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"In my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [Arms Control Today] is one and it's the only one my husband and I fight over who gets to read it first."

– Suzanne DiMaggio
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
April 15, 2019
July/August 2007
Edition Date: 
Sunday, July 1, 2007
Cover Image: 

U.S. Reaffirms Europe Anti-Missile Plan

Wade Boese

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 7 proposal to share radar data on missiles with the United States might be an earnest offer, a cynical ploy to undercut U.S. plans to base anti-missile systems in Europe, or both. Regardless, U.S. leaders say they will continue their current missile defense approach despite strong Russian opposition.

Meeting with President George W. Bush in Heiligendamm, Germany, Putin volunteered the “joint use” of the Russian-leased Gabala radar in Azerbaijan. Putin implied the radar could be used to peer south into Iran, which the United States estimates could develop long-range missiles to strike all of Europe or the United States before 2015. Washington claims its plan to station 10 strategic ground-based midcourse interceptors in Poland and an X-band radar in the Czech Republic is to protect against a growing Iranian threat and poses no danger to Russia.

Putin further suggested that if an actual threat materialized, interceptors could be deployed in southern Europe, Iraq, or on naval ships instead of in Poland, where Moscow contends interceptors could reach into Russia. The interceptors endorsed by Putin would be technically different than those planned for Poland. Instead of aiming to collide with warheads in space, the alternative interceptors would be designed to destroy missiles in their boost phase, when a missile’s rocket engines are still burning shortly after launch.

Although U.S. officials expressed surprise at Putin’s proposal, this is not the first time he has made it. Putin floated essentially the same concept in June 2000 when President Bill Clinton was weighing deployment of a nationwide U.S. defense. (See ACT, July/August 2000. )

Washington rejected the proposal then, in part, on the basis that the technology was not available. The United States currently has programs that might produce ship- and land-based interceptors for boost-phase testing around 2014. (See ACT, June 2007. )

Bush welcomed Putin’s ideas as “interesting.” The two leaders agreed experts from both sides will explore the Russian proposal.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials maintain they will not pause their current effort. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal June 8 that “we’re going to continue to work this with Poland and the Czech Republic.” Engaging with Russia, she added, “doesn’t mean that you are going to get off course on what you’re trying to do.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates informed reporters June 14 that the United States saw Putin’s proposal on the Gabala radar as “an additional capability” and not a substitute for the proposed Czech-based radar. The Gabala radar is a Soviet-era early-warning radar designed to spot and track missiles shortly after launch, while X-band radars are supposed to provide more precise flight-tracking data and pick a warhead out of a target cluster flying through space.

The U.S. reaction was not what the Kremlin wanted. Talking to reporters June 8, Putin stated, “[W]e hope that no unilateral action will be taken until these consultations and talks have concluded.” Similarly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in a Moscow press briefing the next day declared, “[I]t is necessary as a minimum to freeze all the actions in deploying missile defense elements in Europe for a period of at least the study of our proposals.”

Russian officials assert there is no urgency to field anti-missile systems in Europe. They project a long-range Iranian missile threat as at least 15 to 20 years away. Even if Tehran moved more rapidly, Putin claimed June 7 that a three- to five-year lag would occur between the initial test and deployment of long-range missiles, permitting time for defenses to be erected.

Indeed, Putin’s Gabala radar proposal is about sharing data with the United States in order to form a common or joint assessment of Iran’s capabilities. Before initiating any possible defense schemes, such as Putin’s boost-phase concept, there should be mutual agreement about the threat, a Russian government official told Arms Control Today June 14.

Putin suggested as much June 8. “We propose carrying out a real assessment of the missile threats for the period through to 2020 and agreeing on what joint steps we can take to counter these threats,” the president explained to reporters.

The same day, Anatoly Antonov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department of International Security and Disarmament, stated, “Only after concrete answers are obtained to questions about the nature and trends of missile proliferation should it be decided whether and what military-technical means are needed to repulse this threat.” He later noted that missile defenses should be “the last resort…when all the alternative measures have been exhausted.”

Moscow’s apparent assumption is that data from the Gabala radar will support their position that Iran poses no near-term threat, obviating U.S. plans. “Joint use of the information which this radar station obtains makes it possible…to give up the plans of deploying missile defense elements in Europe,” Lavrov said.

If the United States does not abandon or alter its current missile defense plans for Europe, Russian officials say there will be consequences. On June 8, Putin reiterated warnings that Russia would “target” the Polish and Czech anti-missile sites if they are built.

Putin’s comments followed a May 29 flight test of what Russian officials claimed was a new multiple-warhead ICBM capable of penetrating defenses. Referred to as an RS-24 by Russian officials, the missile is apparently a modified version of Russia’s most modern missile, the single-warhead Topol-M.

In a Jan. 1 data exchange, Russia claimed a total force of 530 ICBMs, of which 44 are silo-based Topol-Ms and three are mobile Topol-Ms. The United States currently deploys 500 silo-based ICBMs but plans to cut 50 of these missiles. (See ACT, May 2007.)

Washington has sought to soften Moscow’s hostility by publicly expressing interest in missile defense cooperation with Russia. But Putin June 4 derided U.S. offers as empty, saying they entail Russia providing missiles “as targets [that the United States] can use in training.”

Putin asserted that day that if Washington did not change course, Moscow would be bound to respond and could not be held responsible for the result. “We will absolve ourselves from the responsibility of our retaliatory steps because we are not initiating what is certainly growing into a new arms race in Europe,” Putin said.

 

Nuclear Talks Waiting on the United States

U.S. and Russian negotiators have put on hold talks on measures to succeed a landmark nuclear weapons reduction treaty while the Bush administration figures out its positions. But U.S. lawmakers are already starting to volunteer their advice.

The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is scheduled to expire Dec. 5, 2009. It slashed deployed U.S. and Russian strategic forces from more than 10,000 warheads apiece to 6,000 each and established an extensive verification regime. U.S. and Russian experts met for the first time in March to share ideas on what to do after START’s expiration. (See ACT, May 2007. )

Neither side is advocating exercising START’s five-year extension option. However, Moscow desires a new agreement capping both nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, while Washington opposes such a formal approach, preferring a loose collection of confidence-building measures.

Arms Control Today has learned, however, that the two governments have agreed to prepare positions for future discussion on at least four issues: information exchanges, facility visits, missile launch notices, and noninterference with national technical means such as satellites. A second U.S. and Russian experts meeting reportedly is waiting on the Bush administration to complete this process and put together a proposal.

A June 18 McClatchy Newspapers report attributed the delay to Washington infighting. The U.S. intelligence community is keen on preserving intrusive mechanisms to keep tabs on Russia’s nuclear arsenal. But this position conflicts with that held by administration officials who say such measures are burdensome and unnecessary because Russia is no longer an enemy.

In a June 21 statement, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, sided with the intelligence community. Recommending that START verification and transparency measures be extended, Lugar noted that “the predictability and confidence provided by treaty verification reduces the chances of misinterpretation, miscalculation, and error.”

Similarly, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), chair of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, stated at a June 11 Arms Control Association event that “the intelligence community has expressed concern with losing the verification component provided by START.” Tauscher recommended that U.S. and Russian leaders approve a “bridge agreement that will extend START” until a new agreement can be negotiated.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 7 proposal to share radar data on missiles with the United States might be an earnest offer, a cynical ploy to undercut U.S. plans to base anti-missile systems in Europe, or both. Regardless, U.S. leaders say they will continue their current missile defense approach despite strong Russian opposition. (Continue)

Following the Clues: The Role of Forensics in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Sidney Niemeyer and David K. Smith

Although the more than 50 incidents of trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials each year are worrisome, these cases also provide valuable insight to the movement of these materials worldwide. Conducting thorough investigations that utilize nuclear forensics techniques to determine the source of interdicted nuclear materials can help prevent additional trafficking and ultimately terrorist use of nuclear weapons.

After all, the most likely early warning of an adversary’s planned nuclear attack will be previous involvement in illicit transfer of nuclear materials. Until now, however, local authorities have viewed such incidents as narrow violations of domestic laws rather than as threats to national and international security.

If nuclear forensic investigations become the norm for interdicted nuclear materials, investigators could analyze nuclear materials, devices or associated material to identify the source and the route of transit and ultimately help to identify the traffickers.[1] In particular, a nuclear forensics investigation might help answer such questions as: Is there a leak in one of the known holdings of nuclear material? Where was legitimate control lost? How did the material come to be where we found it? Can we link this material to the perpetrators? Is this case connected to previous cases?

A case becomes more significant if it can be linked to other instances demonstrating a sustained effort to sell or obtain nuclear material. Even some incidents that appear to constitute a relatively low threat, for example, trafficking in low-enriched uranium, ought to be investigated because such commerce may portend more serious threats. For example, an adversary may be attempting “trial runs” to test the ability to transport nuclear material without detection. Experience from law enforcement indicates that the combined evidence from two related cases enhances the probability of solving them both.

Once the difficult task of detection and interdiction has been accomplished, nuclear forensics should be used to understand the history of the interdicted material. If the source of the leak can be identified, steps can be taken to close that leak. A scenario that calls for a particularly rapid nuclear forensics investigation is one in which the perpetrators are close to assembling and detonating more than one nuclear bomb. The attacks of September 11, 2001, taught us that if a group of terrorists possess sufficient material, they might well attack multiple targets. Nuclear forensics, applied in time, can be the key to thwarting such a coordinated, multipronged attack.

Indeed, the use of nuclear forensics in a pre-detonation scenario may prove more effective as a preventative measure and deterrent than the more acknowledged scenario of using such techniques in the aftermath of a nuclear attack.[2] Deterrence works only when an adversary perceives that the consequences of its actions will be met by a credible and exacting response. In the case of a nuclear detonation, the typical stated (or implied) response is commensurately severe. Yet, some have questioned the government’s willingness to launch a devastating counterattack against those perceived to be responsible, especially when the evidence against the adversary might be less than unequivocal. By contrast, when the episode involves intercepting nuclear materials at an earlier stage, the response against a supplier could be less draconian and thereby viewed as more credible. Earlier intervention allows decision-makers more time to craft a broader and more measured response.

The time is right to promote the deterrent function of nuclear forensics. Several international instruments are now in place to advance forensic capabilities internationally. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obligates states to take steps to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and supporting technologies. The United States and Russia have recently spearheaded the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which provides for cooperation between law enforcement agencies to address the problem of the spread of radiological materials. Several U.S.-led efforts, including the Nuclear Trafficking Response Group and the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, identify nuclear forensics as an important vehicle to ensure the responsible international stewardship of nuclear materials.

Using these arrangements, several specific steps need to be taken to enhance the usefulness of nuclear forensics in preventing nuclear terrorism. First, the United States and other states that have declared countering nuclear terrorism as a priority should seek to establish a new international norm that places far greater importance on conducting nuclear forensic investigations for interdictions of illicit nuclear materials. In a majority of past incidents, the investigation was conducted in the context of local government laws, often from the customs perspective that places a premium on the monetary value of the interdicted material, i.e., if you cannot sell it for much, we do not care much. New policies are necessary that emphasize threats to international and national security. All governments must be committed to pursuing these illegal acts to the fullest extent possible. Doing so would surely greatly enhance the global ability to detect the early warning signs of nuclear terrorist activity.

Second, greatly expand international cooperation in both developing nuclear forensics as a newly emerging discipline and pursuing nuclear forensic investigations. Nuclear smuggling is an international problem; identified smuggling routes do not neatly coincide with state borders. An informal and unaffiliated group that assembles the world’s leading experts in nuclear forensics, the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG), has been working toward just that end since 1995.[3] The ITWG continues to make progress, but it would benefit greatly from new policies that support a greater level of cooperation. These would include much more vigorously developing bilateral R&D projects in nuclear forensics data collection and interpretation; establishing relationships for working cases collaboratively; advancing best practices in pursuing nuclear forensics investigations to establish a global “knowledge base” system that would draw upon subject matter experts and associated information in a way that also protects national interests; and increasing the scope of participation in the ITWG by new member states and organizations affected by nuclear trafficking.

Third, governments should make greater investments in improving their nuclear forensics capability. The magnitude of the investment depends on the extent to which policymakers agree on the relative importance of nuclear forensics in a national strategy for counterterrorism and nonproliferation. We suggest that the current level of investment will only slowly mature U.S. capabilities in nuclear forensics. If we are to embrace an international objective of true nuclear accountability, the appropriate technologies must enable the United States and its partner governments to trace illicit nuclear materials back to their points of origin and unauthorized diversion as well as help identify those responsible for these acts.

 


Sidney Niemeyer is a physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and currently serves as a scientific adviser to the newly formed National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center in the Department of Homeland Security. David K. Smith is a geochemist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and also serves as a scientific advisor on international nuclear forensics to the U.S. Department of State and the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center.


ENDNOTES

1. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Nuclear Forensics Support,” Nuclear Security Series, No. 2 (2006), p. 67.

2. See Graham Allison, “Deterring Kim Jong Il,” The Washington Post, October 27, 2006; Michael May et al., “Preparing for the Worst,” Nature, October 2006, pp. 907-908; William Dunlop and Harold Smith, “Who Did It? Using International Nuclear Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism,” Arms Control Today, October 2006, pp. 6-10.

3. L. Koch et al., “Proceedings: European Safeguards Research and Development Association,” 1999, pp. 805-810.

An Unrealized Nexus? WMD-related Trafficking, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union

Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, powerfully advanced the notion that terrorist groups might acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or, more plausibly, radiological dispersal devices (RDD). Terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction is ample. Al Qaeda has been on record as determined to acquire and use these weapons.

In 1995, several years prior to the September 11 attacks, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo sought to gain nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and it successfully used sarin gas. That same year, Chechen rebels planted but did not explode an RDD made of cesium-137 and dynamite in Moscow’s Izmailovsky Park.

In 2004 the uncovering of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network fueled new concerns that trafficking in WMD material could give rise to a parallel black market of nuclear material linked to organized crime. Pointing out that terrorist organizations and organized crime had already cooperated in the drug trafficking business, a number of analysts warned that organized crime might decide to channel WMD material to terrorists.

Much of the concern about a possible nexus between WMD trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism focused on the former Soviet Union, particularly Central Asia and the Caucasus. There, a large number of insufficiently secured nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities are located in close proximity to trafficking routes for drugs and small arms. Powerful radiation sources also are plentiful and inadequately protected. Furthermore, several terrorist groups in the region have become increasingly radicalized since the September 11 attacks.

Even though these developments suggested that a perfect storm was brewing, more than five years later there is no compelling evidence of a solid nexus among WMD-related trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime in the former Soviet Union. To be sure, a cautionary note is in order. Serious data collection problems in the region make understanding trafficking patterns an inherently limited proposition at best. They also make it essential to improve the quality and quantity of data collection and sharing by local and regional authorities.

Nonetheless, all available evidence indicates that the character of WMD trafficking in the post-2001 period has remained essentially the same as in the pre-2001 period, displaying amateurish features and dominated by the supply side. Trafficking cases involving weapons-grade nuclear material have entailed minuscule quantities, and their number has substantially decreased compared to the pre-2001 period, when most of the proliferation-significant events involving kilogram-level quantities of material were reported. That said, the post-2001 evidence of trafficking in WMD-related material does show new and potentially worrisome characteristics that bear close scrutiny.

The Data Set

This article is based on an analysis of 183 trafficking incidents that occurred in the former Soviet Union between January 2001 and December 2006. The incidents were reported in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ (CNS) NIS Export Control Observer,[1] the International Export Control Observer,[2] and the CNS Newly Independent States Nuclear Trafficking Abstracts Database,[3] which gather information from a variety of regional, national and international sources, including gray literature such as conference reports and interviews.[4] The data set includes incidents that constitute illegal activities, with or without criminal intent; orphan material; and cases where the arrest of the perpetrators or seizure of the material occurred outside the former Soviet Union but concerned material or individuals originating or suspected of originating from the former Soviet Union. Hoaxes and events that were first reported as illicit trafficking cases but later revealed to be legal shipments or that had no WMD connection were discarded. Yet, because of the incompleteness of information available in open and gray sources and inconsistencies in press reporting, the data set may include occasional mistakes.

WMD-Trafficking Incidents Prior to 2001

Prior to 2001, aside from a few proliferation-significant incidents[5] in the early 1990s,[6] WMD-related trafficking in the region displayed amateurish features. Although known trafficking involved primarily nuclear and radioactive material—low-enriched uranium (LEU),[7] radioactive isotopes, and contaminated scrap metal—the material was most often stolen for the value of the metal casing and not for the radioactive or nuclear material it contained.

Perpetrators were primarily opportunists motivated by financial gains. They generally were uninformed about the value of the material, which they typically overestimated, or unaware of the possibility of detection or of the associated health hazards. Trafficking was conducted in contraband style, with material hidden in a bag, car, or bus and transported along a southern route, crossing Central Asia and the Caucasus, and proceeding west toward Europe through Turkey. In the late 1990s, the more commonly used westbound route from Russia to Europe was replaced by the southern route. Trafficking appeared dominated by the supply side, with no evidence of an actual demand or connection with organized crime or terrorist groups.

General Trends of Post-2001 WMD Trafficking

Since 2001, the features of WMD-related trafficking appear not to have changed substantially. Most known trafficking incidents involve radioactive orphan sources, contaminated scrap metal, radioactive isotopes such as cesium-137, and low-grade nuclear material, primarily LEU. The first three items account for about 50 percent of the trafficking transactions. In many ways, this is not surprising. Powerful radiation sources disposed of improperly by medical and industrial facilities or abandoned by the Soviet army are abundant throughout the former Soviet Union. Other potent sources contained in radioisotope thermoelectric generators—devices built to provide electricity in lighthouses, radio beacons, and meteorological stations—are inadequately protected.

No proliferation-significant cases have been reported in the 2001-2006 period. Known trafficking incidents with plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) involve minuscule quantities of material that would not pose a proliferation threat. In addition, a very small portion of these incidents involves weapons-grade material. For instance, 7 percent of the trafficking transactions (14 cases) involve plutonium (Pu-238 and Pu-239),[8] but they consist of minuscule amounts contained in industrial instruments or smoke detectors, which would not pose a proliferation threat.[9]

Only 5 percent, or 10 cases of the known trafficking incidents during the 2001-2006 period, involve HEU. Three of these cases concern HEU with an enrichment level of at least 80 percent, but they also involve only small quantities of material. One had five grams of HEU enriched to about 80 percent. The material, suspected of originating in an unidentified former Soviet Union country, was seized in France in 2001.[10] Another incident involves 170 grams of HEU seized in Georgia at the border with Armenia. Although media reports issued after the material was seized in 2003 did not specify the material’s enrichment level, later reports indicated that the HEU was enriched to almost 90 percent. The third case, which occurred in early 2006, involved 100 grams of HEU enriched to 89.4 percent.[11] This material was also seized in Georgia at the border with Armenia. The enrichment level of the remaining seven HEU cases was not specified, but four of these incidents were reported in 2005 by Georgian authorities, who indicated that the material had been seized during the previous two to three years and was not weapons-grade HEU.[12]

The profile of the perpetrators and their trafficking methods also remains constant. Perpetrators usually are opportunists (39 percent), either facility insiders or native residents of the city or country of material acquisition. Seven percent of the trafficking cases over the 2001-2006 period involved crime groups (12 cases), which include established organized crime groups (seven cases), such as the Balashikha group in Moscow, and groups of individuals suspected of belonging to a regional or international smuggling rings (five cases). Trafficking perpetrated by crime groups hardly differs from the other incidents. They do entail potent radioactive sources that could be used in RDDs, such as cesium-137, or nuclear material such as HEU (two cases) and LEU (two cases). They also involve material with no nuclear application, such as osmium-187 (four cases), or with low radioactivity levels, such as depleted uranium.[13] This may indicate that these groups have a limited understanding of the material’s value. In addition, these incidents generally involve small quantities of material.

Only three cases are loosely connected to a terrorist organization. The first case is based on a 2002 report published in The Guardian, indicating that, according to an unidentified U.S. official, Chechen rebels stole radioactive sources and nuclear material from the Volgodonsk nuclear power plant located in Rostov Oblast, Russia. These allegations were not corroborated by other sources and even denied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, and Volgodonsk officials.[14] The second case involved two individuals from the Caucasus who attempted to acquire 15 kilograms of uranium with an unspecified enrichment level from a Russian nuclear combine in 2003.[15] The Russian press speculated that the material was to be used for a dirty bomb to be exploded in St. Petersburg during the city’s tercentennial celebrations. These allegations could not be corroborated as the buyer escaped the police. In addition, given the low radioactivity level of uranium, it would not have made a particularly powerful RDD. The third case, which took place in 2005, involved a Sunday Times reporter posing as an intermediary for Algerian terrorists. He approached an arms dealer in the secessionist region of Transdniestria, Moldova, who was willing to sell Alazan rockets with warheads purportedly containing the radioactive material strontium and cesium. Yet, the possibility that these conventional rockets had been modified to carry radioactive warheads has been subject of much debate and no firm conclusion. Moreover, the reporter’s allegation could not be corroborated as he broke off the deal before paying a substantial amount of money to the arms dealer.[16]

As far as the structure of the market is concerned, it remains decidedly supply side. There are no established connections between suppliers and possible brokers or clients, who most often are nonexistent. Suppliers still overestimate the value of the material and do not seem to have a clear idea of what material has value for nuclear weapons or RDD development. Indeed, many of the transactions entail materials that have no nuclear weapons or RDD application or hardly any radioactivity (e.g., osmium-187, cesium-133, [red] mercury, or depleted uranium).[17] In addition, trafficking transactions are often held in public spaces, such as train stations, with few precautions taken to hide these activities. Twenty-two percent of the trafficking cases identified during the 2001-2006 period were discovered during the sale of the material, 10 percent of which were the result of sting operations. Another 22 percent were discovered during the transportation of the material, most often while crossing a border or as a by-product of roadside police checks.

Novel Characteristics

Even though post-2001 trafficking data does not support the feared nexus among terrorism, organized crime and WMD-related trafficking, new trafficking characteristics have emerged that bear close monitoring.

One of these new features is the appearance of trafficking in chemical and biological material. Only two incidents have been reported for the 2001-2006 period. One involved a nonpathogenic strain of the Ebola virus in Ukraine in 2002.[18] The other concerned mustard gas in Georgia in 2003.[19] In both cases, a dearth of information was provided on the material and, in the case of the Ebola strain, no details about the origin, destination, and perpetrators were revealed, making it difficult to ascertain if this was indeed a trafficking case. Nevertheless, the two cases share something in common: the material was discovered by chance, during an unrelated roadside check (Georgia) and during a customs shipment inspection (Ukraine). Because of the absence of appropriate material detection equipment deployed in the former Soviet Union, this fact alone underscores the difficulty of detecting biological and chemical material. Therefore, the small number of reported incidents may not be representative of actual trafficking in these materials.

Notably, trafficking routes appear to have become more varied during the post-2001 period. Seizure and arrest patterns show that previously the main route went south through Central Asia and the Caucasus and then west to Europe. Today, traffickers are likely using three main corridors. First, the east-west route, going directly from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to Europe, which was more widely used in the early 1990s, has been reactivated. Second, a new south-east route crossing Central Asia into neighboring Asian countries seems to have emerged. Finally, the late 1990s south-west route has been maintained, with a good portion of the traffic merging in the Caucasus, probably because, from there, the goods can either go west through Turkey or east into Asia and the Middle East. Although today most materials are seized before they reach their declared destination, the use of multiple routes is worrisome because it may indicate that traffickers have detected a possible new demand in these regions. Multiple routes may also deplete the few resources available to the region’s enforcement communities, thus making it more difficult to monitor and control trafficking.

Another troubling feature is that a few cases involved nuclear or radioactive material in combination with small arms (four cases) and narcotics (two cases), which may indicate a convergence between arms or drugs and WMD-related material. In some of these cases, the nuclear or radioactive material was discovered by chance during an unrelated drug or financial investigation.[20] This may indicate that the drug control and financial fraud enforcement agencies can also be useful instruments of proliferation prevention.

The data set also includes a small number of cases involving opportunists that show a higher degree of organization. Several incidents involve groups of individuals who do not belong to an established organized crime group but collaborate for a specific operation, sometimes with the active participation of former law enforcement representatives.[21] Some opportunist cases also involve weapons and explosives, which may be indicative of a link with organized crime.[22]

In addition, one out of four cases involves potent radioactive sources, particularly cesium-137 (37 cases) and stronsium-90 (six cases), which could be used for RDDs. This characteristic is not completely new; trafficking with these sources was common before 2001 because they can be found in many orphaned industrial instruments. Prior to 2001, however, monitoring focused on state capabilities, and because these materials cannot be used for nuclear weapons, this type of trafficking was not considered a high proliferation risk. Given current concern over terrorist use of RDDs, trafficking with these potent radioactive sources has become more preoccupying. Yet, in light of the meager information in media reports about either the quantity or quality of the material, it is difficult to ascertain whether these events are of proliferation significance.

Absence of Proliferation-Significant Cases

The most striking change in the post-2001 period is the absence of reported proliferation-significant cases (kilogram-level quantities of weapons-grade material). Whereas during the early 1990s, when several cases involving kilogram-level quantities of weapons-grade material were recorded, data for the post-2001 period show only three incidents with gram-level quantities of HEU enriched to 80 percent or more. An analysis of these three cases indicates a connection with organized crime for only one of them and no apparent connection with terrorism.

The two Georgian cases have several common characteristics. They both involve opportunists, who were arrested in Georgia while coming from Russia. In both cases, the enrichment level of the material was almost 90 percent, which might indicate that they came from the same source. The French case, on the other hand, involved a criminal group. Although the investigation and the trial that followed the seizure and arrest of the perpetrators did not establish the origin of the material, plane tickets and documents written in the Cyrillic alphabet found in the apartment of one of the perpetrators point to an Eastern origin. The French perpetrators also kept the material in a glass ampoule contained in a lead cylinder.[23] This is in sharp contrast with the transportation means used by the perpetrator in the 2006 Georgian case, which consisted in a plastic bag tucked in his pocket.[24] As HEU is not highly radioactive, this did not represent a health hazard for the perpetrator as long as the HEU was not ingested.[25] Whether the perpetrator was simply blissfully ignorant or was advised by a knowledgeable co-conspirator not to fret about the matter is unknown. In any event, aside from the fact that the three cases involve gram-level quantities of material that could have constituted a sample of a larger quantity of material, the three cases do not seem to constitute a consistent trafficking pattern.

The absence of proliferation-significant cases may be an indicator that international efforts to improve security at nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union are bearing fruit. If so, the occasional incidents involving small quantities of weapons-grade material may be instances of material stolen in the early 1990s, when security measures were not in place. Conversely, the absence of incidents with significant amounts of weapons-grade material also may be a sign that local authorities are unable to identify such cases or that perpetrators have become more sophisticated in their transactions. Because of the dearth of information, we can only speculate.

2003 Spike in Activity

The number of reported trafficking cases in most categories of material, except HEU and LEU, suddenly increases in 2003 and steadily decreases the following years. The number of cases involving opportunists shows a similar evolution. The surge in plutonium cases (small quantities contained in industrial instruments or smoke detectors) is slightly delayed, with an increase occurring in 2004 and a steady decrease starting in 2005. This parallel movement may indicate an improvement in detection capabilities that may have produced a deterrent effect, which is difficult to prove because media sources do not always indicate the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the material. Nevertheless, the possibility underscores the importance of U.S. and IAEA programs, initiated or accelerated after the September 11 attacks, to detect radioactive sources at border points.

The number of cases involving HEU, LEU, and other unspecified enriched uranium, on the other hand, decreases in 2002 and then flattens to a low level in subsequent years.[26] This may be indicative of the fact that there are not many such cases because of the improvement of physical security measures at facilities storing such material. On the other hand, it may also indicate that due to their weak radioactivity, HEU and LEU cannot be detected by existing radiation-detection equipment. Consequently, more trafficking cases possibly have occurred. The small number of cases involving organized crime and terrorist groups can be interpreted the same way. This may indicate the absence of involvement of such groups in trafficking in the former Soviet Union, or it may show that existing border-control equipment and methods are not efficient against more sophisticated groups.

Absence of Evidence Is Not Evidence of Absence

Except for the cases having a loose terrorist connection, the data does not show much of a convergence between WMD-related material trafficking and terrorism. Yet, caution regarding this conclusion is warranted for several reasons. First, investigations of trafficking incidents in the former Soviet Union are usually incomplete, especially so in Central Asia and the Caucasus, because the enforcement communities in these countries do not have sufficient funding or appropriate training to conduct systematic investigations. As a result, investigations are often limited to the arrest of the seller, with little or no information on the identity of other members of a network, if any, or any determination of the origin of the material. The few cases where several members of a trafficking chain—seller, buyer, and intermediaries—were identified and arrested typically involve nationals of the former Soviet Union all meeting in the same place for the transaction.[27] Seldom can the police or security services identify sellers or buyers if they are located in a foreign country. They are also often unable to discover the final destination of the material or even the origin of the material if it did not come from a local facility.

A second problem relates to the lack of information sharing among enforcement organizations in the region, which may spring from the absence of technical means, the lack of political will, and territorial or political disputes. The problematic cooperation between Russia and Georgia regarding the identification of the HEU seized by Georgian authorities in 2006 illustrates the fact that political disputes constitute a powerful obstacle to cooperation in preventing proliferation and identifying trafficking patterns.

Another major obstacle to understanding trafficking patterns is the infancy of export control in the region. For instance, Turkmenistan has no export control law and no export control list for strategic goods.[28] Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have export control laws, but implementing legislation and an export control list for each country are still under development. Uzbekistan’s export control law was adopted only in 2004, and the country’s export control list also is under development.

Except for Russia and Kazakhstan, most countries of the former Soviet Union have a weak legal basis for regulating exports with contradictory and/or incomplete legislation, an underdeveloped licensing system, and understaffed export control organizations with underpaid and untrained personnel. Customs border posts are still ill-equipped to deal with trafficking of WMD-related material, although several U.S. and international programs are underway to provide proliferation-prevention equipment and training in several countries of the region. Some border sections also remain unprotected because of access constraints, such as mountain passes, or territorial disputes. For instance, because of disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Azeri government does not control 132 kilometers of the border between Azerbaijan and Iran. Mountain passes in Tajikistan, especially at the border with Afghanistan, which stretches over 1,200 kilometers, are the most difficult to protect. Visibility in these areas is limited to 10 meters or less.

Finally, insufficient reporting is another cause for concern. Because of their lack of training, customs officials, border guards, and security services sometimes do not recognize the importance of events. During an IAEA workshop in 2001, a Russian customs officer indicated that he was aware of more than 200 cases of illicit trafficking that had not been reported because field custom agents considered them insignificant. Nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities also may not report incidents occurring within their walls either because they poorly appreciate the importance of the event or they fear being involved in a police investigation.

Training programs on export control of strategic material have been launched in various countries in the former Soviet Union since the mid-1990s and are aimed to inform industry and the enforcement community. These programs, however, are primarily directed toward aiding the development of national export control systems or providing training on border control methods and the use of border control equipment. Very little is done in the field of increasing nonproliferation awareness among customs, border guards, and industry. The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program managed by the Department of State is probably one of the few programs that sponsors such training. The program is very limited, with a total budget of $42 million in 2006 to cover 40 countries, of which former Soviet Union countries constitute only a small portion.[29]

Recommendations

Because our capacity to understand future trends in WMD-trafficking hinges on appropriate reporting from the field, it will become increasingly important to improve the quality and quantity of information gathering by training local and regional officials in recognizing significant incidents. The proliferation consequences of such an imperfect system ought to galvanize the international community to lend appropriate assistance.

The data collected over the 2001-2006 period shows that programs aiming to provide radiation-detection equipment have had some success and should be continued and reinforced, especially in countries located on the southern borders of the former Soviet Union. Although existing technology does not detect HEU, it does detect other material with nuclear-weapon or RDD applications (plutonium and radioactive sources). Until recently, the bulk of such U.S. assistance went to Russia and Kazakhstan because they possessed the largest quantities of WMD material. Only after 2001 did other countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus begin to receive more attention, due to their location on trafficking routes, their position as transit countries, and their proximity to troubled areas such as Afghanistan and Iran.

Nevertheless, border-control assistance programs in countries such as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are still wanting. These two countries are located on the trafficking routes for drugs coming from Afghanistan, they have porous borders, and Tajikistan is a theater of terrorist activity. In addition, their customs and border guards are ill-equipped and unprepared to deal with trafficking in WMD-related material. These also are the two countries in the former Soviet Union with the worst record in terms of export-control system development. It is important to direct more funding to install radiation detection equipment at their borders—some of which is already being done under the EXBS program—encourage the development of their national export-control systems, and train their border control personnel.

Considering that several countries of the region, such as Georgia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, have mountainous areas difficult to protect, the provision of other technical means would greatly improve border control. Tools such as night-vision equipment, all-terrain vehicles, communication equipment, and helicopters would sharply improve the efficiency of these organizations. It also is important to provide the means to support and operate such equipment. Some of these measures are already being implemented under U.S.-funded programs. Many customs and border guard posts remain unequipped, however, according to local customs and border guard representatives. Another important measure consists of raising the morale and motivation of customs and border guards to perform their tasks efficiently. Increasing or complementing their salaries can help here.

New methods are needed to improve data collection related to trafficking in the region. This could be achieved by establishing a regional information-sharing mechanism that would allow national export-control and intelligence communities to share information. Some countries in the region exchange information on licensing on a bilateral basis (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan) while others do not (Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine).[30] Regional organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Community[31] have been established to harmonize export control procedures and improve information sharing. The organization has a limited membership, however, and so far has achieved little tangible progress. No regional information-sharing mechanisms exist. Previous attempts to create such a system—the Regional Transit Agreement—were supported by the State Department for several years but failed in part because of conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The initiative should be reactivated, and conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan could be avoided by establishing Georgia as the intermediary between the two countries.

Considering that 20 percent of known trafficking cases have been discovered as a result of an investigation, improving police investigative capabilities and training police forces in the region—drug control and financial brigades—in identifying WMD-related material could also greatly benefit data collection and improve our understanding of the possible connections among crime, terrorism, and trafficking.

Programs in the field of chemical and biological nonproliferation are still wanting. Existing training programs and equipment provision are geared toward nuclear material and technology. Considering the dearth of biological and chemical detection equipment, it is important to help customs and border guards identify these materials with other means. These could include such tools as product identification workshops or the design of manuals describing goods related to biological and chemical weapons that could be used by border control personnel. The creation of expert centers on which border control personnel could call for assistance in identifying such material would also be helpful. So far, such centers only exist in Russia. Yet, many other former Soviet states have facilities that at one time produced biological and chemical weapons and that could serve as an expert adjunct to law enforcement agencies.

Finally, for any new system or mechanism to be successful in the region, another major challenge will have to be overcome: the absence of a nonproliferation culture. Government and customs officials, border guards, and exporters alike have little understanding of the concept of export control as a means to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Improvements in this area have occurred in Russia and Kazakhstan, but in most other countries of the former Soviet Union, export control is usually understood as “customs control,” that is, the act of checking the validity of documents and collecting duties. It is important to educate local authorities and industry representatives about basic nonproliferation concepts while providing them with updated information on WMD-related material and trafficking techniques and patterns. Several training workshops have been organized under the auspices of the Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce as well as the IAEA. These workshops, however, are often organized with long intervals between them and for a limited number of actors. There is a need for continuous and wider training. Only such a system would truly generate a change in mentality and behaviors. This could be achieved by setting up a nonproliferation curriculum within customs, border guards, and police academies and supporting the creation of such academies where they do not already exist.

 


Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is a senior researcher at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Marina Matevski and Karl Scheuerman provided assistance in collecting and organizing the data that form the basis for this article.


ENDNOTES

1. See Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), NIS Export Control Observer, available at http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm.

2. See CNS, International Export Control Observer, available at http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm.

3. See CNS, NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, available at http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/index.html.

4. The incident involving weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) that was reported in January 2007 in The New York Times was included in the data set, as the material was seized in Georgia in January 2006. See Lawrence Scott Sheets and William Broad, “Georgia Says It Blocked Smuggling of Arms-Grade Uranium,” The New York Times, January 25, 2007, p. A1.

5. Proliferation-significant cases are defined as involving kilogram-level quantities of plutonium-239 or HEU with an enrichment level of 80 percent or more. At least 3 kilograms of plutonium-239 or 25 kilograms of HEU enriched to 80 percent or more would be required to build a nuclear bomb. In principle, a nuclear bomb could also be built with uranium enriched to less than 80 percent. The lower the enrichment level, however, the greater the quantity of uranium required. For instance, at 20 percent enrichment, about 200 kilograms of uranium or more would be needed to build a bomb. A bomb maker would also need to understand very advanced techniques in order to be able to use uranium enriched to about 20 percent. Charles Ferguson and William Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005).

6. For a description of these cases, see William C. Potter and Elena Sokova “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2002, pp. 112-120.

7. Uranium containing less than 20 percent of the isotope uranium-235.

8. An additional plutonium event was reported in the press in 2003. Because the material was stolen in 1993 and the perpetrator attempted to sell it the same year, this case was not included in the data set.

9. Traditionally, plutonium-238 is used for civilian purposes, while plutonium-239 is used in weapons production. Other types of smoke detectors use americium-241, a radioactive isotope slightly heavier than plutonium. A terrorist would need millions of detectors in order to extract enough americium or plutonium to make a powerful RDD. Steve Coll, “The Unthinkable,” The New Yorker, March 12, 2007, pp. 48-57.

10. “French Court Sentences Uranium Smugglers to Jail” NIS Export Control Observer, August 2003, p. 17.

11. Sheets and Broad, “Georgia Says It Blocked Smuggling of Arms-Grade Uranium.”

12. “Georgia Reports Four New Cases of HEU Seizure,” NIS Export Control Observer, July 2005.

13. See “Cesium Sellers Caught Red-handed,” Security Service of Ukraine, May 6, 2004; “1.8kg Uranium Seized in Batumi, Georgia,” Interfax News Agency, July 24, 2001; “Balashikha Organized Crime Group Members Arrested for Attempted Sale of Uranium-235,” Gazeta.ru, December 4, 2001; “Omsk Oblast: Counterintelligence Agents Catch Pensioners Selling Radioactive Osmium and Counterfeit Iraqi Currency,” VolgaInform, March 2, 2003.

14. “Russian Nuclear Theft Alarms U.S.,” The Guardian, July 19, 2002.

15. “A Charmed Pilgrim,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, July 19, 2004.

16. “Dirty Bomb Rockets Again Reported for Sale in Transnistria” NIS Export Control Observer, June 2005.

17. See “National Security Service Detains Three Residents of Tokmok Attempting to Sell Strategic Material for Over One Million Soms,” Kyrgyzinfo News Agency, February 11, 2005; “Incidents of Illicit trafficking in the NIS-Russia,” NIS Export Control Observer, April 2005.

18. “Two Incidents of Pathogen Smuggling Reported,” NIS Export Control Observer, July 2003.

19. “Two Radioactive Smuggling Cases Occur in Georgia Within Weeks,” NIS Export Control Observer, July 2003.

20. See “Kazakhstani Officials Confiscate 1.5kg Uranium Oxide, Heroin,” Interfax News Agency, March 11, 2002; “Tajik Authorities Foil Attempt by Uzbekistani Citizen to Sell Plutonium,” ITAR-TASS, March 15, 2004; “Dirty Bomb in a Nuclear Suitcase,” Izvestia.ru, October 3, 2003; “Des trafiquants d’uranium arrêtés par hazard,” Liberation, July 24, 2001 (in French).

21. “1.8kg Uranium Seized in Batumi, Georgia”; “Balashikha Organized Crime Group Members Arrested for Attempted Sale of Uranium-235.”

22. “Polish Police Arrest Gang Selling Explosives, Radioactive Material,” Gazeta Wyborcza, in FBIS document EUP20030903000339, September 3, 2003; “Dirty Bomb in a Nuclear Suitcase.”

23. “Des trafiquants d’uranium arrêtés par hazard.”

24. No information on the transportation means was given for the 2003 HEU case.

25. As a heavy metal, uranium can pose a toxic risk, especially to the kidneys, if taken into the body.

26. An artificial surge in HEU cases was created by the announcement made in 2005 by Georgian authorities that they thwarted four attempts of trafficking with HEU in the previous two to three years. As the dates of these incidents were not given, they were all recorded in 2005.

27. See “Radioactive Components Stolen From Scientific Research Institute’s Storage Facility Pass Through Ukraine and Seized by Special Services on Western Border,” Fakty i kommentarii (Kiev), May 23, 2002; “Smuggling of Rare-Earth Metals Into Russia Stopped,” Interfax News Agency, December 28, 2001.

28. Turkmenistan’s existing export control list includes only categories of material, such as nuclear material and military technology, but does not provide a detailed list of controlled items.

29. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program.

30. Eighth Central Asia and the Caucasus Regional Forum on Export Control, Tbilisi, Georgia, May 16-18, 2006.

31. The Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) was created in May 2001, when the five member states—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan—ratified the corresponding treaty. Uzbekistan has joined the organization recently. EURASEC replaced the customs union of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Conventional Arms Treaty Dispute Persists

Wade Boese

Russia and NATO are still at odds over a European conventional arms pact despite an emergency meeting June 11-15 to discuss their differences. Russia is complaining that its long-standing concerns are still being ignored but has not suspended implementation of the treaty as it previously warned it might.

Anatoly Antonov, who heads the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department of International Security and Disarmament, asserted that other states paid only “lip service” to Russia’s positions at the Vienna gathering. The 26-member NATO alliance issued a statement expressing “regret” that no agreement could be reached.

Russian President Vladimir Putin had said in April that Russia might halt implementation of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which caps the number of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft that 30 countries can station between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Antonov said June 15, however, that a possible suspension was now “closer.”

Under a suspension or moratorium, Antonov explained, Russia would stop treaty inspections, notifications, and data exchanges. It would also consider moot weapons limits on Russian arms deployments in its northern and southern regions, or so-called flanks. But he said Moscow did not intend to increase its weapons deployments or withdraw from the treaty, which requires at least a 150-day advance notice.

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, who led the U.S. delegation to the conference, told reporters June 12 that Russia had not indicated that a possible suspension was “imminent” but acknowledged that “it is certainly on the table.” A U.S. government official told Arms Control Today June 20 that “everybody is waiting for the other shoe to drop.”

Citing “serious problems” with NATO behavior under the CFE Treaty, Moscow called May 28 for the “extraordinary conference” on the accord. Russian negotiators arrived at the Vienna gathering with a half-dozen “problems” to discuss.

Russia’s main complaint is that NATO countries are refusing to ratify a November 1999 revision of the agreement, known as the Adapted CFE Treaty. Entry into force of that updated accord requires ratification by all the original treaty states-parties. Thus far, however, only Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have done so.

NATO members are postponing ratification of the adapted treaty, which replaces bloc and geographic arms limits with national weapon ceilings, until Russia withdraws its military forces from the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Moldova. Moscow pledged to do so in documents concluded in parallel with the revised accord at a summit in Istanbul. (See ACT, November 1999. ) Kremlin officials charge the NATO linkage is “artificial.”

Moscow is eager for the adapted treaty to take effect because it loosens Russian flank restrictions, enabling larger Russian force deployments in the volatile Caucasus region, which includes Chechnya. The Kremlin wants to eventually negotiate away the flank limits entirely, but NATO countries have not agreed to do so.

The adapted treaty also contains an accession clause not included in the original treaty. Russian officials are unhappy that NATO members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia are outside the treaty and without weapons limits. The four states have pledged to join the adapted treaty when the option becomes available.

NATO governments maintain that Russia holds the key to making this happen by ending its military presence in Georgia and Moldova.

Russia is working to close two remaining bases in Georgia by the end of 2008. But Georgia charges Russia has not fully abandoned another base, Gudauta, as claimed. This base is located in Abkhazia, a separatist region in Georgia.

The Kremlin’s withdrawal from Moldova has been stalled since 2004. Approximately 1,300 Russian forces remain inside the breakaway region of Transdniestria, where some of the troops are guarding a 21,000-metric-ton ammunition stockpile.

At the June conference, NATO members reiterated proposals to help Russia exit the two states. They suggested that multinational peacekeepers replace Russian forces in Moldova and that a voluntary international fund help pay for the destruction and removal of the ammunition. They also reaffirmed a German offer to lead a fact-finding mission to Gudauta to assess its status.

The Russian delegation dismissed the NATO proposals as nothing new and said the Georgian and Moldovan situations were being handled bilaterally. It insisted that NATO members should start ratifying the adapted treaty or that all CFE states-parties should provisionally apply the updated accord no later than July 1, 2008. NATO opposes this proposal.

The Russian and NATO delegations left the conference saying they were open to further talks, and Germany offered to host another conference for that purpose this fall.

Cluster Munitions Control Efforts Make Gains

Wade Boese

The clock appears to be ticking on the unconstrained use of cluster munitions. The ranks of a Norwegian-led initiative to prohibit these types of weapons have swelled to approximately 70 countries. Meanwhile, the United States recently switched its position in another forum to support negotiating some restrictions on cluster munitions.

Cluster munitions are weapons fired from artillery and rockets or dropped by planes that fragment and spread as many as 600 submunitions (small bomblets or grenades) over broad areas. When the submunitions fail to detonate properly, which can happen frequently, they can injure or kill people who later come into contact with them. Independent studies estimate that tens of thousands of noncombatants over the past several decades might have fallen victim to cluster munitions.

The first use of cluster munitions dates back to World War II, but Israel’s large-scale use of cluster munitions against Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon last August increased attention to the weapon system. (See ACT, October 2006. ) In a June 5 report, the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre in South Lebanon stated that 904 cluster munitions strike areas had been identified in Lebanon and that leftover cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance had claimed 236 postconflict casualties, including 31 deaths.

At a June 19-22 meeting in Geneva, the United States, a supplier of some of the cluster munitions used by Israel last summer, announced it would back negotiations on cluster munitions under the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which numbers 102 states-parties. The convention regulates indiscriminate and inhumane arms, such as incendiary weapons, through five separate protocols.

Last fall, Washington helped block work on a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions. (See ACT, December 2006. ) Ronald Bettauer, head of the U.S. CCW delegation, said June 18 that the about-face reflected “the importance of this issue, concerns raised by other countries, and our own concerns about the humanitarian implications of these weapons.”

Bettauer indicated four days later that the United States does not have a specific proposal. “The United States has taken no position as to the outcome of the negotiations,” he told other delegations. Bettauer, however, noted that any result should “protect civilians while taking into account security requirements.”

On behalf of the European Union, Germany has proposed a negotiating mandate to conclude a CCW protocol on cluster munitions by the end of 2008. Acting on its own accord, Germany also has submitted a draft protocol that would phase-out cluster munitions, but initially permit the use of cluster munitions that met certain technical requirements, such as submunitions failure rates of less than one percent. It would also allow cluster munitions use against targets not near populated areas.    

Despite the U.S. reversal and the EU proposal, there is no guarantee that negotiations will be initiated. The CCW operates by consensus and other countries, including China and Russia, have previously balked at cluster munitions measures. CCW members will decide this November on whether to start any cluster munitions negotiations.

Frustrated with the cumbersome and slow-moving CCW process, Norway last year—much to Washington’s chagrin—opted to launch an independent process to negotiate a cluster munitions treaty. The inaugural February meeting of the so-called Oslo Process brought together 46 countries that committed to concluding in 2008 an agreement banning cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.” (See ACT, April 2007. )

A growing group, including several African states, gathered May 23-25 in Lima, Peru, for a second meeting to propel the process forward and give the proposed treaty more shape. Norway provided the countries with a draft discussion text.

Key aspects of that document included an initial six-year period for destroying stockpiled systems and an initial 10-year period for clearing cluster munitions contaminating a country’s territory. There were also provisions for governments to assist cluster munitions victims and make regular implementation reports. The Norwegian draft also called for entry into force of a future treaty once 20 countries ratify it.

Differences of opinions emerged on all of those issues, but two other issues provoked more substantial debate and revealed some divisions.

Participants disagreed over whether there should be a transition time permitting states to use cluster munitions until alternative weapons become available.

They also diverged over what cluster munitions should be prohibited. For example, some contended cluster munitions equipped with self-destruct mechanisms or those with low failure rates should be allowed, but other states argued for a blanket ban.

This latter group is strongly backed by nongovernmental groups involved in the Oslo Process. Jody Williams, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for her work against anti-personnel landmines, told the Lima conference May 25, “Honest assessments of the use of cluster munitions in real combat situations, we believe, can only lead to the elimination of cluster munitions.”

In general, states coming down on the more stringent sides of the transition and exemption issues are those that hold out little hope for or are not party to the CCW. Led by Norway, this group also includes Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, and Peru.

Oslo participants supporting transition times and exemptions tend also to back negotiating a CCW instrument. Australia, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland rank among those states putting greater stock in a possible CCW instrument, while Canada, France, and the United Kingdom occupy more middle ground, voicing support for both paths. The contention by some of these states is that a CCW protocol, if negotiated, would potentially capture more major powers and cluster munitions producers and users.

Nongovernmental organizations are urging states to ignore the siren song of the CCW. Steve Goose, director of the arms division at Human Rights Watch and a co-chair of the Cluster Munition Coalition, argued in separate May 25 press statements that the CCW was a “dead-end process” and “a distraction that should be avoided.”

Meanwhile, Oslo Process participants are pushing ahead on several fronts. At the May meeting, Peru declared that it would work toward turning Latin America into a zone free of cluster munitions. In addition, Hungary and Switzerland announced national moratoriums. Belgium and Costa Rica are arranging regional meetings of Oslo participants, while the next full meeting is scheduled for Dec. 5-7 in Vienna.

Missile Defense Collision Course

By Daryl G. Kimball

When President George W. Bush withdrew from the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty five years ago, he asserted that “my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.” Now, Bush’s latest proposal to site 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic has severely compounded the Kremlin’s anxieties about growing U.S. offensive and defensive strategic capabilities.

President Vladimir Putin’s response to missile defense deployments in two former Warsaw Pact states has been hostile and counterproductive: he has threatened to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; to target the sites with Russian missiles; and to stop work on a Joint Data Exchange Center intended to help avoid an accidental or mistaken nuclear attack.

For some Americans and Europeans, a rudimentary defense against a potential long-range missile threat from Iran may seem attractive. But for now, it is a flawed idea whose time has not come.

Russia’s concerns may be exaggerated, but that does not alter the reality that the European anti-missile plan is premature and the technology unproven. And, if Washington presses ahead despite Russian objections, it could trigger the renewal of U.S.-Russian missile competition and hamper efforts to further reduce each nation’s still massive nuclear warhead and missile arsenals.

In recent weeks, U.S. officials have crisscrossed Europe to say the proposed system is not designed to counter Russia’s nuclear-armed missiles and therefore does not threaten Russia’s security. To be sure, 10 U.S. interceptors would only provide a rudimentary defense against a handful of incoming missiles, let alone Russia’s current force of some 500 land-based missiles. Highly scripted tests involving prototypes of ground-based interceptors now deployed in California and Alaska have failed three out of five times since 2002. The proposed system in Europe would use a new type of interceptor that has yet to be built, let alone tested.

But just as U.S. officials are seeking missile defenses against an Iranian missile threat that does not exist, Russian leaders are worried they cannot maintain their strategic nuclear retaliatory capability against a porous strategic missile defense that has not been built and a potential U.S. nuclear buildup that will not likely materialize.

Why? Because old habits die hard. Russia and the United States each still deploy approximately 4,000 nuclear warheads on delivery vehicles on high alert, and as a result, military strategists on both sides plan for the worst. Under the flimsy 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the United States will be able to maintain a large “hedge” arsenal of reserve warheads and excess missile capacity. After SORT expires in 2012, the United States could increase its deployed strategic arsenal from 2,200 to well over 4,000 nuclear warheads.

Russia is on a path to maintain approximately 2,000 deployed strategic warheads by 2012. But the size of Russia’s long-range missile force would be relatively smaller. Independent estimates are that Russia’s land-based missile force could shrink dramatically, down to as few as 150 by the year 2015.

Russia’s fear is that the larger and more accurate U.S. missile arsenal would be capable of delivering a decapitating first strike. U.S. missile defense assets could then counter the few remaining missiles based in Russia’s European territory that might survive and be launched.

To avoid this scenario, Russia could slow its planned nuclear force reductions and accelerate deployment of new long-range missile systems, an option made easier if the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is allowed to expire in 2009. But dismantling strategic arms reductions pacts in order to preserve Russia’s ability to annihilate the United States does not make missile defense a better idea.

Unfortunately, Bush and Putin will not likely resolve their differences and avert a collision on missile defense any time soon. Putin’s offer to use the Russian-leased Gabala radar in Azerbaijan to evaluate Iran’s missile program and, if necessary, to use other basing plans that would not interfere with Russian missiles is worth exploring. Nevertheless, the White House seems determined to begin construction of the European system before Bush leaves office.

Such an approach is mistaken and reckless. There should be no rush to deploy an unproven system against a potential missile threat that will not likely materialize until 2015 or beyond. In any case, Congress is on track to cut the administration’s $310 million request for the European strategic missile defense project and focus U.S. efforts on more capable short- and medium-range interceptors.

The United States and its NATO partners should defer work on the European strategic missile defense project until Bush’s and Putin’s successors arrive. In the meantime, they should engage Russia in a meaningful dialogue to address its missile defense concerns, explore technical alternatives, and advance new proposals for deeper warhead and missile force cuts that would reduce tensions and erase Russian fears of U.S. nuclear supremacy.

When President George W. Bush withdrew from the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty five years ago, he asserted that “my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.” Now, Bush’s latest proposal to site 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic has severely compounded the Kremlin’s anxieties about growing U.S. offensive and defensive strategic capabilities.

President Vladimir Putin’s response to missile defense deployments in two former Warsaw Pact states has been hostile and counterproductive: he has threatened to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; to target the sites with Russian missiles; and to stop work on a Joint Data Exchange Center intended to help avoid an accidental or mistaken nuclear attack. (Continue)

ElBaradei: IAEA Budget Problems Dangerous

Paul Kerr

Budget constraints are jeopardizing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) ability to perform vital parts of its mission, particularly those most closely related to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has warned in recent months. Meanwhile, a committee established by the IAEA Board of Governors to review the adequacy of agency safeguards has ended its work after having made little progress in its deliberations.

According to a document obtained by Arms Control Today, ElBaradei told the IAEA board June 15 that the proposed agency budget for 2008 “does not by any stretch of the imagination meet our basic, essential requirements,” adding that “our ability to carry out our essential functions is being chipped away.”

The IAEA performs a wide variety of nuclear-related functions, including promoting safety in nuclear facilities as well as cooperating with countries on matters such as nuclear power and nuclear medicine.

It also performs missions critical to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, the IAEA implements safeguards agreements, which states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are required to conclude. Such agreements allow the agency to monitor certain declared nuclear activities and facilities to ensure they are used solely for peaceful purposes.

Additionally, the IAEA performs functions designed to prevent the smuggling and theft of nuclear material, such as maintaining a database that tracks illicit trafficking in such material. The agency also provides assistance to states to help them prevent the theft of nuclear material.

Budget in Flux

The IAEA board has not yet agreed on a budget for fiscal year 2008, a situation that ElBaradei described June 11 as “disappointing.” The board could decide on a budget at an early July meeting, Agence France-Presse reported June 17, but that has not yet been confirmed.

The board is required to submit the agency’s annual budget to the IAEA General Conference, which meets each September. The director-general initially develops the budget with input from IAEA staff and member states.

Based on a UN formula, each member-state contributes a certain amount of funds to the IAEA’s “regular budget.” The agency’s total regular budget for fiscal year 2007 is approximately $370 million. The IAEA also receives voluntary contributions from member states.

The agency’s fiscal year 2007 verification budget, which includes the implementation of safeguards, is less than $145 million. The budget for nuclear safety and security, which includes measures to secure nuclear materials, is approximately $30 million.

Starting in the mid-1980s, a group of wealthy countries imposed a “zero real-growth” budget on the IAEA. Beginning in 2003, however, the agency has received modest budget increases.

For fiscal year 2008, ElBaradei submitted a nominally zero real-growth budget, according to another document obtained by Arms Control Today. However, it contains a separate category of funding for “essential investments.” Some governments have asked the IAEA to decrease its 2008 fiscal year budget, the document says.

Size Matters

ElBaradei warned June 15 that continued flat budgets would force the agency to cut back on some of its missions. Similarly, he argued four days earlier that the “dichotomy between increased high priority activities and inadequate funding, if continued, will lead to the failure of critical IAEA functions.”

Government officials and outside experts widely acknowledge that the IAEA’s workload will increase in the future. According to an April 18 Department of State fact sheet, “requirements for IAEA safeguards and inspections are expected to increase dramatically over time” because more countries are likely to increase their reliance on nuclear power.

At least in the short term, the agency also will need to devote more resources to other functions, such as evaluating information supplied by member-states as more countries conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements, according to a 2005 IAEA budget document.   

Additional protocols expand the number of nuclear-related activities and facilities that an NPT member-state must declare, as well as augment the agency’s authority to detect undeclared nuclear activities. So far, 82 out of 189 NPT states-parties have additional protocols in force; another 30 have signed them.           

A former senior IAEA official pointed out, however, that there are only a few states with significant nuclear activities that do not have an additional protocol in force.           

The IAEA would also be tasked with monitoring a multilateral North Korean nuclear agreement as well as a nuclear cooperation deal between the United States and India, if either became a reality (see pages 41 and 42).

Nongovernmental experts interviewed by Arms Control Today in June agreed that the IAEA needs a budget increase immediately. Government officials have made similar claims. For example, Ambassador Abdul Minty, South Africa’s representative to the IAEA Board of Governors, warned in a June 14 statement that the IAEA’s current budget situation could result in the “weakening” of the agency.

The State Department fact sheet also acknowledged that the agency needs additional funding. But in a June 21 interview with Arms Control Today, a knowledgeable U.S. official said that the urgency of ElBaradei’s case is “not proven.”

Agency officials and nongovernmental experts, meanwhile, have identified a number of IAEA functions that could be adversely affected by current budget levels. These include a number of issues related to the IAEA’s safeguards mandate. Indeed, ElBaradei warned June 15 that the agency’s “safeguards function is being eroded over time.”

As one example, he cited the state of the IAEA’s laboratories, asserting June 11 that they “are full of equipment that is outdated.” As a result, ElBaradei added June 15, the agency must “rely on a very small number of external laboratories” for analyses of environmental samples.

Both Matthew Bunn, a former Clinton administration official who is currently a senior research associate at Harvard University, and Andreas Persbo, a researcher at the Verification Research, Training, and Information Center, agreed with ElBaradei’s assessment.

The agency takes environmental samples from countries’ nuclear facilities in order to determine, for example, if a country used them for secret activities involving nuclear material. The use of such samples is expected to increase, according to the 2005 budget document.

Additionally, the former IAEA official argued that the IAEA will need to buy more satellite images for its future safeguards work.

Both ElBaradei and Bunn have indicated that the IAEA needs additional as well as new types of equipment for conducting its safeguards activities.

Both also have argued that the agency’s budget for nuclear security is too low. ElBaradei complained June 15 that the IAEA relies on “highly unpredictable” voluntary contributions for 90 percent of that budget.

Safeguards Committee Ends Work

Meanwhile, a committee established in June 2005 to consider methods for improving IAEA safeguards has ended its work without making any recommendations.

The United States pushed the IAEA board to establish the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification after President George W. Bush called for its formation in a 2004 speech. The committee, which was granted a two-year term, was expected to provide advice to the board on whether current safeguards are sufficient for dealing with potential proliferation challenges, such as clandestine nuclear programs and the threat of nuclear terrorism. (See ACT, July/August 2006.)

A Vienna-based diplomat told Arms Control Today June 21 that the committee, which held a total of six meetings, was ultimately unable to reach consensus on a list of 18 recommendations provided by the IAEA secretariat.

ElBaradei stated in June 2005 that the IAEA board would decide after two years whether to extend the committee’s mandate. However, “there are no immediate plans” for continuing its work, the Vienna diplomat said.

The diplomat added that the committee was supposed to generate ideas for improving safeguards, but disagreements among the members prevented this, leading the group to ask the secretariat to provide recommendations.

The secretariat circulated technical papers in May 2006 that described measures to improve the safeguards system, including augmenting the capabilities of the agency’s laboratory network, encouraging states to provide the agency with data about nuclear-related transactions, and expanding the list of materials and equipment that NPT states-parties are required to declare under additional protocols. The secretariat also suggested means of increasing the IAEA’s use of satellite imagery, but the diplomat said that the committee’s discussions about the subject were not productive.

From the beginning, the committee was characterized by its members’ lack of willingness to be “constructive,” the diplomat said, explaining that many states perceived the process to be “political” rather than “technical.” Disagreement about persistently contentious issues related to the NPT, such as whether states-parties should place more emphasis on non-nuclear-weapon states’ compliance with safeguards obligations or nuclear-weapon states’ obligations to reduce their nuclear arsenals, contributed to the committee’s lack of progress, the diplomat said.

Corrected online August 29, 2008. See explanation.

 

Editor's Note

Miles A. Pomper

It is perhaps the scenario most dreaded by the American public and U.S. national security experts: Organized crime gangs take advantage of poorly secured former Soviet nuclear materials and smuggle a bomb’s worth of nuclear material across unguarded borders. They pass the material to terrorists, who eventually detonate such a weapon in the United States or against U.S. interests.

Fortunately, such a scenario has yet to play out in real life. Indeed, as Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley notes in this month’s cover story, available data indicates that, despite post-September 11 fears, a nexus among terrorists, organized crime, and dangerous weapons trafficking has not formed in the former Soviet Union. Still, she cautions that more needs to be done to keep such nightmares from becoming reality.

Likewise, Sidney Niemayer and David K. Smith say that, by failing to keep better track of these incidents and relevant materials, governments in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere are failing to fully tap a vital resource. Follow-on investigations and information sharing, they say, could help determine the origin of nuclear or radiological materials and point to the perpetrators of such crimes.

Americans may fear a nuclear attack by terrorists, but some non-nuclear-weapon states fear such an attack from the United States and other nuclear weapons possessors. To assuage their concern, they have pushed the nuclear-weapon states to provide assurances that they will not use nuclear arms against states without them. But as George Bunn and Jean du Preez argue in another article, the Bush administration has watered down the already limited negative security assurances provided by previous U.S. administrations. They urge the next U.S. president to solidify these commitments.

Our news section this month looks at Russia’s missile defense offer, a U.S. offer on cluster munitions, congressional opposition to a new nuclear warhead, and the release of a new International Atomic Energy Agency report on international cooperation to limit the dangers of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities.

How to cope with the potential dangers caused by the global spread of nuclear fuel-cycle technology is one of the themes of the book Atoms for Peace: A Future After 50 Years?, edited by Joseph Pilat. Ambassador Norman A. Wulf says the book demonstrates that supply-side approaches to controlling nuclear proliferation are losing effectiveness and more efforts need to be made to dampen the motivations for new states to acquire such weapons.

Also, a printer error led to some words being dropped from the introduction to the cover story in the print edition of our June issue. As a service to our readers, we have reprinted the article in full on page 51 of the July/August print edition of Arms Control Today.

Books of Note

Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: New Prospects for Security Against Nuclear Weapons
Edited by Jeffrey Laurenti and Carl Robichaud, The Century Foundation Press, May 2007, 142 pp.

This book is the product of a Century Foundation conference held in February. Summarizing the recommendations that gained the broadest support during discussions, Joseph Cirincione, vice president for national security at the Center for American Progress, and Carl Robichaud, program officer at the Century Foundation, identify nine goals for sustaining the nonproliferation regime, including the end of fissile material production, the removal and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and consistent reinforcement of nonproliferation norms. Several leaders in the field then propose means for achieving these goals, including approaches that seek to preserve the virtues, not the vices, of traditional arms control strategies and to use market forces to support nonproliferation. Despite the outward deadlock of the arms control debate, the authors maintain that positive advancements are possible if leaders strengthen their commitment to the principles of nonproliferation and disarmament. Ultimately, the book stresses the need for a comprehensive strategy, complete with concrete goals, to repair the political and structural inconsistencies in the nonproliferation regime.


Arms Control After Iraq: Normative and Operational Challenges
Edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations University Press, 2006, 452 pp.

Taking advantage of a wide variety of state and regional perspectives, this book, edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and UN Assistant Secretary-General Ramesh Thakur, covers how the strategies of nonproliferation and disarmament have adjusted since the war in Iraq and also how the “tools” of arms control have changed in their importance and impact. Several contributors discuss the new emphasis on counterproliferation and the switch from deterrence to “compellence” strategies. The efforts of the UN Security Council and the international community at large are discussed not only for their limited ability to enforce compliance but also for the role their ground-breaking verification bodies played in dealing with Iraq. In addition, points of view from the nuclear powers and other influential parties, such as Egypt and Japan, offer differing cultural and historical approaches to nonproliferation.


Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540
Edited by Olivia Bosch et al., Brookings Institution Press, 2007, 226 pp.

Three years after its adoption, policymakers and scholars evaluate UN Security Council Resolution 1540, a 2004 measure obligating all UN member states to act to prevent nonstate access to weapons of mass destruction. In 14 essays, diverse authors from around the globe put the resolution in legal, historic, and strategic context and recommend guidelines for enforcement, lawmaking, and prosecution. Part one presents Resolution 1540 as part of the broader history of efforts against proliferation. Part two discusses the resolution in relation to nonproliferation treaties on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Part three relates Resolution 1540 to other recent efforts, including the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative. Acknowledging that the resolution’s effects on nonstate proliferation have yet to be determined, the editors conclude that its most lasting contribution will be its validation of a globally cooperative agenda against proliferation.


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Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: New Prospects for Security Against Nuclear Weapons. Edited by Jeffrey Laurenti and Carl Robichaud, The Century Foundation Press, May 2007, 142 pp.

Arms Control After Iraq: Normative and Operational Challenges. Edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations University Press, 2006, 452 pp.

Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540. Edited by Olivia Bosch et al., Brookings Institution Press, 2007, 226 pp.

July/August 2007 Bibliography

Of Special Interest

Beckett, Margaret, “For a Nuclear-Free World,” Jerusalem Post, June 26, 2007.

Biden, Joe, “CSI: Nukes,” The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2007, p. A17.

Carter, Ashton B., May, Michael M., and Perry, William J., “After the Bomb,” The New York Times, June 12, 2007, p. A23.

Nunn, Sam, “The Mountaintop: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 14, 2007, 8 pp.

Odom, William E., “The Nuclear Option,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2007, p. 51.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, June 11, 2007, 752 pp.

I. Strategic Arms

D’Agostino, Thomas P. The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, National Nuclear Security Administration, June 15, 2007, 6 pp.

Drell, Sidney, “A Reliable Path to Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 48.

The Economist, “Vlad and MAD,” June 9, 2007, p. 67.

Gormley, Dennis M., “Silent Retreat: The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, July 2007, p. 183.

Harvey, John R., “Nonproliferation’s New Soldier: How the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program will Bolster Global Security,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 32.

Krauss, Lawrence M., “A Case of Dubious Rationales,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 41.

Landay, Jonathan, “Dispute Delays Arms-Control Talks with Moscow,” McClatchy Newspapers, June 18, 2007.

Liang, John, “Air Force Plans to Begin Reducing Minuteman III Fleet This Month,” Inside Missile Defense, June 6, 2007, p. 2.

Matthews, William, “D’Agostino Aims to Shift U.S. Lawmakers’ View in Favor of RRW,” Defense News, June 15, 2007.

Pikayev, Alexander A., “Unfair Advantage,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 36.

Pincus, Walter, “House Vote Stops Appropriation for New Generation of Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, June 20, 2007, p. A20.

Saunders, Doug, “Cold Warrior Putin Threatens to Target Europe,” The Globe and Mail, June 4, 2007, p. A1.

Shen, Dingli, “Upsetting a Delicate Balance,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 37.

Vartabedian, Ralph, “U.S. Speeding Up Nuclear Disarmament,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 2007.

Weitz, Richard, “Missile Tests Underscore Moscow’s Desire to Maintain Nuclear Deterrent,” World Politics Review, June 1, 2007.

II. Nuclear Proliferation

Gusterson, Hugh, “Nuclear Terrorism: Correcting the Future,” The Bulletin Online, June 5, 2007.

Kramer, Andrew E., “Russia’s Nuclear Power Company Finds Business Is Good - in Iran and Elsewhere,” International Herald Tribune, June 7, 2007.

Stinson, Jeffrey, “Russia Increasingly Filling Demand for Nuclear Technology,” USA Today, June 3, 2007.

India

Agence-France Presse, “Rice Eyes U.S.-India Nuclear Deal This Year,” June 27, 2007.

Associated Press, “Group of Regional Indian Parties Denounces India-U.S. Nuclear Deal,” June 6, 2007.

Bidwai, Praful, “Last-Minute Hitch over U.S.-India Deal,” Inter Press Service, June 7, 2007.

The Hindu, “U.S. Needs to Make Changes in Deal: Scientists,” June 18, 2007.

Jha, Ravi S., “Wrangling Continues on U.S.-Indo Nuclear Deal,” Khaleej Times, June 11, 2007.

Johnson, Jo, “Cloud Over U.S.-India Nuclear Accord,” Financial Times, June 3, 2007.

Nayar, K. P., “Nuke Talks in 3-Para Knot,” The Telegraph, June 4, 2007.

Rajesh, Y. P., “Little Progress in India-U.S. Nuclear Deal Talks,” Reuters, June 2, 2007.

Sethi, Manpreet, Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: Reprocessing Issue Reconstructed, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Issue Brief, June 2007, 4 pp.

Stephenson, John, Will the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative Light India? Assessing the Economic & Resource Arguments for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, June 5, 2007, 12 pp.

Varadarajan, Siddharth, “Manmohan Sent Strong Message through Burns,” The Hindu, June 6, 2007.

Iran

Bhadrakumar, M.K., “Russia’s Tango with Tehran,” Asia Times, June 26, 2007.

Goldschmidt, Pierre, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Between Denial and Despair,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Proliferation Analysis, June 15, 2007.

Heinrich, Mark, “Iran Sets Talks with IAEA as New Sanctions Loom,” Reuters, June 21, 2007.

Heinrich, Mark and Strohecker, “ElBaradei Urges Iran to Halt Atomic Expansion,“ Reuters, June 14, 2007.

Hiro, Dilip, “The Iranian Bomb in a MAD World,” Asia Times, June 12, 2007.

Perkovich, George, and Squassoni, Sharon, Iran Goes Secret Again, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 14, 2007.

Pipes, Daniel, “Can the IAF Take Out Iran’s Nukes?” Jerusalem Post, June 13, 2007.

Reuters, “Rice Cool to Any Partial Nuclear Suspension by Iran,” June 24, 2007.

Sands, David R. “Iran Uses Fronts to Avoid U.N. Sanctions,” The Washington Times, June 13, 2007, p. A1.

North Korea

Gertz, Bill, “Data on N. Korea Centrifuges Sought,” The Washington Times, June 12, 2007, p. A1.

Herman, Bert, “Roh: Nuclear Crisis Just a Bargaining Chip,” The Washington Times, June 1, 2007, p. A17.

Jong-Heon, Lee, “Eyes Focused on N. Korea,” United Press International, June 15, 2007.

Magnier, Mark, “N. Koreans Hope Food and Shelter Come Next,” Los Angeles Times, June 2, 2007, p. A1.

Reuters, “North Korea Allows IAEA Team to Visit Nuclear Plant,” June 27, 2007.

Reuters, “Frozen North Korean Funds Released from Macau Bank,” June 14, 2007.

Sanger, David E., and Onishi, Norimitsu, “U.S., In Shift, Plans Talks in North Korea on Arsenal,” The New York Times, June 21, 2007, p. A8.

Song, Jung-a and Sevastopulo, Demetri, “N. Korea Invites UN to Nuclear Showdown,” Financial Times, June 17, 2007.

Pakistan

Albright, David and Brannan, Paul, Pakistan Appears to be Building a Third Plutonium Production Reactor at Khushab Nuclear Site, The Institute for Science and International Security, June 21, 2007, 6 pp.

Xinhua, “Pakistan Denies Report on New Nuclear Reactor,” June 23, 2007.

III. Nonproliferation

Fox, Jon, “Senators Call for Test Ban Treaty Ratification,” Global Security Newswire, June 8, 2007.

Group of Eight, Heiligendamm Statement on Non-Proliferation, June 8, 2007.

Group of Eight, Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group, June 8, 2007.

Heupel, Monika, Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Division of Labor Strategy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Papers, June 2007, 28 pp.

Jan, Sadaqat, “Pakistan Joins Fight on Nuke Terror,” Associated Press, June 10, 2007.

Perkovich, George, et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security: 2007 Report Card on Progress, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007.

Sokolski, Henry, What Nuclear Challenges Might the EU Meet?, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, June 14, 2007, 6 pp.

Weitz, Richard, “Future Global Nonproliferation Partnership Would Need More Follow-Through,” World Politics Review, June 28, 2007.

IV. Missiles and Missile Defense

Alison, Sebastian and Pinchuk, Ellen, “Russia Will Target Czech, Polish Missile Sites, Ivanov Says,” Bloomberg News, June 14, 2007.

Chivers, C.J., “Putin Proposes Alternatives for Missile Defense System,” The New York Times, June 9, 2007, p. A6.

Coyle, Philip, A Game of Make-Believe: The European Missile Shield, Neiman Watchdog, June 8, 2007, 2 pp.

De la Grange, Arnaud, “Antimissile Defence’s Real Purpose: Political Integration More than Military Protection,” Le Figaro, June 12, 2007.

Gard, Robert, “Outside View: Euro-BMD Bad for U.S.,” United Press International, June 22, 2007.

Grier, Peter, “A Leaner, Looser ‘Star Wars’ System” Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 2007.

Hildreth, Steven A. and Ek, Carl, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, Congressional Research Service, June 22, 2007, 11 pp.

The Hindu, “No Move to Cap Long-Range Missiles,” June 19, 2007.

Ismayilov, Rovshan, “Radar for Rent,” Transitions Online, June 11, 2007.

ISN Security Watch, “Radar Diplomacy,” June 13, 2007.

Kuchins, Andrew C., “Vlad the Surpriser,” Newsday, June 10, 2007.

Lasker, John, “U.S. Ramps Up Missile Tests in the Pacific,” Asia Times, June 5, 2007.

Loven, Jennifer, “Bush Defends Missile Defense System,” Associated Press, June 1, 2007.

Mainville, Michael, “Azerbaijani Radar A Looming Presence for Nervous Inhabitants,” Agence-France Presse, June 8, 2007.

Matthews, William, “As U.S., Russia Spar over Missile Defense, Congress Cuts Funding,” Defense News, June 4, 2007.

Osgood, Carl, “Missile Defense: Cheney's Nuclear War Doctrine,” Executive Intelligence Review, June 29, 2007.

Postol, Theodore and Goodby, James, “Old Thinking about a New Threat,” International Herald Tribune, June 8, 2007.

Reuters, “Clinton Derides U.S. Missile Shield Plan,” June 29, 2007.

Sevastopulo, Demetri and Dinmore, Guy, “Russia and US Play Politics with Missiles,” Financial Times, June 21, 2007.

Shanker, Thom, “U.S. to Keep Europe as Site for Deterrent to Missiles,” The New York Times, June 15, 2007, p. A6.

Sieff, Martin, “Why U.S. May Reject Putin Plan,” United Press International, June 18, 2007.

Stott, Michael and Solovyov, Dmitry, “Russia Touts Radar Offer, Says U.S. Shield Not Needed,” Reuters, June 9, 2007.

Stratfor: “Geopolitical Diary: Understanding Putin's Missile-Defense Offer,” June 8, 2007.

Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, “Putin Surprises Bush with Plan on Missile Shield,” The New York Times, June 8, 2007, p. A1.

Thatcher, Jonathan, “Missiles Skid over Iced-Up North Korea Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, June 8, 2007.

Weitz, Richard, “A Bush-Putin Discussion on the Radar,” The Washington Post.com’s Think Tank Town, June 20, 2007.

V. Chemical and Biological Arms

Galbraith, Peter W., “’Chemical Ali’ Didn’t Act Alone,” Los Angeles Times, June 28, 2007.

Giacomo, Carol, “U.S.-Libya Chemical Arms-Related Deal in Doubt,” Reuters, June 8, 2007.

Lombardo, Ingrid, Chemical Non-Lethal Weapons: Why the Pentagon Wants Them and Others Don’t, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Story, June 8, 2007.

Krans, Maxim, “The Hysteria Behind Russia’s Ban on DNA Exports,” RIA Novosti, June 1, 2007.

Weitz, Richard, “Russian Chemical Weapons Dismantlement: Progress with Problems,” WMD Insights, June 2007.

Xinhua, “China to Establish Anti-Bioterrorism System, June 27, 2007.

VI. Conventional Arms

Aitamurto, Tanja, “Seven Questions about Cluster Weapons,” Helsingin Sanomat, June 6, 2007.

Associated Press, “Russia Completes Withdrawal from 1 of 2 Remaining Bases in Georgia,” June 27, 2007.

Associated Press, “U.S. Reverses Position and is now Willing to Negotiate a Cluster Bomb Treaty,” June 19, 2007.

Buzhinskiy, Evgeny, “One Step From a Moratorium: Why the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Does Not Suit Russia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 15, 2007.

Dempsey, Judy, “NATO Offer on Weapons Falls Short, Russia Says,” June 13, 2007.

The Economist, “A Change of Heart, or of Tactic,” June 21, 2007.

Elkus, Adam, “Gangs, Terrorists, and Trade,” Foreign Policy in Focus, June 6, 2007.

Horta, Loro, “China on the March in Latin America,” Asia Times, June 28, 2007.

International Committee of the Red Cross, Humanitarian, Military, Technical and Legal Challenges of Cluster Munitions, 2007, 89 pp.

ITAR-TASS, “Russia Doesn’t Want to Bury CFE, But May Have to Impose Moratorium: Minister,” June 21, 2007.

Keaton, Jamey, “U.S.: NATO Has Intercepted Iranian Arms,” Associated Press, June 13, 2007.

Kole, William J., “Russia Fails in Arms Treaty Overhaul,” Associated Press, June 15, 2007.

Murphy, John, “Israel Sees Problem Skyrocket; Militants Empty Towns with Simple Weapon,” The Baltimore Sun, June 2, 2007, p. A1.

Peuch, Jean-Christophe, “Russia: Moscow ‘Unhappy’ with Outcome of CFE Conference,” Radio Free Europe, June 15, 2007.

Pham, J. Peter, “Hu’s Selling Guns to Africa,” World Politics Review, June 28, 2007.

Reuters, “U.S. Open to Negotiations on Cluster Bombs But No Ban,” June 18, 2007.

RIA Novosti: “Russia Will Not Talk CFE Treaty Withdrawal in Vienna: Lavrov,” June 6, 2007.

Rickards, Jane, “Taiwan Rejects Most of U.S. Arms Package Offered in 2001,” The Washington Post, June 16, 2007, p. A11.

Slackman, Michael, “Running Guns to Gaza: A Living in the Desert,” The New York Times, June 19, 2007.

Smucker, Philip, “Taliban Uses Weapons Made in China, Iran,” The Washington Times, June 5, 2007.

Turse, Nick, “The Secret Air War in Iraq,” The Nation, June 11, 2007.

The Wall Street Journal, “Taiwan’s Self-Defense,” June 22, 2007.

Wright, Robin, “Iranian Flow of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say; Arms Shipments Tracked to Iraqi, Afghan Groups,” The Washington Post, June 3, 2007, p. A14.

VII. U.S. Policy

The Albuquerque Tribune, “Weapons Labs Need to Embrace Change,” June 29, 2007.

Berman, Russell, “Clinton Proposes New Ways to Combat Nuclear Proliferation,” New York Sun, June 28, 2007.

Porter, Gareth, “New Arms Claim Reveals Cheney-Military Rift,” Inter Press Service, June 20, 2007.

VIII. Space

Hitchens, Theresa, “Code Red?” Imaging Notes, Summer 2007.

Hoffman, Carl, “Battlefield Space,” PopularMechanics, July 2007, p. 76.

Reuters, “Eyes on Iran, Israel Launches New Spy Satellite,” June 11, 2007.

Tellis, Ashley J., Punching the U.S. Military’s ‘Soft Ribs:’ China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 51, June 2007, 7 pp.

Zaitsev, Yuri, “The Problem of Space Junk,” RIA Novosti, June 6, 2007.

IX. Other

Barr, Robert, “BAE Systems Subject of Investigation,” Associated Press, June 26, 2007.

Butler, Richard, “Don’t Kick the Inspectors Out of the U.N.,” The New York Times, June 29, 2007.

Gertz, Bill, “China Arms Talks, Reciprocity Stalled,” The Washington Times, June 14, 2007, p. A6.

Highfield, Roger, “How to Build a Greener H-Bomb,” Telegraph.co.uk, June 26, 2007.

Kay, Julie, “Merchants of Doom: A Burgeoning Anti-Terrorism Industry is Peddling Radiation Protection Suits, Nerve Gas Antidotes, and the Latest Spy Aids,” Chicago Sun-Times, June 24, 2007.

Minnick, Wendell, “Just an Update to Some Readers, ‘Realistic Appraisal’ of Threat to Others,” Defense News, June 4, 2007.

Puska, Susan, “Military Backs China’s Africa Adventure,” Asia Times, June 8, 2007.

Wald, Matthew L., “Sole U.S. Company That Enriches Uranium is Struggling to Stay in Business,” The New York Times, June 12, 2007, p. C4.

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