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“For 50 years, the Arms Control Association has educated citizens around the world to help create broad support for U.S.-led arms control and nonproliferation achievements.”

– President Joe Biden
June 2, 2022
October 2007
Edition Date: 
Monday, October 1, 2007
Cover Image: 

October 2007 Bibliography

Of Special Interest

Bunn, Matthew, Securing the Bomb 2007, Project on Managing the Atom, September 2007, 171 pp.

Carter, Jimmy, “Nuclear Steps Undermine Peace,” Taipei Times, September 12, 2007, p. 9.

Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2007, 92 pp.

Panofsky, Wolfgang K.H., “Missiles No Defense,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 26, 2007, p. B9.

Warrick, Joby and Pincus, Walter, “Missteps in the Bunker,” The Washington Post, September 23, 2007, p. A1.

I. Strategic Arms

Beste, Ralf, and Simons, Stefan, “Sarko’s Nuke Offer Bombs with Berlin,” Spiegel Online, September 17, 2007.

Ford, Christopher, A., Disarmament and Non-Nuclear Stability in Tomorrow’s World, Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues, August 31, 2007.

Hoffman, Michael, “B-52 Mistakenly Flies With Nukes Aboard,” Army Times, September 10, 2007.

JASON, Reliable Replacement Warhead Executive Summary, The MITRE Corporation, August 29, 2007, 9 pp.

Norris, Robert S., and Kristensen, Hans M., “The U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, Today and Tomorrow,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2007, p.60.

Pincus, Walter, “Nuclear Warhead Design Hits Snag,” The Washington Post, September 30, 2007, p. A17.

Pincus, Walter, “Errors Behind Warheads’ Flight Unfold,” The Washington Post, September 28, 2007, p. A2.

Podvig, Pavel, “U.S. Loose Nukes,” The Bulletin Online, September 13, 2007.

Ramberg, Bennett, “Does the United States Really Need to Build a New Nuclear Weapon?” The Baltimore Sun, September 16, 2007, p. A17.

Taylor Jr., Stuart, “Reagan Was Right,” National Journal, September 17, 2007.

Woolf, Amy F., U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, Congressional Research Service, September 5, 2007, 27 pp.

II. Nuclear Proliferation

India

All India Congress Committee, India’s Nuclear Energy Programme and the 123 Agreement with United States, September 2007, 21 pp.

Bidwai, Praful, Sanctifying Mass Destruction, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, September 17, 2007.

Council on Foreign Relations, Courses of Action for Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group: A Conversation with the Hon. Edward J. Markey on Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and India, September 13, 2007.

Heinrich, Mark, and Strohecker, Karin, “India Holds Off on Safeguards Process with IAEA,” Reuters, September 20, 2007.

The Hindu, “Do Not Succumb to U.S. Pressure: Left to Govt.,” September 20, 2007.

The New Republic, “Bang Galore,” September 10, 2007, p. 1.

Toki, Masako, “Will Japan Support India’s Nukes?” Foreign Policy in Focus, September 26, 2007.

Vaidyanathan, Lalitha, “U.S. Nudges India to Negotiate IAEA Safeguards,” Business Standard, September 17, 2007.

Yamin, Saira, “The U.S., India, and the Elusive 123 Deal,” Foreign Policy in Focus,September 7, 2007.

Iran

Agence France-Presse, “Iran a Key Issue at UN Nuclear Watchdog Conference,” September 16, 2007.

Blair, Edmund, “Iran Is Running 3,000 Atomic Centrifuges: President,” Reuters, September 2, 2007.

Bloomberg, “Gates: U.S. will Deal with Iran Diplomatically,” September 17, 2007.

Daragahi, Borzou, “Israel Would Be Countered, Iranian Says,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2007 p. A9.

Farley, Maggie, and Gerstenzang, James, “Iran Tells U.N.: Nuclear Issue ‘Closed,’” Los Angeles Times, September 26, 2007, p. A1.

Feldman, Nizan, “How Powerful is the Iranian Oil Weapon?” Strategic Assessment, August 2007, p. 82.

Heinrich, Mark, “Developing States Rap ‘Interference’ in Iran Deal,” Reuters, September 11, 2007.

Landau, Emily B., “Back to the Future on Iran: A Problematic Return to Negotiations,” Strategic Assessment, August 2007, p. 79.

Mansharof, Y., “Nuclear Issue Appears to be Creating Rift in Iran’s Senior Leadership,” Jerusalem Post, September 20, 2007, p. 6.

Pletka, Danielle, “Putting the Heat on Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2007, p. A14.

Sanger, David E., and Shanker, Thom, “Washington Sees an Opportunity on Iran,” The New York Times, September 27, 2007, p. A6.

Uni, Assaf, “Iran and Germany: Business as Usual?” Haaretz, September 18, 2007.

Weisman, Steven R., “Lack of ID Data Impedes U.N. Sanctions against Iran,” The New York Times, September 17, 2007, p. A3.

Williamson, Hugh, Dombey, Daniel, and Hall, Ben, “Germans Hit Back in Iran Sanctions Row,” Financial Times, September 26, 2007, p. 12.

Wright, Robin, “U.S., Europeans Planning Own Iran Sanctions,” The Washington Post, September 22, 2007, p. A13.

Israel

Associated Press, “N. Korea Accuses U.S. of Helping Israel Develop Nuclear Weapons,” September 25, 2007.

Jahn, George, “Israel Seeks Exemption from Atomic Rules,” Associated Press, September 25, 2007.

Kessler, Glenn, “Israel Submits Nuclear Trade Plan,” The Washington Post, September 30, 2007, p. A23.

North Korea

Agence France-Presse, “U.S., China to Reward North Korea With Fuel Aid,” September 13, 2007.

Anderson, John Ward, “N. Korea Agrees to Nuclear Deadline,” The Washington Post, September 3, 2007, p. A10.

Associated Press, “South Korean Candidate Calls for EU Role in Ending North Korean Nuclear Standoff,” September 20, 2007.

Baker, Peter, “U.S. to Ship Oil to North Korea,” The Washington Post, September 29, 2007, p. A13.

The Economist, “Pyongyang or Bust,” September 27, 2007.

Kim, Jack, “Bush-Kim Jong-il Summit Possible Next Year: Envoy,” Reuters, September 11, 2007.

Snyder, Scott, “Responses to North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Capitulation or Collective Action?,” The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2007, p. 33.

Other

Bolton, John R., “Syria Joins the Axis of Evil,” The Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2007, p. 19.

Gertz, Bill, “Algeria, China Teamed on Nuke,” The Washington Times, September 17, 2007, p. A1.

Kessler, Glenn, and Wright, Robin, “Israel, U.S. Shared Data On Suspected Nuclear Site,” The Washington Post, September 21, 2007, p. A01.

Mazzetti, Mark, and Cooper, Helene, “Israeli Nuclear Suspicions Linked to Raid in Syria,“ The New York Times, September 18, 2007, p. A11.

Salama, Sammy, and Weber, Heidi, “Arab Nuclear Envy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2007, p. 44.

Winfield, Nicole, “U.S.: Syria On Nuclear Watch List,” Associated Press, September 15, 2007.

III. Nonproliferation

Aloise, Gene, and Rhodes, Keith, Combating Nuclear Smuggling, General Accounting Office report, September 18, 2007, 14 pp.

Associated Press, “U.S. Says It Has Removed All U.S.-Origin Enriched Uranium From South Korea,” September 19, 2007.

Associated Press, “Leaders Urge Rapid Ratification of Treaty Banning Nuclear Test Explosions,” September 18, 2007.

Associated Press, “11 More Nations Cautiously Move Toward Joining U.S.-Initiated Nuclear Project,” September 16, 2007.

Bunn, Matthew, “Thwarting Terrorists: More to be Done,” The Washington Post, September 26, 2007, p. A19.

The Economist, “A Radioactive Rebellion,” September 13, 2007.

Goldschmidt, Pierre, Rule of Law, Politics and Nuclear Non-proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Proliferation Analysis, September 7, 2007.

Krieger, David, Meeting the Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, September 17, 2007.

Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, “Reinvigorate Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Democracy, Fall 2007.

Sokova, Elena, and Chuen, Cristina Hansell, “Nuclear Power Broker,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2007, p. 50.

Strohecker, Karin, “U.S., China Urged to Stop Hindering Atom Test Ban Pact,” Reuters, September 18, 2007.

The Times of India, “IAEA Providing Security Against Nuclear Terrorism,” September 12, 2007.

Velek, Victor, “Ministry Signs Atomic Pact,” The Prague Post, September 19, 2007.

Webb, Greg, “South Africa Asks Nations to Step Up Khan Network Investigation,” Global Security Newswire, September 11, 2007.

World Nuclear News, “More U.S. Warheads to Be Used for Power Generation,” September 18, 2007.

IV. Missiles and Missile Defense

Agence France-Presse, “U.S. Military Inspect Russian Radar in Azerbaijan,” September 18, 2007.

Associated Press, “Leaders of Central European Left-Wing Parties Reject U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” September 14, 2007.

Butler, Desmond, “U.S. Missile Plans for Europe under Fire,” Associated Press, September 27, 2007.

Butler, Desmond, “Missile Defense Strains U.S.-Russia Ties,” Associated Press, September 16, 2007.

Government Accountability Office, Space Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative, September 12, 2007, 39 pp.

Greenlees, Donald, “China and India Leading Asian Missile Buildup,” International Herald Tribune, September 20, 2007, p. A1.

Gusterson, Hugh, “Determining the Truth About U.S. Missile Defense,” The Bulletin Online, September 24, 2007.

Matthews, William, “U.S. Missile Defense Chief Paints Rosy Picture for Europeans,” Defense News, September 24, 2007, p. 41.

RIA Novosti, “Russia Says No Progress on Missile Shield Talks With U.S.,” September 19, 2007.

Shanker, Thom, “Missile Test Is Lauded as a Success,” The New York Times, September 29, 2007, p. A10.

Shanker, Thom, “Russian Radar in Azerbaijan is Unacceptable, Missile Defense Chief Says,” International Herald Tribune, September 19, 2007, p. 3.

Sieff, Martin, “BMD Focus: Optimistic Realism – Part 1,” United Press International, September 27, 2007.

Wolf, Jim, “Senate Panel Slashes European Missile Defense Shield,” Reuters, September 12, 2007.

V. Chemical and Biological Arms

Associated Press, “July Blast in Syria Linked to Chemical Arms, Report Says,” September 20, 2007.

Guillemin, Jeanne, “Seduced by the State,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2007, p. 14.

International Herald Tribune, “Russian Scientist Accused of Trying to Smuggle Possible Biological Weapons Materials,” September 14, 2007.

Kellman, Barry, Bioviolence, Cambridge University Press, September 2007, 392 pp.

Medical Research News, “Australian Doctor Awarded for Uncovering Smallpox Bioterrorism Risk,” September 18, 2007.

Smithson, Amy E., ed., Beijing on Biohazards: Chinese Experts on Bioweapons Nonproliferation Issues, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, September 17, 2007, 141 pp.

VI. Conventional Arms

Belfast Telegraph, “NATO Comes Clean on Cluster Bombs,” September 17, 2007.

Chuter, Andrew, “Saudis Sign $8.9B Eurofighter Deal,” Defense News, September 17, 2007.

Doyle, John M., “BAE, NG Bid to Test Counter-MANPADS on Airliners,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 14, 2007.

Finn, Peter, “Russia, Indonesia Set $1 Billion Arms Deal,” The Washington Post, September 7, 2007, p. A14.

Hanley, Charles J., “U.N. Members, Gun Lobby Face Treaty Fight,” Associated Press, September 30, 2007.

NATO, NATO Hands Over Target Data on Cluster Munitions to Serb Authorities, September 25, 2007.

Norton-Taylor, Richard, “Human Rights Groups Accuse MoD of Hypocrisy Over Cluster Bombs,” The Guardian, September 18, 2007.

RIA Novosti, “U.S. Develops 14-Ton Super Bomb, Bigger Than Russian Vacuum Bomb,” September 13, 2007.

Schweid, Barry, “Looming $20B Arms Sale Raises Concerns,” Associated Press, September 18, 2007.

Solovyov, Dmitry, “Russia Tests Superstrength Bomb: Military,” Reuters, September 11, 2007.

Wolf, Jim, “Pentagon Says Israel Improves Arms-Export Controls,” Reuters, September 5, 2007.

VII. U.S. Policy

Aloise, Gene, Nuclear Security: DOE and NRC Have Different Security Requirements for Protecting Weapons-Grade Material from Terrorist Attacks, General Accounting Office, September 11, 2007, 5 pp.

Air Force Times, “Senator Seeks Review of Nuke-Handling Policy,” September 13, 2007.

VIII. Space

Broad, William J., “From the Start, the Space Race Was an Arms Race,” The New York Times, September 25, 2007, p. F10.

Grego, Laura, “The Battle for Peace in Space,” New Scientist, September 5, 2007, p. 24.

Hofmeyer, Erik, “Celestial Eagle: Historic Anti-Satellite Mission Remembered,” Space War, September 19, 2007.

Isachenkov, Vladimir, “Russia Warns Against Space Weapons,” Associated Press, September 27, 2007.

IX. Other

Pearce, Jeremy, “Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Physicist and Adviser on Arms Control, Dies at 88,” The New York Times, September 28, 2007.

Santora, Marc, “Giuliani, in London, Urges Broad NATO Expansion,” International Herald Tribune, September 20, 2007.

Weil, Martin, “Wolfgang Panofsky, 88; Physicist, Fought for Disarmament,” The Washington Post, September 28, 2007, p. B7.

Congress, Pentagon Probe Nuke Overflight

Zachary Hosford

The transfer of six nuclear warheads aboard a strategic U.S. bomber Aug. 30 has prompted a Pentagon internal investigation and congressional legislation requiring a review of U.S. nuclear custody policies.

Citing Department of Defense policy, Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell declined to reveal whether or not the situation did in fact involve nuclear weapons, stating only that there was an “incident” regarding the routine transfer of munitions. He confirmed, however, that the event was significant enough to warrant the notification of President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the latter of whom requested that he be kept apprised of the matter.

The transport of nuclear weapons on combat aircraft does not violate any international treaties to which the United States is party, but safety concerns following a series of accidents during the Cold War involving nuclear weapon-equipped bombers did prompt the government to prohibit such flights in 1968. The United States continues to transfer nuclear weapons aboard military cargo aircraft as well as on ground transportation using public routes.

News reports indicate that a B-52 Stratofortress flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, after having been loaded with the nuclear air-launched cruise missiles. Apparently, military personnel inadvertently attached the nuclear version of the AGM-129A Advanced Cruise Missile to the bomber before it departed on its approximately 2,500-kilometer cross-country journey.

According to the Air Force, airmen discovered the error during internal checks, although not until hours after the warheads had been removed from their storage bunker. Consequently, a munitions squadron commander was relieved of his duties, and additional airmen were “temporarily decertified to perform their duties involving munitions,” according to Lt. Col. Edward Thomas, an Air Force spokesperson.

The Air Force also announced that it had launched an investigation into the incident, in part “to identify any appropriate corrective actions” beyond the aforementioned personnel changes. Additionally, Air Combat Command, the Air Force authority in control of the two involved bomb wings, directed a “command-wide stand down” to review its processes at all of its bases to protect against a repeat occurrence.

Lawmakers responded to the incident as well. Senator Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) won approval for an amendment to the fiscal year 2008 Senate defense appropriations bill requiring a “top to bottom review of policies and procedures for controlling custody of, and securing, U.S. nuclear weapons.”

The amendment calls for an evaluation of Defense Department and Department of Energy practices to “monitor and control all aspects of the nation’s nuclear weapons.” It further stipulates that the review, which would culminate with the submission to Congress of a classified report on its findings, be completed within 90 days.

The Senate defense appropriations committee approved the bill Sept. 12, and it has since moved to the full Senate for consideration. The House passed its appropriations bill Aug. 5 without a provision on nuclear custody policies. For the legislation to become law, differences between the Senate bill and the House-passed version must be reconciled in a conference committee.

Experts Seek Measures to Control Bioweapons

Oliver Meier

The first of a series of meetings in preparation for the 2011 review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) produced no concrete results but was hailed by participants for its positive atmosphere. Experts and diplomats from 90 BWC states-parties as well as representatives from a range of international organizations met in Geneva Aug. 20-24 to discuss ways and means to enhance national implementation of the biological weapons prohibition, including law enforcement, and measures to improve regional and subregional cooperation on BWC implementation.

The meeting was the first in a series of intersessional gatherings agreed to at the last review conference in 2006. (See ACT, January/February 2007. ) It took place against the background of lingering differences about how much attention to spend on the threat from bioterrorism. It also remains unclear whether a follow-up meeting of BWC states-parties in December will be able to decide on specific measures to improve implementation of the biological weapons ban.

Differences on Bioterrorism

National implementation measures, which include laws, administrative procedures, and regulations to bring domestic laws into conformity with BWC obligations, had already been discussed at a similar conference in 2003, and many delegations effectively rehashed their statements.

In the background, however, divisions between participants about the relative importance of discussions on the threat from bioterrorism lingered. Some states-parties are concerned that bioterrorism, an issue high on the U.S. agenda, receives too much consideration. They emphasize that other issues could be neglected, such as state-sponsored biological weapons activities and scientific developments that could lead to the development of novel biological warfare agents.

German expert and delegation member Volker Beck told Arms Control Today Sept. 13 that “states-parties should take care that discussions on bioterrorism do not gain too much weight” at the December 2007 meeting nor during the general intersessional process. Beck argued that tackling the threat from bioterrorism is only one element of BWC implementation and that state-sponsored biological weapons activities must also receive adequate attention, especially considering rapid developments in the life sciences that might be misused for hostile purposes. “The balance must be right,” he cautioned. Beck pointed out as an example that although improving the enforcement of national legislation, an issue highlighted by the U.S. delegation, is an important goal, a number of states do not even have appropriate legislation in place.

Others disagree. “Bioterrorism is an important subject but that doesn’t mean that, in the context of national implementation, people are losing sight of other issues, particularly scientific developments of relevance to the BWC,” Pakistani ambassador Masood Khan, who chaired the meeting, told Arms Control Today in an interview Sept. 17.

Fears that the danger from bioterrorism is being exaggerated also lingered when experts discussed a proposal from the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA) to create a bioincident database under its auspices. Some experts questioned the ODA’s intention to include biological weapons hoaxes in the database, apparently suspecting a ploy to increase resources devoted to the effort. It also remains unclear how the ODA intends to deal with a 2006 UN General Assembly resolution requiring that the database complement a similar effort by Interpol that is designed to compile a list of “biocrimes.”

Launch of the Implementation Support Unit

On Aug. 20, BWC states-parties celebrated the official launch of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), a BWC mini-secretariat with a staff of three agreed on at the sixth review conference. Its administrative tasks include serving as a clearinghouse on a range of BWC-related activities.

Of particular relevance to the 2007 BWC meetings is the ISU’s responsibility to coordinate efforts to assist states-parties in meeting national implementation obligations. It has already compiled a database of laws and regulations passed by member states. ISU head Richard Lennane told Arms Control Today Sept. 14 that he has received several offers, but only a few preliminary inquiries of governments about such help.

In a Sept. 17 interview with Arms Control Today, Khan appealed for patience. “The issue needs to be sorted out through dialogue,” he stated. “Concerned states-parties should have a clear idea what kind of assistance they require. Diplomats and experts are sensitized to the idea, but now we have to take the next steps to negotiate a transition from the realization of the desirability of assistance to spelling out practical steps.”

Confidence-Building Measures Lack Transparency

The ISU is now the central repository for the so-called confidence-building measures (CBMs), an annual information exchange on biological weapons-relevant activities agreed on by states-parties in 1986. During the meeting of experts, the ISU announced that, in 2007, 58 states-parties had fulfilled their political obligation to submit a declaration. This rate of participation marks an all-time high.

All declarations received are supposed to be posted on a secure section of the ISU website accessible only to governments. However, four states have not yet given permission to have their CBMs distributed via the ISU site. Lennane hopes that the situation is “only temporary” and will be resolved when states’ concerns about the security of the ISU site have been addressed. The ISU also intends to post all declarations that states have made public on its open website but has decided to delay publication of the latest CBMs until problems with the secure website have been sorted out.

Progress on Universality

At the sixth review conference, states-parties had agreed that the chair of meetings of experts would also be in charge of coordinating activities to foster universalization. On the last day of the August meeting, Khan reported that four states-parties (Gabon, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, and Trinidad and Tobago) had acceded to BWC in 2007, bringing the number of states-parties to 159. Khan also told the meeting that, in responses to letters to non-states-parties, Mozambique had informed him its accession is advanced. An Israeli official had replied that Israel shared the view that “the threat of biological warfare is indeed an ominous one” but that “regional circumstances…cannot be overlooked by Israel upon any consideration of the issue of possible accession to the BWC.”

The ISU is also supporting universalization efforts, for example, by encouraging non-states-parties to provide information about national points of contact for biological weapons control. Such information, including the state of affairs regarding accession, is posted on the secure section of the ISU website so that BWC states-parties can get in touch with non-states-parties and lobby for accession to the biological weapons ban.

States-Parties Meet in December

The report from the meeting of experts includes a compilation of proposals, and Khan may also issue a separate synthesis of discussions in preparation for the Dec. 10-14 meeting of states-parties. It will be up to that conference to take concrete action on issues discussed at the meeting of experts. Khan, who will also chair the December meeting, is cautiously optimistic that it might be possible to move beyond what was possible during the intersessional process preceding the previous BWC review conference.

“States-parties are their own masters, and if they decide to do so, we can see what we can achieve,” Khan said. “Can we make the whole exercise more focused? And if states-parties produce a paper, would it have any operative part? That we have to look into. But at the meeting of experts, there was a realization that we can move forward and that while the last intersessional process [was] a good model, we need not be constrained by it.”

One idea that might be developed in December is an implementation checklist for national legislation. Such a checklist is already used by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and was seen by many delegations as having advantages when compared to the development of one-size-fits-all model legislation. Khan tends to agree. “Most states-parties showed interest in this area, and I think it will be taken up again in December. This is a good idea. If we have a clear-cut implementation checklist, we will be able to measure our progress; and successes in one country can be replicated in another country, of course after tailoring them to the specific requirements of that country,” he told Arms Control Today.

The ISU’s Lennane concurs. He hopes that even though past meetings of states-parties during the 2003-2005 intersessional process were not able to draft specific recommendations, the next meeting of states-parties “may be prepared to take the next step.” One of Lennane’s suggestions is that the meeting could call on regional organizations to incorporate recommendations related to national implementation into their work.

Khan points out that, “in the past, such cooperation on regional and subregional cooperation has been focused on such issues as universalization. At the meeting of experts, there was a realization that now you also need to use these mechanisms as building blocks for more cooperation, for an understanding of different phenomena, and for widening the networks, which can help states-parties to implement the BWC in a more effective manner.”

Negotiations Elude Disarmament Body Again

Wade Boese

Despite its claim to be the “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community,” the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD) recently concluded its ninth consecutive year without any treaty negotiations. A majority of members failed to persuade China, Iran, and Pakistan to support the latest proposal to revive work at the moribund conference, but many pledged to continue their efforts next year.

Since completing the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, conference members, particularly the United States and China, have clashed over negotiating priorities. Washington, Tokyo, and European capitals back the conclusion of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) to end the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes. The Geneva-based conference briefly held FMCT negotiations in 1998, but they did not produce any results, and the talks did not carry over to the following year.

Beijing and Moscow, in contrast, support negotiating a new agreement on restricting future weapons deployments in outer space, while non-nuclear-weapon states lobby for action on nuclear disarmament and assurances that they will not be attacked with nuclear arms.

After 1998, members have debated various compromises to satisfy all of the competing demands. None has won the consensus required to officially start work.

Members this year focused on a March 23 initiative as the best hope to end the negotiating dry spell. That proposal calls for FMCT negotiations and less formal talks on outer space, nuclear disarmament, and assurances for states without nuclear weapons. (See ACT, April 2007. )

Many countries quickly threw their support to the package or, like France and the United States, signaled they would not block it. Russia postponed until next year submission of a draft treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, reportedly to avoid bogging down deliberations over the March initiative.

Still, some states raised reservations or objections to the March proposal. A few of those countries, such as India, eventually and grudgingly accepted the package; but China, Iran, and Pakistan could not be swayed before the 2007 conference’s Sept. 14 close.

China, as well as Iran, contends the package does not ensure enough “substantive” work on issues other than an FMCT. Although Beijing in August 2003 dropped its insistence on outer space negotiations, it apparently wants reassurance that consenting to outer space discussions under the current proposal would not foreclose the possibility of future negotiations.

Some Western officials familiar with the conference speculate that Beijing is using the outer space issue to avoid FMCT negotiations. China is the only recognized nuclear-weapon state—the other four are France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—that has not publicly declared a moratorium on fissile material production for weapons. A senior U.S. official Sept. 20 told Arms Control Today that “if China decides negotiations on an FMCT are in its interests, Iran and Pakistan may reevaluate their position.”

Several CD diplomats interviewed in September by Arms Control Today, however, suggested that Pakistan presents the biggest hurdle to future adoption of the March package. Masood Khan, Pakistan’s ambassador to the conference, said in a Sept. 13 speech that the four core issues should receive “equal and balanced treatment.” That position is unacceptable to several countries, particularly France and the United States.

Islamabad also charges that the fissile material treaty part of the package is inadequate. The proposal states that FMCT negotiations should be conducted “without any preconditions.”

Pakistan maintains that a prescribed goal of any fissile material treaty negotiations should be an accord that is verifiable, an objective initially endorsed by the entire conference in 1995 but rejected by the Bush administration in 2004. (See ACT, September 2004. ) Administration officials say governments would waste money and time on creating verification measures that ultimately would burden lawful states and fail to deter cheaters.

The U.S. position has little support, yet most CD members, unlike Pakistan, have relented on proclaiming “verifiability” as a fixed goal of negotiations to accommodate the United States. The senior U.S. official said that Washington understands that not all governments accept the U.S. position at “face value” and therefore it is “prepared to make [its] case in the course of negotiations if others should propose a [verification] regime.” 

Pakistan also wants a fissile material treaty negotiation mandate to explicitly note that countries may explore measures on existing stockpiles of fissile material instead of focusing narrowly on halting fissile material production for weapons. Pakistan has long favored such an approach because it does not want a future FMCT to have the effect of freezing existing fissile material imbalances between it and India.

Indeed, Islamabad is pointing to a two-year-old Bush administration initiative to increase U.S. and global civilian nuclear trade with New Delhi as jeopardizing Pakistani security and justifying its hard-lines on a fissile material treaty. Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which includes President General Pervez Musharraf and Pakistan’s foreign affairs and defense ministers, warned in an Aug. 2 press release that the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation deal would “enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons.”

Washington contends the deal is solely about aiding India’s nuclear energy growth, while critics charge it also will benefit India’s military complex by enabling New Delhi to devote more of its limited domestic resources to building nuclear bombs. (See ACT, September 2007. ) Islamabad argues that it should have been offered a similar arrangement.

Despite the stiff resistance of Pakistan to the March proposal, the CD diplomats interviewed by Arms Control Today see it as the likely starting point for discussions when the conference reconvenes Jan. 21, 2008. Sergio Duarte, the UN high representative for disarmament affairs, exhorted the conference Aug. 21 that it “stands tantalizingly one short step away from resolving its long-standing impasse.”

Some ambassadors ending their tenures at the conference used farewell speeches to express their frustration with the conference’s failure to move sooner. Speaking Aug. 16, departing Canadian Ambassador Paul Meyer argued that “[i]f the CD was a business, it would have been declared insolvent long ago and shut down,” while Italian Ambassador Carlo Trezza lamented Sept. 13 that conference diplomacy amounted to “negotiation on negotiations.”

Swedish Ambassador Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier complained sharply Aug. 30 of witnessing “an anemic stalemate with delegations resorting to recitals of ceremonious mantras, covering up the traces of their own passivity by useless finger-pointing and blame games, hiding behind the commas of the rules of procedure and shamelessly abusing the consensus rule to abort any attempt to seriously tackle difficult or sensitive issues.” Nonetheless, she concluded by saying that she left the conference “with hope and expectations.”

Then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker implied last year to the conference that if it did not initiate FMCT negotiations soon, the United States would reconsider its CD participation. The senior U.S. official declined to say if the United States would scale back its presence next year, simply saying that “Americans believe in results, not endless process games.” The United States is scheduled to be one of six countries to occupy the body’s rotating presidency next year.

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