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Arms Control Today

Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report

On February 24, the Clinton administration released its "Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs, and Implications." The study, conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD), estimated the cost of NATO enlargement will total $27 billion to $35 billion over a 13 year period, beginning in July 1997, when the alliance is expected to extend invitations to new members at a NATO summit in Madrid.

DOD assumed the initial expansion would include a "small group of nonspecified Central European countries" integrated at a modest pace, reflecting the lack of any overt threat to the security environment. The estimate assumed no substantial NATO forces or nuclear weapons would be permanently stationed on the new territories. Instead, the report foresees a rear guard strategy emphasizing rapid reinforcement capabilities. Earlier studies by RAND ($42 billion) and the Congressional Budget Office ($61 billion to $125 billion) based their estimates on a more extensive reconfiguration of NATO forces and alternative threat scenarios.

The DOD report estimated U.S. costs at $1.5 billion to $2 billion over 10 years. DOD assumed the United States would incur minimal costs for the restructuring of new members' militaries and for upgrading the regional reinforcement capabilities. The United States would be responsible for 15 percent of the direct costs of NATO enlargement, such as ensuring interoperability of forces and integrating command and control systems, while new and current members would account for the other 85 percent. Overall, the U.S. portion of total NATO expansion costs would be approximately 5 to 8 percent using the DOD estimates. The administration cautioned that this was not an official NATO position and that costs were subject to change if underlying assumptions proved incorrect.

The Post Cold War Settlement in Europe: A Triumph of Arms Control

Michael Mandelbaum

On March 26, Michael Mandelbaum, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, addressed the annual luncheon meeting of the Arms Control Association (ACA). Mandelbaum, who is also director of the Project on East West Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations, spoke on the impact of arms control advances on European security. As one of the leading critics of NATO enlargement, he focused on the implications of the expansion policy for future arms control agreements. Mandelbaum delivered his remarks only days after the Helsinki summit meeting between President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Mandelbaum has written and edited several books on U.S. foreign policy, including The Dawn of Peace in Europe (Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), and has taught at the U.S. Naval Academy and Harvard University. Mandelbaum earned a B.A. from Yale University, an M.A. from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. The text is an edited version of his luncheon speech.

If a cure for cancer were discovered, what would be the response? There would be admiration for the discoverers and celebration of the discovery. It would be a great, triumphal public event.

For the political equivalent of cancer, a cure has been discovered. The greatest scourge of our century is war. The worst and most destructive wars—World Wars I and II—have begun and been fought in the heart of Europe. The Cold War began and ended there. The danger of a major war in Europe was the central obsession of the American government for much of the 20th century, and rightly so. But that danger is now at its lowest level in decades, perhaps in all of Europe's modern history.

What is the reason for this? What is the equivalent, for war in Europe, of a cure for cancer? It is, among other things, arms control. The post Cold War settlement now in place in Europe is a triumph of arms control. That statement raises three questions. First, how and why could this statement be true? Second, if it is true, why has this achievement been so little appreciated? And third, why does it matter whether this achievement is appreciated?

In my book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, I argue that there is a new security order in place in Europe, one that differs from the two most familiar ways of organizing security: balance of power politics and world government. Balance of power politics has been the source of such stability as Europe has enjoyed for most of its recorded history, including during the Cold War years. World government is a utopian dream that has been envisioned and advocated but never implemented, and that might not be a source of celebration if it were implemented, which it almost surely will not be.

The theme of The Dawn of Peace in Europe is that, in the wake of the Cold War, Europe has established a third method for achieving security, which I call common security and that owes something to the concept of cooperative security that was developed at the Brookings Institution. Within this common security regime, Europe is still made up of sovereign states. There is no supranational authority. The states of Europe are still armed. But peace in Europe does not depend—as it has for most of Europe's recorded history—on a finely balanced hostility between and among the most powerful European nations. The new common security order has dramatically reduced both the incentives and the capabilities for war.

The incentives have been reduced by the great political changes of 1989 and 1991. It is important to understand the events of those years as not only liberating the people involved, from whom the yoke of communism was lifted, but also as reducing substantially the threat of war. Communism itself, and the imperial domination that came with it in Europe, were standing causes of war. As long as communism and a communist European empire lasted, those oppressed would struggle to break free and those of us who were already free would struggle against the threat that communism posed.

Not only the end of communism, but also the beginnings of democracy contributed to peace in Europe. For democracy is associated with peace. There is, of course, no iron law that democracies are necessarily and always peaceful. And the most problematical country in Europe for the purposes of European security, Russia, is not fully democratic. Nonetheless, there has been since 1989 and 1991, a marked and remarkable surge of democratization across formerly communist Europe, and that contributes to the unprecedentedly peaceful character of relations between and among sovereign states there.

The military capabilities of the countries of Europe are also less threatening now than in the past, and this has been accomplished by arms control. Specifically, it has been accomplished by the remarkable series of accords that were signed beginning with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces [INF] agreement of December 1987, and culminating with the START II accord of January 1993. These arms control agreements are similar in appearance to those of the earlier part of the Cold War, but as I argue in The Dawn of Peace in Europe, they differ in content in two truly revolutionary ways.

First, the later series of arms reduction agreements is characterized by "defense dominance." That is, they have reshaped military arsenals to make them more useful for defense than for offense in the case of conventional forces, and more useful for deterrence than for actual war fighting in the case of nuclear armaments. Country "X" will be concerned, of course, about the capabilities of its neighbor, Country "Y" no matter what "Y" says about its own intentions. Country "X" will be least concerned about Country "Y" if Country "Y" has no weapons at all. But the nations of Europe have not laid down their arms completely, and are unlikely to do so.

The next best circumstance, from the point of view of peace, is if Country "X" does not feel threatened by the armaments of Country "Y" because those armaments are suitable for self defense and not for attack. That is now the status quo in Europe thanks to arms control.

Country "X" will also want to know that Country "Y" is abiding by the limits to which it has agreed, and that what Country "Y" is actually doing with the armaments that it legally has is not threatening. The later arms control in Europe fulfills both conditions. The 1987 to 1993 agreements, that is, provide for both "static" and "operational" arms control.

The second revolutionary feature of the post 1987 arms agreements, both conventional and nuclear, is that they establish transparency. That is all the countries of Europe and North America now can know what armaments all the other states have, what they are doing with them, and whether they are violating the agreed limits—and they can know this at all times. This is an important development.

Verification did not, of course, begin in 1987. "Verifiability" has been a necessary condition for almost all arms control accords into which the United States has entered since 1945. The issue of verification has been a major theme of the nuclear age. Verification would be available even without formal agreements, through what have come to be known as "national technical means"—that is, satellites.

But verification under the auspices of the later arms agreements is more comprehensive and more intrusive than what was available previously and what would be available in the absence of these agreements. And it is significant that verification is mandated by treaty. This makes violations plainly illegal, which means that it is more likely that countries that detect violations by others will act on them. The reason surprise attacks succeed, as Richard Betts has written, is not that the country being attacked lacks warning, but rather that it lacks the political will to respond. It is easier to muster the requisite political will when the violation is unambiguously illegal. Under the later series of arms control agreements, this would be the case.

To summarize: A balance of power system rests on deterrence. A world government, should it ever exist, would rest on unchallenged authority. Common security, however, the system of security now in place in Europe, rests on confidence. The entire system of security—including changes of regime, changes of borders and changes in the military balance—can be seen as one large confidence building measure. Together, these measures have generated more confidence than ever before in modern history that there will be no war in Europe, and for good reason. Where security is concerned, Europe now enjoys the best of all possible worlds.

This is surely cause for celebration: yet it is not being celebrated. Why's this so? I believe that the sweeping, comprehensive—indeed, revolutionary—arms control accords now in place have been overlooked for the same reason that made them possible in the first place.

Historically, arms control has been tied to, has depended on and has been subsumed by international politics. Arms control is, to use a term common in social science, a dependent variable, and the independent variable on which it has depended has been the status of East West relations. For most of the Cold War, East West relations were hostile and frozen. They were marked by disagreement on fundamental issues. Neither side would budge on these issues and neither dared try to budge the other, which would have been extremely dangerous.

In this context, early arms control took on a symbolic role. It was a form of reassurance. It demonstrated that both sides understood the dangers of the nuclear age and would keep their rivalry within bounds. Arms control in the 1970s and in the 1980s did not, could not, indeed was not intended to, end the East West rivalry. Because this was so, arms accords affected the instruments of that rivalry, namely, armaments—with the notable exception the ABM Treaty—only marginally.

If the effects on actual deployments were marginal, arms control was still important because the rivalry that it addressed was a real one. Arms control riveted the eyes of the world because the world needed reassurance about the rivalry between the two great nuclear powers. Peace rested on prudence, not on the absence of any reason to go to war. Arms control did not cause the prudence that preserved the peace, but it did signal that both sides would practice that prudence.

Then, with the changes set in motion by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the political differences at the core of the East West rivalry disappeared. They disappeared because the Soviet Union gave up the goals to which the West had been opposed. This was the meaning of 1989 and 1991. Under these new political circumstances, the role of arms control changed. It was no longer marginal to actual military deployments; it became central. It was no longer a symbolic but, rather, a substantive matter. Instead of making small adjustments to large arsenals for political effects, arms control came to involve the wholesale restructuring of armaments on both sides with sweeping military effects.

These revolutionary changes in arms control, however, were little noticed because of the absence of political conflict between East and West, which, as I've suggested, was precisely what made them possible in the first place. People turned out to be uninterested in what happens to weapons they do not expect or fear will be used against them. That, I believe, is the reason for the lack of appreciation for what is a remarkable historic achievement.

Yet, both American political parties have reason not only for interest but for pride in what has been achieved. Democrats, after all, were the champions of arms control in the 1970s and 1980s. They considered it central to East West relations. But now that they are in power, they seem to have all but forgotten about arms agreements that exceed in scope what were once their fondest wishes.

Republicans tended to be skeptical about arms control in the latter stages of the Cold War. Indeed, President Ronald Reagan entered office opposed to it, claiming that it was "bad medicine." He said that, had he been in charge in the 1970s, where negotiations with Moscow were concerned he would have done things differently. And in office he proceeded to do things differently. The current accords—the ones to which first the Soviet Union and then Russia agreed—were designed in and by his administration, based on its criticisms of what had gone wrong previously. The post 1987 arms treaties are, in effect, Republican agreements and are among the most important diplomatic achievements in the history of the United States.

If the common security regime now in place endures, the arms treaties will be the pillars of the post Cold War order, even as the Marshall Plan and NATO were the pillars of the West's Cold War policy. This is no small achievement. Yet, these agreements get less respect than they deserve. But this raises the third question I mentioned at the outset: Does this lack of interest really matter? After all, these treaties have been negotiated and signed. Those that have been implemented are doing their work. It is a historical commonplace that what once seemed miraculous quickly becomes routine. The world does not celebrate Jonas Salk's birthday, despite the importance of the Salk vaccine for polio. Every day, millions of people unthinkingly cross bridges, the construction of which was once regarded as an engineering miracle. That's progress. Isn't this true of arms control as well?

Unfortunately, it is not quite true. The significance of these achievements does matter because the achievements are not secure. They are not irreversible. Indeed, I believe they are threatened by the prospect of NATO expansion to Central Europe. They are threatened in two ways.

First, the arms treaties are threatened. For example, START II, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons aimed at the United States and is therefore of some interest to Americans, has been held hostage in the Russian Parliament, the Duma, to the prospect of NATO expansion. In Helsinki in March, President Yeltsin promised to try to get the Duma to ratify this treaty. He's promised this before.

There is an even larger problem with NATO expansion. It puts the entire post Cold War settlement, in which the post 1987 arms agreements are embedded, in jeopardy. That settlement is extraordinarily favorable to the United States. It was tailored to our specifications. The liberation of Eastern Europe in 1989 was something we had demanded since 1945. Indeed, the liberation of Eastern Europe removed the basic cause of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was an event so favorable to the West that we never imagined that it was possible. And it is crucial that all of these changes were voluntary; first the Soviet Union and then Russia agreed to them. Thus, the post Cold War settlement has a certain legitimacy in Russian eyes. Because this settlement is so extraordinarily favorable to us, that legitimacy is a priceless asset for the West. But with NATO expansion we are in danger of squandering it.

The post Cold War settlement rests on three principles, all of which NATO expansion would violate. The first is the principle of consensus, according to which changes will be made with the acquiescence of everyone. NATO expansion, however, is the first major change in the security architecture of Europe to be made over the objections of Russia.

The second principle underlying the post Cold War settlement is inclusion, meaning that Russia will be welcomed into the international community in general, and into specific international organizations to the extent that it is willing and able to join them. But NATO expansion is an act of exclusion. It draws a new line of division in Europe where none existed before, and places Russia—and not only Russia—on the far side of that line.

The third principle is embedded both in the common security order as a whole and in the arms treaties that are so important to it: transparency. NATO expansion is the opposite of transparent. The American government has asserted that expansion will be open ended and that there will be further expansions after the first one, but it has refused to say where, when, or by what criteria this further expansion will take place.

What is the danger in all this? It is not that Russia will be able to stop the expansion. Russia is too weak to do so. Nor, I think, is there an immediate danger that the Russians will break out of the constraints of the arms treaties that they have signed. They're too poor to do that now. Rather, the danger that NATO expansion poses to the post Cold War settlement arises over the long term. The risk is that in the eyes of the Russian political class—and therefore ultimately in the eyes of ordinary Russians—NATO expansion will delegitimate the entire settlement, and make it a central goal of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century to overturn what has been put in place.

This is not, to say the least, a desirable outcome. If it should come to pass—if we should return to a Europe of military blocs, balances of power and political hostility—no doubt the United States and its allies could hold their own. We could once again deter Russia if we had to. But this would not necessarily be easy, it would not necessarily be cheap, and it would certainly not be free of risk. One thing, however, it certainly would be: If, 25 years from now, we look back at this period as a turning point, the moment when the common security order dissolved and Europe returned to the kind of balance of power arrangements so familiar in history, one point will be beyond dispute: this need not have happened.


Questions and Answers

Q: In one of the joint statements from the Helsinki summit, President Clinton cites the unprecedented progress in arms control during the past four years. Is it really unprecedented? Are we making more progress now than we made four years before?

Mandelbaum: From a historical perspective, the years from 1987 to 1993 constitute the great period of arms control. The task of this administration was and is to build on and consolidate what was achieved then. It has certainly made an effort to do so, but NATO expansion will hinder, not consolidate, it.

Q: If at one end of the spectrum you have world government, I assume that on the opposite end there is anarchy, and in between balance of power. In your remarks, you didn't mention collective security. Is there a difference between common security and collective security?

Mandelbaum: As Humpty Dumpty said, a word means what I choose it to mean; no more, no less. In The Dawn of Peace in Europe, I define collective security in such a way that it doesn't belong on that spectrum. By my definition it refers to two things: alliances, which are perfectly compatible with a balance of power and were at the core of the balance during the Cold War; and a regional or world police force, in which countries band together to deal with trouble spots. I devote a chapter to this subject in The Dawn of Peace in Europe.

Such a police force, I argue in that chapter, is undoubtedly desirable, but it is not feasible. The political will to pay a significant price to calm trouble spots around the globe is lacking in the United States and in other countries that might contribute to such a force.

Q: Administration officials are saying that NATO enlargement is a done deal, and I know you don't agree. They also say that attempts to block enlargement will destroy U.S. leadership in the world and particularly in Europe. Can you respond to both these points?

Mandelbaum: It is certainly not too late to stop NATO expansion unless the Constitution of the United States has been repealed. The Constitution provides that the Senate must ratify treaties by a two thirds majority.

As for the argument that terrible consequences would follow if expansion were stopped—an argument that will drown out all others if NATO does formally opt to invite new members this summer—this is an artifact of the Cold War. It has a certain resonance because it had a certain plausibility during the Cold War, which created a set of conditions that no longer exists.

Then, the United States was confronting a militant, militarized, hostile adversary around the world. It was reasonable to fear that pulling back in one area would invite aggression elsewhere. This was, after all, the reason the U.S. fought in Korea. The Korean Peninsula was of no strategic significance to the United States in 1950, but President Truman and his advisers believed that a failure to respond in Korea would produce trouble in Europe. This was also the reason for standing firm in West Berlin—an enclave that was militarily indefensible except by nuclear weapons. It was the reason for fighting—possibly even after 1968—in Vietnam.

Whatever one may think of the way this argument was applied during the Cold War, at least it had some plausibility. There was, after all, a Cold War. There was a Soviet Union. Now there is neither. So the question arises: What would be the consequences of stopping expansion now? What would be the consequences of postponing the decision, of taking another course? Is it really imaginable that the Soviet army would be in West Berlin the next day? There is no Soviet army; there is no divided Berlin. The world is now safe for the United States to admit and correct its mistakes in foreign policy. This is a mistake. We ought to admit it and then correct it.

Q: The thrust of your argument is that Russia is going to, with NATO expansion, set as its goal for the next century the overthrow of the post Cold War settlement. Assuming NATO enlargement stops short of drawing in the republics of the former Soviet Union, even in Russian eyes, won't the forces of economic growth and expansion be much more powerful forces in shaping Russia's long term views of its security and foreign policy goals?

Mandelbaum: I would hope that this would happen. But your premise is that NATO will not expand to the former Soviet republics. However, this administration has already effectively promised that expansion to some former Soviet republics—notably the Baltic states—will take place. Those former Soviet republics believe that they have been promised eventual NATO membership, in which case the danger of a nationalist backlash in Russia would be greater.

There are many powerful forces at work in Russia and on Russia, pushing Russia toward the kind of internal organization and international conduct that is desirable. NATO expansion to Central Europe would not necessarily and automatically override these forces. But expansion lends support to countervailing forces.

Q: If NATO expansion is such a bad idea, what is the right idea for including the Eastern and Western European security objectives, and what is the right future for NATO?

Mandelbaum: A number of second and third order issues in European security ought to be addressed. Further reductions in nuclear and non nuclear arms are desirable. Kaliningrad ought to be demilitarized. The independence of Belarus ought to be put on a formal basis. But the basic structure of the optimal European security order is, I believe, in place. What will improve it is something that by definition cannot be rushed: time. Over time the security order will become more normal, more deeply rooted and more legitimate.

As for the future of NATO, I believe it ought to be maintained. It is important to have an American commitment to Europe for modified versions of the original reasons: "To keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out and to keep the Germans down." We need NATO to relieve the Germans of the need to conduct an independent security policy, something that the Germans themselves do not wish to do. In addition, NATO ought to be sustained because if things go wrong in Russia, as they might, the Atlantic alliance would form the basis of an opposing coalition, just as it did during the Cold War. But if things do go wrong in Russia, they won't go wrong in a hurry. The Russians won't be in a position to threaten anybody for years; there will be plenty of advance warning.

How many troops are now needed in Europe? That depends on the magnitude of the threat. Now it is not great. If all goes well, it will diminish further over time. In that case it would be possible to bring troop levels down further. At some point, under the best case scenario, no American troops would remain in Europe. In that case NATO would have reverted to what it was intended to be in the first place: a guarantee pact. What began simply as a treaty, only became an integrated military force on the European continent in response to the outbreak of the Korean War.

Moreover, I believe that there is enough political support in the United States to sustain the NATO we need. But I do not believe that there will be domestic political support to sustain an expanded NATO which is not needed.

Indeed, if there is a backlash in the United States against the costs of an expanded NATO—and those costs, in political and economic terms, are likely to be considerably higher than the administration is claiming—it will call into question not just simply NATO expansion but the American commitment to Europe itself.

Q: If Russia views NATO as an alliance that opposes it, would European security be vastly increased by allowing Russia also to join NATO? Why are we precluding Russia from joining NATO?

Mandelbaum: I'm lukewarm, at best, to the idea of including Russia in NATO, but the prospect now seems to me less implausible than it once did, for four reasons. First, it is a better idea than the one this administration is proposing to carry out. Second, it preserves one of the fundamental principles on which the Cold War was ended: inclusion. Third, it might give the United States some leverage on the issue that matters most to us: Russian nuclear weapons. If Russia were part of NATO, it would be easier to reduce and control weapons that can strike North America. Fourth, if NATO does expand to Central Europe, it will then face three choices: to stay where it is, thus establishing in perpetuity a "grey zone" between NATO and Russia, the countries of which—Ukraine and the three Baltic states—would thereby become vulnerable in a number of ways; to expand to include this grey zone, which the Russians have suggested they would regard as akin to an act of war; or to expand to include Russia itself. Under those circumstances, the last option might be the least worst one.

Q: If the administration were to turn around and all of the sudden say: "Fine, no more NATO expansion," or if the Madrid summit were to be canceled, what do we tell those countries that have now had false expectations of protection under the NATO umbrella?

Mandelbaum: The countries that are expecting admission aren't threatened. None has a border with Russia. So none would be in a worse position where its security is concerned.

I also think it's a myth that there is powerful sentiment in favor of joining NATO in the prospective new member states. This is true of Poland; none of the surveys of opinion that I have seen show very much public enthusiasm in the Czech Republic or in Hungary. If membership in a Western international organization is necessary for the well being of these countries, the proper organization for them to join is the European Union, not NATO.

Q: What combination of inside politics and appeal to American public opinion do you see as most likely to bring about a change in the administration's policy on NATO expansion, and in what time frame?

Mandelbaum: There are deep reservations about NATO expansion in the foreign policy community and among those few members of Congress who follow the issue closely. I also believe that, to the extent that this issue is publicly discussed, support drops away. This is one of those issues about which people, when they first hear about it, think, "Oh, that's a good idea. Let's take them in." Then, when the details and the contingencies and the dangers are probed, support plummets.

The further the debate goes, the more unease there's going to be, which is why I believe that the administration will increasingly fall back on the argument: "It's too late. Maybe we made a mistake, but you—the Congress and the public—have to back us up because if you don't the whole world will collapse." But this argument, too, is specious.

Joint Statements of the Helsinki Summit

Joint Statement on Parameters On Future Reductions In Nuclear Forces

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The Start I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear weapon free. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

Once Start II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a Start III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.

Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long range sea launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

Joint Statement Concerning The Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1995 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

The scale of deployment—in number and geographic scope—of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.

The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 28, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty¾the obligation not to give non ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode¾the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher velocity TMD systems.

Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land based and air based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The elements for the agreement on higher velocity TMD systems are:

The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.

The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.

The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.

Joint U.S. Russian Statement On European Security

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S. Russian relationship in recent years.

Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, meets the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.

They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision making. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision making and action on security issues of common concern.

The Presidents noted that the NATO Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.

The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any destabilizing build up of forces in different regions of Europe.

The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.

The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.

Joint U.S Russian Statement On Chemical Weapons

President Clinton and President Yeltsin discussed issues relating to the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. They stressed the commitment of the United States and Russia to full and effective accomplishment of the tasks and objectives of the convention.

The Presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries. President Clinton expressed his determination that the United States be a party when the Convention enters into force in April of this year, and is strongly urging prompt Senate action. President Yeltsin noted that the Convention had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation for prompt ratification.

Mindful of their special role and responsibility in the matter of chemical disarmament, the United States and Russia understand that their participation in the Convention is important to its effective implementation and universality.

The Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Parties will continue cooperation between them in chemical disarmament.

The United States will seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed.

For more information contact Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr. or Jack Mendelsohn

March 1997 Arms Control In Print

February 15 - March 15, 1997

Compiled by Sami Fournier


  • An American Legacy: Building a Nuclear Weapon Free World, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1997, 16pp. Ph. (202) 223 5956.
  • Hartung, William D. and Jennifer Washburn. U.S. Arms Transfers to Indonesia 1975 1997: Who's Influencing Whom? New York: World Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center, March 1997, 31pp. Ph. (212) 229 5808.
  • Pierre, Andrew J. and Dmitri Trenin. "Developing NATO Russian Relations," Survival, Spring 1997, pp.5 18.
  • Steinbruner, John. "Russia Faces an Unsafe Reliance on Nukes," The Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1997, p.11.


  • Arms Control Briefing Book, Washington, DC: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, March 1997, 66pp.
  • Khripunov, Igor. "New Environment Demands Fresh Vision for Arms Control," Defense News, February 3 9, 1997, p.19.
  • "The New Horizon for Arms Cuts," The New York Times, March 11, 1997, p.A28.
  • Plesch, Daniel and Natalie Goldring. "From Dumdums to Nerve Gas," The Christian Science Monitor, March 5, 1997, p.20.
  • Plesch, Daniel and Stephen Young. "A Look at U.S. Arms Control Policy," CDS Bulletin of Arms Control, March 1997, pp.2 7.
  • Woolf, Amy F. "Arms Control and Disarmament Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events," CRS Report for Congress, January 24, 1997, 77pp.
  • International Affairs—Function 150 Summary and Highlights Fiscal 1998 Budget Request, Washington, DC: Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, U.S. Department of State, February 1997, 40pp. Ph. (202) 647 3434.
  • Verification, Compliance and Confidence Building: The Global and Regional Interface, J. Marshall Beier and Steven Mataija, Eds., North York, Ontario: York University Centre for International and Security Studies, 1996, 174pp. Ph. (416) 736 5156.


  • Gordon, Michael. "U.S. Proposes Deeper Cuts in Atom Arms," The New York Times, March 9, 1997, p.A9.
  • Mendelsohn, Jack. "Crossing the Finnish' Line," Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p.2.
  • Smith, Jeffrey. "U.S. Studies Deeper Nuclear Warhead Cuts," The Washington Post, January 23, 1997, p.A4.
  • Starr, Barbara. "Yeltsin's Unclear Future Stalls Arms Negotiations," Jane's Defense Weekly, March 12, 1997, p.3.
  • Zimmerman, Tim. "Just When you Thought You Were Safe" U.S. News and World Report, February 18, 1997, pp.38 39.


  • Diamond, Howard. "UNSCOM Head Says Iraq Has 'Operational' Missile Force," Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p.25.
  • "Missile Deal in Cypriot Budget Angers Turkey," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 26, 1997, p.15.
  • Wolf, Jim. "Missiles from China Pose Threat, Lake Says," The Philadelphia Inquirer, March 14, 1997, p.32.


  • Cerniello, Craig. "Panel Upholds NIE Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to U.S.," Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p.22.
  • Cerniello, Craig. "NMD Debate in Congress Heats Up As Lott, Lugar Introduce New Bills," Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p.21.
  • Cirincione, Joseph. "Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate," Foreign Policy, Spring 1997, pp.39 55.
  • Donnelly, John. "Pentagon Programs $17.9 Billion for Missile Defense," Defense Week Special, February 5, 1997, p.2.
  • Scott, William B. "Commanders Demand Effective Missile Defense," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 3, 1997, pp.42 43.
  • Gertz, Bill. "Service Chiefs Fear for Missile Defense," The Washington Times, March 10, 1997, p.A4.
  • Mann, Paul. "ABM Treaty at 25: Relic or Rebirth?" Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 24, 1997, pp.50 53.
  • Dornheim, Michael A. "THAAD Program Future Tied to Test Results," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 3, 1997, pp.64 65.
  • Dupont, Daniel G. "Pentagon Review of Latest THAAD Failure, State of Technology' Under Way," Inside Missile Defense, March 12, 1997, p.1.
  • Erlich, Jeff. "Pentagon Seeks to Boost Missile Defense Fund," Defense News, February 17 23, 1997, p.18.
  • Guilbeaux Jr., Lt. Col. Wilson. "Boost Phase Intercept: Implications for Theater Missile Defense," Urbana Champaign IL: ACDIS Occasional Paper, December 1996, 16pp.
  • Mintz, John. "Missile Defense System Fails Fourth Test," The Washington Post, March 7, 1997, p.G1.
  • "No Quid Pro Quo on TMD," Defense News, March 10 16, 1997, p.38.


  • Anselmo, Joseph C. "Russian Threat Still Massive," Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 24, 1997, pp.48 49.
  • Guldin, Robert. "A Farewell to Arms," GWlawschool, November 1996, pp.27 29.
  • Müller, Harald, Alexander Kelle, Katja Frank, Sylvia Meier and Annette Schaper, Nuclear Disarmament: With What End in View?, Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, December, 1996, p.49.
  • Hoadley, Steve. The 1995 NPT Conference: An Application of Zartman's Multilateral Negotiation Theory, Canberra: Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, 1996, 25pp. Ph. (06) 249 3098.
  • Multilateral Approaches to Non Proliferation, Andrew Latham, Ed., North York, Ontario: York University Centre for International and Security Studies, 1995, 152pp. Ph. (416) 736 5156.
  • Ranger, Robin and David Weincek. The Devil's Brews II: Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Security, Lancashire, UK: Centre for Defense and International Security, Lancaster University, 1997, 74pp. Ph. (44) 171 256 0704.
  • Weapons of Mass Destruction: Are the Nonproliferation Regimes Falling Behind? Report of the 37th Strategy for Peace, US Foreign Policy Conference, Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, October 1996, 16pp.
  • Bajpai, Kanti. Nuclear Weapons and the Security of India: Giving Up the Bomb, Canberra: Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, 1996, 26pp. Ph. 06 249 3098.
  • Diamond, Howard. "Nuclear Deal With North Korea Back on Track After Sub Incident," Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p.23.
  • Feldman, Shai. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, Cambridge, Massachusetts: CSIA Studies in International Security, 1997, Ph. (617) 495 1400.
  • Koch, Andrew. "Pakistan Persists With Nuclear Procurement," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1997, p.131 133.
  • Korea and East Asia, Seoul, Korea: Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, December 1996, 25 pp.
  • Manning, Robert A. "PACATOM: Nuclear Cooperation in Asia," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1997, pp.217 232.
  • "Striking a Balance in Pursuit of Progress," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 12, 1997, pp.23 24.
  • Yumin, Hu. "Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Counterproliferation Strategy," International Strategic Studies, China Institute for International Strategic Studies, 1996, pp.34 39. Ph.(010) 62 021 048


  • Albright, David, Frans Berkhout and William Walker. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, New York: Oxford University Press, SIPRI, 1997, 502pp.
  • Ellis, Jason. "Nunn Lugar's Mid Life Crisis," Survival, Spring 1997, pp.84 110.
  • Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, Selig S. Harrison, ed.Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996, 120pp.
  • Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance Has Improved, US GAO, February 1997, 6pp. Ph. (202) 512 6000.


  • Gibbs, W. Wayt. "In Focus: Computer Bombs," Scientific American, March 1997, pp.14 16.
  • McNally, James. "No Bluffing About Nuclear Arms," The Washington Times, March 11, 1997, p.A21.


  • Blank, Stephen J. The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China, March 4, 1997, Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 40pp. Ph. (717) 245 4133.
  • Crawford, Dorn. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review of Key Treaty Elements, Washington, DC: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, December 1996, 53pp.
  • Eikenberry, Karl W. Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers, Washington, DC: INSS, National Defense University, February 1995, 65pp.
  • Harahan, Joseph P. and John C. Kuhn. On Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty, A History of the On Site Inspection Agency and CFE Implementation, 1990 1996. Washington, DC: On Site Inspection Agency, 1996, 369pp.
  • Hartung, William D. Peddling Arms, Peddling Influence: Exposing the Arms Export Lobby, New York, NY: World Policy Institute, October 1996, 23pp. (212) 229 5808.
  • Hull, Andrew and David Markov. "A Changing Market in the Arms Bazaar," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1997, pp.140 142.
  • Leklem, Erik and Sarah Walkling. "CFE Treaty Modernization," Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1997, p.3.
  • Sharp, Jane M.O. "Update on the Dayton Arms Control Arrangements," CDS Bulletin of Arms Control, March 1997, pp.8 13.
  • Turner, Craig. "U.S. Led Push for Land Mine Ban Is Stymied," The Los Angeles Times, March 7, 1997, p.2.
  • Walkling, Sarah. "U.S. Favors CD Negotiations To Achieve Ban on Landmines," Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p.20.
  • Walkling, Sarah. "Wassenaar Members End Plenary, First Data Exchange Falls Short," Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p.24.
  • "Wassenaar's Weakness," Defense News, January 20 27, p.18.


  • Cooper, Mary H. "Chemical and Biological Weapons," CQ Researcher, January 31, 1997, pp.75 90.
  • Deans, Bob. "U.S. Disarms Without Pact," The Washington Times, March 10, 1997, p.A14.
  • "Here Come the Spies," The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1997, p.1.
  • "Iraq Produced Nerve Agent; U.N. Doubts it was Destroyed," The Baltimore Sun, March 4, 1997, p.1.
  • Leklem, Erik. "Administration, Senate Republicans Draw Battle Lines Over CWC," Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p.19.
  • Towell, Pat. "Clinton Pressures GOP to Act on Chemical Arms Ban," Congressional Quarterly, March 1, 1997, pp.545 550.
  • The Utility of Sampling and Analysis for Compliance Monitoring of the Biological Weapons Convention, Jonathan B. Tucker, Ed. Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security Research, February 1997, 68pp. Ph. (510) 422 6141.



  • Drozdiak, William. "Russia, NATO Near Agreement on Structure of New Partnership," The Washington Post, March 12, 1997, p.A23. "NATO Goes A wooing," The Economist, January 25 31, 1997. pp.15 16.
  • Rubinstein, Alvin. "America's Stake in Russia Today," Orbis, Winter 1997, pp.31 38.
  • Sneider, Daniel. "Of Supercomputers and National Security," The Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1997, p.3.
  • Tigner, Brooks. "Critics Blast Brigade Idea," Defense News, February 24 March 2, 1997, p.1.
  • Abshire, David M. "A Debate for 16 Parliaments," The Washington Post, February 19, 1997, p.A21.
  • Aristotelous, Aristos. Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: The Military Balance, 1995 1996. Cyprus: Cyprus Center for Strategic Studies, 1995, 168pp. Ph. (202) 232 8993.
  • Drozdiak, William. "NATO Expansion on the Cheap' May Have Surcharge," The Washington Post, March 12, 1997, p.A1.
  • Fitchett, Joseph. "NATO Expansion Wins Ukrainian Endorsement," International Herald Tribune, February 26, 1997, p.5.
  • Grant, Robert P. "Transatlantic Armament Relations Under Strain," Survival, Spring 1997, pp.111 137.
  • Le Gloannec, Anne Marie. "Europe by Other Means?," International Affairs, January 1997, pp.83 98.
  • Nunn, Senator Sam. "The Course for NATO," Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, January 13, 1997, 5pp.
  • "Public Indifferent About NATO Expansion," Washington, DC: Pew Research Center News Release, January 24, 1997, 13pp. Ph. (202) 293 3126.
  • Rogers, Mark. "Test of Strength as NATO Looks to Grow," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 26, 1997, p.25 27.
  • Shulte, Gregory L. "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO," Survival, Spring 1997, pp.19 42.
  • Starr, Barbara. "U.S. Worry over Russia and Expansion Costs," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 25, 1997, p.28 31.
  • Talbott, Strobe. "Russia Has Nothing to Fear," The New York Times, February 18, 1997, p.A25.
  • Tigner, Brooks. "Crisis in Albania Challenges PfP Viability," Defense News, March 10 16, p.3.
  • Whitney, Craig R. "NATO, in Concession to Russia, Won't Base New Forces in East," The New York Times, March 15, 1997, p.7.
  • "Why Bigger is Better," The Economist, February 15, 1997, p.21.
  • Building for Security and Peace in the Middle East, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997, 88pp. Ph. (202) 452 0650.
  • Groom, A.J.R., Edward Newman and Paul Taylor. Burdensome Victory: The United Nations and Iraq, Canberra: Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, 1996, 34pp. Ph. (06) 249 3098.
  • "Iraq to ship scrap missile motors for UN analysis," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 5, 1997, p.16.
  • Bedi, Rahul and Nikolai Novichkov. "India Matches Regional Build up with Kilo' Buy," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 19, 1997, p.3.
  • Goodstein, Laurie. "North, South Korea Hold Positive' Talks," The Washington Post, March 6, 1997, p.A26.
  • Harrison, Selig S. "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," Foreign Policy, Spring 1997, pp.57 75.
  • Raghuvanshi, Vivek. "India to Deploy Prithvi Despite Pakistani Concerns," Defense News, March 10 16, 1997, p.34.
  • Shin, Dong Ik and Gerald Segal. "Getting Serious About Asia Europe Security Cooperation," Survival, Spring 1997.
  • Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Americas: A Reference Book of Hemispheric Documents, ACDA, December 1996, 372pp.
  • Conca, Ken. Manufacturing Insecurity: The Rise and Fall of Brazil's Military Industrial Complex. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, 283pp.


  • "A Quick Look at the Clinton Administration's FY 1998 Defense Budget Request," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 6, 1997, 3pp. Ph. (202) 331 7990.


  • Erlich, Jeff. "Bunker Busting Bomb Prompts U.S. Discord," Defense News, February 24 March 2, 1997, p.1.
  • "The Future of Warfare," The Economist, March 8, 1997, pp.21 24.
  • Robb, Charles S. "Challenging the Assumptions of U.S. Military Strategy," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1997, pp.115 131.


  • Strategic Assessment 1997, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997, 300pp. Ph. (202) 685 3838.
  • Stremlau, John. "Sharpening International Sanctions," Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, November, 1996, 78pp. Ph. (202) 429 7979.
  • Zawels, Estanislao Angel et. al. Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues, New York and Geneva: UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, 1996, 234pp. Ph. (41 22) 917 26 12.
For more information, please contact Sami Fournier

CD Ends First Session of 1997 Without Mandates for Negotiations

By Howard Diamond

The 61 nation UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva ended its first 1997 session on March 27 without achieving agreed mandates for negotiations or establishing the necessary bodies in which to conduct them.

Beginning its work on January 21, the world's principal multilateral arms control forum was unable to set an agenda beyond the eight basic items first promulgated in 1978, now considered a formality. Many countries hoped that the CD would keep up the momentum of last year's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and make rapid progress on a global fissile material cutoff treaty and on an anti personnel landmines ban. However, competing priorities of the Western nations on the one hand and the non aligned movement (NAM) states on the other compounded by the CD requirement to work only by consensus have prevented formation of any ad hoc committees in which negotiations could begin.

The United States and most other Western countries want the CD to focus on what they believe is a more pragmatic agenda, in particular, negotiating a fissile material production ban and a global landmine ban (see ACT, January/February 1996). The NAM, led by India, insists that the immediate aim of the CD should be establishing a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament which would include the fissile material ban.

According to one U.S. official familiar with the CD negotiations, "The countries blocking the fissile material cutoff treaty by linking it to a timebound framework are the same ones trying to protect their own [nuclear weapons] programs." The United States maintains that the CD is the wrong place to negotiate nuclear reductions, arguing that agreements such as START I and II, among nuclear weapon states, are the best way to make large reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Attempting to bridge the gap between supporters of immediate fissile ban negotiations (such as the United States, Russia, Britain and France) and the non aligned, which wants to subsume a fissile cutoff within a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament, Japan proposed establishing a special coordinator to identify the nuclear disarmament issues with the greatest potential for fruitful negotiations and to report back to the conference before the end of the final 1997 session. New Zealand suggested establishing a nuclear disarmament committee that would immediately begin with the fissile material cutoff negotiations, while also considering longer term issues. However, both sides are unwilling to make compromises that look like concessions, and these proposals received little support.

The CD will hold two more sessions in 1997, the first from May 12 to June 27 and the second from July 28 to September 10. A U.S. official suggested little progress was likely in the second session, but movement was possible in the third. According to the official, "There's a waiting game to see which side will crack." In the absence of a major breakthrough or change in position, the CD may accomplish little this year.

CD Ends First Session of 1997 Without Mandates for Negotiations

Crossing the 'Finnish' Line

January/February 1997 

Jack Mendelsohn

The U.S. Russian arms control agenda is in serious trouble. START II is under attack in the Russian Duma, the two governments have been unable to agree on the terms under which highly capable theater missile defense (TMD) systems may be deployed, and most of the Russian political and military elites remain implacably hostile to the idea of NATO expansion.

The upcoming March 20 21 summit meeting in Helsinki could break the current impasse, however, if Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin can agree on a joint declaration committing the two countries to a bold arms control package. If they fail to seize this opportunity, the prospects are dim for an improved U.S. Russian security relationship and for progress in arms control.

The key element of this declaration should be an explicit commitment to a "framework" for a START III agreement with a lower ceiling on deployed warheads (between 2,000 and 2,500). The negotiations for these deeper reductions would begin immediately after the Duma ratifies START II. This commitment would help ease understandable Russian concerns over the restructuring, budgetary and scheduling demands of the existing START accords.

As important as a commitment to further reductions may be, it will not be sufficient by itself to induce the Duma to ratify START II. Moscow also links ratification to the continued viability of the ABM Treaty and has been critical of the pressure in the U.S. Congress for a national missile defense (NMD) system and of the plans by the Clinton administration for the large scale deployment of highly capable TMD systems. To help the Duma over the ballistic missile defense hurdle, the START III framework could call for a new reduction schedule that would extend START II implementation by two or more years beyond 2003.

As currently conceived, the administration's NMD "3 plus 3" program would hold off actual deployments until 2003 or later. Plans for Theater High Altitude Area Defense deployment—which the Russians seem to have agreed would be ABM Treaty compliant if not linked to space based sensors for tracking and guidance—call for the first unit to be in the field by 2004. If the START II implementation schedule were extended to 2006, for example, Russia would have additional time to assess the impact of proposed missile defenses on its strategic nuclear forces before the completion of its reductions.

Perhaps the most serious roadblock to START II ratification is NATO's decision to expand eastward. Whatever the Western arguments in favor of expansion may be, enlarging NATO at a time when Russia is politically and militarily weak risks energizing precisely those forces in Russian domestic politics—the conservatives, the nationalists, the communists and the militarists—who are most hostile to reform in Russia and to the West in general. If these forces gain political strength, they will inevitably turn Russia away from a cooperative relationship with the United States and into a reluctant, if not intractable, arms control partner.

Moscow's principal military objection to NATO expansion has been the possibility the alliance might deploy additional troops and/or tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of its new Central European members. To address Russian concerns regarding the potential deployment of NATO ground forces in the new member states, the alliance recently put forward an excellent proposal to limit to current national entitlements all national and stationed ground equipment in those states likely to join NATO.

To deal with the sensitive issue of tactical nuclear weapons, the summit declaration should initiate a separate negotiation on the disposition of these weapons. As a first step, the United States and Russia could freeze the numbers and location of all tactical nuclear weapons, alleviating Russian concerns about their forward deployment. As a mid term goal, this forum could seek to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from the operational forces of both sides either under a treaty, as in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or through reciprocal unilateral commitments, as undertaken by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in late 1991. This would address U.S. concerns about the safety and security of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have a historic opportunity awaiting them in Helsinki. If the two leaders can make progress on a political settlement to accompany NATO expansion and agree on the next steps in bilateral arms control, the summit will get U.S. Russian relations back on track and START II across the "Finnish" line. If they fail, a "cold peace" may indeed be upon us.

The U.S.-Russian arms control agenda is in serious trouble. 

U.S. Favors CD Negotiations To Achieve Ban on Landmines

Sarah Walkling

AFTER MONTHS of indecision, the Clinton administration announced January 17 that it will initially pursue negotiations for a comprehensive global ban on anti personnel landmines at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, instead of through the Canadian led effort to negotiate and sign an international treaty by December 1997. (See ACT, October 1996.) The administration also declared that the current U.S. export moratorium on anti personnel mines, which was to continue until 1999, would become permanent.

By opting for the CD, the administration has chosen the slower path for implementing a ban. The CD, which opened its first session of 1997 on January 21, may not decide whether a landmine ban will be on its agenda until the summer of 1997 or later. Meanwhile, the Canadian led effort, also known as the "Ottawa Process," will begin reviewing an Austrian draft treaty text during a February 12 14 conference in Vienna. The United States is expected to attend the Vienna meeting.

The administration favors the 61 member CD because Russia and China—top producers of anti personnel landmines and opponents of a landmine ban—have said they will not participate in the Ottawa Process. Both countries are members of the CD. Without their participation, administration officials say, a treaty would not halt the use, production, export or stockpiling of anti personnel mines. However, White House spokesman Mike McCurry said January 17 the CD negotiations would be "mutually reinforcing" of the Canadian initiative. If China and Russia join the Canadian effort, the United States has said it will also participate. Regardless of the forum, the United States will seek an exception for its mines deployed on the Korean Peninsula.

Other states that favor negotiating a ban at the CD include Australia, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. On January 23, the French representative to the CD, Ambassador Joelle Bourgois, said, "France prefers an efficient treaty, even if the result took time, to a hastily concluded but useless agreement." Some members of the non aligned movement (NAM) that oppose conducting the negotiations at the CD say the landmine talks might overshadow the comprehensive nuclear disarmament negotiations which several NAM states hope to initiate. If the CD agenda does include a landmine ban, the ad hoc committee that would be established for negotiating a ban will likely focus on reaching agreement on an export ban first.

According to Bob Bell, National Security Council senior director for defense policy and arms control, "[O]ur best shot at this in terms of achieving the president's goal of a global ban—not just a ban among some countries but a ban that really touches the countries that are causing the problem on different continents around the world—is to take it to the CD where we have a proven track record." Acknowledging that achieving a ban "is going to be tough," Bell said, "we think we can get a landmines agreement out of the CD ..."

However, Senator Patrick Leahy (D VT), the leading congressional advocate for a global ban, expressed disappointment in the administration's decision. In a January 17 press release, Leahy said the Canadian initiative offers "the best opportunity" for rapid progress because it establishes "a moral and tactical imperative" for bringing holdout countries aboard. "It is doubtful that the CD will produce an agreement to achieve a ban," Leahy said. "The CD process requires step by step consensus that rewards holdout states, who effectively have a veto that retards or prevents strong agreements." Last year, India alone was able to block consensus on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the CD. The otherwise agreed treaty was taken directly to the UN General Assembly by Australia and was opened for signature in September 1996 despite Indian opposition.


Finding Alternatives

The day after the White House announced its decision to push for negotiation of a ban in the CD, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported on its efforts to end its military reliance on anti personnel landmines. Clinton ordered the assessment as part of a landmine initiative announced in May 1996. (See ACT, May/June 1996.) The Pentagon has since reviewed its war plans and has begun to revise its doctrine and training manuals to eliminate requirements for anti personnel landmine use. According to a DOD official, the changes represent "a fundamental shift in the way we go to war."

While the Defense Department has not found a single alternative to landmines, the official said, "[T]here appear to be a number of systems, when used in combination, which offer some very promising prospects for us." Specifically, a combination of "new killing mechanisms and mix of new intelligence sensors" would allow the U.S. military to decrease its reliance on statically emplaced non self destruct mines.

As part of his 1996 initiative, Clinton ordered the U.S. military to immediately discontinue use of so called "dumb" mines, which remain active until detonated or cleared, except for training purposes or on the Korean Peninsula and to destroy all non essential stockpiles by 1999. According to the Pentagon, the United States will still possess approximately one million such mines.

Nuclear Deal With North Korea Back on Track After Sub Incident

Howard Diamond

IMPLEMENTATION of the 1994 U.S. North Korean agreed framework resumed in January following Pyongyang's December 29 expression of regret over the grounding of one of its reconnaissance submarines on the South Korean coast. On January 8, the "canning" of spent fuel at North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility resumed after having stopped in November. That same day, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea signed two protocols in New York that will allow KEDO to begin site preparation work on the $5 billion light water reactor (LWR) project, the central component of the agreed framework.

KEDO is the international consortium founded by the United States, Japan and South Korea to implement the 1994 denuclearization accord. The agreement requires North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons program in exchange for the construction of two proliferation resistant 1,000 megawatt (electric) LWRs and the delivery of heavy fuel oil while the reactors are being built.


Canning' Resumes

The canning operation, which entails transferring the spent fuel rods from a cooling pond where they are currently stored into steel containers suitable for transhipment, was suspended in early November after North Korean workers failed to return from a scheduled work stoppage. At that point, more than half of the Yongbyon reactor's 8,000 spent fuel elements had been placed in "dry storage" by the U.S. Department of Energy and its private contractor.

North Korea removed the spent fuel from its 5 megawatt (electric) experimental reactor at Yongbyon in 1994. The fuel remains a serious proliferation hazard because it contains enough plutonium to build several nuclear bombs. As part of the 1994 deal, North Korea shut down the Yongbyon reactor, with the promise to dismantle it and send its spent fuel out of the country without being reprocessed. U.S. officials hope to complete the canning operation by the end of 1997.

With the submarine incident resolved, KEDO has resumed activity on a number of fronts, according to KEDO spokesman Jason Shaplen. The two protocols signed January 8 by KEDO and Pyongyang represent an important milestone in the LWR project's development, clearing the way for KEDO to begin site preparation near Sinpo in North Korea. Arrangements for KEDO to contract for services in North Korea and KEDO's access to the proposed construction site are covered in the agreements.

KEDO's seventh site survey team is preparing to visit North Korea to conduct a detailed geological investigation and some additional preliminary site preparation work. South Korea indefinitely postponed a planned October trip by the mostly South Korean team of engineers due to concerns over their safety while working in North Korea. The submarine incident delayed the site preparation, but the effect on the overall LWR project schedule is uncertain. The 1995 KEDO North Korean supply agreement calls for completion of the first reactor by 2003 on a "best efforts" basis, and KEDO hopes to be able to make up some of the lost time.

In addition to sending the first shipment of heavy fuel oil for the current year supply schedule, which began on October 31, 1996, KEDO has reached an agreement in principle on accession to KEDO by EURATOM, the nuclear regulatory body of the European Union (EU). The EU is expected to make "an immediate contribution of $13 million and an annual contribution of $20 million in the future" according to Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord. The EU contribution would nearly equal the annual level of U.S. financial support ($22 million for 1996), and would pay for approximately one third of the annual $60 million cost of fuel deliveries to North Korea.

KEDO and Pyongyang have not yet begun to negotiate a protocol on penalties if either party fails to meet its obligations as called for in the supply agreement. Shaplen said talks on the non payment protocol will begin as soon as is practicable.


The Submarine Incident

The resumption of activity implementing the framework accord as of January 31, 1997, came after three and a half months of escalating tension, carefully phrased threats, and intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts. On September 18, the North Korean sub was discovered grounded 100 yards off the South Korean coast.

South Korean President Kim Young Sam called the incident a provocation and demanded a sincere apology from the North. On October 9, South Korea suspended the signing of two KEDO North Korean protocols and a trip by KEDO's site survey team to the North.

Lord flew to Seoul the next day to mend U.S. South Korean relations damaged by Secretary of State Warren Christopher's initial call for restraint from "all parties." After meeting with South Korean leaders, Lord confirmed Washington's and Seoul's support for the agreed framework, but added that there would be "a pause in the pace of our activities."

In response, North Korea warned on October 15 that another delay in work on the reactors might prompt the North to reconsider its nuclear freeze. North Korean preparations to test an intermediate range ballistic missile were reported by the Japanese press the next day. The cancellation of the missile test was announced by the State Department on November 8, after several meetings in New York between U.S. and North Korean diplomats.


U.S. South Korean Disagreement

On November 9, South Korean President Kim reiterated his demand for a "sincere apology" in an interview with The Washington Post. At the time, U.S. officials asked the North to make "an acceptable gesture." Subsequently, the United States and South Korea settled their differnces at the November 24 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila. In the reportedly heated exchange, President Clinton prevailed on President Kim to support American diplomatic efforts to negotiate a resolution of the crisis. The final negotiations went on through December between U.S. and North Korean diplomats in New York.

The result was a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement read over the radio on December 29 that recognized Pyongyang's responsibility for the incident, offered "deep regret," and promised to prevent a recurrence of similar events. South Korean Foreign Minister Yoo Chong Ha termed the North's statement an acceptable apology, thus clearing the way for continued South Korean participation on the agreed framework.

Signatories to the Biological Weapons Convention

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, was negotiated from 1968 to 1971 and opened for signature on April 10, 1972. The convention entered into force with 43 parties on March 26, 1975, upon ratification by the three depositary states: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

As of January 31, 1997, 140 states-parties have either ratified (R) or acceded (A) to the treaty, as indicated in the table below; 18 additional signatories that have not ratified the convention are also listed. These countries' status with regard to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of biological weapons, is also noted. Some states have deposited reservations to the BWC or Geneva Protocol, and those relevant to the application of the treaty are noted below.

Countries in bold type have been identified by U.S. government sources as having or actively developing biological weapons programs. (See notes a through d for sources.) Members of the Australia Group, an informal export control organization that shares information on the trade in chemical and biological agents, are shown in italics.

Country BWC BWC Geneva Protocol
  Date of Signature Date of Ratification or Accession Date of Ratification
Afghanistan 4/10/72 3/26/75 (R) 12/9/86
Albania   6/3/92 (A) 12/20/89
Argentina 8/1/72 11/27/79 (R) 5/12/69
Armenia   6/7/94 (A)  
Austrailia 4/10/72 10/5/77 (R) 5/24/302,3
Austria 4/10/72 8/10/73 (R)1 5/9/28
Bahamas, The   11/26/86 (A) 7/10/732,3
Bahrain   10/28/88 (A) 12/9/88
Bangladesh   3/11/85 (A) 5/20/89
Barbados 2/16/73 2/16/73 (R) 7/16/76
Belarus 4/10/72 3/26/75 (R)  
Belgium 4/10/72 3/15/79 (R) 12/4/282,3
Belize   10/20/86 (A) 9/21/81
Benin 4/10/72 4/25/75 (R) 12/9/86
Bhutan   6/8/78 (A) 6/12/78
Bolivia 4/10/72 10/30/75 (R) 8/13/85
Bosnia & Herzegovina   8/15/94 (A)  
Botswana 4/10/72 2/5/92 (R) 9/30/662,3
Brazil 4/10/72 2/27/73 (R) 8/28/70
Brunei   1/31/91 (A)  
Bulgaria 4/10/72 8/2/72 (R) 3/7/34
Burkina Faso   4/17/91 (A) 3/3/71
Burundi 4/10/72    
Cambodia 4/10/72 3/9/83 (R) 3/15/83
Canada 4/10/72 9/18/72 (R) 5/6/30
Cape Verde   10/20/77 (A) 10/15/91
Cental African Rep. 4/10/72   7/31/70
Chile 4/10/72 4/22/80 (R) 7/2/35
Chinac   11/15/84 (A) 8/24/292,3
Colombia 4/10/72 12/19/83 (R)  
Congo   10/23/78 (A)  
Costa Rica 4/10/72 12/17/73 (R)  
Cote d'Ivoire 5/23/72   7/27/70
Croatia   4/28/93 (A)  
Cuba 4/12/72 4/21/76 (R) 6/24/66
Cyprus 4/10/72 11/6/73 (R) 12/12/66
Czech Republic   4/5/93 (A) 8/16/38
Denmark 4/10/72 3/1/73 (R) 5/5/30
Dominica   11/8/78 (A) 11/8/78
Dominican Republic 4/10/72 2/23/73 (R) 12/8/70
Ecuador 6/14/72 3/12/75 (R) 9/16/70
Egyptc 4/10/72   12/6/28
El Salvador 4/10/72 12/31/91 (R) Signatory
Equatorial Guinea   1/16/89 (A) 5/20/89
Estonia   6/21/93 (A) 8/28/312,3
Ethiopia 4/10/72 5/26/75 (R) 10/7/35
Fiji 2/22/73 9/4/73 (R) 3/21/732,3
Finland 4/10/72 2/4/74 (R) 6/26/29
France   9/27/84 (A) 5/10/26
Gabon 4/10/72    
Gambia, The 6/2/72 11/21/91 (R) 11/5/66
Georgia   5/26/92 (A)  
Germany 4/10/72 11/28/72 (R) 4/25/29
Ghana 4/10/72 6/6/75 (R) 5/3/67
Greece 4/10/72 12/10/75 (R) 5/30/31
Grenada   10/22/86 (A) 1/3/89
Guatemala 5/9/72 9/19/73 (R) 5/3/83
Guinea-Bissau   8/20/76 (A) 5/20/89
Guyana 1/3/73    
Haiti 4/10/72    
Honduras 4/10/72 3/14/79 (R)  
Hungary 4/10/72 12/27/72 (R) 10/11/52
Iceland 4/10/72 2/15/73 (R) 11/2/67
India 1/15/73 7/15/74 (R) 4/9/302,3
Indonesia 6/20/72 2/19/92 (R) 1/21/71
Iranabcd 4/10/72 8/22/73 (R) 11/5/29
Iraqabcd 5/11/72 6/19/91 (R) 9/8/312,3
Ireland 4/10/72 10/27/72 (R) 8/29/30
Italy 4/10/72 5/30/75 (R) 4/3/28
Jamaica   8/13/75 (A) 7/28/70
Japan 4/10/72 6/8/82 (R) 5/21/70
Jordan 4/10/72 5/30/75 (R) 1/20/772,3
Kenya   1/7/76 (A) 7/6/70
Korea, Northabd   3/13/87 (A) 1/4/892,3
Korea, South 4/10/72 6/25/87 (R) 1/4/892,3
Kuwait 4/14/72 7/18/72 (R) 12/15/712,3
Laos 4/10/72 3/20/73 (R) 5/20/89
Lebanon 4/10/72 3/26/75 (R) 4/17/69
Lesotho 4/10/72 9/6/77 (R) 3/10/72
Liberia 4/10/72   6/17/27
Libyaabcd   1/19/82 (A) 12/29/713
Liechtenstein   5/30/91 (A) 9/6/91
Luxembourg 4/10/72 3/23/76 (R) 9/1/36
Macedonia   12/24/96 (A)  
Madagascar 10/13/72   8/2/67
Malawi 4/10/72   9/14/70
Malaysia 4/10/72 9/6/91 (R) 12/10/70
Maldives   8/2/93 (A) 12/27/66
Mali 4/10/72   11/19/66
Malta 9/11/72 4/7/75 (R) 9/21/64
Mauritius 4/10/72 8/7/72 (R) 3/12/68
Mexico 4/10/72 4/8/74 (R) 5/28/32
Mongolia 4/10/72 9/5/72 (R) 12/6/683
Morocco 5/2/72   10/13/70
Myanmar (Burma) 4/10/72   1/4/482,3
Nepal 4/10/72   5/9/69
Netherlands, The 4/10/72 6/22/81 (R) 10/31/30
New Zealand 4/10/72 12/13/72 (R) 5/24/30
Nicaragua 4/10/72 8/7/75 (R) 10/5/90
Niger 4/21/72 6/23/72 (R) 4/5/67
Nigeria 7/3/72 7/3/73 (R) 10/15/682,3
Norway 4/10/72 8/1/73 (R) 7/27/32
Oman   3/31/92 (A)  
Pakistanb,5 4/10/72 9/25/74 (R) 4/15/60
Panama 5/2/72 3/20/74 (R) 12/4/70
Papua New Guinea   10/27/80 (A) 9/2/802,3
Paraguay   6/9/76 (A) 10/22/33
Peru 4/10/72 6/5/85 (R) 8/13/85
Phillipines 4/10/72 5/21/73 (R) 6/8/73
Poland 4/10/72 1/25/73 (R) 2/4/29
Portugal 6/29/72 5/15/75 (R) 7/1/302,3
Qatar 11/14/72 4/17/75 (R) 10/18/76
Romania 4/10/72 7/25/79 (R) 8/23/292,3
Russiabcd 4/10/72 3/26/75 (R) 4/5/282,3
Rwanda 4/10/72 5/20/75 (R) 5/11/64
Saint Kitts & Nevis   4/2/91 (A) 4/27/89
Saint Lucia   11/26/86 (A) 12/21/88
San Marino 9/12/72 3/11/75 (R)  
Sao Tome & Principe   8/24/79 (A)  
Saudi Arabia 4/12/72 5/24/72 (R) 1/27/71
Senegal 4/10/72 3/26/75 (R) 6/15/77
Serbia & Montenegro 4/10/72 10/25/73 (R)  
Seychelles   10/11/79 (A) 6/29/762,3
Sierra Leone 11/7/72 6/29/76 (R) 3/20/67
Singapore 6/19/72 12/2/75 (R) 8/29/652,3
Slovak Republic   5/17/93 (A) 9/22/93
Slovenia   4/7/92 (A)  
Solomon Islands   6/17/81 (A) 6/1/81
Somalia 7/3/72    
South Africa 4/10/72 11/3/75 (R) 5/24/302,3
Spain 4/10/72 6/20/79 (R) 8/22/292,3
Sri Lanka 4/10/72 11/18/86 (R) 1/20/54
Suriname   1/6/93 (A) 10/31/30
Swaziland   6/18/91 (A) 7/23/91
Sweden 2/27/75 2/5/76 (R) 4/25/30
Switzerland 4/10/72 5/4/76 (R)1 7/12/32
Syriacd 4/14/72   12/17/68
Taiwancd 4/10/72 2/9/73 (R) 8/7/29
Tanzania 8/16/72   4/22/63
Thailand 1/17/73 5/28/75 (R) 6/6/31
Togo 4/10/72 11/10/76 (R) 4/5/71
Tonga   9/28/76 (A) 7/19/71
Tunisia 4/10/72 5/18/73 (R) 7/12/67
Turkey 4/10/72 10/25/74 (R) 10/5/29
Turkmenistan   1/11/96 (A)  
Uganda   5/12/92 (A) 5/24/65
Ukraine 4/10/72 3/26/75 (R)  
United Arab Emirates 9/28/72    
United Kingdom 4/10/72 3/26/75 (R) 4/9/302,3
United States 4/10/72 3/26/75 (R) 4/10/754
Uruguay   4/6/81 (A) 4/12/77
Uzbekistan   1/11/96 (A)  
Vanuatu   10/12/90 (A)  
Venezuela 4/10/72 10/18/78 (R) 2/8/28
Vietnam   6/20/80 (A) 12/15/802,3
Yemen 4/26/72 6/1/79 (R) 3/17/713
Zaire 4/10/72 9/16/75 (R)  
Zimbabwe   11/5/90 (A) 4/18/80

Sources: ACDA, Government of France, Government of the United Kingdom, UN Treaty Office, U.S. Department of State Treaty Office.

Notes: a, b, c, d: Suspect according to: a. Speech by DCI John Deutch before the Los Alamos National Laboratory Conference on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, May 23, 1996; b. "Proliferation: Threat and Response," DOD. 1996; c. 1995 ACDA Annual Report; d. Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

1. Binding with respect to neutrality status.

2. Binding only as regards relations with other parties.

3. To cease to be binding in regard to any enemy states whose armed forces or allies do not observe provisions.

4. To cease to be binding as regards use of chemical agents with respect to any enemy state whose armed forces or allies do not observe provisions.

5. Submitted background information declaring full compliance with obligations under the convention. BWC/CONF IV/3 (October 28, 1996)

Administration, Senate Opposition Draw Battle Lines Over CWC

January/February 1997

By Erik J. Keklem

With less than three months remaining until formal entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Clinton administration's renewed push for Senate approval of the accord has encountered stiff opposition by top Republicans still seeking to link Senate consideration to other arms control and foreign policy issues. The treaty is once again being held up by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R NC), who last year led a successful effort to derail the administration's effort to bring the convention to a vote. (See ACT, September 1996.)

The 1993 treaty, now signed by 161 countries including the United States and ratified by 70, will enter into force April 29 with or without U.S. ratification. If the United States fails to ratify the treaty by that date, it will be barred from membership in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the implementing body that will begin formal operation April 29. As a result, the United States will be unable to participate in the decision making process during the first critical months of the convention's implementation.

The Congressional Debate

The administration's campaign, led by new National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, hopes to persuade Republican leaders to bring a resolution of ratification before the full Senate for a vote before the April 29 deadline. However, both Helms and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R MS), either of whom can prevent the CWC from coming to the Senate floor for a vote, have told the administration that other issues must be addressed before they will move to vote on the treaty.

In a January 8 letter to Clinton, Lott said, "[I]t will be very difficult to explore the possibility of Senate action on the Chemical Weapons Convention without first addressing legitimate security and Constitutional concerns on other important arms control issues." In particular, Lott suggested Senate advice and consent are required for any "demarcation" limits to the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, for the ABM Treaty's multilateralization and for new "flank" limits to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. "As you seek bipartisan cooperation [on the CWC]," Lott said, "you must understand our expectation for such cooperation on ABM multilateralization, ABM demarcation and CFE flank limits."

Opposition By Helms

In a January 29 letter to Lott, Helms said he remained opposed to the treaty "as transmitted" by the president, and recommended instead that the Senate consider the CWC only after it passes legislation on "top Republican priorities." Among the issues that must first be addressed, according to Helms, are legislation to restructure U.S. foreign policy agencies, legislation that ensures comprehensive UN reform, submission to the Senate for advice and consent of modifications to the ABM Treaty and the CFE Treaty, and legislation to deploy a national missile defense system.

In his letter, Helms said, "at a minimum the only acceptable end result of our efforts must be a resolution of ratification, approved by the Foreign Relations Committee," that addresses key Republican concerns. In an accompanying memo, Helms included the conditioning of U.S. ratification on: a Russian commitment to implement the 1990 U.S. Russian "Bilateral Destruction Agreement" and ratify the CWC; accession to the CWC by "those countries possessing chemical weapons which pose a threat to the United States"; and presidential certification that U.S. intelligence can "monitor with a high degree of confidence the compliance of all parties" to the convention. Other key conditions in the memo included clarification of the U.S. response to acts of non compliance with the CWC, ensuring the primacy of the Constitution over all convention provisions and the protection of confidential business information.

The specific language of the resolution of ratification will be key, as some of the conditions outlined by Helms, if included or attached as "poison pill" amendments to the resolution on the Senate floor could effectively block U.S. ratification. In his letter to Lott, Helms said, "I believe that the starting point for any further discussions on the CWC must be the resolution of ratification which I presented to the Foreign Relations Committee on April 25, 1996." The original Helms resolution was rejected by a majority of the committee last year before it approved an alternative resolution co sponsored by committee Republicans and Democrats.

Administration, Senate Opposition Draw Battle Lines Over CWC


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