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"I want to tell you that your fact sheet on the [Missile Technology Control Regime] is very well done and useful for me when I have to speak on MTCR issues."

– Amb. Thomas Hajnoczi
Chair, MTCR
May 19, 2021
January/February 2009
Edition Date: 
Thursday, January 15, 2009
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BWC States Address Safety, Security Measures

Oliver Meier

At a Dec. 1-5 meeting, states-parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) discussed steps to improve the safety and security of biological agents as well as oversight mechanisms to prevent the misuse of biotechnology for hostile purposes.

The conference was the second of a series of four annual meetings to prepare for the 2011 review conference and part of an intersessional mechanism agreed at the last review conference in 2006. (See ACT, January/February 2007.)

The Cook Islands' Dec. 4 accession brought the number of BWC states-parties to 163. Ninety-seven states-parties were present at the meeting in Geneva.

Intersessional meetings are not expected to arrive at consensus conclusions. Thus, the Macedonian chair Ambassador Georgi Avramchev in a synthesis paper attached to the conference's final report merely summarized proposals made during a one-week meeting of experts that had taken place in August 2008 on the same issue. (See ACT, October 2008.) Several states-parties representatives pointed out that the chair's list of measures was more detailed than, for example, similar documents that had been tabled at intersessional meetings in 2003 and 2005 on related issues. Such specificity was possible only at the price of simply listing possible national measures without urging states actually to implement them.

Nevertheless, participants highlighted as a positive trend that the meeting demonstrated growing international convergence in defining the issues at hand, with most parties now agreeing that biosafety measures have the goal of protecting humans from biological agents and that biosecurity entails measures to protect relevant agents and technologies.

Differences remained on the relation between biosafety and biosecurity on the one hand and other topics covered by the BWC on the other. Although Western states tended to emphasize the intrinsic value of measures to improve the safety and security of dangerous pathogens, developing countries placed the issue in the context of peaceful cooperation in biotechnology. Thus, Anayansi Rodriguez Camejo of Cuba, speaking Dec. 1 on behalf of the group of states in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), argued that "achieving necessary standards in the fields of biosafety and biosecurity requires and is facilitated by international cooperation and strengthening the implementation of Article X" of the BWC on cooperation among states-parties on peaceful uses of biotechnology.

Richard Lennane, head of the BWC's Implementation Support Unit (ISU), in a Dec. 17 interview with Arms Control Today observed a shift of thinking among nonaligned countries. "The fact that the NAM are linking progress on these issues to peaceful cooperation is very positive. It is a clear sign that the stark political divide between developing and industrialized countries on the relation between cooperation and control under the BWC is dissolving." A knowledgeable U.S. official in a Dec. 18 interview with Arms Control Today highlighted the common ground between Western and nonaligned positions on biosafety and biosecurity issues. "Many nonaligned [countries] recognized the intrinsic value of biosafety and biosecurity measures. And this is an area where the EU [European Union] and the United States are increasingly active and we have a growing outreach program."

There remained apparent differences of emphasis with regard to the importance of oversight mechanisms for laboratory activities and codes of conduct, which were also discussed during the meeting. NAM countries were weary of undue limitations on scientific research and cautioned that "codes of conduct should avoid any restrictions on exchange of scientific discoveries in the field of biology for prevention of disease and other peaceful purposes." Lennane observed that "those countries with less experience in involving civil society in policy administration are more cautious about the possible role of codes of conduct than others."

The Long Shadow of the Review Conference

A message to the meeting by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon contributed to discussions about future measures to strengthen the convention. Ban urged states-parties Dec. 1 "to begin thinking about additional steps that could be taken at the next review conference" in 2011. Specifically, Ban called on states-parties to "explore the potential for further multilateral cooperation in the fields of verification, compliance and enforcement of the convention."

Talks on a verification and compliance mechanism for the BWC collapsed in 2001 when, after six years of negotiations, the Bush administration rejected a draft protocol, arguing that the convention was inherently unverifiable. (See ACT, September 2001.)

In Lennane's view, Ban's statement "hit the right note. States-parties have now begun to discuss how to structure discussions about what they want out of the next review conference. It may be too early to say what specific expectations are, and people are also waiting [to see] what the new U.S. administration may bring to the table. At the same time, there are a number of states-parties that believe that the status quo is not good enough and that the 2011 review conference should be able to agree on more than the current intersessional process."

Although NAM countries are among those endorsing a resumption of talks on a compliance mechanism at the next review conference, Western states generally remain cautious. It is not yet clear what position the incoming Obama administration will take on the issue.

A German diplomat in a Dec. 18 interview with Arms Control Today said that, "for sure, states-parties mentioned verification also in view of the incoming U.S. administration." The diplomat cautioned that "there may be a danger of referring to the term 'verification' only without any constructive elements for improving or controlling compliance, putting much pressure on Washington too early if the Obama administration feels that the topic is forced on its agenda." France, speaking on behalf of the EU, in the closing statement to the conference on Dec. 5 therefore guardedly stated that the EU is working "with a long-term view to developing measures to verify compliance with the convention."

The U.S. official advised "those who have hopes that the incoming administration might revise the U.S. position on verifiability of the convention to read the recent report from a bipartisan, congressionally established WMD Commission, which concludes that the decision to reject the verification protocol in 2001 was the right one."

Other specific proposals to strengthen the BWC tabled at the meeting included a Russian proposition to create an "international scientific advisory panel" to independently analyze technological developments relevant to the bioweapons prohibition, which was embraced by other delegates but viewed with reservation by the United States. Several states-parties also suggested ideas to improve the annual exchanges of confidence-building measures (CBMs), and Switzerland even tabled a working paper on "preparing the ground for the CBM content debate." The U.S. official agreed that, with regard to prospects for the review conference, CBMs "are one area where we foresee active interest."

Many states-parties commended the ISU, a three-person secretariat set up in 2006 to support efforts of states-parties to implement the convention. On the sidelines of the meeting, the EU announced that it will give 1.4 million euros (about $2 million) to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) over the next two years for a variety of efforts to assist BWC implementation and for outreach activities to states outside the BWC. The joint action, adopted Nov. 10, will also be used to fund two additional staff positions over the next two years to support the work of the ISU in Geneva. In 2007, Washington rebuffed a European call for extra-budgetary support for the ISU. (See ACT, January 2008.) To avoid such conflicts, the two staff will be formally associated with the UNODA.

The conference appointed Canadian Ambassador Marius Grinius as chair of the 2009 meetings of experts to be held Aug. 24-28 and meeting of states-parties on Dec. 7-11. The focus this year will be on international cooperation for peaceful purposes and capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance and detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases.

 

EU Issues Space Code of Conduct

Jeff Abramson

In December, the European Union issued a draft code of conduct for outer space activities that skirted many thorny issues that have plagued prior international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. Designed to encompass civilian and military uses of space, key features of the text include a voluntary commitment to refrain from intentionally harming space objects, measures to control and mitigate space debris, and mechanisms for cooperation and consultation. The EU is now expected to hold consultations to revise the text so that it is acceptable to more countries.

Concerns about an arms race in outer space and harm to orbiting satellites have grown in recent years. In February 2008, the United States, citing safety concerns, destroyed an ailing satellite before it deorbited using a modified interceptor designed to counter short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The action was interpreted by some as a demonstration of U.S. anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. (See ACT, March 2008.) In January 2007, China tested an ASAT system, destroying one of its own satellites and creating significant space debris. (See ACT, March 2007.)

Making progress on space issues was a goal of Nicolas Sarkozy during France's presidency of the EU, which ended with the close of 2008. Paris hosts the headquarters of the European Space Agency, and the French space agency CNES owns a major share in Arienspace, a leader in commercial space launch services.

In issuing the draft code, the EU specifically pointed to a 2006 UN General Assembly resolution asking states for concrete proposals for "outer space transparency and confidence-building measures."

The code encompasses civilian, commercial, and military activities, seeking to "enhance the safety, security and predictability of outer space activities" and "prevent outer space from becoming an area of conflict."

It calls for states subscribing voluntarily to "minimize the possibility of accidents in space...or any form of harmful interference" and to "refrain from any action which will or might bring about, directly or indirectly, the damage or destruction of outer space objects."

It contains an important proviso, allowing for destruction of space objects to "reduce the creation of space debris and/or justified by imperative safety considerations," an apparent reference to the February 2008 U.S. destruction of an ailing satellite due to claimed terrestrial safety concerns. (See ACT, March 2008.)

The code also includes commitments to provide notifications "in a timely manner" of maneuvers, orbital changes, and malfunctions that might place space objects at risk, including any accidents or collisions that have taken place. It would establish annual information sharing, a consultation mechanism, biennial meetings of subscribing states, and a database of key contacts and activities in order to create cooperative mechanisms and an organizational infrastructure to support them.

Recent efforts to develop codes of conduct have generally been less controversial than treaty-based approaches to limit the placement of weapons in space.

China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February 2008 a draft "Treaty on the Prevention of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat of Force Against Outer Space Objects" (PPWT). Under the proposed accord, states would commit not to place in orbit "any objects carrying any kind of weapons." Such a prohibition goes further than the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which forbids placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space.

The Chinese-Russian draft treaty also would obligate its members "not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects."

In an Aug. 19, 2008, letter to the CD, U.S. Ambassador Christina Rocca rejected the PPWT, reiterating U.S. opposition to "prohibitions on military or intelligences uses of space." She raised concerns about the lack of clarity in defining what constitutes a threat and the ease of breaking out of the treaty because it does not ban the research, development, and terrestrial storage of ASAT systems or space-based systems. She restated U.S. concerns that "it is not possible to develop an effectively verifiable agreement" that would ban space-based weapons or terrestrial-based ASAT systems.

Rocca reiterated, however, U.S. support for the negotiation of voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures so long as they were done without "linkage" to any arms control agreement.

The draft code indeed avoids many of those linkages. It includes no definition of weapons nor prohibits their placement in space. It also does not expressly limit missile defense, which particularly after the 2008 U.S. test is viewed by many as a latent ASAT capability. A French diplomat told Arms Control Today in an e-mail Jan. 7 that the code instead "focuses on the development of space activities for all states for peaceful purposes."

The diplomat indicated that the code would not be submitted to the CD or considered a counterproposal to the PPWT. As next steps, the EU will launch bilateral consultations with space-faring and other interested countries "with a view to amending the project and reaching a text that would be acceptable by the greatest number of countries."

 

 

 

In December, the European Union issued a draft code of conduct for outer space activities that skirted many thorny issues that have plagued prior international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. Designed to encompass civilian and military uses of space, key features of the text include a voluntary commitment to refrain from intentionally harming space objects, measures to control and mitigate space debris, and mechanisms for cooperation and consultation. The EU is now expected to hold consultations to revise the text so that it is acceptable to more countries. (Continue)

States Approve OPCW Budget, Not Report

Oliver Meier

A Dec. 2-5 meeting in The Hague of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) states-parties failed to adopt a consensus final report but agreed on a budget for 2009 and modest measures to reform the treaty's verification system.

The 126 state-parties participating in the conference approved a 74.5 million euro (about $105 million) budget for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is implementing the 1993 convention. This marks the fourth consecutive year that the OPCW will have a zero nominal growth budget.

Currently, the OPCW spends about 80 percent of its verification resources on monitoring the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and 20 percent on industry verification to detect and deter illicit development or production of chemical weapons.

In the run-up to the December meeting, differences surfaced among states-parties on how to structure the OPCW budget. With chemical weapons destruction making progress, associated verification costs are slowly falling. The 2009 OPCW budget is also likely to benefit from the fact that chemical weapons possessor states have improved their record in paying their required share of the costs of verifying the weapons' destruction. Western countries would like to use the freed-up funds to inspect additional commercial facilities, particularly so-called other chemical production facilities (OCPFs).

Many OCPFs use modern production techniques and could be converted with relative ease for chemical weapons production. Yet, these facilities produce chemicals that fall outside the three "schedules" of chemicals that can be used for chemical weapons production. These schedules form the basis of most industry verification activities. (See ACT, January/February 2007.) As a result, the OCPFs are inspected at a relatively low rate. French Ambassador Jean-François Blarel, speaking Dec. 2 on behalf of the European Union, pointed out that "if we did not increase the number of inspections, and if the number of declared OCPF sites remained stable, it would take 33 years to inspect them all."

The second CWC review conference in April 2008 had charged the OPCW's Technical Secretariat with evaluating the effect of revisions to the site selection methodology for OCPFs. (See ACT, May 2008.) In the run-up to the conference of states-parties, OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter had suggested conducting an additional 10 OCPF inspections in 2009.

Developing countries, on whose territory a relative large share of OCPFs operate, preferred to wait. Cuba, speaking on behalf of member states of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), stated Dec. 2 that "any changes in the frequency of OCPF inspections, if required, should take into account any refinements to the OCPF inspection regime or improvements in site-selection methodology, and should be based on a thorough discussion and a decision of the policy-making organs."

In the end, the 2009 budget contains a slight increase in the budget for industry inspections, including for the OCPFs. Member states agreed on an additional eight industry inspections in 2009, seven of which will be conducted at the OCPFs and one at a scheduled facility. A knowledgeable U.S. official told Arms Control Today in a Dec. 18 interview that the United States was "happy to see a recognition that OCPFs require more inspections, but of course we would have liked to see even more OCPF inspections next year."

With the budget decision out of the way, the chair, Japanese Ambassador Minoru Shibuya, prepared the meeting's final report. According to diplomats, Iran blocked consensus on the last day of the meeting by insisting on tougher language urging chemical-weapon possessors to comply with treaty deadlines for destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. The U.S. official said that "there were no speakers on the issue of destruction when it came up on the agenda of the conference. We were therefore surprised when Iran circulated language on the issue on Friday afternoon."

According to the CWC, all chemical weapons stockpiles have to be destroyed no later than April 29, 2012. The U.S. government has conceded that it will not be able to meet that deadline, and it is unlikely that Russia will be able to comply with destruction timelines. The United States and Russia have the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles. (See ACT, December 2008.)

Iran reportedly remained isolated with its position but adamant. The Iranian delegation thus prevented the adoption of a consensus final report, but its request to open up previous issues, including the agreement on the budget, was unsuccessful. The meeting concluded with the adoption of a chairman's report instead of a consensus document.

Observers and participants hold different views about the significance of the meeting's inability to adopt a consensus report. OPCW spokesperson Michael Luhan, in a Dec. 18 e-mail to Arms Control Today, pointed out that the chairman's report included all necessary decisions to ensure the normal functioning of the OPCW in 2009. "The lack of a consensus, while unfortunate, owed to a rare combination of circumstances and we don't see any trend emerging from it." The U.S. official also predicted that the failure to adopt a consensus report will have a limited effect on the future operation of the convention: "There was a lot of frustration in the room, but we have a strong ethic of consensus in the CWC, and I believe that ethic still remains or may even have been strengthened by what happened."

Other diplomats and observers speaking in private were more concerned about the implications. They remarked this was the first time that CWC states-parties had been unable to agree on a consensus final report and feared that a precedent might have been set. Some also viewed the disagreement as a reflection of underlying divisions about whether the CWC is primarily a disarmament accord or a nonproliferation treaty and whether, accordingly, the OPCW's primary task is the monitoring of chemical weapons destruction or the verification of the nonproduction of chemical weapons.

 

A Dec. 2-5 meeting in The Hague of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) states-parties failed to adopt a consensus final report but agreed on a budget for 2009 and modest measures to reform the treaty's verification system.

The 126 state-parties participating in the conference approved a 74.5 million euro (about $105 million) budget for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is implementing the 1993 convention. This marks the fourth consecutive year that the OPCW will have a zero nominal growth budget. (Continue)

Report Predicts Future Global Arms Trends

Kirsten McNeil

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) released its fourth Global Trends report on Nov. 20, timed to correspond every four years to the period of transition between presidential administrations. Chaired by Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis Thomas Fingar, the NIC is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which sits atop the sprawling U.S. intelligence community. The "Global Trends 2025" report aims to identify key strategic drivers in the global system that could shape the issues facing the new administration and to guide policymakers toward a broad view of the world.

The report addressed weapons proliferation as well as other global issues, such as climate change and economic trends. Broadly speaking, the report predicts that China and India will see an increase in their relative power, shifting the international system to a multipolar scheme rather than the current unipolar one. The United States will continue to remain the most powerful country but will see a relative decrease as these other states rise in stature. Up-and-coming states such as Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey will also be major drivers in the system.

At a Nov. 20 press conference, Fingar warned that "[i]f Iran were to go nuclear, there could be a regional arms race. If one of the states that has the capability elects to proliferate...we could have a problem. And it's not too hard to imagine regimes having access to a weapon without the kind of fail-safe controls that we have [and] the Russians have."

More broadly, the report goes on to state, "[f]uture asymmetries in conventional military capabilities among potential rivals might tempt weak states to view nuclear weapons as a necessary and justifiable defense in response to the threat of overwhelming conventional attacks."

During the period, conventional weapons are predicted to be of increasing importance for terrorists, who are expected to seek advanced tactical weapons, such as anti-tank missiles and man-portable weapon systems. The current spread of improvised explosive devices and inexpensive robotics and sensors is expected to continue. The study characterizes warfare in the year 2025 as increasingly asymmetric, nonmilitary, and reliant on information.

Overall, the report tells a cautionary tale based on the spread of different kinds of weapons systems in conjunction with expanding and evolving reasons for conflict to occur among states. As the report notes, "[T]raditional security concerns are declining in importance but may be replaced by new issues, such as competition over resources."

 

 

 

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) released its fourth Global Trends report on Nov. 20, timed to correspond every four years to the period of transition between presidential administrations. Chaired by Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis Thomas Fingar, the NIC is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which sits atop the sprawling U.S. intelligence community. The "Global Trends 2025" report aims to identify key strategic drivers in the global system that could shape the issues facing the new administration and to guide policymakers toward a broad view of the world. (Continue)

Landmine Ban Deadline Extended

Jeff Abramson

At the ninth meeting of states-parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, also referred to as the Ottawa Convention, in November 2008, 15 countries requested and received extensions to their 2009 demining deadlines. The United Kingdom received a 10-year extension, the maximum possible, and agreed to "proceed immediately with the clearance of three mined areas" and to provide a detailed update and demining plan by June 30, 2010. Prior to the extension, the country had been criticized for failing to take action to clear mine-impacted areas of the Falkland Islands, which are also claimed by Argentina. Clearance deadline extensions of varying lengths were also granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

At the meeting, Belarus, Greece, and Turkey addressed their failure to meet March 2008 stockpile destruction deadlines. Belarus restated its need for financial assistance to destroy more than 3.3 million Soviet-era design PFM-type mines, which are particularly difficult to handle safely due to the toxicity of their liquid explosive. Greece, which claimed almost 1.6 million landmines as of April 30, 2008, reiterated plans to transfer its stockpile to Bulgaria for destruction by mid-2009. Turkey claimed it had destroyed 800,000 landmines in the previous year and stated that it aimed to complete destruction of its approximately 1.8 million landmines by early 2010.

Under the treaty, which entered into force in 1999, members have 10 years to clear areas of anti-personnel mines and four years to destroy their stockpiles, with the exception of the minimum number necessary for the development of and training in mine detection, clearance, and destruction techniques. Additional countries that joined the treaty in 2000 will face 2010 clearance deadlines. Some of these states are likely to seek extensions at the treaty's second review conference to be held Nov. 30-Dec. 4, 2009, in Cartagena, Colombia.

 

 

 

At the ninth meeting of states-parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, also referred to as the Ottawa Convention, in November 2008, 15 countries requested and received extensions to their 2009 demining deadlines. The United Kingdom received a 10-year extension, the maximum possible, and agreed to "proceed immediately with the clearance of three mined areas" and to provide a detailed update and demining plan by June 30, 2010. Prior to the extension, the country had been criticized for failing to take action to clear mine-impacted areas of the Falkland Islands, which are also claimed by Argentina. Clearance deadline extensions of varying lengths were also granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. (Continue)

Countries Sign Cluster Munitions Convention

Jeff Abramson

During a December ceremony in Oslo, 94 countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), including many western European countries that have stockpiled and produced the weapons. Unexpectedly, Afghanistan also agreed to the treaty, breaking with the United States, which reiterated its preference for a separate process that would recognize greater military utility for cluster munitions while establishing some limits on their use. As expected, other major producers and stockpilers, including China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia, did not sign the treaty.

The Dec. 2-4 signing ceremony culminated a relatively rapid process begun in February 2007 with an Oslo meeting to negotiate a legally binding agreement on cluster munitions. The CCM, which resulted from the so-called Oslo process, bans nearly all cluster munitions and sets guidelines for stockpile destruction and clearance, as well as assistance to and involvement of cluster munition victims. (See ACT, December 2008.)

At the ceremony, Norway signed and ratified the treaty. So too did Ireland, which hosted the critical May 2008 meeting where the treaty text was concluded with key compromises allowing for military cooperation with nonmember states and the use of weapons that meet stringent criteria to avoid indiscriminate effects. (See ACT, July/August 2008.) Those compromises made it easier for NATO allies to sign the convention, 18 of which did so at the ceremony.

Afghanistan, currently supported by NATO troops, signed the treaty at the last moment. In explaining the move, Ambassador Jawed Ludin noted that his country belonged to "a region that suffers from dangerous overarmament" and credited the advocacy of Afghan victims of cluster munitions in the decision. Cluster munitions were used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan during 1979-1989 and again by U.S. forces during 2001-2002.

The Holy See and Sierra Leone were the only other states to ratify the treaty, which will enter into force six months after the 30th state ratifies it.

As the Oslo ceremony was beginning, the Department of State released a statement reiterating Washington's position that "such a general ban on cluster munitions will put the lives of our military men and women, and those of our coalition partners, at risk." The United States has adopted a policy that limits the use of weapons that fail to detonate as intended more than 1 percent of the time. It is also pursuing an agreement on cluster munitions within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. (See ACT, December 2008.)

Other major producers and stockpilers, including China and Russia, are also participating in that process, which reconvenes in February, and did not sign the treaty.

The position of Russia, which used cluster munitions in Georgia last summer, may be particularly relevant to some of its eastern European neighbors. Finland, which indicated in May that it would sign the treaty but then stated in October that it would not, is concerned about defending itself against potential Russian aggression, according to Finnish and Japanese media reports. An Oct. 31 government statement did not mention Russia but said that the CCM "will be discussed again after an evaluation of defence capabilities has been carried out and the international development work along with the supply and cost options of cluster munitions have been analysed." Finland indicated in 2004 that it would join the anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in 2012 and subsequently that it would seek to replace its landmines in part with cluster munitions.

According to the press reports, Poland is also retaining cluster munitions to protect itself. On Sept. 9, the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza quoted Defense Minister Bogdan Klich as saying, "We need those weapons to defend our territory."

Cluster munitions are bombs, rockets, and artillery shells that disperse small submunitions over broad areas that sometimes fail to explode initially, later injuring or killing noncombatants. The United States, which possesses a stockpile of more than 700 million submunitions, used the weapons in the 1960s and 1970s in Southeast Asia, leaving an estimated 20 million unexploded bomblets in Laos alone at the end of the Vietnam War with casualties still occuring today. In signing the CCM, Laotian Deputy Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith claimed that the "signing of the convention...is just the beginning of our journey to the ultimate goal of eradicating the scourge of cluster munitions and liberating the people and our children from fear and threat of such [a] silent killer. If we are to achieve this goal, this convention has to be fully and effectively implemented."

 

WMD Commission Issues Findings

Daniel Arnaudo

On Dec. 3, a congressionally mandated commission released a report offering 15 recommendations to help the U.S. government improve its ability to prevent and respond to threats of biological and nuclear terrorism. Drawing even more attention and criticism than the recommendations, however, was the commission's prediction that terrorists were likely to carry out an attack with biological or nuclear weapons somewhere in the world within the next five years.

The nine-member Commission on the Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, chaired by former Sens. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) and Jim Talent (R-Mo.), devoted considerable attention to biological weapons issues, particularly the security of facilities said to be involved in research of vaccines and other defenses against biological weapons. Funding for such research has grown substantially since the September 2001 terrorist attacks and has raised concerns that the United States is not adhering to its commitments under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). (See ACT, October 2004.)

One recommendation of the commission is to improve the security culture at biological labs in the United States and overseas. The report calls for a review of biosecurity at labs nationwide, federal registration for all labs with a biosafety level (BSL) of 3 or 4, and increased funding for bioforensics research to identify biological agents and such characteristics as their age and place of origin.

High-containment (BSL-3) and maximum-containment (BSL-4) labs are designed for the safe handling of pathogens with the highest levels of lethality and contagiousness. All BSL-4 labs are currently required to register with the U.S. government, but only those BSL-3 labs that work with pathogens or toxins designated as select agents, or that conduct recombinant DNA research with federal funding, are required to do so. An unknown number of BSL-3 labs, ranging from tens to hundreds, do not fall into either category.

The registration of all BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs would be coordinated by a federal agency designated by the president and would contribute to a database of high-security facilities that would help the government assess the "aggregate risks" associated with the expansion of biological research. This agency could also help develop a strategy for securing dangerous pathogens better and creating mandatory security standards for all labs to follow in the future.

Internationally, the commission recommends that the Departments of State and Health and Human Services press the international community to convene a conference to create global biological security standards.

Although the commission condones the Bush administration's 2001 decision to pull out of the negotiations on the BWC extended verification protocol (see ACT, September 2001), it recommends that the next administration reaffirm the importance of the BWC and work toward achieving universal adherence as a means of promoting better international biosecurity. One hundred and sixty-one states are party to the BWC, and 14 have signed but not ratified it.

A second focus of the report is combating nuclear terrorism. It recommends that the Obama administration conduct a comprehensive review of the recently completed U.S.-Indian nuclear energy cooperation agreement's effect on programs in the region. (See ACT, October 2008.) The report also calls for greater attention to be paid to Pakistan, calling it "the geographic crossroads for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction" (WMD).

Ensuring the continued viability of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is another major concern of the report. It calls on the United States to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime by supporting and funding an international nuclear fuel bank (see page 43), imposing stricter penalties for nations that violate or withdraw from the NPT, and increasing the inspection capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The report supports the negotiation of a treaty to end the production of fissile materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in weapons, saying that alternative approaches to a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty should be explored. It suggests that the five NPT nuclear-weapon states jointly declare a halt to their own production of materials for weapons. Four of the five have indicated officially that they are no longer producing fissile material for weapons purposes; China has indicated so unofficially.

Other recommendations touch on the involvement of the U.S. public with these issues and the ability of the federal government to coordinate with state and local governments and offer citizens information on threats and preparedness.

To improve public understanding, the commission calls on the government to release more information on how to respond to a WMD attack, including descriptions of specific actions that citizens can take in the event of an attack. It similarly asks for better explanations of the meaning of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) color-coded threat levels and what individual citizens should do in response. The commission found that the system has resulted in a "highly simplistic representation of the nation's risk" thus far.

The report emphasizes the need to reform the system of congressional oversight for national and homeland security, noting that DHS has 16 committees overseeing it in the House and 14 in the Senate. It calls for the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees to become the sole oversight bodies. It also calls on the foreign relations, intelligence, and armed services committees to cooperate and share information better on WMD and terrorism threats, partly by expanding the number of fellowships and positions for personnel with relevant expertise from the nongovernmental sector.

In the executive branch, the commission recommends that the Homeland Security Council be folded into the National Security Council. The report suggests that much duplication of work and confusion could be avoided with a merger but that the homeland security advisor could continue to exist as the president's principal adviser coordinating the domestic agencies responsible for disaster preparedness and response. According to a Jan. 9 report in The Washington Post, President-elect Barack Obama has already instructed his designated chief adviser on counterterrorism, John Brennan, to personally investigate whether the two should be merged.

The controversial prediction on WMD use comes in the first line of the report's executive summary, which notes that "it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." This prediction was immediately picked up by the world media and criticized by one of the commission's members, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Executive Director Henry Sokolski, who also produced an "additional view" questioning the report's focus on the likelihood of an attack from terrorists. Sokolski contends that the commission should have taken more time to focus on threats emanating from the export of U.S. nuclear energy technology to countries that cannot fully secure their nuclear facilities.

In a Jan. 7 interview with Arms Control Today, Sokolski noted that the 2013 prediction was dependant on a government estimate that suggested that an attack could consist of a "single letter bomb that might kill one or several people" or an "extremely unlikely" nuclear attack or would not occur at all. Graham said at a Dec. 11 discussion at the Center for National Policy that the report notes that although the anthrax letter attacks of 2001 killed five people, they also cost the government and the economy billions of dollars in the panic and investigation that followed.

The prediction has other critics, including Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.), chair of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence and Terrorism Risk Assessment, who said Dec. 2 that "[i]t's time to retire the fear card. We need to educate and inform the American people, not terrify them with alarming details about possible threats to the homeland."

This page was corrected on January 23, 2009. The original paragraph describing the registration of labs incorrectly implied that no BSL-3 labs are required to register with the U.S. government. At present, some BSL-3 labs are required to register if they (1) work with pathogens or toxins designated as select agents, or (2) conduct recombinant DNA research with federal funding. An unknown number of BSL-3 labs do not fall into either category, and the commission recommends that they also be registered.

On Dec. 3, a congressionally mandated commission released a report offering 15 recommendations to help the U.S. government improve its ability to prevent and respond to threats of biological and nuclear terrorism. Drawing even more attention and criticism than the recommendations, however, was the commission's prediction that terrorists were likely to carry out an attack with biological or nuclear weapons somewhere in the world within the next five years. (Continue)

Six-Party Talks Stall Over Sampling

Peter Crail

The latest round of six-way talks aimed at denuclearizing North Korea ended Dec. 11 in stalemate as the parties continued to disagree on the issue of verifying North Korea's nuclear activities. The four days of talks are expected to have marked the last formal gathering of the six parties (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) in which the Bush administration participated.

The six countries primarily discussed procedures for verification and the schedule for completing the disablement of North Korea's key nuclear facilities and the delivery of energy assistance to North Korea in line with agreements concluded in 2007.

Japan, South Korea, and the United States attempted to tie energy assistance to an agreement on verification. Despite this attempt, the parties agreed in a chairman's statement issued at the close of the meeting "to implement in parallel the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and the provision of economic and energy assistance" to North Korea. China and Russia indicated following the meeting that they would continue this assistance while U.S. allies in the region indicated that they would review any assistance in light of the stalemate on verification.

 

Sampling Remains Key Hurdle

The primary issue of contention was Pyongyang's refusal to agree in writing that verification of its nuclear activities will include scientific sampling. Sampling allows inspectors to analyze materials, equipment, or the environment around facilities to gather information about substances of relevance to a nuclear program.

Sampling is the main outstanding issue in a long-standing dispute over when and how to address the verification of North Korea's nuclear activities. During a Dec. 21 interview on NBC's "Meet the Press," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, "[W]e have about 80 percent of the verification protocol agreed with the North.... What the North wouldn't do is go the last 20 percent, which is to clarify some of the elements of scientific procedures that might be used to sample the soil."

The verification dispute began in earnest after Pyongyang's formal declaration of its nuclear activities in June 2008. The next month, the six parties agreed on a broad outline for what verifying that declaration would entail, but Washington insisted afterward that North Korea's declaration was not complete without a verification protocol identifying more specific inspection measures. (See ACT, October 2008.)

North Korea asserted that it was not obligated to address verification at all at that point in the negotiations because six-party agreements in October 2007 outlining the sequence for the current phase of North Korea's denuclearization did not require concluding a verification protocol.

Nonetheless, the United States and North Korea addressed the verification issue during a bilateral meeting in early October. No written text has been publicly released from the meeting. In public fact sheets and briefings, however, U.S. officials have summarized what they believed was agreed to at the meeting, without clearly distinguishing between written and verbal commitments.

Rice seemed to imply on "Meet the Press" that the two sides had agreed in writing to "things like interviews with scientists, the right to go and ask questions and probe concerning various facilities, the right to look at operations records, [and] to look at production records." She also noted that North Korea had turned over to the United States about 18,000 documents detailing the operations of its nuclear facilities.

In addition, according to U.S. officials, North Korea verbally agreed to allow foreign inspectors to conduct sampling procedures at that meeting. (See ACT, November 2008.) The U.S. envoy to the talks, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, stated during a Dec. 10 press briefing that "the issue has always been whether we could take understandings reached in Pyongyang and get them onto paper."

North Korea has since insisted that it is only required at this point to carry out the limited verification steps agreed in writing with the United States in October 2008, which did not include sampling provisions. The Japanese pro-North Korean daily Choson Sinbo, which often expresses Pyongyang's official policy, said Dec. 12 that "an agreement on guaranteed [verification] actions is restricted to the scope confirmed in writing by the two sides."

Pyongyang, however, appears to have left the door open to going beyond its written agreement with Washington once the October 2007 agreement has been fully implemented. A Nov. 14 statement by a North Korean Foreign Ministry official that the written verification agreement defines "the way and scope of verification...at the phase of disablement" suggested that Pyongyang may be willing to address the question of sampling in the third and ostensibly final phase of the negotiations. (See ACT, December 2008.)

North Korea pledged to disable the key nuclear facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear complex in the October 2007 six-party agreement detailing the "second phase actions" of the country's denuclearization efforts. (See ACT, November 2007.) In return for disablement and Pyongyang's provision of a declaration of all of its nuclear activities, the other five parties pledged that North Korea would receive political benefits and one million tons of heavy fuel oil or its equivalent in energy assistance.

During the first phase of the process, North Korea shut down its key nuclear facilities in July 2007 and received an initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

Although the six-party agreements are intended to lead to the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the existing agreements did not require the conclusion of a verification protocol. Pyongyang has insisted that verification is a "third phase" step.

Acquiring a written North Korean agreement on sampling during the meeting was a key goal for Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Diplomatic sources told Arms Control Today in December that the three countries coordinated a common position on verification prior to the meeting.

The sources contrasted this close coordination among the three countries in December with what they saw as a lack of consultation by the United States with its Asian allies prior to the October 2008 U.S.-North Korean agreement and Washington's subsequent removal of Pyongyang from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. (See ACT, November 2008.)

China, as chair of the meeting, led an effort to draft a document on verification for the parties to negotiate, based on bilateral consultations with each of the other states. The South Korean daily Hankyoreh reported Dec. 10 and Arms Control Today confirmed with diplomatic sources in December that the Chinese drafts did not mention sampling explicitly but used wording such as "scientific verification procedures" and "international standards" in order to find consensus.

Hill told reporters Dec. 10 that "most delegations were prepared to work with the Chinese text," although "that consensus was not shared by" North Korea.

Despite the lack of agreement on sampling during the meeting, Rice predicted that Pyongyang would agree to acceptable verification measures. She stated in a Dec. 19 Council on Foreign Relations interview that, "within the context of the six-party talks, you ultimately will get a verification protocol that allows us to deal with a lot of very troubling activities."

 

Disagreement Over Energy Assistance

In response to the stalemate in the six-party talks over the verification issue, Washington has sought to halt energy assistance to North Korea being provided in return for the disablement of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Department of State spokesperson Sean McCormack claimed during a Dec. 12 press conference that heavy fuel oil shipments being provided as part of this assistance will not continue without a verification agreement, stating that "there is an understanding among the parties...that fuel oil shipments will not go forward absent progress."

Of the one million tons of heavy fuel oil or its equivalent pledged to North Korea in 2007, about 60 percent has been provided as of the beginning of 2009. Washington finished supplying its portion, amounting to 200,000 tons, in December, leaving it with no shipments of its own to halt.

South Korea, which has been providing heavy fuel oil equivalents such as steel plates to North Korea, stopped short of stating that it would halt its energy assistance but indicated that such assistance will be reconsidered. Noting that Seoul had 3,000 tons of steel plates prepared to send to Pyongyang, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Moon Tae-young explained that "the timing for the delivery will be reviewed in consideration of various factors, including the disablement."

It does not appear that Washington coordinated its intention for halting all energy assistance with Beijing and Moscow.

Russia's envoy to the six-party talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin told reporters Dec. 14 that Moscow was "surprised" by the State Department's remarks on halting energy assistance and intended to complete its supply of 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Russia delivered its third shipment of 50,000 tons in December, and Borodavkin noted that a fourth and final shipment is planned to follow "in a few months."

Similarly, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao told reporters Dec. 16 that the parties to the talks confirmed that they would continue to implement the agreements made in 2007, "including on fuel oil deliveries in exchange for deactivating North Korean nuclear facilities." Beijing intends to provide energy assistance equivalent to about 99,000 tons of heavy fuel oil by the end of January.

Also at issue is Japan's share of the energy assistance, which amounts to 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Tokyo has maintained that it would not provide any assistance until its concerns regarding Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea during the 1970s and '80s were resolved.

The United States has approached Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union to request that they provide energy assistance in lieu of Japan. Australia and New Zealand have offered to contribute energy assistance to Pyongyang in order to assist the negotiations but, following the failed talks, conditioned their offer on further progress on verification. Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith told reporters in Tokyo Dec. 18 that Canberra will "need to see progress made so far as verification is concerned" before it will agree to deliver any fuel to North Korea.

Pyongyang responded to the prospect of halted energy assistance with a threat to slow disablement work. The North Korean envoy to the six-party talks, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, stated during a Dec. 13 press conference that if the energy assistance was not provided, "we will adjust the speed of disablement."

It may be months before Pyongyang halts disablement altogether because China and Russia are continuing to deliver energy assistance. Asahi Shimbun quoted a North Korean source Dec. 18 as stating that "aid from China and Russia has continued and we do not intend to stop the disablement process yet."

The six parties have traditionally linked energy assistance to progress on disablement, and Pyongyang has complained on several occasions that disablement efforts have outpaced the fuel oil deliveries. North Korea slowed disablement work on several occasions in 2008 in response. Eight of 11 agreed disablement steps have been completed as of January 2009.

 

 

 

The latest round of six-way talks aimed at denuclearizing North Korea ended Dec. 11 in stalemate as the parties continued to disagree on the issue of verifying North Korea's nuclear activities. The four days of talks are expected to have marked the last formal gathering of the six parties (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) in which the Bush administration participated. (Continue)

Test Hit, Diplomatic Flop for U.S. Missile Defense

Wade Boese

The Bush administration scored a hit in a recent test of a U.S.-based strategic anti-missile system, but struck out in talks to ease Russian opposition to the planned stationing of a similar system in Europe. The lead U.S. negotiator said the Kremlin had shifted its attention to preparing for the Obama administration.

John Rood, acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, led a U.S. team to Moscow Dec. 15 to discuss missile defense and other security issues with Russian officials led by Sergey Ryabkov, deputy minister of foreign affairs. Briefing reporters two days later in Washington, Rood described Russia as showing "less flexibility" toward U.S. proposals to reduce tensions surrounding the proposed basing of 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic.

Russia has reacted with incredulity and military threats to Bush administration claims that the deployments are to protect against growing Iranian missile capabilities. Moscow charges the real purpose behind the U.S. plan is to counter Russian nuclear forces.

Speaking Dec. 19 to reporters, Ryabkov disputed Rood's characterization of Russia's position as more rigid. Instead, Ryabkov accused the United States of reneging on earlier offers to alleviate Russian concerns about the proposed U.S. deployments.

During an October 2007 visit to Moscow, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who has agreed to stay in his current post for the Obama administration, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice broached a package of conciliatory steps with Russia. (See ACT, November 2007.) U.S. and Russian officials since then have quarreled over exactly what was proposed. For example, Russian officials charge the United States suggested a permanent Russian presence could be maintained at the proposed bases, but the United States denies such a promise was made. The Polish and Czech governments have spoken out against that possibility.

Russia prefers that the United States cancel the deployment and agree to conduct a joint assessment of the Iranian missile threat before proceeding with any specific defensive measures. Deploring "unilateral actions prejudicial to Russia's security," Ryabkov said Russia was ready for a "constructive dialogue and equal partnership" with the United States in countering missile threats.

Rood contended that Russia intends to "test the mettle of the new administration" and is "looking carefully at the position of the new team." President-elect Barack Obama has not endorsed or rejected the proposed European plan. His stated view is that anti-missile systems in general should be proven to work before they are fielded and should not sap resources from projects addressing more likely threats. (See ACT, December 2008.)

The interceptor model slated for installation in Poland is scheduled to be flight-tested for the first time late this summer. Current plans also call for testing it against a target twice in 2010. Congress has prohibited deployment of the interceptor model abroad until it is certified by the secretary of defense as passing operationally realistic testing.

The proposed interceptor is derived from the U.S. ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) interceptor. Instead of three rocket boosters like the GMD system, the interceptor posited for Poland is to be powered by just two rocket boosters due to the shorter time frames and distances for a possible missile intercept over Europe compared with defending the United States. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials express few doubts that the untested model will perform as intended given its similarity to the more mature GMD interceptor. Twenty-two of those interceptors have been stationed in Fort Greely, Alaska; another three are installed at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

Test Intercept Achieved

The agency's confidence presumably grew Dec. 5 with the GMD system's interception of a mock warhead more than 200 kilometers above the Pacific Ocean. The target missile flew south out of Kodiak Island, Alaska, while the interceptor was fired from Vandenberg about 19 minutes after the target's launch. Ten minutes later, the interceptor's exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), a roughly 60-kilogram device that uses radar data and its own onboard sensors to hone in on its quarry, collided with the mock warhead.

Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, director of the MDA, described the experiment that day to reporters as "the largest, most complex test we have ever done." Similarly, an agency spokesperson, Rick Lehner, told Arms Control Today Jan. 5 that the trial was the "most operationally realistic test to date."

The test, however, was not as taxing as originally planned. Along with releasing a mock warhead, the target missile was supposed to activate unspecified countermeasures, but it failed to do so. Countermeasures, such as balloon decoys employed in earlier anti-missile tests between 1999 and 2002, are intended to make it more difficult for anti-missile systems to strike the correct target.

Some independent experts critical of U.S. missile defense efforts contend that any adversary capable of mating nuclear warheads to long-range ballistic missiles will be technically savvy enough to design countermeasures that can trump U.S. interceptors. The MDA disputes that assertion, and Lehner pointed to the recent test trouble as proof. He said, "[I]t isn't that easy to deploy [countermeasures] when you want them." Still, O'Reilly said the agency's intention is to "use more and more sophisticated countermeasures" for future tests.

Despite the countermeasures failure, the recent test, which cost up to an estimated $150 million, set some new milestones for the agency. The experiment marked the first time that a crew based at the Fort Greely site rather than a crew at the fire control center at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, triggered the interceptor launch. Lehner said the soldiers firing the interceptor did not know precisely when the target missile would fly into space, but were only notified of a "period of interest."

In another first for the agency, four separate radars participated in the intercept mission by feeding tracking data into the system's fire control center. "What we showed today is all those sensors working together," O'Reilly told reporters.

Two of the radars contributing information were the Sea-Based X-band Radar, an advanced discrimination radar outfitted on a mobile, oceangoing oil rig platform, and an Aegis SPY-1 ship-based radar. Those radars have been involved in previous GMD intercept tests, but in a shadow mode, meaning the data they gathered was not actually used to inform the intercept.

The target's trajectory, speed, and altitude were intended to resemble those of a postulated missile attack by North Korea, which has yet to successfully flight-test a missile capable of reaching the continental United States. Similar target trajectories were used in the last two successful GMD test intercepts in September 2006 and September 2007. All told, the long-range system has hit targets in eight of 13 test attempts since 1999.

The MDA is considering a change of trajectories in its next GMD system test, which is tentatively scheduled for late spring or early summer. The plan is to fire the target, including countermeasures, on a northeast heading from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands and the interceptor from Vandenberg. Those trajectories will require the interceptor to perform over a longer distance. Lehner said there is "no possibility" that the target missile's mock warhead could land on the United States or Canada if the interceptor missed.

 

The Bush administration scored a hit in a recent test of a U.S.-based strategic anti-missile system, but struck out in talks to ease Russian opposition to the planned stationing of a similar system in Europe...

U.S. Ratifies Additional Protocol

Peter Crail

President George W. Bush Dec. 30 signed the instrument of ratification for a U.S. additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. Although the United States is a nuclear-weapon state under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and is not required to adopt IAEA safeguards, it has done so as a confidence-building measure. Washington has also pressed for the universal application of the 1997 Model Additional Protocol in order to better detect and deter illicit nuclear activities.

The additional protocol provides the IAEA with greater authority to monitor all nuclear activities within a state. Such expanded authority includes the ability to carry out short-notice inspections and the use of environmental sampling.

The ratification takes place more than four years after the Senate provided its advice and consent to ratify the measure in March 2004. In consenting to ratification, the Senate stipulated that the president certify that appropriate managed access procedures for international inspections are in force in order to prevent the compromise of information of "direct national security significance." This condition required a number of U.S. agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice, and State, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to adopt a variety of procedures and regulations to implement the protocol. (See ACT, March 2008.) The Senate adopted legislation required to carry out this implementation in November 2006, leaving the remaining work to the U.S. agencies.

President George W. Bush Dec. 30 signed the instrument of ratification for a U.S. additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. Although the United States is a nuclear-weapon state under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and is not required to adopt IAEA safeguards, it has done so as a confidence-building measure. Washington has also pressed for the universal application of the 1997 Model Additional Protocol in order to better detect and deter illicit nuclear activities. (Continue)

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