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"In my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [Arms Control Today] is one and it's the only one my husband and I fight over who gets to read it first."

– Suzanne DiMaggio
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
April 15, 2019
September 2008
Edition Date: 
Monday, September 1, 2008
Cover Image: 

UN Report Urges Progress on WMD Controls

Peter Crail

A UN nonproliferation committee issued a progress report July 30 on states' efforts to implement a global instrument aimed at preventing terrorists and other nonstate actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The report indicated that although many states have instituted a range of measures for this purpose, countries "need to do far more than they have already done" to fulfill their international obligations in this regard.

The UN Security Council established the committee, which is comprised of the same states serving on the council, to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004. (See ACT, May 2004. ) The resolution requires all states to implement and enforce a wide variety of "appropriate effective" national controls over nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials and the means to deliver them. Originally established for two years, the council extended the 1540 Committee's mandate for two years in 2006 and an additional three years in April 2008. (See ACT, June 2008. )

The council required states to submit a report on their efforts to carry out the national measures outlined in the resolution and have encouraged them to submit additional information as further steps are taken. The July 30 report's assessment is primarily based on the reports that states have submitted. As of July, 155 of 192 states have submitted an initial report. Of those, 102 shared additional information with the committee.

According to the report, the majority of states that have submitted reports have adopted very few of the 313 specific national measures identified by the committee as necessary for fulfilling the obligations under Resolution 1540. Moreover, no state has carried out all of the resolution's requirements.

The required measures include laws to criminalize the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and to account for and secure materials that may be used to create them. In addition, the resolution necessitates that states institute export and border controls to prevent dangerous materials from illicitly entering or leaving that country's territory.

Recognizing the difficulties many states have in carrying out these obligations due to a lack of experience, a lack of resources, or other factors, the report concludes that the implementation of the resolution "is a long-term endeavor requiring ongoing outreach and assistance programs tailored to the needs of each state."

One of the key functions of the committee is to serve as a "clearing house" for requests and offers of assistance. In this regard, the report recommended that the committee engage in "actively matching offers and requests for assistance." A source close to the committee told Arms Control Today Aug. 20 that, during the initial years of the committee's operation, some members of the body were reluctant to suggest such an active role in matching assistance due to a preference to engage in such work bilaterally or in other ways outside the committee.

Several states, intergovernmental bodies, and nongovernmental organizations have carried out activities to assist countries in implementing measures related to Resolution 1540 since 2004.

In some areas, state participation in multilateral arms control agreements has helped them to fulfill specific national requirements under Resolution 1540. The report observes, for example, that the nuclear safeguards commitment contained in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the legal prohibitions against nonstate actors manufacturing chemical weapons as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention also satisfy respective obligations under the resolution.

The report notes, however, that "as these international instruments deal primarily with state-to-state obligations," states will need to implement "specific supplementary legislation" to address nonstate actors. It observes that "many states are not yet fully cognizant of the fact that" such requirements to address nonstate actors are not covered by legislation implementing these international agreements.

One fairly new nonproliferation effort contained in Resolution 1540 is the requirement to prevent proliferation financing. The United States in particular has paid increasing attention to the use of money laundering and other illicit financial practices to fund the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related components and delivery systems. (See ACT, June 2005. )

According to the report, 64 states have adopted measures to prevent proliferation financing, representing a fourfold increase since 2006. To do so, most states have adapted their anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering legislation to apply also to proliferation.

A UN nonproliferation committee issued a progress report July 30 on states' efforts to implement a global instrument aimed at preventing terrorists and other nonstate actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The report indicated that although many states have instituted a range of measures for this purpose, countries "need to do far more than they have already done" to fulfill their international obligations in this regard. (Continue)

Russian Cluster Use Alleged; U.S. Clarifies Policy

Jeff Abramson

In July, the United States clarified its military policy on cluster munitions, weapons that Russia has subsequently been accused of using in Georgia. The developments come amid global efforts to limit the weapons.

On July 9, the Department of Defense released a three-page memo outlining U.S. cluster munitions policy that explicitly claims a military utility for the weapons while also emphasizing a need to "minimize the potential unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure." The policy mandates that by 2018 the Defense Department will not use, sell, or transfer cluster munitions with a failure rate greater than 1 percent. Until then, any usage of weapons not meeting that threshold must be approved by a combatant commander. Since 2005, department policy has prohibited procurement of new weapons that do not meet that reliability level, and current law prohibits their transfer during this fiscal year.

Cluster munitions are bombs, rockets, and artillery shells that disperse small submunitions over broad areas. These submunitions sometimes fail to explode initially, later injuring or killing noncombatants. U.S. policy has focused in part on improving the reliability of these weapons. This stand has been attacked by nongovernmental groups within the Cluster Munition Coalition, who have disputed that levels of tested reliability claimed by the United States and others accurately reflect the realities of actual use. The U.S. policy clarification comes soon after more than 100 countries committed to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which bans cluster munitions that do not meet even more stringent criteria, such as having self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms. That treaty, a product of the so-called Oslo process, opens for signature in December. (See ACT, July/August 2008.)

The CCW and Allegations of Russian Use

Instead of joining the CCM, the United States, Russia, and many major producers and stockpilers of the weapons have been exploring a new protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) that would explicitly address cluster munitions. Whether recent claims of Russian use of cluster munitions in Georgia will impact the CCW discussions remains to be seen.

Human Rights Watch, an international nongovernmental organization, alleged that Russia dropped cluster munitions in August during its conflict in Georgia. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili repeated those claims in a press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Aug. 15, a charge denied by Russia. The human rights group cited photographs and interviews with doctors, military personnel, civilian witnesses, and victims in claiming that Russian aircraft dropped RBK-250 cluster bombs, each containing 30 submunitions, on the towns of Gori and Ruisi. In Ruisi, three civilians were killed and five wounded. In Gori, at least eight civilians were killed and dozens injured, including Dutch and Israeli journalists, according to the report.

Russia's state-run news agency RIA Novosti quoted Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the general staff, as denying the claims. He said during an Aug. 15 news briefing, "We did not use cluster bombs, and what's more, there was absolutely no necessity to do so."

A CCW group of governmental experts (GGE), which contains U.S. and Russian representatives, meets again meets Sept. 1-5. In July, the group held its third and longest meeting of the year. During that meeting, a draft discussion text was circulated with a range of options on use restrictions, storage and destruction, and definition of cluster munitions. Some of the alternatives were very similar to the CCM; others were more reflective of the U.S. approach.

The meeting's chair, Danish Ambassador Bent Wigotski, told Arms Control Today in an Aug. 19 e-mail that he senses "strong support from most states, including those not in Oslo, to conclude an agreement, i.e. to adopt a proposal, this year. This support is based on the fact that all major user and producers are participating in the GGE." Key areas he identified for future discussion include general prohibitions and restrictions, as well as protection of civilians and civilian objects and victim assistance.

If the September meeting is not successful, the group is scheduled to meet again in early November, prior to an annual meeting of states-parties Nov. 13-14, where an additional protocol on cluster munitions could be presented for approval.

In the meantime, the Senate may strengthen the U.S. hand at the CCW table by providing its advice and consent to ratification of three protocols and an amendment to the CCW. On July 29, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved by voice vote measures, some of which have been on the Senate's calendar since 1997, that expand the scope of the treaty to intrastate conflict, regulate the use of incendiary weapons, ban the use of blinding lasers, and address the effects of explosive remnants of war.

A committee staff member told Arms Control Today in an e-mail Aug. 15 that the committee will attempt to have the measures debated by the full Senate before Congress adjourns for the November presidential and congressional elections. In an April meeting of the committee, officials from the Departments of Defense and State testified that ratification of remaining CCW measures would aid U.S. efforts to negotiate a cluster munitions protocol in the CCW. (See ACT, May 2008.)

Small Arms Conference Nets Agreement

Jeff Abramson

After failing to achieve consensus at a 2006 review conference, this year's delegates to an international gathering to address the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons overcame procedural objections to vote for modest next steps.

By its very nature, the illicit trade is difficult to gauge. The independent research group Small Arms Survey estimates the authorized trade of small arms, light weapons, and related ammunition at more than $4 billion per year.

In 2001, UN member states adopted the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and in 2005 agreed to an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. (See ACT, September 2001; June 2006.) Together, the instruments provide recommendations for national, regional, and global cooperation to limit the illegal transfer of small arms, such as revolvers, pistols and some machine guns, and light weapons such as heavy machine guns and other weapons that can generally be transported by a pack animal or light vehicle. The measures are politically binding, rather than legal agreements, meaning that although states commit to following the pacts, there are essentially no legal consequences for failing to do so.

In 2006, countries came together for a five-year review of the program of action but failed to agree on improvements to the plan. At the outset of that gathering, U.S. representatives indicated that they would not accept any final agreement that mentioned ammunition, civilian possession of small arms, or transfers to nonstate actors. Although not the only obstacle, the U.S. positions were viewed as a major cause for the two-week meeting's failure. (See ACT, September 2006.)

Following that meeting, the UN General Assembly in December 2006 called for a biennial meeting of states to be held no later than 2008. In order to improve the chance of reaching consensus, this year's chair-designate, Ambassador Dalius Čekuolis of Lithuania, began consultations seven months before the July 14-18 biennial. This led to a decision to focus the gathering on four topics for which consensus appeared possible: international cooperation, assistance, and national capacity building; stockpile management and surplus disposal; illicit brokering; and a review of the 2005 instrument on tracing.

Čekuolis and his advisers created a draft outcome document that included a section entitled "The way forward" for each of the topics. These sections generally reaffirmed that states are committed to addressing the issue, should work together, and should develop national laws when needed. Other key topics broached at the meeting but not resolved in the report include discussing ammunition in stockpile decisions, linking humanitarian assistance to progress on small arms goals, including gender considerations in small arms and light weapons decisions, and calling for legally binding instruments.

On the final day of the meeting, the chair asked for adoption of the report. However, Iran's delegation insisted on opening up the report for line by line debate. When consensus could not be reached on accepting the outcome document, its approval was put to a formal vote. In that final vote, 134 countries adopted the report with none opposed. Iran and Zimbabwe abstained.

The United States was absent for the vote. U.S. representatives attended only the fourth day of the meeting, dedicated to the 2005 tracing instrument. In responding to language calling for a legally binding instrument, a U.S. representative asked for an additional sentence in the report that ultimately read, "Other States believed that the character of the Instrument had already been decided through negotiations and that the critical task now was to implement it." Prior to this year's gathering, there were indications that the United States would not be attending the full meeting, raising the prospects for success as well as questions about the program's relevance. In its annual report submitted ahead of the meeting, the United States said it "strongly supports" the program of action and by its own analysis "is one of less than a dozen countries that have implemented all aspects" of the program. The report emphasized the need for implementation, stating that "[m]ore practical assistance, not more meetings, is what is needed to reduce illicit trafficking."

At the time of the meeting, 47 countries still had never submitted a report on their implementation of the program of action. Researchers noted that widely accepted standards for reporting and assessing progress on the effort do not exist. Fewer than 50 countries had legislation specifically addressing brokering.

Whether and when the next meeting of states is to be scheduled, as well as smaller gatherings as part of the UN process, is likely to be taken up by the UN First Committee, which focuses on disarmament and international security, when it meets Oct. 6-Nov. 4.

An adviser to the chair told Arms Control Today Aug. 18 that the meeting was a success and leaves the way open for significant future work. The International Action Network on Small Arms, a leading international advocacy coalition, called the agreement "a significant step forward for the international effort to tackle the illicit gun trade."

After failing to achieve consensus at a 2006 review conference, this year's delegates to an international gathering to address the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons overcame procedural objections to vote for modest next steps.

By its very nature, the illicit trade is difficult to gauge. The independent research group Small Arms Survey estimates the authorized trade of small arms, light weapons, and related ammunition at more than $4 billion per year. (Continue)

U.S. Removes Uranium From Iraqi Nuclear Site

Meredith Lugo

In early July, U.S. forces transferred 550 metric tons of yellowcake, the compound made from mined natural uranium ore, from the Iraqi nuclear site of Tuwaitha to a port in Montreal. If the material were processed for military purposes, it would be sufficient for as many as 50 nuclear weapons. The Canadian corporation Cameco purchased the nuclear material.

In a July 7 briefing, Department of State spokesperson Sean McCormack said the operation was conducted according to applicable International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Citing "security concerns," McCormack noted that the transfer was done secretly. An unnamed senior U.S. official told the Associated Press in July that the transferal took nearly three months, beginning in April.

The United States flew the material to the British island Diego Garcia, the site of a U.S. naval base, where it was then shipped to Montreal. The Associated Press reports that officials considered moving the yellowcake through Kuwait to a port on the Persian Gulf, but were deterred by concerns about passing through Iraq's Shiite territory and the possibility of an Iranian-U.S. naval clash in the Strait of Hormuz.

In a July 2008 interview with the Canadian television network CTV, Cameco spokesperson Lyle Krahn indicated that the company intends to process the uranium in Ontario and sell it as fuel for nuclear reactors. Cameco is the largest producer of uranium in the world and was "invited" by the U.S. government to bid on the material from Iraq.

Yellowcake is a solid compound made from refined uranium ore. It is converted into uranium hexafluoride and enriched into low-enriched uranium (LEU) for civilian nuclear reactors. At higher levels of enrichment, the compound may be used for nuclear weapons material. The 550 tons that were transferred is enough to produce as many as 50 nuclear weapons. In June 2003, the Department of Energy removed 1.77 tons of LEU from the Tuwaitha complex. (See ACT, September 2004. )

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein purchased the yellowcake in the early 1980s from Niger. Following the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the IAEA discovered and safeguarded the material at Tuwaitha until 1998, when its inspectors were ousted from Iraq. International inspectors were not invited back into the country until 2002, on the brink of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. An IAEA report prior to the 2003 war concluded that all declared uranium compounds in Iraq were untouched during the suspension on inspections.

The nuclear compound at Tuwaitha was the center of concern in 2003, when the agency reported looting of the complex after Iraqi soldiers and civilian guards abandoned their posts during combat in mid-March. By April, U.S. forces had secured the facilities. A senior defense official in June 2003 said the site was found "in disarray" and that some of the IAEA seals had been broken. An IAEA inspection shortly thereafter discovered uranium compounds scattered across the floor and many storage containers emptied or missing. Some of the barrels used in the Tuwaitha facilities had been sold to Iraqi locals to store drinking water and food. The IAEA recovered all of the spilled uranium, which was repackaged after all materials had successfully been accounted for.

The IAEA reported in 2006 that levels of radiation around Tuwaitha were several times greater than normal, putting nearby villagers at risk. The Iraqi government asked for IAEA assistance to decommission former nuclear facilities around the country, and the agency has noted that a full clean-up and decommission is a sizeable challenge that will likely take up to a decade.

As the remnants of Iraq's prior nuclear efforts are being addressed, Baghdad took a further step toward integration into the nuclear nonproliferation regime by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on August 19. The treaty, which opened for signature in 1996, prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons. Tibor Tóth, executive secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization's Preparatory Committee, remarked that Iraq's decision was "particularly significant given the multitude of challenges facing the government of Iraq today."

In early July, U.S. forces transferred 550 metric tons of yellowcake, the compound made from mined natural uranium ore, from the Iraqi nuclear site of Tuwaitha to a port in Montreal. If the material were processed for military purposes, it would be sufficient for as many as 50 nuclear weapons. The Canadian corporation Cameco purchased the nuclear material.

In a July 7 briefing, Department of State spokesperson Sean McCormack said the operation was conducted according to applicable International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Citing "security concerns," McCormack noted that the transfer was done secretly. An unnamed senior U.S. official told the Associated Press in July that the transferal took nearly three months, beginning in April. (Continue)

Syria Shirks Follow-Up IAEA Probe

Peter Crail

Syria has denied the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) permission to conduct additional inspections to verify claims by Washington that it had a clandestine nuclear weapons program. In September 2007, Israel bombed a facility near the village of al-Kibar on suspicions that the site was a nuclear reactor under construction with North Korean assistance. (See ACT, October 2007. )

The official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported Aug. 9 that an official source from the Syrian Foreign Ministry said that Damascus previously concluded a memorandum of understanding with the IAEA to carry out a single visit at the al-Kibar site. According to SANA, the source added that Syria can provide the agency with answers to any further questions regarding the site. Damascus maintains that the site was not a nuclear facility.

The IAEA conducted an investigation of the site June 22-24 and is still in the process of analyzing environmental samples from the visit. Although nuclear material is not believed to have been introduced to the facility prior to its destruction, the presence of graphite in the samples might bolster the case by Washington that the facility was a nuclear reactor modeled on North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon. North Korea used its Yongbyon reactor to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons program.

The agency began its investigation following U.S. briefings April 24 to the IAEA, Congress, and the public, outlining the Bush administration's suspicions that the facility was a nuclear reactor nearing operation. (See ACT, May 2008. ) In June, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told the agency's Board of Governors that the IAEA is "treating this information with the seriousness it deserves." He further noted that, as a state with comprehensive IAEA safeguards in force, Syria "has an obligation to report the planning and construction of any nuclear facility" to the agency.

In the midst of considerations regarding Syria's possible violation of its safeguards obligation to report the construction of a nuclear reactor, Damascus is also pushing for election to a two-year seat on the agency's 35-member Board of Governors. The board is one of the IAEA's key decision-making bodies and elects 11 rotating members each September based on a geographical distribution.

Syria's membership on the board might have some impact on the board's decisions regarding any further consideration of Syria's suspected nuclear program, as well as Iran's nuclear efforts, but Damascus would not be in a position to block any decisions unilaterally. The board generally aims to operate by consensus but is not required to do so. Under IAEA statute, the board adopts resolutions on a simple majority basis.

Syria, Russia Talk Arms Sales

In addition to seeking a seat on the IAEA board, Damascus is also looking to strengthen its relations with Moscow in the wake of Russia's recent conflict with Georgia.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow Aug. 21. During his visit, Assad expressed support for Russia's position regarding Georgia, stating, "Georgia started this crisis, but the West is blaming Russia." The Georgian conflict put Syrian rival Israel and Russia at odds due to Israel's support for Georgia's military.

Russian Deputy Chief of General Staff Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn said during an Aug.19 press conference that "Israel armed the Georgian army," explaining that Israel provided military equipment and training to the Georgians.

Assad appeared to take advantage of this blow to Russia's relations with Israel by seeking Russian arms for Syria, a prospect to which Moscow appeared receptive.

The Itar-Tass news agency quoted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Aug. 21 saying that Russia is prepared to sell arms to Syria that "have a defensive character and that do not in any way interfere with the strategic balance in the region."

In recent years, Syria has revived some of its conventional arms trade with Russia, which had decreased significantly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The two countries concluded arms agreements valued at about $700 million between 2003 and 2006, compared to just $400 million between 1995 and 2002. Moreover, in 2005, Russia cancelled most of the $13 billion Syria owes from previous bilateral arms agreements.

Syrian and Russian officials denied Russian media reports that any new arms sales would involve the transfer of the 280-kilometer-range SS-26 Iskander-E ballistic missiles to Syria. SANA stated Aug. 22 that "[t]here is no truth to media reports that Syria had agreed to deploy Iskander missiles on its territory." The SS-26 is designed to have evasive capabilities to penetrate missile defense systems.

Israel has expressed concern regarding potential arms sales to neighboring Syria. In an Aug. 14 interview with the Israeli newspaper Novosti Nedeli, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni indicated that Israel requested that Russia refrain from selling arms to Syria. She highlighted the risk that such weapons might be transferred to terrorist organizations, stating that "if some of the weapons inevitably find their way to Hezbollah, and consequently, the tension increases, it makes sense to stop shipping weapons and to not sell new types of weapons."

Syria has denied the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) permission to conduct additional inspections to verify claims by Washington that it had a clandestine nuclear weapons program. In September 2007, Israel bombed a facility near the village of al-Kibar on suspicions that the site was a nuclear reactor under construction with North Korean assistance. (Continue)

Treasury Tightens Sanctions Net on Iran

Brian Radzinsky

While U.S. and European diplomats pursue a fourth round of UN sanctions on Iran, the Bush administration and Congress are moving forward with a parallel strategy of using U.S. financial clout to tighten the noose on the Iranian economy. The Department of the Treasury July 8 and Aug. 12 froze the U.S. assets of 13 individuals and organizations with connections to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Meanwhile, European energy giants Total and StatoilHydro announced they would hold off from future investment in Iran's oil and gas sectors, apparently in response to growing pressure from sanctions.

The Security Council has imposed three sets of sanctions because of Tehran's failure to halt its uranium-enrichment-related activities and its construction of a heavy-water reactor. A uranium-enrichment program can be used to enrich uranium to low levels for use in nuclear power reactors or to high levels for use in nuclear weapons. A heavy-water reactor can produce plutonium, which also can be used for peaceful or military purposes.

Sanctions appear to be taking their toll on Iran's economy, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Aug. 14. It finds that UN, U.S., and EU sanctions are choking foreign investment and hurting the profitability of Iranian banks.

The Treasury Department July 8 sanctioned four individuals and four organizations for connections to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Dawood Agha-Jani, Moshen Hojati, Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi, and Naser Maleki were named for their connections to subsidiary organizations either of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) or the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). The AEOI oversees Iran's gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program. The UN Security Council and the U.S. government maintain that the AIO oversees Iran's ballistic and cruise missile programs.

The Treasury Department also froze the U.S. assets of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG), Parchin Chemical Industries, Shahid Sattari Industries, and Seventh of Tir. The U.S. government claims Shahid Sattari Industries is "an entity...owned or controlled by" the AIO. The other three organizations were sanctioned for connections to Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO). The Department of State sanctioned DIO in 2007 "for engaging or attempting to engage in activities or transactions that materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery."

On Aug. 12, the Treasury Department sanctioned four organizations-the Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC), the Joza Industrial company, the Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine, and the Safety Equipment Procurement Company (SEP Co.)-as well as Jabber Ibn Hayan, an AEOI employee. The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine was sanctioned as a subsidiary of the AEOI. The Treasury Department maintains that the NFRPC is "AEOI's center for the development of nuclear fuel, involved in enrichment-related activities." UN Security Council Resolution 1747, which imposed a second round of sanctions on Iran, identifies the NFRPC as a "part" of the AEOI. SEP Co. and Joza Industrial were identified by Security Council Resolution 1803 as "front companies" for the AIO.

All the individuals and organizations sanctioned by the Treasury Department have been named previously in Security Council Resolution 1737, 1747, or 1803. (See ACT, April 2008. )

Such sanctions are imposed under Executive Order 13382, which President George W. Bush signed in June 2005. The order gives the Treasury and State Departments the authority to freeze the U.S. assets of foreign entities suspected of supplying or supporting the development of unconventional arms and ballistic or cruise missiles. It is not clear what U.S. assets, if any, the designated individuals and organizations hold. The Treasury Department maintains that it does not disclose such information. (See ACT, July/August 2007. )

Energy Companies Curtail Investment in South Pars

Asian and European corporations have faced scrutiny from many sectors, including such pro-Israel groups as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, to curtail investment in Iran's oil and gas industries. U.S. state legislatures have also been lobbied to mandate divestment of public funds from companies with $20 million or more invested in Iran's oil and gas sectors. Nearly a dozen U.S. states have passed such laws. (See ACT, July/August 2008. )

Iran holds the world's second-largest natural gas reserves in the world. The country is currently involved in a massive project to develop its liquefied natural gas reserves at South Pars along with Asian and European energy companies. The South Pars field is estimated to contain about 47 percent of Iran's total gas resources, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

In July, French energy group Total announced that it would curtail its involvement in the South Pars project. Total CEO Christophe de Margerie cited the "political risk" of continued investment in Iran. Royal Dutch Shell and Spain's Repsol pulled out of the South Pars project in 2007.

Norwegian oil group StatoilHydro similarly announced Aug. 1 it would make no new investments in Iran's energy sectors, although it would fulfill existing contracts. CEO Helge Lund said StatoilHydro was "attentive" to United States and EU regulations, although current EU sanctions do not target StatoilHydro's activities.

StatoilHydro signed an agreement in October 2002 to develop three phases of the South Pars natural gas field. In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee July 9, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns suggested that the Norwegian company's investment in South Pars might fall "within the purview" of the Iran Sanctions Act of 2006. The Iran Sanctions Act requires the president to sanction companies with investments of $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector. Such sanctions might include denial of U.S. bank loans and restrictions on the importation of goods produced by the sanctioned company. (See ACT, May 2004. )

Other energy corporations, however, continue to invest in the project. Malaysian oil company Petronas announced to news media in July that it was "capable and able" to complete the project. Chinese oil company Sinopec has not shied away from a $2 billion agreement to develop an oil field at Yadavaran is western Iran. India and Iran are also moving forward with plans to construct a $7.5 billion liquefied natural gas pipeline.

Congress Moves Closer to Additional Sanctions

The Senate, meanwhile, may consider two pieces of legislation that would expand economic sanctions and, in the case of one bill, make it easier for U.S. states to divest from companies tied to Iran.

The Senate Banking Committee July 17 approved 19-2 a bill sponsored by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) that would provide safe harbor for fund managers who authorize divestment from companies with $20 million or more invested in Iran's energy sector. It would also ban the importation of all Iranian products and commodities, except for informational materials such as news reports. Current policy still allows the United States to import small gifts, certain foods, and carpets from Iran. The bill bans U.S. exports in turn, although exceptions are made for agricultural products, food, medical supplies, commercial aircraft parts, and informational materials.

The Senate may also vote on another Iran sanctions bill, the Iran Sanctions Act of 2008, approved by the Senate Finance Committee June 18. The bill, sponsored by Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.), is also notable for a provision that would block the passage of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia known as a 123 agreement, after the relevant section of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Similar legislation seeking to punish the Kremlin for its ongoing nuclear and military cooperation with Iran was adopted by the House of Representatives in 2007. (See ACT, November 2007. )

While U.S. and European diplomats pursue a fourth round of UN sanctions on Iran, the Bush administration and Congress are moving forward with a parallel strategy of using U.S. financial clout to tighten the noose on the Iranian economy. The Department of the Treasury July 8 and Aug. 12 froze the U.S. assets of 13 individuals and organizations with connections to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Meanwhile, European energy giants Total and StatoilHydro announced they would hold off from future investment in Iran's oil and gas sectors, apparently in response to growing pressure from sanctions. (Continue)

Iran Space Launch Raises Missile Concerns

Peter Crail

Iran carried out a test of a space launch vehicle Aug. 17, claiming the test was in preparation for placing an Iranian satellite in orbit. Although not believed to have been successful, the test has continued to raise concerns in the West. U.S. and European governments fear that Iran's development of rockets capable of placing satellites in orbit will improve Iran's ability to build longer-range ballistic missiles.

Indeed, the rocket test did demonstrate the connection between Iran's ballistic missile program and its space program. The two-staged rocket, named Safir (Ambassador), is believed to make use of a modified version of Iran's most advanced ballistic missile system, the Shahab-3, as its first stage. The Safir's second stage appears to use an indigenously developed propulsion system. Iran has not yet successfully tested a multiple-staged missile or rocket.

The Aug. 17 rocket test followed the launch of two suborbital sounding rockets designed to carry out scientific experiments at high altitudes. The two rockets, launched in February 2007 and February 2008, were also variations of the Shahab-3 missile.

Iran carried out a test of the Shahab-3 during military exercises held July 9-10. Iranian officials claimed that the test involved a variant with a range of 2,000 kilometers. However, the missile appeared to have been a standard Shahab-3 missile with a range of about 1,200 kilometers. The dimensions of the missile reported by the Iranian state-run media July 9 were nearly identical to the estimated dimensions of the Shahab-3 originally developed in the late 1990s, leaving little room for modifications that would be needed to extend the missile's range.

Speaking to the Iranian press following the Aug. 17 space launch, Reza Taqipur, the head of Iran's Aerospace Organization, stressed the "home-grown" nature of the Safir system. The Shahab-3, the rocket's first stage, is based on North Korea's Nodong-1 ballistic missile design, but the second stage does appear to represent an advance in Iran's domestic ballistic missile capabilities. Former UN weapons inspector Geoffrey Forden told Arms Control Today Aug. 18 that the second stage of the Safir demonstrated that the increasing sophistication of Iran's missile development "is driven by indigenous innovation" as opposed to foreign assistance. He added that "the important thing is that Iran, not North Korea, not Iraq, is the first country to break out of the Scud type of missile mold."

Many countries in the developing world acquired Scud missiles from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the missiles have served as the template around which several missile programs have centered. North Korea's Nodong-1, for example, is based on the Scud design.

Specifically, Forden assessed that the second-stage rocket uses a new thrust vector control system and that the difficulties in developing such a system helps to explain why the Safir appeared to have flown off course during its second stage. This system provides a more efficient steering mechanism for the rocket to carry out course adjustments than traditional Scud-based designs.

Uzi Rubin, former director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, agreed that the Safir's second stage represented a departure from the "Scud mold." Rubin told Arms Control Today Aug. 19 that "Iran took a risky path" by forgoing a previously tested Taepo Dong-1-based system and pursuing a newer design with only two stages.

North Korea tested a three-stage variant of its 2,000-kilometer-range Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile as a space launch vehicle in 1998. The test failed due to a malfunction with its third stage.

Most space launch vehicles use more than two sets of engines in order to produce enough thrust to place satellites in orbit. Questioning why Iran decided not to add a third stage to the Safir, Rubin suggested that Tehran may have been discouraged by the failure of the third stage during North Korea's 1998 space test or that the first stage did not have enough thrust to permit the added weight of additional stages.

Using the two-stage design, the Safir would only have the lifting power to deliver a very small payload. Iran has declared its intention to use the system to launch its 20-kilogram Omid (Hope) satellite. Forden assessed that the Safir would not have sufficient power to place a satellite in orbit.

Experts generally consider missiles capable of carrying at least 500 kilograms to be usable for delivering a nuclear weapon.

In spite of Iran's missile advances, the country still faces a number of hurdles in increasing the range of its ballistic missiles. The Shahab-3, Iran's longest-range missile, reportedly has a range up to 2,000 kilometers, placing all of the Middle East and parts of southern Europe within striking distance. (See ACT, October 2007. )

Extending that range will require mastering the staging process. In addition to the failed Safir test, Iran's previous tests of multiple-stage missiles were unsuccessful, including the 2,000-kilometer-range Ashura in November 2007. (See ACT, January/February 2008. )

Tehran would also need to develop a re-entry vehicle for the missile's warhead to protect it upon return into the atmosphere. The United States and its allies claim that materials acquired from Iranian technicians by Western intelligence agencies demonstrate that Iran has been working on designs for a re-entry vehicle. A February 2008 International Atomic Energy Agency report stated that the re-entry design contained in these materials was "quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device." (See ACT, March 2008. )

The United States responded to the test by highlighting the tie between the technologies used to develop space-faring rockets and those used to develop long-range ballistic missiles. National Security Council spokesperson Gordon Johndroe said Aug. 18 that Iran's test and the "dual-use possibilities for their ballistic missile program are inconsistent with their UN Security Council obligations."

The UN Security Council has adopted three resolutions sanctioning Iranian entities involved in Iran's missile programs and requiring that all states take steps to prevent Iran from acquiring technology relevant to the development of such missiles. However, the resolutions have not placed an obligation on Iran to halt or curtail these programs.

Israeli officials offered a more muted response to the launch. Yitzhak Ben Israel, chairman of the Israeli Space Agency, told Israeli public radio that because Israeli territory had already been within the range of Iran's Shahab-3 missiles, "the threat posed by Iran comes from its nuclear program and not from its satellites or ballistic missiles."

In response to the threats faced by Israel from Iran's missiles, the United States has agreed to deploy an X-band early-warning radar system to Israel that would potentially increase Israel's ability to track and intercept incoming ballistic missiles. According to the terms of the agreement, the details of which have yet to be finalized, the X-band system would be operated by U.S. personnel from the Pentagon's European Command.

Lt. General Henry Obering, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, told Defense News Aug. 7 that if the radar can be tied into Israel's Arrow missile defense system, Israel "will be able to launch that interceptor way before they could with an autonomous system."

Iran carried out a test of a space launch vehicle Aug. 17, claiming the test was in preparation for placing an Iranian satellite in orbit. Although not believed to have been successful, the test has continued to raise concerns in the West. U.S. and European governments fear that Iran's development of rockets capable of placing satellites in orbit will improve Iran's ability to build longer-range ballistic missiles. (Continue)

Iran Not Receptive to Revised Nuclear Proposal

Peter Crail

The United States indicated that it intends to pursue additional UN sanctions against Iran after Tehran did not accept a June proposal for negotiations regarding its nuclear program. Plans for a fourth Security Council sanctions resolution may not be forthcoming, however, as Russia appears to be focused on continuing the six countries' negotiating track with Iran rather than seeking further punitive measures. Moreover, deteriorating relations between Moscow and the West following the Russian conflict with Georgia in August might strain efforts to reach agreement on an approach toward Iran.

The negotiations proposal, which was crafted by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Germany, outlined a series of incentives that Iran would receive in return for suspending its nuclear fuel-cycle activities, building on a previous proposal from June 2006. (See ACT, July/August 2008. ) The renewed proposal included an implicit offer that, during preliminary discussions for negotiations, the six countries would not pursue additional sanctions so long as Iran agreed not to expand its uranium-enrichment facility further.

Tehran has insisted that it would not suspend its uranium-enrichment-related activities and the construction of its heavy-water reactor, key requirements of the incentives proposal and four Security Council resolutions.

On July 19, the six countries discussed the proposal with Iran in Geneva. In a reversal of Washington's insistence that it would not send a representative to meet with Iran until it fulfils a Security Council demand to suspend its nuclear fuel cycle activities, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns participated in the Geneva discussions. The Geneva talks followed a June meeting in Tehran when five of the six countries, excluding the United States, presented the proposal to Iranian officials.

During the July 19 meeting, Iran presented a framework and timetable for comprehensive negotiations on its relationship with the West, suggesting that the agenda for such negotiations be based on the commonalities of the six-country proposal and a proposal by Tehran delivered in May. (See ACT, June 2008. ) Iran's proposal to the six countries also contained a variety of topics for comprehensive negotiations but did not include any commitments that Iran would make in regard to its nuclear program.

Following the meeting, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana told a press conference that the six countries did not have "an answer to the most important question," regarding Iran's willingness to suspend its fuel cycle activities. He indicated that the six countries were hoping to get answers from Iran regarding their proposal "in a couple of weeks."

Iran provided the six countries with an additional response Aug. 5. Department of State spokesperson Gonzalo Gallegos told reporters Aug. 6 that, following a discussion between the political directors of the six countries, there was consensus that it did not meet their expectations for a clear response from Tehran. He added that because the six countries had not yet received a definitive, positive response from Iran regarding the incentives package, they "are discussing next steps in the UN Security Council and beginning to consider the possible outlines of another sanctions resolution."

Although Washington has expressed interest in moving forward with a fourth UN sanctions resolution, Moscow does not appear to be ready to entertain additional sanctions at this point. When asked Aug. 6 whether there were plans for an additional sanctions resolution on Iran, Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin stated, "[T]here has been no firm agreements, or understandings, or any kind of concerted work in this regard." He stressed that the six countries had not established any deadlines and that "there is ongoing dialogue" with Iran.

A European diplomat told Arms Control Today in June that an additional sanctions resolution was unlikely to be agreed on this year and that the countries were more likely to focus on implementing the existing UN sanctions.

As part of efforts to carry out current UN sanctions, the 27-nation European Union Aug. 7 agreed on a series of additional sanctions on Iran. These sanctions primarily instituted measures against Iran that the Security Council "called upon" but did not require states to carry out in Resolution 1803, adopted in March. (See ACT, April 2008. ) Such efforts include a decision that EU members will inspect cargo to and from Iran carried by Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line if "there are reasonable grounds to believe" that the cargo contains goods that might aid Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

In addition, the EU legislation calls on its members to exercise "restraint" in providing public financial support for trade with Iran, such as granting export credits, guarantees, or insurance. As a bloc, the EU remains Iran's largest trading partner, but due to sanctions and pressure on European firms not to do business with Iran, China has overtaken Germany as Iran's single-largest trading partner over the last year.

The EU measures also require that European financial institutions closely monitor any dealings with Iranian banks, in particular Bank Saderat, Iran's second-largest bank. Resolution 1803 cited Bank Saderat, along with Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank, for special consideration when calling on all states to "exercise vigilance" over financial activities with Iranian banks. The EU placed sanctions on Bank Melli in June, requiring the bank to close its offices in Hamburg, London, and Paris. (See ACT, July/August 2008. ) The United States and the EU have accused Bank Melli of involvement in proliferation financing and Bank Saderat of terrorism financing.        

According to an Aug. 14 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report regarding Iran's economy, the financial sanctions against Iranian banks appear to have had some effect on their operations. The report observed that some of Iran's state-owned banks were undercapitalized, stating that "UN and U.S. sanctions against certain Iranian institutions have created difficulties for trade financing and payments, discouraged foreign investment, and adversely affected" their profitability.

In addition to recommending caution in dealing with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, the Security Council required that all states freeze the assets of Bank Sepah, Iran's third-largest bank, in March 2007.

Overall, however, the IMF concluded that Iran's economy is likely to continue to experience growth due to revenues from high oil prices, particularly if oil remained above $110 per barrel. Oil settled to about $115 per barrel at the end of August after rising to a record high of about $147 in July.

Editor's Note

Miles A. Pomper

Talk to Egypt's outgoing ambassador to the United States, Nabil Fahmy, and you will quickly realize how adamant he is that the Middle East will see no end to nuclear crises until states agree to establish a zone free of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Fahmy's stance, spelled out in an interview excerpted in this month's magazine, reflects a geopolitical reality: Egypt's peace treaty partner and neighbor Israel is widely believed to have nuclear arms, Iraq and Libya sought to acquire them in the past, and an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor and Iran's uranium-enrichment program have generated concerns that they are on the same course. These developments have raised security concerns in Egypt, a non-nuclear-weapon state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Egypt also has been among the leading countries insisting that they will not waive their NPT rights to trade in peaceful nuclear technology, including sensitive technologies such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing that can provide fissile material for weapons as well as fuel for nuclear reactors. Facing such opposition, states, nuclear operators, and independent groups have suggested roughly a dozen ways that states might be induced to rely on the international market rather than acquire such facilities themselves. Fiona Simpson lays out the current status of those options and their likely prospects in one of our feature articles.

In another, Frank N. von Hippel argues for a different way of chipping away at this problem by addressing Iran's contention that it needs to build its own enrichment facilities to guarantee a supply of nuclear fuel. He says that the international community should seek to meet this demand for energy security by providing Iran with a sufficient stockpile of low-enriched uranium. In return, he contends, Iran should provide greater transparency.

In our news section this month, Peter Crail discusses recent developments in Iran's nuclear and missile programs, Wade Boese looks at how the recent conflict between Russia and Georgia will affect the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and Oliver Meier notes how a recently declassified Pentagon report is contributing to ongoing questions about the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

One of the wonders of the nuclear age is that no nuclear weapons have been used in war since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than six decades ago. In our book review section this month, William Burr examines The Nuclear Taboo, a new work by Nina Tannenwald, which chronicles the evolution of a norm against the use of such arms.

NATO Mulls Nuke Modernization, Security

Oliver Meier

Reports about security problems at U.S. nuclear weapons bases in Europe have led to renewed calls from parliamentarians of European allies for an end to NATO's nuclear weapons-sharing arrangements. But a senior NATO official interviewed by Arms Control Today rejected the reports about security problems, predicted a continuation of NATO's nuclear weapons policies, and called for a modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

"There is no question that nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe and secure," Guy Roberts, NATO deputy assistant secretary-general for weapons of mass destruction policy and director for nuclear policy, told Arms Control Today Aug. 14.

On June 19, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists released the classified findings of a February U.S. Air Force blue ribbon review (BRR), which he had obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. The "Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures" found that most European sites where U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed "require significant additional resources to meet [Department of Defense] security requirements."

The review had been launched following an August 2007 incident in the United States, when a B-52 bomber flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana wrongly and unknowingly armed with nuclear cruise missiles. (See ACT, July/August 2008. )

Security at U.S. Bases in Europe

NATO keeps details of its nuclear deployments secret, but Kristensen estimates that the United States probably still deploys between 150 and 240 B-61 bombs in Europe. Under nuclear sharing arrangements, as many as 140 weapons can still be assigned for use by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, none of which have their own nuclear arms. These weapons remain under U.S. custody during peacetime but can be released to U.S. allies for delivery in times of war. Other states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have repeatedly criticized these arrangements as contradicting the NPT, because they would permit control of nuclear weapons to pass to countries who have forsworn the possession of such weapons under the treaty. (See ACT, June 2008. )

Despite the fact that European nuclear weapons bases were notified in advance of the visits by the U.S. Air Force inspectors, the review still found several deficits in security provided by European allies that host U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory, noting "inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment provided to the security mission provided by the host nation." Examples of areas with shortcomings include support buildings, fencing, lighting, and security systems. The review also criticized the use of conscripts and unionized security personnel for security tasks.

Officials from NATO states and NATO headquarters have rejected the review's findings and methodology. Roberts said that "there is nothing new in the BRR report. The report contains no security issue that NATO wasn't aware of." Roberts explained that security issues are continuously monitored by NATO through the Joint Theater Management Group, which reports quarterly through the vice-chairman of the High Level Group to the Nuclear Planning Group, which decides on the nuclear policy of the alliance. "Based on these reports, a number of enhancements are being implemented. The BRR report did not add anything new."

During a June 25 parliamentary debate in Berlin, Thomas Kossendey, German assistant secretary for defense, argued that the report and related discussions in NATO have "demonstrated that we do not need to worry" about the security of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. In a July 1 meeting of the Dutch Defense Committee, Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop also maintained that safety and security at the Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands are in good order.

Volkel, alleged to host up to 20 U.S. nuclear weapons, is one of four European air force bases operated by NPT non-nuclear-weapon states where Kristensen says U.S. B-61 nuclear bombs are deployed.

NATO officials also condemn the review for being misleading. "If conscripts are used to provide security, so what? These are well-trained soldiers," Roberts told Arms Control Today. "And the necessity to repair a support building is not necessarily a security issue. If there is a hole in a fence, that gets repaired," he said.

European officials also argued that the report was unfair because the Air Force inspectors applied stricter U.S. security standards, applicable to the inner perimeter of the actual nuclear weapons storage area, to the outer perimeter that is guarded by allies. As a result, NATO does not see any need to take additional measures to improve the security at European nuclear weapons bases.

NATO is angry at the U.S. Air Force for not consulting or at least advising NATO before the report was issued. "This was released without prior warning, and the information regarding the security of nuclear weapons stored in Europe is inaccurate and misleading," Roberts said. "In my view, the report also contains sensitive information, much of which should not have made it into the public domain, even under the Freedom of Information Act."

Nuclear Weapons Consolidation?

Kristensen claimed that the review triggered a consolidation of U.S. nuclear weapons at fewer European bases. Citing anonymous sources, he indicated that one U.S. Munition Support Squadron (MUNSS) will be withdrawn from one national base in Europe, possibly Ghedi Torre in Italy.

MUNSS are units specially trained to guard nuclear weapons storage sites. Withdrawal of such a unit would signal an end of the nuclear mission of a base.

Roberts refuted rumors that NATO is considering a redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. "There is no discussion whatsoever in NATO about consolidating nuclear weapons at fewer bases," he told Arms Control Today.

Renewed German Debate on Nuclear Weapons

The report about security problems at nuclear weapons bases triggered a new debate about the utility of NATO nuclear weapons deployments, particularly in Germany. During a June 25 parliamentary debate in Berlin, representative of all parties with the exception of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (the party of Chancellor Angela Merkel) reacted to the news of security leaks by calling for a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from German territory.

Rolf Mützenich, arms control spokesperson of the Social Democrats, who share power in a coalition with the conservatives in Berlin, argued that weapons should be withdrawn from Büchel, the German air force base where Kristensen says up to 20 B-61 warheads are still stored. Mützenich called for a global initiative on short-range, tactical nuclear weapons. He sought to dispel fears of a loss of influence in NATO should Germany end nuclear deployments and said that U.S. nuclear weapons had been withdrawn in 2005 from the U.S. air base in Ramstein, Germany, without any negative implications for Germany's national security or role in NATO. (See ACT, September 2007. )

Supporters of Germany's continued involvement in nuclear sharing argued that nuclear deterrence not only is essential for national security but also gives Berlin "the possibility to influence a decision about the use of nuclear weapons within NATO," as Kossendey argued. But other conservatives indirectly conceded the problems with security of NATO's nuclear weapons. Christian Democratic Union arms control spokesperson Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg warned that politicians should not "ride on a wave of populism or else we will some day be as insecure as the weapons in Büchel."

Meanwhile, some other parliamentarians continue to press for new arms control initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons. For example, in a joint article published on May 7 on the Web site atomwaffenfrei.de, Mützenich; Patrick Vankrunkelsen, a member of the Belgian parliament; and Sergei Kolesnikov, a member of the Russian Duma, called for an end of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including western Russia.

NATO's Nuclear Inertia

The increasing pressure on the alliance to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons comes as NATO is conducting an internal review of its nuclear deterrence posture and nuclear deterrence requirements for the twenty-first century. (See ACT, September 2007. ) NATO, however, seems to be thinking about modernization of nuclear forces rather than about reduction.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in June 12 remarks to the press during the NATO defense ministers council, said that "there was talk about modernization of both policies and capabilities" within the alliance. He argued that NATO had already reduced its nuclear forces substantially and maintained that among alliance members "there was no dissent from the fact that we needed a nuclear deterrent in NATO and needed to keep it modern."

In his Arms Control Today interview, Roberts provided further details of options to renew U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. He argued that NATO member states will have to make some difficult choices about modernizing nuclear forces. "There is a recognition by member states and NATO that dual-capable aircraft are aging. The B-61 is a weapon that will need to be upgraded or replaced if NATO wants to maintain a credible and capable nuclear deterrent." (See ACT, July/August 2006. ) Roberts said that the proposed so-called reliable replacement warhead (RRW) is currently the only option to replace aging U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, beyond 2015. "If the RRW program is not going ahead, there will be a need for a life extension program for the B-61."

Launched in 2004, the RRW program aims to produce warheads that will ostensibly be safer, easier to maintain, and more reliable than the estimated 5,400 warheads in the current U.S. stockpile. Congress has eliminated nearly all funding for the program because it wants to review U.S. nuclear policy before deciding whether to proceed with the development of a new type of warhead. (See ACT, January/February 2008. )

But Roberts said that NATO's review of long-term deterrence requirements is unlikely to result in fundamental changes in nuclear weapons policies. He pointed out that so far no NATO member state has questioned the basic requirements of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear sharing, stating that "[w]e at NATO and NATO member states fully embrace extended deterrence. There is no debate on this question." Roberts said that discussions are likely to produce a report only by June 2009, after an April 2009 summit, when NATO is expected to launch a review of its 1999 Strategic Concept. "The report on nuclear weapons doctrine would nevertheless feed into discussions on a new Strategic Concept which we hope can then be approved at a 2010 summit," he said.

Reports about security problems at U.S. nuclear weapons bases in Europe have led to renewed calls from parliamentarians of European allies for an end to NATO's nuclear weapons-sharing arrangements. But a senior NATO official interviewed by Arms Control Today rejected the reports about security problems, predicted a continuation of NATO's nuclear weapons policies, and called for a modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

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