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"Though we have acheived progress, our work is not over. That is why I support the mission of the Arms Control Association. It is, quite simply, the most effective and important organization working in the field today." 

– Larry Weiler
Former U.S.-Russian arms control negotiator
August 7, 2018
March 2007
Edition Date: 
Thursday, March 1, 2007
Cover Image: 

Chinese Satellite Destruction Stirs Debate

Wade Boese

In January, China for the first time used a weapon to destroy one of its satellites. Beijing says its feat was not hostile, but it polluted space with a huge amount of potentially harmful debris and sparked debate over China’s professed desire to prevent a space arms race.

China Jan. 11 demolished an aging weather satellite, the Feng Yun-1C, orbiting Earth at an altitude of approximately 850 kilometers. The satellite disintegrated when struck by a projectile carried into space by a ballistic missile launched from the Xichang space launch facility in southwestern China.

The United States and the Soviet Union pursued anti-satellite weapons programs throughout much of the Cold War. Before China’s test, Washington in 1985 had carried out the only previous test in which a satellite was destroyed. In that experiment, an F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft fired a missile armed with a kill vehicle that collided with the U.S. Solwind satellite.

Beijing provided no advance notice of its test and stayed silent for days afterward. The U.S. government confirmed the incident Jan. 18.

China publicly acknowledged the test Jan. 23. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao said that day that the test was “not targeted at any country.” He reiterated China’s long-standing position that it opposes the “weaponization” of space, but Liu did not discuss the reasons for the test, an approach the Chinese government has maintained.

Broad speculation has filled the void. Some have interpreted the experiment as a Chinese show of strength and a warning to Washington that its space assets would be vulnerable to attack if the United States and China ever went to war. Others have seen the test as Beijing’s attempt to stimulate the United States to drop its long-standing opposition to Chinese- and Russian-advocated negotiations on prevention of an arms race in outer space.

If the latter was the intent, China appears to have miscalculated, at least in the short term. U.S. Ambassador Christina Rocca told delegates to the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva Feb. 13, “Despite the [anti-satellite] test, we continue to believe that there is no arms race in space, and therefore no problem for arms control to solve.”

Rocca’s statement meshes with the Bush administration’s stance in its national space policy released last October, ruling out future arms control measures for space. In general, the policy emphasized that “freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power.” (See ACT, November 2006. )

Rocca assured CD members that the United States is “not out to claim space for its own or to weaponize it.” But she also stressed Washington would defend its space assets from threats, noting that the Chinese test “reminds us that a relatively small number of countries are exploring and acquiring capabilities to counter, attack, and defeat vital space systems.”

Pointing out that China launched its satellite-smashing weapon from earth, Rocca questioned whether a space weapons treaty would include terrestrial-based anti-satellite arms. She suggested such definitional issues and potential verification difficulties posed immense problems and pitfalls for any negotiations. Past Chinese and Russian proposals have included obligations against “the threat or use of force against outer space objects.”

Other CD members pressed China for an explanation of its test, but some also urged the United States to revise its anti-space negotiations stand. German Ambassador Bernhard Brasack, speaking Feb. 13 for the 27-member European Union, declared it “irresponsible to block the further discussion on [the space issue] for fear of too ambitious goals.” The CD operates by consensus, and the United States for years has staunchly objected to space talks.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Feb. 10 that Moscow would soon be submitting to the conference a draft treaty banning space weapons. The Kremlin is keen on stopping possible deployment of U.S. anti-missile systems in space, an option the Pentagon wants to start testing around 2012.

Meanwhile, Canada’s ambassador to the CD, Paul Meyer, promoted a multilateral moratorium on anti-satellite tests. He argued Feb. 13 that it was an urgent step, given increasing space debris, which refers to any man-made item in orbit that no longer has a use.

Meyer did not explicitly say so, but China’s test created a lot of space garbage. Indeed, Nicholas Johnson, NASA’s chief scientist for orbital debris, told Arms Control Today Feb. 22 that the obliteration of the Feng Yun-1C marked “the worst satellite breakup” ever in terms of creating large debris and long-term effects on the “near-Earth environment.”

The United States tracks large debris, any item greater than 10 centimeters, because it could collide with and damage or destroy satellites or manned spacecraft. Because items in space are traveling so fast, even debris as small as one centimeter could prove harmful.

Johnson said the United States is currently tracking approximately 1,000 large debris items out of the more than 35,000 pieces of debris one centimeter or larger that NASA estimates the Chinese test produced. Before the test, roughly 10,000 large debris units existed in space.

Although some of the new debris will soon re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere, satellites and spacecraft will have to navigate around some chunks for years, decades, and perhaps a century or more. If the new test debris damages any country’s space assets, China would be liable under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which aims to preserve space for peaceful purposes and protect national and international space assets. Beijing acceded to the treaty in 1983.

Given the high cost of satellites and their significant commercial and military utility, many countries are eager to prevent additional space debris. In February, a subcommittee of the 67-member UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which includes China, Russia, and the United States, adopted nonbinding space-debris mitigation guidelines. The full committee is expected to adopt the guidelines later this year.

The space debris problem clearly ranked as an immediate worry for U.S. officials after the Chinese test, but they also questioned the Chinese political and military motivations behind the test. Senior administration officials labeled the test variously as “very troubling,” “very worrisome,” “destabilizing,” and “quite unpleasant.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee Feb. 6 that the test showed a capability but does not reveal how it fits within China’s “strategic outlook” or potential-use calculations. U.S. officials say they are seeking such clarifications from Beijing.

Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) argued Jan. 29 that Beijing’s intentions are self-evident and that United States should pursue space weapons capabilities, including anti-satellite systems. “We need to have the capability to eliminate a hostile satellite when necessary,” Kyl said.

A senior Air Force official told reporters Feb. 5 that the United States is not interested in such a destructive capability. “We don’t want to do that,” said the official, who also added that the United States is “not real eager to cause a lot of debris in space.”

One idea the official proposed exploring was adding sensors to each satellite to enable it to “see if somebody is coming up close” or to know if it has been “hit by a laser.” Both China and the United States allegedly have been exploring microsatellites that could maneuver close to and disable another satellite, as well as lasers to blind or impair satellites.

 

The USSR’s Past Anti-Satellite Testing

Wade Boese

The Soviet Union pursued anti-satellite (ASAT) programs for decades but apparently never smashed a satellite into bits as China did recently and the United States did in 1985. Still, Washington assessed Moscow’s capabilities as a viable threat to U.S. satellites.

Before instituting a moratorium on ASAT test launches in August 1983, the Kremlin conducted at least 20 ASAT tests beginning in 1968. The Soviet tests involved the use of interceptor vehicles with explosives designed to detonate near their intended target.

None of the Soviet tests resulted in a target’s complete destruction. Indeed, Nicholas Johnson, NASA’s chief expert on orbital debris, told Arms Control Today Feb. 24 that “only one Soviet ASAT target ever released debris as a result of an ASAT engagement.” He reported that four pieces of debris were detected from a November 1968 test.

Nevertheless, Johnson noted that even though targets were not obliterated, the tests were not necessarily failures. “In [the November 1968 test] and other successful engagements, the target satellite might well have been ‘destroyed’ from an operational viewpoint,” he stated.

The Pentagon assessed the Soviet Union as first attaining an operational ASAT capability in 1971. The now-disbanded congressional Office of Technology Assessment reported in an extensive September 1985 report on ASAT systems that “Soviet ASAT capabilities threaten U.S. military capabilities to some extent now and potentially to a much greater extent in the future.”

Moscow continued to investigate ASAT systems, allegedly including lasers, after its 1983 test moratorium, but it is uncertain how extensive and productive those efforts were and what Russia’s exact ASAT capabilities are today.

HEU Smuggling Sting Raises Security Concerns

Justin Reed

Georgia and the United States revealed in January that in early 2006 they had arrested a Russian man attempting to sell 100 grams of weapons-grade uranium. The seizure was one of the largest of its kind and raised questions about the security of nuclear stockpiles in the region.

A joint Georgian-CIA operation nabbed Oleg Khinsagov in Tbilisi along with several Georgian accomplices. The sting was set up after Georgian authorities discovered extensive smuggling operations in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“When we sent buyers, the channels through Abkhazia and South Ossetia began to expand, and we started seeing a huge flow of materials…. Sometimes it was low-grade enriched materials, but this was the first instance of highly enriched material,” Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili told the Associated Press.

Khinsagov was carrying a plastic bag full of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in his jacket pocket. “He was offering this as the first stage in a deal and said he had other pieces,” Merabishvili said. “We don’t know if that was true,” he added. Georgian authorities sentenced Khinsagov to eight to 10 years in prison.

Efforts to discover the origin of the HEU have been hampered by squabbling between Russia and Georgia. Georgia gave a sample of the smuggled material to Russia for analysis but Russia’s Scientific Research Institute of Non-Organic Materials called the quantity of the sample “insignificant.” Only a few grams of HEU are needed to perform a full forensic analysis, however.

The Russian prosecutor-general is considering an inquiry.

Georgian and Russian officials blame each other for not being fully forthcoming. Tensions have been high since President Mikheil Saakashvili was elected in 2004 on a pro-U.S. platform. His election exacerbated disagreements over the stationing of Russian troops in border regions. (See ACT, January/February 2007. )

In a related development, the United States and Georgia signed a deal in February 2007 to increase cooperation in preventing nuclear smuggling. The agreement will facilitate information sharing between U.S. and Georgian offices, train Georgian experts, adequately store discovered radioactive substances, and increase border patrols.

The United States has already provided similar assistance to Russia to prevent nuclear smuggling.

Bush Cuts Threat Reduction Budget

Daniel Arnaudo

President George W. Bush’s 2008 fiscal year budget request calls for more cuts in programs related to nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union, although some individual threat reduction programs would see gains or maintain funding.

Some proposed reductions reflect the winding down or closure of programs, while other cuts may reflect a shift in priorities away from traditional U.S.-Russian programs such as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) to more regional or international programs.

Department of Defense

Money requested for the CTR program in the Department of Defense budget is down again this year to $348 million. The $24 million reduction for fiscal year 2008 follows a $44 million cut the previous year. The CTR program seeks to better control the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) complex in the former Soviet Union by securing chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities and finding employment for former weapons scientists and technicians.

The Pentagon budget would increase spending by $75 million in fiscal year 2008 for biological threat reduction efforts, including securing pathogens and facilities and setting up monitoring equipment for border posts and customs. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), however, said he plans to offer an amendment to increase funding for biological weapons nonproliferation by $100 million. If approved, this would bring overall spending to $244 million in the next fiscal year.

Nonetheless, in a Jan. 25 interview with Inside the Pentagon, Rep. John Spratt (D-S.C.), a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, said broader increases for CTR funding were unlikely. Spratt said that although he wanted to see increased funding for securing fissile material and a more “rigid” scheme of accounting for sites in Russia and the United States, “I don’t think the budget will come to us…with enough money in [in it] to do these extra things.” He said he would work to find an offset for increased funding of nuclear nonproliferation activities but would not take it out of funding for the war in Iraq or other essential activities.

Indeed, money proposed for the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program was down to $23 million for fiscal year 2008, a decrease of $64 million from current spending. This reflects the completion of a number of significant upgrades to Russian facilities and a shift to maintenance.

No funds were requested for the chemical weapons destruction program in fiscal year 2008. Although work on the weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye in Russia is still unfinished, the program is scheduled to end this year. Independent experts estimate the facility needs at least another $200 million to be completed.

The Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program, on the other hand, is slated to receive $38 million for fiscal year 2008, a $5 million increase over the current spending. This will help to transport 48 trainloads of nuclear warheads to more secure facilities for storage and dismantlement.

The administration also requested a $2 million increase in funding for the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program. The $78 million in funds requested for fiscal year 2008 would be used to carry out such tasks as eliminating 65 ICBMs, defueling and storing another 20 ICBMs, and decommissioning or eliminating 44 ICBM silos.

The request for the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative to create better monitoring facilities on the borders of former non-Russian Soviet states was slightly higher than the previous year, at $38 million.

Department of Energy

The administration’s fiscal year 2008 budget request for a number of Department of Energy nonproliferation programs would also be below current spending. The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMP&C) program was cut by $41 million to $372 million.

The INMP&C program works to secure the former Soviet nuclear complex, both personnel and material. Part of its funding is dedicated to goals agreed to in a 2005 joint statement between Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bratislava. The Energy Department has explained that the decreases reflect completion of many of the upgrades.

The Energy Department cut $40 million out of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and 12th Main Directorate program, citing contractor and technical access problems as well as poor weather conditions. The program seeks to secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons usable materials at SRF and 12th Main Directorate sites in Russia. The Bush administration also indicated that it projects further large cuts in funding to programs in “closed” Russian cities once dedicated to designing and testing nuclear weapons. In 2005 at Bratislava, however, the United States promised to continue to support such programs.

The Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program also will receive less funding this year as its projects in Russia continue to wind down. Some $182 million is requested for fiscal year 2008, down $25 million from current spending. The projects were created to replace Russian plutonium reactors with generators powered by fossil fuels at Severnsk and Zhelenznogorsk. They are on schedule to be completed by fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2011, respectively.

Funding for the Russian Fissile Materials Disposition program will be cut to zero for fiscal year 2008. This comes after a dispute over Moscow’s refusal to pay for a mixed-oxide fuel-fabrication facility. This refusal angered Congress and halted the program, which converts weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for civilian nuclear reactors. The greater Fissile Materials Disposition program, which focuses on cutting stockpiles in the United States through similar techniques, was slightly increased to $609 million after the Senate concluded it was still worthwhile.

By contrast, funding for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) continues to increase, up $13 million to $119 million. The program works to reduce and protect nuclear and radiological material internationally.

Department of State

The administration requested $464 million for the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs line item in the Department of State’s budget. Funding for all of the subprograms within this section devoted to nonproliferation were down, something that was noted by Sens. Barack Obama (D-Ill.) and Lugar in a Feb. 8 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Export Controls and Border Related Security was set at $41 million, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund at $30 million, and the Global Threat Reduction Program, formerly the Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise Program, is presently allocated $53.5 million.

Obama in particular took issue with the cuts, saying that these are “modest, but cuts nevertheless.” He added, “Now, I recognize that budgets are about priorities, but given how important, potentially, interdiction and some of these other programs are, you know, I’d like to see us at least stay constant…not go backwards.”

In response, Rice, while noting that these programs may be in less demand than in past, said, “I don’t think that we want to be complacent, and obviously we’ll keep examining it.” The administration, however, requested a $36 million increase for small arms and light weapons destruction activities globally. This proposed boost would raise future spending to $44.7 million.

President George W. Bush’s 2008 fiscal year budget request calls for more cuts in programs related to nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union, although some individual threat reduction programs would see gains or maintain funding.

House Approves Nonproliferation Initiatives

Miles A. Pomper

The House of Representatives approved several nonproliferation initiatives in January as part of a broader bill to fully implement the recommendations of an independent commission that investigated the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Implementing a campaign pledge of new Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), the House approved the measure 299-128 on Jan. 9 in one of the first pieces of legislation of the new Democratic-controlled Congress. Congressional aides said that they expect the measure eventually to be reconciled in a House-Senate conference committee with similarly broad legislation approved Feb. 15 by the Senate Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security Committee.

The 9/11 Commission, formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, had warned in 2004 that “the greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States” comes from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (See ACT, September 2004. )

Key provisions in the House bill would lift legal roadblocks to providing aid to Russia and other former Soviet states to safeguard or destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons stockpiles as well as associated delivery vehicles and facilities; create a White House office to coordinate U.S. efforts to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism as well as establish an independent commission guiding U.S efforts; and seek to use sanctions and foreign aid to prevent the emergence of new black market nuclear networks.

The House bill would overturn long-standing requirements that bar the disbursement of threat reduction monies unless the president annually certifies that former Soviet states receiving the aid are committed to meeting several criteria, including compliance with all arms control agreements. In December 2005, Congress granted the president permanent authority to annually waive those restrictions but stopped short of eliminating them outright. (See ACT, January/February 2006. )

The certification requirement became a major hurdle to threat reduction activities in Russia and other former Soviet states in 2002 when President George W. Bush refused to certify Russia’s commitment to complying with treaties banning chemical and biological weapons. That refusal, the first since the program began in 1991, triggered a freeze of some threat reduction funds, stalling projects aimed at securing and dismantling surplus weapons and their fabrication facilities.

The bill included another provision that would create a new Senate-confirmed White House coordinator of efforts to counter the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, particularly to terrorist groups.

Democrats have long campaigned for such a coordinator, saying that greater coherence needs to be brought to scattered efforts across the government. But the idea has won little support from the White House itself, which sees it as simply adding additional bureaucracy. Moreover, budget authority for individual programs would still remain with the relevant agencies.

In a related provision, the measure would establish a nine-member independent commission to assess the current initiatives in this area and recommend steps for moving forward.

A newer initiative included in the bill seeks to prevent the recurrence of black market nuclear networks like the one fashioned by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan’s network is said to have provided technology for enriching uranium to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

It would require the president to impose sanctions for the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing materials or technology to some non-nuclear-weapon states that did not have functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants as of Jan. 1, 2004. In particular, penalties would be required if the transfers went to states that did not have in force an additional protocol to their safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or had a nuclear weapons program. The most sweeping sanctions would include suspensions of arms licenses and foreign aid to countries that host such black market networks. However, these sanctions could be waived by the president.

Both uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel for plutonium can provide the fissile material for nuclear weapons. Additional protocols provide IAEA inspectors with greater authority to investigate allegations of undeclared weapons programs.

The passage of the nonproliferation provisions was a victory for Democrats, such as Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), who have unsuccessfully pushed similar legislation in the previous Republican-controlled Congress.

Tauscher told the House that, “[f]or too long, the Bush administration and their congressional allies have left nonproliferation on the back burner. The bill before us today provides the tools we need to fight the threat of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

Many Republicans, however, objected both to the broad scope of the bill and individual provisions. In particular, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sought to strip a provision that would encourage the Bush administration to seek UN Security Council authorization for its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The 2003 initiative launched by the United States aims to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction and related goods to terrorists and countries of proliferation concern.

“Giving the United Nations the ability to define what is permissible under the PSI will result in the imposition of unpredictable limitations, unpredictable conditions, and unpredictable interpretations and would result in a regulatory straightjacket overseen by the international bureaucracy,” Ros-Lehtinen said. “If this recommendation were followed, the PSI would be undermined.”

Democrats, however, countered that the provision was aimed at broadening international support for the PSI. The motion failed on a largely party-line vote of 198-230.

The House of Representatives approved several nonproliferation initiatives in January as part of a broader bill to fully implement the recommendations of an independent commission that investigated the September 11 terrorist attacks.

U.S. Funding for CTBTO Lags

Daryl G. Kimball

Accumulating shortfalls in the U.S. contribution to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) could slow its effort to complete a global monitoring network and conduct data analysis designed to detect and deter treaty violations, according to diplomats and congressional staff. The deficits are mounting even as that network recently scored some new successes in registering North Korea’s Oct. 9, 2006, nuclear test.

In fiscal year 2006, which ended Sept. 30, 2006, the Bush administration requested and Congress approved $14.4 million for the CTBTO, which was more than $6 million short of the $22 million assessed by the Vienna-based organization. A stopgap fiscal year 2007 spending bill approved by Congress in February set spending at the same levels, which meant it fell even further short of last year’s U.S. assessment of $23 million.

The Bush administration’s budget request for fiscal year 2008, which begins Oct. 1, calls for an $18 million U.S. contribution. Although closer to the CTBTO’s current-year assessment, it would still fall about $3 million short.

A few other, smaller states also are behind in their contribution to the CTBTO. The United States is the single largest contributor, however, making any funding shortage significant. The CTBTO’s budget for 2007 is $102 million.

The budgetary shortfalls could directly affect the CTBTO’s ability to complete construction and certify for use the remaining stations in the International Monitoring System (IMS), diplomats say.

“While it is difficult to understand how shortfalls in contributions from specific countries will affect the CTBTO, less money is less money,” said a senior diplomat based in Vienna. “The main victim will likely be the completion of the remaining IMS stations, as well as maintenance and recapitalization for some existing stations, some of which are nearly 10 years old,” the diplomat said.

The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) calls for the establishment of 321 monitoring stations to collect data worldwide and transmit them in real time to the International Data Center (IDC) in Vienna. When fully completed, the system will consist of 170 seismic, 60 infrasound, and 11 hydroacoustic stations capable of detecting tremors and waves caused by a nuclear explosion. The system will also include more than 80 radionuclide stations, supported by 16 analytical laboratories, to measure air samples for radioactive material associated with nuclear explosions.

The IMS stations and IDC analyses provide a baseline capability for detection that is augmented by national intelligence gathering techniques, as well as thousands of civilian seismic monitoring stations. Among the IMS stations yet to be completed are those in more remote regions, such as Turkmenistan, and those involving more sophisticated and expensive technologies.

According to the diplomat, “If this continues, the United States could also lose its voting rights sometime in 2008-2009, which depend on states-parties making their assessed contributions to the CTBTO.”

Under Article II of the CTBT, which the United States has signed but not ratified, “a member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two years.” CTBTO member states may make an exception if they believe the failure to pay is due to “conditions beyond the control of the member.”

IMS Assets Detect North Korean Test

Although only 60 percent of all IMS stations have been certified and are transmitting data, more than 10 of the IMS primary seismic stations detected the ground tremors produced by the Oct. 9, 2006, North Korean underground nuclear test explosion near P’unggye, according to the January 2007 newsletter of the CTBTO, Spectrum. The North Korean test blast was estimated by various national, international, and scientific monitors to be less than 1 kiloton (TNT equivalent) in yield. (See ACT, November 2006. )

More significantly, one of 10 experimental “noble gas” monitoring stations that are to be part of the IMS detected trace amounts of unique radioactive material that confirmed the explosion was nuclear. The station, which is located near Yellowknife in Canada’s Northwest Territories, detected two spikes in xenon gas readings, on Oct. 22 and 25, which, on the basis of atmospheric modeling, were consistent with the North Korean test, according to diplomats from two countries who are familiar with the data.

On Oct. 11, 2006, U.S. national monitoring assets also detected “radioactive debris” that indicated the explosion was nuclear, according to a statement from the office of the U.S. director of national intelligence.

Out of the Valley: Advancing the Biological Weapons Convention After the 2006 Review Conference

Jez Littlewood

At 6:15 p.m. on Friday, Dec. 8, 2006, the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was brought to a close with smiles, handshakes, and the resounding applause of 103 delegations in Geneva. Less audible was a collective sigh of relief that the conference ended amicably, unlike its predecessor five years ago. Without opening up old wounds, states-parties reached an agreement that reaffirmed the basic prohibitions against biological weapons and endorsed decisions on further work to strengthen implementation of the convention.

The outcome of the conference, which had begun three weeks earlier, unequivocally signaled for more than 100 states that biological weapons remain illegitimate and illegal. Triumphant, the president of the conference, Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, said that, “without any exaggeration, this is a historic moment, both for the Biological Weapons Convention and for multilateral security and disarmament.”[1]

Nongovernmental observers were more circumspect, referring to the outcome as a “modest success” at best.[2] Others went further, noting that “the set of accomplishments was meager and far from commensurate with the gravity and urgency of the biological weapons threat.”[3] Even The Economist reflected that it is both a puzzle and a worry that the bar for measuring progress in the BWC has dropped so low, given the scale of scientific developments relevant to biological weapons and the threat of terrorism.[4]

These divergent assessments reflect differing expectations for the review conference and, more fundamentally, differing perceptions of what such a conference can actually do to counter the biological weapons threat. A review conference does not solve problems; if successful, it lays the ground for additional work in a wide variety of areas to address difficulties. This review conference, by healing past wounds and opening up channels for discussion, has created new opportunities for more progress. The key question for the outcome of this conference is not a debate over whether the outcome should be judged a “modest” or “historic” success, but whether states-parties and civil society will take advantage of the opportunities created between now and 2011.

Successes of the Review Conference

The review conference scored some tangible achievements.[5] The obvious successes include the establishment of an implementation support unit to provide administrative and other support to facilitate implementation of the convention as well as an agreement on a work program from 2007 to 2010 to advance the convention. Member-states also pledged greater efforts to achieve universal adherence to the convention, which would require 16 signatories and 24 non-states-parties to join the 155 states that have signaled their rejection of biological weapons under any circumstances.[6]

Just as important, however, agreement was reached in other areas critical to the day-to-day management of biological disarmament. These include the reaffirmation that the use of biological or toxin weapons is effectively a violation of the convention and a clear statement against terrorism and any terrorist use of biological weapons. Linked to these was a renewed signal from the states-parties to provide support and assistance to each other in the event of biological weapons use, regardless of such use being by another state-party, a state not party to the convention, or a nonstate actor such as a terrorist group. The reaffirmation of the scope of the convention’s prohibitions and its application to all scientific and technological developments is also not insignificant. There was continued emphasis on the requirement for effective national implementation efforts, including export controls and penal legislation to implement the BWC. Small but potentially important successes can also be found in the call for the establishment of national points of contact in each state-party to facilitate communication and coordination of efforts and in the acknowledgement of the need to increase the quality and quantity of submissions under the annual confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Finally, the states-parties recognized the convention does not stand alone as a bulwark against biological weapons but is supported by other international agreements and regional and international organizations. States, therefore, endorsed other steps taken to raise the bar against the acquisition or use of biological weapons. These steps included bolstering public health capabilities to cope with possible deliberate biological weapons attacks, enhancing biodefense efforts, and strengthening supply-side controls on materials and equipment that could be used for biological weapons.

This list of tangible achievements is neither short nor without substance. Still, the degree of success in reaching agreement on these decisions in 2006 will and should be judged not by the actual words in the final declaration, but the extent to which these decisions and recommendations are implemented between now and the seventh review conference in 2011.

Moreover, the conference did not achieve everything it might have. Issues that were politically contentious or offered little chance of agreement were sidestepped. The degree to which this matters is open to interpretation. For some states-parties, however, and many nongovernmental observers, issues such as verification, biodefense programs, transparency, and the scale of scientific developments relevant to the convention are important.[7]

The question of verification is perhaps the most obvious failure. The prospect of a verification mechanism for the convention still enthralls some states-parties, appalls others, and is used adeptly by still others for political gains. Residual concerns about the possibility of a standoff between those states-parties that feel strongest about verification proved unfounded. It is clear to any observer that a number of states-parties remain committed in principle to the idea of developing a verification mechanism for the convention. Some, such as the members of the European Union, remain committed to the idea “in the long term.”[8] Others, such as the members of the Nonaligned Movement, reiterated their conviction that a legally binding, multilaterally negotiated, and nondiscriminatory agreement was the only sustainable way to strengthen the convention.[9] Still others noted their views that some kind of verification or compliance framework retained their support. None, however, turned verification into the issue of 2006. Thus, although the idea of verification is far from dead in the BWC, it lacks political viability. Indeed, the concept of verification of the convention received its most vocal support from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rather than states-parties.

Those for whom verification of the BWC is a serious long-term objective need new thinking on how that might be made to work. Fortunately, such thinking has already begun. Some scholars have put forward fresh ideas on governing technology. Others have challenged the twin poles of the conventional argument about verifiability, that either the BWC is “inherently unverifiable” or that verification of the convention will automatically flow from a return to negotiations in Geneva.[10]

Still, such thinking has yet to mature, and it has not filtered down to all states-parties. Thus, verification in the BWC context is now a project that will take at least a decade, if not an additional quarter-century, to reach fruition, if it ever can.

Enhancing transparency of biodefense work and scientific research and development that might be particularly applicable to offensive biological weapons programs also did not receive the kind of attention for which outside observers might have wished. Detailed debates and discussions on subjects such as global biosecurity standards, international oversight of potentially contentious research, or the need for specific codes of conduct for biodefense scientists are not suited to the work of review conferences. Discussions on these issues are highly technical, politically complex, and take time to mature in the international diplomatic arena. If detailed debates on these issues had been attempted, the differences of opinion and the strength of those differences would have posed significant risks to reaching any outcome. External observers may perceive the failure to address these kinds of issues in detail as a serious shortcoming, but political realities dictate what is possible. If such debates are to be had within the context of the BWC, the groundwork for them will have to be laid out very carefully. Indeed, these debates might be more fruitfully held outside the convention.

Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming of the conference was the lack of detailed agreement for enhancing existing transparency mechanisms, such as CBMs. In the run-up to the review conference, there were hopes among civil society and within some states-parties for a revitalization of the CBMs.[11]

As the conference drew near, however, the many different views on CBMs held by states-parties presented clear signals that any agreement to go beyond their existing scope and modalities would be hard won. More than 45 states-parties indicated their preference to undertake some work on CBMs, but others believed that after 20 years a fundamental review of their operation was required before new, additional, or revised CBMs could be devised.[12] In simple terms, a four-way stalemate developed among states-parties in favor of new and increased commitments, states-parties in favor only of existing or even fewer CBM commitments, states-parties in favor of a fundamental review of CBMs before any new decisions were taken, and states-parties in favor of addressing only technical and procedural issues. Such differences of opinion meant very little substantive work on CBMs could occur at the review conference.

More important in some ways than tangible achievements or failures was the intangible outcome, the psychological effect that the perceived success of the review conference will have on states-parties. In the run-up to the conference, the states-parties were in a metaphorical valley. Behind them lay the failure of 2001 and the verification protocol that cast its shadow over all work undertaken since then. Before them lay the mountain they had to climb to escape this shadow: the sixth review conference. Failure in 2006 would have further undermined confidence in the ability of states-parties collectively to address any of the problems with the convention. With this in mind, those states-parties that undertook some planning for the outcome did so with an eye on what was achievable rather than what was ideal. The steps forward may appear to be small or even inconsequential, but they were chosen carefully and after much deliberation.

As a result, any successful outcome was always going to be modest. There was never going to be a great leap of faith or an attempt to resolve known differences about the past. Now that the conference has passed, states-parties are freer to consider much broader issues, including those that remain politically contentious. The impact of such freedom may not be felt immediately, but new ideas for the BWC will begin to enter into play in the next few years.

Some of this new thinking will emerge organically as the program of work takes shape. Between 2003 and 2005, the codes of conduct debate blossomed beyond all expectations, yet its impact was not solely in the BWC context but in the sense of responsibility it injected into life scientists and the constructive debate between scientific communities and states-parties it engendered. Under the new work program, the discussions on peaceful cooperation offer the opportunity to move beyond rhetoric and platitudes about the relationship between disarmament and development and engage in some substantive discussions. Likewise, the question of assistance and support may open the door to progress on the issue of investigating incidents of noncompliance or violations of the convention. It is highly unlikely that states-parties will agree to new undertakings or additional understandings to provide assistance and support or protection in the event of biological weapons use without also finding a better means of investigating the perpetrators of such acts and bringing them to account for their actions.

Equally, the broad nongovernmental community and civil society actors may find a new lease of life in contributing to efforts by states-parties. For example, an international agreement or lack thereof does not present the largest obstacle to verification. Rather, it is a willingness to think about what verification of biological disarmament actually entails that is missing from many of the civil society and NGO debates. The undertakings in the convention are national undertakings within an international agreement. Compliance with the BWC is the responsibility of each state-party, and verification of compliance ought therefore to begin at home. The final declaration of 2006 includes a number of action points, from establishing points of contact to the submission of CBMs, from maintaining effective national implementation measures to promoting universal adherence by those 40 states that retain the option of biological weapons in their armories. The final declaration, along with its predecessors, is not a complete checklist, but a blueprint exists for what states-parties are expected to do to implement this convention. The expectations for implementation have been set by states-parties; are they going to meet them between now and 2011? Assessing what is being done and how does not rely on an internationally negotiated multilateral framework but on questioning national governments and inculcating a culture of demonstrating compliance through national transparency and action. There is plenty of scope to begin making each state more accountable for and transparent in its undertakings without a verification protocol modeled on Cold War arms control.

Those interested in seeing the global biological disarmament regime strengthened need to consider what it actually means, how it is managed in the real world, and where further work is still required. Space and time for thinking and action has now been created by the outcome of the sixth review conference. Whether that freedom is used creatively and to maximum effect or to rerun old debates that offer little prospect of resolution remains to be seen.

So What Does the Outcome Mean?

Contrary to some observations, the BWC is not in crisis. The convention is not about to break down, and its provisions have not been openly violated by any state. Furthermore, no state-party is threatening to withdraw from the convention. Although the United States continues to identify some, but not all, states it believes are in noncompliance with their obligations, the United States is not alone in its compliance concerns, even if it is the only one to publicly voice them. Despite this, the convention is not prone to collapse under the weight of unresolved noncompliance allegations. The scope of the convention is also not in doubt as there is agreement that the BWC covers all biological and toxin weapons, and its basic prohibitions are comprehensive enough to include all relevant scientific and technological developments regardless of the field of science from which they emerge.

Still, more work is required on actual implementation mechanisms, how to increase the quality and quantity of existing transparency mechanisms, and efforts to share information to demonstrate compliance with all obligations under the BWC.

The outcome of 2006 reflects what was possible at this conference. There is a danger with all review conferences of international conventions, not just the BWC, that such meetings become overburdened with issues, expectations, and demands. Review conferences, however, are a discrete form of international diplomacy. Their task is to review the operation of the agreement to ensure its purposes are being met. If the purposes of the agreement are not being met, then the task at hand is to attempt to reach agreement on collective actions that will steer implementation of the convention back on track. The task of a review conference is not to resolve all known problems, rectify all the deficiencies, remold the agreement every five years, or necessarily to increase or decrease the number of legally or politically binding obligations undertaken by states-parties. Just as an unsuccessful review conference does not signal the demise of a treaty, a successful review conference does not signal the fulfillment of all the treaty’s obligations or agreement on all known differences. To expect solutions to all known problems is to be wildly optimistic.

At its core, the sixth review conference was about putting past disputes behind the states-parties and laying the groundwork for further work to strengthen the anti-biological weapons regime. The BWC is the foundation of that work, and in 2006 those foundations were strengthened. The outcome creates both a political climate that can be wisely exploited and the conditions for additional work against biological weapons for the future gain of all. It is also an outcome that reflects the minimal expectations for implementation of the BWC between now and 2011 for 155 states-parties. The outcome may be modest, but it is a base from which to conduct more work collectively and not a ceiling or a proscribed limitation on what each state-party might do to implement the convention. Each state-party can go farther, do more, and undertake additional actions to strengthen the BWC over the next five years, and it can do so nationally, with its neighbors, with its allies, in concert with others, and with its BWC partners.

 

Another Pendulum Swing?

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force in 1975, and perceptions of the usefulness of the convention have oscillated between seeing it as a beacon of multilateral arms control and viewing it as irrelevant.[1] The last two decades have seen particularly significant shifts in international perceptions of the treaty.

During the 1990s, states-parties attempted to develop a legally binding compliance protocol to strengthen the convention.[2] In 2001 this effort fell apart. That failure, along with the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the later anthrax attacks led certain governments and sections of civil society to damn the convention as weak, ineffective, and out of step with the demands of the contemporary security environment.[3] The result was a widespread view that “something must be done” to enhance efforts at preventing biological weapons use. Disagreement on what that something was and how it was to be done resulted in very different political and practical approaches to bolstering the convention.

Some, such as the United States, believed that efforts to prevent the use of biological weapons had to be undertaken outside the convention through activities such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. Others, such as the hard-line members of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), believed that the events in 2001 underlined the need to return to multilateral negotiations on a compliance protocol without delay. A third group, including European countries, moderate NAM members, Australia, and New Zealand, favored a less-ideological approach to countering biological weapons that sought to make use of national and multilateral efforts, as well as everything in between.

The third group carried the day. The political fallout of 2001 was patched over in 2002 at the resumed session of the fifth review conference. An agreement laid out a work program over three years (2003 to 2005) on five topics, with the outcome of that work program to be considered in 2006 at the sixth review conference.[4]

During the intervening period, the work program, which began with very low expectations, developed into a serious and useful forum for considering how the convention should be implemented and which mechanisms had to be adopted by states-parties to fulfill their obligations. The success of the work program was such that, at the recent review conference, states agreed to a similar program for the next five years.[5]

International efforts also continued external to the convention. In 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, requiring all states to take efforts to prevent biological and other weapons from falling into the hands of terrorist groups. In 2006 the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy, which, inter alia, encouraged the secretary-general to improve the mechanism for investigating alleged use of biological and chemical weapons.[6]

Moreover, threat perceptions have changed. Although some nonstate actors have openly claimed biological weapons capabilities and threatened to use them,[7] fears of terrorists using sophisticated biological weapons have shifted from worst-case scenarios to a more measured assessment of the threat such groups posed in the immediate future.[8] Moreover, states do not appear to have taken advantage of perceived weaknesses in the BWC and recent scientific and technological developments by bolstering their armories with new weapons. Indeed, no state, whether party or not to the BWC, openly boasts of an offensive biological weapons program. The norm against state use of biological weapons and the legal embodiment of that norm, the BWC, are strong.[9]

Amid these changes, by early 2006 it was clear that a successful outcome to the sixth review conference was possible through agreement on a modest final document that aimed to consolidate the convention as the basis for action against biological weapons across a broad front.[10]

 


ENDNOTES

1. “Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction: Final Document,” BWC/CONF.II/SR.3, September 18, 1986, p. 6; Douglas J. Feith, “Biological Weapons & the Limits of Arms Control,” The International Interest, Winter 1986/87, p. 39; Iris S. Portny, “U.S. to Oppose Efforts to Change Biological, Toxin Weapons Treaty,” Washington Times, June 9, 1986.

2. Jez Littlewood, The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution ( Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).

3. For the views of states-parties in 2001, see Graham S. Pearson, “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Report From Geneva,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 54 (December 2001), pp. 13-26; John R. Bolton, Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons Convention RevCon Meeting, Geneva, November 19, 2001; The Royal Society, “Controls of Biological Weapons Critically Weakened,” January 19, 2004 (media release); Carolyn M. Leddy, Remarks to “Future Measures for Strengthening the BWC Regime,” Tokyo, February 14, 2006.

4. “Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction: Final Document,” BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002, pp. 3-4.

5. “Council Common Position 2006/242/CFSP of 20 March 2006 Relating to the 2006 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention” (hereinafter March 2006 EU Common Position); “Intervention of Canada on Behalf of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention Preparatory Committee,” April 26-28, 2006 (hereinafter April 2006 Canada intervention); “Joint Declaration, Preparatory Committee for the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,” April 26, 2006 (hereinafter April 2006 joint declaration.)

6. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/288, September 2006.

7. Julie Stahl, “Palestinian Threat to Use Biological, Chemical Weapons Just a Bluff, Expert Says,” CNSNews.com, June 26, 2006.

8. Milton Leitenberg, “Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat,” U.S. Army War College, 2005; Malcolm Dando, “The Bioterrorist Cookbook,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2005.

9. John C. Rood, Remarks to the Sixth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Geneva, November 20, 2006.

10. See March 2006 EU Common Position; April 2006 Canada intervention; April 2006 joint declaration.

 

 


Jez Littlewood is a research fellow at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, and a research associate at the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. Since 2005 he has been a part-time adviser on the Biological Weapons Convention to the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit of the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office. He is author of The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution (2005). The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.


ENDNOTES

1. Ambassador Masood Khan, “Closing Remarks of Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, President of the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention,” Geneva, December 8, 2006.

2. Alan Pearson, “Modest Progress at the Sixth Review Conference,” BWC Observer, December 11, 2006.

3. “The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention: Success or Failure? An Interview With Jonathan B. Tucker,” CNS Research, January 4, 2007.

4. “Can the Line Against Bio-Terror Hold?” The Economist, December 16-22, 2006, pp. 60-61.

5. “Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,” BWC/CONF.VI/6, Geneva, December 8, 2006.

6. Oliver Meier, “States Strengthen Biological Weapons Convention” Arms Control Today, January/February 2007, pp. 27-29.

7. See Trevor Findlay, “Verification of the BWC: Last Gasp or Signs of Life?” Arms Control Today, September 2006, pp. 12-16; Roger Roffey et al., “Crucial Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists,” Arms Control Today, September 2006, pp. 17-20; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens: The Need for Global Biosecurity Standards,” Arms Control Today, June 2003, pp. 3-10; Christopher F. Chyba, “Biotechnology and the Challenge to Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, October 2006, pp. 11-17.

8. “European Union Council Common Position 2006/242/CFSP of 20 March 2006 Relating to the 2006 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.”

9. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Juan Antonio Fernández Palacios, Permanent Representative of Cuba, on Behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention at the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC,” Geneva, November 20, 2006.

10. Findlay, “Verification of the BWC”; Chyba, “Biotechnology and the Challenge to Arms Control.”

11. “Meeting the Challenges of Reviewing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Summary Report,” The Geneva Forum, March 2006; Nicholas Isla and Iris Hunger, “Building Transparency Through Confidence Building Measures” Arms Control Today, July/August 2006, pp. 19-25; “A New Strategy: Strengthening the Biological Weapons Regime Through Modular Mechanisms,” Verification Matters: VERTIC Research Reports, No. 6 (October 2006).

12. For a range of different views on confidence-building measures made public at the sixth review conference, see the opening statements by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, India, South Africa, and Russia, which are available at www.unog.ch.

Bush Seeks Budget Boost for Future Warhead

Wade Boese

The Bush administration wants lawmakers this year to nearly quintuple spending on what it claims will be the prototype future U.S. nuclear warhead. But as of the end of February, Congress was waiting on the administration to choose between two competing prototype designs.

Initiated in 2004, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program has emerged as the centerpiece of the administration’s proposed overhaul of the complex maintaining the U.S. inventory of approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads. The long-term goal, administration officials say, is to elevate warhead production capabilities while cutting actual warhead numbers. Current plans call for nearly halving the arsenal by 2012. (See ACT, July/August 2004. )

The RRW program fits into the administration’s plan for a simple warhead that the revamped weapons enterprise ostensibly could produce quickly and maintain easily and safely. Proponents claim the minimalist nature of RRW warheads also would eliminate any need to test them, but skeptics doubt Congress and the military will ultimately accept swapping proven warheads for untested ones.

The United States stopped nuclear testing in 1992, and Congress has established that it wants the RRW program to avoid sparking a revival. Some lawmakers, such as House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chair Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), have floated linking support for the RRW program to U.S. ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the Senate rejected in October 1999 and the Bush administration opposes.

Warheads are currently validated through surveillance and refurbishment efforts under the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. RRW proponents assert, however, that as time passes and changes accumulate, the risk grows that warhead performance might diminish.

Still, the administration recently reported in its Feb. 5 fiscal year 2008 budget request documents that “Stockpile Stewardship is working…the stockpile remains safe and reliable.” Recent studies also have concluded that plutonium, the material at the core of each U.S. bomb, may last as long as a century without degrading the warhead. (See ACT, January/February 2007. )

In its proposed budget, the administration is seeking $6.5 billion in nuclear weapons spending. This total, which is about $100 million more than current spending, would continue the current stewardship approach while ramping up the RRW process and the overhaul of the complex, which is dubbed Complex 2030 for the year it is to be realized.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency of the Department of Energy, administers U.S. nuclear weapons spending. The latest annual budget request is for the year beginning Oct. 1.

The RRW program is receiving $25 million in the current fiscal year expiring Sept. 30, but the proposed NNSA budget would increase funding to about $89 million. The Navy also is seeking $30 million to support the RRW program.

The first warhead that the RRW program is slated to replace is the W76 warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In principle, RRW models are supposed to replicate the capabilities and purposes of the warheads they replace, but NNSA officials say the program eventually could tailor bombs for new missions.

The administration projects direct costs for the RRW program climbing each year and eventually reaching $179 million in fiscal year 2012. The NNSA is seeking to have the first warhead of the series available that year or 2014 at the latest. The agency hopes to begin full-scale RRW production by 2025.

The Nuclear Weapons Council, comprised of officials from the NNSA and the Pentagon, had fallen months behind in announcing which RRW design it intends to build. The Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos nuclear laboratories both submitted designs last spring for a scheduled decision last fall.

Reports suggest that the council had endorsed a hybrid of the two proposals but had not convinced all the stakeholders of that approach. Nonetheless, the proposed budget contains funds to “conduct a conceptual study for additional RRW options.”

While the NNSA is seeking to jump-start work on future warheads, the agency has fallen far behind on disassembling retired warheads. If the agency achieves its proclaimed goal of accelerating such work, the dismantlement backlog will not be eliminated until nearly 2024. The NNSA said this work is important because “reducing the total number of U.S. nuclear warheads sends a clear message to the world that critical modernization programs such as [the] RRW [program] do not signal a return to the arms race of the Cold War.”

Slightly more than $52 million is budgeted for dismantlement, which is roughly $22 million below last year’s request. The NNSA says this reduction still squares with the aim of boosting future work because the “upfront costs” of hiring additional people and procuring new equipment for that effort occurred this year.

For warheads remaining in the inventory, the NNSA is seeking $1.4 billion in directed stockpile funding to maintain them and extend their lifespan. The submarine-launched W76 is slated for the largest slice of this spending, at nearly $245 million.

The NNSA requested money for two new programs to help prevent or respond to a nuclear attack against the United States. One program, for $16 million, would seek to develop technologies to allow relatively inexperienced teams of first responders to be able to isolate and stabilize a detected nuclear or radiological threat. Another $12 million would be devoted to establishing a National Technical Nuclear Forensics program to enable the identification and sourcing of material in a nuclear device both pre- and post-detonation. (See ACT, October 2006. )

The agency has not yet calculated the future costs of implementing its Complex 2030 vision. It contends that the overhaul will ultimately save money because the number of facilities, staff, and weapons will shrink, as will the security costs of protecting nuclear materials consolidated at fewer sites. Although the NNSA says it will maintain all eight sites of the existing complex, the NNSA asserted Jan. 31 that each location “would look much different than today” and the entire complex would require one-quarter or one-third less personnel.

Still, some lawmakers have questioned whether the administration’s makeover is ambitious enough for what they contend is a bloated, outdated, and wasteful weapons enterprise. Chief among these gadflies has been Rep. David Hobson (R-Ohio), who had been serving as the chairman of the House Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, which takes the lead on determining funding for the weapons complex. If the NNSA had been hoping for some relief with the Democratic election victory last fall, it may be disappointed. The new chairman, Rep. Pete Visclosky (D-Ind.), shares views similar to Hobson.

Déjà Vu All Over Again

Daryl G. Kimball

The Cold War may be over, but the nuclear-armed missiles and suspicions remain. Now, Washington’s plan to deploy ground-based missile interceptors in the former Eastern Bloc—coupled with the expansion of NATO and the Bush administration’s resistance to further offensive nuclear reductions—are increasing Moscow’s anxieties about U.S. strategic missile capabilities.

U.S. officials say their anti-missile systems are designed to deal with a potential Iranian missile force not Russia’s. They correctly note that even if 10 U.S.-controlled missile interceptors are eventually stationed in Poland, Russia’s missiles could overwhelm and evade the defenses with far cheaper countermeasures.

Rather than simply dismiss Russia’s complaints as an overreaction, U.S. and European leaders should engage Russia in a broad strategic dialogue and negotiate further, verifiable reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. If the situation is mishandled, it could revive dormant tensions and instability.

Recent signs do not bode well. Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his military leaders said a European-based anti-missile system could trigger a new arms race and lead Moscow to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. That pact led to the elimination of more than 2,600 U.S. and Soviet short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles, and with the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), helped thaw the Cold War confrontation less than a generation ago.

The commander of Russia’s strategic forces also bluntly warned Poland and the Czech Republic that if they host U.S. anti-missile systems on their soil, Russian forces would be “capable of having these installations as their targets.” U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice shot back, calling the comment “extremely unfortunate.” The Czech foreign minister accused Russia of “blackmail.”

It was not supposed to be this way. Five years ago when President George W. Bush unilaterally withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, he asserted that U.S. withdrawal would not “in any way undermine our new relationship or Russian security.” Putin resisted the move but could do little to stop it. To save face, Putin successfully pressed Bush to codify planned reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, which led to the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).

But SORT, unlike previous agreements, provides far too little predictability and transparency. SORT obliges Russia and the United States to reduce their respective deployed strategic warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 2012, but the warhead limit expires the day it enters into force, allows each side to retain thousands of nondeployed reserve warheads and delivery systems, and provides no new monitoring or verification mechanisms.

The approach gives U.S. defense planners the flexibility to reconstitute a larger nuclear force and utilize leftover strategic nuclear delivery systems for conventional strike missions. Having discarded the ABM Treaty, the Bush administration rushed to deploy rudimentary ground-based missile interceptors in Alaska beginning in 2004. It wants to deploy a similar system in Europe around 2011. Russia, which is no longer able to maintain parity, sees these combined developments as a threat to its shrinking nuclear strike force. Making matters worse for both sides, START is due to expire at the end of 2009, and with it the verification provisions that U.S. strategic forces commander General James Cartwright has said promote transparency and stability.

It was in this context that on June 27, 2006, Putin called for the resumption of the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear dialogue. Unfortunately, U.S. officials rejected Russia’s September proposal for expert-level talks. Without the transparency and limits of START and INF Treaty, the United States and Russia risk returning to the distrust, worst-case assumptions, and arms competition of the past.

Now, Bush is asking Congress for $225 million for fiscal year 2008 to begin building the anti-missile system in Europe. Lawmakers should reject the project, which can’t work effectively, is intended to counter a potential Iranian missile threat that is still years away, and would undermine other risk reduction priorities.

Congress should also call on the White House to pursue talks with the Kremlin to preserve the INF Treaty and START verification provisions, and to accelerate the drawdown of the still massive and dangerous U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons stockpiles. Thousands of these warheads remain on high alert. Withdrawal of the 400-some U.S. short-range nuclear weapons in Europe could spur cuts in Russia’s far larger arsenal of these smaller and more portable nuclear weapons, which remain high-value targets for terrorists and a threat to everyone.

Russia ’s cynical rhetoric should not be seen as an invitation to confrontation so much as a reminder that there has not been enough meaningful cooperation. Given the long history of U.S.-Russian nuclear rivalry and Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, U.S. and Russian leaders must extend the life of their existing arms control agreements and seek new reductions to reestablish trust and stability.

The Cold War may be over, but the nuclear-armed missiles and suspicions remain. Now, Washington’s plan to deploy ground-based missile interceptors in the former Eastern Bloc—coupled with the expansion of NATO and the Bush administration’s resistance to further offensive nuclear reductions—are increasing Moscow’s anxieties about U.S. strategic missile capabilities.

U.S. officials say their anti-missile systems are designed to deal with a potential Iranian missile force not Russia’s. They correctly note that even if 10 U.S.-controlled missile interceptors are eventually stationed in Poland, Russia’s missiles could overwhelm and evade the defenses with far cheaper countermeasures. (Continue)

Missile Defense Remains Budget Priority

Wade Boese

Anti-missile programs have been a consistent Bush administration funding favorite, and its recent budget request to Congress continues the trend. All told, the Pentagon is seeking approximately $10.8 billion for its various missile defense projects.

The full Department of Defense fiscal year 2008 spending submission equals $623 billion and is supposed to fund all military activities, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for the year beginning Oct. 1. But the Pentagon also asked lawmakers Feb. 5 for an extra $93 billion to bridge an estimated spending shortfall through Oct. 1, primarily to maintain ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Most of the proposed future missile defense funding is part of the $75 billion research, development, test, and evaluation portion of the Pentagon budget because many of the systems are works in progress. The task of readying them for action rests primarily with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

The MDA initially planned this year to ask for $9.3 billion, the same amount as last year’s budget request, but the Pentagon instructed the agency to shave $500 million. Still, the leftover $8.8 billion bid stands as the third largest ever for the MDA or its predecessors and accounts for roughly 80 percent of all proposed fiscal year 2008 missile defense spending.

About one-half of the MDA funds are dedicated to the agency’s three anti-missile systems undergoing or on the verge of deployment. The rudimentary, long-range Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) is allocated the largest slice of the budget, at $2.5 billion. The ship-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and the ground-mobile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) are allotted $1 billion and $858 million, respectively. These two systems are geared toward stopping short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles, but the MDA hopes ultimately to upgrade them to counter long-range missiles too.

The $2 billion in non-MDA missile defense spending is dispersed among the Air Force, Army, and Joint Staff. Almost one-half of this amount, $912.5 million, is on tap for the Army’s short- and medium-range ballistic missile defense system, the Patriot, which has a mixed battlefield record. (See ACT, November 2003. ) The Army intends to allocate nearly $473 million for purchasing 108 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors. By the end of this year, the Army PAC-3 inventory is projected to number some 540 interceptors.

The Air Force aims to spend $587 million for the Space-Based Infrared System-high (SBIRS-high) program and $231 million on the Alternative Infrared Space System. Both satellite constellations are intended to spot ballistic missile launches around the world. The Air Force initiated the second program last year because of concerns about the rising costs and technical viability of SBIRS, although its initial orbiting sensor is reportedly performing well.

The MDA hopes that one of the Air Force systems can eventually be paired with the MDA’s own nascent Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) to provide seamless and precise tracking of hostile ballistic missiles worldwide. The MDA is seeking $331.5 million for the program, which is supposed to launch two demonstration satellites this year. But the STSS also has been prone to delays. Indeed, the MDA reported in January that the launch of possible follow-on satellites to the first duo have slipped at least four years to 2016.

The MDA has touted SBIRS and the STSS as key data contributors to the agency’s signature GMD system. Under orders from President George W. Bush, the MDA fielded the first GMD interceptor in July 2004 despite the system’s sparse and spotty testing record. More than two years later, the MDA scored the first and, to date, only intercept of a target in flight using an interceptor model the same as those deployed. (See ACT, October 2006. )

As of the end of February, 14 GMD interceptors were emplaced in Alaska and another two stationed in California. The MDA aims to raise the total to roughly two dozen by the end of this year and up to 54 by 2011, including 10 in Europe.

Similarly, the MDA is looking to build up its sea-based component, the Aegis defense, which has scored seven hits in nine intercept tests. Seven warships are now outfitted with the Aegis missile defense engagement capability, and three more are supposed to join their ranks this year. The MDA envisions up to 18 vessels armed with a total of 83 interceptors sailing the world’s waters by 2011.

The MDA aims to add THAAD interceptors to the deployment mix by 2009. After experiencing a seven-year intercept testing hiatus, THAAD has hit targets in two recent experiments, the latest on Jan. 27. THAAD interceptors are designed to collide with enemy ballistic missiles as they descend toward the ground.

The agency also is trying to perfect two systems to counter missiles shortly after their launch, when they are still ascending. But both projects, the Airborne Laser (ABL) and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), pose significant engineering and technical challenges.

The MDA recently pushed back by a year to 2009 the first shoot-down attempt of a target in flight by the ABL aircraft, a modified Boeing 747 equipped with a powerful laser. This is six years later than originally scheduled.

Indeed, the Bush administration initiated the fast accelerating, ground-based KEI in 2003 as a possible ABL replacement. Now the KEI is experiencing similar problems. Its potential operational availability has moved back four years to 2014.

Still, the agency is currently standing by both programs. The MDA is seeking nearly $549 million for the ABL and $227.5 million for the KEI. MDA spokesperson Rick Lehner told Arms Control Today Feb. 20 that KEI bore much of the agency’s $500 million cut.

The other program primarily affected was the agency’s proposed space-based test bed. This project calls for deploying and testing by around 2012 a few satellites armed with interceptors. The MDA had slated $45 million for initiating work but slashed it to $10 million. Future annual funding is projected to climb to $124 million in fiscal year 2013.

The MDA nearly doubled funding this year for another futuristic effort, the Multiple Kill Vehicle. Slotted for $271 million, this program aims to develop kill vehicles small enough so several can fit on a single interceptor. This capability, which is supposed to be ready for flight by 2012, would lessen the requirement for satellites or interceptors to try and discriminate an actual warhead from any decoys or other countermeasures employed to confuse a defense.

Critics say that the MDA’s anti-missile systems, most notably the GMD, are vulnerable to decoys and countermeasures. They contend tests must be made more challenging by conducting them under greater real-world conditions and against more realistic targets.

The Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Pentagon’s independent weapons testing office, shares a similar view. In an annual survey of arms programs, the office recently described the U.S. missile defense capability as “very basic” but “increasing.” Although the office assessed the MDA as conducting “disciplined ground and flight testing,” it noted that the programs need “additional flight test data under stressing conditions…to increase confidence in the models, simulations, and assessment of system capability.”

At least one lawmaker, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), is almost certain to pay careful attention to the testing reporting. Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Levin has been critical of the Pentagon’s missile defense approach. “I think it’s a mistake to purchase all of the missiles before we know that they’re going to work,” he told reporters last November.

If Levin’s remarks are any indicator, the Bush administration may find its latest missile defense spending proposal to be a tougher sell this year with Congress under Democratic control than it has been in previous years when Republicans ruled.

Anti-missile programs have been a consistent Bush administration funding favorite, and its recent budget request to Congress continues the trend. All told, the Pentagon is seeking approximately $10.8 billion for its various missile defense projects. (Continue)

Moving Nonproliferation Forward

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats. Edited by George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba

Barclay Ward

Notwithstanding occasional hand-wringing about the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assertions that it has now failed, this regime has done exactly what was expected of it when it was forged nearly 40 years ago. It has prevented widespread nuclear proliferation.

To be sure, the September 11 terrorist attacks, North Korea’s recent nuclear test, Iran’s nuclear program, and the proliferation network of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan highlight some fundamental challenges to the nonproliferation regime that require urgent attention. Yet, over the years, the regime has proven largely successful because it has adapted to new challenges. Since amending the bedrock nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is a near impossibility, a number of additional, tailored structures have been grafted onto the original regime. Formation of the Zangger Committee and then the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to control the export of sensitive nuclear technology, security assurances by the nuclear-weapon states, and the gradual spread of nuclear-weapon-free zones were some of the early additions.

The last decade has offered up an especially rich assortment of initiatives necessary to extend the regime’s capabilities to meet new­ and sometimes old challenges. These initiatives have included the 1997 Model Additional Protocol, whose adherents pledge to permit increased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections; the U.S. Nunn-Lugar program, to help former Soviet states and possibly other states dismantle and secure nuclear weapons and material; the Proliferation Security Initiative, to work with like-minded states to interdict shipments related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all states to exercise control over nuclear and other materials related to weapons of mass destruction.

These initiatives have been a response in part to concerns about the misuse of peaceful nuclear fuel-cycle technology and the increasing threat of substate actors, such as terrorists, and individual proliferators, such as Khan. At the same time, the perennial issue of nuclear disarmament continues to rumble in the halls of NPT conferences.

How far these initiatives can advance depends in part on the actions by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states in handling their own nuclear weapons. They need to demonstrate their commitment to the treaty by carrying out measures in accord with the treaty’s Article VI, which calls for steps toward nuclear disarmament. To the extent that such states can persuade non-nuclear-weapon states that they have reduced the role that nuclear weapons play in deterrence, the easier it will be to persuade them that they are fulfilling this commitment. Moreover, de-emphasizing nuclear weapons would help support the argument that the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon states are better served without nuclear weapons than with them.

The authors of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy examine these and other related issues in a nonpolemical, balanced way. This valuable book delivers more than what the title might suggest, as the scope of the book extends well beyond a narrow assessment of U.S. nuclear policy to a broader assessment of how that approach affects the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the overall state of the regime itself.

One focus of editors George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba is the danger of non-nuclear-weapon states developing and mastering critical elements of the full nuclear fuel cycle, including enriching uranium to produce fuel or separating plutonium from spent fuel (reprocessing). Unfortunately, such technology, even if ostensibly acquired for peaceful purposes, can also have a direct military application and provide the fissile material for nuclear weapons. North Korea is a classic example. Iran is another candidate.

A sensible solution to this not-new problem is to find an effective way of restricting the spread of these sensitive technologies. In 2004, President George W. Bush proposed limiting exports of uranium and reprocessing technologies to those countries that already had fully functioning facilities. A year later, an IAEA experts group identified a number of other possibilities for consideration, and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has proposed a moratorium on building new enrichment facilities. The Group of Eight has supported a moratorium on exports of sensitive technologies to new programs.

The idea that enrichment and reprocessing should be restricted is neither new nor particularly radical. A great deal of attention was given to this problem in the 1970s. In his chapter on the history of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, Bunn who was one of the U.S. negotiators of the NPT, recalls that, in the first draft of the treaty, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union favored the spread of these technologies. The final wording of Article IV, recognizing the “inalienable right” to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, reflected an effort to attract support from the developing world.

Even so, the NPT, while recognizing the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, restricts the exercise of that right by tying it to the fulfillment of the treaty’s two nonproliferation provisions, in particular the commitment under Article II not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The hitch is being able to come to a common understanding in the international community on precisely when a state has crossed the line. Given that conundrum, the international community needs to reach agreement on effective means to restrict the spread of these sensitive technologies. There are many ideas on the table right now—the chapters by Chyba, Chaim Braun, and Bunn explain them well—and they should all be considered. The time has come to reach an agreed conclusion.

Substate actors such as terrorists or proliferators were simply not taken into account in the treaty’s establishment. The NPT applies only to states, as does the NSG and many other initial elements of the regime. Moreover, many states are not members of the NSG, and states such as Pakistan are neither parties to the NPT nor members of the NSG and are not, therefore, legally bound to observe norms accepted by others. To be sure, the danger of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials was recognized well before the September 11 attacks, and in part the Nunn-Lugar program was initiated to reduce the risk that nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union could fall into the wrong hands.

Nevertheless, it is not enough. We now know that. Khan, operating his vast international network from his home base in Pakistan, did quite well for himself, selling enrichment technology and equipment to eager customers such as Iran. We need a systematic global effort to prevent other Khan-type networks from emerging. This is one objective of Resolution 1540, which calls on states to maintain controls over their nuclear and other WMD materials and, above all, to keep such materials out of the hands of terrorists. The resolution also established a committee of the UN Security Council to monitor the resolution, principally through reports on implementation that states are required to submit. Compliance has been mixed so far, which, as Chyba, Braun, and Bunn point out, raises the yet unanswered question of enforcement.

The Model Additional Protocol has been one of the most important initiatives in the last decade, permitting IAEA inspectors to go beyond declared facilities and to take advantage of environmental sampling and other new technologies. There has been much debate in the nonproliferation community over the question of whether a country’s individual adoption of an additional protocol to their safeguards agreement should be required of non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT or whether it should be voluntary. So far, it has been voluntary, and to date, many NPT parties have not yet brought an additional protocol into force. So, the Model Additional Protocol represents a huge potential advancement of the regime, but the present reality still falls short.

Even if all states were to adopt an additional protocol, the authors of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy advocate looking for other safeguards to complement those of the IAEA. An example would be the Quadripartite Agreement, involving Brazil, Argentina, a binational agency, and the IAEA. Similarly, during negotiations for the NPT, members of the European Community argued that they already had Euratom safeguards on their facilities and the final treaty language on safeguards permits Euratom safeguards to be applied within the framework of IAEA safeguards. Above all, frequency and continuity of safeguarding is important, but if we expect the IAEA to do the safeguarding job we are demanding, the agency needs far greater financial support in this area.

The most severe criticisms in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy are of just that: U.S. nuclear weapons policy. The authors take a dim view of what they see as efforts to think up new missions for nuclear weapons and of the corollary idea that such new missions will require new weapons. The chapters by W. K. H. Panofsky and Dean Wilkening and by Roger Speed and Michael May present a balanced, factual consideration of policy and weapons development. Much attention is given to such documents as the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 and the U.S. National Security Strategy released the same year. Do we really need a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator to hit deeply buried targets? The authors doubt it. Do we need new low-yield weapons? Again, doubt. Will a national missile defense adequately protect the U.S. homeland? Not likely, the authors conclude. Better container security at ports would probably be more immediately effective.

One of the tough tasks is persuading the rest of the world that the United States is truly committed to eliminating or at least greatly reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons. U.S. officials point to the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and the substantial reduction of deployed strategic weapons anticipated on December 31, 2012. They urge a continuation of the nuclear test moratorium. They plug for a fissile material cutoff treaty. Almost all states agree to these measures, although in the case of fissile material cutoff, some find the absence of verification provisions puzzling.

But, states receive a mixed signal when they also read the heavy emphasis on military capabilities in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the announcement of U.S. readiness for preemptive action (really preventive war, the authors observe), statements in the nuclear posture review that new weapons might be needed, and Senate rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999. A quick scan of plenary statements at NPT conferences reveals that not all are convinced of the U.S. commitment to nuclear disarmament as called for in Article VI of the NPT.

As the authors note, it is not likely that non-nuclear-weapon states will decide to seek nuclear weapons simply because the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states still have them, but it is possible that they could use the continued possession of them as an excuse to duck out of their nonproliferation commitments. More worrisome to the authors is that the muscular tone of our policy pronouncements coupled with our unmatched conventional military capabilities might not necessarily dissuade states from pursuing nuclear weapons. In the opening chapter, Christopher Chyba and Karthika Sasikumar quote the Indian army chief of staff drawing a lesson from the 1991 Persian Gulf War: “Don’t fight the Americans without nuclear weapons.”

In truth, it is difficult with accuracy to predict the impact that specific policies of the nuclear-weapon states will have on the nonproliferation regime. For example, the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty did not appear to stir up the hornets’ nest, as had been predicted. What the non-nuclear-weapon states seem to want most is a sense of genuine commitment to disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states and discernible movement in that direction. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the future viability of some of the pronouncements of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the nuclear posture review. To date, for example, the use of preemptive war to prevent nuclear proliferation has not been convincing.

Two final points: First, given the necessary initiatives of the past decade as well as the issues currently being discussed, we are looking at a nonproliferation regime that has the potential to be even more effective than it has been in its past. Whether reality matches potential, however, depends principally on governmental will in the international community, and right now a great deal more needs to be demonstrated. U.S. leadership is critical. As the authors of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy point out, the United States has always been at the forefront of the nonproliferation regime, and it is imperative that we remain fully committed. Second, as we grapple with new and old issues and launch initiatives, we need to avoid losing our focus and keep in mind that, by themselves, these initiatives are not a substitute for all that has gone before but form an integral part of the ever-evolving nonproliferation regime.


Barclay Ward is emeritus professor of political science at The University of the South.


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A Review of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats edited by George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba

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