Login/Logout

*
*  

"I find hope in the work of long-established groups such as the Arms Control Association...[and] I find hope in younger anti-nuclear activists and the movement around the world to formally ban the bomb."

– Vincent Intondi
Author, "African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement
July 1, 2020
Events

ATT Roundtable Discussion - September 30, 2009

Sections:

Body: 

On September 30, 2009, representatives from U.S. and foreign defense industries, the U.S. government, Congressional offices, and non-governmental organizations and think tanks were invited to discuss a potential Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The roundtable was organized by the Arms Control Association, the Center for Industry and Security (CITS) at the University of Georgia, Oxfam America, and Saferworld.

See attached document for meeting report.

Description: 

On September 30, 2009, representatives from U.S. and foreign defense industries, the U.S. government, Congressional offices, and non-governmental organizations and think tanks were invited to discuss a potential Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The New Nuclear Agenda: The Obama Administration and Arms Control

Sections:

Body: 

Remarks of Tom Z. Collina, Research Director
Confronting Global WMD Threats Conference sponsored by US Air Force, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Colonial Williamsburg
August 13-14, 2009


As the world's two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia must lead by example.
--President Barack Obama, Moscow, July 6, 2009


On behalf of the nonpartisan, independent Arms Control Association, I would like to commend the US Air Force, USAF Counterproliferation Center and Defense Threat Reduction Agency for hosting this important event and for inviting me to speak. It is an honor and privilege to be here.

I have no doubt that our next speaker Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller will do an excellent job describing the administration’s current positions on arms control. So as not to steal her thunder, I will try to give a different perspective and look further into the future as to where administration policy should go, and why.

But first, the present. On April 5 in Prague, President Obama delivered an electrifying speech on the future of nuclear weapons. In it, the president committed the United States to a bold new path on nuclear weapons and global security, including his now-famous pledge to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” President Obama made clear that he is seeking a nuclear-weapons free world not as an end in itself, but as a key part of a broader strategy to reduce the risk of nuclear war, contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear terrorism:

Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.

The president’s concern, widely shared by others, about a “nuclear tipping point” is fueled by recent events. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 (the first state ever to do so), conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, and continues to produce nuclear materials and test its missiles. Iran is also testing missiles, developing a nuclear power program and is enriching uranium, which could potentially be used in nuclear weapons. At a time of justified concern about climate change, the spread of nuclear power to additional nations, including states in the Middle East, is a key proliferation concern. North Korea in particular seems intent on sharing its nuclear-knowhow, with frightening implications for proliferation and terrorism. Militant groups have reportedly attempted attacks on nuclear sites in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the United States and Russia continue to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons on active alert, far in excess of any justifiable mission other than keeping rough parity with the other. This overblown posture perpetuates the myth that such large arsenals are necessary to ensure US and Russian security, when in fact the opposite is true. Both countries are vulnerable to the accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, to the loss of control of these weapons (as illustrated by the 2007 incident in which the Air Force mistakenly loaded nuclear weapons onto B52 bombers) and to nuclear materials falling into terrorists’ hands. Large nuclear arsenals are the root cause of these threats, not solutions to them.

The challenge now for the Obama administration is to strike a new balance between the often-competing priorities of deterrence and nonproliferation, such that the US nuclear force can be maintained at lower levels while at the same time fostering the international cooperation we need to meet today’s proliferation challenges. The need for a new approach is urgent, as nuclear dangers have been increasing just as US leadership was receding.

President Obama is now providing the new leadership we need. With his Prague speech, the July Moscow Summit, the G8 meeting in Italy and other efforts, the president has swiftly begun to reinvent US nuclear policy to address the threats we face today, and will likely face tomorrow. He has begun in earnest to refocusUS efforts on reducing Cold War arsenals and countering nuclear proliferation and terrorism by undertakingan integrated strategy:

1. Reestablishing US leadership on arms control. The Obama administration recognizes that proliferation is a global challenge that cannot be solved without US leadership and international support. The administration is seeking to earn that support by resuming talks with Russia on a binding, verifiable arms reduction agreement to replace START by the end of 2009. The President has also called for senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban the production of fissile materials for weapons. The president also declared, significantly, an ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. These important steps open the door for the US to resume its historic role as an effective leader on global efforts to stop the bomb’s spread.

2. Redefining the purpose of nuclear weapons. The administration’s arms control agenda must be supported by realistic missions for a reduced nuclear arsenal. If the United States were to adopt a policy that focuses the mission of nuclear weapons to preventing their use by others, then it could drastically reduce the nuclear inventory to a total of no more than 1,000 weapons of all types— strategic, tactical, deployed, and reserves. The ongoing Nuclear Posture Review must address this challenge and support the president’s goals.

3. Reinvesting in the Nonproliferation Treaty system. By making good on past arms control commitments and by working to improve the international inspections system, President Obama hopes to ensure a successful NPT review conference in 2010 and a stronger treaty thereafter. The president also plans to reenergize diplomatic efforts to restrain North Korea and Iran’s nuclear programs. The administration plans to work for stronger measures to address noncompliance and withdrawals from the treaty and to prevent civil power programs from being used as fronts for weapons activities, such as by placing greater restrictions on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Significantly, the president will chair a special meeting of the U.N. Security Council in September on nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament.

4. Strengthening programs to thwart nuclear terrorism. In addition to the NPT and the nuclear inspection system, there is a growing web of multilateral agreements to thwart terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons and material, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and others. President Obama announced in Prague a new international effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, break up black markets, intercept materials in transit, and use financial tool to disrupt illicit trade. To better coordinate and promote these efforts, the president also announced plans to host a Global Nuclear Security Summit in March 2010 in Washington, DC.

The Obama administration’s integrated strategy on nuclear security can be best understood as a target with concentric circles. The bull’s eye is securing nuclear materials and weapons that may be vulnerable to terrorists. The next circle out is the NPT regime, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. The outer circle is the US-Russian arms reduction process, which is essential to reducing and securing nuclear arsenals in their own right and to creating international support for the NPT regime and other efforts.

New START and Beyond

The first step in the Obama administration’s nuclear agenda is to rebuild the US-Russian arms control process. This July in Moscow Presidents Obama and Medvedev made history by “resetting” US-Russian relations after years of decline. In particular, the two presidents agreed to replace the START treaty to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

The START follow-on agreement, or “New START,” is by necessity a limited effort as it must be concluded by the time START expires on December 5. Modest as it may be, New START is an essential down-payment toward further verifiable reductions in each side’s bloated nuclear arsenals. As the two presidents outlined, the new agreement will create 25% lower limits on strategic delivery systems (from START limits of 1,600 to 1,100) and on the number of warheads that may be deployed on those systems (from SORT limits of 2,200 to 1,675).

Given the December deadline, this new treaty will not be able to deal with some of the most important and difficult issues, such as deeper strategic reductions, tactical weapons, missile defense, and verified dismantlement of retired warheads. Yet these issues must be tackled if President Obama hopes to make progress toward his goal of a nuclear-free world. The heavy lifting is still to come.

Therefore, U.S. and Russian leaders should not stop with New START, but should expeditiously begin to outline the next agreement—I’ll call it “New START II.” Even as they work to wrap up the current round of negotiations, the two sides should prepare the way for a new round of talks on deeper reductions in 2010.

In this next phase, the two sides should aim to:

1. Reduce their respective arsenals to 1,000 total warheads or fewer, with verified dismantlement of retired warheads and disposal of fissile materials, and

2. Agree on limitations to strategic missile defenses that will give the United States the option of deploying a system to counter missile threats from Iran or North Korea, but that would not undermine Russia's confidence in its nuclear deterrent.

Arsenal Reductions: As part of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review, the United States should focus the mission of nuclear weapons to deterring their use by others. If it does, then it could drastically reduce its nuclear inventory to a total of no more than 1,000 weapons of all types—strategic, tactical, deployed, and reserves (compared to over 5,000 such weapons today).

Such a reduced force and revised targeting strategy would be more than enough to leave no doubt that the United States retains the ability to retaliate against any nuclear-armed state in the event they would initiate a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies.

As for tactical weapons, some Russian military planners believe they are needed as an insurance policy against U.S. and NATO conventional forces, but the military value of these weapons is questionable. Not only is the chance of a direct conventional conflict between Russia and NATO remote, but the huge potential damage from tactical weapons makes their use inappropriate as a response to conventional attack. Hanging on to these weapons also perpetuates the risk that they may fall into the hands of terrorists.

It would be far better to retire these unnecessary weapons and have their dismantlement verified and their nuclear materials rendered unusable for military purposes. Verifiable dismantlement of all retired warheads and disposition of fissile materials would further reduce both sides’ capabilities to reconstitute a larger arsenal. U.S. leaders may be more likely to agree to verifiable dismantlement if Russia agrees to begin dismantling its outdated tactical arsenal.

To nudge Russia in this direction, NATO should be willing to consider giving up its tactical weapons as well. Bob Einhorn, State Department special advisor on nonproliferation and arms control, said in July that the need to reduce Russian tactical weapons "poses a question of whether the U.S., as an inducement to Russia to limit or consolidate its tactical weapons, should be prepared to reduce or eliminate the relatively small number of U.S. nuclear weapons that remain in Europe."

Missile Defense: Neither the US nor Russia should allow the missile defense issue to impede progress toward deeper nuclear reductions. The Obama administration has reasonably delayed work on a third missile interceptor site in Europe, but it is unlikely to rule out additional interceptors until it completes its ongoing review of U.S. missile defense policy. Suggestions that the administration has “traded” European missile defense for Russian agreement to New START are mistaken.

The reality is that there is nothing to trade. The U.S. interceptors for Europe have not been tested and are years away from possible deployment. There is time for Moscow and Washington to explore and develop truly cooperative approaches to counter Iran’s potential long-range missile threat and agree to limits on strategic missile defenses. If the US and Russia can work together to contain Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, then there would less need for a European deployment.

Beyond New START, it is unlikely that Russia will agree to significantly lower levels of nuclear arms in the face of the possibility of unlimited US missile defense deployments. The time has come to set priorities, and the Obama administration should prioritize arsenal reductions. The security value of arms control is proven; strategic missile defense is not.

Ending Nuclear Testing, Fissile Material Production

In addition to New START, an important part of the administration’s nonproliferation agenda is ratification of CTBT and negotiation of a FMCT. Significant progress on these agreements will greatly aid efforts to strengthen the NPT at the May 2010 review conference and will enhance global nonproliferation efforts in general. In the words of Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security:

We are not so naïve as to believe that problem states will end their proliferation programs if the United States and Russia reduce our nuclear arsenals. But we are confident that progress in this area will reinforce the central role of the NPT and help us build support to sanction or engage states on favorable terms to us. Our collective ability to bring the weight of international pressure against proliferators would be undermined by a lack of effort towards disarmament.

US Senate ratification of CTBT is more important than ever, given the need to reestablish US leadership on arms control, strengthen the NPT, and constrain the development of advanced nuclear weapons by other states. Meanwhile, the treaty is effectively verifiable and will not undermine the US deterrent force; the United States can maintain a reliable arsenal under a CTBT. According to the bipartisan 2009 Council of Foreign Relations Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy co-chaired by Bill Perry and Brent Scowcroft:

While a state could develop a first-generation Hiroshima-type nuclear bomb without nuclear testing, the CTBT would prevent a state from gaining guaranteed technical assurance through nuclear testing that advanced nuclear weapons would work reliably. The political benefit of the CTBT is that it has been strongly linked to the vitality of the nonproliferation regime. The Task Force believes that the benefits outweigh the costs and that the CTBT is in U.S. national security interests.

As important as it is, the CTBT ratification effort is in danger of getting lost in the noise. The administration is understandably focusing first on New START, given that START will expire in four months. Ratification of New START is not expected until next spring, hopefully before the May NPT conference. It may not be possible to mount a successful CTBT ratification effort before the NPT meeting, although the administration should still seek to do so. At a minimum CTBT ratification should be well underway with the prospect for a vote in summer 2010, and by no means should this vote be delayed until the fall. To achieve this goal the Obama administration needs to launch a high profile campaign for CTBT ratification soon.

FMCT is essential to capping global stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials, and thus is an important part of a broader effort to reduce those stockpiles and prevent their transfer to other states or terrorist groups. But it will take time to negotiate this treaty at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. In the meantime, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France should announce moratoria on the production of fissile materials for weapons and seek agreement from China, India, Pakistan, and Israel to do the same.

By the May NPT meeting, the US and Russia should make every effort to ratify New START and announce plans to quickly move on to talks on New START II. By then, a high prolife CTBT ratification campaign should be well underway in Washington and the nuclear weapon states could announce joint plans to deposit their instruments of ratification and seek entry-into-force of the treaty. It would also be useful for the nuclear weapons states to declare joint moratoria on fissile material production for weapons, call for a global halt, and announce a timeframe for completing FMCT negotiations at the CD.

The Road to Zero

The Obama administration’s nuclear agenda is ambitious. Achieving it will take time and will make the world safer in the near-term, and help us toward the long-term vision of a nuclear weapons-free world. Once we complete this first phase, the world will be in a better position to determine the next steps. The United States and Russia, for example, will at some point need to bring China, the United Kingdom and France into talks. We will need to talk with India, Pakistan and Israel. Many tough questions remain. The map we have to a nuclear weapons free world--incomplete as it may be--is good enough to start the journey.

Thank you.

Description: 

Remarks of Tom Z. Collina, Research Director. Confronting Global WMD Threats Conference sponsored by US Air Force, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

ACA Director Addresses STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium

Sections:

Body: 

What Are Nuclear Weapons For?
Reassessing and Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. Security Policy

Remarks of Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
for the First Annual Strategic Deterrence Symposium
U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
July 29, 2009


On behalf of the nonpartisan, independent Arms Control Association, I want to commend U.S. Strategic Command and General Chilton in particular for creating this forum for discussion and for inviting nongovernmental experts to participate.

It is important because a reexamination and adjustment of the role of nuclear weapons in United States national security strategy is long overdue.

Although the U.S.-Soviet superpower competition that gave rise to the development, testing, and deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear delivery systems ended nearly twenty years ago, many of the weapons and the policies developed to justify their possession and potential use persist.

U.S. nuclear weapons policy must be reoriented in order to help support and advance the comprehensive nuclear risk reduction agenda that has been outlined by President Barack Obama, which is urgently needed to address a wide range of proliferation challenges that are pushing the world close to a “nuclear tipping point.”

Current Roles and Missions are Anachronistic and Obsolete
Since the early 1960s, the primary military mission for U.S. nuclear weapons has been counterforce, that is, the attack of military, mostly nuclear, targets and the enemy’s leadership. The requirements for the counterforce mission perpetuate the most dangerous characteristics of nuclear forces, with weapons kept at high levels of alert, ready to launch upon warning of an enemy attack, and able to preemptively attack enemy forces.

U.S. nuclear weapons and the threat they might be used not only served to deter the Soviet Union and other Cold War adversaries from embarking on a course of action considered hostile or contrary to U.S. security interests, but they were also used to try to coerce Cold War era adversaries into taking more compliant diplomatic positions. In other words, U.S. policymakers viewed nuclear weapons as not only essential to a nuclear deterrence strategy but also a "compellence" strategy designed to coerce, or intimidate. Because policymakers and military planners considered the credibility and superiority of U.S. nuclear forces to be essential to these objectives, U.S. governments built up U.S. nuclear arsenals and delivery capabilities.

Unfortunately, even after two post-Cold War Nuclear Posture Reviews, the United States still has a nuclear force posture that calls for fewer operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons but still essentially retains the same basic roles and retains all of the essential characteristics it had during the Cold War. Current doctrine calls for:

  • a nuclear arsenal and readiness posture capable of delivering a devastating counterforce attack against Russia, China, and other potential regional nuclear-armed foes.
  • the possible use of nuclear weapons to defend U.S. forces and allies against massive conventional military attacks; and
  • the possible use of nuclear weapons to counter suspected chemical or biological weapons threats.

As a result the United States and Russia currently deploy more than 2,200 strategic warheads each on hundreds of strategic delivery systems. Many more strategic warheads are retained in reserve as a hedge against unspecified future security threats and the highly unlikely possibility of a catastrophic failure of one or more of the United States existing warhead types.

With the end of the Cold War and the development of new conventional technologies, the traditional purposes for U.S. nuclear weapons have become increasingly less relevant. It is also increasingly clear that yesterday's doctrines and the nuclear forces that derive from them make it more difficult to convince other states that nuclear weapons are a weapon of last resort that are not needed for their security.

However, justified U.S. fears of a bolt-from-the-blue Soviet nuclear attack once were, they no longer apply to our current world. Russia is seeking lower, verifiable ceilings on both deployed warheads and strategic delivery systems. Current and future U.S. conventional military power is more than sufficient to defeat any other conventional military aggressor.

Nor is there any conceivable circumstance that requires or could justify the use of U.S. nuclear weapons to deal with an unconventional chemical or biological weapons threat. As former Secretary of Defense William Perry said in April 1996 in reference to the suspected Libyan chemical weapons facility at Tarhunah, "[if] some nation were to attack the United States with chemical weapons … we could make a devastating response without the use of nuclear weapons.” Perry noted, "in every situation that I have seen so far, nuclear weapons would not be required for response."

U.S. nuclear doctrine should not treat nuclear weapons as a mere extension of the most powerful conventional forces. In the real world they are and must be treated separately. No U.S. President has seen fit to use nuclear weapons even in the midst of two protracted wars—Korea and Vietnam.

As General Colin Powell said in his 1995 autobiography: “No matter how small these nuclear payloads were, we would be crossing a threshold. Using nukes at this point would mark one of the most significant political decisions since Hiroshima.”

The Adverse Effects of Current U.S. Nuclear Force Posture
So long as the United States hangs on to these obsolete Cold War nuclear missions and counterforce strategy and implies the potential use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, chemical, and biological threats, U.S. nuclear weapons will be more of a liability than an asset in addressing today’s highest national security priority: which is preventing the use of nuclear weapons and their proliferation to terrorists and additional states. Why is this the case?

A nuclear U.S. nuclear arsenal of many thousands of weapons does nothing to deter terrorists from using a nuclear bomb should they acquire one. Even with advances in nuclear forensics, attribution challenges make the threat of use of nuclear weapons against states that might in some way assist or facilitate nuclear terrorism impractical and imprudent.

In fact, the more nuclear weapons there are in the world, the more difficult it is to maintain adequate nuclear weapons security standards. Over time there is low-probability, but high-consequence risk that terrorists will get their hands on one.

Without significant reductions in the role and number of U.S. (and Russian) nuclear weapons, and without U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, our ability to harness the international support necessary to prevent nuclear terrorism and prevent new nuclear weapon states will be greatly diminished.

Without these reductions and the test ban, many non-nuclear-weapon states will become less willing to agree to more effective IAEA safeguards, tighter constraints on the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies, tougher sanctions against violators, and improved interdiction efforts, among other steps.

There is another important reason for the United States to reduce its reliance and emphasis on nuclear weapons: so long as we do, other states with nuclear weapons—friends and foes alike— will or will be tempted to emphasize nuclear weapons into their own plans, policies, and practices, and seek to improve the capabilities and size of their nuclear forces and delivery systems. We should support measures, such as the CTBT, and pursue initiatives that would help prevent qualitative improvements in any nuclear arsenal—others or our own.

Quite simply, maintaining a large nuclear arsenal dedicated to perform a wide range of missions is unnecessary and contrary to the United States security interest. The number and role of U.S. nuclear weapons should be strictly limited to what is essential and unique.

Transforming U.S. Nuclear Policy: Moving to a "Core Nuclear Deterrence" Posture
In recent years, a growing number of national security experts and leaders, including President Barack Obama, have come to recognize the importance of dramatically changing the roles and missions of U.S. nuclear weapons in ways that:

  • minimize the salience and number of nuclear weapons;
  • advance concrete nuclear risk reduction steps consistent with the United States nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) disarmament obligations; and
  • reinforce our commitment to eventually achieve a world without of nuclear weapons.

We can and should limit the role of our nuclear weapons to a core deterrence mission: maintaining a sufficient, survivable nuclear force for the sole purpose of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by another country against the United States or its allies. With secure forces, deterring a nuclear strike requires far fewer nuclear warheads and delivery systems than the current counterforce-oriented nuclear arsenal.

Thus, if the United States were to adopt a policy that explicitly limits the purpose of nuclear weapons to preventing their use by others, then it could drastically reduce its nuclear inventory to a total of no more than 1,000 weapons of all types—strategic, non-strategic, deployed, and nondeployed—within the next few years. As outlined in a 2005 Arms Control Association report by Dr. Sidney Drell and Ambassador James Goodby, the United States could quickly downshift to a strategic triad of:

  • some 288 warheads on a fleet of three or more Trident submarines on patrol,
  • 100 warheads on 100 land-based Minuteman missiles, and
  • about two dozen nuclear-capable strategic bombers.

Comparable numbers of nondeployed warheads and delivery systems could serve as a "responsive" force.

Such a force and revised targeting strategy would be more than enough to leave no one in doubt that the United States retains the ability of devastating retaliation against any nuclear-armed state in the event they would initiate a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies.

If the United States were to adopt a core deterrence strategy, it could and should eliminate the requirement and plans for rapid launch in response to a nuclear attack. Instead, the United States should adopt a posture that is geared to giving the commander-in-chief far more time to consider his response to a nuclear attack or provocation. We should notify Russia of this policy and urge it to make similar changes in its policy and practices. This would significantly reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch. It is reckless that we remain dependent on the effectiveness of Russian command and control systems 24/7, 365 days a year.

With a core deterrence posture, U.S. policymakers would no longer make ambiguous statements regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons except in the event of the use of nuclear weapons by others. In other words, the U.S. officials should end the practice of stating that “all options are on the table” in response to lesser threats.

A core deterrence strategy would not require new types of nuclear warheads. To reinforce the United States commitment to reducing the role and missions of U.S. nuclear weapons, the United States should also declare that it will not develop or produce new design warheads or modified warheads for the purpose of creating new military capabilities.

Adoption of a core nuclear deterrence policy and deeper, verifiable U.S. and Russian nuclear force reductions would also open the way for President Obama to fulfill his goal of initiating "a high-level dialogue among all the declared nuclear-weapon states on how to...move toward meaningful reductions and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons."

A core deterrence approach would also reinforce existing U.S. negative security assurances vis-à-vis nonnuclear weapon states and support our positive security assurances to allies in the event of nuclear attack upon them.

Those who suggest that deep U.S. nuclear weapons reductions would lead certain U.S. allies to consider building their own nuclear arsenals exaggerate the role of “extended nuclear deterrence” today and ignore the risks and costs of going nuclear. Many factors beyond sheer numbers of nuclear weapons mitigate against a decision by a U.S. ally to go nuclear, not the least of which is the diplomatic and conventional military support the United States can and would provide.

Implications for Maintaining a Smaller Nuclear Stockpile
So long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will and can maintain its arsenal in a safe, secure, and reliable fashion. Contrary to the suggestions of some, the United States is NOT on the brink of losing the capability to maintain its nuclear weapons and political support for core stockpile stewardship activities is strong. In fact, the United States’ current capability to maintain its existing stockpile warheads is more than adequate and does not depend on a program of nuclear test explosions.

With sufficient multiyear funding the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal has been—and can continue to be—maintained and modernized through non-nuclear tests and evaluations, and as necessary, the replacement or remanufacture of key components to previous design specifications.

Since 1994, a rigorous certification process has determined each warhead type in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal to be safe and reliable. Life Extension Programs have successfully modernized major warhead types in the arsenal and stretched out their effective service life for decades to come.

Future year budget requests should focus the resources of the nuclear weapons laboratories and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) on core tasks, and the weapons labs must avoid unnecessary alterations to existing weapons through warhead life extension refurbishment. New evidence on the longevity of weapons plutonium has removed any urgency to engineer and manufacture new design replacement warheads.

A clear “no new nuclear weapons” policy, as outlined above, would help counter possible perceptions that an augmented stockpile stewardship program will lead to qualitative improvements in the military capabilities that could undermine a principle benefit of the CTBT to disarmament and the NPT, which is preventing the development of new and more deadly nuclear weapons.

Bottom Line
Yesterday’s nuclear doctrines and arsenals do not fit today’s realities. All of us here have a responsibility and duty help implement the steps necessary to dramatically reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons by shifting to a "core nuclear deterrence" posture," restore U.S. credibility on disarmament, maintain our enduring nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear test explosions, and open a conversation with the world's other nuclear-armed states on joint measures to reduce and eventually eliminate global stockpiles.

As President Obama said in a speech on Monday July 27, “… together, we must strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by renewing its basic bargain: countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament; countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them; and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. A balance of terror cannot hold. In the 21st century, a strong and global regime is the only basis for security from the world's deadliest weapons.”

Finally, as I advocate for a shrinking of our nuclear arsenal and the role of nuclear weapons in our military strategy, I want to express my respect and appreciation for those who serve the Strategic Forces Command. STRATCOM serves with dedication and distinction in carrying out the policy directions of civilian authority. If we are to succeed in moving to a safer world, your continuing high quality service will be critical.

Description: 

Remarks by ACA Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball at the First Annual Strategic Deterrence Symposium on July 29, 2009.

ACA Missile Defense Briefings - Powerpoint by Philip Coyle and Remarks by Greg Thielmann

Sections:

Body: 

The Arms Control Association Presents

Policy Briefing on Missile Defense

July 21, 2009

 

Ballistic missile defense has long been one of the most contentious issues in U.S.-Russian relations. At the July 6 Moscow Summit, the two sides found agreement on many START-related issues but continued to differ on missile defense. President Obama recently announced that a U.S. review of plans to build a missile defense system in Europe will be completed by the end of the summer. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue efforts to develop and deploy ballistic missiles. ACA will offer widely recognized experts to brief on the nature of the emerging missile threat, on the status of U.S. programs to counter that threat, and on the broader implications for U.S. national security.

When: Tuesday, July 21, 2009, 10:00am to 11:30am
Where: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Choate Room
1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC

Panelists:

Steven Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense and Nonproliferation, Congressional Research Service

Philip E. Coyle, III, Former Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense; Senior Advisor, World Security Institute

Greg Thielmann, Former Office Director, State Department Intelligence Bureau (INR); Former Senior Staff Member, Senate Intelligence Committee; Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association

Moderator: Tom Z. Collina, Research Director, Arms Control Association

 


 

For more information on missile defense, please download Greg Thielmann's Threat Assessment Briefing "Strategic Missile Defense: A Reality Check (PDF)

 


 

Policy Briefing on Missile Defense Implications
Greg Thielmann
Carnegie Endowment
July 21, 2009

My research project at ACA deals with assessing threats realistically and proposing appropriate policy responses.

Today I will be laying out my conclusion that:

  • Our strategic missile defense efforts have actually increased the military threats we face
  • The only way for strategic missile defenses to decrease the threat is to find cooperative solutions with Russia and China.

Let me suggest an insurance metaphor for the U.S. missile defense program.

  • With insurance, we regularly pay a known price to avoid the uncertain possibility of paying a much higher price for a catastrophic event.Long-range ballistic missile defense is a form of insurance or risk management, hedging against the risk of catastrophic losses from a nuclear missile attack on the United States.
  • Long-range ballistic missile defense is a form of insurance or risk management, hedging against the risk of catastrophic losses from a nuclear missile attack on the United States.
  • For more than twenty years, the U.S. has been buying missile defense insurance to mitigate this risk – paying a very high premium for very restricted coverage.
    • Steven Hildreth has described the two emerging offensive threats, which shape our current strategic missile defense efforts.
    • Phillip Coyle has described the kind of restricted coverage we currently enjoy.

I will describe real world impacts and policy implications.

  • I won’t dwell on the direct costs of these programs, except to note that sunk costs since the launch of SDI are well in excess of 100 billion dollars.

“Opportunity costs” is the term economists use for measuring the things we have to give up in deciding to pursue a certain action; we have given up a lot already.

  • I won’t try to list all of the historic opportunity costs, but I’ll mention a couple of programmatic costs, which affect the here and now.
    • The billions spent annually on strategic missile defenses are not available to help pay the costs of two ongoing wars.
    • Strategic missile defense detracts from national efforts to defend against more likely vectors of nuclear attack through our ports and across our land borders from non-state actors.
      • Groups like al-Qaida are not going to be launching ICBMs at the United States.

Let me explain how long-range ballistic missile defenses have actually increased the threats we face – threats from our most powerful potential adversaries and from hostile proliferant states.

First point: Strategic missile defense has worsened the threat from
Russia and China...


-- the only countries, which can jeopardize our survival as a nation:

  • At different times during the Cold War, each was the principal target of U.S. strategic missile defenses; and in each case we eventually decided that such defenses could not be effective.
  • Now neither nation is considered an enemy. During the last decade, it has been U.S. policy to deploy an effective missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack – not against the arsenals of Russia and China.
  • The problem is that we have not been able to figure out a way to build limited territorial defenses without causing Russia and China to worry that their own deterrent capabilities could be threatened.
    • So far, U.S. determination to deploy territorial missile defenses has at least twice prevented stabilizing agreements with Moscow on strategic offensive arms control.
      • As a consequence, Russia has ended up with more capable systems than it would otherwise have had in order to ensure that it could penetrate U.S. defenses.
    • U.S. missile defenses have also given Beijing strong incentives to improve the quality and quantity of China’s strategic forces.
      • China is today the only one of the five NPT nuclear weapons states that is increasing rather than decreasing the size of its nuclear missile force over the last decade.

Second point: Deployment of U.S. strategic missile defenses actually
encourages rogue state missile programs.

  • Missile defense proponents continue to argue the opposite case – that U.S. missile defense deployments will dissuade rogue nations from pursuing missiles and nuclear weapons.
  • There is no evidence that deployments of missile defenses discourage deployments of missile offenses – none.
    • We see instead the opposite dynamic between defenses and offenses:
      • Russian ABM deployment—U.S. MIRVing
      • Israeli Arrow ATBM deployment—Continuing expansion of Iranian missile program
      • Indian strategic defense program initiated—Continuing expansion of Pakistani nuclear/missile programs
      • Taiwan deployment of Patriot ATBM—Chinese augmentation of missile forces across the straits, now over 1,000.
  • You have heard Steven describe how vigorous North Korean and Iranian missile efforts have been, in spite of massive U.S. investments in missile defense during the last decade.

Clearly, missile defenses don’t dissuade the North Koreans and Iranians—but do they really encourage them?

  • I concede we don’t know for sure what the “Supreme Leader” or the “Dear Leader” are thinking. But consider my hypothesis, which is at least consistent with what we do know.
  • Both North Korea and Iran want to gain prestige and power from their missile and nuclear programs.
    • For the U.S. to act as if its nuclear deterrent is insufficient to deter Pyongyang and Tehran from launching missile attacks against the United States is to credit these small nuclear/missile programs with enormous power – beyond that of the Soviet Union in its heyday.
      • Hardliners in these countries can argue that their missiles have succeeded in spreading fear in the United States and its allies; they have made the enemies of Iran and North Korea cower.
        • They can claim vindication for their policies, arguing: “The massive U.S. missile defense effort is proof that our nuclear and missile programs are potent.”

Moreover, missile defense not only encourages proliferation; it facilitates it.

  • Instead of strengthening non-proliferation efforts, U.S. missile defenses and the proliferation of related technology to friendly governments outside the NPT weakens non-proliferation regimes like the MTCR.
    • Most ballistic missile defense technology cannot be distinguished from ballistic missile offense technology.
    • So transfers of U.S. missile defense technology to non-NPT signatories fosters missile proliferation:
      • The U.S. helps Israel build missile defense systems; Israel offers to sell Arrow ballistic missile interceptors and their associated Green Pine radar to India. (Neither state is a signatory to the NPT.) Non-proliferation norms are violated and other non-proliferation efforts become more difficult.

To return to my insurance metaphor, paying our premiums is actually contributing to the risks that we’re trying to insure against.

-- And the coverage provided by the U.S. strategic ballistic missile defense insurance has a long list of restrictions.

  • If you read the fine print, you realize that it may not cover multiple launches or warheads using simple decoys or chaff or night shots with cooled warheads, etc.
    • Consequently, the policy holder has no guarantee in a crisis that his insurance would prevent North Korean or Iranian nuclear missiles from landing in the United States.
  • The fine print also includes another disclaimer: the insurance policy doesn’t apply to the most likely nuclear threat the U.S. will face – from non-state terrorist groups.

I will leave you with the words of the distinguished scientist, Dr. Richard Garwin, who previously served the United States first as a designer of nuclear weapons and a designer of penetration aids to accompany them:

“Our best defense against states that might fire ICBMs against the United States is still the commitment to a massively destructive retaliatory strike against the military of the country. We should not weaken that deterrence in our enthusiasm to replace it with a system to destroy the warhead in flight.”

--Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Center
June 3, 2009



Description: 

Panelists: Steven Hildreth, Philip E. Coyle III, and Greg Thielmann

Subject Resources:

ACA Moscow Summit Press Conference Broadcast Live on C-Span 1

Sections:

Body: 

To watch a video of this event, please click here.

A transcript of this event can be downloaded below.

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director (202) 463-8270 x107; and
Greg Thielmann, Senior Fellow (202) 463-8270 x103

(Washington, D.C.): From July 6-8, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dimitry Medvedev will meet in Moscow. A top goal will be to evaluate and advance progress on the negotiation of a new agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which is due to expire on December 5. Talks on the follow-on agreement began in April.

At the end of the first day of the summit in Moscow, two leading U.S. experts on nuclear weapons policy and arms control will analyze the status of the START follow-on talks, review the key issues of contention (including missile defense), describe likely outcomes, and discuss the importance of further nuclear reductions.



TIME: Monday July 6 from 1:00pm-2:00pm EDT
LOCATION: 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Choate Room
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Building)

Morton Halperin is a senior advisor at the Open Society Institute and was a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which released its report in May. He also served in the Clinton, Nixon, and Johnson administrations working on nuclear policy and arms control.

Daryl G. Kimball
is executive director of the Association and publisher of ACA's journal Arms Control Today. He has written extensively on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation for twenty years and has led major public policy advocacy campaigns to reduce the threats posed by nuclear weapons.

For further information, see:

Description: 

(Washington, D.C.): From July 6-8, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dimitry Medvedev will meet in Moscow. A top goal will be to evaluate and advance progress on the negotiation of a new agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which is due to expire on December 5. Talks on the follow-on agreement began in April.

Country Resources:

TRANSCRIPT: Arms Control Association Annual Meeting - Morning Panel

Sections:

Body: 


ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

"ADVANCING U.S. NONPROLIFERATION
AND DISARMAMENT LEADERSHIP - MORNING PANEL"

WELCOME/MODERATOR:
DARYL KIMBALL,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

SPEAKERS:
THOMAS PICKERING,
FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO UNITED NATIONS

JOE CIRINCIONE,
PRESIDENT,
THE PLOUGHSHARES FUND

JOAN ROHLFING,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS,
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009



DARYL KIMBALL: All right, good morning, my friends. Welcome. If everyone could take a seat, find a seat, there is overflow space in the back. Please turn off you cell phones, put them on vibrate. So good morning, I'm Daryl Kimball, I'm the executive director of the Arms Control Association, and on behalf of the staff, the board of directors, I want to thank you all for being here. I want to welcome our members, our supporters, friends, associates, perhaps some of our enemies - but we all welcome you here this morning.

Let me just explain a little bit about what we're going to be doing through the course of the day - it's described in your program after this morning's panel discussion which I'll turn to in just a moment. We'll have our luncheon address, we'll hear from Gary Samore, special assistant to the president and Senior director for counter-proliferation policy. That will begin around noontime. We are full up for the lunch, so if you have not registered I don't think we've got additional space, but you can check with my assistant and the meeting organizer, Dan Arnaudo.

Following the luncheon, those of you who are Arms Control Association members and those of you who have the stamina for yet another session, you're welcome to join me, our board chairman John Steinbruner, other board members in the Butler Room, which is immediately behind this room in the rear on this floor, for our formal board election for a brief update and discussion on the association's program in finances in 2009 and going into 2010 - which are going to be two exciting years for us, and for all of us.

Now, our morning panel discussion this morning is titled "New Opportunities on Iran, Arms Control and Disarmament in U.S. Nuclear Policy" - a rather broad title, a rather vague title - but it will begin to take shape as you hear from our three excellent speakers. With every new presidential administration there are adjustments in our nation's foreign policies, but the administration of President Barack Obama promises to usher in a new, energetic and overdue period of renewed nonproliferation and disarmament diplomacy that I don't think was seen in decades. You can judge for yourself how many decades, but we haven't seen it in a long time.

In sum, arms control as a vital U.S. and global security tool is back. And as he, the president, outlined in his speech on April 5, in Prague, the president recognizes what many of you in this room, what the Arms Control Association and our community have been arguing for quite some time, which is that American leadership on nonproliferation disarmament and arms control is critical to building the necessary international support to repair and enforce the global nonproliferation system.

He put it very well: He said, and I quote, "As a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it." So as I'm sure you'll agree, that speech is a great start, but the hard work of building support for and implementing the plan of action that he outlined is still before us. There is a lot of work that we all need to engage in.

So our expert panel this morning is going to be discussing some of those future decisions and issues and opportunities. And to begin, we're going to hear from Ambassador Thomas Pickering about the diplomacy that's going to be necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. As we all know - or many of us might think - the previous administration's efforts, however well-intentioned, vis-à-vis Iran have simply not been working. The sanctions-focused policy did not succeed as Iran has continued to slowly build up its uranium enrichment capacity and string out the IAEA inspections.

In response to the situation, President Obama's secretary of state has promised to engage with Tehran's leaders in a dialogue to try to deal with the problem. Now what does the administration need to do to maximize the chances for success, and what pitfalls should be avoided? Those are some of the questions that Ambassador Pickering is here to share his thoughts about. He's got a long and distinguished bio. As you can see, he's got experience in the region. He is also the principal co-author of the April 2009 white paper by the Iran policy group of the American Foreign Policy Project - which I recommend to you; there are some copies of that outside.

Now, another issue that we're going to be talking about is the long list - the ambitious list - of arms control and disarmament initiatives that the president outlined in Prague, including a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia, ratification of the CTB here in the U.S., a new treaty on ending fissile production - all of which is designed to, in part, strengthen U.S. security and to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty as a whole, going into the 2010 Review Conference.

Joe Cirincione, who many of you know, who is the president of the Ploughshares Fund and leading expert in the field - he is going to describe and explain what he sees as the growing support for this agenda; what he sees as the new realism of arms control, which was the title of one of your blog posts; and what the Obama administration - and I hope Joe you'll say what our community needs to do to keep moving forward.

And then finally and perhaps most importantly Obama's pledge to put an end to Cold War thinking, and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and to urge others to do the same - promising words. I think the test of whether he accomplishes that will be known over the next few months as we see the outcome of the nuclear posture review which is due to be completed at years end.

And on that topic - Joan Rohlfing is going to address that topic. Joan is the senior vice president for programs and operations with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and she's got a great deal of experience on the Hill, in the executive branch, and, over the past few years, with Senator Nunn in the NGO community. So we're very glad you could be here with us, especially after yesterday's dramatic events - the meeting at the White House between the four statesmen, including Senator Nunn, with president Obama. So, with that I'm going to turn to Joe - I'm sorry, Ambassador Pickering, to begin. And after each of them speaks we'll take your questions and I'm sure we'll have a vigorous discussion. So, with that, Ambassador Pickering, the podium is yours.

AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING: Thank you very much, and thank you for the opportunity to come by and talk about a subject that's been on my mind for a long time. I'd like to begin with at least four simple confessions. One is, as a product of Washington, I am very much in the thrall of what I used to call the curse of the Congress: Everything has been said, but not everybody has said it yet. (Laughter.) So if you hear things that are familiar, you'll excuse me.

And, secondly, not only is this excellent paper in which Richard Parker played a tremendous role in putting together available, but over the last couple of years, with two other colleagues, Jim Walsh at MIT and Bill Luers in New York, we have written some thoughts about how to deal with Iran in the future on the nuclear question. And I certainly would commend that series to you because the latest paper by Richard I think brings it up to date and I hope answers a number of the continuing questions that have come up.

And then I would say, just finally, that there is an old French proverb, or at least question, that constantly assails us here in Washington: It's working okay in practice, but will it work in theory? (Laughter.) And so I'm going to try to stay away from that and continue in the line of what I think is the process and the product of good ideas. I'm going to talk very briefly about Iran as much as I can, a little bit about some ideas on dealing with the Iran nuclear program, and then talk a little bit without, I hope, tramping too hard on Joe's feet, a little about how Russia, in my view, fits into this and how, indeed, what I think Joe's going to talk about helps us with Russia to fit into this.

To begin, there are lots of experts on Iran, and I have had the opportunity to speak at length with a number of Americans and a number of Iranian experts on Iran, and one of the most startling things I found early on, particularly speaking with Iranians who would often appear in group sessions, that they would all start explaining Iran at that particular point in time, from the same copybook, and as they got into their discussions, each would diverge into different directions.

And so, at the end of the day you were left with a confusing welter of contrary information about Iranian internal politics. My view was that nobody really knows for sure, perhaps even the supreme leader, and that it is therefore a serious mistake to base one's policies highly or totally on an analysis of what you believe may be going on internally in Iran, as beguiling, as interesting, and maybe as logical as that might be.

That's difficult, obviously, for all of us who have been brought up on other systems of analysis and other ways of dealing with logic, but you could understand a little bit about the perspective on Iran if you were to put yourself, say, in a remote island in the Pacific and had to interpret American events from slow newspapers and vicarious television. Some of the same would certainly be the truth.

It is, therefore, I think, very difficult to rely on that, and one of the early advices that we offered freely to the new administration was that there is very little value to be gained in trying to pick the negotiators on the other side as much as you would like to, which is a kind of offshoot, if you could put it that way, from my central thesis about Iranian internal politics, that you really have to play, to use the Rumsfeld quotation in a different context, with the hand with which you're dealt rather than to try to change the way in which the hand slides the cards onto the table. It is quite a different set of activities.

I think the third thing that is important for us in looking at Iran is that, as terrible a tantrum-giver as Ahmadinejad is, he is both important politically in Iran and, in hierarchical and in government terms, a great deal less that his title would signify. And we do know and understand in fact that Iran has a supreme leader but it also has a collectivity or a non-collectivity of advisory functions that reach out in one way or another to the supreme leader, and that it remains difficult.

And then I think the final - if you call these home truths or market truths - is that Iran is a great society with its own language, with its own great history, and to go along with it, 2,500 years of bazaar - not bizarre, bazaar - and bazaar is what helps you to understand how you give and take in the marketplace. And to underestimate Iranian capacities for dealing with negotiations, perhaps in their own terms, is a serious mistake on our part.

So let me just take that mistake and begin the second part of my talk and say that with respect to that, there is, in my view, no real substitute in dealing with Iran in the current period to the notion that we have to become diplomatically engaged and that we have to do that without preconditions, because the preconditions are usually the show-stoppers, and people as experienced in bazaar trading as the Iranians know and understand, in fact, that they will not get very far toward their objectives, and that for many reasons that we could examine in greater difficulty, patience is a virtue which at the moment works on their side and not on ours.

But we have to counter, I think, with I would call offers and opportunities and recognize that it will still take some patience to move the question ahead. And indeed, I think that while in fact the meeting on Monday at the White House between the prime minister of Israel and the president of the United States indicated a time schedule which, I am convinced, from Iranian perspectives, is vastly optimistic, nevertheless, we are once again folded into the question of time schedules.

We do know that the history of Israeli analysis of the Iranian problem, not to put too fine a point on it, has been for the last six years, Iran has been only a year away from a nuclear weapon. At some point, obviously, like a stopped clock, that will be right. At the moment we have difficulties, obviously, in contending with that question. And I heard this morning on the radio that a group of experts - I don't know who they were, maybe some in this room - decided that we have a five-year window, which may or may not be optimistic at all. We have to wait and see. The DNI has continued to talk about the potential for something happening in the next five years without, I think, a great deal of certainty as to what the near term or the far term is.

I think, secondly, my colleagues and I, who have written on the subject, have quite strongly recommended that we at least offer to open conversations with Iran without those preconditions, and I believe the administration has made it clear that it is in that position. The other two things that we offered are not, in my view, totally appetizing, either to the arms control or the nonproliferation community, nor to the current leadership in that community in places of significant importance in making policy, including your speaker at lunch. But they involve a two-part related approach to Iran on the question of enrichment, which I still believe is important and I'll do my best to try to explain why.

The first part of that, the unappetizing part, is that we ought to think about laying on the table for the Iranians a multinational proposal for enrichment for their civil nuclear activities, but that we ought to couple that and make it inextricably linked with a proposal which also demands the most thorough and obviously complete inspection system we can devise to deal with Iran. My problem at the moment is not, frankly, that somehow the Iranians are incapable of understanding how to enrich with centrifuges, or even, in the long term, somehow genetically incapable of managing cascades, as much as we would like to think that that is something that works very much in our favor.

So if the problem is not that the Iranians can find a way to enrich and enrich to higher levels, and to do so perhaps with trial and error; our problem is basically, I think, either we find a way all over Iran to be sure, in fact, that they aren't doing this, or we in fact give up and accept the fact that they will move ahead to a weapon, certainly something that I'm not prepared to agree to.

I also think, in a kind of typical American diplomatic way, that we have a great deal more leverage with Iran in getting the inspection system we would like if we do a couple of things, and one of those couple of things is to in fact basically say we hear what you say and we're giving you everything you say you want, but we're creating the best firewall we can against everything we say we don't want.

And this obviously would mean putting forward the kind of proposal I have talked about, but filling in all the blanks and the details, not all of which have been filled in, in order, in fact, to make that both what I would call the most generous offer we could make to Iran in light of Iran's profession of non-interest in nuclear weapons but interest in civil nuclear activities on the one hand, and, secondly, in light of our deep concern that either directly or clandestinely they will move ahead.

We have a serious problem, obviously, of breakout. We have that problem under any circumstances, whether in fact we were to succeed in getting Iran to freeze or stop enrichment permanently, even with an effective inspection program, and there I think we have to come to some conclusion at some point in light of this as to whether breakout would produce a military reaction, increased sanctions, or indeed pure acquiescence on our part. But there is no easy way to avoid that, and the proposal I make has no easy answer to that question, nor does the administration proposal have an easy answer to the question.

The difficulty I have with the administration proposal is that freezing, or indeed a permanent commitment not to enrich, aside from the fact of being historically, in my view, unrealizable, but even if you set that aside, has no real quid pro quo for getting the kind of inspection system that you and I believe, I hope, that we need to have in place to prevent a clandestine reproduction of its enrichment capacity and obviously moving toward a weapon.

In any event, I'll leave that point there and say that the other question that I wish to raise, which will help me to segue a little bit toward the Russian piece, because I think the Russians are important here, has to do with the potential now for taking this construct, which we have postulated will have real relevance to Iran, and see whether in fact this construct couldn't be relevant to civil enrichment everywhere, all around the world. In fact, I think it could be.

I think it could be coupled with, as well, a serious effort to phase out reprocessing for civil purposes, which I think you will all understand the importance of. But in fact, if we were then, the United States, perhaps coupled with our friends in Moscow, to take the lead and to say there are two things that have to attach to enrichment for civil purposes which we have been slothful about and somewhat lackadaisical.

One, international involvement, so in fact we - if I could put it this way - de-nationalize the kind of jihadi notion that the Iranians have that this is the sum and substance of their total national being and represents for them the historical future as great people on this earth. And, secondly that we introduce in that process the transparency that ownership and operation on a multinational basis can bring. I'm not a great one for transferring a lot of extra technology under multinational ownership. We'll have to address that question, obviously, if it has any legs, as a proposal, but I think that part is important.

I also think that the inspection systems should be pretty much the same. They should be devoted to dealing with non-recognized non-nuclear powers - recognized non-nuclear powers - with what I have postulated is important with Iran: preventing clandestine replication and other methods to lead toward a breakout.

And the other side, for the weapons countries, because I would strongly propose that the recognized nuclear weapons countries also adopt this proposal, is that there would be a clear inspection system to prevent diversion into military programs, something that is already covered by the moratorium and I hope will be followed by the kind of rapid action that the president at least talks about on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

So I see this multilateral approach as having three purposes: one, to put on the table something that is generic that Iran in fact can be asked to comply with; secondly, putting on something that begins in a more serious way to close the loophole in the NPT for enrichment and reprocessing; and, thirdly, to be an initial down payment on taking the moratorium and moving it toward an FMCT, which is fully verified. So I think it has some significance as well.

We all know, in fact, that as this process goes ahead, we may well come, given Iranian attitudes toward negotiations, to a need for additional sanctions to encourage them to move toward what I consider to be a fair proposal on the table, were that proposal to eventuate. We also know that we need, at least in the U.N. context for multilateral sanctions, the Russians and the Chinese, and perhaps also to make a series of unilateral sanctions effective. How and in what way we go about this is difficult.

What has been, I think, important, is that over the last three or four months we have begun to see a change in the Russian-U.S. relationship. It is no longer a relationship, as it had been for the last six or eight years, characterized by a series of negative actions one against the other - ankle-kicking going forward to kicking each other at higher levels when the time came. And this has been, I think, the product of a lack of one simple question between the two of us: Where is it that the U.S. and Russia have a common national interest in working together, and how can we find a way to emphasize that as part and parcel of our going ahead?

Many people make fun of our relationship in the Clinton-Yeltsin period, but indeed it had at least some modicum of that kind of an approach, and having watched that first hand, I believe it did change attitudes on both sides and produced what I would call a mutual investment in some success in the areas that are of mutual interest on both sides. And we can take that back to the Soviet period. And, indeed, disarmament is the centerpiece of that, perhaps beginning with nuclear disarmament. Joe will discuss this in detail, but obviously addressing the START treaty and the talks that Rose and others are engaged in now in Moscow as we speak are the first down payments, we hope, in a process to move ahead.

It's my hope, and only my hope, that two things could begin to help enlist the Russians in dealing with Iran in a situation where they did not believe that the frustration of next American steps, however carefully conceived of on the sanctions side, was a key element of a successful Russian foreign policy. One of those is obviously the one that I've just mentioned, that we are putting on the table and we are actively engaging ourselves for the first time in a proposal that may have a chance of actually working.

And the second piece is that overall, the U.S.-Russian relationship, not just in the disarmament area but being carried forward in things like membership in the World Trade Organization, and serious discussions over the questions of how to deal with near abroads and other things can add a new quotient to that relationship, within which the proliferation piece can be discussed and seen on a much clearer basis as a win-win in our mutual interest.

And while it would be impossible, in my view, to secure a Russian prior commitment to support additional sanctions on Iran at any time, one could, I think, begin to lay out in common a plan of approach which after - in fact is expected by some - Iran were to frustrate talks on these issues against the backdrop of the kinds of thoughts and proposals I put on the table, we would get as much of a commitment as one can get by both Russia - and I think if Russia comes along, China will - and China, to take a serious look at how to, if I could put it this way, incentivize that process through sanctions.

In any event, those are my thoughts. I'd be delighted, when the time comes, to talk to you about questions and issues that you have. No proposal is sufficient unto itself unless it is tested in the marketplace, and I'm delighted to do that. And thank you very much.

(Applause.)

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you, Tom, for that comprehensive and masterful overview. Joe?

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much, Daryl, and thank you for your dedication and leadership, and thank you all, members of the Arms Control Association - oh, I forgot my check. I meant to renew my membership. I promise I will do it later today.

MR. KIMBALL: There's a form on every chair.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Oh, thank you very much.

MR. KIMBALL: We can get you one.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much. Can I have that glass of water, please? I'm delighted to be here. I'm delighted to see all of you. And I'm particularly honored that the chairman of the Ploughshares Fund board, Roger Hale, has joined us today, along with the inexhaustible executive director, Naila Bolus, so I have to be very careful of what I say here today. (Laughter.)

On April 5th Barack Obama gave the first full foreign policy speech of his presidency. It was devoted to nuclear policy and was one of the most comprehensive, progressive, and ambitious arms control and disarmament agendas ever detailed by a U.S. president. With this address, President Barack Obama began the transformation of U.S. nuclear policy. The question is, can he finish the job? I see four main obstacles.

First, the global economic crisis, which, if it worsens, threatens to swallow any transformational agenda, including on nuclear policy. Second, the nuclear Neanderthals, those with financial or ideological ties to the existing nuclear bureaucracy and posture. No matter how hard they beat the drums, however, this is a tribe in decline, clinging to tired doctrines and obsolete weapons.

Third is a more serious problem: the divisions within the administration itself. The tensions between the transformationalists, who share the president's vision of a world without nuclear weapons, and the incrementalists, who do not believe elimination possible or proliferation reversible will likely increase. Though all are good people, the half steps favored by the incrementalists will not give us full security.

Going slowly when we must go boldly risks the failure of the president's agenda. Still, with skill, presidential leadership, and the active participation of organizations like the Arms Control Association, I believe these divisions can be softened, coalitions forged, and the forces of reaction defeated. The last obstacle is cynicism. This is perhaps the most serious and deserves a bit more attention. Washington is the perfect place to talk about cynicism. You want to talk about sin, go to Vegas - (laughter) - vanity, L.A. - (laughter) - greed, where else, New York - (laughter).

But Washington - Washington is the capital of cynicism. It is here in all types and flavors. We have right cynicism that holds that nuclear disarmament is undesirable. The arrogance, insults and falsehoods of this tendency are on display most every week on the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. Moderate cynicism holds that nuclear disarmament is unachievable. That is the pose of many editors and journalists. It argues with vapid phrases, little knowledge, and nonsensical assertions that eliminating nuclear weapons is as futile as eliminating gunpowder. It is the pose of those who wish to appear worldly and wise with little actual effort.

We also have the left cynicism of those who believe disarmament is both desirable and achievable but who do not believe this president is up to the task. They disparage the appointments that are not good enough, the reports that do not go far enough, and a president who does not believe deeply enough. Overcoming this pervasive cynicism will be our greatest challenge, for it can sap the will of officials, filling them with a fear of appearing weak or foolish, and demoralize proponents, who will shrink from commitment to an apparently hopeless cause.

Cynicism is sometimes justified - this is Washington - but it should never substitute for research or reason. We cannot let attitude replace analysis. Obama understands this. In his Prague speech he says, "Such fatalism is our deadly adversary." He says, "There are those who hear talk of a world without nuclear weapons and doubt whether it's worth setting a goal that seems impossible to achieve."

And, speaking directly to our experience, he says, "I know that a call to arms can stir the souls of men and women more than a call to lay them down. That is why the voices of peace and progress must be raised together." I share this belief, not just ideologically, not just philosophically, but from a calm analysis of the political and historical trends now in motion. I see the arrows moving in our direction.

I see the threats increasing, having developed a fierce momentum over the past eight years, but also a growing consensus that the policies of the past administration have failed and they are joined with a new consensus that sees disarmament and nonproliferation as two sides of the same coin, and an historic shift of the center of America's security elite to a renewed embrace of disarmament and arms control, as demonstrated just yesterday by the White House visit of Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn. Indeed, arms control has become the new realism. There is a global sense of urgency that is fueling new efforts, new alliances, new progress. I don't have time for a full analysis here today, but let me provide two examples to demonstrate that.

Conservatives, who, just a few years ago, condemned treaties as the illusion of security, are now embracing agreements to reduce nuclear arms. Exhibit A is James Schlesinger, former Republican secretary of defense and energy, who just endorsed a new treaty with Russia. Quote, "The moment appears ripe for a renewal of arms control with Russia, and this bodes well for continued reductions in nuclear arsenals," said the U.S. Strategic Commission he co-chairs.

Schlesinger once led the charge against further reductions and helped frame the Bush administration's alternative approach. He wrote in his 2000 article, "The Demise of Arms Control," quote, "The necessary target for arms control is to constrain those who desire to acquire nuclear weapons. In this view, the threat comes from other states and a large, robust U.S. nuclear arsenal was needed to counter this proliferation."

But two weeks ago, Schlesinger switched. The commission, whose leadership he chairs with former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, reported to Congress that, quote, "The United States must seek additional cooperative measures of a political kind, including, for example, arms control and nonproliferation." Exhibit B is Brent Scowcroft, a perennial realist and a representative of a different wing of the Republican Party. He was never ideologically opposed to negotiated reductions with the Russians. However, in 1999 he opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Two weeks ago Brent Scowcroft also shifted. The Council on Foreign Relations task force he co-chaired with the ubiquitous Bill Perry recommended that the Senate ratify the nuclear test ban he once opposed. He also agreed that the U.S.-Russian relationship is ripe for a new formal arms control agreement, one that would reflect current defense needs and realities and would result in deeper reductions.

Charlie Curtis at the Nuclear Threat Initiative describes the effect of these shifts and other changes as the thawing of frozen seas. Each day we see new passages opening to Europe, Russia and Asia. Some routes, like those to North Korea, remain blocked. I don't want to overstate this. Secretary Schlesinger is still opposed to nuclear disarmament. Scowcroft still favors a large U.S. nuclear arsenal, but both, and many of their colleagues, have shifted significantly. While not endorsing Obama's ultimate goal, they support several of his preliminary steps. That is enough for now.

The key is to forge broad agreement on the immediate policies whose fulfillment can build confidence in the realism of nuclear disarmament and the logic of zero. If Obama holds firmly to his ultimate goal, it appears that prospects are improving for building this bipartisan consensus on the actions that can help realize his vision. I believe there is a reasonably good chance of achieving, in the next 12 months, a number of critical threat reduction agreements whose victories can unlock the broader strategic agenda.

These include a follow-on treaty to START, with a further lowering of the number of strategic nuclear weapons allowed under the SORT treaty; negotiations underway for a new treaty to limit total U.S. and Russian forces to 1,000 or fewer weapons each; U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; a new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review that will reduce the role of nuclear weapons and security policy and begin the transformation of nuclear forces to the 21st century threats; a successful 2010 NPT review conference that will increase the barriers to proliferation and revitalize the grand bargains.

Negotiations are well underway for a verifiable ban on the production of nuclear weapons material; the containment and possible rollback of the North Korea nuclear program; negotiations for the containment of the Iranian program with some tangible signs of progress; finally, an accelerated program for securing and eliminating, where possible, all loose nuclear materials and weapons propelled by an historic global summit here in Washington.

This will be real progress, making our world more secure, but tough problems will remain, most importantly Pakistan, which will remain the most dangerous country on earth for some time and the greatest threat to the United States, Israel and other nations.

The hard work will not be over. It will never be over. But I and the leaders of the Ploughshares Fund believe that, given adequate resources, unselfish collaboration and the skill and determination we know are present in the arms control and security organizations, we can, working with the administration and Congress, achieve these substantial victories in the next 12 months. We have no choice. We have to. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you very much, Joe. Joan, that's a hard act to follow, but I think you're up to it. Joan Rohlfing.

JOAN ROHLFING: Thank you, Daryl. It's a pleasure to be here today and to see so many familiar and friendly faces. It is a tough act to follow. It's always tough to go third, in part because some of the same lines I was planning to use have now been stolen. (Laughter.) But I too am going to talk about opportunities as well as challenges facing our community today and advancing the ambitious agenda outlined by President Obama, and in particular looking at the Nuclear Posture Review.

We do have a significant opportunity to reshape the very framework of United States nuclear weapons policy, posture and operations through the nuclear posture review in the coming year. As Joe mentioned, this is really kind of a strategic opportunity, not in a generation at least and, I would argue, probably not since the beginning of the nuclear age has there been so much political space to really fundamentally rethink our nuclear policy and posture.

With respect to the Nuclear Posture Review, what does it mean to get it right? I'm sure there are many definitions in this room of what we would call getting it right, and many different visions of what we would like to see coming out of that review. Let's talk about first why it matters. It matters because it will set the stage for the most important operational steps that President Obama must take during his administration to reduce the nuclear threat. It will lay the foundation for all of the key initiatives that he has already outlined as his administration's priorities in this arena; for example, the START follow-on treaty, CTBT, fissile material control - or cut-off treaty, excuse me, and also strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty.

And ultimately what comes out of this posture review is going to help reshape our global norms, practices and the legal context in which not just the United States but our allies and the rest of the world develop their own thinking and approaches to reducing the nuclear threat. So the stakes are high. The NPR really, really matters. And this president will probably have one shot at getting it right, certainly in the first term.

So what does it look like to get it right? Let me lay out six elements that I think are important to come out of the back end of this review. And this is not meant to be comprehensive, but I think these would be my six priorities.

The first is with respect to declaratory policy. Declaratory policy is essential for communicating the strategic purposes of our nuclear arsenal. There was a nice - I'd like to take a quote, actually, from the Perry-Schlesinger Commission. In the very beginning of their discussion about the nuclear posture they say - and this is fundamental - "The design of the nuclear posture must follow from an understanding of the strategic purposes it is intended to serve." This is pretty basic and fundamentally important.

"The Nuclear Posture Review, in my view, should support a declaratory policy that meets the president's objective of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy." Those were his words from the Prague speech. "Such a policy should make clear that nuclear weapons have no military war-fighting purpose, but for as long as they remain in our arsenal, they will be used only to deter."

Declaratory policy is also important for its implications for targeting policy, and ultimately for the number of weapons that the U.S. judges it needs to fulfill this basic mission. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission goes on to define a very broad definition of what it takes to deter. There's a lot of room for debate here and it's not necessarily a helpful debate, in my judgment.

Among other things, the commission report notes that it's important to be able to provide assurance to our allies, dissuasion of potential competitors, strategic equivalency with Russia, the maintenance of calculated ambiguity with respect to our use policy, and even to provide for damage limitation capacity.

I would submit that such a broad definition of deterrence in fact does not advance the ball at all. It's an old definition of deterrence and it gets us to maintaining the same numbers and the same type of posture that we've lived with for the past many decades. In my view, to be consistent with the president's vision and to really reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, we need a tighter definition of deterrence, one that would say something like this, that nuclear weapons are legitimate for only one purpose: deterring their use.

We also ought to seriously be examining, throughout this posture review, the option of a no-first-use policy. This would obviously require careful allied diplomacy before going there. But I do think it's something that the review ought to look at. So that's the first element: declaratory policy.

The second element that an NPR should include, it ought to look at the operational status of our forces. We ought to look at, how can we work to create a global norm against launch-ready nuclear forces? In order to create such a global norm, we ourselves would first have to adopt such a posture. We ought to seriously examine how we might go about taking forces off of their launch-ready or high-alert status.

The third element: I think the review must obviously look at how many weapons do we need, must examine the numbers. It needs to provide a basis for a deep reduction in numbers. This may require some clarification that strategic parity with Russia, or for that matter any state, is not necessary. The fourth element, the review ought to clarify that there are no new military requirements that might lead to the need for a new nuclear weapon type. There's a linkage here obviously to a need for testing, and in order to support the president's objective of ratifying a comprehensive test ban, I think having an unequivocal statement about our military requirements vis-à-vis new weapon types would be important.

That having been said, I do think it's important that we understand that for as long as we maintain weapons in our arsenal, they will need to be maintained in a safe, secure and reliable manner, and it is important for us - it will be required to make prudent and reasonable investments in the nuclear science, engineering and production base necessary to maintain those weapons.

The next element - and I've lost track of where I am; I think it's five - is to provide a strategic basis for the withdrawal of forward-deployed weapons in Europe. Again, this would also need to be managed very carefully from a diplomatic standpoint and should only happen after a consultative process with our allies, but I think the groundwork for this with respect to U.S. requirements must be laid in the Nuclear Posture Review itself.

And the sixth element has to do with the role of ballistic missile defense. It needs to be examined as a strategic component of our nuclear arsenal and our strategic requirements, and we ought to - I would hope that coming out of this review there would be an affirmation of the importance of cooperating, not just with allies but also with the Russians on ballistic missile defense.

In other words, coming out of this posture review, there needs to be very clear and unambiguous signals that the U.S. is serious about the vision and the steps outlined by President Obama in meeting its NPT Article VI obligation. The good news is that we have an opportunity to do just that. Prague gives us an excellent framework, the Prague speech, and that speech, together with other statements already made by President Obama, provide the necessary frame in which these kinds of elements can be driven out of a review.

But is the speech, in and of itself, a sufficient scoping document? I would submit it is not. It's going to be essential that there be a guiding document coming out of the National Security Council in order to really drive this process from a presidential standpoint. And I'll say just another word on that in a moment.

So what are the challenges to getting there? And there are some very serious challenges. And let me just talk briefly about three. Number one is the bureaucracy, and some of this overlaps with what Joe said. Number two are the people we need. Number three is the process that needs to be established. And I'll say a further word about each of those.

It's clear that the bureaucracy - our governmental bureaucracy, the pieces that connect to this issue, have vested interests in the status quo. Within the last two weeks we saw, I think, an unfortunate statement by the commander of Strategic Command, where he mentioned that the president ought to keep all options, including the nuclear option, on the table in response to a cyber attack.

It's clear that there are people who still think very differently about the possible use of a nuclear weapon and the role and purpose of nuclear weapons. We have the DOE nuclear weapons complex and the laboratories. They clearly have a vested interest in continuing to work on new weapon types and not just to maintain the old weapon types.

This is one of the biggest challenges I think this new administration is going to face is getting it right, making sure we have the right balance, that we're making appropriate investments in that infrastructure, but not keeping our father's Oldsmobile around, if that's even possible these days. (Laughter.)

Let's talk about people. We need staff in key positions and staff that personally support the president's stated agenda. A number of positions, as this community knows, have been slow to fill, and many of the key staff - I mean, I look at the folks in this audience and all of us who have been working on this issue for decades, we've come up through the Cold War paradigm. Shifting to a new way of thinking is not easy. It's going to take vision, it's going to take leadership, and it's going to take people with vision and leadership in the right positions.

And on the third challenge, that of process, this is perhaps the most fundamental point: The process of the Nuclear Posture Review must be driven by the president and his staff. There must be a presidential - or should be a presidential study directive that lays out both the policy parameters and clearly articulates the options that the president would like to have examined.

This should not be left solely to the Department of Defense. There are some very good people at the Department of Defense, but again, because of the bureaucratic inertia, it's not clear that a process that is exclusively DOD driven will end up in the right place, even if they have people from other agencies at the working level plugged into their working groups, which I know they do. But in the end, these are the president's weapons and it's going to take presidential leadership for him to move this forward, and it's going to take a centrally managed process, through the NSC, to make this happen.

Do we have all of these ingredients today? Not clear to me, and it's not clear to me - not for want of trying to figure out the answers to that but, you know, I fear that we don't quite have all of the right elements in place, so we need to, as a community, pay close attention to this and encourage our colleagues and the senior officials in the White House to do what I would call the right thing, to come out of the back end of this where we need to be to support the president's vision. I will conclude with that. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you very much to all of our speakers. You have served up a very full plate of ideas and suggestions. It is now your turn, and we will let the people in the overflow room have a chance too to ask your questions. This is our discussion time.

There are two handsome, good analysts here from the Arms Control Association who will bring you a microphone. Please state your name and your question, and who you would like to try to answer it. So why don't we start over there with Howard, I believe.

Q: Howard Morland. If Iran does indeed aspire to a nuclear arsenal, I would assume that the existence of Israel's nuclear arsenal is a factor in their thinking. What impact would it have on the conflict between Iran and the West if Israel did not have nuclear weapons?

AMB. PICKERING: I think that your conclusion is kind of hard to controvert. I also think that Pakistani weapons play a role. So I think that de-nuclearizing Israel, if it was conceivable, as a single, isolated act at the stroke of some kind of pen, would not in the long run make a difference.

Many have analyzed reasons why Iran would like to have a nuclear weapon. Some of them relate to threats in the region. Some of them relate to feelings about their inevitable important role in the Middle East. Some of them relate to the fact that unfortunately now all of the big powers who are now represented in the Security Council have nuclear weapons, and some of the aspirants seem to be there or headed in that direction. So my feeling is, yeah, but not conclusively so.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Can I just add to that briefly?

MR. KIMBALL: Sure. Joe?

MR. CIRINCIONE: There is a new report out from the East-West Institute. You may have seen a mention of it in the Washington Post yesterday. The Ploughshares fund was pleased to support that report. It was a team effort done by U.S. and Russian experts over the course of the last year that concluded that Iran is indeed capable of building a nuclear weapon within approximately one or two years but it would take another five years or so to fashion that weapon into a deliverable warhead, and during that time they'd have to develop a long-range weapon that could actually hit Israel. They're some time away from that.

They also noted an often-overlooked fact that of course such an attack would be suicidal. People tend to forget about the role of deterrence in nuclear weapons. It is alive and well and it affects Israel just as it affected most nuclear powers during the nuclear age. I encourage you to go to the East-West Institute Web site and download that report. It's the best, most thorough independent analysis I've seen. And Ted Postol, one of the authors of the report, along with Richard Garwin and Phil Coyle and others, was going to be at the AAAS tomorrow, giving a talk on the Iranian and North-Korean ballistic missile capabilities, based in part on the work he did on that report.

MR. KIMBALL: All right, why don't we go up here? Peter, if you'd bring it up - I'm sorry, Paul. Yes.

Q: Herbert Levin (sp). I wanted to ask you to go back to the American domestic side. Is there a thought of we need to revive ACDA? We've seen, just since President Obama came in, that if you need money or acquiescence from the House, you're not going to get assistance from the House Republicans, and in the last couple of days we have seen, and not to our surprise, that the senators all have their own interests on everything from gun control to the environment.

Which committees are going to take this - Foreign Relations, Defense, Energy? We've had a lot of these wonderful schemes and we've been convinced of them and then they've died in the Congress, going back to the League of Nations. So tell us where is your support to carry these things forward in the Congress, or are we just talking about what's true and beautiful and good?

(Laughter.)

MR. KIMBALL: All right, Joe, Joan perhaps?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me start. Did I detect a trace of cynicism - (laughter) - in that remark? Quickly, ACDA never should have been dismantled. This was a serious mistake on the part of the Clinton administration and part of an ill-considered compromise with Jesse Helms.

The purpose, of course, was to not only destroy the mechanism, but when they appointed John Bolton to sow the SALT on the earth so that it would never rise again. Wrong. Arms control is back. The State Department is back. It's got some of the most dynamic and powerful leadership I have ever seen assembled at the State Department.

And might I point out it's an all-female power team - (laughter) - ranging from Secretary Hillary Clinton, to soon-to-be Undersecretary Ellen Tauscher, to our chief negotiator, Rose Gottemoeller, to our NPT representative, Susan Burk, to our director of policy planning, Anne-Marie Slaughter.

This is a powerful, thoughtful, intelligent team. I think they can do the job. In fact, I actually believe the State Department will likely emerge as the lead on this set of issues. I actually don't see a team at the other agencies or departments that can actually withstand the combined talents of what's being put together at the State Department. But they need help, and Rose Gottemoeller has talked publicly about the need to recruit the best and brightest. One of the counters to cynicism is youth, people who haven't quite yet experienced it. We experience that in our lives when we have children. Well, now it's time to put those children to work. (Laughter.)

So there is a rebuilding process underway at the State Department that I think shows great, great promise and support across the agencies, including from the secretary of defense, who argues passionately about the need to increase our donations, our funding for - sorry, Ploughshares Fund - include our funding for diplomacy, and even if that means taking some from the military side of the budget.

Q: What about the Congress?

MR. KIMBALL: Joan, the Congress.

AMB. PICKERING: I can answer that.

MR. KIMBALL: Joan, try the Congress. Let's have Joan.

MS. ROHLFING: Fine, leave the hard question for me. (Laughter.) All joking aside, though, I think, you know, as with the agencies, we've also seen, over the last decade or so, that we've lost a lot of capacity in the Congress in terms of not only the staff expertise on these issues, but also member expertise and attention to these issues.

And so there's got to be a process of rebuilding, but I think the events of the day - I mean, the fact that the administration has made nonproliferation and disarmament a priority will, of necessity, get members to refocus on this issue, and we already see some signs that the Congress itself is beginning to figure out that they need to create some mechanisms for focusing on these issues.

They've reenergized something called the nuclear - excuse me, the National Security Working Group on the Senate side. And so we - you know, we hope that we'll see some renewed energy, renewed attention, and some new policies coming a result of that. I did just also want to echo the importance of building capacity, not just in the agencies but across the board. We need to work as a community to bring younger people into this community. As I look out at the sea of faces in this room, I see only a few people who are below the age of 30, so this is something we need to tackle on a class action basis.

MR. : Does that include you too, Joan?

(Laughter.)

MS. ROHLFING: Definitely not.

AMB. PICKERING: Daryl -

MR. KIMBALL: Tom?

AMB. PICKERING: - could I mention just a few pieces that I think Herb's question raises? I'm not sure that executive branch organizational tinkering makes a huge difference on the Hill. What makes a difference on the Hill is what Joe and Joan have described, a commitment at very senior levels in the executive branch to get the job done.

I have had a feeling for a long period of time, since I started in ACDA at the day of its birth, that there is an important role to be filled by an organization like ACDA, which is a unique way to catalyze the people in this room around a particular objective to fund, where we need it, R&D and other kinds of activities, and obviously to help to bring together the interagency.

I'm not sure that it necessarily has to be stand-alone if you have got a Secretary of State and a State Department that's willing - as it appears to me now - to get behind this. But I've always favored where you had programmatic activities, particularly in AID and in public diplomacy, to use a Defense Department model, which is to create within the State Department a kind of stand-alone agency that can bring together more of the resources and much of the synergy and a lot of the program direction and program management experience, which doesn't exist normally in the State Department, to that end.

And that couples two things: one, a committed secretary and a committed department behind the budgetary aspects, and the synergies and indeed the R&D capacity, if it's necessary, and other kinds of programmatic activities, if they are necessary, to come out of the process.

I have a question mark over whether that kind of a future approach to arms control in the State Department is necessary, only because I'm not sure that all those needs have not yet been successfully met. I do think, however, that Congresswoman Tauscher will have that capacity, either virtually or if she wishes to proceed in a more formal way, perhaps organizationally, to make that happen if that seemed to be necessary.

I think the cluster of bureaus that in fact resulted from ACDA in a marriage with OPM is pretty good, but I don't know yet whether in fact the programmatic requirements and a significant budget for R&D are requirements that in the future need to be provided by somebody. In my view, they ought to be provided by an agency in State if that's the case.

MR. KIMBALL: And just quickly, I mean, a final thought on Congress and what this community needs to do. I mean, I think Joan is right that, you know, we have - there are gaps that have developed over time in terms of the staff expertise, the member expertise on these issues over time, the same kinds of problems that we have in the executive branch that need to be filled with good people.

So, I mean, when I said in my introduction there's a lot of hard work ahead of us, I mean, part of that hard work is explaining to folks - I mean, it's kind of remarkable - what was the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty? It is explaining to reporters, and reporters are smart people but they've got a lot of things on their minds, okay? What are these issues about, et cetera, et cetera. So, I mean, this is a challenge not just for the executive branch and the leadership, but it's a challenge for the nongovernmental and academic communities, who need to fill in this gap in public and expert knowledge that has crept in.

We have several more hands up. We're going to go over to this side of the room here, in the middle - Cole (sp) - and then we're going to take one from the back in the next round, so be prepared.

Q: Good morning. Paul Hughes, U.S. Institute of Peace. A lot of the discussions that we have heard today revolve around the United States dealing with state issues relative to Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, notably lacking China. But my question is really about nuclear terrorism, the non-state perspective on this, and your thoughts on how the United States government should prepare or deal with this particular issue.

One of the buzzwords we hear today is whole-of-government efforts, and I'd be interested in your perspectives on what obstacles and opportunities might present themselves with that. And I would also like to see where you would think the National Security Labs would fit into that whole of government solution.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me just tee this up for Joan - (laughter) - and just on the threat. I have said for years that nuclear terrorism is the gravest threat to U.S. national security, that the Bush analysis that the main threat came from a few hostile states whose - and the answer to this was to overthrow the regimes in those states, is fundamentally wrong and has led to the acceleration of the threats, not their diminution.

Two, I think Obama gets this. They say it repeatedly, that the gravest threat to U.S. national security comes from nuclear terrorism. And it is during the campaign and now in his program it's one of his most urgent actions, and you say it on day four of the administration when he created the office for the coordination and the prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism, and then later appointed Gary Samore to head that office and is staffing it up with 10 people.

So this is not like the old days where there was just a senior director for nuclear policy. No, now we have an office in the White House to coordinate this. That's what experts have long recommended and that's some of the institutional change that can help bring about the whole government. Two, I think it's urgent that we communicate this to our allies. Let me give you one specific and pointed example. I think Israel is dead wrong that Iran is its major nuclear threat. Iran does not have a nuclear weapon, is not likely to have a nuclear weapon for some years, and if it does, will be deterred from using that weapon by the threat of instant and overwhelming devastation.

This is not true for Osama bin Laden, a sworn enemy of Israel who is in Pakistan, kilometers away from nuclear weapons. That is the most urgent threat facing Israel, and the sooner that state realizes it, the better our alliance will be and the more whole governments approach will be able to take. I believe it's imperative for analysts in America, at the government level and in the private sphere to be articulating this analysis, to be developing this, and to counter the kind of easy, lazy analysis that seems to dominate the press that every time a state does something, that that is our most urgent threat. We have to get away from this idea that North Korea and Iran, however serious, represent existential threats to us. They do not.

MS. ROHLFING: Thank you, Joe. (Laughter.)

Let me take another cut on the question, some of which will amplify what Joe just said, certainly consistent with it but maybe a little bit different perspective. And I think it's a really excellent question, Paul, because so much of what we think about and talk about with respect to the near-term arms control agenda, does connect to states. But in my view, the whole reason we have laid out the agenda we have is precisely to try and get our arms around the much harder and more urgent problem of stemming the proliferation into the hands of terrorist organizations.

And, you know, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that this is a lot about getting control of materials. It's materials, materials, materials - locking those materials down, creating a new global architecture for the commerce in those materials, namely the fuel cycle, both the front and the back end of the fuel cycle. And just those two things alone - you know fissile material cut-off treaty, enhanced inspections and safeguards - a lot of things connect to how do we secure materials and create a new global architecture for how they're managed?

This is going to be, you know, a long process of creating norms, practices, legal constraints for doing that, and I think, you know, the president's got it right to be focusing on securing materials as part of his near-term agenda. He's planning to conduct a nuclear security summit, likely early next year, we hear, to engage other states in the world that have nuclear materials that - fissile materials that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. So, you know, this does require broad input from many elements of the government. There is a big diplomatic agenda. There is a big technical agenda.

Here is where it connects to the labs, to answer your other question. In fact, I think that job is so big and the nonproliferation components that connect to the lockdown agenda create an opportunity for our labs to build a new research agenda, an R&D agenda in service of the nonproliferation mission, a new organizing principle for our laboratories that can go a long way in substituting for the work they're no longer likely to be doing on building new weapon types, and I think our government ought to invest some serious effort in trying to refocus the research agenda that way.

MR. KIMBALL: Great.

MS. ROHLFING: Thank you.

MR. KIMBALL: Ambassador Pickering.

AMB. PICKERING: As a former - let me just try to moderate a little between Joe's, I think, well-taken but extreme statements - (laughter) - and Joan's highly rational focus on material because I think the two come together.

I tend to agree with Joe on the over-exaggeration of the Iranian problem. I cannot agree, however, that there is only one source of material for terrorist groups and that's homegrown. We have, in a sense, the possibility - I think remote but not totally impossible - of stealing a whole weapon, and we have the possibility, as Joan has quite rightly brought out, of having loose material.

And we need to guard against that, and I think that the Israelis do see the potential for Iran, and maybe even North Korea, although I haven't said much about North Korea because it's a long way away, and Russia and others being sources of loose material. Whether in fact we have enough capacity totally and radically and rapidly to identify the source of material for any explosion this country remains a difficult problem to answer.

I, finally, agree totally with Joan that I think the labs could play a huge role in all areas of this - everything from being more helpful at identifying material to finding new and very careful ways to deal with material and finding new and better ways to identify when people are moving material up the range of enrichment, or whatever, as the process goes ahead.

And I would strongly urge that the administration, if it hasn't done already, seek to put a permanent interagency operation in shape, led by somebody like Gary, who is very significant, who can't do it in his 10-man office alone, who has to have the full resources of the major Cabinet departments and who have to operate, in my view, with a heavy dose of significant expertise as opposed to merely the turf representatives of the agencies, a kind of mixture of this particular approach.

And my feeling is that that kind of effort in permanent existence, with one other ingredient - and many of these were identified by the Project on National Security Reform, where I have spent a little bit of time - the funding. In effect, if this funding is all going to be drawn out of the existing budgets, we know that that's a two-year process before any dollar appears.

If, in fact, we're either prepared to order new funding or, in effect, to include it in supplementals, if we have anymore of those, we will be a lot better off. But there has to be some kind of funding source. My view is this is so important that we ought to capture funds in some of the large departments and then replenish those as we go ahead on a regular rolling basis to make this kind of thing happen because we know the labs don't do research for free.

MR. KIMBALL: And if you haven't already read it, there is a great article in the latest Arms Control Today by Ken Luango on the next generation of threat reduction that addresses many of these questions, and he tries to put forward some forward-looking ideas. We're going to - Cole is going to ask those of you in the back to raise your hand. He is going to select someone in the overflow area.

You're going to stand up with a microphone and come into this little gap and ask your question, please, so that we can include those in the back. Are we almost there? Okay, I meant the back, back, Cole, but, okay, let's go from the back, back, all right? Peter, with alacrity, please. No one wants to ask you a question. Oh, my god. Okay, then we'll do it over here. Rebecca Johnson. Cole, could you bring the microphone over to this -

Q: Thank you very much, and thank you to the panel. This is very, very interesting. My question really is, President Obama's election and the Prague speech were very, very widely welcomed around the world, so I'd like your views on what other countries could do that would support these initiatives for disarmament, for progressive disarmament, and also perhaps what should be avoided.

MR. KIMBALL: All right, anyone want to take that one?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me start. The United Kingdom is already doing it. Gordon Brown has said that he wants the United Kingdom to be in the forefront of a global campaign for nuclear disarmament and he wants the U.K. to be a disarmament laboratory, and how exactly we do this. I think those kind of statements and efforts have to be encouraged and given the funding and attention that can make them serious.

The government of Norway is providing funding for a number of conferences, initiatives, studies, and using their convening power to bring together experts from around the world. The government of Sweden is doing something on a smaller scale but somewhat similar. Italy is the chairperson of the G-8 this year and make nonproliferation one of its priority agenda items and is moving out smartly on this, including sponsoring a conference just a couple of months ago with the "four horsemen" in -

MS. ROHLFING: Just a couple of weeks ago.

MR. CIRINCIONE: A couple of weeks ago in Rome. I wasn't invited, Joan. (Laughter.) I'd like to correct that.

MR. KIMBALL: There will be another one.

MR. CIRINCIONE: There will be another one. So that's some examples of the sort of convening and diplomatic support for this process. There must be others.

MR. KIMBALL: Ambassador Pickering. Yes?

AMB. PICKERING: Yeah, I would say that what's to be avoided is the famous Nancy Reagan statement about drugs, "Just say no." What's to be encouraged, obviously, is to find positive ways to say yes, but that's a philosophical attitude and we all know that probably there is more interest in this and more willingness to make positive contributions to it, with exception of two or three places where I think things are still scratchy.

One of the issues that's scratchy is of course what threshold do we reach to bring in others on nuclear disarmament? And that will be debated and discussed, and we need to prepare and condition others to do it. And while the U.K. is volunteering to be a laboratory and has basically said it wants to go to zero, it hasn't yet named the level or the date at which it will become involved with the reduction of its weapons, and for some good reason. They want to see where the 90-percenters go and how and what way they determine it.

I think that there are other pieces of arms control and disarmament that we tend, in our mesmerization with weapons of mass destruction, to put aside, but will become increasingly important as we go to lower levels, and indeed may provide some deterrent mechanisms as well as be the source of some very difficult problems. And of course we know that every war since 1945 has happily not involved crossing the nuclear threshold. So we have serious problems on the conventional side. The Russians, in the midst of what I would call the high dudgeon set of arrangements and relationships have gotten out of CFE, at least in part. We need to think about that.

I think we need to think seriously, with our European friends, which we seem incapable of doing right now, of taking President Medvedev up on his notion that it would be a good idea to sit down and talk about European security. It doesn't mean you have to scrap NATO and destroy the EU, or do anything else. And, in fact, President Medvedev, as far as I know, has invited the U.S. to join, so it isn't Europe and Russia against the U.S. anymore.

And this is, I think, an interesting and important challenge and could lead to some very useful and constructive thinking about a number of these problems as we go ahead. We need to think very much about failed states, which are not purely a question of arms, although arms happen to be a major lubricant that leads to significant difficulty. Very few failed states have become problems without arms.

And so it is a very important thing that we begin to look at. Not that I think we are yet in a position to control the question, but I'll give you one more example. Mexico is driven nuts by the fact that 95 percent of the weapons now being involved in the war against the government by the drug and criminal cartels in Mexico come regularly from the United States. And it is part of the two-way traffic we want to stop.

And in many ways, President Obama has moved out on this. This is not popular, as you know, by the NRA community, but in some sense it is yet another indication of the fact that at the low end we have to think as much as we have to think at the high end.

MS. ROHLFING: Can I -

MR. KIMBALL: Go ahead, Joan.

MS. ROHLFING: Can I add to that? And this builds, I guess, on Ambassador Pickering's point. Other countries are going to need to recognize that to advance this agenda seriously is going to require more than just the U.S. and Russia building their arsenals down. I think there is some sense that other nations can hang back and wait until significant reductions have been achieved by the U.S. and Russia before they need to take seriously their own Article VI obligations.

And I think one of the things that we need to do as a community over the next year and beyond is to clarify that it's not just the nuclear weapons states that have an obligation to work to achieve the Article VI goals. There needs to be constructive engagement of all nations of the world, and there needs to be - we've been talking within our nuclear security project, coming out of the two Wall Street Journal op-eds, about the importance of creating a joint enterprise, an enterprise that includes both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states.

You know, a number of things simply can't be done only by the nuclear weapons states. We can engineer a new architecture for the fuel cycle just among the nuclear weapons states. We can only accomplish nuclear material security by working with all states that harbor nuclear materials today, some 40-plus nations.

We could use the help of other states in working with - working to bring into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty the other outlier states who are necessary for CTBT to enter into force, and it ought not just to be U.S. diplomacy working to convince India and Pakistan to sign and ratify the treaty - among others, by the way.

And, finally, this shouldn't also be an effort only funded by, or predominantly funded by, the United States and a couple of other nations. There must be some financial contribution in order to fund the costs associated with this ambitious agenda, and I think we may have an opportunity, looking forward all the way to next year's G-8, when the Canadians again assume the presidency. I think there is an expectation in that there is an opportunity to invest in a renewed global partnership and to up the financial contribution of the G-8 for that purpose. So there's actually quite a healthy agenda for others to assume.

MR. KIMBALL: Great. We just have time for a couple more questions. We'll have Ambassador Wolf here, in the handsome gold tie, and ask - and then if the respondents could be as brief as they can, that would be helpful.

Q: Norman Wolf. I will try to be very brief. I don't want to get into a discussion of whether there should be an act or not. I would like to make a quick observation. My own sense is that the State Department remains a very unfavorable environment for specialists - great for generalists, not great for specialists. The second observation I would make is I think the experience of the last eight years demonstrates that if you want to have a robust bureaucracy in place, you need legislation. It cannot be simply left to administrative determinations.

My question, however, is for Joan, and it's a very - perhaps one that answers itself. I don't know. But you mentioned the need to examine carefully, in the Nuclear Posture Review, the role of missile defense and, given the power of the military industrial complex, the fact that the missile defense people seem to have a constituent in every congressional district, in every state in the United States. How do you see, or do you see a way forward to address missile defense on the merits as opposed to as part of the military industrial equation?

MS. ROHLFING: Sure. The answer is yes. And I think it comes back to the point I made in my conclusion about the importance of presidential leadership. I think for me the question is not whether or not we should have ballistic missile defense; it's what kind of ballistic missile defense can we have?

We need a system that is not threatening to other countries, that is perceived to contribute to not just our security but the security of other nations around the world that might be threatened by a ballistic missile strike of some sort. And this is why it needs to be a cooperative system. So I think, though, the fundamental point is really the president's vision and direction on guiding his bureaucracy toward the right answer is going to be essential, on that and every other issue covered by the review.

MR. KIMBALL: Well, and he has already said that he is not going to pursue a strategic ballistic missile system that's not been proven, that's not cost-effective. And, quite clearly, to anybody who has been reading Arms Control Today or even the Washington Post, the European missile defense proposal is not proven. It's not cost-effective. And as several of you have pointed out, the Iranian ballistic missile threat has not yet emerged and will not likely emerge for quite some time. So, I mean, in the short term, that particular aspect I think - I mean, the issue has been addressed. There still will be that constituency, but as Joan says, we need to think about what kind and how does it work in practice? All right, over here, Elaine Grossman. And Peter has your microphone.

Q: Elaine Grossman with Global Security Newswire. We haven't heard a lot from the Obama administration yet about de-alerting the U.S. nuclear arsenal. And I'm wondering if the panel might address what the significance of that quietude might be at this point. Is there fighting behind the scenes? We did hear a little bit from General Chilton that he's opposed to de-alerting since Obama has come on as president. So if you could address that, it would be great.

MR. KIMBALL: Joan?

MS. ROHLFING: Let me take a stab at that first. I think it's certainly emblematic of the controversy surrounding the notion of de-alerting, even the terminology itself is quite controversial. You have a number of people in the military and the administration, this and previous ones, who say, you know, we're not on hair-trigger alert. This is a definitional question. I think we're certain - certainly our forces are postured to be launch-ready. Whether you consider that a hair trigger or not is just a definitional issue.

You know, I think the other reason is that, frankly, to reach some conclusions on how one might go about taking forces off of their launch-ready status in order to increase warning time is something that needs to be carefully examined through the course of the Nuclear Posture Review. And so, you know, my view is it wouldn't have been prudent for the president to prejudge where that examination comes out, but he ought to make sure that it's included in the review. But I recognize it's controversial, even though I don't honestly understand why.

MR. KIMBALL: All right, with that, I'm sorry; I think we're going to have to cut short this discussion. I know there is much, much more we could explore, but there is lunch awaiting many of you upstairs. We'll be joined in approximately 25, 30 minutes by Gary Samore. I want to ask you to join me in thanking our panelists for their great presentations. (Applause.) Thank you all, and we'll see you in a few minutes.

(END)

 


Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

Description: 

Morning Panel: "Advancing U.S. Nonproliferation and Disarmament Leadership" featuring ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball, Thomas Pickering, Joe Cirincione, and Joan Rohlfing (Continue)

Country Resources:

TRANSCRIPT: Arms Control Association Annual Meeting - Speaker Luncheon with Gary Samore

Sections:

Body: 

ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

"ADVANCING U.S. NONPROLIFERATION
AND DISARMAMENT LEADERSHIP - SPEAKER LUNCHEON"

WELCOME/MODERATOR:
DARYL KIMBALL,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

SPEAKER:
GARY SAMORE,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT OBAMA AND WHITE HOUSE COORDINATOR FOR ARMS CONTROL AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM,
U.S. GOVERNMENT

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009



DARYL KIMBALL: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. If I could please have your attention for just a moment? Thank you all for being here this afternoon. Is the microphone working? Yes, all right. I want to thank everyone for being here today. I'm Daryl Kimball with the Arms Control Association and, on behalf of our board of directors, our staff, I want to welcome our many members and friends, associates, who are here. As we await the arrival of our keynote speaker who is on his way from Capitol Hill, where he had a meeting this morning, I wanted to just take a moment to remind everyone of some of the exciting things that are happening here at the Arms Control Association as we try to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunity that exists - that we were just discussing a little bit about this morning in our session.

With strong support from all of our individual members, our major foundation supporters, we're moving ahead as best as we can to increase our capacity, to increase our expertise, so that we can be more effective over the next several years. We have benefited over the last several months from you and larger grants from some of our key foundation supporters - such as the Ploughshares Fund, who is well-represented here today with Joe Cirincione this morning, Naila Bolus, executive director, and two of their key board members, Roger Hale, the chairman, and Michael Douglas, who's joined us here for lunch today.

We also have received some renewed support from the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Connect-U.S. Fund for work on the conference of the test ban treaty, the Hewlett Foundation and others. And so, this is allowing us to build our capacity, to move ahead. Just let me tick off a few of the things that we're doing that many of you might not realize as you get your "Arms Control Today" and you look at that little section at the beginning, "The Masthead," that describes our staff.

In March, we just benefited from the arrival of a State Department and INR veteran Greg Thielmann, who's now working with us as a senior fellow on a new project - a realistic threat assessments and policy responses project - which is there, due in large part, to additional support from the Ploughshares Fund. Greg is going to be helping us to deal with some of the important questions and issues that we were talking about this morning about as properly and realistically assessing the threats - missiles, nuclear - regarding North Korea, Iran and others - so that we can come up with the right policy solutions.

In December, we launched a new project for the CTBT, working with our fellow NGOs and expert community members to bring together the energy and the expertise that we're going to need to build the case for the conference of test ban treaty to support the president's initiative to immediately and aggressively get the CTB over the finish line. And next month, we're going to have more about that with our new Web site. We have the arrival of a new editorial team, Miles Pomper, our long-time editor, has moved on to greener pastures and a new career at the Monterrey Institute for Nonproliferation Studies.

We're glad, however, to have Dan Horner, veteran journalist, who's joined us as our new "Arms Control Today" editor. And to help me manage all of this, we have a new deputy director position that we created just this spring. I'm surprised to see Jeff Abramson, our former managing editor and new deputy director, here, because I thought you'd have better things to do today. He and his wife, Beth, are the proud new parents of a baby girl, Kalliope, who was just born yesterday. Congratulations! (Laughter, applause.) On Monday. And so these ACA lunches are so exciting that he just had to ...

But that's a reminder of why we're here. It is something of a cliché, but it is really true. As I look into the face of my young daughter, Nola, and, you know - you all have your own sons and daughters and loved ones - it is for them and the future generations that we're working so hard now to make sure that we can move towards and realize a world free of nuclear weapons and build a safer planet for all.

I want to thank everybody for their support over the past year, which has, of course, been a difficult one from an economic standpoint. We, at the same time however, are living through a very certain time in terms of the historic opportunity we have to move ahead. So I want to ask you all to please consider making yet another contribution to ACA. There are a number of the "Yes We Can Do" little fliers that were on your chairs this morning - and I think they should be on your table now - if they're not, we will make them available on your table - that outlines our priorities and very much the community's priorities on these issues over the next couple years.

So, we're glad to have Gary Samore here with us. Where did Gary go? There he is. And Gary is, of course, a special assistant to the president and senior director for counter-proliferation strategy - otherwise known on the streets of Washington as the "WMD czar." Let me just say a couple words before I bring him up here and he'll give his remarks. You'll have a chance to ask him some questions.

Gary's resume is so long; it is quite remarkable. I mean, he has experience in the NGO sector, at the Council on Foreign Relations, the MacArthur Foundation, The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. From '96 to 2000, he was the special assistant to President Clinton and senior director for nonproliferation at the NSC. All these things make him the obvious choice for this key position at the White House at this historic juncture.

So we're glad you're here, Gary. More importantly, I think we're all extremely delighted that the president has assigned the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issue as one of his top issues just in the first - I think within the first hundred days - that April 5th speech took place. And let me just also say, we talked a little bit in the morning, Joe Cirincione did about the dangers of cynicism here in Washington.

And it's clear that while some of the cynics and supporters of the nuclear status quo over the past few weeks have tried to dismiss the president's call for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons an exercise in wishful thinking, they're of course wrong and the real fantasy is to expect that nuclear restraint and greater commitment to nonproliferation from other states in the absence of bold U.S. action on disarmament and nonproliferation diplomacy.

So, we're eager to work together with you, Gary. John Wolfstall in the vice president's office is also here - of course, a former ACA staff alum that we are very, very proud of. I've asked Gary to describe, in further detail, to the extent that he can, the administration's approach and rational on reducing and eliminating the nuclear offense threat, and we will have the chance to ask a few questions before he has to leave later on. Gary, the podium is yours.

(Applause.)

GARY SAMORE: Thank you very much, Daryl. I've always admired the work of the Arms Control Association and, in particular, I actually have a pretty good collection of "Arms Control Today," which I have read throughout my career. It's one of the few really serious publications on arms control issues, and I think it's very important to keep that alive. I think our community has gone through a difficult period, and now I think we may have an opportunity for a renaissance - and it's extremely important I think that we encourage younger people to try to make a career working on arms control and nonproliferation issues. \

As much as I share the president's vision that we need to work toward a nuclear-free world, I also suspect that there's going to be career opportunities in this business for some time. Let me say that I've been - as Daryl mentioned - I've been working on these issues for some time now. I think President Obama is the fifth president that I've worked for. And I am really impressed, genuinely impressed with his interest and knowledge on arms control on nonproliferation issues.

And having spent a fair amount of time with him now, with other people of course, talking about these issues, he really gets it. He really has internalized the essential message and strategy that he is trying to pursue, which was captured in the Prague speech. He really understands that you need to have both the vision of moving toward a nuclear-free world, and also practical steps. The vision without the practical steps is rhetoric, and the practical steps without the vision really doesn't have the same political punch.

And what the president gets is that the overall strategy toward arms control has to meet the national security needs of the United States, both in terms of maintaining an effective nuclear arsenal - as long as we have nuclear weapons - but also in terms of the arms control strategy helping us to deal with real national security threats like Iran and North Korea pursuing nuclear weapons and the danger that terrorists will seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

And to me, that's the way to make the political case for arms control and disarmament and nonproliferation. If, of course, has value in itself - it has merit in itself - but you've got to show how it deals with real national security threats that the U.S. and our allies are facing. So what I'd like to do is review, very briefly with you, the main elements of the Prague speech and sort of where we are.

Of course, it hasn't been very much time, but we've already seen some progress and it's my job as the White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction and terrorism to try to pull together these different strands in a way that makes for a comprehensive game plan. You'll recall the three pillars in the Prague speech: first of all, arms control and disarmament - that is to say, dealing with countries that have nuclear weapons, limiting and trying to move toward elimination of those nuclear weapons - secondly, nonproliferation - preventing other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons - and third is the basket of nuclear cooperation and security - trying to encourage the growth of nuclear power while keeping the risk to proliferation as low as possible and making sure that nuclear materials are safe and secure and not vulnerable to theft.

On the arms control front, we've moved out on each of the main elements that the president talked about in his Prague speech. The president, as well as Russian President Medvedev announced in London at their meeting that they had reached agreement, in principle, on seeking a successor to the START treaty, which you all know expires in early December. And this would be a legally binding treaty; it would control - it would have limits on nuclear capabilities below the Moscow Treaty and the START treaty.

Rose Gottemoeller has formed her team. She's in Moscow even as we speak meeting with the Russians, and she has a very intense schedule planned for her negotiations with the Russians that will lead up to the president's trip to Moscow in early July, and we hope at that point, we would be able to announce at least some more details of what we've agreed to. There are a number of contentious issues.

These arms control treaties are always difficult, and you know, they deal with some very fundamental national security issues, both on the Russian and the American side, so we're very realistic about understanding how much we can achieve in this immediate arms control agreement for this year, in terms of preserving some of the central verification provisions of START, in terms of making some further reductions below the Moscow numbers.

But I think we have to consider this initial treaty to be a first step, and that there will be additional negotiations, which are likely to take longer periods of time, in which we'll look at deeper cuts and we'll be informed by the results of the nuclear posture review, which is taking place this year and will be finished at the end of the year and which will present the president with a much broader range of options to choose from in considering the U.S. nuclear strategy and targeting issues.

The second issue the president mentioned in the arms control basket was the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which, as you all know, there's been a paralysis at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for 10 years, and I, frankly, have been astonished at how the president's speech seems to have really made some very substantial process in terms of unsticking that stalemate. Just today, the Algerian president of the Conference on Disarmament has tabled a compromise work plan, which would include the start of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT.

And I'm sensing that we could very easily reach a consensus on that document and we would be able, then, to see the FMCT negotiations begin quite soon, although it's clearly going to take some time for governments to get themselves organized. It's been 10 years since people have really focused on this, and I would expect that the serious negotiations probably wouldn't get underway until at the end of the this year or early next year, if the CD reaches agreement on a work plan.

And I think we also all have to be realistic that this treaty is not likely to be concluded in the near future; there are a, again, a number of very contentious issues, which you're all familiar with and which were certainly exposed in the course of the discussions back in the mid-'90s, and none of them have been resolved. So you know, this is important to get this started, but I think we should be realistic that it's not likely to be - that we're not likely to see agreement on a treaty right away.

And lastly, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - the president pledged to move ahead with U.S. ratification, which we hope will create a positive momentum and bring other countries onboard so that the CTBT can enter into force. Of all the things the president talked about in the Prague speech, this is the one that's probably the most controversial from a domestic U.S. standpoint. There seems to be very strong consensus on a post-START agreement and on FMCT, as well as the nonproliferation and nuclear security elements of the president's speech, but CTBT is still a very controversial issue and it's been 10 years, of course, since the Senate dealt with it.

So we're moving very deliberately in terms of doing the necessary technical and intelligence work to look at the important questions of verification, questions of American stockpile stewardship - can we be sure that our forces will remain reliable and effective under a long-term nuclear testing ban? And again, the nuclear posture review, I think, will help us address that question. So my anticipation is that we'll spend this year building support for the treaty and looking at the important issues so that we can present our best case to the Senate for their advice and consent.

In the nonproliferation basket, our hope is that by moving ahead on these arms control issues, we'll be in a very strong position, at the NPT Review Conference to lead a coalition of countries to strengthen the NPT. The NPT, as you all know, has a number of structural flaws; some of them can be fixed - some of them can't be - but we want to be very ambitious as the president laid out in the Prague speech, in terms of looking at ways to strengthen IAEA inspections, to strengthen enforcement and compliance measures, as well as steps to make it more difficult for countries to withdraw from the treaty.

And all of these reforms that we would like to put forward obviously have a direct bearing on countries like Iran and North Korea. And so from our standpoint, strengthening the NPT is directly relevant to dealing with those issues as part of an overall strategy. The other thing we would hope to achieve at the NPT Review Conference - and this relates to the third basket of nuclear cooperation and security - we think it's important that we try to develop a new global architecture for nuclear cooperation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

There are lots of ideas out there, like fuel banks and international fuel centers, which would obviate the need for countries to develop their own fuel-cycle capabilities, and as we expect nuclear power will expand, including to countries that don't currently have nuclear power facilities, it's important that we develop a system that will make it possible for nuclear power to spread without fuel-cycle capability spreading as well. And that also can provide a positive model for countries like Iran. If they wish to resolve the nuclear issue, they can have access to assured fuel supplies without feeling the need to develop their own enrichment capacity.

And the last piece, just to mention briefly, the president pledged that we would seek to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials over the course of the next four years, and as an important step to achieve that, we're planning to have a global nuclear summit sometime next year, and that would hopefully be a meeting of key leaders on this issue, which could pledge support to work together. As you all know, the nuclear security issue is one that requires cooperation among a fairly large number of countries; it can't be dealt with just on a U.S.-Russia basis or a G-8 basis. It's going to require a much larger group.

And I think that cooperation on nuclear security among this larger group can help to support cooperation on other nonproliferation and arms control objectives as well. So from our standpoint, we see these three pillars as an integrated package, and it's important to move together on all three of them; we're not going to be able to make progress on one in the absence of making progress on the other two, so from our standpoint, this has to be done in a systematic way. And I want to thank all of you and look forward to asking your support as we move forward in all of this, and I'd be happy to answer some questions.

(Applause.)

MR. KIMBALL: All right, thank you very much, Gary. Why don't we start the questions with some newspaper and other reporters we have here. Mary - maybe Mary Beth can start us.

Q: Thank you. Mary Beth Sheridan from the Washington Post. I'm wondering if you could tell us your impressions of the significance of the Iranian missile test today.

MR. SAMORE: Well, I think it's a significant technical development. Up to now, the Iranian missile force has been based on liquid-fueled systems, which they obtained from North Korea. And the Ashura system that they tested is a solid-propellant system, which apparently, they developed on their own. And from a military standpoint, it's a significant advantage over liquid-fueled systems - much easier to move around, as a mobile system and can be launched on much shorter warning.

Of course, this is just a test. I mean, obviously, there's still much more work to be done before it could be built and deployed, but I see it as a significant step forward in terms of Iran's, you know, capability to deliver weapons. And I think it actually helps us in terms of making the case to countries like Russia, which have been skeptical in the past about whether Iran really poses a threat. This is a very clear demonstration that Iran is moving in the direction of longer-range and more capable missile systems and I am hopeful that we'll be able to capitalize on the test in order to strengthen the coalition that we already have to try to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

MR. KIMBALL: All right, thank you. Over here? (Inaudible, off mike.)

Q: Michael Adler from the Wilson Center. Hi, Gary. Just wondering, it seems that there's some kind of - even the president said he hoped to know by the end of the year whether there would be progress in talking to Iran and some diplomats put the "deadline" - in quotes - as much earlier, perhaps as early as the third week in September, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. And it seems that you're hoping to get some kind of freeze of Iranian enrichment - even a suspension, or even the application of the additional protocol. Realistically, given the past of this whole diplomacy and the Iranian nuclear crisis, what do you think are the chances that you can make progress with Iran?

MR. SAMORE: It's a very good question, and we all know the history of the negotiations, which have been very frustrating, and I imagine, will continue to be quite frustrating. However, I do think the Obama administration brings some additional assets to the table. First of all, I do think the president is genuinely interested in engaging Iran and in improving U.S.-Iranian relations and finding a way for Iran to have a place in the world that is respected and responsible. And I think that, actually, provides very powerful leverage, because I think there will be a number of people inside Iran who will be attracted to that vision and who will want to see the nuclear issue resolved so that it can be realized.

Secondly, on a more practical level, I think the collapse in oil prices has made the Iranian regime more sensitive to the threat of economic sanctions, and therefore more likely to look for a compromise that will avoid the risk of greater sanctions. And third, I think President Obama - and we've tried very hard to strengthen the international coalition so that if our overture to Iran is not successful, we'll be in a stronger position to take other action, to increase pressure. And our strategy towards Russia in terms of resetting the button and working on the nuclear issues, our strategy toward our allies - all of this is intended to create a stronger bargaining position. So I think we have a better chance of success now than we have in the last couple of - than we've been able to achieve in the last couple of years of negotiations. And as the president said, we should know by the end of this year - we should have some indications by the end of this year whether we're making progress.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Right over here. Elaine?

Q: Elaine Grossman from the National Journal Group. I wonder if you might elaborate a little bit on what your plans are for this global nuclear summit next year. What countries do you want to see included in that, and what would your objectives be, coming out of it? Thank you.

MR. SAMORE: To be honest, I'm going to have to duck your question, because we really haven't been able to figure that out. I mean, and I don't want to sort of do it in a press statement until we really have our plan all together. But I think it will be, you know, a very important event and something that I'm - actually, sometimes I get up in the middle of the night and think, how are we going to do this? I mean, it's an awful lot of work to be done, especially when you're out - but I'm sorry, I just can't answer the question now.

We're thinking very hard - in fact, we've got meetings today to talk about exactly this issue, and you know, once we have an agreement in the government, then I think it will become - I mean, we'll be very transparent; it will become very obvious what we're doing and who's invited an so forth, but we're not quite there, yet.

Q: Is there some disagreement, then?

MR. SAMORE: No, no, there's no disagreement. It's just everybody's very busy and, you know, the Prague speech laid out an incredibly ambitious agenda, and in fact, when I was listening to the speech, I thought, boy, this is an awful lot to do! (Laughter.) So you know, the speech was great to start things off, but the implementation, of course, can sometimes take an awful lot of work.

MR. KIMBALL: So the challenge is so big even the WMD czar lays awake at night thinking about how we're going to solve these things. We have a question right here - Nicholas.

Q: Nicholas Kralev of the Washington Times. I'm very glad, Gary, that you managed to get out of that hotel in Mumbai, in November. I want to take you to North Korea. We know where we were in October-November, with Yongbyon mostly disabled, with the cooling tower blown up, but there's been nothing happening - even, there's been some reversal since then. What are your concerns about how far this reversal could go, and is there danger, today, in the next few months, of the North Koreans actually producing plutonium?

MR. SAMORE: Well, I think there is. I think the North Koreans have made a very deliberate, conscious decision to walk away from the agreements they made with the Bush administration, including to reverse the steps that they took to disable the Yongbyon facilities. And of course, they've publicly threatened that they will not only produce plutonium; they will also proceed with an enrichment program and test nuclear devices. I think the North Koreans have decided that they would try to kill the Six Party Talks and to pursue the nuclear issue in a purely bilateral relationship with the United States.

Now, how much of this reflects internal developments in North Korea, I really don't think we know. But in terms of our policy, we've made it clear that we are not prepared to engage on a purely bilateral basis. We will insist upon the preservation of the Six Party Talks as the framework for dealing with the issue - for disarming North Korea - and we will insist on North Korean nuclear disarmament as our objective. I think the North Koreans would like to be recognized or accepted as a nuclear weapons state and we're not going to do that; we've made that very clear.

Now, the North Koreans will take their measures. I mean, they will take the escalatory steps that they have decided to take. We will respond, with our allies and our partners, in terms of taking, you know, actions in response, as we did after their satellite launch in terms of additional U.N. sanctions. My prediction is, at the end of the day, the North Koreans will find that they have no choice but to engage in the Six Party Talks again, because there's no other alternative. But it may take some time before we get there; it may take months before we get there.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. We have a question right here.

Q: First, congratulations on the effective, within the first week of the NPT PrepCom last week, an agenda was set for the Review Conference, in no small measure because of your hitting the right note. And I think that the press has not properly given credit to the administration for that. My question relates to - two - they go hand-in-hand. This leap forward could be set back by the kinds of things that have come out of General Chilton, where he recently said that we would reserve the use of nuclear weapons against a cyber attack.

And he added that he saw no impediments to that, and the rest of the world heard a rejection of negative security assurances, a rejection of the doctrine of proportionality. The other is the modernization - the discussion of modernization in exchange for a CTBT. And I would hope that if there's any discussion of modernization, it's modernization of the Pantex dismantlement facility, which recent press reports have said are 15 years behind schedule. That would be a modernization that would do wonder in moving the nonproliferation/disarmament regime ahead - (inaudible, off mike). Could you comment on General Chilton and modernization of disarmament?

MR. SAMORE: Well thank you Jonathan. I should have mentioned the NPT PrepCom, because it was quite remarkable that there was agreement on an agenda, whereas in 2005, you know, disagreement over the agenda certainly substantially contributed to the failure of the conference. And I do think that - and it's not just me; a number of countries have said to us that President Obama's Prague speech really did mobilize a sense of confidence and optimism at the conference and no country wanted to be the one responsible for imposing procedural obstacles and delays. So it really did make a difference; I think you're right - there's a directly translatable effect.

On negative security issues, this is - I think it's a very difficult issue for all the nuclear weapons states, except, perhaps, for China, which has a clear no-first-use position. There's a lot of history here, there's a lot of theology, there's a lot of legalism. The nuclear posture review will look at questions of doctrine - of declaratory doctrine. And I think it's premature for me to comment on that now, but this is obviously one of the issues that we will want to look at. President Obama said, in his Prague speech, that we want to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons for U.S. security strategy, and that has implications for negative security assurances and our statements about use doctrine, but we're still working on that and I'm not in a position to comment further.

In terms of modernization, I think we have to balance, on one hand, our desire to take steps toward, you know, limiting and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, but on the other hand, the need to make sure that our arsenal - as long as we have an arsenal - is effective and reliable. And I'm trying to get smart and I'm looking at the stockpile stewardship program, which I think has been quite successful over the last decade, and I think there's a lot of credit to be given to DOE for the work they've done to make this into a very strong, scientific-based program.

Whether we can continue that indefinitely - whether we have to look at other options, you know, to maintain reliability and effectiveness, whether we need more funding to keep that program going, those are all things that will be looked at as part of the nuclear posture review, and again, I think it's better to wait for that work to be completed rather than to have me speak about it now.

MR. KIMBALL: And a key question, of course, is what does the word modernization mean? It can mean many different things to many different people in many different contexts. Okay, we have a question here in the middle - the bearded gentleman known as David Culp with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Thank you.

Q: Hi, Gary. David Culp with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Big congratulations on the Prague speech. I think that really is going to be seen as a historic speech. But on your goal of securing all nuclear material in four years, which probably everybody in this room supports, you actually cut the budget for the program that's doing the work at the Energy Department. Now, this is a program that has had strong bipartisan support, where they have, for the last several years, been regularly increasing the budget, and your budget submission cut the budget.

Now, I know you're going to tell me you have plans to do all this stuff in the out-years, and that's true, you show very large increases in the out-years. But frankly, the budget profile makes no sense. You're cutting the budget and then you're dramatically increasing it, and I would encourage you to work with the Congress over the next few months to come up with a more coherent budget profile.

MR. SAMORE: Well, part of what we're doing is, we've asked both Energy and the other departments to develop a plan for this four-year plan to secure all vulnerable nuclear material - I emphasize vulnerable. And that will certainly include questions of resources and budget. That work hasn't been finished yet, but I do think we will be seeking the necessary funds from Congress in order to carry that out. But right now, we don't actually have a plan, and that's something that people are working very hard on.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Right over here, behind the cameras. Thank you, Murray (sp).

Q: Thank you, Gary. My name is Jiang (sp) from Radio Free Asia. On North Korea, I would like to ask you what's your view and the information about the possibility of the second nuclear test, and what's the Obama administration's plan regarding this?

MR. SAMORE: Well, the North Koreans have threatened that they may conduct a second nuclear test, and they may do it. The best we can do is to try to persuade them that that would be a mistake, and we will work with our allies in the Six Party Talks to try to convince the North Koreans not to do that. And if they do it, then we'll take appropriate measures, just as we did in response to the satellite test.

MR. KIMBALL: Okay. In the back there, in the middle - Peter - thank you. Mr. Sanger, yes.

Q: Hi, Gary, David Sanger from the New York Times. You have a pretty full agenda with the Pakistanis right now, but when you left office in the end of the Clinton administration, the official position was still to try to walk back their nuclear program. We now see significant evidence that they're expanding at a pretty good pace. Could you talk a little bit about that, and whether or not the Obama administration has begun to discuss with Pakistan slowing down or reversing their current build-rate, in addition to the nuclear security issues you've spoken on before?

MR. KIMBALL: And, I mean, one other corollary is, what else can be done ahead of the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, with respect to other nations, beyond Pakistan?

MR. SAMORE: Well certainly, the elements of the arms control approach, both FMCT and CTBT, would obviously have a direct bearing on countries like Pakistan that are not constrained by the NPT. So I think one way we get at the issue is by pursuing these new international instruments. And certainly, in the past, while there have been negotiations, we have encouraged that there be a moratorium on activities that would be contrary to the treaty.

Of course, in the case of the CTBT, there's been a test moratorium that's been observed by all countries except North Korea, even though the treaty is not enforced. And from our standpoint, it would be very desirable to have a similar kind of arrangement with the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. So I think that is one approach that we would take to try to address that issue.

In the past - and I've dealt with the South Asian nuclear issue since the Reagan administration - it is one of the most difficult issues, because the steps that we would like Pakistan to take in terms of restraining and limiting their nuclear program, the Pakistani government has always said they will do that in conjunction with India. The Indians have always said we can't take steps unless similar steps are taken by China and the other nuclear weapons states, and very quickly, you end up with a situation where it's hard to make progress. And I think we have to think of dealing with the South Asian problem not on a purely regional basis, but in the context of a more global approach.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Right here, please. And then, Bruce, we'll go to you.

Q: Gary, Cooper Levin (ph). Gary, after our complete capitulation to the Indians in the previous administration - (laughter, applause) - that is, maybe I should stop right there. (Laughter.) That is, where they can build as many nukes and tests and so forth with no real disadvantages. Why shouldn't other countries just assume that if they ignore the United States long enough, they, too, will be blessed? In other words, we've said we'll interdict North Korean vessels; no ship has been stopped, et cetera, et cetera. How are you going to get people to be less determined and successful in defeating us in this area than the Indians have been?

MR. SAMORE: You know, I think it's a risk and I think that the only way to convince countries is to demonstrate, through success, that we are going to be able to stop nuclear weapons activities. It's been a while since we've had a success. I mean, if you look back over the last 30 years, we've had quite a few successes in terms of countries deciding not to pursue nuclear weapons, whether it's Argentina or Brazil or Ukraine or the South Africans giving up their nuclear weapons - I guess Libya is the most recent success story.

And so we need to look at Iran - to me, Iran is a critical tipping point for the whole regime. If we lose on Iran, I think it raises questions about the viability of the NPT within the Middle East. I think there's a great danger that it would trigger an arms race in the region. On the other hand, if we're successful with Iran - if we're able to restrain their nuclear activities and limit their acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, I think that sends a virtuous message.

So I think the only way to influence other countries' perceptions is through actions. I mean, words are fine, but what really counts are actions. And so for me, Iran has got to be at the top of the agenda for the future of, you know, our effort. If we fail with Iran, the message of seeking a nuclear-free world is going to be very significantly undercut.

MR. KIMBALL: Okay. Bruce MacDonald right here and then we'll go to the rear.

Q: Hi, Bruce MacDonald with the Strategic Posture Review Commission at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Gary, you may sleep less well, given the agenda you've got, but a lot of us sleep better knowing that you're where you are. (Laughter.) I wanted to ask, in the Strategic Posture Review Commission Report - the Perry-Schlesinger Report that was just issued a couple of weeks ago - in relation to the CTBT, which it could not reach consensus on, but it did point out there was a consensus on several steps the administration should take as the Senate reviews the treaty as it comes up again.

One is to conduct a broad assessment of benefits, costs and risks; second, to seek agreement on a specific definition of what is meant by a nuclear test - there have been questions raised there; a credible diplomatic strategy for moving from U.S. ratification to actual entry into force; commit to some progress of periodic review of the national security consequences of continued CTBT adherence; and then finally, some demonstration by the administration and the Congress that there will be some follow-through on the safeguards program. I mean, a bit of a laundry list, but I wanted to ask you, in light of those recommendations, what you think the Obama administration's response to that might be.

MR. SAMORE: Well, that's very much along the lines of our own thinking. And you know, the commission report has helped to reinforce our approach toward CTBT in terms of the recognition that we need to very deliberately and carefully lay the groundwork by doing exactly the kinds of studies and reviews that you've considered before we think it's right to have this issue addressed by the Senate. So we're, I think, acting very much in accord with what the commission has recommended.

MR. KIMBALL: And I just need to interject and add - the administration's going to have to answer this question itself - but the question, the assertion that the treaty does not make it clear what is banned is an issue that personally think the commission did a terrible job in addressing. And we've been through this before, Bruce. But the record is very clear from the negotiations from '94-'96, that the treaty bans all nuclear test explosions. It is also clear from the testimony of Stephen Ledogar in 1999 that Russia agrees that hydro-nuclear test are prohibited, that hydrodynamic tests are allowed. So we'll go through that again, but that's one, I think, severe flaw in this report that we should just be conscious of. We have a question in the rear. Paul, thank you.

Q: Paul Kawika Martin, Peace Action, formerly SANE/FREEZE. The nuclear posture review - how do you envision it reflecting President Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons? More specifically, how is that process going to differ from the previous two administrations, and has the president given directions on what he would like to see, or will he give it back if it's not what he likes to see?

MR. SAMORE: Well, I think it will be much more effective if the nuclear posture review takes place in a collaborative way, and we have set up a system so that the nuclear posture review, which is headed by the Department of Defense, will be in collaboration with the State Department, with the Department of Energy, and finally, overseen by the National Security Council. So I'm very confident that the NPR will present the president with a very broad range of options.

The point of the NPR is not to come back with a single proposed strategy and nuclear requirements; the point is to come back with a range of different options and give the president the opportunity to consider those. And I think we have superb colleagues in the Department of Defense, State and Energy and I'm very confident that the review will give the president a broad range of options in terms of numbers and doctrine and so forth.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. I think we had a couple of questions in the middle. We'll go, first, with Tom Cochran over there by the window and then back to Rebecca.

Q: Tom Cochran with NRDC. Gary, does the U.S. government have any evidence that Iran has resumed weaponization portion of its nuclear program that would counter the NIE finding previously that they had ceased weaponization?

MR. SAMORE: It's a good question, but I'm afraid I'm not in a position to answer it. I'm sorry.

(Laughter.)

MR. KIMBALL: All-right. That will have to be it on that one. Rebecca?

Q: Hi, Gary. Just to confirm what Daryl said, just last week at the U.N., when my book on the CTB was being launched, Ambassador Ledogar, whom many of you know - very, very tough Republican negotiator - chief negotiator of the CTBT confirmed that everybody - all the P-5 - knew exactly what they were signing up to when they signed the CTBT, and I think that any suggestion that they didn't just needs to be swept away - it's swept away by the negotiating record.

But my question to you is - first of all, congratulations on President Obama's Prague speech, which has been welcomed throughout the world. So my question is, in what ways, and particularly in relation to the CTBT and the progressive steps on disarmament - in what way can the rest of the world support and reinforce the positive impact that we're seeing coming from the Obama administration, both on the NPT and the Conference on Disarmament, but more widely?

MR. SAMORE: Well, obviously, we would want to - we need to work together with a lot of other countries - with a range of countries in order to achieve the objectives that the president laid out. So we see this as a collaborative effort. This is not something the U.S. can do by itself; it's not something we can do with Russia; it's not something we can do with the G-8 or even the G-20. And I think, you know, we've got a year now before the NPT Review Conference, and we're going to be very active in terms of trying to build a coalition of support for a balanced outcome of the Review Conference.

In my experience in the past, very often, people don't pay very much attention to the NPT Review Conference document until the last 24 hours of the meeting, which is not a very good way to have a constructive outcome. So we'd like to start much earlier, in terms of getting these issues out. And I thought the PrepCom meeting last week in New York was a very good start. I think when we have our full team in place, we'll be in a much better position to carry out those kinds of consultations that we'll need in order to make the Review Conference a success.

And just to mention, I think it's important that we engage other governments, not only at the foreign ministry level, but also, you know, the energy departments or the energy commissions, the defense people, as well as the leadership level. Again, in the past sometimes, I think the NPT has been treated as something just for diplomats, and I frankly think it's too important just for diplomats. I think it's important that, you know, the generals and the presidents and kings, and scientists also, should be part of the process.

MR. KIMBALL: Great. Last, final, brief question, right here, please.

Q: Thanks Paul Lettow from the Council on Foreign Relations. Gary, thank you for your service and for being with us today; we appreciate it. In terms of restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing, have we reached a point where a year-on-year moratorium is kind of officially seen as dead, and will the U.S. continue to support a criteria-based system in the Nuclear Suppliers Group?

MR. SAMORE: Yes, I think that a criteria-based system is a very effective way to proceed, because I think it avoids the ideological problem of appearing to be denying countries their, quote, unquote, "rights," under the NPT, however you interpret Article IV. There's a strong view there that - and we would get strong resistance if we tried to formally ban or limit people's access to fuel-cycle technology for civil purposes. And it would be, frankly, counterproductive; we would not be able to get the support we need on other elements of the agenda if we tried to pursue that.

So I think a criteria-based approach is the best approach and, you know, the fact is, if you look at the economic and technological need for fuel cycle, there's only a few countries in the world that have an actual requirement for having their own fuel cycle, given the nature of their nuclear power industries. And there are many countries that have, as you know, very extensive nuclear power programs that rely on foreign fuel and enrichment services and it works just fine. So I think that that's the best approach we can take, and my understanding is that the NSG is very close to agreement on a criteria-based system.

MR. KIMBALL: Well, thank you very much for being with us today. (Applause.) You've been extremely generous with your time, masterful in answering these tough - and some easy - questions. And all of use are ready to work with you and the president on this great endeavor. Just like President Kennedy called upon society with the Limited Test Ban Treaty, we're all ready to work hard in a - as Secretary Schultz said - a non-partisan fashion. All right, thank you.

MR. SAMORE: Thank you all very much. Keep up the good work.

(Applause.)

MR. KIMBALL: All right. I would encourage you to take your time, finish your desserts that may be in front of you. We are going to be picking up on the member's meeting in the Butler Room downstairs at roughly 1:00 p.m. Thank you all.

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

Description: 

Speaker Luncheon - "Advancing U.S. Nonproliferation and Disarmament Leadership" with Gary Samore, Special Assistant to President Obama and White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism

Country Resources:

Kimball and Rademaker Debate the CTBT at CSIS

Sections:

Body: 

ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball, and Stephen Rademaker, former Assistant Secretary of State, debated the merits of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) during the 3rd Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Debates the Issues.

PONI Debates the Issues: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

May 13, 2009

Description: 

ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball and Former Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker debate the merits of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Realizing the Promise of the CTBT

Sections:

Body: 

Statement by Representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Preparatory Meeting for the 2010 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

May 5, 2009

Distinguished delegates,

The history of the nuclear age makes clear that opportunities to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons are often fleeting. When the right political conditions are in place, government leaders must seize the chance to make progress.

Now is such a time.

Entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is within sight. Since the idea of a ban on nuclear testing was first proposed in the 1950s, it has stood among the highest priorities on the international nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. The CTBT is more important now than ever.

By banning all nuclear weapon test explosions, including very low-yield hydronuclear explosions, the CTBT limits the ability of established nuclear-weapon states to field more sophisticated warheads and makes it far more difficult for newer members of the club to perfect smaller, more easily deliverable warheads. For this reason, CTBT ratification has long been considered essential to the fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT and the goal of "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

The CTBT also serves to reinforce the nonproliferation system by acting as a downstream confidence-building measure about a state's nuclear intentions and, in this regard, it can help head-off and de-escalate regional tensions. With no shortage of conflict and hostility in the Middle East, ratification by Israel, Egypt and Iran would reduce nuclear-weapons-related security concerns in the region. It would also help create the conditions necessary for the realization of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as called for in the Middle East Resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

India and Pakistan could substantially ease regional tensions and demonstrate nuclear restraint by converting their unilateral test moratoria into a legally-binding commitment to end nuclear testing through the CTBT.

With the CTBT in force, global and national capabilities to detect and deter possible clandestine nuclear testing by other states will be significantly greater. Entry-into-force is essential to making short-notice, on-site inspections possible and maintaining long-term political and financial support from other nations for the operation of the International Monitoring System and International Data Center.

The CTBT has near-universal support: 180 nations have signed and 148 have ratified the Treaty. Last fall, the UN General Assembly voted 175-1 in favor of The CTBT-and we expect that the one "no" vote by the United States to become a "yes" vote this year. We applaud those states that support of the Treaty and make their full financial contribution to the build-up and operation of the international monitoring and verification system.

Unfortunately, broad support is not enough. Article XIV of the Treaty provides that in order to enter into force, ratification is needed from a number of key players. Nine necessary states have failed to ratify the CTBT and are therefore delaying its entry into force.

Ratification by the United States and China is particularly important. Given their existing nuclear test moratoria and 1996 signature of the CTBT, Washington and Beijing already bear most CTBT-related responsibilities, yet their failure to ratify has denied them and others the full security benefits of CTBT entry into force.

The United States is poised to be a leader on the CTBT once again as President Barack Obama has pledged to achieve ratification "as soon as practical." We applaud his April 5 statement in Prague in which he said:

"To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned."

To do so, President Obama must convince two-thirds of the Senate that the treaty enhances U.S. security, is effectively verifiable, and would not compromise future efforts to maintain the reliability, safety, or security of the United States' remaining stockpile of nuclear warheads. Technical advances in each of these areas over the past decade should make the case for the CTBT even stronger than it was in 1999 when the Senate failed to provide its advice and consent for ratification.

The Obama administration's effort will require sustained, top-level leadership. His efforts will have the full support of a wide array of NGOs in the United States and around the globe.

For years, Chinese government representatives have reported that the CTBT is before the National People's Congress for consideration but has apparently taken no action to win legislative approval needed for ratification.

Washington's renewed pursuit of CTBT ratification opens up opportunities for China and other Annex II states, such as Indonesia, to lead the way toward entry into force by ratifying before the United States does. Action by Beijing would increase its credibility as a nonproliferation leader and improve the chances that other states in Asia, as well as the United States, would follow suit. Ratification by Indonesia would enhance its reputation as a world leader and agent for international security.

If Israel were to ratify the CTBT, it would bring that nation closer to the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream and help encourage other states in the region to do so.

Iranian ratification would help reduce concerns that its nuclear program could be used to develop and deploy deliverable nuclear warheads. Continued failure by Iran to ratify the CTBT raises further questions about the nature of its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.

The recent decision of the government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea to suspend its participation in the Six-Party Denuclearization process is deeply disappointing. We sincerely urge the Pyonyang to refrain from further nuclear testing and we urge the effective and rapid implementation of the commitments made pursuant to the Six-Party agreements by all involved as a step toward mutual security, as well as CTBT entry into force.

If India and Pakistan wish to be regarded as responsible states with advanced nuclear technology, they need to engage more widely and deeply with the international community in support of meaningful and legally-binding nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament measures, particularly the CTBT, as well those outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 1998.

The decision last year by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to adopt a proposal by the United States and other key supplier states to grant India-a non-signatory to the NPT and the CTBT-a once-off exemption from NSG nuclear trading restrictions was deeply disappointing to many and contrary to the 1995 NPT Review Conference commitment to engage in nuclear trade only with those states that accept full-scope safeguards.

In the wake of that episode, leading states have a responsibility to work much harder to encourage India to meet the same nonproliferation and disarmament standards expected of other states, including ratification of the CTBT. Responsible nuclear supplier states should also make it clear to Indian officials, as the United States has already done, that as a matter of national policy they will terminate nuclear trade with any state that conducts a nuclear test explosion regardless of the circumstances.

To help put the CTBT over the finish line, we also strongly urge that like-minded pro-CTBT states work together to develop a common diplomatic strategy to persuade the remaining states to sign and/or ratify the treaty. Pro-CTBT states should announce their intention to execute that strategy at the September 23-25 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT at the United Nations here New York.

To reinforce their commitment to the purpose and objectives of the CTBT, we also call upon all nuclear-armed nations to adopt clear policies not to develop or produce new design warheads or to modify existing warhead types in a manner that creates new military capabilities. The Obama administration has taken an important step in this direction by stating that it will "stop the development of new nuclear weapons."

To increase confidence in their commitment to the CTBT, we urge nuclear-armed states to seriously consider joining France in closing their test sites to all nuclear weapons-related research activities and experiments, particularly those involving fissile material, and, in the meantime, to adopt additional transparency measures at their test sites.

CTBT entry into force is within reach. The next one to two years may represent the best opportunity to secure the future of this long-awaited and much-needed treaty. We urge you to act now and to act with boldness.

Thank you.

This statement was coordinated by the Arms Control Association and has been endorsed by the following individuals and organizations:

Irma Arguello, Chair, Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation (Argentina)

Prof. Mashahiko Asada, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University

Hideyuki Ban, Co-Director, Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (Japan)

Cara Bautista, Coordinator, Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World (U.S.A.)

Barry Blechman, Distinguished Fellow, Henry L. Stimson Center (U.S.A.)

Jay Coughlin, Director, Nuclear Watch New Mexico (U.S.A.)

David Culp, Legislative Director, Friends Committee on National Legislation (U.S.A.)

Ambassador Jonathan Dean, former arms control negotiator, U.S. Department of State

Prof. Trevor Findlay, Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, Carleton University

Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute (U.S.A.)

Ambassador Robert Grey, former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

John Hallam, Coordinator, Nuclear Flashpoints (Australia)

Mort Halperin, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State 1996-2001 (U.S.A)

Prof. Frank von Hippel, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University

Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British-American Security Information Council (U.K.-U.S.A.)

Dr. Rebecca Johnson, Founding Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (U.K.)

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association (U.S.A.)

Kevin Knobloch, President, Union of Concerned Scientists (U.S.A.)

David Krieger, President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (U.S.A.)

John Rainwater, Executive Director, Peace Action West (U.S.A.)

Lawrence Scheinman, Distinguished Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies

Susi Snyder, Secretary General, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Vappu Taipale, M.D., Co-President, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Hiromichi Umebayashi, Special Adviser, Peace Depot (Japan)

Paul Walker, Director, Security and Sustainability, Global Green USA (U.S.A.).

Peter Wilk, MD, Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility (U.S.A.)

Angela Woodward, Executive Director, Verification, Research, Training, and Information Centre (U.K.)

Description: 

Statement by Representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Preparatory Meeting for the 2010 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Country Resources:

TRANSCRIPT: Carnegie Endowment Conference Panel on the Future of the CTBT

Sections:

Body: 

MODERATOR:

DARYL KIMBALL,

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

SPEAKERS:

SIDNEY DRELL,

PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS, EMERITUS,

SLAC NATIONAL ACCELERATOR LABORATORY

AMBASSADOR JAMES GOODBY,

RESEARCH FELLOW,

HOOVER INSTITUTION

AMBASSADOR TIBOR TÓTH,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PREPARATORY COMMISSION,

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION

TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 2009

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

From the 2009 Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation Conference

DARYL KIMBALL: If everyone could please find their seats, turn off their cell phones.

Welcome to the Polaris room. I'm Daryl Kimball. I'm executive director of the Arms Control Association. I'm moderating this session on the future of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the CTBT.

The prospects for the treaty this morning are considerably brighter in the afterglow of President Obama's speech in Prague, in which he outlined his vision for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation system, advancing U.S. and Russian efforts on nuclear disarmament and taking steps to prevent nuclear terrorism. And as most of you, if not all of you, have heard by now, he made his intentions on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty quite clear. He said, "to achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned."

Before we hear from our speakers, a few contextual thoughts on this issue a day after that speech. Why go for the CTBT? In essence, why is this treaty still - after five decades of pursuing it -- still a valuable global security instrument? The simple answer, and we'll hear more from our speakers is that by prohibiting the test explosions of all nations and all environments, the CTBT makes it far more difficult for states with advanced nuclear weapons programs to develop new types of nuclear warheads and it makes it more difficult for could be nuclear arm nations like Iran to proof test if they pursue nuclear weapons, more advanced types of nuclear warheads that could be placed on ballistic missiles and delivered by ballistic missiles.

And as the president said in his speech, the CTBT, of course is a central part of the global nuclear nonproliferation architecture, a key portion of the commitments from 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences and of course U.S. leadership on the test ban is going to be critical for the success of the 2010 conference.

And entry into force, we should not forget, is also critical to improving national and global efforts to detect and deter secret nuclear test explosions by the countries and making onsite inspections possible under the terms of the treaty.

Now, many people have been asking me and asking one anotherhow close are we to U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? On March 27, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry, provided what I considered to be the most accurate answer to that question. Not all members of Congress provide the most accurate answers, but I think he did in this case.

He said, quote, "We are very close. We don't have that many votes to win over to win. But they are serious folks" - that is, in the Senate - "and we are going to have to persuade them." He went on to say that his committee will hold hearings on the treaty. He did not say when. He said a vote by the full Senate he said is unlikely before next year.

In other words, and this is me again, not John Kerry, the political conditions are more favorable for ratification - U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty than they have ever been since the opening for signature of the treaty in September, 1996. And with smart and strong leadership from the president, securing the necessary two thirds, 67 votes, in the Senate before the end of 2010 and perhaps before the pivotal May, 2010, NPT review conference, is clearly within reach.

Now, Obama's call for immediate efforts on the CTBT are important in my view since the task of winning the support in the Senate is going to take some time. We can't go from zero to 67, if you will, overnight. There hasn't been a debate, meaningful discussion about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in about 10 years.

In order to move forward, the president, along with Senator Kerry are going to have to engage with the Senate, as we heard Jim Steinberg say at lunch yesterday, in a discussion to go over the technical issues, to listen to their concerns, to hear their views and to respond to those views. And of course the support of key Republicans such as John McCain and Senator Lugar, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, are going to be critical. And we should remember that John McCain in his 2008 presidential run said that we should take another look at the CTBT.

Now, the outcome of the debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the Senate will undoubtedly hinge upon the politics of the moment and the various calculations that individual senators are going to make. But it's also going to be based on the same three key technical and security issues that were the center of the Senate's 1999 debate and ultimately it's "no" vote on the treaty. And recognizing that reality, Secretary of State Clinton back in January at her confirmation hearing said, and I quote, "We need to ensure that the administration works intensively with senators so they are fully briefed on key technical issues and receive the best scientific evidence available."

Obama's pledge on Sunday to aggressively pursue CTB ratification in my view suggests that there will be a high level administration led effort, involving the White House and key members of the cabinet. And as we heard Jim Steinberg say at the luncheon yesterday, that effort will, in some way or another, be spearheaded by Vice President Biden.

Now, in light of all this, we've organized a panel discussion this morning on the three key technical issues that I believe, that many believe will be at the center of debate on the test ban in the next several months.

First, how have U.S. capabilities to safely and reliably maintain the existing arsenal improved? Is resumed testing or new design warheads technically necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile?

Dr. Sidney Drell of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Lab and a fellow at the Hoover Institution is going to talk about the developments with regard to the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program over the last decade.

Second, we're going to hear about verification and how global capabilities to detect clandestine test explosions have improved over the last decade, particularly with the International Monitoring System that is being developed and deployed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna. And we have with us here today Ambassador Tibor Tóth, the executive secretary of that organization, to report on that issue.

And finally and perhaps most importantly, how does the CTBT improve U.S. security by restricting the ability of other states to conduct nuclear test explosions? How does the CTBT today, in the 21st century improve the security situation in dangerous regions like the Middle East and South Asia? Ambassador Jim Goodby, who has a long, distinguished career in the field and particular on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as an advisor to General Shalikashvili with his report in 2001, is going to look at this issue.

And finally, as you listen to these presentations, I would ask you to think about one very important issue and that is that as a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and with the United States' nuclear test moratorium that's been in place since September, 1992, the United States already bears most CTBT-related responsibilities but has denied itself the political and security benefits of being a ratifying state. Such a situation, in my view, is extremely self-defeating since there is neither the need politically, militarily, or technically for renewed U.S. testing.

So following their remarks, and we'll go sequentially - we'll hear from you. I hope we have a robust discussion.

And first up is Dr. Sid Drell. Thanks for being here from California.

SIDNEY DRELL: I had a few slides, but I think we'll forget them. So in 1999, when the United States took the test ban discussion to the Senate, there was a very perfunctory inadequate debate, but the technical issue of could we maintain a safe, effective, reliable, secure stockpile without testing was one of the technical issues. And what I want to discuss is what have we learned since then? Should that still be a barrier in anyone's mind to ratifying the CTBT?

Since 1999 we've had 10 more years of a very well-supported, multifaceted Stockpile Stewardship Program created by the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. It was first created following the moratorium established under the first President Bush in 1992. During these 10 years since 1999, annually that program has certified the operation of our arsenal, its safety, reliability, and effectiveness. And it should now be said and let me say it with a simple quote from the heads of the weapons programs at the two laboratories, Bruce Goodwin at Livermore and Glenn Mara at Los Alamos - and this is their quote - "To date the SSP, Stockpile Stewardship Program has achieved remarkable successes. It has enabled the laboratory directors to assure the nation that we do not need to conduct a nuclear test to certify the deterrent is safe, secure, and reliable." Period.

Now, there're two fundamental measures of the program's success and they are the ability to discover causes for concern in the stockpile - the so-called significant findings, flaws due to production or design error or aging. And the second one is - its measure of success they've been able to fix these significant findings. And this process is responsive to and independently reviewed by the military's strategic command, who are the customers.

The good news comes together, however, also with a challenge. The SSP is a dynamic program and as the director of Livermore, George Miller, cautioned in recent testimony, "Sustaining the investments in stockpile stewardship is critical both to maintaining confidence in a likely increasingly smaller stockpile and providing the science and technology foundations that allow the laboratory to confront the defining issues of the 21st century."

Here let me give you - it will be listed on a slide, but you can't read it from the back of the room anyway. I can tell you what I consider the main technical achievements of the last decade that the labs have attested to.

First of all, there is what's called the Life Extension Program. We've refurbished the materials and components of the weapons in the stockpile to extend their lifetimes with high confidence. The first two of these LEPs, Life Extension Programs, were done for the ICBM warhead, the W87 and for the Trident warhead, the W76. There are more coming.

Most of the refurbishments and upgrades affect components outside the nuclear explosive package such as arming, fusing, firing, and boost gas transfer systems, which can be tested without nuclear tests under the CTBT. More to the point is has also been possible in the SSP to validate reengineered components within the nuclear explosive package on the basis of a suite of careful experiments and analyses that this program was able to do. And I'll come to that in a minute.

A second very important progress over the past decade is that Los Alamos has reestablished the capability to produce new plutonium pits, which are the core components of the primaries of a nuclear weapon. For the first time in 20 years, ever since Rocky Flats was closed down for environmental violations, the United States can build replacement pits. We have for the W88 Trident warhead and that has been certified for deployment, and if needed, in the future, should something happen to require it, we have demonstrated that capability without testing.

The third one is that a thorough multiyear study by the labs that was independently reviewed, critiqued by the JASON Group has removed the critical concern about the stability of the crystal structure of the plutonium metal due to radioactive decay while it's sitting in the stockpile. And we can confirm that their lifetimes are longer than very conservatively say 85 to 100 years. This finding was achieved as a result of significant advances in understanding.

Let me take a minute to say how can you worry about the radioactive decay of plutonium? It has a 22,000-year lifetime, which means that in any year one out of 22,000 plutonium nuclei decays. However, when that plutonium nucleus decays to a uranium and an alpha, a very energetic uranium nucleus is rattling around in the crystal structure. A solid has a crystal structure.

Plutonium, because of the large number of electrons-and for physicists the 5f electron has many phases under physical conditions-which are near each other. It's not very stable. And it's one phase you want and you want stabilized. But when the uranium nucleus is rattling around, it rattles until it slows down by knocking onto about 2,000 - more than 2,000 lattice sites where the plutonium nuclei are sitting. And if in one decay you rattle 2,000, that's one tenth of the one out of 22,000. In 10 years, you've perhaps rattled the cage and you've destroyed the crystal structure. It turns out that is not so. That's an experimental result. It turns out that the crystal heals itself. The displaced plutonium nucleus finds its place back where it belongs in the face centered crystal structure.

Experiments were done at SLAC and other labs by measuring X-ray fine structure, X-ray absorption fine structure and that is not happening. That is a major result which says that these pits- you're going to [be able to] count on them. And the other experiments showed that is the case in the order of a century.

That concern of having weapons more than 25 years old has been totally removed during the last decade. And another one I would mention is that the boost gas systems, when you have a plutonium implosion, what you do as the plutonium squeezes, you insert some deuterium and tritium into the cavity and as it squeezes and things heat up, you fuse plutonium - the deuterium and tritium join together and create an alpha particle - that's fusion. And you also create energetic neutrons. It's not the energy you get that way. It's the neutrons you get that way. And those neutrons speed up the fission process and that's why boosting - that's how boosting has made it possible to take a big bomb like the plutonium bomb over Nagasaki into a small bomb which then is the trigger that ignites the big secondary.

Well, boost gas systems have been improved and made more robust and therefore guarantee a large yield from the primary to ignite the secondary.

These are four major technical advances in 10 years. What were the essential ingredients of the Stockpile Stewardship Program that made these achievements possible? Well, the key technical achievement was made possible by advances in our understanding the science of what goes on in a nuclear explosion.

And let me say, looking ahead to an uncertain future, as long as we do have nuclear weapons - and we can all hope that President Obama will make good progress in what we've been hearing with great pleasure this last week - the nation will continue to need a strong, dynamic, science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program that does not call on testing, which has both the talent and the tools necessary to be able to respond to changes and surprises that may come up in the future strategically or technically. And with a strong infrastructure in stockpile stewardship, one can be sure that the president in the future, should he conclude or she conclude that due to strategic problems we may have to resume testing, we will have that capability. We will have the capability to respond to any future need.

And so what I'm saying is the Stockpile Stewardship Program has been a success without testing and I believe it's one that we have to maintain the success of without testing because we've displayed that testing has not been critical.

And what were the ingredients of the Stockpile Stewardship Program that made it successful? First of all, as a scientist, I can tell you the critical ingredient is to have good people working it, who know what they're doing and are embedded in the program, which allows them to maintain their skills. All the equipment in the world isn't going to buy you what you need if you don't have good scientists there and they don't come and stay if they're doing nothing.

We also must have a vigilant search for and discovery of problems in the stockpile that may arise from design errors or what not and that's what we've had and we've displayed we can do. Once the problem's discovered, people have to fix the problem. That takes both theory and experiment, theory to be able to try and understand what's wrong, but experiments to find out whether the theorists are right or wrong. And to have experiments, you need equipment and you need a support for a strong program.

Now, during the past 10 years, supercomputers have come. They have increased the capacity of these computers by a million fold. We can now - and this has been critical - do high fidelity three-dimensional calculations of the implosion process, and of what's going on in nuclear explosions. And we can do it for the first time with good, high fidelity, three-dimensional studies. And we have the advanced analytic tools and the codes developed to go with the super computers so that - with the high speed memory - so that's possible to carry out a program.

Additional facilities have been some small instruments in the lab, diamond anvil and what not, and big instruments. One of the things that it's important to do is to see as the implosion process goes ahead how that process is taking place, as you squeeze the plutonium down. Now we've had machines to do that, but now have much better machines. We can see what plasma instabilities are created. We can calculate them. We have models. We can test them with the computers and we can get data from the new machines - the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro-Test Facility. That's a new machine operating in Los Alamos which allows us to make three-dimensional pictures with this X-ray radiography with extremely high precision.

The new ignition facility - National Ignition Facility just completed and beginning its research campaign at Livermore, will allow us to test the codes, these very high power codes with the super computers against data in the laboratory and further confirm their accuracy, their validity under conditions that cannot otherwise be created, except by nuclear explosion.

So I think we have answered the questions that were raised and can now be removed as a barrier.

Finally, clearly there are concerns expressed by other people who don't agree with this and they say that the - as we work to refurbish the weapons we have, small margins of performance get smaller and we lose confidence. What matters is how big is the performance margin, the measure of how much output you're getting above what you need - how big that is compared with the uncertainties.

Now, with the boost system, you can increase the margins, but the main thing that stockpile stewardship has done, in my view, it's decreased the uncertainties because we understand things.

We can do physics now, not just models. So I believe that this increase of the ratio of the performance margins to the uncertainties has given more confidence in our stockpile now than we could have had on scientific basis 10 years ago.

So I disagree with those who say, we're losing confidence or the future is bleak although the present is good. And I do believe, as the head of STRATCOM said recently, the program's been successful. It's not the whole story, but we must have - and his words were, we must modernize the nuclear infrastructure. And that is true. The nuclear infrastructure's old. And so a balanced program maintaining the science, improving the infrastructure so we can continue to operate this way as long as we have weapons is the right answer. But the need for testing, I believe, has been put to sleep.

Thank you.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you.

Tibor? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR TIBOR TÓTH: Thank you so much. To illustrate the verification

capabilities, I would like to take you on a journey and I would like to bring you back to October, 2006 [and the DPRK nuclear test], and to walk you through how the system worked at that time. So it's 9th of October, 2006. For Washington and New York, 8th of October, 2006.

You have to recall that at that time our system was 50 percent in place in terms of the seismic stations. The readiness was lower for the noble gas component, 25 percent at that time and still we were not operating 24/7, around the clock. And of course, as it eventually turned out, the yield was a lower yield for a country to do it for the first time, 0.5 kiloton.

So against this background what happened? The first layer of verification - the seismic stations - recorded the data - 22 seismic stations, primary and auxiliary seismic stations. And we need three primary stations to include the event in our bulletin.

The geographic distribution is quite interesting and let me try to illustrate that point. The distribution of the stations is clear north and south, east and west. And if you have a look, Bolivia, La Paz, is more than 7,000 kilometers away.

The way the system functioned was first of all the stations tested, communication system tested because from the stations we have to move the data to Vienna. The international data center tested because the international data center had to do the analysis of the data and again because we distributed the data, raw data and the - what we call the process data, the communication system again was tested in both directions. As a result of that, we could test the components of the system, important ingredients; number two, functions; and number three, the timelines for all these functions were treaty-based timelines against the background that we were not operating and we are not operating 24/7.

Even a meeting of states signatories and ratifiers were initiated the same day when the test happened. The data generated by the seismic component is very much in conformity with the onsite inspection requirements. For your information, after entering into force, there will have to be an area of 1,000 square kilometers identified for the initiation of the onsite inspection. The area identified by the 22 stations was around 800 square kilometers, very much below the level required for the initiation of onsite inspection.

The next layer of the system is the noble gas component. And it's clear from the seismic data, which was recorded at that time that the data and the data products were leading to a manmade event. At the same time, the link had to be made whether this manmade event had a nuclear fingerprint or not, and this is where the noble gas technology came into the picture. First of all, we had to calculate the venting. We took the 0.5 kiloton as a reference point for that calculation. We had to do it as a function of time and of course as a function of the conditions prevailing in the territory of North Korea. And then with an additional technology, which we call atmospheric transport modeling, we tried to simulate and project how this release of xenon-133 might reach our noble gas stations.

I mentioned to you. We have 25 percent of the noble gas system in place. At that time, we had 10 out of the 14 noble gas stations in place. So we had to see and we had to hope that the closest stations like Japan or Mongolia will record the release of xenon. At the same time, what happened, it was [the station at] Yellowknife, Canada more than 7,000 kilometers that recorded it.

The atmospheric transport modeling is based on an input which is six million pieces of meteorological data per day. So I would like to demonstrate to you in a much simpler way. And here you see the dispersion pattern. And this is a three-dimensional model at the altitude identified with different colors.

The message here that, of course, with replication of a certain exclusion modeling, where other potential sources of release were identified as well and excluded from this dispersion pattern, we could correlate the release as projected by us at the DPRK test site with the time, with the absolute amount and with the pattern of the recording.

The xenon-133 traveled for 12 days. The half life is relatively short. It's - half of that time is the half life of that particular noble gas. And in addition to that, the eventual amount recorded at Yellowknife, Canada, was the equivalent of 300 atoms of xenon-133. So it's a very minute quantity.

The importance of these findings for the noble gas component was, number one, the recording facilities worked, the laboratories functioned very much along the expectations and again we were doing that exercise in the conditions of what we call provisional operation, not the 24/7 type of operation, but against the timelines prescribed by us in terms of releasing the data once the data is processed and the data products.

The yield is, of course, relevant here as well. If you put together the seismic and the noble gas component, practically what emerged as a result of the DPRK test is an unforced test upon the verification system. In a situation where the readiness for their own 25-50 percent - that was the range. And the yield of this particular test was 30-50 times smaller than first test yields taken historically from other nuclear weapon countries.

What is interesting to see - okay, we were there in October, 2006. Where are we in April, 2009? And here I would like to mention first of all the build up - the title of this event is "Break or Build." We are in the build-up process. The build up of the stations brought us to 250 seismic stations compared to 180 where we were in 2006 - 180 vs. 250.

The number of the noble gas systems doubled in the last more than two years. So we moved from 10 of those noble gas stations to 22 by now. And if you allow me, this is where we were in October 2006. And this is where we are. I try to illustrate for the back row as well a bit some of the difference. And the difference is 70 more stations and facilities added to the system.

That will have to be translated into what we call detection capabilities. And this is the detection capability back in 2006 and the point which is relevant here, the North Korean test was magnitude four detected event, green. So what you see with green color here is the detection capability, which in the case of North Korea was 0.5 kiloton. What is turquoise or what is moving in the blue, turquoise is 3.5 and blue is magnitude three. And let me show the present detection capability. And again, for the back rows, let me just move back and forth. And for those who are sitting closer, again I would like to call your attention to the blue and the turquoise which quite significantly improved in the last two years. And just to give you some rough calculations and I do not claim that I'm the source of these calculations, but magnitude 3.5 is the equivalent range of 0.1 kiloton. And magnitude three is the equivalent range of tens of tons, 0.0 something, might be 0.3 as low as that particular number. So I hope that this is giving you some approximate reference point.

The detection capability does not reflect, number one, the auxiliary stations. And here some calculations are indicating that through the auxiliary stations, an additional improvement of 0.25, 0.5 magnitude can be achieved. These slides, of course, do not reflect some of the additional capabilities which might be gained as a result of other international systems and other national systems. It's extremely important not to forget those systems internationally functioning, regionally functioning, providing regional seismic data about events. Another technology, noble gas, there is an increase of national noble gas capacities. It is to a certain degree a spin-off of some of our success efforts like creating a noble gas system which can be transported. It's called - (inaudible) - and it was used as well in the context of DPRK by some countries and onsite inspection. Of course, what you see here does not reflect this.

The last points I would like to make and then to sum up what is the message here, the progress which has been made compared to the period 1996 to 1999, let's take this period, when the treaty emerged from the drawing board of Geneva and when the U.S. Senate ratification failed. If you take 1996 Geneva, what was foreseen at that time [was] the seismic component being able to deliver one kiloton detection sensitivity for underground seismic events with a full blown system in place. What the National Academy of Science's report did foresee in 2002- and still this was more a concept. It was not reality. It was a concept. It did foresee that with the full blown system the detection level might be as good as 0.1 kiloton. The example of North Korea's is a reality not a concept. And the reality, as you could see, that with only 50 percent readiness of the system, the 0.1 kiloton level was achieved in the northern hemisphere for defining areas U.S., Russian Federation, China.

What the 2009 slide hopefully revealed to you that as a reality we are moving to this 0.0 something that is tens of tons of the detection capability, still with a system which is 75 percent ready because 250 stations means the system is 75 percent ready.

And as a last slide, let me leave you with this notion that we will have another 25 percent of muscle just on the seismic system. Especially with addition of national technical means, other international systems, and the onsite inspection component [we have] a high degree of confidence that the treaty can be monitored,. {Or in the parlance of} the Nitze-Baker requirements for the verification: no test of military significance can go undetected.

I would stop here, though, I would like to make later on some points. I don't think that the treaty should be approached just on basis of verification, as a low lying fruit, verification around the corner, verification which is needed.

I think what we will have to do is to assess what are the demand-side requirements but as for the supply side, yes - verification in accordance with those criteria apply to other arms control agreements is something which is doable.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you, Ambassador Tóth, and just by the way, there are a few copies of the executive summary of the 2002 National Academy Science Report on the Tactical Issues on the CTB in the back. If we've run out, they're on the Arms Control Association Web site as well as the Shalikashvili Report from 2001, which Ambassador Jim Goodby will be making reference to in a couple of minutes.

Ambassador Goodby?

AMBASSADOR JAMES GOODBY: Thank you, Daryl and thank all of you for coming out. After five decades of talk, as our president said, it's refreshing to see so many people interested in this subject, which to me is worth five decades if we can achieve some results at the end of it.

I think this is one of those good news/bad news stories that we're telling here on the platform. We've heard very good news from the two previous speakers. Now, I'd like to tell you a little bad news, which in a word is that the nonproliferation regime, which we've tried to build up over five decades, has deteriorated in the last 10 years or so. Just think about it. Just mention a few names: North Korea, Iran, Syria, A.Q. Khan. I don't need to elaborate. Those names speak for themselves.

The splits between nuclear haves and have-nots has widened, and even my use of those terms shows you what the roots of the problem really are. The basic bargain of the Nonproliferation Treaty has lost credibility. People don't believe that it's still operative. The 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty review conference was close to a disaster. The U.N. summit meeting of that same year failed to reach agreement on measures to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, a real disgrace in the words of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The renaissance in civil nuclear power is poised to spread technology and materials around the world in the next decades. Is it going to be safeguarded? The additional protocols of the IAEA are still a long way from becoming universals. Tensions in the Middle East and South Asia have risen, no end in sight. As summed up by George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn in their Wall Street Journal article of a couple of years ago, and I quote, "The world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era," unquote.

They believed - I think they still believe - that reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence is "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective," their words. A comprehensive effort to revitalize and restore credibility for the nonproliferation regime is needed, desperately needed and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must be part of it.

Daryl Kimball mentioned General Shalikashvili's report and I'd like to say a bit more about that. General Shalikashvili was asked in the year 2000, after the Senate had turned down the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to talk to senators, and Nancy Gallagher and I accompanied General Shalikashvili. I think Nancy is in the room. We talked to at least a third of the Senate, people that we thought would be influential and we wanted to hear their views.

And as a result of all those discussions, General Shalikashvili prepared a report, which he presented to President Clinton in 2001 in January. The essence of that report was that General Shalikashvili saw the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as one key element in a network of barriers against proliferation - not a panacea in itself, but an element critical to the success of the whole project.

As Daryl Kimball has noted, his report pointed out that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would prevent the advanced nuclear weapon states from making significant improvements in their weapon stockpiles and it would prevent non-nuclear weapon states from entering into a nuclear weapon status, except perhaps through a primitive gun-type atom bomb.

I might parenthetically say here that Sid Drell was one of those who briefed General Shalikashvili about the effects of testing and the effects of discontinuing testing. And I think perhaps he might want to say something later about that particular aspect of it.

Because General Shalikashvili understood that what the nuclear powers do, in fact, does effect the decisions of other countries.

And testing is perhaps the most visible of nuclear weapons activities. It amounts, in my view, to a signal to the world that the testing state has little or no intention of complying with the provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and that it probably regards nuclear arsenals as a nonnegotiable element of its defense posture. That's what testing signals.

Now, each state, of course, that is thinking about the test ban treaty has to make its own mind, make its own assessment of the effect of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because no agreement, especially the nuclear field can be considered risk free. No nuclear weapons program itself is without risk for that matter. And that assessment is always in order. If the advantages outweigh the risks, one proceeds. If not, one does not.

Now, General Shalikashvili's assessment of the advantages for the United States was as follows. And I'm quoting directly from his report. I think from what Daryl has said, his report is at the back of the room. You can read it.

He said, "The test ban treaty will complicate and slow down the efforts of aspiring nuclear states, especially regarding more advanced types of nuclear weapons. It will hamper the development by Russia and China of nuclear weapons based on new designs and will essentially rule out certain advances. It will add to the legal and political constraints that nations must consider when they form their judgments about national defense policies. The Test Ban Treaty," he said, "is vital to the long-term health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and will increase support for other elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy.

The United States is well positioned to sustain its nuclear deterrent under the test ban treaty. The verification regime established under the Treaty will enhance the United States' own very capable nuclear test monitoring system and foster new techniques to improve verification. The Treaty will make it easier to mobilize domestic and international support for clarifying ambiguous situations and for responding vigorously if any nation conducts a nuclear test."

Much has changed both for good and for bad in the past 10 years. But those assessments, I believe, remain correct.

Now, the past 10 years have shown us how unilateral moratoriums work and how they don't work. We've learned some things about them. And one lesson is that instabilities are inherent in moratoriums. When any participant can drop out with little or no notification, an atmosphere of the temporary is inescapable. This makes it difficult to support institutions like the CTBT office that are essential, in my view, to the long-term consensus in favor of banning explosive tests.

Another instability is that since there are no agreed standards regarding the scope of a moratorium, there are always bound to be doubts about whether there is a leveled playing field among the countries observing those moratoriums.

And a third is that there is no agreed way to remove doubts about other nations' actions: no on-site inspections, no transparency at test sites. The general expectation that a binding treaty is not in the cards obviously discourages any state that might be thinking about refraining from nuclear weapons program from doing so. I think, for example, that a CTBT would be a higher barrier for Iran to jump over than is a moratorium, probably the same for North Korea as well. I think there is no real alternative to a fully ratified CTB, in short.

The importance of the context for a CTBT cannot be overstated. President Obama has said that he will work to put us on the road to a world without nuclear weapons. What the end of a two tier system, if that is in sight - as I hope it is - my guess is that it will easier for CTBT holdouts to accept the test ban. I hope therefore that all possessors of nuclear weapons will rally around the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. It isn't a simple or an easy thing to do, but it provides a goal and it provides a compass. It should help nations to think more positively about a test ban.

But conversely, if we can't get a test ban and enforce the outlaw preliminary nuclear weapons is bleak.

And I wind up by paraphrasing a statement made by Shultz, Kissinger, Perry and Nunn, and this is it: without a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons will not be perceived as realistic or possible. It's that important.

Thanks.

(Applause.)

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you very much. All right, everyone. Now it's your turn to ask questions, pose thoughts. We've got a very expert audience here. It's quite an amazing gathering today. There's a microphone in the middle. Please state your name. Try to get to your question quickly.

We'll begin with you, sir.

Q: I'm Bob Civiak. I'm an independent consultant most recently working with Nuclear

Weapons Complex Consolidation Policy Network.

Dr. Drell gave a very good defense of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, but there are other more cheaper and more reliable and more certain ways of maintaining the United States stockpile and that's simply stopping making changes to nuclear weapons. That's a complicated issue and I don't want to go into that here.

What I do want to mention is that the NNSA spends more than 50 percent of its budget on nuclear weapons doing research and development primarily to improve the codes to predict the behavior of an exploding nuclear weapon. Most of that work is important for designing new nuclear weapons and the NNSA has proposed two new nuclear weapons over the last few years, and now they're proposing to continue to develop nuclear weapons through an advanced LEP program.

And my question is, is granting additional money to the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the ability to continue to make changes to nuclear weapons consistent with President Obama's view of decreasing the importance of nuclear weapons? Is it consistent with our CTB obligations to end the nuclear weapons arms race? Or is it making a deal with the devil to spend more money on stockpile stewardship in order to get a CTBT?

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Thank you. Before you jump into that, Sid, let's take one more question and then we'll respond.

Q: Thank you. Rebecca Johnson, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. I'd like to thank all the panelists for really very, very good presentations - very thoughtful, very useful.

A couple of weeks ago, I was speaking to Ambassador Stephen Ledogar by phone, and some of you may know he was appointed by George Bush senior to complete the Chemical Weapons Treaty negotiations and then retained by President Clinton to head the U.S. delegation for the CTBT negotiations in Geneva in the 1990s. And he was very, very troubled and had said to me that there was a story or there was a story circulating in Washington that the Russians had not accepted the zero-yield interpretation of the scope of the finalized treaty. And anyone who was involved in the negotiations at that time, and I know that the chair of the final year, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker is actually here, would know that that's complete nonsense. But my question for the panel is from where are such false accusations arising? Are they being taken seriously? Are they playing in the attempts to get ratification? And what can be done to put the record straight?

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Ambassador Goodby, you might want to handle that one, but let's - Sid, do you want to answer the first question that Bob Civiak just put forward?

MR. DRELL: Yes. The Life Extension Program is not in any way, I believe, involved in designing new weapons. The discussion of the reliable replacement warhead, the RRW, was different from - the LEP program said there were parts in the weapons chemicals, tritium, and so forth that have to be changed periodically, they age.

And the Life Extension Program was a program which was refurbishing -- sticking as close as possible to the existing designs. Some manufacturing processes have changed over the years and you have to take that into account.

The RRW program was moving more toward changing some of the components significantly for reasons of making the margins bigger rather than the uncertainties smaller.

And I think it's wrong to mischaracterize the program that way. These weapons are living longer than we've had experience with. And I believe it is important to do the science, to have the computer codes and so forth, so that our confidence in these weapons can be attested to without getting new data unavailable without testing. So I think a healthy SSP program is part of what's going to be the sensible policy without testing.

The technical definition of zero, to answer your question, is that no sustaining chain reaction be created. There is no ideal zero. Plutonium-239 made in a reactor comes with another isotope in small percentage, Pu-240. And that does spontaneously fission. And that point is being abused by those who oppose the CTBT because the energy released without a chain reaction from spontaneous fission is so many orders of magnitude below what the high explosives is yielding that it's silly to even talk about.

AMB. GOODBY: Rebecca, the question you asked has been around since the very days in which the treaty was testified to by the Clinton administration. Not only Steve Ledogar should be troubled, but also former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright should be troubled because she very specifically told the Senate that there had been conversations with the Russians and other nuclear weapon states and that there was agreement that zero means zero.

There were discussions among the nuclear-weapon states, not widely revealed because there were a lot of non nuclear weapon states also negotiating this treaty, that simply picked up the language of the existing Limited Test Ban Treaty which has been in force now since 1963.

And behind the scenes, the nuclear weapon states agreed that zero meant zero. They specifically agreed that hydrodynamic tests would be permitted, hydro nuclear tests, which do have some sustained fission yield - very short - would be prohibited. We've talked to a lot of people who were involved in those discussions as well as read the testimony. That seems to have been widely agreed. I think there's no doubt that the Russian ambassador at the time stated this, and I understand that in testimony before the State Duma they said the same thing. So there should not be any doubt about the agreement as to what the scope of the treaty is. And still these rumors persist.

MR. KIMBALL: Yes, and I think those rumors are based upon opponents of the CTBT selectively quoting officials from the Russian government, mostly in the late '90s, that were ambiguous about this issue. But, as Ambassador Goodby said, there's a definitive statement from 2000 during the course of the State Duma deliberations on the CTBT in which the senior Russian government official said, and I quote, "Qualitative modernization of nuclear weapons is only possible through full scale and hydronuclear tests with the emission of fissile energy, the carrying out of which directly contradicts the CTBT," close quote.

Next question, Bruce McDonald.

Q: I'm Bruce McDonald with the Strategic Posture Review Commission. I find the arguments that our distinguished panelists make quite compelling.

But let me - with that is a - and I'm a supporter of the CTBT, but with that as a preface let me raise one question that's been rattling around for a while and it comes as no surprise that it's been rattling around more lately. I'm sure we're going to hear a lot more of it as well, and that's the question of decoupling.

The concern that some have expressed is that, while the international monitoring system is quite good, that it is possible in doing tests in a cavern and with various enclosures and that sort of thing, that it's possible to muffle the effect of a nuclear blast by anywhere from a factor of 10 to 100.

And so that being able to restricting or to tech down to a few tens of pounds, I guess that would be - or tons rather of explosive yield that one - again, I'm quoting them, this is not my argument - that you're talking about - you know, yields up to maybe a kiloton or so, and that being able to conduct tests such as that on the sly would provide some significant advantage, particularly in the area of small scale tactical weapons which right now Russia is probably less concerned about their strategic arsenal than their tactical arsenal, especially vis-à-vis China.

So what I'd like to ask our panelists, what is your response to this question that is not new, but it has strong legs, apparently? And I'd be interested if you all could shed some light.

And then as just one postscript really to thank you all for your unstinting service on behalf of this cause over many, many years. It's really a gift to the country and the world.

(Applause.)

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Thank you. We'll take one more question and then we will try to answer the questions. Jay Coghlan.

Q: I'm Jay Coghlan with Nuclear Watch New Mexico. And Mr. Drell, you cited the JASON pit lifetime study as one of the four technical breakthroughs or achievements over the last decade that will help enable CTB ratification.

As a brief background, a gentleman that you no doubt knew, J. Carson Mark at Los Alamos, the ex-director of the theoretical division, but he told me in 1996 that Los Alamos had set aside plutonium pits for decades for the express purpose of studying aging. And in his own words, I quote, "The big news was no news." And then I filed a Freedom of Information Act request for that - denied, classified. That didn't sit well with me.

So when I heard in 2004 that NNSA was doing their own pit lifetime studies, I then went to an aid of Senator Bingaman asking that there should be required independent review of those pit lifetime studies. So the senator subsequently got an amendment in the 2005 Defense Authorization Act and enhanced the JASON pit lifetime study. Now, since that time, NNSA has been alleging other problems - possible problems with weapons reliabilities, specifically with secondaries.

My question to you becomes if the JASONs were to do another study on weapons reliability, and if it was up to you, what issues would you like to explore?

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Thank you. But let's first try to address the decoupling question which I think has been around as long as going back to Edward Teller and folks like that.

Ambassador Tóth, would you like to take a crack at that, and maybe, Jim, you can add something more.

AMB. TÓTH: Yes. Let me recall the detection capabilities slide first. So I made a reference to this 0.03 level, and if you make the computation, then, if you go to the lower end of this range, you need a decoupling factor of 100 to have this one kiloton event decoupled and muffled to this level, making it noticeable by the system.

As a layman, as a diplomat, what I came across in the literature is the decoupling factor of 70 which was achieved in the United States in an experiment back in 1966 with a yield of 0.38 kiloton.

So that level is practically beneath the level which the National Academy of Sciences and JASON is identifying as a military significant one. And another element here is that this decoupling was carried out in a sort of cavity which was created by a previous blast of 5.6 or 5.8 kiloton.

As for the Russian Federation, what you come across in the literature is a factor of 12, historically. This is going back to 1976. This is based on a cavity created by an explosion of 70 kilotons and the decoupling led to this factor of 12.

There is another complexity here besides the detection, and I think Dave Hafemeister, who was sitting in this room, has an amazing series of publications about that. He is naming practically six criteria of how to address the issue of decoupling.

And the point he is making that these criteria have to be applied together, and with this criteria one can move from a 90 percent probability level down to 50 percent probability in the case of three tests 15 percent probability that a test would go undetected.

What he is mentioning, the excursion of the yield, especially for a country which is doing it for the first time, this is something very difficult to fix the right way. And here you might recall the DPRK test because earlier, before the test, some of the early indications were of a higher yield than eventually turned out, so it might have been a sort of a not just a fusion but a phenomenon which might be quite close to an excursion yield.

Element number three, besides the two ones I mentioned already, the venting. The venting, number one, is related and correlated to the yield. For those who are knowledgeable in this area, the lower the yield, the better the chances are in a cavity environment there is a venting happening - that the noble gas particulates will be seeping to the surface. So this trade off is again working against too low yield events going on because of the venting.

And for your information, there was a reference about a one kiloton event decoupled. But what I tried to point out in the context of the DPRK was a 0.5 kiloton event, a 0.5 kiloton event which the 25 percent readiness of system was in very extreme circumstances recorded and attributed.

In addition to that, there are other elements like new technologies - InSAR technology which could identify the change of the surface up to the precision of a couple of millimeters as we understand from the literature as well.

So there are a number of ifs and question marks, and especially for a new country, these ifs are extremely complicated to handle in the conjunction and there is a question for both a practitioner, a nuclear weapon state. But here, the question of, again, the Nitze-Baker definition of verification is coming in place, whether those potential cheatings are of military significance or not or rather they can be identified and intersected innovate that the benefits can be readdressed and denied of those who are carrying off.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you. And as we consider the questions that will arise regarding verifiability, I think we shouldn't lose sight of the reality that today the United States has an interest, and the world has an interest in detecting with high confidence clandestine nuclear explosions. And the fundamental question we've got to ask is, are we in a better situation with the treaty in force or without? And the answer is clear. So that's the other thing to keep in perspective as these questions do arise.

So, Dr. Drell, do you want to respond or answer the question that Jay Coughlin asked about?

MR. DRELL: I generally believe that as long as we have an arsenal and we want to know that it's safe, reliable, and secure, we should have continual reviews and analyses of what's going on.

So you asked, if there any special problem about a secondary or what not. I think that it should be studied like we were called upon at JASON to study the plutonium lifetime.

I just think, though, a strong scientific program studying the processes that are going on in a very complicated event; namely, a nuclear explosion, is part of maintaining a community of weapon scientists who will be prepared should something we haven't anticipated come up in the future or should the strategic situation change and we may need to go back to thinking more seriously about nuclear weapons.

I can't think of any one thing, but I do believe a strong program to show that one has the vigilance along the way. There are many areas where predictive physics still does not exist. The Congress is supporting now something called the national boost initiative. The boost physics is very complicated and getting more fundamental predictive physics involved I think is good. So my belief is we do need a healthy stockpile stewardship program, and I consider that a part of the CTBT world that I aspire to.

MR. KIMBALL: All right. We'll take two more questions. Another round, please.

Q: Good morning. My name is Rebecca Davis. I work with the Air Force's International Treaties and Agreements branch. My question relates to the issue that I think is going to be the hardest when we talk about getting the votes for the CTBT and that is stockpile reliability. I believe it was back in the fall at Carnegie that Secretary Gates said that he believes for the future, we either need an RRW, or the ability to test for a stockpile. When you go back to the congressional testimony over the past couple of years, the lab directors always talk about the increased risk that we face with the aging stockpile.

So when this debate comes up, rational people are going to disagree on this issue and I'd like to hear how you make sense of that, and then, do you think there's going to have to be certain concessions, the six safeguards like they had in 1999 concessions to have an RRW? How do you think that issue is going to resolve?

MR. KIMBALL: Okay. I mean, Sid Drell's whole presentation addressed that fundamental issue about whether new designed warheads are necessary. But Sid, do you respond directly to what Gates said at Carnegie?

MR. DRELL: My point was that your confidence in the weapon depends upon how big your performance margins are compared with the uncertainties. And that if you're going to change the weapons - the RRW approach was to change the weapons, make a hybrid or something.

And to do that without testing the new combination is no way to decrease the uncertainties in how well you know the margins. The LEP approach concentrated very much on trying to make the weapon as close as possible to the one already has if you take into account changed manufacturing process and things like that, including environmental factors in order to decrease the uncertainty.

And I think that, first of all, the political decision has been made, no RRW. We're going to stick with LEPs.

Secondly, I think that scientifically that is the right one for this time because the margin over the uncertainty is being improved by, first of all, making modest improvements in margins by better boost systems, but making significant decreases in uncertainties and, therefore, making the ratio larger.

But I do believe that part of maintaining a Stockpile Stewardship Program and confidence in the stockpile is to have the ability to meet future unknown problems that may arise.

And you do that by a good research program which maintains good people, hones their skills, and opens a spectrum of possible responses to potential needs.

That's why I thought it was interesting that the chairman of STRATCOM talked about maintaining the ability to respond by modernizing the infrastructure - no longer saying modernizing the weapon in that statement, if you read it, which I thought it was interesting. So it is not a trivial problem to maintain a confidence in a deterrent as long as we have it without testing and to convince people that we know what we're talking about.

And therefore, one has got to continue what I consider a strong program. And that's going to mean that in the present budget cycle, one is going to have to see that the weapons labs are going to come in and going to say, if the budget continues to go down in the science and technology part, they're going to begin to question their ability to maintain the stockpile just based on a diminishing Stockpile Stewardship Program. And they're going to have to be listened to on that point because I do believe that we need to keep a healthy program for scientists and to prevent surprise.

MR. KIMBALL: On the political point, very quickly, before we get to the other questions -we're running out of time - on end-game trades. This has been in the air for months as the proponents of RRW have sought to revive a program that is dead.

The starting gun on the discussion on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has just sounded.

What the end-game bargains may be to get the final consent it may have absolutely nothing to do with any of the issues we're talking about today. It may have to do with a road project somewhere or something else.

So I think it's premature to talk about what is it going to take, especially if you consider what I said at the beginning which is that there hasn't been a serious debate about this subject in 10 years.

Most senators probably couldn't tell you what RRW is if you ask them what it is. So there's a lot of time we go before we can really answer the question what are the end-game bargain is.

But the other thing -- and I would be remiss in not mentioning this -- in all my contacts with diplomats from various countries, there's another issue that comes up that the United States - Democrats and Republicans - have to consider with respect to a new design warhead program. It is that if the United States is pursuing a new design of warheads in the name of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the purpose of which is to end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons arsenals, countries will ask, well, what is the point of the CTBT? And countries with nuclear weapons who are trying to maintain their weapons or maybe modernize their weapons, they're not going to believe anything that the U.S. administration says about "no new military capabilities."

So I think this would severely undermine the entire purpose, and going back to Jim Goodby's point, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a key part of the global nonproliferation architecture and it would make that part of the architecture wet cement rather than solid cement. So that's another thing to consider.

Next question. Jennifer?

Q: Jennifer Mackby from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And I just thought I would mention to the people in the room there is an independent scientific study going on to determine and evaluate the verification capabilities of the system. These are top scientists from all around the world in their fields, whether it's infrasound, radionuclide, seismic, et cetera, all the technologies involved in the treaty -

MR. KIMBALL: And when is the event coming up?

Q: - in addition to data fusion and data mining. And they will their final results in June in a large conference in Vienna, and we, CSIS, and AAAS will be bringing those results here to Washington, D.C., in July for those of you who are interested. So stay tuned. Thank you.

MR. KIMBALL: All right.

Q: I have no idea - of course, the U.S. will be doing its own studies and they're unlikely to listen to those internationals. But you never know. There will be some American scientists involved in this international study.

MR. KIMBALL: I wouldn't be surprised if the United States didn't start listening to others. But all right. Thank you, Jennifer.

Larry, your question.

Q: Surely that the CTB is the most frustrating endeavor in the history of diplomacy. Fifty-two years ago, Jim Goodby and I in London were dealing with this and exchanging cartoons on the subject. For the young ones here, 52 years is more than a half of century. (Laughter.) He doesn't look it, but I do. (Laughter.)

But seriously, in London, 52 years ago, if they hadn't had a horrible diplomatic error on the part of the U.S. negotiator, we very well might have had the first arms agreement be a CTBT. And we had Eisenhower as the president who would have gotten it ratified fairly easily, I believe.

In the early '60s, the argument got down to, did Ambassador Dean agree to four inspections, as the Russians claimed, or six to eight on-site inspections? That was the difference. People weren't that involved in the technicalities then. And we had people like some very distinguished scientists arguing you're going test back of the moon, the Russians would test back of the moon. And they will always have arguments against this.

My question that I'd like to put now to the panel is what do they think is the most serious argument that has to be overcome of all of the various arguments that will be raised in order to get the 67 votes? And related to that, what do they think will be the role of the public in this? Because, let's not forget: it was the discovery and the increased awareness of strontium-90 and carbon-14 and mother's milk in the bones of children that had more to do with the ratification of the limited test ban treaty than any technical discussion in or out of the government.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you, Larry Weiler.

Let's take the last question and then we'll respond and then I'm going to give each of the speakers a couple of minutes to wrap up their thoughts. Yes, sir.

Q: Hi. I'm Sharior Shariv (ph) with the World Federalist Movement. I basically have a management question for Ambassador Tóth or the panel. And the question is that having the fact that IAEA is part of the U.N., but in my understanding, CTBT is a separate organization, its own members and contributions of the members probably were - that's where the budget comes from.

And then we have NPT, yet another organization, and START is being restarted so that would be a bilateral organization.

Has there been any effort, as far as you know, to streamline things, to bring them under one umbrella either under the U.N., if the U.N. is the right organization to handle it, or any kind of attempt to streamline these organizations?

MR. KIMBALL: All right. Thank you. Why don't we start with Larry Weiler's question about what's going to be most difficult - I think we might come up with three, or four, five different answers about that. But Sid, Jim, Tibor, your thoughts.

AMB. GOODBY: I think one of the important issues is whether one can get senators to read the treaty. (Laughter.) I don't mean in the insulting way, although I admit, it does sound that way. But I doubt very much that any senator, certainly in the past 10 years has read it.

I read through it again just a couple of days ago. It's a powerful document. It provides for on-site inspection. It provides the mechanics of doing it. It is a document that if senators read through it, they will find that there are review provisions, that there is a potential for setting up a scientific advisory panel on call. There are so many useful things in it that in my mind outweigh the questions that have been raised that I can't really believe the senators have read it that carefully and understand what it does. So that would be number one.

And number two, I think, would be to convince senators that in fact, a lot has changed as I've been emphasizing the bad things that have happened, but as you listen to the other speakers, we are so much ahead of where we were in terms of verification and in terms of the understanding of how nuclear weapons work that it's almost, in my mind, a no-brainer to say, yes, obviously, we should go ahead and ratify.

So there are some fundamental things that I think have to be done by the Senate. But it's going to take a while to work our way through senator by senator talking about this treaty. But I think in the end we'll succeed.

MR. KIMBALL: Ambassador Tóth, your thoughts, and if you could address the last gentleman's question.

AMB. TÓTH: I think we have to pay the necessary attention to the verification issue. I don't think it took place back in 1999. There is a need to involve scientists, to have a fresh look.

But I don't think this is the defining issue. And to a certain degree, of course, there is a complicated discussion about the stockpile stewardship. Again, I don't necessarily believe if you try to look upon the ratification from a positive point of view that answering the questions of be it verification or stockpile stewardship will be enough.

Probably what we will have to do is to revisit the benefits of the treaty from a wider perspective, from a post-'99, post-2001 viewpoint. And this is what Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and Nunn put forward in the context of the U.S. and the Russian Federation is relevant not only for the U.S. and Russia but relevant for all the other eight countries whose ratification is still needed for the entry into force, how they put this issue in the context of not just a potential miscalculation but how they put this issue in the context of a potential terrorist nexus to nuclear weapons vis-à-vis their own security.

I think the only angle they can answer this question of ratification or non-ratification, would it make a difference for them as a country, would it make a difference for any of those nine outstanding ratifiers from the point of view of the terrorist nexus of nuclear weapons, increasing amounts of fissile material, increasing amounts of facilities, increasing numbers of people and institutions and technology holders, and what might be the link between some of the security issues they are facing here in the U.S., in Asia, in South Asia, and in the Middle East. That question is, of course, relevant from the point of view of the issue of the challenges.

And there was a question over the IAEA, and I might link the two questions here. There is a distinctive delineation between what the IAEA is doing and what the CTBT is supposed to do. IAEA is talking care of the up-stream barriers, layers of defense against the misuse of nuclear technology, fissile material, preventing the weaponization. And what the test ban treaty is doing it's practically the last barrier on that road. This is the last barrier which a country would have to cross to enter the nuclear club.

The complexity on the upstream elements is that the distinctions are becoming blurred, dual-use technologies. On this final barrier, fortunately, we are not affected by the dual-use nature of technologies. Nuclear weapon tests are nuclear weapon tests. There's no peaceful use of nuclear weapon tests.

From that point of view, the specific cases like North Korea, the specific case of Iran will have to be factored in. Whether this last barrier is to be the last one to be put in place or not - why this is the last barrier probably be it in the context of the DPRK or in the context of Iran or any other issue coming up, this layer of defense will have to be put in place as soon as possible, especially in a situation where the P-5 countries might sign up to a norm and might be undertaking obligations which they would legitimately expect to be respected by others as well.

So this whole issue of discrimination, different obligations, preaching while doing other things is becoming irrelevant. This issue for North Korea, for Iran, for any country will come up not as a part of those particular negotiations but a totally different game plan that these countries will have to follow those rules which others are hopefully following as a result of a hopeful ratification.

MR. KIMBALL: Excellent points. Sid?

MR. DRELL: What an historic moment. For the first time in 20 years leaders of two very powerful countries have said, we want to get rid of nuclear weapons. It's a huge moment.

That's changed the context. Everything is open.

If I worry about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty verification, then let's have a little more transparency. That was talked about 20, 10 years ago because there's every reason once the CTBT is in force that the United States and Russia could - I think the real worry about verification comes down to what are the "bad" Russians doing? What are nuclear countries doing that we're not doing?

Of course, you worry, otherwise, about proliferation. But I think the political opposition is based on concern that the Russians are cheating. Let's have on-site stations at Novaya Zemlya and in Nevada. We've offered. People have talked about that. It's not new. It would seem that you just have to ratify the CTBT and that problem will go away. So I think transparency is very important.

We have a six-month withdrawal clause from the CTBT because we have to be prepared in case things change. That's why I say we have to have a good science program so if that six-month withdrawal clause has to be invoked, we are ready and we know what we're doing.

And so, I think maintaining a Stockpile Stewardship Program, one of the issues that wasn't mentioned but has to be is this urgent push for the RRW really was based on an argument which was new. It said, we have to make these weapons more resistant to a terrorist using it against us if they capture one. That's a point worth looking into. The RRW did look into that. They didn't get all the way there when they were stopped and one didn't know how much you could accomplish that without testing. And so there are legitimate issues which require that we keep alive this idea.

[The} treaty has a six-month withdrawal clause and we'd better not put our guard down. And that's why I think maintaining the Stockpile Stewardship Program healthy is going to be a very important part of the debate.

MR. KIMBALL: Thank you. One final thought in response to Larry Weiler's good question about the role the public and the other tough issue. This is an international conference. It's a public conference. The role of the public is of course going to be important.

Personally, based on my experience working in the field for about 20 years, we're in a different time than we were 20 years ago when the threat of an actual nuclear exchange was quite palpable in the public.

The public is not likely going to be as involved as it was in 1963, 1964 when it was my baby teeth [absorbing Strontium-90], but the public is going to be important.

And the president is going to have to use all of his skills as an orator and as a communicator to tap into that because there is a strong well of support from the public for these kinds of initiatives and actions to reduce the nuclear danger.

The other thing that will be important to address, and this is one of the last arguments of the opponents of the CTB are going to make that we already are hearing about, it is: well, the United States might ratify, but maybe these other countries won't ratify. And that is a challenge and it is going to require the leadership and the hard work of the other countries that are strong supporters of the test ban treaty to work with the president to bring in the other countries that must sign and ratify the treaty for it to enter into force according to Article XIV of the treaty.

And I think one very promising point, and we'll end on this note, is that not only did the president say that he's going to reach out to the Senate to secure a ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date, but he will also launch a diplomatic effort to bring on board other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force. That's also very important for the entire CTB enterprise.

So I wish to thank you all for being here. Please join me in thanking our panelists.

(Applause.)

The session is concluded. And enjoy the rest of your conference.

(END)

Description: 

Moderator - ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball Speakers- Sidney Drell, Ambassador James Goodby, and Ambassador Tibor Tóth

Country Resources:

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - Events