"No one can solve this problem alone, but together we can change things for the better." 

– Setsuko Thurlow
Hiroshima Survivor
June 6, 2016
Arms Control Today

DOE Sets First 'Subcritical' Test for June

The Department of Energy (DOE) announced on April 4 that it would conduct the first in a series of "subcritical" experiments deep underground at the Nevada Test Site in June 1997, with the second experiment to follow this fall. The experiments, which will utilize high explosives and fissile materials (including plutonium) but not generate any nuclear yield, are part of DOE's ScienceBased Stockpile Stewardship program designed to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal under the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty. The treaty prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." The experiments will, among other things, provide additional information on the behavior of weapons materials and components, allowing for improved computer simulations of nuclear explosions.

The first subcritical experiment was originally scheduled for June 1996, during the final stages of the CTB Treaty negotiations. DOE postponed it at the last minute, however, claiming that more time was needed to assess the environmental implications of such experiments. (See ACT, July 1996.)

The subcritical experiments remain controversial. Some critics have argued that the experiments will undermine the CTB Treaty because they will be perceived by some as an attempt by the United States to qualitatively improve its nuclear arsenal contrary to the spirit of the treaty. Other critics have argued that because they will be conducted underground at the Nevada Test Site, the experiments will complicate future verification efforts by establishing the precedent for continuing activities at former test sites. DOE has maintained, however, that the experiments are consistent with the CTB Treaty because they are not nuclear explosions and the treaty permits continued activities at former test sites.


Senate Committee Approves NMD Bill Mandating Deployment By End of 2003

Craig Cerniello

ON APRIL 24, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved by a vote of 108, along party lines, the "National Missile Defense Act of 1997" (S. 7), a bill sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) that would require the United States to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system by the end of 2003. (See ACT, January/February 1997 .) The Senate is unlikely to take up the bill before the end of May.

In the committee's report, the 10 Republican senators make the case for such a system. They argue that the Clinton administration's refusal to commit to the deployment of an NMD system at this time is a mistake because the United States currently faces longrange ballistic missile threats from Russia and China, and that ICBM threats from other countries (for example, North Korea) are likely to emerge "within the coming years." In this context, the senators claim that it is necessary to specify now a firm deployment date for an NMD system, as S.7 does, in order to "provide focus and establish a sense of priority and urgency." They also reject the argument that deployment of an NMD system "will undermine offensive arms control or stability."

The committee's eight Democratic senators sharply disagree with these views. In their dissent, they base their opposition on the fact that S. 7 "commits the United States to deploy a national missile defense system by 2003 before we know the cost of such a system; before we know whether the system would work effectively; and before we know whether deployment of such a system would jeopardize our current and future nuclear arms reductions, or what the nature of the threat will be at the time of deployment."

Recognizing that the nature of the ballistic missile threat to U.S. territory is a crucial factor in any NMD deployment decision, the Democrats point out that the intelligence community has already judged the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia or China to be "remote." They also challenge the credibility of the potential North Korean ICBM program in light of Pyongyang's deep economic troubles.

In addition, the Democratic senators have expressed their strong concern that S.7 will jeopardize the viability of the ABM Treaty upon which rests the U.S.Russian strategic offensive arms reduction process. S.7 urges the president to pursue, if necessary, highlevel discussions with the Russians to amend the ABM Treaty to permit NMD deployment; and, if such an agreement has not been reached within one year of its enactment, the bill directs the United States to consider withdrawing from the treaty.

Another key concern voiced by the Democrats is the lack of a cost estimate accompanying the legislation. In an April 24 letter to Senator Strom Thurmond (RSC), Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Director June O'Neill said her agency could not provide a cost estimate of S.7 because the bill's definition of a "limited ballistic missile attack" is drawn from a classified document, making it difficult for the CBO to provide an unclassified assessment. A CBO cost estimate was critical in last year's debate on the "Defend America Act" (a more elaborate version of S. 7), and ultimately persuaded the House to remove the legislation from floor consideration. (See ACT, May/June 1996.)

The committee's report also contains the Clinton administration's position on S.7. In an April 23 letter to Thurmond, the general counsel of the Defense Department, Judith Miller, said S.7 would divert resources from more pressing military needs and "result in a less effective defense when and if a threat does emerge." According to Miller, "by mandating [NMD] deployment and a oneyear deadline in which to achieve negotiated changes to the ABM Treaty, S.7 could be interpreted by the Russians as putting the United States on a path toward abrogating the ABM Treaty, thus putting at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II." The treaties, when fully implemented, will reduce the number of deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by more than twothirds from Cold War levels.

Senate Committee Approves NMD Bill Mandating Deployment By End of 2003

Clinton Moves Closer to Easing Limits On Arms Sales to Latin America


Wade Boese

THE CLINTON administration appears poised to end a two-decade-old policy of restricting sales of U.S. high-tech weapons, such as fighter aircraft and advanced missiles, to Latin America. During the first week of April, the administration announced that it granted Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas, manufacturers of the F-16 and F/A-18, respectively, authorization to provide technical specifications and marketing information on these aircraft to Chile.

Administration officials insist that although a two-year policy review of the informal ban is not yet complete, the administration did not want to "disadvantage" any U.S. firms in competition for future sales if the policy is eventually altered.

Chile is seeking to modernize its air force with a purchase of at least 20 advanced fighters. To be considered for the sale, Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas were permitted to submit the information to meet a Chilean deadline of March 31, 1997. Chilean interest and expectations concerning the potential availability of the F-16s and F/A-18s increased following the appearance of the fighters at a March 1996 airshow in Chile after their having been excluded from a previous Latin American airshow in 1994. Other aircraft vying for the sale include the Swedish JAS39 Gripen (which is also subject to the restrictions because the aircraft contain a large percentage estimated at 30 percent of U.S.-made components), the French Mirage 20005, and the Russian MiG-29. Brazil is also considering a modernization of its air force in the near future.


The Latin American Market

Although the Latin American arms market is relatively small, competition in the estimated $500 million annual market is intensifying. The region accounted for 3.3 percent of all international arms deliveries in 1995, but this represented a second consecutive year of growth after five years of steady decline. Recent military modernization programs by Latin American nations are responsible for the market's upswing. Despite the unilateral restrictions on high-tech equipment, the United States is still the leading arms supplier to Latin America, accounting for 26 percent of the value of arms deliveries between 1992 and 1995.

Since 1978, the United States has adhered to a policy of "severe restraint" on hightech weapons exports to Latin America. President Jimmy Carter imposed the restrictions in response to widespread human rights abuses by the region's dictatorships and military regimes. One of those dictators, General Augusto Pinochet, still serves as the commander-in-chief of Chile's army. Venezuela's purchase of 24 F-16s in 1981 stands as the only previous exception to the policy.

Support for modifying the restrictions has steadily accumulated during the Clinton administration's policy review. Military contractors, with the support of the Pentagon, have been urging the administration to allow new sales to the region. Their efforts received a boost in December 1996 when then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher, an earlier advocate of retaining the ban, signed a memorandum with then-Secretary of Defense William Perry urging President Clinton to change the policy. Perry's successor, William Cohen, firmly supports replacing the current restrictions with the standard U.S. policy of a case-by-case approach.

Advocates of a policy change contend that the current restrictions are outdated since all Latin American nations, except Cuba, have democratically elected governments and growing economies. A favored justification is that foreign firms will supply the weapons if U.S. firms do not, and that results in the loss of U.S. jobs. This argument prompted 38 Senators and 79 House members to sign a mid-1996 letter to Christopher requesting a removal of the restrictions.

Critics of the proposed policy change say the region's democracies are fragile and remain susceptible to a disproportionate amount of influence from their militaries. Many argue that in a region where one-half of the population lives in poverty, spending approximately $25 million per aircraft is unnecessary.

Another concern is that new U.S. sales could initiate an arms race and destabilize the present security environment. Argentina, a vocal opponent of Chile's impending acquisition, has repeatedly raised the specter of a new arms race. Only last November State Department deputy spokesman Glyn Davies expressed "concern" and "disappointment" over Peru's purchase of 12 Belarussian MiG-29s because it could provoke an arms race. Administration officials have not said whether new U.S. transfers of similar high-tech weaponry could have the same effect.

Most observers agree that the recent developments indicate an impending change in policy. Only very rarely will the U.S. government allow American firms to compete for a sale and then disapprove of it if the firm succeeds in winning the bid. Defense Secretary Cohen said April 15 that he expected a decision to be made within the next "month or two."

KEDO Reactor Project Moves Through Protocols Toward Implementation

Howard Diamond

FOLLOWING AN April 9-15 trip to North Korea by an "expertlevel" delegation, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) intends to begin sitepreparation work for the lightwater reactor (LWR) project at the Sinpo site in North Korea by late spring or early summer 1997.

KEDO is the international consortium formed to implement key elements of the 1994 U.S.North Korean agreed framework, under which Pyongyang has frozen its nuclear program in exchange for the construction of two LWRs and shipments of heavy fuel oil. North Korea has been receiving annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil while their nuclear complex in Yongbyon remains shut down under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. To date, more than 75 percent of the spent fuel from North Korea's plutoniumproducing, 5megawatt (electric) gasgraphite reactor has been packaged, or "canned," for shipment out of North Korea, as required by the agreed framework.

The expertlevel delegation, which included 54 representatives from the KEDO secretariat and the governments of the United States, Japan and South Korea, held talks with North Korea in Majon and in Sinpo. The talks focused on detailed implementation of the five preconstruction protocols that have been negotiated between KEDO and Pyongyang since completion of the December 1995 supply agreement.

The supply agreement established the scope and terms for KEDO to provide North Korea with the two LWRs, but required negotiation of five additional protocols before KEDO could start work in North Korea. The protocols concern the legal status of KEDO personnel, communications, transportation, control of the project site and contracting within North Korea. A KEDO official said the meetings focused on gaining shared understandings of how the protocols would be implemented "on the ground." According to the official, most issues have been worked out, but some technical details still remain. The group also established a new precedent, traveling to North Korea directly by ship from South Korea, rather than flying in from a third country.

Additionally, KEDO's seventh sight survey team at Sinpo is expected to complete its fivemonth investigation in August 1997. The team of about 30 scientists and engineers has been in North Korea since March 1, and is performing the final indepth geological investigations and surveys of the site boundaries.

Negotiations of an additional protocol dealing with the issue of nonpayment began in New York on March 18, and are expected to be concluded by the first week of May. The new protocol will clarify the means of redress available to KEDO in the event of failure by Pyongyang to repay the costs of the LWR project.

While the LWR project moves forward, it appears that KEDO will be completing the project with a new chief executive. Ambassador Stephen L. Bosworth, who has been KEDO's executive director since July 19, 1995, is reportedly the frontrunner to be appointed as the next U.S. ambassador to Seoul. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul has been without an ambassador since December 31, 1996, when Ambassador James T. Laney stepped down.

KEDO Reactor Project Moves Through Protocols Toward Implementation

In Memoriam: ACDA (1961-1997)


Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

As part of the price for Senate approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, President Clinton announced plans to abolish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and fold its functions into the State Department. Although it has received little public attention, ACDA's demise as an independent voice for arms control will impair national security by narrowing arms control options for presidential decisionmaking.

A subdued Clinton administration quietly claimed the abolition was a planned component of the program to "reinvent government." But the State Department, which had sought the elimination of ACDA from the beginning of the administration, proclaimed that its new acquisition will eliminate one of the vestiges of the Cold War, and allow arms control to be handled as an arm of foreign policy.

ACDA was created as an independent agency by President Kennedy 36 years ago, not to serve as an instrument in the Cold War but to provide future presidents with a source of arms control policy options as an alternative to the ongoing arms race. Kennedy and his advisors rejected the State Department as the location for the new organization because it would be dominated by a foreign service bureaucracy preoccupied with relations with client states. Similarly, the Defense Department was rejected because of its preoccupation with seeking security by building rather than limiting arms.

While ACDA's success has always been dependent on presidential interest in arms control, the new agency proved its worth as a component of the national security establishment in a succession of administrations. During the Johnson administration, ACDA's persistent efforts to negotiate the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) despite State Department opposition gave Johnson the opportunity to go forward with the treaty over objections by major allies. During the Nixon administration, a strong ACDA team working with Henry Kissinger negotiated the ABM Treaty and the SALT I agreement despite a less than enthusiastic Defense Department and an apathetic State Department. During the Carter administration, ACDA played the lead role in the president's ambitious arms control agenda, including the negotiation of the SALT II agreement.

The second half of ACDA's short life was less propitious. During the Reagan years, ACDA's leaders were as often opponents as advocates of arms control. When President Bush and Secretary of State Baker had to deal with the collapse of the Soviet Union, they demonstrated that a few senior State Department officials working with the president could quickly accomplish major steps by bypassing the bureaucracy, including ACDA. But the arms control agenda and implementation of past accomplishments has become too complex to be handled routinely in this topdown manner. During the first Clinton term, ACDA demonstrated its value by delivering a consensus agreement to the indefinite extension of the NPT and spearheading the successful completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty. The administration, however, treated ACDA shabbily by delaying appointments and permitting its frequent exclusion from interagency activities.

As the victim of an unfriendly takeover, ACDA will be in a poor position to bargain with the vastly larger institution that will absorb it. Nevertheless, an effort is being made to give arms control some measure of titular independence by allowing the responsible undersecretary to have access to the president through the secretary of state. If Congress approves, this may work with the present incumbents. However, such an unnatural bureaucratic arrangement cannot long endure. With its budget; personnel; and its legal, public and congressional relations in the hands of the State Department, the arms control function and its experienced practitioners will not fare well in the face of declining budgets, and the department's many other pressing responsibilities as well as concern for furthering the careers of foreign service officers.

In the coming year, the administration will be faced with many critical arms control policy issues, including Russian ratification of START II, negotiation of START III, defense of the ABM Treaty and Senate approval of the CTB Treaty. It remains to be seen how these difficult issues will be handled within a State Department consumed with the crusade to expand NATO and faced with extraordinarily difficult congressional relations.

In merging ACDA into the State Department, President Clinton has taken a major step without serious congressional or public debate. Thus, he must take responsibility to assure that ACDA's demise does not deprive him and his successors of independent arms control and national security recommendations which the State Department might judge to be in conflict with some tactical foreign policy objective. If the process fails to meet presidential needs, his successors will have to resurrect ACDA.

Summary of the Senate Resolution of Ratification

On April 24, the Senate approved a resolution of advice and consent to ratification (Senate Executive Resolution 75) of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by a vote of 74-26. The resolution contained 28 "conditions" for Senate approval of the treaty, agreed upon by CWC supporters and opponents, who also agreed to eliminate five "killer" conditions that would have prevented the president from formally ratifying the convention. Several presidential certifications were required by the resolution and were made (in an April 25 message to Congress) before the U.S. instrument of ratification was deposited with the UN secretary general. The text of these conditions, which is almost as long as the treaty itself, is summarized below with explanatory comments in italics.

On April 25, President Bill Clinton informed the secretary-general that the United States would become an original party to the convention by ratifying the treaty before its April 29 entry-into-force deadline (180 days after the 65th signatory deposited its instrument of ratification).

With these conditions, the Senate sought to reassert its constitutional role in the treaty-making process, influence the interpretation of various treaty provisions and provide advice on various policy issues. Numerous requirements were placed on the executive branch, including certifications to be made prior to the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification and periodically thereafter.

Condition 1: The Senate reserves the right to include reservations in its advice and consent to ratification, notwithstanding the explicit ban in Article XXII on reservations to the convention. Although this right was not exercised in the resolution of ratification, the Senate restates its constitutional right to do so in the future when considering amendments to the convention.

Condition 2: The executive branch is prohibited from providing any payment or assistance (including the transfer of inkind items) to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) without formal authorization and appropriation by Congress. This condition also mandates statutory authorization and appropriation for potential expenses such as the cost of challenge inspections should the treaty's Executive Council assess such a cost.

Despite this condition, under the convention, failure of the United States to meet its financial obligations would lead to the revocation of its right to vote in the organization after its arrears exceed the amount due in the preceding two years (Article VIII, Paragraph 8). Condition 20 (see below) seeks to address this issue, but does not appear to resolve it.

Condition 3: Requires establishment by the OPCW of an independent, internal oversight office by the end of 1997 to investigate and report on the activities of the OPCW and perform annual audits of the handling of classified information and the laboratories designated in the convention's verification annex (Part II, Paragraph 55). This condition mandates cooperation by the OPCW with the oversight office, and an annual evaluation of OPCW compliance with oversight office recommendations. If, after April 28, 1998, the president has not certified to Congress that such an office has been successfully created, 50 percent of the U.S. assessment for the OPCW budget will be withheld.

If this institutional change is not acceptable to the OPCW, the withheld U.S. assessment would eventually lead to the loss of the U.S. vote in the organization.

Condition 4: A costsharing arrangement with the OPCW will be required before the United States undertakes new research or development expenditures to improve CWC verification, and the president shall provide Congress with an annual report on cost sharing.

This reflects Senate concerns that the United States might have to assume the bulk of the cost for improving the verification system, but does not affect unilateral U.S. efforts to improve U.S. verification capabilities.

Condition 5: Before U.S. intelligence is provided to the OPCW, the president must certify to Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in consultation with the secretaries of state and defense, has established procedures to protect intelligence sources and methods. Periodic presidential reporting to appropriate congressional committees on the implementation of these measures is required. The DCI may ask for a waiver if he deems that providing certain information to the OPCW is vital to U.S. national security.

This condition addresses congressional concerns about safeguarding intelligence sources and methods in cases where the treaty requires disclosure of information to the OPCW for purposes of verification or inspection (Article IX, Paragraph 9).

Condition 6: Requires Senate advice and consent to any amendment to the CWC, in accordance with its constitutional treaty powers.

Condition 7: Requires presidential certification, prior to deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that the convention does not require the United States to weaken its national export controls, which are understood to be compatable with all the convention's provisions, including Article XI, Paragraph 2. The president is also required to certify that each member of the Australia Group (an informal forum of 30 states including the United States that have established common chemical and biological weapons export control measures) has informed the United States at the "highest diplomatic levels" of its understanding that its export control measures are compatible with the convention, including Article XI, Paragraph 2, and "its commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and nonproliferation measures against nonAustralia Group members." The president must also make an annual certification that the body "remains a viable mechanism" and that its effectiveness has not been undermined. In the event this certification cannot be made in the future, "the president shall consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a resolution of continued adherence to the convention, notwithstanding the fundamental change in circumstance."

Condition 8: Requires the president to submit to Congress within 180 days a classified review of U.S. policy on "negative security assurances" (assurances that it will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclearweapon states) in the event that such countries employ chemical or biological weapons against the United States, its allies or third parties. The study will include a determination of the appropriate response to such an attack in the absence of a U.S. retaliatory chemical weapons capability.

Condition 9: Requires the president to certify before the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, and annually thereafter, that the "legitimate commercial activities" of the U.S. chemical, biological and pharmaceutical industries are not being "significantly harmed" by convention limitations on access to and production of chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 in the treaty Annex On Chemicals.

Schedule 1 chemicals are advanced chemical weapon agents and their precursors and most are not relevant to "legitimate commercial activities."

Condition 10: Requires the executive branch to offer regular briefings at least four times per year to Senate and House committees to describe all compliance issues relating to the convention and a report on U.S. efforts to resolve them, particularly with reference to actions to be considered by the OPCW. In addition, the president must submit to the Senate and House both classified and unclassified annual reports on compliance on a countrybycountry basis and on steps the United States is taking to deal with any noncompliance issues.

Condition 11: Requires the secretary of defense to ensure that U.S. forces are effectively equipped, organized and trained to carry out military missions in chemically or biologically contaminated environments. It further mandates that the secretaries of defense and state begin talks with key allies and likely coalition partners to determine the necessary steps to ensure that allied and coalition forces, as well as critical civilian personnel, are equipped and prepared to operate in such environments. It also imposes detailed, annual reporting requirements on the administration regarding the progress of these negotiations and on past, current and planned chemical and biological weapons defense activities.

Condition 12: States that nothing in the convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the United States.

Condition 13: Requires the president to consult with the Senate and take specified enforcement actions¾both unilateral and multilateral¾should he determine that "persuasive information exists" that a stateparty is violating the convention so as to threaten U.S. national security interests. Should the state of noncompliance continue for more than one year, the president shall consult with the Senate about seeking a resolution of support for continued convention adherence.

Condition 14: Requires the U.S. government not to accept any effort by Russia to condition the deposit of its instrument of ratification on U.S. financial guarantees to pay for Russia's chemical weapons destruction obligations under the 1990 U.S.Soviet Bilateral Destruction Agreement or the CWC.

This condition does not affect current U.S. support for Russian destruction of chemical weapons or future support, provided such financial assistance is not linked by Russia as a precondition to its adherence to the convention.

Condition 15: Requires the president to certify to Congress, before deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that the United States will not contribute to the voluntary fund for defense assistance in Article X, and will not provide assistance to statesparties that are ineligible for certain types of U.S. assistance (for example, state sponsors of international terrorism as determined by the United States) other than the provision of medical antidotes and treatment.

This condition responds to the concern that the United States would be required to assist states (such as Iran and Cuba) with defensive equipment and capabilities that convention opponents argued would enhance their potential offensive chemical weapon capabilities, or that other countries would take advantage of this provision to assist such states in this manner.

Condition 16: Requires the president to notify Congress whenever he determines there is "persuasive evidence" that an OPCW employee has willfully disclosed confidential U.S. business information that resulted in financial harm to a U.S. entity. If the president is unable to certify to Congress that immunity from jurisdiction has been waived by the OPCW for any such individual, the United States shall withhold the disbursement of half of the U.S. annual contribution to the OPCW's regular budget until the president certifies that such immunity has been waived or that the situation has been resolved.

Condition 17: States the "Sense of the Senate" that the Senate should not approve in future treaties any article or provision that would prohibit the Senate from giving its advice and consent to ratification subject to amendment or reservation. It further states that U.S. negotiators should not agree to any such convention provision in the future, and that Senate approval of past treaties with similar provisions are not precedentsetting.

Condition 18: Requires the president to certify to the Senate, before the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that no samples collected in the United States (for example, soil samples obtained during an onsite inspection) will be "transferred for analysis" to any laboratory outside the United States. Such samples would have to be analyzed in U.S. laboratories.

Condition 19: Expresses the Senate's finding that the CWC would not have prevented the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo cult's sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway, and that in the future terrorists will view chemical weapons with increasing interest.

The condition fails to note that the CWC requires (Article VII) all parties to take steps, including national legislation, to prevent individuals under their jurisdiction from undertaking acts banned by the convention. Prior to the Tokyo attack there was no legislation permitting Japanese police action even though the Aum Shinrikyo cult was suspected of chemical weapon activity.

Condition 20: States the "Sense of the Senate" that the United States should not lose its vote in the OPCW if it is more than two years in arrears in its assessment as required by Article VIII, Section A, since voting is permitted in the OPCW despite financial payments owed, as long as such nonpayment "is due to conditions beyond the control of the member." The Senate's declared view is that U.S. nonpayment would fall under this exception, and the United States should be allowed to vote in the OPCW in the event that Congress does not appropriate the full amount of U.S. financial assessments for the OPCW, since the Congress is beyond the control of the executive branch.

By this condition, the Senate seeks to build a case against U.S. loss of its voting privileges as a consequence of several Senate conditions within the resolution of ratification that require dues to be withheld in certain circumstances.

Condition 21: States the "Sense of the Senate" that the OnSite Inspection Agency (OSIA) of the Department of Defense should provide assistance in advance of all routine and challenge inspections in the United States, with the consent of the owner or operator of the inspected facility.

Condition 22: This provision sets a $25 million financial cap on the regular annual U.S. contributions to the OPCW, adjustable for inflation at three year intervals notwithstanding the provisions on financing in Article VIII, Section A, Paragraph 7. This cap may be waived by a joint resolution of Congress if the president certifies in a statement to Congress that national security interests or the OPCW's ability to conduct challenge inspections are at stake. Costs of U.S. chemical weapons disposal are not included in this cap.

Condition 23: Requires presidential notification, with a subsequent report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, whenever additions to the treaty's list of scheduled chemicals are proposed. The report will detail the impact of the change on U.S. industry, including a costbenefit analysis and an assessment of the impact of the CWC verification process on the United States. The condition also requires the president to consult with Congress as to whether the United States should object to the proposed addition.

Condition 24: Reaffirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation that the "shared understanding" between the executive branch and the Senate remains binding and unalterable unless the convention is resubmitted to the Senate.

Beginning with its 1988 ratification of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Senate has included this as a condition, termed the "Biden Amendment," in all the subsequent arms control treaties it has ratified.

Condition 25: The Senate declares its intent to consider for approval all international agreements that obligate the United States to reduce or limit the armed forces or armaments in a militarily significant way pursuant only to the treaty powers set forth in the Constitution.

This condition has been attached to major arms control treaties in recent years to discourage the executive branch from using the option for amending the treaty by executive agreements approved by a majority of both the House and Senate.

Condition 26: Requires the president to certify to Congress that the United States is not restricted by the CWC in the use of riot control agents, including against combatants in a number of circumstances, including: (1) the conduct of peacetime military operations when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such as recent use of U.S. forces in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda); (2) consensual peacekeeping operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI of the UN Charter; and (3) peacekeeping operations when force is authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The language of this condition has been crafted in an attempt to avoid a direct conflict with the language of Article I, Paragraph 5, which states: "Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare." This is a gray area and some parties to the convention may question whether this condition is consistent with the convention.

Condition 27: Requires presidential certification prior to deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification that the United States is continuing to pursue alternative technologies for chemical weapons destruction, "in order to ensure that the U.S. has the safest, most effective and environmentally sound" method to meet its destruction obligations and that the deadline for destruction of chemical weapons, set by previous legislation for 2004, is superseded by the CWC deadline of April 29, 2007. This condition declares that the United States may change its destruction technology at any time, and that the president, after consultation with Congress, may request an extension from the Executive Council if additional time is needed for destruction utilizing alternative technologies.

Condition 28: Requires the president to certify to Congress that a criminal search warrant will be obtained for any U.S. facility subject to challenge inspection, if consent of the owner or operator has been withheld. For routine inspections of declared facilities where consent has been withheld, an administrative search warrant from a U.S. magistrate judge is required.

This responds to concerns that U.S. citizens and businesses might be subject to unreasonable searches and seizures by the OPCW, that would contravene their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

April 1997 Bibliography



Compiled by James Perez


Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. April 1997. Ph.(202)4637942.

Larson, Deborah Welch. Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.Soviet Relations During the Cold War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997, 329pp.

Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran, Eric Arnett, ed., Oxford University Press, 1997, 367pp.



"Arms Control and the Helsinki Summit: Issues and Obstacles in the Second Clinton Term," Arms Control Today, March 1997, pp.915. (An ACA Panel Discussion With Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Jack Mendelsohn, John Rhinelander and John Steinbruner.)

Chubin, Shahram. Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Persian Gulf Case, Occasional Paper 33, The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1997, 45pp. Ph.(202)2235956.

Diamond, Howard. "CD Ends First Session of 1997 Without Mandates for Negotiations," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.27.

In Praise of Weapons Control," The Economist, May 10, 1997, pp.1516.

Mandelbaum, Michael. "The PostCold War Settlement in Europe: A Triumph of Arms Control," Arms Control Today, March 1997, pp.38.

Mendelsohn, Jack. "Arms Control: The Unfinished Agenda," Current History, April 1997, pp.145150.

Mendelsohn, Jack and Craig Cerniello. "The Arms Control Agenda At the Helsinki Summit," Arms Control Today, March 1997, pp.1618.


Deen, Thalif. "USA Accuses Saddam of Stalling on Scud' Motors," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 19, 1997, p.5.



Dean, Jonathan. The Road Beyond START: How Far Should We Go? The Atlantic Council of the United States, March 1997, 26pp. Ph.(202)7784945.

Erlich, Jeff. "Obstacles Are Ahead For Nuke Reduction," Defense News, March 2430,1997, p.60.

Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr. "Helsinki: A Pyrrhic Victory?" Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.2.

Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. "It's Time to Break the Nuclear Monopoly," The Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 1997, p.18.

Mann, Paul. "Helsinki Summit Spurs Strategic Partnership," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 31, 1997, pp.2427.

"Military Can Meet Threat with 2,000 Nukes, But Not Less, Official Says," Inside the Air Force, March 28, 1997, p.12.

Richter, Paul. "U.S. Nuclear Cuts Could Increase Risk to Civilians, Expert Warns," The Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1997, p.9.


"Chinese Submarine to Test Missile Derivative," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 1997, p.15.

Donnelly, John. "China SLBM Can Target U.S. By 2007, Navy Intel Says," Defense Week, April 7, 1997, p.2.

"Russia Scraps 19 Nuclear Missiles," The Washington Times, April 2, 1997, p.A13.



Gerth, Jeff. "Officials Say China Illegally Sent U.S. Equipment to Military Plant," The New York Times, April 23, 1997, p.A1.

Mihollin, Gary. "China Cheats (What a Surprise!)" The New York Times, April 24, 1997, p.A35.



"Army Uses Russian Scuds to Test Patriot Missile Crews," The Boston Globe, May 1, 1997, p.23.

Dornheim, Michael A. "THAAD Second Source Unlikely, Army Says," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 24, 1997, p.33.

Erlanger, Steven. "White House Defends Missile Accord," The New York Times, March 25, 1997, p.A6.

Erlich, Jeff. "Quick Start Could Stop IsraeliU.S. Laser Effort," Defense News, May 511, 1997, p.1.

Erlich, Jeff. "U.S. To Stand by THAAD Despite Arrow II Success," Defense News, March 1723, 1997, p.30.

Evers, Stacey. "Contractors Join Up on National Missile Defence," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 26, 1997, p.6.

Hughes, David. "Next Arrow Test This Summer After Scoring Direct Hit," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 24, 1997, p.34.

Janssen Lok, Joris and Barbara Starr. "Japan to Test Ballistic Missile Defence System," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 2, 1997, p.8.

Lara, Belén. ATBM Systems and European Security, UNISCI Papers No.6. Madrid, 1997, 82pp. Ph. 34 1 394 29 24

"THAAD In Need of Major Restructuring," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 30, 1997, p.3.

Ruane, Michael E. "U.S. Looks to Lasers to Destroy Missiles," The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 8, 1997, p.1.

Starr, Barbara. "Extra $50m Is Needed to Fully Test U.S.Israeli Laser," Janes Defence Weekly, May 7, 1997, p.17.



Arkin, William M and Robert S. Norris. The Internet and the Bomb: A Research Guide to Policy and Information about Nuclear Weapons, NRDC, April 1997, 159pp. Ph.(202)2896868.

Diamond, Howard, "U.S. Investigating Computer Exports To Russian Nuclear Weapons Labs," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.25.

Gertz, Bill. "GOP Senator Hits Clinton Policy," The Washington Times, April 18, 1997, p.A8.

Gordon, Michael R. "Ukraine Decides Not to Supply Key Parts for Iranian Reactor," The New York Times, April 15, 1997, p.A12.

"Israel Reportedly Aided S. Africa With Narms," The Washington Times, April 23, 1997, p.A12.

Opall, Barbara. "White House Resists Tighter Rein on Supercomputer Sales," Defense News, April 28May 4,1997, p.4.

Preston, Thomas. "From Lambs to Lions':Nuclear Proliferation's Grand Reshuffling of Interstate Security Relationships," Cooperation and Conflict, March 1997, pp.79117.



"2 Arrested in Macedonia in Attempt to Sell Uranium," The Baltimore Sun, April 4, 1997, p.2.

PohlingBrown, Pamela. "The Plutonium Mountain: Preventing Diversion," Jane's Defence Contracts, April 1997, pp.57.

Shridhar, D. "India Needs FMCT Strategy," Defense News, March 1723, 1997, p.27.

Wald, Matthew L. "Danger From Uranium Waste Grows as Government Considers Its Fate," The New York Times, March 25, 1997, p.A14.

Woellert, Lorraine. "Nuclear Waste on Wake Island?" The Washington Times, April 14, p.A1.



"Government Plans a Pair Of Underground Blasts," The New York Times, April 5, 1997, p.A11.

Preserving the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Under the Comprehensive Test Ban, CBO Papers, May 1997, 77pp.

Vartabedian, Ralph. "Plan to Build Nuclear Weapons Facilities Is Illegal, Suit Says," The Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1997, p.B5.



Barner, Tim and Jonathan Dean. A Global Treaty For Reducing Conventional Arms and Armed Conflict, Task Force on Peace and Security, Union of Concerned Scientists, February 28, 1997, 27pp. Ph.(202)3320900.

Lelyveld, Michael S. "Bill Backed By Rights Groups Has Weapons Exporters Up In Arms," The Journal of Commerce, April 28, 1997, p.1.

"NATO Forces Destroy Missing' Weapons," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.12.

Priest, Dana. "Global AntiLand Mine Coalition Targets Past Producers," The Washington Post, April 18, 1997, p.A26.

"Upcoming Summit Could Put U.S. on Hot Seat Regarding Landmine Ban," Inside the Pentagon, April 3, 1997, p.17.

Walkling, Sarah. "NATO Presents Initial Proposal For Adaptation of CFE Treaty," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.24.

Walkling, Sarah. "111 States Consider Draft Treaty Banning AntiPersonnel Landmines," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.23.

Waller, Douglas. "How Washington Works¼Arms Deals," Time, April 14, 1997, p.48.



Dewar, Helen. "Senate Approves Chemical Arms Pact After Clinton Pledge," The Washington Post, April 25, 1997, p.A1.

Evers, Stacey. "U.S. Cities Will Be Aided Against Toxic Attack," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.6.

Hockstader, Lee. "Russia Refused to Ratify Chemical Weapons Ban," The Washington Post, April 26, 1997, p.A22.

Karniol, Robert. "China Supplied Iran With Decontamination Agent," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 30, 1997, p.17.

Landay, Jonathan S. "Iran May Pose First Test of ChemicalArms Ban," The Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 1997, p.3.

Lippman, Thomas W. and Peter Baker. "Bipartisanship, But at a Price," The Washington Post, April 25, 1997, p.A1.

Leklem, Erik J. "Majority Leader Emerges As Key To Fate of CWC in Senate," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.22.

Scarborough, Rowan. "China Helps Iran Develop Chemical Arms," The Washington Times, April 11, 1997, p.A1.

Shenon, Philip. "Weapons Expert Tells of Possible Iraqi Gas Attacks in Gulf War," The New York Times, April 25, 1997, p.A17.

Shenon, Philip. "Rights Group Suspects Yugolslav Army May Have Chemical Arms," The New York Times, March 28, 1997, p.A5.

Starr, Barbara. "CIA Admits Difficulties in Analysing Iraqi CW Sites," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 1997, p.4.




Averre, Derek. "Export Controls and the Global Market: The Southern Vector in Russia's Arms Exports," The Monitor, Winter 1997, pp.17. Ph.(706)5422985.

Brzezinski, Matthew. "SinoRussian Warmth Chills the West," The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 1997, p.10.

Cerniello, Craig. "GoreChernomyrdin Commission Expands Cooperative Measures," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.26.

Cold War International History Project Bulletin, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Winter 1996/1997, 422pp. Ph.(202)3572967.

Hockstader, Lee. "Russia, China Sign New Friendship Pact," The Washington Post, April 24, 1997, p.A27.

Yulish, Charles B. "Status of the U.S. and Russian Megatons to Megawatts' Program," The Monitor, Winter 1997, pp.1214. Ph.(706)5422985.


Buhayer, Constantine Tim. "Greeks Go On Alert Over Albania crisis," Jane's Intelligence Rev & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, May 1997, p.2.

Dobbs, Michael. "U.S.Russia Talks on NATO Charter Stall," The Washington Post, May 1, 1997, p.A21.

Dobbs, Michael. "Lobbying for NATO Spot Intensifies," The Washington Post, April 27, 1997, p.A26.

Friedman, Thomas L. "ByeBye NATO," The New York Times, April 14, 1997, p.A25.

Gilman, Benjamin A. "How to Expand NATO," The Washington Times, April 23, 1997, p.A17.

Graham, Bradley. "Clinton Naming Army Gen. Clark as Top NATO Commander," The Washington Post, March 31, 1997, p.A6.

Rosner, Jeremy D. "Nato Enlargement," Armed Forces Journal, April 1997, pp.810.

Schweid, Barry. "Russia Pushes for NATO Guarantees," The Washington Times, May 2, 1997, p.A17.

Sloan, Stanley R. NATO Enlargement and the Former European Neutrals, CRS, February 18, 1997, 6pp.


Arnett, Eric. "Iran Made Rocket Motor Test, Says Israeli General," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.4.

"Iraq Is Hiding Weapons, Inspector Says," The Baltimore Sun, April 25, 1997, p.22.

"Israel Claims That Syria Is Making VX Nerve Gas," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 7, 1997, p.6.

"Israel: Iran Could Build Nodong in Two Years," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 30, 1997, p.5.

Finnegan, Philip. "Saudis Study Missile Buy To Replace Aging Arsenal," Defense News, March 1723, 1997, p.3.

Lancaster, John. "U.S. Presses to Put More Arms in Gulf States' Bulging Arsenals," The Washington Post, April 4, 1997, p.A16.

Sayed, Abdulhay. "The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Force and the Middle East Peace Process," Security Dialogue, March 1997, pp.3148.

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Bedi, Rahul. "India Urged to Take Agni to its Logical Conclusion,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, May 7, 1997, p.5.

Briscoe, David. "China's Missile Capacity Is Growing, Pentagon Says," The Philaelphia Inquirer, Apri 10, 1997, p.18.

Browne, Andrew. "Defector's Scenario Sees Sea of Flames' for South," The Washington Times, April 23, 1997, p.A11.

Cooper, Kenneth J. "For India, Pakistan, Just Talking Is a Start," The Washington Post, March 27, 1997, p.A35.

Diamond, Howard. "The Korea Deal: Advantage U.S." The Washington Post, April 17, 1997, p.A23.

Faison, Seth. "Gingrich Warns China That U.S. Would Step In to Defend Taiwan," The New York Times, March 31, 1997, p.A1.

Gertz, Bill. "Beijing Creates Military Monster," The Washington Times, April 10, 1997, p.A1.

Gertz, Bill. "N. Korea Could Opt For War, U.S. Told," The Washington Times, April 24, 1997, p.A3.

Gilinsky, Victor and Henry Sokolski. "Korea: How Long Do We Live With Blackmail?" The Washington Post, March 27, 1997, p.A27.

Goshko, John M. "North Korea Again Balks at Resumption of Peace Talks," The Washington Post, April 21, 1997, p.A22.

Hoffman, David. "Border Pact Signed by Asia Powers," The Washington Post, April 25, 1997, p.A31.

Karniol, Robert. "F16s, Mirage 20005s, IDFs Boost Taiwan Force," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.15.

Opall, Barbara. "ASEAN Economic Strength Bolsters Security," Defense News, March 31April 6, 1997, p.6.

Sokolski, Henry. "Our OpenEnded' Deal With Korea," The Washington Post, April 24, 1997, p.A24.

Starr, Barbara. "China Could Overwhelm' Regional Missile Shield," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.16.

Sullivan, Kevin. "N. Korea Has AWeapons Defector Quoted as Saying," The Washington Post, April 23, 1997, p.A23.

Thornton, Thomas. "Easing India and Pakistan Toward the Table," The Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 1997, p.19.


Bailey Hutchison, Kay. "Policy Lag on Latin America," The Washington Times, April 20, 1997, p.B3.

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May, Michael A. "Arms Exclusion Divides Latin Allies," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, May 1997, p.14.

"Reckless Salesmanship on Arms," The New York Times, April 22, 1997, p.A22.

Sims, Calvin. "Latins See Dickering on Sale of Jets to Chile as End of U.S. Ban," The New York Times, April 7, 1997, p.A9.



Graham, Bradley. "Cohen Weighing Three Possible Courses for Shape of Future U.S. Military," The Washington Post, April 4, 1997, p.A4.

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Clinton Announces Reorganization Plan, ACDA To Lose Independent Status

Jack Mendelsohn

ON APRIL 18 the White House, through the vice president's office, announced that President Bill Clinton had approved a two-year reorganization plan for the nation's foreign affairs agencies. In the words of a White House fact sheet, the plan is designed to bring "an end to bureaucracies originally designed for the Cold War."

Specifically, the plan calls for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to be fully integrated into the State Department within one year, for the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) to be integrated over a two-year period, and for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to remain a distinct agency but under the "direct authority and foreign policy guidance" of the secretary of state. The overall reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies, of which ACDA's integration is only a small part, is to be undertaken by a group of eight task forces which will have approximately 60 days to complete their work.

The State Department had sought, since the beginning of the Clinton administration, to absorb ACDA, which was created in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy. Earlier efforts (in 199394) to eliminate the agency were rebuffed by a Democratic Congress. But a Republican-dominated Congress and the hostage-taking tactics of Senator Jesse Helms (RNC), who refused to take up the Chemical Weapons Convention until the adminstration had committed itself to reorganize the foreign affairs bureaucracy, resulted in the administration's April decision to disestablish ACDA and USIA.

The framework for ACDA's integration into the State Department was worked out in early 1997 between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and ACDA Director John Holum and ultimately approved by the president. Holum, who admitted that "the thought of being ACDA's last director is painful," claims that he was "totally convinced that the president's decision will materially strengthen the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament missions and the entire foreign affairs structure."

According to U.S. officials, the consolidation plan calls for ACDA and the current Political-Military Bureau in the Department of State to be combined and reorganized into two or three bureaus with responsibility for regional security (including arms transfers) and arms control and nonproliferation. All arms control responsibilities currently residing in other State Department bureaus (such as funding for some international agreements, which is handled in the International Organizations Bureau, and responsibility for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty negotiations, which is currently lodged in the European Bureau) are to be transferred to these new bureaus.

The new bureaus resulting from this merger will report to an undersecretary of state for international security, arms control and nonproliferation. The exact title for this undersecretary slot is yet to be determined, but the position is currently held by Lynn Davis, who is leaving the government in the near future. Holum is slated to assume the post on an acting basis pending confirmation.

According to the interagency agreement, the undersecretary of state in charge of the arms control function will have the right, unique in the executive branch, to communicate directly with the president through the secretary of state, to attend all National Security Council (NSC) and principals meetings on arms control and nonproliferation issues, and to voice his opinion on these issues separately from the secretary of state. The intent of this arrangement is to preserve an independent voice for arms control, but critics of the consolidation argue that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain for very long such a role for an undersecretary.

To support the arms control function within the State Department, a verification and compliance unit separate from the State Departments's Bureau of Intelligence and Research will be attached to the undersecretary's office. Other ACDA offices which are duplicative of existing bureaus in the State Department, such as public affairs, administration and congressional liaison, will be eliminated.

To protect the rights, responsibilities and authority of the new undersecretary for arms control, this reorganization will ultimately have to be spelled out either in legislation or in an executive order. But Congress has begun to discuss its own ideas for reorganization in the House International Relations Committee, with the introduction of "The Foreign Policy Reform Act," which is to be taken up by the full House in early June. It is unclear at this writing whether the administration's plan for ACDA integration will be preempted by a congressional reorganization bill.

Of major concern to supporters of arms control is the loss of an independent voice on this issue within the executive branch, as well as the fear that the potentially enhanced arms control function to be created within the State Department will inevitably fall victim to bureaucratic predation or indifference. Lurking in the background is the equally disturbing realization that any congressionally mandated consolidation is likely to downplay even further the role of arms control in the executive branch.

U.S., Russia Sign Amendments To CTR Program

The Department of Defense announced on April 23 that it had concluded four amendments to current agreements with Russia under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), or "NunnLugar," security assistance program. The amendments, which were signed in Moscow in early April, add a total of $214.3 million in funding for existing CTR activities in Russia $209.3 million in fiscal year (FY) 1997 CTR funds and $5 million in previously unobligated FY 1996 CTR funds.

The first amendment provides an additional $15 million in CTR funding to the Weapons Protection, Control and Accounting (WPC&A) Program. This raises the total amount of assistance to the WPC&A program, which seeks to enhance the security of Russian nuclear weapons while they are being transported and stored, to $116 million.

The second amendment increases funding for the construction of a fissile material storage facility at Mayak in Chelyabinsk from $84 million to $150 million. The Mayak facility will be capable of storing 50,000 containers of fissile material from approximately 12,500 dismantled nuclear weapons.

The third amendment increases CTR funding for chemical weapons (CW) destruction from $68 million to $136.5 million. Under this program, the United States is helping Russia develop a CW destruction process and assisting with the eventual construction of a CW destruction facility.

The final amendment increases CTR funding for the elimination of strategic offensive arms from $231 million to $295.8 million. This assistance facilitates the elimination of Russian strategic nuclear delivery systems in accordance with START I.

Iraqi Missile Parts Arrive in U.S. for Tests

Parts from about 130 destroyed Iraqi missiles were shipped to the United States on March 9 for analysis to determine if Iraqi missile destruction complies with the UN mandate that ended the Persian Gulf War.

The missiles, which Iraq said it destroyed in April 1991 without UN supervision, may have included operational Soviet rocket motors as required by UN Security Council Resolution 687. But the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with implementing the mandate, suspects that Iraq may have substituted worthless replicas. To verify Iraqi compliance, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, head of UNSCOM, insisted on exhuming the missile parts for analysis by an international team of experts. The parts were sent via Bahrain on March 8 to a U.S. Department of Defense laboratory in Huntsville, Alabama, after an agreement for their removal was reached in Baghdad between Ekeus and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minsiter Tariq Aziz. UNSCOM expects metallurgical tests to show whether the missile parts came from functional Soviet produced systems, and whether critical components that Iraq cannot produce domestically were removed before the missiles were destroyed.


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