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"The Arms Control Association’s work is an important resource to legislators and policymakers when contemplating a new policy direction or decision."

– General John Shalikashvili
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
May 2007
Edition Date: 
Tuesday, May 1, 2007
Cover Image: 

Letter to the Editor

Mark Avrum Gubrud

As Geoffrey Forden (“After China’s Test: Time for a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Arms Control Today, March 2007) indicates, space arms control has been stalled for many years, primarily by U.S. refusal to engage in negotiations or even less formally discuss the subject with other countries. Following China’s successful test of a direct-ascent, kinetic-energy anti-satellite weapon (ASAT), a number of analysts have proposed a ban focused narrowly on that type of weapon. Forden, in his piece, proposes restricting kinetic-energy and laser ASATs but leaving other technologies unaddressed.

Some strong arguments support proposals to focus attention on kinetic energy ASATs. Such weapons, which directly strike targets at high speeds, create large amounts of persistent orbital debris, an increasingly serious threat to all traffic in space. China’s addition to the debris burden has been condemned worldwide and has raised the concern that further tests, or a war in space using such weapons, might render space unusable for military or civilian purposes. The U.S. military shares this concern, has not tested a kinetic-energy weapon against an orbital target in over two decades, and apparently does not plan to do so in the future. Given that at least a live-impact testing ban would be highly verifiable (since it is impossible to hide the debris shower), the U.S. military might not object to such a ban, particularly if framed as a debris-control measure rather than as arms control.

Yet, even in the absence of such a ban, China will likely judge that the public relations costs of further orbital impact tests outweigh any military gains. As Forden states, the weapon can be tested adequately in close flybys, including at high (e.g., geosynchronous) altitudes, and can be impact tested against suborbital targets, at high closing speeds as the United States does, with its missile defense tests.

Forden proposes criteria that would ban the former but would permit the latter. Under such rules, terminal homing systems could be perfected openly. Intermediate-range target acquisition and tracking systems could be tested in low-closing-speed rendezvous operations, since high-speed flybys are not needed to verify their performance at the required updating rates. Thus, the further development of kinetic-energy ASAT technology would not be blocked.

More importantly, such proposals ignore the most significant technological trend in space weapons and military space power today: the development of small, autonomously maneuvering satellites. These “microsatellites,” or “nanosatellites,” have been advertised as experiments toward robotic servicing and refueling of satellites, anti-ASAT defenses, and even debris clearing. The feasibility and economics of such uses, however, are far more dubious than the usability of such vehicles for surveying, monitoring, inspecting, and actively probing foreign satellites and, if a decision is made to do so, interfering with, quarantining, damaging, or destroying satellites by a variety of means, without necessarily creating debris.

Such weapons, by definition, make their final approach at low closing speed, yet they need not take much longer than direct-ascent kinetic-energy ASATs to insert into orbits in close proximity with their targets. Since they might be capable of disabling actions that could be reversed and since they might be used first to inspect a target and decide if it is dangerous, they may be more likely to be used in a crisis. If sent to loiter near a potentially dangerous target, they might invite a preemptive attack on themselves, and their mere existence may provoke potential adversaries to equip future satellites with the needed “defensive” weapons.

Although there is little evidence to support claims that China has already deployed microsatellite space mines, the technology is certainly within reach of China and other space-faring nations. Chinese capabilities in this area will become an increasing concern for the U.S. military if Beijing follows the U.S. example by developing and testing highly maneuverable, miniature robotic vehicles whose use as weapons is an obvious possibility.

To prevent an arms race in space, arms control needs to stand in the way of the most important current and future developments in anti-satellite technology. Orbital proximity systems need not be banned but should be subject to accountability, openness, and verifiable technical limits designed to distinguish them from “co-orbital ASATs” and to control the latter. A kinetic-energy ASAT test ban would be simpler but would not significantly constrain current U.S. space weapons development plans, which others will likely follow.

Mark Avrum Gubrud is a graduate research assistant in experimental physics at the University of Maryland.


 

Geoffrey Forden Responds:

I agree with many of the points that Mark Avrum Gubrud makes in his letter. Where we differ most, or so it appears to me, is in the matter of pragmatism. I firmly believe that the time is ripe to outlaw an entire class of weapons: those based on kinetic, hit-to-kill technology, which have no legitimate use. Furthermore, we can ban these weapons from even being developed rather than “merely” agreeing to a ban on their use.

Gubrud, by contrast, suggests that there should be a way of banning robotic technology used in close proximity to other satellites, which he suggests are uneconomical in any case. I cannot comment on the economics of such activities, but I can give an example where they would clearly be desirable. Consider the plan of rescuing the Hubble Space Telescope by having a robotic vehicle rendezvous with the crippled satellite and boost it into a higher orbit, perhaps even fixing it. Such a robotic mission would be much more desirable than having a team of astronauts risk the 2 percent chance of a catastrophic accident associated with a shuttle flight.

While a code of conduct or even a treaty could pledge every space-faring nation to refrain from using such as system as a weapon, it could not prevent it from being developed, tested, or deployed. Nor should it; the trouble with dual-use technology is that its peaceful applications are often too valuable to ban outright.

I had many things in mind when I stated that kinetic-kill ASATs were the most dangerous form of space weapon. Given the relative lack of military utility for ASATs, however, the most relevant is the problem of persistent debris. The January Chinese ASAT test alone increased by at least 50 percent the likelihood of any low-Earth-orbit satellite being destroyed by an unintended collision. The world cannot afford the luxury of letting these weapons be developed.

Finally, I think it is a mistake to apply the adjective “direct ascent” to the Chinese weapon since it masks the real sophistication and range of the system. It is true it struck its target directly after being released from a suborbital launch vehicle. It could just as easily have been mounted on one of China’s rockets capable of inserting a satellite into geostationary orbit, a mission that would have involved first a parking and then a transfer orbit. If it had, it would have been able to hit strategically more important communications satellites.

Geoffrey Forden is a research associate with the Science, Technology, and Society Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as chief of the multidisciplinary analysis section of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

Progress or Problems at CW Destruction Site?

Daniel Arnaudo

U.S. officials say they are close to signing an agreement with the Russian government to complete the building of a major chemical weapons destruction facility that has been plagued by construction delays.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities April 11, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Benkert stated that construction of the facility at Shchuch’ye “is now about 50 percent complete. We expect to amend the agreements and add the final contracts and funding to complete this project very soon.”

Shchuch’ye is a complex containing one-seventh of Russia’s roughly 40,000-metric-ton chemical weapons arsenal. The munitions stored there include some of the most dangerous chemical weapons—nerve agents such as sarin, soman, and Russian VX—housed in 1.9 million artillery shells and 600 rocket and missile warheads. (See ACT, July/August 2001.)

Former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), an architect of U.S. programs to contain such dangers, described the stockpile in testimony at the April 11 hearing as “enough chemical weapons in that facility to kill everybody on the face of the earth three or four times over if it was disseminated in an efficient way. Of course, [it] wouldn’t be. Chemicals aren’t. But that shows you the magnitude.”

Nunn also said that when he recently visited the site, he saw open holes in the roof and that the buildings were slowly sinking into the wet ground and urged U.S. officials to complete an agreement and move forward.

Nonetheless, Benkert did not set any clear timeline for finishing the negotiations nor did he mention any dates for completing a project that has consistently encountered setbacks.

He also did not explain how completion of the project would be funded. Since Congress authorized the project in 1992, costs have risen from an initial estimate of $750 million to more than $1 billion. Although some money Congress has already appropriated has not yet been spent on the project, the Bush administration did not request additional funding for the project in its fiscal year 2008 budget request. Outside experts have expressed skepticism that Russia will be willing to foot the bill for any gap in funding.

U.S. funding for the destruction of Russian chemical weapons has always been contentious. In 1993, Congress mandated that Russia meet a series of conditions before the money was released, including accounting for their entire chemical weapons stockpiles and destroying all its nerve agents at Shchuch’ye. As Russia was unable or unwilling to meet some of these conditions, Congress eliminated funding in 2000 and 2001 and held it back for nine months in 2002 until lawmakers granted President George W. Bush the authority to waive the restrictions on national security grounds.

In 2006, Congress gave the president permanent authority to waive the restrictions. Despite this breakthrough, problems persist both with U.S. funding and on the Russian side of the partnership, according to a U.S. official familiar with the program.

In particular, the effort at Shchuch’ye has recently run into a number of problems that have slowed progress, including funding limitations, a lack of skilled labor, delays by the Russian government, and concern about subcontractors bidding for the project.

Problems with the Russian subcontractor bids made to the Parsons Corp., which was designated by the Department of Defense to manage the project, have become a significant obstacle. The bids all were much higher than estimated and would have left the project well over the budget set by Congress.

“Over the past year, there were significant problems ensuring that final contract awards could be accomplished transparently for prices that had a reasonable relation to the work proposed to be accomplished,” Benkert said.

But he added, “After detailed negotiations, we are now poised to sign an agreement with Russia, which will allow us to pull the Shchuch’ye project across the goal line within the U.S. budget. If that budget turns out to be insufficient, we expect to have Russia’s commitment to fund whatever is necessary to complete the project.”

 The new agreement that Benkert said was near completion would insert the Russian government into the process to accept subcontractor bids and more directly control the process, according to congressional sources. An apparent stumbling block to closing the deal, however, is a U.S. desire to maintain oversight and inspection over the project after the job of subcontracting has been handed over to Russia.

At the hearing, Sen. Elizabeth Dole (R-N.C.) posed just such a question, asking Benkert, “Has [the Defense Department] pared back the scope of its work on systemization of this facility and the training of the Russian operators as a result of this development?” Benkert replied that the Defense Department had worked to incorporate continued U.S. oversight into the agreement and that it will be “watching this very carefully as it progresses to make sure that, in fact, the work does what it’s supposed to do.”

Moscow’s original plan was to bring the facility online by 2006, but that deadline was extended to 2009 after discussions with the U.S. government. That deadline is now likely to slip further.

The facilities at Shchuch’ye and other sites have been established to meet Russia’s commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Under that pact, Russia is supposed to destroy its entire Soviet-era 40,000-metric-ton arsenal by 2012, but it is widely anticipated that it will not meet that deadline. (See ACT, January/February 2005.)

In addition to the United States, other countries also have invested money and material in the project. Contributors include Canada, which has committed up to $25 million for the construction of a local railway; France, which has committed more than $6 million; and other countries, which have committed millions more through direct work on the project or through the G-8 Global Partnership.

The United States remains by far the largest foreign source of funding for the project, so its support remains critical. Congress in the coming months will have a chance to weigh in on this, including the lack of funds for Shchuch’ye, when it takes up fiscal year 2008 defense appropriations and authorization legislation.

Books of Note

The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor
By William Langewiesche, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, May 2007, 179 pp.

Pulling together articles that first appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, William Langewiesche profiles three characters to illustrate how the great powers have lost their monopoly on nuclear weapons. He seeks to enter the mind of all terrorists, probing nuclear stockpile defenses for vulnerabilities. The thought experiment reveals that even the lowest-hanging nuclear fruit can be difficult to reach for most terrorists. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s rise as a self-styled nuclear Robin Hood dominates the book and personifies the inevitable spread of nuclear know-how to poorer states. Finally, Langewiesche chronicles Khan’s eventual ruin through the work of trade journalist Mark Hibbs. The book warns that nuclear arrivistes are more likely than traditional possessors to use their weapons. Langewiesche worries that the present nuclear regime cannot prevent such malignant enfranchisement. Any state with sufficient determination can acquire what he calls “the fast-track, nation-equalizing, don’t tread- on-me, flat-out-awesome destructive power” of nuclear weapons.


Space as a Strategic Asset
By Joan Johnson-Freese, Columbia University Press, March 2007, 304 pp.

Joan Johnson-Freese calls for U.S. space policy to lead the world to greater levels of cooperation and away from the trappings of an arms race in space. Johnson-Freese, a scholar at the U.S. Naval War College, eloquently, if sometimes sardonically, claims that the United States’ emphasis on military uses of space and its attempts to deny other nations access to dual-use space technologies, hurts U.S. strategic interests. Instead, she argues for international space cooperation, contending that, in its absence, the United States will only drive Europe and, more importantly, China to develop independent capabilities that could unseat the United States’ dominant position in space. The book examines subjects ranging from the history of space policy to the politicization of the aerospace industry and the military’s reach into space. She calls on policymakers to cut through bureaucracy and politics to establish policy that is bold, financially sustainable across successive administrations, and aimed at the twin goals of preventing a space arms race and maintaining the United States’ place as a world leader.


The Small Arms Trade: A Beginner’s Guide
By Rachel Stohl, Matt Schroeder, and Dan Smith, Oneworld Publications, February 2007, 192 pp.

The Small Arms Trade: A Beginner’s Guide is a primer designed to present the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation in terms accessible to the general public. The authors, Rachel Stohl, Matt Schroeder, and Dan Smith, appeal to a broad audience in an effort to increase awareness about a major threat to international peace and security, more widespread but less understood than that posed by chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The book looks at two particularly devastating types of weapons, the AK-47 and shoulder-fired missiles, to illustrate the dangers and consequences of the indiscriminate spread of small arms and light weapons. Despite the increasing number of initiatives to tackle the trafficking of these arms, the authors ultimately conclude that a truly adequate response necessitates a more comprehensive approach in which all states cooperate to control supply, address demand, and end misuse of these deadly instruments.


Are you interested in purchasing these books? You can help support the Arms Control Association by visiting one of our partners.

 

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The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor. By William Langewiesche, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, May 2007, 179 pp.

Space as a Strategic Asset. By Joan Johnson-Freese, Columbia University Press, March 2007, 304 pp.

The Small Arms Trade: A Beginner's Guide. By Rachel Stohl, Matt Schroeder, and Dan Smith, Oneworld Publications, February 2007, 192 pp.

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