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Bloomberg News
August 27, 2018
July/August 2007
Edition Date: 
Sunday, July 1, 2007
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Conventional Arms Treaty Dispute Persists

Wade Boese

Russia and NATO are still at odds over a European conventional arms pact despite an emergency meeting June 11-15 to discuss their differences. Russia is complaining that its long-standing concerns are still being ignored but has not suspended implementation of the treaty as it previously warned it might.

Anatoly Antonov, who heads the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department of International Security and Disarmament, asserted that other states paid only “lip service” to Russia’s positions at the Vienna gathering. The 26-member NATO alliance issued a statement expressing “regret” that no agreement could be reached.

Russian President Vladimir Putin had said in April that Russia might halt implementation of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which caps the number of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft that 30 countries can station between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Antonov said June 15, however, that a possible suspension was now “closer.”

Under a suspension or moratorium, Antonov explained, Russia would stop treaty inspections, notifications, and data exchanges. It would also consider moot weapons limits on Russian arms deployments in its northern and southern regions, or so-called flanks. But he said Moscow did not intend to increase its weapons deployments or withdraw from the treaty, which requires at least a 150-day advance notice.

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, who led the U.S. delegation to the conference, told reporters June 12 that Russia had not indicated that a possible suspension was “imminent” but acknowledged that “it is certainly on the table.” A U.S. government official told Arms Control Today June 20 that “everybody is waiting for the other shoe to drop.”

Citing “serious problems” with NATO behavior under the CFE Treaty, Moscow called May 28 for the “extraordinary conference” on the accord. Russian negotiators arrived at the Vienna gathering with a half-dozen “problems” to discuss.

Russia’s main complaint is that NATO countries are refusing to ratify a November 1999 revision of the agreement, known as the Adapted CFE Treaty. Entry into force of that updated accord requires ratification by all the original treaty states-parties. Thus far, however, only Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have done so.

NATO members are postponing ratification of the adapted treaty, which replaces bloc and geographic arms limits with national weapon ceilings, until Russia withdraws its military forces from the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Moldova. Moscow pledged to do so in documents concluded in parallel with the revised accord at a summit in Istanbul. (See ACT, November 1999. ) Kremlin officials charge the NATO linkage is “artificial.”

Moscow is eager for the adapted treaty to take effect because it loosens Russian flank restrictions, enabling larger Russian force deployments in the volatile Caucasus region, which includes Chechnya. The Kremlin wants to eventually negotiate away the flank limits entirely, but NATO countries have not agreed to do so.

The adapted treaty also contains an accession clause not included in the original treaty. Russian officials are unhappy that NATO members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia are outside the treaty and without weapons limits. The four states have pledged to join the adapted treaty when the option becomes available.

NATO governments maintain that Russia holds the key to making this happen by ending its military presence in Georgia and Moldova.

Russia is working to close two remaining bases in Georgia by the end of 2008. But Georgia charges Russia has not fully abandoned another base, Gudauta, as claimed. This base is located in Abkhazia, a separatist region in Georgia.

The Kremlin’s withdrawal from Moldova has been stalled since 2004. Approximately 1,300 Russian forces remain inside the breakaway region of Transdniestria, where some of the troops are guarding a 21,000-metric-ton ammunition stockpile.

At the June conference, NATO members reiterated proposals to help Russia exit the two states. They suggested that multinational peacekeepers replace Russian forces in Moldova and that a voluntary international fund help pay for the destruction and removal of the ammunition. They also reaffirmed a German offer to lead a fact-finding mission to Gudauta to assess its status.

The Russian delegation dismissed the NATO proposals as nothing new and said the Georgian and Moldovan situations were being handled bilaterally. It insisted that NATO members should start ratifying the adapted treaty or that all CFE states-parties should provisionally apply the updated accord no later than July 1, 2008. NATO opposes this proposal.

The Russian and NATO delegations left the conference saying they were open to further talks, and Germany offered to host another conference for that purpose this fall.

Iran-Iraq Chemical Warfare Aftershocks Persist

Alex Bollfrass

Almost two decades after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the conflict’s chemical weapons legacy lingers in the streets of Ramadi and in courtrooms throughout the world. Iranian, Kurdish, and U.S. victims of Iraq’s chemical weapons are seeking judicial redress. At the same time, the Iraqi special tribunal has sentenced three key perpetrators to death.

Revealing that the left-over dangers from eight years of that war have not ended, UN inspectors charged with verifying and monitoring Iraq’s disarmament warned in their latest report of the continuing threat that munitions and expertise left behind by the war still pose even as insurgents mount new types of chemical attacks.

Death Sentence for “Chemical Ali”

Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam Hussein’s cousin and top aide, was pronounced guilty on June 24 of ordering the use of chemical weapons during the dictator’s anti-Kurdish operation, a decision that earned him the nickname “Chemical Ali.” He was sentenced to death by hanging.

The so-called Anfal campaign lasted from late February to early September 1988. The prosecution alleged that the campaign destroyed approximately 2,000 villages and killed 180,000 people. The trial’s defendants claimed that it was a counter-insurgency operation and the Kurds were supporting the Iranian enemy. According to the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal’s verdict, the Anfal campaign constituted genocide, a war crime, and a crime against humanity.

During the Anfal campaign, Ali Hassan served as secretary-general of the Ba’ath Party’s northern bureau. He later oversaw the Kuwaiti occupation and was minister of the interior prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion. Two other high-ranking officials were also given the death penalty and another two received life sentences for their role in the attacks.

Complaints Collect in Dutch Courts

Iraq’s chemical warfare program relied on foreign suppliers, one of whom recently had his 15-year prison sentence extended another two years. The businessman Frans van Anraat had been convicted in December 2005 of complicity in war crimes for shipping more than 1,100 tons of thiodiglycol from a U.S. company to Iraq. The chemical was crucial in the production of the mustard gas used by the Ba’athists in their attacks on Kurds in 1987 and 1988, which included the Anfal campaign.

A Dutch appeals court increased Van Anraat’s sentence on May 9, arguing that he had been “driven by naked greed,” but it found the evidence insufficient to convict him of complicity in genocide. The appeals court also ruled that 15 Kurdish plaintiffs would not receive the €680 in damages that the lower court had awarded them.

These victims, however, are being represented in a separate upcoming civil case. The state prosecutor also is considering an appeal of the case to the Netherlands’ high court in hopes of establishing van Anraat’s complicity in genocide.

The Iranian government will be filing its own legal claims in the matter. Iranian news sources reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi Mostafavi announced May 12 in Tehran that his government would be launching suits against Iraq’s Western chemical suppliers and that it had created a dossier on the subject.

Iranian diplomats contacted by Arms Control Today did not respond to requests for details. It appears that the first suit will be brought in the Netherlands, in connection with the van Anraat case.

During the war, Iran developed its own chemical weapons program and supplier network in response to Iraqi attacks. One Israeli supplier, Nahum Manbar, is on the verge of release from prison in that country. He was sentenced to 16 years in 1998 but is likely to be released soon, pending the state attorney’s request for Israeli intelligence to vet if Manbar’s release would pose a threat. Two of Iran’s suppliers have also served jail sentences in the United States.

U.S. Veterans’ Suit Wilting

The Iranian lawsuits are starting just as U.S. Persian Gulf War veterans’ quest for compensation is trickling to a halt. The U.S. military blew up Iraqi ammunition depots containing chemical weapons agents and may have inadvertently exposed its own soldiers to toxic fallout. The class action lawsuit targeting alleged Western chemical suppliers to Hussein’s government, originally filed in 1994, has failed to gain traction in U.S. and European courts.

The class action complaint comprises some 3,000 plaintiffs, but its list of defendants has dwindled from 46 businesses to two companies. The lead attorney in the case, Gary Pitts, told Arms Control Today June 15 that he has been unable to establish proper jurisdiction over the mostly European companies in the United States, despite their U.S. subsidiaries.

As an American, Pitts has been unable to file in the national courts of the major suppliers: Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Some of the biggest suppliers to Iraq were German, but Germany’s judiciary rules do not permit consolidated lawsuits. This means that each plaintiff would need to file separate suits against each company.

Pitts said the “heavy players” had escaped punishment. One of the two remaining defendants, Alcolac Inc., was previously convicted of violating U.S. export laws in 1989 for supplying van Anraat with the thiodiglycol that he sold to the Iraqis. Kellogg, the other company, built an ammonia facility in Iraq but was not listed in the detailed records of its chemical weapons program that Iraq gave to the United Nations.

Another setback for the case has been the disappearance of a key witness, Alaa al-Saeed. He headed the Iraqi chemical weapons program at al-Muthanna, the largest chemical weapons facility under the Ba’athist government, and had agreed to testify in the case.

On his way to a new Iraqi government post in the Science Ministry, al-Saeed was kidnapped in March and is still believed to be in captivity. A representative of the U.S. embassy in Iraq confirmed to Arms Control Today June 17 that its Office of Hostage Affairs had an open file on al-Saeed but declined to provide details.

UNMOVIC Issues Warning of Lingering Expertise, Materials

In addition to occupying judges with questions of guilt and compensation, the war’s consequences still pose threats to the lives of people in Iraq. The UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) recently warned about the danger of an escalation in chemical attacks in Iraq. In their May 29 report to the Security Council, the commissioners noted that at least 10 insurgent attacks have killed dozens and injured hundreds of individuals. It observes that the situation is aggravated by the presence of a past program’s materials and expertise.

These attacks involved the dispersion of widely available chlorine gas with conventional explosives. The report, addressing the period between the beginning of March and the end of May, alerts the Security Council that hundreds of individuals in Iraq have experience in producing and delivering chemical weapons. The supply of these scientists’ expertise and insurgents’ demands for deadly weaponry presents a dangerous combination.

Another risk factor mentioned in the report is the existence of procurement networks that can acquire chemical precursors for weapons. UNMOVIC says that despite Security Council resolutions mandating that any dual-use chemicals imported into Iraq must be reported to it, UNMOVIC has received no such information since the U.S. invasion of March 2003. Consequently, weapons-usable chemicals can be shipped into Iraq with impunity.

Dual-use-chemical production equipment exists in Iraq, providing the infrastructure for small-scale production of chemical weapons. UNMOVIC points out that those interested in using chemical weapons could improvise primitive delivery systems to reach their targets.

The report also noted the possible existence of pre-1991 chemical weapons. Mustard gas-filled artillery shells may be particularly dangerous because the agent is unlikely to have deteriorated in potency. The remaining nerve-agent warheads are less of a direct threat because of probable degradation, but they may still pose a health hazard, according to the Iraq inspection agency.

The agency was disbanded June 29 before it could take action on removing these threats. Legal consequences from the Iran-Iraq War, on the other hand, will be rippling through the courts for the indefinite future.

Almost two decades after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the conflict’s chemical weapons legacy lingers in the streets of Ramadi and in courtrooms throughout the world. Iranian, Kurdish, and U.S. victims of Iraq’s chemical weapons are seeking judicial redress. At the same time, the Iraqi special tribunal has sentenced three key perpetrators to death. (Continue)

Sanctions on Iran Grow

Paul Kerr and Wade Boese

During the past several months, the U.S. Departments of State and the Treasury have placed sanctions on several Iranian entities that they claim have engaged in activities related to Tehran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Meanwhile, the international community has moved forward in implementing other sanctions on Iran that were imposed in UN Security Council resolutions.

In June 2005, President George W. Bush authorized the Treasury Department in Executive Order 13382 to freeze the U.S. assets of foreign entities suspected of supplying or supporting the development of unconventional arms and ballistic or cruise missile programs. (See ACT, September 2005. ) The order bars U.S. citizens, companies, and institutions from doing business or facilitating transactions with sanctioned entities, a term that encompasses individuals, private companies, or government agencies. Other foreign entities that do business with those already sanctioned risk being penalized as well.

The Treasury Department recently added a total of seven Iranian entities in three separate announcements. The first announcement was in April, the second and third in June. Earlier this year, the department added nine entities to the list, six of which were Iranian. (See ACT, March 2007. )

The U.S. government has designated a total of 43 entities under the executive order; 20 are Iranian. Of those, 15 are subsidiaries of five other entities.

Whether any of these designees have any assets under U.S. jurisdiction is unclear. Treasury Department spokesperson Molly Millerwise told Arms Control Today June 28 that the department does not disclose such information. Asked whether the assets belonging to subsidiaries of designated parent entities also are frozen, Millerwise explained that “all of” a designated company’s “property and interests in property are blocked. Depending on the facts and circumstances, its investments in other companies may be considered blocked property.”

Almost all of the recently designated entities are listed in an annex to UN Security Council Resolution 1737, which was adopted last December. The two exceptions are Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization and a related entity, Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group. The resolution imposed a series of sanctions on Iran, including restrictions on importing and exporting a variety of goods and technologies related to Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs. (See ACT, April 2007. )

On April 3, the State Department designated Iran’s Defense Industries Organization under the executive order for activities “that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery,” according to an announcement in the Federal Register. The State Department provided no details, but the annex to Resolution 1737 describes the Defense Industries Organization as an “overarching” entity controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Some of the organization’s “subordinates” have been involved in Iran’s centrifuge and missile programs, according to the annex. The April 3 designation was the first such action by the State Department under the executive order.

On June 8, the Treasury Department designated two companies, Pars Tarash and Farayand Technique, for their involvement with Iran’s gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program. There is widespread concern within the international community that this program could be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Tehran maintains that the program is exclusively to produce fuel for nuclear reactors (see page 26 ). 

The companies are connected to Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, the Kalaye Electric Company, or both, according to a department press release.

Bush included the Atomic Energy Organization, which the Treasury Department describes as “the main Iranian institute for research and development activities in the field of nuclear technology,” in an annex to the original 2005 executive order. The Kalaye Electric Company, a subsidiary of the organization, was similarly designated in February 2007. (See ACT, March 2007. )

On June 15, the department designated two individuals, Mohammad Qannadi and Ali Hajinia Leilabadi. According to a department press release issued that day, Qannadi and Leilabadi act or purport to act “for or on behalf of” Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and the Mesbah Energy Company respectively. The Mesbah Energy Company is an Atomic Energy Organization “subordinate,” which the Treasury Department designated in January 2006.

Mesbah Energy Company has been used to “procure products for Iran’s heavy water project,” the press release stated. Iran is constructing a heavy water-moderated nuclear reactor and an associated heavy-water plant. The annex to Resolution 1737 describes the company as a “provider” for the reactor project. The United States and other countries suspect that the reactor could be used to produce plutonium for fissile material in nuclear weapons.

The United States also has targeted entities involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program. On June 8, the Treasury Department designated Fajr Industries Group and Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group under the 2005 executive order. Both are connected to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, according to the department.

The Aerospace Industries Organization, which was also identified in the original executive order’s annex, “is a subsidiary of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, and is the overall manager and coordinator of Iran’s missile program.”

Both of the newly designated entities are involved in procuring equipment and materials for Iran’s ballistic missile program, according to the department, whose June 8 press release provided some details about these activities.

For example, it stated that Fajr Industries Group “has consistently procured a wide range of missile guidance and control equipment on behalf of” the Aerospace Industries Organization. Since the late 1990s, the company has “purchased high strength steel alloy, useful for guidance equipment in ballistic missiles,” the press release said.

For its part, the Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group purchased in April 2005 “a state-of-the-art crane…probably intended for use in Iran’s Shahab missile program,” the press release says, adding that such cranes “can be used to support missiles…in the field or at storage facilities.” The Shahab-3 is the longest-range missile that Iran has deployed to date. (See ACT, January/February 2007. )

Additionally, the company acted on behalf of the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, a “subordinate entity” of the Aerospace Industries Organization, to acquire equipment “that could be used to calibrate guidance and control instruments for more accurate [ballistic missile] targeting.”

State Department Sanctions

Earlier this year, the State Department imposed sanctions on 31 entities under the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act for unspecified transfers of items, either to or from Iran or Syria, related to weapons of mass destruction, certain conventional weapons, and ballistic or cruise missiles. 

For two years, the sanctioned entities will be prohibited from receiving U.S. government contracts, assistance, or military trade, as well as any goods controlled by the 1979 Export Administration Act, which regulates exports that have both civilian and military purposes. The State Department provided no details about the entities’ activities.

According to announcements published in the Federal Register Jan. 5 and April 23, two dozen entities located in 10 countries were sanctioned in January; 13 entities located in seven countries were sanctioned in April. The State Department in April also sanctioned Hezbollah, a foreign terrorist organization.

Of the penalized entities, four were Iranian. One of these, the Sanam Industrial Group, also is designated under Resolution 1747, which contains an annex similar to that of Resolution 1737. The council adopted Resolution 1747 March 24. Iran’s Defense Industries Organization was sanctioned both in January and April.

Except for Hezbollah, the other entities are located in 10 other countries: China, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Sudan, and Syria. Six of these entities were sanctioned both in January and April.

Implementation of UN Sanctions Continues

Belgium’s UN permanent representative Johan Verbeke, who chairs the committee overseeing the sanctions imposed on Iran, gave a progress report to the Security Council June 21. The Security Council set up the committee to monitor countries’ compliance with Resolutions 1737 and 1747.

Verbeke said that the committee, which is required to report to the Security Council every 90 days about its progress, has received reports from 50 states and the European Union regarding their implementation of Resolution 1747. That resolution called on all countries to report on their implementation of the sanctions within 60 days.

A total of 73 countries have submitted reports regarding their implementation of Resolution 1737, he added. As of March 23, some 51 states and the EU had done so, Verbeke reported at the time. The United Nations has a total of 192 member states. (See ACT, May 2007 .)

In addition to receiving governments’ reports, the committee adopted guidelines May 30 for implementing the resolutions, Verbeke said.

Cluster Munitions Control Efforts Make Gains

Wade Boese

The clock appears to be ticking on the unconstrained use of cluster munitions. The ranks of a Norwegian-led initiative to prohibit these types of weapons have swelled to approximately 70 countries. Meanwhile, the United States recently switched its position in another forum to support negotiating some restrictions on cluster munitions.

Cluster munitions are weapons fired from artillery and rockets or dropped by planes that fragment and spread as many as 600 submunitions (small bomblets or grenades) over broad areas. When the submunitions fail to detonate properly, which can happen frequently, they can injure or kill people who later come into contact with them. Independent studies estimate that tens of thousands of noncombatants over the past several decades might have fallen victim to cluster munitions.

The first use of cluster munitions dates back to World War II, but Israel’s large-scale use of cluster munitions against Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon last August increased attention to the weapon system. (See ACT, October 2006. ) In a June 5 report, the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre in South Lebanon stated that 904 cluster munitions strike areas had been identified in Lebanon and that leftover cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance had claimed 236 postconflict casualties, including 31 deaths.

At a June 19-22 meeting in Geneva, the United States, a supplier of some of the cluster munitions used by Israel last summer, announced it would back negotiations on cluster munitions under the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which numbers 102 states-parties. The convention regulates indiscriminate and inhumane arms, such as incendiary weapons, through five separate protocols.

Last fall, Washington helped block work on a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions. (See ACT, December 2006. ) Ronald Bettauer, head of the U.S. CCW delegation, said June 18 that the about-face reflected “the importance of this issue, concerns raised by other countries, and our own concerns about the humanitarian implications of these weapons.”

Bettauer indicated four days later that the United States does not have a specific proposal. “The United States has taken no position as to the outcome of the negotiations,” he told other delegations. Bettauer, however, noted that any result should “protect civilians while taking into account security requirements.”

On behalf of the European Union, Germany has proposed a negotiating mandate to conclude a CCW protocol on cluster munitions by the end of 2008. Acting on its own accord, Germany also has submitted a draft protocol that would phase-out cluster munitions, but initially permit the use of cluster munitions that met certain technical requirements, such as submunitions failure rates of less than one percent. It would also allow cluster munitions use against targets not near populated areas.    

Despite the U.S. reversal and the EU proposal, there is no guarantee that negotiations will be initiated. The CCW operates by consensus and other countries, including China and Russia, have previously balked at cluster munitions measures. CCW members will decide this November on whether to start any cluster munitions negotiations.

Frustrated with the cumbersome and slow-moving CCW process, Norway last year—much to Washington’s chagrin—opted to launch an independent process to negotiate a cluster munitions treaty. The inaugural February meeting of the so-called Oslo Process brought together 46 countries that committed to concluding in 2008 an agreement banning cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.” (See ACT, April 2007. )

A growing group, including several African states, gathered May 23-25 in Lima, Peru, for a second meeting to propel the process forward and give the proposed treaty more shape. Norway provided the countries with a draft discussion text.

Key aspects of that document included an initial six-year period for destroying stockpiled systems and an initial 10-year period for clearing cluster munitions contaminating a country’s territory. There were also provisions for governments to assist cluster munitions victims and make regular implementation reports. The Norwegian draft also called for entry into force of a future treaty once 20 countries ratify it.

Differences of opinions emerged on all of those issues, but two other issues provoked more substantial debate and revealed some divisions.

Participants disagreed over whether there should be a transition time permitting states to use cluster munitions until alternative weapons become available.

They also diverged over what cluster munitions should be prohibited. For example, some contended cluster munitions equipped with self-destruct mechanisms or those with low failure rates should be allowed, but other states argued for a blanket ban.

This latter group is strongly backed by nongovernmental groups involved in the Oslo Process. Jody Williams, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for her work against anti-personnel landmines, told the Lima conference May 25, “Honest assessments of the use of cluster munitions in real combat situations, we believe, can only lead to the elimination of cluster munitions.”

In general, states coming down on the more stringent sides of the transition and exemption issues are those that hold out little hope for or are not party to the CCW. Led by Norway, this group also includes Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, and Peru.

Oslo participants supporting transition times and exemptions tend also to back negotiating a CCW instrument. Australia, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland rank among those states putting greater stock in a possible CCW instrument, while Canada, France, and the United Kingdom occupy more middle ground, voicing support for both paths. The contention by some of these states is that a CCW protocol, if negotiated, would potentially capture more major powers and cluster munitions producers and users.

Nongovernmental organizations are urging states to ignore the siren song of the CCW. Steve Goose, director of the arms division at Human Rights Watch and a co-chair of the Cluster Munition Coalition, argued in separate May 25 press statements that the CCW was a “dead-end process” and “a distraction that should be avoided.”

Meanwhile, Oslo Process participants are pushing ahead on several fronts. At the May meeting, Peru declared that it would work toward turning Latin America into a zone free of cluster munitions. In addition, Hungary and Switzerland announced national moratoriums. Belgium and Costa Rica are arranging regional meetings of Oslo participants, while the next full meeting is scheduled for Dec. 5-7 in Vienna.

Missile Defense Collision Course

By Daryl G. Kimball

When President George W. Bush withdrew from the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty five years ago, he asserted that “my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.” Now, Bush’s latest proposal to site 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic has severely compounded the Kremlin’s anxieties about growing U.S. offensive and defensive strategic capabilities.

President Vladimir Putin’s response to missile defense deployments in two former Warsaw Pact states has been hostile and counterproductive: he has threatened to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; to target the sites with Russian missiles; and to stop work on a Joint Data Exchange Center intended to help avoid an accidental or mistaken nuclear attack.

For some Americans and Europeans, a rudimentary defense against a potential long-range missile threat from Iran may seem attractive. But for now, it is a flawed idea whose time has not come.

Russia’s concerns may be exaggerated, but that does not alter the reality that the European anti-missile plan is premature and the technology unproven. And, if Washington presses ahead despite Russian objections, it could trigger the renewal of U.S.-Russian missile competition and hamper efforts to further reduce each nation’s still massive nuclear warhead and missile arsenals.

In recent weeks, U.S. officials have crisscrossed Europe to say the proposed system is not designed to counter Russia’s nuclear-armed missiles and therefore does not threaten Russia’s security. To be sure, 10 U.S. interceptors would only provide a rudimentary defense against a handful of incoming missiles, let alone Russia’s current force of some 500 land-based missiles. Highly scripted tests involving prototypes of ground-based interceptors now deployed in California and Alaska have failed three out of five times since 2002. The proposed system in Europe would use a new type of interceptor that has yet to be built, let alone tested.

But just as U.S. officials are seeking missile defenses against an Iranian missile threat that does not exist, Russian leaders are worried they cannot maintain their strategic nuclear retaliatory capability against a porous strategic missile defense that has not been built and a potential U.S. nuclear buildup that will not likely materialize.

Why? Because old habits die hard. Russia and the United States each still deploy approximately 4,000 nuclear warheads on delivery vehicles on high alert, and as a result, military strategists on both sides plan for the worst. Under the flimsy 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the United States will be able to maintain a large “hedge” arsenal of reserve warheads and excess missile capacity. After SORT expires in 2012, the United States could increase its deployed strategic arsenal from 2,200 to well over 4,000 nuclear warheads.

Russia is on a path to maintain approximately 2,000 deployed strategic warheads by 2012. But the size of Russia’s long-range missile force would be relatively smaller. Independent estimates are that Russia’s land-based missile force could shrink dramatically, down to as few as 150 by the year 2015.

Russia’s fear is that the larger and more accurate U.S. missile arsenal would be capable of delivering a decapitating first strike. U.S. missile defense assets could then counter the few remaining missiles based in Russia’s European territory that might survive and be launched.

To avoid this scenario, Russia could slow its planned nuclear force reductions and accelerate deployment of new long-range missile systems, an option made easier if the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is allowed to expire in 2009. But dismantling strategic arms reductions pacts in order to preserve Russia’s ability to annihilate the United States does not make missile defense a better idea.

Unfortunately, Bush and Putin will not likely resolve their differences and avert a collision on missile defense any time soon. Putin’s offer to use the Russian-leased Gabala radar in Azerbaijan to evaluate Iran’s missile program and, if necessary, to use other basing plans that would not interfere with Russian missiles is worth exploring. Nevertheless, the White House seems determined to begin construction of the European system before Bush leaves office.

Such an approach is mistaken and reckless. There should be no rush to deploy an unproven system against a potential missile threat that will not likely materialize until 2015 or beyond. In any case, Congress is on track to cut the administration’s $310 million request for the European strategic missile defense project and focus U.S. efforts on more capable short- and medium-range interceptors.

The United States and its NATO partners should defer work on the European strategic missile defense project until Bush’s and Putin’s successors arrive. In the meantime, they should engage Russia in a meaningful dialogue to address its missile defense concerns, explore technical alternatives, and advance new proposals for deeper warhead and missile force cuts that would reduce tensions and erase Russian fears of U.S. nuclear supremacy.

When President George W. Bush withdrew from the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty five years ago, he asserted that “my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.” Now, Bush’s latest proposal to site 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic has severely compounded the Kremlin’s anxieties about growing U.S. offensive and defensive strategic capabilities.

President Vladimir Putin’s response to missile defense deployments in two former Warsaw Pact states has been hostile and counterproductive: he has threatened to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; to target the sites with Russian missiles; and to stop work on a Joint Data Exchange Center intended to help avoid an accidental or mistaken nuclear attack. (Continue)

ElBaradei: IAEA Budget Problems Dangerous

Paul Kerr

Budget constraints are jeopardizing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) ability to perform vital parts of its mission, particularly those most closely related to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has warned in recent months. Meanwhile, a committee established by the IAEA Board of Governors to review the adequacy of agency safeguards has ended its work after having made little progress in its deliberations.

According to a document obtained by Arms Control Today, ElBaradei told the IAEA board June 15 that the proposed agency budget for 2008 “does not by any stretch of the imagination meet our basic, essential requirements,” adding that “our ability to carry out our essential functions is being chipped away.”

The IAEA performs a wide variety of nuclear-related functions, including promoting safety in nuclear facilities as well as cooperating with countries on matters such as nuclear power and nuclear medicine.

It also performs missions critical to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, the IAEA implements safeguards agreements, which states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are required to conclude. Such agreements allow the agency to monitor certain declared nuclear activities and facilities to ensure they are used solely for peaceful purposes.

Additionally, the IAEA performs functions designed to prevent the smuggling and theft of nuclear material, such as maintaining a database that tracks illicit trafficking in such material. The agency also provides assistance to states to help them prevent the theft of nuclear material.

Budget in Flux

The IAEA board has not yet agreed on a budget for fiscal year 2008, a situation that ElBaradei described June 11 as “disappointing.” The board could decide on a budget at an early July meeting, Agence France-Presse reported June 17, but that has not yet been confirmed.

The board is required to submit the agency’s annual budget to the IAEA General Conference, which meets each September. The director-general initially develops the budget with input from IAEA staff and member states.

Based on a UN formula, each member-state contributes a certain amount of funds to the IAEA’s “regular budget.” The agency’s total regular budget for fiscal year 2007 is approximately $370 million. The IAEA also receives voluntary contributions from member states.

The agency’s fiscal year 2007 verification budget, which includes the implementation of safeguards, is less than $145 million. The budget for nuclear safety and security, which includes measures to secure nuclear materials, is approximately $30 million.

Starting in the mid-1980s, a group of wealthy countries imposed a “zero real-growth” budget on the IAEA. Beginning in 2003, however, the agency has received modest budget increases.

For fiscal year 2008, ElBaradei submitted a nominally zero real-growth budget, according to another document obtained by Arms Control Today. However, it contains a separate category of funding for “essential investments.” Some governments have asked the IAEA to decrease its 2008 fiscal year budget, the document says.

Size Matters

ElBaradei warned June 15 that continued flat budgets would force the agency to cut back on some of its missions. Similarly, he argued four days earlier that the “dichotomy between increased high priority activities and inadequate funding, if continued, will lead to the failure of critical IAEA functions.”

Government officials and outside experts widely acknowledge that the IAEA’s workload will increase in the future. According to an April 18 Department of State fact sheet, “requirements for IAEA safeguards and inspections are expected to increase dramatically over time” because more countries are likely to increase their reliance on nuclear power.

At least in the short term, the agency also will need to devote more resources to other functions, such as evaluating information supplied by member-states as more countries conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements, according to a 2005 IAEA budget document.   

Additional protocols expand the number of nuclear-related activities and facilities that an NPT member-state must declare, as well as augment the agency’s authority to detect undeclared nuclear activities. So far, 82 out of 189 NPT states-parties have additional protocols in force; another 30 have signed them.           

A former senior IAEA official pointed out, however, that there are only a few states with significant nuclear activities that do not have an additional protocol in force.           

The IAEA would also be tasked with monitoring a multilateral North Korean nuclear agreement as well as a nuclear cooperation deal between the United States and India, if either became a reality (see pages 41 and 42).

Nongovernmental experts interviewed by Arms Control Today in June agreed that the IAEA needs a budget increase immediately. Government officials have made similar claims. For example, Ambassador Abdul Minty, South Africa’s representative to the IAEA Board of Governors, warned in a June 14 statement that the IAEA’s current budget situation could result in the “weakening” of the agency.

The State Department fact sheet also acknowledged that the agency needs additional funding. But in a June 21 interview with Arms Control Today, a knowledgeable U.S. official said that the urgency of ElBaradei’s case is “not proven.”

Agency officials and nongovernmental experts, meanwhile, have identified a number of IAEA functions that could be adversely affected by current budget levels. These include a number of issues related to the IAEA’s safeguards mandate. Indeed, ElBaradei warned June 15 that the agency’s “safeguards function is being eroded over time.”

As one example, he cited the state of the IAEA’s laboratories, asserting June 11 that they “are full of equipment that is outdated.” As a result, ElBaradei added June 15, the agency must “rely on a very small number of external laboratories” for analyses of environmental samples.

Both Matthew Bunn, a former Clinton administration official who is currently a senior research associate at Harvard University, and Andreas Persbo, a researcher at the Verification Research, Training, and Information Center, agreed with ElBaradei’s assessment.

The agency takes environmental samples from countries’ nuclear facilities in order to determine, for example, if a country used them for secret activities involving nuclear material. The use of such samples is expected to increase, according to the 2005 budget document.

Additionally, the former IAEA official argued that the IAEA will need to buy more satellite images for its future safeguards work.

Both ElBaradei and Bunn have indicated that the IAEA needs additional as well as new types of equipment for conducting its safeguards activities.

Both also have argued that the agency’s budget for nuclear security is too low. ElBaradei complained June 15 that the IAEA relies on “highly unpredictable” voluntary contributions for 90 percent of that budget.

Safeguards Committee Ends Work

Meanwhile, a committee established in June 2005 to consider methods for improving IAEA safeguards has ended its work without making any recommendations.

The United States pushed the IAEA board to establish the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification after President George W. Bush called for its formation in a 2004 speech. The committee, which was granted a two-year term, was expected to provide advice to the board on whether current safeguards are sufficient for dealing with potential proliferation challenges, such as clandestine nuclear programs and the threat of nuclear terrorism. (See ACT, July/August 2006.)

A Vienna-based diplomat told Arms Control Today June 21 that the committee, which held a total of six meetings, was ultimately unable to reach consensus on a list of 18 recommendations provided by the IAEA secretariat.

ElBaradei stated in June 2005 that the IAEA board would decide after two years whether to extend the committee’s mandate. However, “there are no immediate plans” for continuing its work, the Vienna diplomat said.

The diplomat added that the committee was supposed to generate ideas for improving safeguards, but disagreements among the members prevented this, leading the group to ask the secretariat to provide recommendations.

The secretariat circulated technical papers in May 2006 that described measures to improve the safeguards system, including augmenting the capabilities of the agency’s laboratory network, encouraging states to provide the agency with data about nuclear-related transactions, and expanding the list of materials and equipment that NPT states-parties are required to declare under additional protocols. The secretariat also suggested means of increasing the IAEA’s use of satellite imagery, but the diplomat said that the committee’s discussions about the subject were not productive.

From the beginning, the committee was characterized by its members’ lack of willingness to be “constructive,” the diplomat said, explaining that many states perceived the process to be “political” rather than “technical.” Disagreement about persistently contentious issues related to the NPT, such as whether states-parties should place more emphasis on non-nuclear-weapon states’ compliance with safeguards obligations or nuclear-weapon states’ obligations to reduce their nuclear arsenals, contributed to the committee’s lack of progress, the diplomat said.

Corrected online August 29, 2008. See explanation.

 

Editor's Note

Miles A. Pomper

It is perhaps the scenario most dreaded by the American public and U.S. national security experts: Organized crime gangs take advantage of poorly secured former Soviet nuclear materials and smuggle a bomb’s worth of nuclear material across unguarded borders. They pass the material to terrorists, who eventually detonate such a weapon in the United States or against U.S. interests.

Fortunately, such a scenario has yet to play out in real life. Indeed, as Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley notes in this month’s cover story, available data indicates that, despite post-September 11 fears, a nexus among terrorists, organized crime, and dangerous weapons trafficking has not formed in the former Soviet Union. Still, she cautions that more needs to be done to keep such nightmares from becoming reality.

Likewise, Sidney Niemayer and David K. Smith say that, by failing to keep better track of these incidents and relevant materials, governments in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere are failing to fully tap a vital resource. Follow-on investigations and information sharing, they say, could help determine the origin of nuclear or radiological materials and point to the perpetrators of such crimes.

Americans may fear a nuclear attack by terrorists, but some non-nuclear-weapon states fear such an attack from the United States and other nuclear weapons possessors. To assuage their concern, they have pushed the nuclear-weapon states to provide assurances that they will not use nuclear arms against states without them. But as George Bunn and Jean du Preez argue in another article, the Bush administration has watered down the already limited negative security assurances provided by previous U.S. administrations. They urge the next U.S. president to solidify these commitments.

Our news section this month looks at Russia’s missile defense offer, a U.S. offer on cluster munitions, congressional opposition to a new nuclear warhead, and the release of a new International Atomic Energy Agency report on international cooperation to limit the dangers of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities.

How to cope with the potential dangers caused by the global spread of nuclear fuel-cycle technology is one of the themes of the book Atoms for Peace: A Future After 50 Years?, edited by Joseph Pilat. Ambassador Norman A. Wulf says the book demonstrates that supply-side approaches to controlling nuclear proliferation are losing effectiveness and more efforts need to be made to dampen the motivations for new states to acquire such weapons.

Also, a printer error led to some words being dropped from the introduction to the cover story in the print edition of our June issue. As a service to our readers, we have reprinted the article in full on page 51 of the July/August print edition of Arms Control Today.

Books of Note

Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: New Prospects for Security Against Nuclear Weapons
Edited by Jeffrey Laurenti and Carl Robichaud, The Century Foundation Press, May 2007, 142 pp.

This book is the product of a Century Foundation conference held in February. Summarizing the recommendations that gained the broadest support during discussions, Joseph Cirincione, vice president for national security at the Center for American Progress, and Carl Robichaud, program officer at the Century Foundation, identify nine goals for sustaining the nonproliferation regime, including the end of fissile material production, the removal and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and consistent reinforcement of nonproliferation norms. Several leaders in the field then propose means for achieving these goals, including approaches that seek to preserve the virtues, not the vices, of traditional arms control strategies and to use market forces to support nonproliferation. Despite the outward deadlock of the arms control debate, the authors maintain that positive advancements are possible if leaders strengthen their commitment to the principles of nonproliferation and disarmament. Ultimately, the book stresses the need for a comprehensive strategy, complete with concrete goals, to repair the political and structural inconsistencies in the nonproliferation regime.


Arms Control After Iraq: Normative and Operational Challenges
Edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations University Press, 2006, 452 pp.

Taking advantage of a wide variety of state and regional perspectives, this book, edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and UN Assistant Secretary-General Ramesh Thakur, covers how the strategies of nonproliferation and disarmament have adjusted since the war in Iraq and also how the “tools” of arms control have changed in their importance and impact. Several contributors discuss the new emphasis on counterproliferation and the switch from deterrence to “compellence” strategies. The efforts of the UN Security Council and the international community at large are discussed not only for their limited ability to enforce compliance but also for the role their ground-breaking verification bodies played in dealing with Iraq. In addition, points of view from the nuclear powers and other influential parties, such as Egypt and Japan, offer differing cultural and historical approaches to nonproliferation.


Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540
Edited by Olivia Bosch et al., Brookings Institution Press, 2007, 226 pp.

Three years after its adoption, policymakers and scholars evaluate UN Security Council Resolution 1540, a 2004 measure obligating all UN member states to act to prevent nonstate access to weapons of mass destruction. In 14 essays, diverse authors from around the globe put the resolution in legal, historic, and strategic context and recommend guidelines for enforcement, lawmaking, and prosecution. Part one presents Resolution 1540 as part of the broader history of efforts against proliferation. Part two discusses the resolution in relation to nonproliferation treaties on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Part three relates Resolution 1540 to other recent efforts, including the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative. Acknowledging that the resolution’s effects on nonstate proliferation have yet to be determined, the editors conclude that its most lasting contribution will be its validation of a globally cooperative agenda against proliferation.


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Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: New Prospects for Security Against Nuclear Weapons. Edited by Jeffrey Laurenti and Carl Robichaud, The Century Foundation Press, May 2007, 142 pp.

Arms Control After Iraq: Normative and Operational Challenges. Edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations University Press, 2006, 452 pp.

Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540. Edited by Olivia Bosch et al., Brookings Institution Press, 2007, 226 pp.

July/August 2007 Bibliography

Of Special Interest

Beckett, Margaret, “For a Nuclear-Free World,” Jerusalem Post, June 26, 2007.

Biden, Joe, “CSI: Nukes,” The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2007, p. A17.

Carter, Ashton B., May, Michael M., and Perry, William J., “After the Bomb,” The New York Times, June 12, 2007, p. A23.

Nunn, Sam, “The Mountaintop: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 14, 2007, 8 pp.

Odom, William E., “The Nuclear Option,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2007, p. 51.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, June 11, 2007, 752 pp.

I. Strategic Arms

D’Agostino, Thomas P. The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, National Nuclear Security Administration, June 15, 2007, 6 pp.

Drell, Sidney, “A Reliable Path to Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 48.

The Economist, “Vlad and MAD,” June 9, 2007, p. 67.

Gormley, Dennis M., “Silent Retreat: The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, July 2007, p. 183.

Harvey, John R., “Nonproliferation’s New Soldier: How the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program will Bolster Global Security,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 32.

Krauss, Lawrence M., “A Case of Dubious Rationales,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 41.

Landay, Jonathan, “Dispute Delays Arms-Control Talks with Moscow,” McClatchy Newspapers, June 18, 2007.

Liang, John, “Air Force Plans to Begin Reducing Minuteman III Fleet This Month,” Inside Missile Defense, June 6, 2007, p. 2.

Matthews, William, “D’Agostino Aims to Shift U.S. Lawmakers’ View in Favor of RRW,” Defense News, June 15, 2007.

Pikayev, Alexander A., “Unfair Advantage,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 36.

Pincus, Walter, “House Vote Stops Appropriation for New Generation of Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, June 20, 2007, p. A20.

Saunders, Doug, “Cold Warrior Putin Threatens to Target Europe,” The Globe and Mail, June 4, 2007, p. A1.

Shen, Dingli, “Upsetting a Delicate Balance,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 37.

Vartabedian, Ralph, “U.S. Speeding Up Nuclear Disarmament,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 2007.

Weitz, Richard, “Missile Tests Underscore Moscow’s Desire to Maintain Nuclear Deterrent,” World Politics Review, June 1, 2007.

II. Nuclear Proliferation

Gusterson, Hugh, “Nuclear Terrorism: Correcting the Future,” The Bulletin Online, June 5, 2007.

Kramer, Andrew E., “Russia’s Nuclear Power Company Finds Business Is Good - in Iran and Elsewhere,” International Herald Tribune, June 7, 2007.

Stinson, Jeffrey, “Russia Increasingly Filling Demand for Nuclear Technology,” USA Today, June 3, 2007.

India

Agence-France Presse, “Rice Eyes U.S.-India Nuclear Deal This Year,” June 27, 2007.

Associated Press, “Group of Regional Indian Parties Denounces India-U.S. Nuclear Deal,” June 6, 2007.

Bidwai, Praful, “Last-Minute Hitch over U.S.-India Deal,” Inter Press Service, June 7, 2007.

The Hindu, “U.S. Needs to Make Changes in Deal: Scientists,” June 18, 2007.

Jha, Ravi S., “Wrangling Continues on U.S.-Indo Nuclear Deal,” Khaleej Times, June 11, 2007.

Johnson, Jo, “Cloud Over U.S.-India Nuclear Accord,” Financial Times, June 3, 2007.

Nayar, K. P., “Nuke Talks in 3-Para Knot,” The Telegraph, June 4, 2007.

Rajesh, Y. P., “Little Progress in India-U.S. Nuclear Deal Talks,” Reuters, June 2, 2007.

Sethi, Manpreet, Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: Reprocessing Issue Reconstructed, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Issue Brief, June 2007, 4 pp.

Stephenson, John, Will the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative Light India? Assessing the Economic & Resource Arguments for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, June 5, 2007, 12 pp.

Varadarajan, Siddharth, “Manmohan Sent Strong Message through Burns,” The Hindu, June 6, 2007.

Iran

Bhadrakumar, M.K., “Russia’s Tango with Tehran,” Asia Times, June 26, 2007.

Goldschmidt, Pierre, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Between Denial and Despair,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Proliferation Analysis, June 15, 2007.

Heinrich, Mark, “Iran Sets Talks with IAEA as New Sanctions Loom,” Reuters, June 21, 2007.

Heinrich, Mark and Strohecker, “ElBaradei Urges Iran to Halt Atomic Expansion,“ Reuters, June 14, 2007.

Hiro, Dilip, “The Iranian Bomb in a MAD World,” Asia Times, June 12, 2007.

Perkovich, George, and Squassoni, Sharon, Iran Goes Secret Again, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 14, 2007.

Pipes, Daniel, “Can the IAF Take Out Iran’s Nukes?” Jerusalem Post, June 13, 2007.

Reuters, “Rice Cool to Any Partial Nuclear Suspension by Iran,” June 24, 2007.

Sands, David R. “Iran Uses Fronts to Avoid U.N. Sanctions,” The Washington Times, June 13, 2007, p. A1.

North Korea

Gertz, Bill, “Data on N. Korea Centrifuges Sought,” The Washington Times, June 12, 2007, p. A1.

Herman, Bert, “Roh: Nuclear Crisis Just a Bargaining Chip,” The Washington Times, June 1, 2007, p. A17.

Jong-Heon, Lee, “Eyes Focused on N. Korea,” United Press International, June 15, 2007.

Magnier, Mark, “N. Koreans Hope Food and Shelter Come Next,” Los Angeles Times, June 2, 2007, p. A1.

Reuters, “North Korea Allows IAEA Team to Visit Nuclear Plant,” June 27, 2007.

Reuters, “Frozen North Korean Funds Released from Macau Bank,” June 14, 2007.

Sanger, David E., and Onishi, Norimitsu, “U.S., In Shift, Plans Talks in North Korea on Arsenal,” The New York Times, June 21, 2007, p. A8.

Song, Jung-a and Sevastopulo, Demetri, “N. Korea Invites UN to Nuclear Showdown,” Financial Times, June 17, 2007.

Pakistan

Albright, David and Brannan, Paul, Pakistan Appears to be Building a Third Plutonium Production Reactor at Khushab Nuclear Site, The Institute for Science and International Security, June 21, 2007, 6 pp.

Xinhua, “Pakistan Denies Report on New Nuclear Reactor,” June 23, 2007.

III. Nonproliferation

Fox, Jon, “Senators Call for Test Ban Treaty Ratification,” Global Security Newswire, June 8, 2007.

Group of Eight, Heiligendamm Statement on Non-Proliferation, June 8, 2007.

Group of Eight, Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group, June 8, 2007.

Heupel, Monika, Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Division of Labor Strategy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Papers, June 2007, 28 pp.

Jan, Sadaqat, “Pakistan Joins Fight on Nuke Terror,” Associated Press, June 10, 2007.

Perkovich, George, et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security: 2007 Report Card on Progress, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007.

Sokolski, Henry, What Nuclear Challenges Might the EU Meet?, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, June 14, 2007, 6 pp.

Weitz, Richard, “Future Global Nonproliferation Partnership Would Need More Follow-Through,” World Politics Review, June 28, 2007.

IV. Missiles and Missile Defense

Alison, Sebastian and Pinchuk, Ellen, “Russia Will Target Czech, Polish Missile Sites, Ivanov Says,” Bloomberg News, June 14, 2007.

Chivers, C.J., “Putin Proposes Alternatives for Missile Defense System,” The New York Times, June 9, 2007, p. A6.

Coyle, Philip, A Game of Make-Believe: The European Missile Shield, Neiman Watchdog, June 8, 2007, 2 pp.

De la Grange, Arnaud, “Antimissile Defence’s Real Purpose: Political Integration More than Military Protection,” Le Figaro, June 12, 2007.

Gard, Robert, “Outside View: Euro-BMD Bad for U.S.,” United Press International, June 22, 2007.

Grier, Peter, “A Leaner, Looser ‘Star Wars’ System” Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 2007.

Hildreth, Steven A. and Ek, Carl, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, Congressional Research Service, June 22, 2007, 11 pp.

The Hindu, “No Move to Cap Long-Range Missiles,” June 19, 2007.

Ismayilov, Rovshan, “Radar for Rent,” Transitions Online, June 11, 2007.

ISN Security Watch, “Radar Diplomacy,” June 13, 2007.

Kuchins, Andrew C., “Vlad the Surpriser,” Newsday, June 10, 2007.

Lasker, John, “U.S. Ramps Up Missile Tests in the Pacific,” Asia Times, June 5, 2007.

Loven, Jennifer, “Bush Defends Missile Defense System,” Associated Press, June 1, 2007.

Mainville, Michael, “Azerbaijani Radar A Looming Presence for Nervous Inhabitants,” Agence-France Presse, June 8, 2007.

Matthews, William, “As U.S., Russia Spar over Missile Defense, Congress Cuts Funding,” Defense News, June 4, 2007.

Osgood, Carl, “Missile Defense: Cheney's Nuclear War Doctrine,” Executive Intelligence Review, June 29, 2007.

Postol, Theodore and Goodby, James, “Old Thinking about a New Threat,” International Herald Tribune, June 8, 2007.

Reuters, “Clinton Derides U.S. Missile Shield Plan,” June 29, 2007.

Sevastopulo, Demetri and Dinmore, Guy, “Russia and US Play Politics with Missiles,” Financial Times, June 21, 2007.

Shanker, Thom, “U.S. to Keep Europe as Site for Deterrent to Missiles,” The New York Times, June 15, 2007, p. A6.

Sieff, Martin, “Why U.S. May Reject Putin Plan,” United Press International, June 18, 2007.

Stott, Michael and Solovyov, Dmitry, “Russia Touts Radar Offer, Says U.S. Shield Not Needed,” Reuters, June 9, 2007.

Stratfor: “Geopolitical Diary: Understanding Putin's Missile-Defense Offer,” June 8, 2007.

Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, “Putin Surprises Bush with Plan on Missile Shield,” The New York Times, June 8, 2007, p. A1.

Thatcher, Jonathan, “Missiles Skid over Iced-Up North Korea Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, June 8, 2007.

Weitz, Richard, “A Bush-Putin Discussion on the Radar,” The Washington Post.com’s Think Tank Town, June 20, 2007.

V. Chemical and Biological Arms

Galbraith, Peter W., “’Chemical Ali’ Didn’t Act Alone,” Los Angeles Times, June 28, 2007.

Giacomo, Carol, “U.S.-Libya Chemical Arms-Related Deal in Doubt,” Reuters, June 8, 2007.

Lombardo, Ingrid, Chemical Non-Lethal Weapons: Why the Pentagon Wants Them and Others Don’t, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Story, June 8, 2007.

Krans, Maxim, “The Hysteria Behind Russia’s Ban on DNA Exports,” RIA Novosti, June 1, 2007.

Weitz, Richard, “Russian Chemical Weapons Dismantlement: Progress with Problems,” WMD Insights, June 2007.

Xinhua, “China to Establish Anti-Bioterrorism System, June 27, 2007.

VI. Conventional Arms

Aitamurto, Tanja, “Seven Questions about Cluster Weapons,” Helsingin Sanomat, June 6, 2007.

Associated Press, “Russia Completes Withdrawal from 1 of 2 Remaining Bases in Georgia,” June 27, 2007.

Associated Press, “U.S. Reverses Position and is now Willing to Negotiate a Cluster Bomb Treaty,” June 19, 2007.

Buzhinskiy, Evgeny, “One Step From a Moratorium: Why the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Does Not Suit Russia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 15, 2007.

Dempsey, Judy, “NATO Offer on Weapons Falls Short, Russia Says,” June 13, 2007.

The Economist, “A Change of Heart, or of Tactic,” June 21, 2007.

Elkus, Adam, “Gangs, Terrorists, and Trade,” Foreign Policy in Focus, June 6, 2007.

Horta, Loro, “China on the March in Latin America,” Asia Times, June 28, 2007.

International Committee of the Red Cross, Humanitarian, Military, Technical and Legal Challenges of Cluster Munitions, 2007, 89 pp.

ITAR-TASS, “Russia Doesn’t Want to Bury CFE, But May Have to Impose Moratorium: Minister,” June 21, 2007.

Keaton, Jamey, “U.S.: NATO Has Intercepted Iranian Arms,” Associated Press, June 13, 2007.

Kole, William J., “Russia Fails in Arms Treaty Overhaul,” Associated Press, June 15, 2007.

Murphy, John, “Israel Sees Problem Skyrocket; Militants Empty Towns with Simple Weapon,” The Baltimore Sun, June 2, 2007, p. A1.

Peuch, Jean-Christophe, “Russia: Moscow ‘Unhappy’ with Outcome of CFE Conference,” Radio Free Europe, June 15, 2007.

Pham, J. Peter, “Hu’s Selling Guns to Africa,” World Politics Review, June 28, 2007.

Reuters, “U.S. Open to Negotiations on Cluster Bombs But No Ban,” June 18, 2007.

RIA Novosti: “Russia Will Not Talk CFE Treaty Withdrawal in Vienna: Lavrov,” June 6, 2007.

Rickards, Jane, “Taiwan Rejects Most of U.S. Arms Package Offered in 2001,” The Washington Post, June 16, 2007, p. A11.

Slackman, Michael, “Running Guns to Gaza: A Living in the Desert,” The New York Times, June 19, 2007.

Smucker, Philip, “Taliban Uses Weapons Made in China, Iran,” The Washington Times, June 5, 2007.

Turse, Nick, “The Secret Air War in Iraq,” The Nation, June 11, 2007.

The Wall Street Journal, “Taiwan’s Self-Defense,” June 22, 2007.

Wright, Robin, “Iranian Flow of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say; Arms Shipments Tracked to Iraqi, Afghan Groups,” The Washington Post, June 3, 2007, p. A14.

VII. U.S. Policy

The Albuquerque Tribune, “Weapons Labs Need to Embrace Change,” June 29, 2007.

Berman, Russell, “Clinton Proposes New Ways to Combat Nuclear Proliferation,” New York Sun, June 28, 2007.

Porter, Gareth, “New Arms Claim Reveals Cheney-Military Rift,” Inter Press Service, June 20, 2007.

VIII. Space

Hitchens, Theresa, “Code Red?” Imaging Notes, Summer 2007.

Hoffman, Carl, “Battlefield Space,” PopularMechanics, July 2007, p. 76.

Reuters, “Eyes on Iran, Israel Launches New Spy Satellite,” June 11, 2007.

Tellis, Ashley J., Punching the U.S. Military’s ‘Soft Ribs:’ China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 51, June 2007, 7 pp.

Zaitsev, Yuri, “The Problem of Space Junk,” RIA Novosti, June 6, 2007.

IX. Other

Barr, Robert, “BAE Systems Subject of Investigation,” Associated Press, June 26, 2007.

Butler, Richard, “Don’t Kick the Inspectors Out of the U.N.,” The New York Times, June 29, 2007.

Gertz, Bill, “China Arms Talks, Reciprocity Stalled,” The Washington Times, June 14, 2007, p. A6.

Highfield, Roger, “How to Build a Greener H-Bomb,” Telegraph.co.uk, June 26, 2007.

Kay, Julie, “Merchants of Doom: A Burgeoning Anti-Terrorism Industry is Peddling Radiation Protection Suits, Nerve Gas Antidotes, and the Latest Spy Aids,” Chicago Sun-Times, June 24, 2007.

Minnick, Wendell, “Just an Update to Some Readers, ‘Realistic Appraisal’ of Threat to Others,” Defense News, June 4, 2007.

Puska, Susan, “Military Backs China’s Africa Adventure,” Asia Times, June 8, 2007.

Wald, Matthew L., “Sole U.S. Company That Enriches Uranium is Struggling to Stay in Business,” The New York Times, June 12, 2007, p. C4.

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