. A21.

Yaphe, Judith S. "Turkey's Domestic Affairs: Shaping the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Number 121, July 1997, 4pp.


Eshel, David. "Persisting Powder Keg," Armed Forces Journal International,. July 1997, pp. 30-33.

Opall, Barbara. "Israel Awaits NATO Summit Before Pressing Washington On Russia-Iran Missile Effort," Defense News, July 7-13, 1997, p. 4.

Pisik, Betsy. "Ekeus Expects Sanctions To Last as Long as Saddam's Rule," The Washington Times, June 30, 1997, p. A9.

Toward 2000: Middle East Challenges for the Next Administration, Alicia Gansz and John Wilner, eds., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996, 70 pp. Ph. (202) 452-0650.


Burns, John F. "India and Pakistan Plan Kashmir Talks," The New York Times, June 24, 1997, p. A6.

Gertz, Bill. "New Chines Missiles Target All of East Asia," The Washington Times, July 10, 1997, p. A1.

Gertz, Bill. "Russia Sells China High-Tech Artillery," The Washington Times, July 3, 1997, p. A1.

Harding, James. "China Looks Abroad for Help in Updating Defense Systems," The Washington Times, July 14, 1997, p. A11.

Jordan, Mary. "80 S. Korean Workers Move to North This Week," The Washington Post, July 24, 1997, p. A2.

Kamil, Anis. "Why U.S. Has Not Signed Protocol To Nuclear Arms Treaty [SEANWFZ]," New Strait Times, June 24, 1997, p. 2.

Karniol, Robert. "Laos Rebuilds Links With Russia in Helicopter Buy, " Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p. 16.

Kremenak, Ben. Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours and Dead Ends, CISSM Papers 5, May 1997, 76 pp. Ph. (301) 405-7601

Mulvenon, James. Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security, Center for Asia-Pacific Policy, June 1997, 41 pp. Ph: (310) 393-0411 x.7197.

Myers, Steven Lee. "North Korea Agrees to Join 4-Party Talks," The New York Times, July 1, 1997, p. A11.

"Pakistan Missile Firing Triggers Indian Protest," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 21, 1997, p. 35.

"Prithvi Has Not Been Deployed, Says India," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 18, 1997, p. 4.

Starr, Barbara. "USA, RoK Assess Options if North Korea Collapses," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, p. 3.

Witter, Willis. "Japan Mulls Boost In Military Might," The Washington Times, July 16, 1997, p. A11.



Alvarez, Lizette. "Senate Is Cool to G.I. Mission in Bosnia but Doesn't Cut Off Funds," The New York Times, July 12, 1997, p. A3.

Greider, William. "Fortress America," Rolling Stone, July 10, 1997, pp. 61-73.

Holzer, Robert and Mark Walsh. "Officials Doubt Might of QDR Cuts," Defense News, July 7-13, 1997, p. 1.

Kitfield, James. "Collision Course," National Journal, June 21, 1997, pp. 1270-1273.

Mann, Paul. "Senate Squelches B2 Funding, Upholds Fighter Program," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 21, 1997, pp. 34-35.

Smith, R. Jeffrey and Bradley Graham. "Administration Considers Changing Mix of Nuclear Warhead Deployment," The Washington Post, June 18, 1997, p. A6.

"U.S. Senate Adds $3.2b to FY98 Defense Budget," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p.5.



Doyle, Michael W. Ways of War and Peace, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997, 557 pp.

Mello, Greg. "New Bomb, No Mission," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, pp. 28-32.

Brazil to Consider Joining the NPT

Brazilian President Fernando Cardoso submitted the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) to the Brazilian congress for ratification on June 20, nearly 20 years after the treaty was opened for signature. Should Brazil accede to the NPT, only four nations (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) would remain outside of the regime. In 1990, Brazil renounced the nuclear weapons program it had been pursuing since the 1970s, and, in 1991, it signed an agreement with Argentina to establish a bilateral nuclear accountancy and control system to verify that each state's nuclear activities would be for peaceful uses only.

Brazil followed Argentina in joining the Treaty of Tlatelolco (a nuclear-weapon-free-zone accord covering Latin America and the Caribbean) in May 1994, but continued to resist joining the NPT on the basis of the treaty's discrimination between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." Argentina acceded to the NPT in 1995.

Neither house of Brazil's bicameral legislature is likely to act on the treaty before fall 1997. Currently in extraordinary session to conclude its normal business, neither the Chamber of Deputies nor the Senate has been able to include the treaty in its agenda. Little domestic opposition to the NPT is expected, since Brazil has already accepted the principle of nuclear nonproliferation through its bilateral agreement with Argentina and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Congress Considers Tightening Export Controls for Supercomputers


Howard Diamond

FOLLOWING THE transfer of several U.S.made high-performance computers to Russia and China, possibly for use in their nuclear weapons programs, Congress is considering legislation that would tighten supercomputer export controls which were eased by the Clinton administration in 1995. An amendment to the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill that is pending in a House-Senate conference committee would require prior written approval from the U.S. government for sales of computers capable of at least 2,000 million theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to countries of proliferation or security concern.

The amendment, cosponsored by Floyd Spence (R-SC), chairman of the House National Security Committee, and Ron Dellums (D-CA), the panel's ranking minority member, was adopted June 19 in the House by a vote of 332-88. Although the Senate rejected a similar amendment offered by Thad Cochran (R-MS) and Richard Durbin (D-IL), it approved, by a vote of 72-17, a substitute measure offered by Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) that would retain the current system for controlling computer exports, but would require a General Accounting Office study of the issue.

Given the lopsided but contradictory votes in the House and Senate, the future of the Spence-Dellums amendment remains uncertain. Congress will ultimately resolve the issue after the conference committee finalizes the 1998 defense bill when legislators return from summer recess.


'Tier3' Controls

When the Clinton administration relaxed export controls on supercomputers in 1995, it created four "tiers" of states within a system of increasing levels of controls and limits, progressing from almost no controls on sales to close allies such as Canada, Western European countries and Japan in "tier-1," to near total prohibition for Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea in "tier-4." The key concern is the status of export controls on the so-called "tier-3" countries that include China, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, much of Eastern Europe, all of the Middle East and the former Soviet republics.

For "tier-3" countries, computers capable of 2,000-7,000 MTOPS may be sold under a general license without prior approval from the Commerce Department. Sales to military or proliferation-related buyers in this group require an individual validated license from the department, as do any sales of computers operating above 7,000 MTOPS. Sales of computers operating above 10,000 MTOPS may require additional safeguards at the end-user's location.

Critics of the administration's policy have argued that the government, rather than the computer companies, should determine whether a potential buyer is a military or proliferation-related end-user. According to one congressional staffer involved in the issue, computer companies, which are responsible for making this determination under the current system, lack the intelligence information needed to make such judgments, and, as the illegal sales to Russia and China indicate, some companies fail in their obligation to "know their customer."


Congressional Inquiry

Congressional concern about supercomputers was stimulated earlier this year when Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) announced that it had acquired five American-made supercomputers—four from Silicon Graphics, and one from IBM—for use in maintaining the safety and reliability of the Russian nuclear arsenal in the absence of nuclear testing. (See ACT, March 1997.) A modern desktop computer using a 200-megahertz Intel Pentium processor is capable of roughly 200 MTOPS, approximately the same level that was used to define a supercomputer in 1991. In comparison, the machines acquired by Russia's weapons labs under the guise of modeling soil and water pollution, operate at 4,400 and 10,000 MTOPS.

The sales led the Military Procurement Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee to hold an April hearing and prompted the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services to hold a hearing on June 11. Commerce Department Undersecretary William Reinsch said in testimony before the House subcommittee that 1,100 supercomputers worth more than $550 million had been exported from the United States between January 1996 and March 1997, including 46 to China worth $17.5 million and eight to Russia worth $19 million.

Reinsch told the Senate subcommittee that the Commerce Department has taken steps to help exporters comply with the 1995 policy, including consulting with companies if they are in doubt about certain buyers; holding seminars for the few U.S. producers of supercomputers; and, where possible, publishing in the Federal Register the names of buyers requiring an individual license. Despite the three cases under investigation, Reinsch said, "by and large these companies have not had a lot of difficulty figuring out . . . who the military end users are and who [are] not." Reinsch also told the Senate subcommittee that additional names of organizations requiring Commerce Department approval would be made public shortly, though, he said, "we have not done it extensively so far [because] there are intelligence sources and methods issues that come up frequently on this issue." On June 30, the department published in the Federal Register the names of 13 entities in China, India, Israel, Pakistan and Russia which exporters should consider to be military-related, and said more would be added in the future. Prior to the June hearing, the Commerce Department had publicly identified Ben-Gurion University in Israel and Bharat Electronics of India as entities of proliferation concern.

The Justice Department is currently investigating the Silicon Graphics and IBM supercomputer sales as well as a sale by Sun Microsystems to a Hong Kong company that subsequently transferred the computer it bought to a weapons lab run by the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

Clinton, Yeltsin Make Arms Control Gains Before 'G-8' Summit in Denver


Craig Cerniello

ADDRESSING A wide range of economic, global and political issues, leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized countries and Russia made modest progress on arms control during their June 20-22 summit meeting in Denver. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin also made some gains on key nuclear arms control issues in their separate bilateral meeting on June 20.

According to National Security Council Deputy Director Jim Steinberg, Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the status of ongoing efforts in the Geneva-based Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to establish a "demarcation line" between theater missile defense (TMD) systems and strategic missile defense systems. During the March Helsinki summit, the United States and Russia reached preliminary agreement on a set of basic principles to govern the status of higher-velocity TMD systems (systems with interceptor velocities above 3 kilometers per second) under the ABM Treaty (see ACT, March 1997). The SCC met May 14-June 18 in an effort to codify the principles agreed at Helsinki in a formal "phase two" agreement on demarcation but was unable to complete its work. During their one-hour meeting in Denver, however, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the sides would attempt to finish the higher-velocity TMD agreement during the current session of the SCC, beginning on July 23.

In addition, the two presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the START II ratification process. The treaty, which was approved by the Senate in January 1996, has not yet been ratified by Russia. According to Steinberg, Yeltsin said in Denver that he was "determined to give [START II] a real push with the Duma," but it remains unclear at this writing whether the Duma will act on the treaty this year.


Summit of the Eight

At the conclusion of the so-called "Summit of the Eight," the G7 countries and Russia issued an 18-page final communique outlining their agreement on a broad range of arms control issues. In addition to their support for the "early" entry into force of START II and "initiation" of START III negotiations, the eight leaders reaffirmed their "unwavering commitment" to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as their commitment to the "immediate commencement and early conclusion" of a global fissile material cutoff treaty. They also called upon all states to "rapidly" sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "to ensure its early entry into force," and encouraged India and Pakistan—nuclear-capable states that have not signed—to adhere to its provisions.

The eight leaders also agreed to expand participation in their "Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material"—adopted in April 1996 at the Moscow nuclear safety and security summit—to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. In a separate progress report of the foreign ministers, issued on June 21, the eight states also called for enhanced cooperation and information-sharing among their law enforcement, intelligence and customs agencies in an effort to further reduce the nuclear smuggling threat.

CD Ends Session Without Resolving Divide Over Agenda


Wade Boese

THE CONFERENCE on Disarmament (CD) concluded its second session of 1997 on June 27, with delegates still at odds over whether the body should pursue negotiations leading to a global ban on antipersonnel landmines, a fissile material cutoff treaty, or a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament. The CD's continuing inability to agree on a work program for 1997 has prevented it from establishing any ad hoc committees for conducting talks.

The conference appointed Australian Ambassador John Campbell as a special coordinator on landmines to "conduct consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the question of antipersonnel landmines" and present a report to the CD on his findings. Additionally, the conference appointed separate special coordinators to address each of three areas: the CD's agenda, the possible expansion of the CD and improving CD effectiveness.

On May 15, Hungary and Japan proposed forming an ad hoc committee with a mandate to negotiate a global ban on landmines, but the proposal stalled as the conference failed to reach a consensus, a requirement for any decision in the CD. China, Egypt, India, Mexico and Turkey opposed a complete ban because it would not take into account some states' "security concerns." Mexico also objected that forming an ad hoc committee on landmines would divert attention away from nuclear disarmament. Finally, some states were reluctant to address the landmine ban, fearing it would detract from or duplicate the work of the Canadian-led "Ottawa Process," which aims to achieve a global ban by the end of 1997. (See this month's feature article by Jim Wurst) The appointment of a special coordinator finally emerged as a compromise on the day before the session ended, when the Syrian delegate left the room to allow consensus.

Despite a consensus resolution by the UN General Assembly in 1993 calling for fissile material production cutoff talks, and the "Principles and Objectives" agreement at the 1995 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference to begin "immediate" negotiation, the CD has failed to begin negotiating a treaty because the Group of Non-Aligned States have linked a cutoff treaty with progress on negotiating nuclear disarmament in the CD.

John Holum, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said on May 15 that negotiating nuclear disarmament in the CD would "set back disarmament." The United States sees bilateral U.S.-Russian negotiations as the sole forum for nuclear disarmament. A U.S. official said the CD should not become "paralyzed by an insistence to attempt tasks that are clearly beyond its capability," and that "the way to make progress in the CD is to work on topics that are suited to it," such as a cutoff treaty. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, in a June 5 address to the CD, also endorsed giving priority to a fissile material cutoff.

Yet, 26 of 29 members of the Group of NonAligned States proposed a mandate on June 12 to establish an ad hoc committee for nuclear disarmament after the group's work proposal proclaimed this as its "highest priority." The nonaligned states, led by India, insist that a cutoff regime should be encompassed within or be considered secondary to nuclear disarmament negotiations. Previously, in a May 31 statement, Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral said India would not sign any forthcoming cutoff treaty.

While the nuclear-weapon states support a ban on the future production of fissile materials, prospects for negotiating are further endangered by substantive disagreements over what such a treaty would entail. A majority of the non-nuclear-weapon states support including stockpiles or "past production."

The appointment of the special coordinators may be the only progress in the conference this year if the delegations cannot agree on a work program or resolve outstanding differences during the final session, scheduled for July 28 to September 10.


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