"...the Arms Control Association [does] so much to keep the focus on the issues so important to everyone here, to hold our leaders accountable to inspire creative thinking and to press for change. So we are grateful for your leadership and for the unyielding dedication to global nuclear security."
– Lord Des Browne
Vice Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative
September 2006
Edition Date: 
Friday, September 1, 2006
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Global Strike Plan Bombs in Congress

Global Strike Plan Bombs in Congress

Wade Boese

Congress made deep cuts in a Pentagon plan to switch the payloads of some nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to conventional munitions as lawmakers moved toward finishing fiscal year 2007 defense spending bills. By contrast, a variety of anti-missile projects and programs to secure and dismantle excess weapons in the former Soviet Union emerged relatively unscathed.

The full Senate began debating its version of the defense appropriations bill in late July, but the deliberations were interrupted by the annual August congressional recess. Once the Senate completes action on the military spending measure, which the Senate Appropriations Committee passed July 20, it will then need to be reconciled with the $427 billion version of the defense appropriations bill that the House passed June 20 on a 407-19 vote. The measure covers expenditures for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1.

The two chambers also must work out differences between their separate defense authorization bills. Senators unanimously passed their version of the bill June 22, a month after their House counterparts. (See ACT, June 2006.) An authorization bill sets policy guidance and spending ceilings, while an appropriation bill allocates specific amounts of funding.

Although the authorization and appropriations bills are not yet law, some budget winners and losers are evident.

Lawmakers dealt a setback to an initiative to quickly deploy a conventional capability to attack targets anywhere in the world in less than an hour. The Bush administration had requested $127 million to begin pursuing its Prompt Global Strike plan by outfitting two dozen SLBMs with conventional warheads instead of nuclear payloads. (See ACT, March 2006.)

The House chopped the administration’s request down to $30 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee was less generous, providing only $5 million to study the concept. On Aug. 3, senators, by a vote of 67-31, rejected a proposal by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) to restore $77 million to the program.

Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), generally a strong supporter of defense spending, was among several senators who spoke out against Sessions’ amendment. Stevens expressed concern that the launch of a conventional SLBM could be misinterpreted by other governments as a nuclear strike and might lead to “risky, even reckless strikes, rather than deliberate, clearly thought-out action.”

U.S. Strategic Command spokesperson Julie Ziegenhorn informed Arms Control Today Aug. 22 that if the reduced funding holds for the project, it would probably prevent the project from being realized as “expeditiously as the department had planned.” Yet, she said Strategic Command, which is in charge of the project, would continue to promote it because the concept “gives our leadership a viable option that shifts away from size, predictability, and mass toward agility, speed, and precision.”

Stevens’ panel was more charitable with the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA), matching the agency’s $9.3 billion request, but it did shift some of the funding around. In a July 25 report, the committee explained that “MDA is investing too much funding in future systems and technology in advance of adequate testing and fielding of currently available technology.”

House members, who approved $9 billion for MDA, criticized the agency for liberally moving funding from one program to another without consulting Congress. Consequently, the House is demanding that MDA report more precisely on and stick with its future funding plans.

The largest share of that funding for the near term will likely flow to the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD), the primary components of which currently are 11 missile interceptors deployed in Alaska and two more in California. These interceptors were put on alert when North Korea began missile test preparations in June.

Although the only longer-range missile North Korea fired in July failed shortly after launch, President George W. Bush told reporters July 7, “We had a reasonable chance of shooting it down.” He added, “At least that’s what the military commanders told me.”

Yet, the deployed interceptors had not destroyed a target in a flight test as of Aug. 31, a shortcoming many in Congress want remedied. Partly toward this end, the Senate appropriations panel approved $225 million extra for “additional test infrastructure enhancements, operational support, and interceptors.”

Some of this additional funding will also support the Aegis ship-based system and the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system, which on July 12 scored its first hit against a target since emerging from a redesign initiated in 1999. These two systems are designed to strike missiles with a range below the long-range threshold of 5,000 kilometers.

Congress appears less favorably disposed toward the Space Tracking and Surveillance System. The satellites in the system are intended to help interceptors discriminate between a warhead and any decoys or debris. The House shaved the administration’s $390 million request by $67 million, while Senate appropriators cut $75 million.

The Senate panel also nearly halved the $405 million request for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor to $205 million. The House did not touch the funding request for the program, which involves developing a powerful interceptor to destroy missiles within the first few minutes of their flight.

Another divergence between the two chambers centers on administration plans to deploy GMD interceptors to Europe. (See ACT, July/August 2006.) The House eliminated the $119 million supporting this action, but the Senate panel fully backed the move.

In recent months, U.S. officials have visited and consulted with their counterparts in the Czech Republic and Poland about hosting the interceptors. MDA spokesperson Rick Lehner told Arms Control Today Aug. 22 that a site recommendation would likely be made within “30 to 60 days.” He ruled out reports that the United Kingdom was being considered, saying that “[i]t will be in Eastern Europe, if anywhere.”

Once fiercely contested in Congress, missile defense spending does not spark as much debate as it did several years ago, but some in Congress still get fired up about the issue. Declaring missile defenses as “nothing but a pipe dream,” Rep. Pete Stark (D-Calif.) argued June 20 that “throwing good money after bad will do little to make Ronald Reagan’s Cold War fantasy a reality.” In contrast, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) convened a July 11 press conference to hail missile defense and blast its critics, remarking that “it’s time for the Democrats to stop fighting the ghost of Ronald Reagan.”

Lawmakers appear more in concert on the Pentagon’s long-standing programs to help countries of the former Soviet Union secure and eliminate their weapons arsenals. The administration’s $372 million request received the blessing of the Senate panel and the full House.

Corrected online August 29, 2008. See explanation.


Editor's Note

Miles A. Pomper

The Bush administration has succeeded since taking office in forcing a new debate on the role of verification in arms control. Propelled by skeptics such as John Bolton, then undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, the administration has, among other steps, rejected a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and negotiated nuclear arms reductions with Russia without verification provisions. In the view of these officials, verification rules do not restrain cheaters but do unnecessarily burden trustworthy states.

Several of our authors this month grapple with the consequences. In our cover story, Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent call for a new strategic arms control agreement. The 1991 START agreement has provided the verification backbone for current U.S.-Russian efforts at slashing weapons arsenals, but it is due to expire in 2009. A new pact, they write, would bolster bilateral disarmament efforts and a relationship undergoing considerable turmoil.

The administration’s opposition to a BWC protocol at the treaty’s 2001-2002 review conference has effectively blocked discussion about it since. Trevor Findlay writes that prospects for reviving such a far-reaching protocol anytime soon are slim, but he sees a growing likelihood that member-states will approve a series of smaller quasi-verification measures at this fall’s review conference.

The conference could also endorse codes of conducts for scientists engaged in research that could lead to biological weapons. In the scientific community, such codes are fairly commonplace as a means of more formally stating generally agreed-on acceptable behavior. As Roger Roffey, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau point out, however, such a code is sorely lacking for scientists who engage in biodefense research.

Our news section this month examines a joint series of nuclear initiatives announced by Putin and President George W. Bush, the impasse at the recent UN conference on small arms, and whether the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program can be revived after that country’s provocative missile tests.

In our “Looking Back” section this month, James Goodby reflects on the landmark 1986 U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit and its lessons for today. At that summit, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came close to agreeing to rid the world of all ballistic missiles and even aired the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether. Although falling short of the goal, the summit provided the groundwork for other agreements, including START. Perhaps it is time to trust and verify again.


LOOKING BACK: The 1986 Reykjavik Summit

Ambassador James E. Goodby

The story of the 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting is a tale of two visionary leaders and an “impossible dream.” It was the most remarkable summit ever held between U.S. and Soviet leaders. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev seriously discussed the elimination of all ballistic missiles held by their two countries and aired the possibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

As Gorbachev said in these pages, “[T]he 1986 U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik, seen by many as a failure, actually gave an impetus to reduction by reaffirming the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and by paving the way toward concrete agreements on intermediate-range nuclear forces and strategic nuclear weapons.”

The world has changed since those heady days, but it is clearer than ever that the twin challenges of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism must be addressed “by reaffirming the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.” At a time when the international community is struggling to prevent a cascade of decisions by more and more states to acquire nuclear weapons, the ideas that briefly occupied center stage at Reykjavik look like the best answer we have.

Reagan and Gorbachev brought two great nations close to the end of the era of the Cold War. Two revolutionaries, each in his own way, became history’s catalysts for change. Gorbachev realized that the Soviet Union needed radical economic reform, and that to do it, he had to end the ideological confrontation with the West. Reagan was unlike any other U.S. president in his revulsion against the immorality of nuclear war, his willingness to do something about it, and his ability to act on his instincts. Turning away from classical arms control, he insisted on nuclear disarmament and succeeded to a remarkable degree. Reagan and Gorbachev found common ground at their first summit in Geneva in 1985; the two leaders declared that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

The road to Reykjavik began with proposals made by Reagan in 1981 to eliminate all intermediate-range ballistic missiles and in 1982 to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads by at least one-third. This was a departure from arms control thinking as it had developed since 1960, but it was rooted in an older paradigm: disarmament. Soviet leaders prior to Gorbachev saw these ideas as one-sided and insincere and rejected them.

The Soviet leaders had reason to be skeptical. Although Reagan had told his administration from the beginning of his presidency that he wanted reductions in nuclear warheads, he presided over a nuclear buildup to close the lead that he believed the Soviet Union had opened up over the United States. He never saw any contradictions in this, but had his administration ended in 1985 instead of 1989, it would have been remembered mainly for an enormous increase in defense spending and for arms control proposals that seemed designed to fail. Reagan’s second term changed all that.

Reagan wanted to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” and he saw two ways of doing that. One was to eliminate them, and he started that process in 1981 and 1982. The other way was to build a defense that would deflect an attack. He started that in 1983. Linking the two methods offered a way forward. What if it were possible to reduce nuclear weapons mutually while building up a defensive system jointly? In principle, there should be a crossover point where defense would have dominance over offense. This idea lay at the heart of the drama at Reykjavik.

Reagan had long mused about the inability of the United States to defend itself against a missile attack. Hydrogen bomb pioneer Edward Teller and Reagan’s own “kitchen cabinet” had encouraged him to think that a defense against ballistic missiles might be possible. On March 23, 1983, Reagan finally announced that he was asking U.S. scientists “to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” Thus was born the idea that a shield could be built that would protect humanity from nuclear attack.

Still, the idea required more confidence between the Soviet Union and the United States than existed at the time. General Secretary Yuri Andropov saw in Reagan’s proposal a scheme that would force the Soviet Union to ever greater defense expenditures and end the period of relative stability that had marked General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s relations with Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. Furthermore, it came at a time when tensions were high because of the planned deployment in Europe of U.S. intermediate-range missiles, as had been decided by NATO at the end of the Carter administration. Andropov denounced the Reagan speech, and a period of bitter relations ensued. Significant progress in arms control and disarmament would have to wait until Reagan’s fellow visionary, Gorbachev, succeeded Andropov as leader of the Soviet Union.


Reagan’s ideas were met by a bold initiative from Gorbachev in January 1986, when he proposed the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2000. Reagan responded by letter on July 25, 1986, and revealed the gist of that letter in an address to the UN General Assembly on September 22. Reagan raised the possibility of radical reductions in offensive ballistic missiles, a multiyear moratorium on deployment of ballistic missile defenses, an obligation to share the benefits of strategic defenses, and the total elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces on a global basis.

Gorbachev expressed uncertainty about Reagan’s thinking and suggested a meeting in Iceland or the United Kingdom to talk about the issues directly. On September 30, 1986, Reagan announced that he had decided to accept Gorbachev’s offer to meet in Iceland. The meeting would take place in less than two weeks, on October 11-12.

The administration thought that the Reykjavik meeting would be an informal exploratory session with a limited agenda, a “base camp,” not a “summit.” Yet, Gorbachev came to Reykjavik with dramatic proposals covering all aspects of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms negotiation: a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, complete elimination of intermediate-range missiles of the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe, nonwithdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for 10 years, and prohibition of testing of space-based elements of a defense system “except research and testing in laboratories.” These were unveiled at the first session on the morning of October 11. A subsequent all-night meeting between senior officials in the two delegations took place and hammered out key parameters for limits on strategic offensive forces. At the session the next day, Gorbachev added to his proposal to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe by calling for a ceiling on such missiles of 100 each in Soviet Asia and in the United States. A major agreement on offensive forces was within sight, but everything depended on an agreement on ballistic missile defense.

When the discussion turned to that question, Gorbachev proposed that an extra, unscheduled session be set up in the afternoon to discuss the issue. Reagan agreed, and the two delegations met first in a session chaired by the foreign ministers. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze insisted that there must be a 10-year period when there would be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. If this could be agreed, all other issues could be solved.

Late in the afternoon of October 12, when the two leaders met again with their foreign ministers to discuss the offense-defense link, Reagan presented the following draft text:

The U.S.S.R. and the United States undertake for 10 years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM treaty. Within the first five years of the 10-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus, by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the U.S.S.R. and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the 10-year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise.

The final session was a scene of high drama. Gorbachev said he wanted to eliminate all strategic forces, not just ballistic missiles. Reagan said, “It would be fine with me if we eliminated all nuclear weapons.” The break point began to appear when Gorbachev, following the script laid out in his initial presentation, insisted that all research and testing of space-based ballistic missile systems be restricted to laboratories.

In the final minutes at Reykjavik, Reagan, as reported by Secretary of State George Shultz, re-read the key clause to Gorbachev: “Listen once again to what I have proposed: during that 10-year period [of nonwithdrawal from the ABM treaty], while continuing research, testing, and development which is permitted by that treaty. It is a question of one word.” Reagan did not want to enter into a negotiation that he viewed as amending the treaty. He had accepted a “broad” interpretation of the treaty, under which wide latitude was allowed for space-based testing, although the treaty’s original negotiators, the Soviets, and the Senate supported a more restrictive interpretation.

Gorbachev insisted on the word “laboratories.” Over this one word, the negotiations broke off. Washington read Gorbachev’s proposal as an attack on the missile defense program, the Strategic Defense Initiative. That one word, “laboratories,” obviously rang alarm bells in the minds of those who had been operating under tense conditions for two days.

So ended “the highest stakes poker game ever played,” as Shultz described it. In Reagan’s words, “We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles—Soviet and American—from the face of the earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.”

One of the great imponderables of history is what would have happened if Gorbachev had dropped the word “laboratories” and his objections to testing in space or if Reagan had accepted the limitation that Gorbachev sought? With the hindsight of history, it seems likely that the deployment of an effective ballistic missile defense system would not have been affected one way or the other. What we do not know is whether a treaty of the kind discussed at Reykjavik would have released Russia and United States from the nuclear deterrence relationship in which they are still entrapped.

Aftermath and Lessons

Nonetheless, Reagan and Gorbachev achieved a great deal at Reykjavik. They had stretched the envelope of thinking about reducing the nuclear danger. They had clearly distinguished between nuclear weapons and all other weapons and had stigmatized nuclear weapons as immoral, their use unacceptable in conflicts among nations. They reinforced the tradition of the non-use of nuclear weapons, and despite the famous word “laboratories,” the Reykjavik meeting led to the signing of the U.S.-Soviet treaty on banning intermediate-range nuclear forces and to a draft treaty on reducing strategic-range nuclear forces that was almost complete by the time Reagan left office. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed in 1991, is still in force. The first treaty to cut strategic nuclear arms significantly, it also provides the basis for verification of the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) concluded by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, which endorsed further strategic weapons cuts. Reykjavik was a long stride toward one part of Reagan’s dream, the elimination of nuclear weapons.

As things stand, however, each country is still hedging in its nuclear weapons programs so as to be prepared for an adverse turn of events in the other. Nuclear weapons are still a major factor in international relations. Rather than pursuing Reagan’s genuine interest in eliminating all nuclear weapons, the Bush administration, for example, has conflated nuclear and conventional weapons in its definition of offensive forces in its new “strategic triad” and refused to consider further reductions in operationally deployed nuclear forces, below SORT levels, even in response to appeals from non-nuclear-weapon states.

These policies contrast sharply with Reagan’s thinking about nuclear weapons. Of course, the world has changed since Reagan left office, and new threats have emerged. Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs were not the problems in the 1980s that they are in 2006. Nuclear-armed terrorist groups were imaginable then but not the real possibility that they are today.

I would argue, however, that Reagan’s ideas about nuclear weapons are as salient today as they were then. There is no doubt that national decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are motivated by regional rivalries, a desire to have an equalizer against the conventional weapons superiority of a global adversary, and by prestige and a sense of entitlement. Iran and North Korea are motivated by these considerations. U.S. policies have to be targeted on local and regional specifics in each case.

The decisions of potential nuclear-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons also are affected by and very likely heavily influenced by their expectations of what other states will be doing. India was very explicit about this in the years before its decision to conduct nuclear weapons tests. A solid front of the present nuclear-weapon states against further proliferation will be more effective and persuasive if they are seen to be moving toward elimination of nuclear weapons, rather than updating them and threatening to use them against non-nuclear-weapon states.

The Bush administration is well positioned to pick up Reagan’s mantle and to continue where he left off. In fact, it is difficult to imagine an administration more likely to win a bipartisan majority in Congress for pursuing Reagan’s nuclear policies. A Reagan-like initiative to cut back the U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear forces as a first step toward a freeze and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons on a global basis would have a powerful anti-proliferation impact. As in Reagan’s vision, ballistic missile defense technology could be shared with other countries as these drawdowns proceed. Would this have any effect on the threat posed by nuclear-armed terrorists? Certainly. More weapons in more hands adds up to a situation where the use of a nuclear bomb by a terrorist group that is able to buy or steal one will become almost inevitable.


Ambassador James E. Goodby was vice chair of the U.S. START delegation during 1982-1983 and chief negotiator of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program during 1993-1994. This essay draws on his latest book, At the Borderline of Armageddon—How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb (2006).



Venezuela, Russia Sign Weapons Deal

Jeremy Wolland

Defying the United States, Russia agreed in July to sell $1 billion in combat aircraft to Venezuela. The deal marks the latest in a series of Russian arms sales to a state that has increasingly clashed with Washington over different ideological approaches to Latin America and the developing world.

Capping Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s July 25-27 visit to Russia, the deal’s announcement comes just two months after Washington said it would no longer permit new U.S.-origin arms sales to the South American state. At that time, U.S. officials said they were disturbed by Venezuelan ties to Iran and Cuba, allegations that Venezuela was serving as a transit point for arms and individuals of concern, and the Chavez government’s links to left-wing Colombian guerrilla groups. (See ACT, June 2006.) By contrast, Moscow has been a willing arms supplier to Venezuela, concluding more than $3 billion in weapons deals, including the most recent agreement, over the past 18 months.

The latest deal will send 24 Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30 MK2 fighter jets and 53 military helicopters to Venezuela. Chavez also announced that Moscow has agreed to build a Kalashnikov rifle factory in Venezuela. Under a prior deal between the two countries, 100,000 Kalashnikov AK-103 rifles are supposed to arrive in Venezuela this year. (See ACT, May 2005.)

The Bush administration has questioned both the necessity and motives for Venezuela’s increasing expenditures and new arms buys. Department of State spokesperson Tom Casey told reporters July 25 that “the arms purchase planned by Venezuela exceeded its defensive needs and are not helpful in terms of regional stability.” He further urged Russia to “reconsider the sale.”

Russian officials defended their deals with Venezuela, saying that they do not break international law. At a press conference July 27 with Chavez, Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to defuse tensions with the United States by asserting that “cooperation between Russia and Venezuela is not directed against any third country.”

Chavez claims that the military purchases are necessary for Venezuela’s self-defense, commenting July 26 that “it is a state responsibility to equip and train the nation’s military bodies. In my case, that is what I am doing, nothing more.”

In an interview the same day with Colombian radio station Radio Caracol, Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel echoed Chavez. “ Venezuela’s purpose [behind its arms buys] is to guarantee the country’s defense and not to attack other countries,” Rangel stated.

In the past, Venezuela purchased U.S. arms, including a 1982 acquisition of 24 F-16A combat jets, but new sales and the supply of spare parts have declined over the course of Chavez’s rule. Venezuelan officials say that this trend has left their military in need of new and replacement weapons and military equipment.

U.S. politicians have questioned how Venezuela intends to use any new arms imports. Rep. Ed Royce (R-Calif.), chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, said at a July 13 hearing that “it is the fear of many that these weapons, or the weapons they replace, will end up arming left-wing terrorist groups.”


Critical Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists

Roger Roffey, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau

When representatives of up to 155 states-parties meet in Geneva from November 20 to December 8 to consider ways to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), they are likely to express support for the promotion and creation of “codes of conduct.” These ethical principles are intended to increase scientists’ awareness and accountability and reduce the risk that biological research and development could be misused for biological weapons.

Yet, producing concrete guidelines for scientists involved in such a broad research area has proved difficult. For example, a June 2005 BWC meeting of experts charged with addressing the adoption of codes of conduct for scientists did not produce any concrete actions.[1]

In fact, it is not realistic to believe that a single broad code can be enacted. States-parties negotiators would be better off focusing on creating a narrower set of guidelines and appropriate oversight mechanisms that would govern a far smaller group of scientists in national biodefense research and development programs, including programs for bioterrorism preparedness and protection. These guidelines could be incorporated into and complement an already existing set of politically binding confidence-building measures, an annual set of national declarations that seeks to build transparency in fields related to the BWC.

Biodefense and the BWC

Although outlawing offensive biological weapons activities, the BWC permits biodefense research and development to develop antidotes and other means of countering biological weapons threats. Yet, the boundary between defensive and offensive biological weapons programs can be hazy. Because it is impossible to know which threats will actually materialize, scientists might carry out research and development activities that arguably could contribute to offensive biological weapons programs.

Moreover, because determining the intentions of other states or nonstate actors is inherently problematic, many intelligence evaluations focus on worst-case scenarios of others’ capabilities. This, in turn, can result in a practically unlimited number of threats and an open-ended demand for resources to evaluate and meet them, especially with regard to possible threats posed by nonstate actors. For example, scientists might develop and test pathogenic strains with modified characteristics, such as resistance to multiple antibiotics or vaccines; or they might replicate, develop, or test new biological munitions or different methods for delivering them. Such activities or the suspicion that they are taking place inevitably cause states to worry that others are carrying out inappropriate research.

These concerns have grown in recent years as a number of states have expanded their biodefense work. U.S funding for bioweapons prevention and defense increased dramatically after the September 11 terrorist attacks, from $1.6 billion to more than $8 billion requested for fiscal year 2007, which begins October 1. All told, 11 federal departments and agencies have spent more than $36 billion since 2001.[2] While spending at the Department of Defense has increased slightly,[3] spending on civil biodefense programs has soared from $414 million in fiscal year 2001 to a requested $7.6 billion in fiscal year 2005.[4]

Advocacy groups have also raised concerns in recent years about pending congressional legislation to establish a new Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency (BARDA) that would serve as a single point of authority within the Department of Health and Human Services for implementing biodefense programs. These groups have criticized provisions in some versions of the legislation to exempt the agency from some Freedom of Information Act provisions requiring public disclosure of the programs. As of July, Congress was still crafting final language on a bill to establish BARDA.[5]

This massive investment in all aspects of biodefense and protection against bioterrorism is unique for the United States. Moreover, the nature and scope of this work in the United States is unclear, leaving some to imagine the worst possibilities. Although the United States has demonstrated significant transparency in its reports to Congress and the BWC, critics have suggested that it has crossed the border between defensive and offensive research.[6]

In Europe, funding has increased as well, although on a much smaller scale as Europeans have not viewed bioterrorism to be as great or as imminent a threat. Moreover, a significant share of funds in Europe has been directed toward improving general public health efforts to fight infectious disease outbreaks and to prepare against possible pandemics rather than toward preventing a bioterrorist attack.

Codes of Conduct and Confidence Building Measures

The BWC calls for countries to provide information annually on their national biological weapons defense research and development programs, including data on past programs stretching back to 1946. The United States provides information about its program annually, but it is only one of a few states that do this. When countries do provide information, it is usually for domestic policy reasons, such as to inform national parliaments, and not for public scrutiny. These reports are not readily available and only distributed to states-parties.[7]

As many consider these biodefense declarations insufficient, states-parties have sought other means of making national programs more transparent. Indeed, such discussions were at the center of seven years of negotiations to strengthen the BWC that broke down in 2001. At that time, the United States, citing national security and commercial interests, announced that it could not support a draft protocol to the treaty that would have included a set of mandatory declarations of activities and facilities and the possibility of on-site visits.[8]

In response to criticism over its decision, U.S. officials as an alternative proposed continuing discussions on a limited set of relevant subjects. This so-called new process was subsequently endorsed by the other BWC states-parties in 2002, and it included a discussion of codes of conduct that would more explicitly state generally agreed-on acceptable behavior. The adoption of such codes is an indicator of responsible behavior and helps to ensure appropriate handling of questionable activities. Further, the process of producing codes involves extensive consultations that raises awareness among scientists and fosters internal consultations. A code can also be a valuable tool for educating students and employees.[9]

Most scientists already work under codes of conduct that govern laboratory standards and safe working practices, but they are often unaware of treaties such as the BWC and Chemical Weapons Convention and how such accords affect their work. The existence of ethical or behavioral guidelines can foster an ethical norm among scientists and strengthen oversight. Yet, codes of conduct for scientists who cover biological warfare-related areas are lacking. Such codes should reinforce the “norm” that biological warfare is unacceptable and provide guid­ance as to how scientists can help prevent it. The United States has proposed that, in the context of the BWC, such a code require generally that scientists use their knowledge and skills for the ad­vancement of human welfare and not for any activities that could be used “for hostile purposes or in armed con­flict.”[10]

A more precise code, however, should also be formalized to help biodefense scientists identify what constitutes offensive research and development and create a mechanism for reporting potential BWC violations should they occur.[11] Instituting such a code would require a firm commitment from scientists, program management, and government but is vital. Although the line between offensive and defensive research will likely change as science advances, many national biodefense programs lack even a basic review of research and development activities. Scientists are also not well informed of the BWC’s restrictions.

Several international and nongovernmental organizations have called for the creation of a global code of conduct or declaration on biological weapons that could involve scientists in current biodefense programs worldwide.[12] In the biodefense area, it would be essential to couple such codes of conduct with independent mechanisms that could provide the necessary oversight to assure the public that a biodefense program is purely defensive.[13] In particular, each institute should establish an independent panel of senior scientists to vet any proposed biodefense work and ensure that it conforms to the established codes of conduct. These panels would then report to an independent national committee.

Canada and Australia already have such mechanisms. Australia has an oversight committee for biodefense work and a code of conduct for scientists in the program. Canada’s national oversight committee annually reviews biological and chemical defense research, development, and training activities undertaken by the Department of National Defense to ensure that these activities are defensive in nature and conducted in a professional manner with no threat to public safety or the environment. The committee members’ appointments are approved by the deputy minister of national defense and the chief of the defense staff on the recommendation of the committee chairperson. Nominations for membership in the Biological and Chemical Defense Review Committee are solicited by the chairperson from the Canadian Society of Microbiologists, the Chemical Institute of Canada, and the Society of Toxicology of Canada. To provide transparency, the committee publicizes its annual reports on its website.[14] A copy is also provided to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Another complementary mechanism that should be required is an independent international authority available to scientists who have qualms about their research or would like to report activities they believe to be unethical or irregular. This “ombudsman” should be affiliated with the United Nations and be under the supervision of independent scientific organizations and/or academies. States should also consider establishing a scientific advisory committee in the framework of the BWC.

Finally, the BWC states-parties should table national papers that describe internal legal review processes for biodefense work, including its role in the interagency consultation and review processes; relevant whistle-blower regulations; and the manner in which such procedures are compatible with rules governing classified work.

Getting Results at the Review Conference

Although the window is closing, states-parties still have time to submit proposals for the upcoming BWC review conference. These proposals could consider a variety of issues—some procedural, others substantive—connected with the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct and any results from the 2005 experts meetings on these subjects. The conference may, inter alia, adopt a code of conduct, adopt guidelines outlining what a code of conduct should contain, agree on a set of measures or a follow-on process to consider further how best to imple­ment such a code, or simply decide to promote codes of conduct that address specific issues.

To make progress, the scope of these efforts should be relatively narrow. It is not realistic to believe that the conference can develop a broad code of conduct covering biological sciences. In addition, a number of other internationally accepted codes of practice already exist in the field. It would be more feasible and effective for the conference to focus on areas where there could be both a benefit and an additional support for the BWC. For instance, the conference could seek to prevent the potential misuse of science related to potential offensive research or development in state-run biodefense programs or activities.

A far-reaching measure would be for states-parties to agree on a set of follow-on measures or on a process regarding a code of conduct for scientists that results in a legally binding commitment. A more modest but more achievable goal would be for the conference to call on states-parties to report on national codes of conduct and supply the texts of such codes as a confidence-building measure.

After adopting such a measure, states would report on any code of conduct for scientists in the biodefense area, whether there is an independent oversight committee for the national biodefense program, and on other relevant codes of conduct for scientists. States-parties also need to consider if current confidence-building declarations on national biological research and development programs are adequate or if it needs to be clarified that these declarations also include research and development on bioterrorism defenses. And states-parties could describe in their national papers the legal review mechanisms to determine whether their biodefense work conforms to the BWC and if any whistle-blower legislation exists that allows for reporting of activities of concern.

In this way, codes of conduct can be closely tied to the fundamental object and purpose of the convention, increasing the likelihood that states-par­ties will support such efforts. This step would be particularly helpful if such confidence-building measures were mandatory and included a means of clarifying declarations, voluntary exchanges of information, and voluntary on-site visits to build confidence. States-parties might also consider agreeing on an intersessional mechanism to allow states to offer implementation assistance.


Scientists need codes of conduct for guidance and to help them clarify their thinking on difficult ethical questions. Countries have to prove to their parliaments and general public that a biodefense program is purely defensive and that the involved scientists are working in line with openly agreed codes of conduct. Independent national oversight committees are therefore needed to review ongoing biodefense research and development activities. In addition, the international community should design some kind of independent international authority to counsel scientists concerned about how their research or results might be used.

At this fall’s BWC review conference, countries should aid this effort by proposing specific guidelines for codes of conduct covering biodefense research and development programs. States-parties should also seek ways to strengthen the confidence-building declarations under the BWC, such as by adding oversight committees and facilitating reporting on activities of concern. In addition, states-parties should review the current declaration on biodefense programs and make it mandatory. Such measures can help ensure that the search for cures to potential biological weapons attacks does not endanger the BWC in the process.

Roger Roffey is a research director at the Swedish Defence Research Agency’s Division of NBC-Defense. Simultaneously, he has held several related, high-level positions in the Swedish government, including serving as a technical expert for the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs during the negotiations to craft a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention and as the head of the Swedish biodefense research and development program. John Hart and Frida Kuhlau are researchers at the Chemical and Biological Warfare Project of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.


Proposed Codes of Conduct

Several codes of conduct have been proposed to guide scientists whose research might potentially violate the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). One proposal put forward by nongovernmental organizations in 2002[1] would clarify that the BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of all microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. In other words, the convention contains no exemption for law enforcement, riot control, or similar purpose. Likewise, it would make clear that the BWC bans the design, construction, or possession for any purpose of delivery mechanisms designed to use biological agents or toxins for hostile purpose or in armed conflict. There is no exemption for peaceful purposes.

In addition, scientists would be advised that constructing novel biological agents, including single-gene changes, for threat assessment is incompatible with the spirit and intent of the BWC and should be disavowed. Similarly, the proposal would steer scientists away from weaponizing active biological agents for defensive purposes. It would also suggest that aerosolization or other dissemination of active biological agents be performed only in fully contained bench-scale environments and only for purposes of detection, prophylaxis, or medical treatment.

An alternative proposed code of conduct[2] calls on any person or institution engaged in any aspect of the life sciences to work to ensure that their discoveries and knowledge do no harm. In particular, its authors suggest scientists refuse to engage in any research intended to facilitate or that has a high probability of being used to facilitate bioterrorism or biowarfare. Additionally, they would guide researchers not to contribute knowingly or recklessly to the development, production, or acquisition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types or in quantities that cannot be justified on the basis that they are necessary for prophylactic, protective, therapeutic, or other peaceful purposes.


1. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “Defending Against Biodefence: The Need for Limits,” BWC Special Paper No. 1, Acronym Institute, January 2003.

2. Margaret A. Somerville and Ronald Atlas, “Ethics: A Weapon to Counter Bioterrorism,” Science, March 25, 2005, pp. 1881-1882.




Debating Definitions

When it comes to codes of conduct and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there can be as much debate about semantics as substance. BWC states-parties have considered the merit of using the term “codes of practice” as opposed to “codes of conduct” because the latter term can be interpreted as applying to individuals only. One suggestion for classification of professional codes is that “ethical codes” aim to be aspirational, “codes of conduct” to be educational and/or advisory, and finally “codes of practice” to be enforceable.[1]

State-parties have also expressed uncertainty as to what constitutes a “program.” Does it mean the collective whole of the various military or civilian research and development activities, including individual projects carried out by defense contractors, or only programs carried out by the defense ministry? The BWC confidence-building measures only call for declarations about a “national biological defense research and development program.”

Some activities formerly characterized as biodefense work now fall under bioterrorism. The dis­tinction is important because work carried out as part of a program to meet perceived bioterrorism threats is probably not directed at other states and may thus be perceived as less threatening. Yet, states may seek to hide some biodefense work that is part of an offensive program by characterizing it as part of efforts to meet bioterrorism threats.


1. See www.projects.ex.ac.uk/codesofconduct/Examples/index.htm.




1. United Nations, Report of the Meeting of Experts, June 13-24, Geneva, August 5, 2005.

2. Stephanie Chang and Alan Pearson, Federal Funding for Biological Weapons Prevention and Defense, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2007, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, June 2006.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress, March 2005.

4. Ari Schuler, “Billions for Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, Fiscal Year 2001-Fiscal Year 2005,” Biosecurity and Bioterorrism: Biodefense Strategy, Practise, and Science, 2004, pp. 86-96.

5. Jocelyn Kaiser, “Bioshield is Slow to Build U.S. Defenses Against Bioweapons,” Science, Vol. 313, No. 5783, July 7, 2006, p. 29; U.S. House of Representatives draft bill H.R. 5533, “Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2006,” June 6, 2006; and U.S. Senate draft bill S.2564, “Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine Drug Development Act of 2006,” April 6, 2006.

6. See Susan Wright, “Taking Biodefense Too Far,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004, pp. 58-66; Jonathan Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?” Arms Control Today, October 2004, pp. 13-19; Milton Leitenberg, James Leonard, and Richard Spertzel, “Biodefence Crossing the Line,” Politics and the Life Sciences, September 2004, pp. 1-2.

7. Nicholas Isla and Iris Hunger, “BWC 2006: Building Transparency Through Confidence Building Measures,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2006, pp. 19-22; Nicholas Isla, “Transparency in Past Offensive Biological Weapons Programmes: An Analysis of Confidence Building Measures Form F, 1992-2003,” Occasional Paper No. 1, Hamburg Centre for Biological Arms Control, June 2006.

8. See Rebecca Whitehair and Seth Brugger, “BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following U.S. Rejection,” Arms Control Today, September 2001, p. 26.

9. See The International Committee of the Red Cross, “Preventing Hostile Use of the Life Sciences—From Ethics and Law to Best Practice,” November 11, 2004. See also Interacademy Panel on International Issues, “IAP Statement on Biosecurity,” November 7, 2005.

10. U.S. Department of State, “Working Paper by the United States of America,” Proposal submitted by the United States at the 2001 BWC Review Conference, November 26, 2001, p. 5.

11. Roger Roffey, “Biological Weapons and Potential Indicators of Offensive Biological Weapons Activities,” SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 557-571.

12. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “Defending Against Biodefence: The Need for Limits,” BWC Special Paper No. 1, Acronym Institute, January 2003. See also “WMA Declaration of Washington on Biological Weapons,” Doc. 17.400, May 16, 2003.

13. Government of Canada, “Biodefence: Codes of Conduct and Practice,” Paper prepared by Canada at the BWC Meeting of Experts, June 9, 2005.

14. Biological and Chemical Defense Review Committee, Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee, 2005 Annual Report, Canadian Department of National Defence, October 2005.



September 2006 Bibliography

Of Special Interest

Albright, David and Brannan, Paul, Commercial Satellite Imagery Suggests Pakistan is Building a Second, Much Larger Plutonium Production Reactor: Is South Asia Headed for a Dramatic Buildup in Nuclear Arsenals?, Institute for Science and International Security, July 24, 2006, 4 pp.

Bunn, Matthew and Wier, Anthony, Securing the Bomb 2006, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University and Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 13, 2006, 178 pp.

Rauf, Tariq, A Cut-Off of Production of Weapon-Usable Fissionable Material: Considerations, Requirements and IAEA Capabilities, International Atomic Energy Agency, August 24, 2006, 27 pp.

Squassoni, Sharon, Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons: Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT), Congressional Research Service, July 14, 2006, 6 pp.

United Nations, Summary of the Compendium of Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes in the Chemical, Biological and Missile Areas, June 21, 2006, 69 pp.

I. Strategic Arms

Agence France-Presse, “Chinese Leadership Calls for Build Up of Strategic Missile Forces,” June 29, 2006.

Andreasen, Steve, “ U.S. Will Gain Much by Reducing Nuclear Arms,” San Jose Mercury News, July 14, 2006.

Arbatov, Alexei and Dvorkin, Vladimir, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2006, 185 pp.

Belous, Vladimir and Safranchuk, Ivan, Stewardship of Test-Free Nuclear Arsenals, World Security Institute, August 2006, 18 pp.

Flory, Peter C. W., Keith Payne, Pavel Podvig, Alexei Arbatov, Keir Lieber, and Daryl Press, “Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 149.

Interfax-AVN, “ Russia Sees Withdrawal from Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty as Option,” August 25, 2006.

ITAR-TASS, “Putin Wants to Step Up Dialogue with U.S. on Strategic Reductions,” July 4, 2006.

Levine, Haninah, Stockpile Stewardship in the United States: A Primer, World Security Institute, June 6, 2006, 13 pp.

RIA Novosti, “Russian Defense Official Doubts Value of New Nuclear Arms Deal with USA,” August 25, 2006.

Skinner, Tony, “Call for a Full UK Public Debate on Nuclear Deterrent,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 5, 2006, p. 6.

Vartabedian, Ralph, “Nuclear Spending Comes Under Fire,” The Los Angeles Times, July 30, 2006, p. A31.

Wheeler, Michael O., International Security Negotiations: Lessons Learned from Negotiating with the Russians on Nuclear Arms, Institute for National Security Studies, 2006, 100 pp.

II. Nuclear Proliferation

Allison, Graham, “The Ongoing Failure of Imagination” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2006, p. 36.

Bonner, Raymond, “Call to Enrich Uranium in Australia Stirs Debate,” The New York Times, August 2, 2006, p. A9.

Crowell, Todd, “Why Japan Will Never Go Nuclear,” Asia Times Online, August 16, 2006.

Demick, Barbara, “N. Korea-Iran Ties Seem to Be Growing Stronger,” Los Angeles Times, July 27, 2006, p. A15.

Elliott, Geoff, “U.S. Backs Howard’s Nuclear Vision,” The Australian, August 17, 2006.

Geblawi, Afaf, “Kadhafi Says Libya Was Close to Building a Nuclear Bomb,” Agence France-Presse, July 25, 2006.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Illicit Trafficking and Other Unauthorized Activities involving Nuclear and Radioactive Materials, August 21, 2006, 9 pp.

Linzer, Dafna, “House Voted on India Deal Unaware of Iran Missile Sales,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2006, p. A14.

Los Angeles Times, “UN Team Detects Illegal Uranium Mining,” July 21, 2006, p. A13.

Maloof, F. Michael, “Nuclear Know-How Trail,” The Washington Times, July 18, 2006, p. 17.

Rosen, Stephen Peter, “After Proliferation: What to Do if More States Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 9.

Smith, Derek D., Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cambridge University Press, July 2006, 197 pp.

Shelley, Louise and Robert Orttung, “Criminal Acts” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2006, p.22.

Sokolski, Henry, “A World Provoked,” National Review, July 20, 2006.


Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “German Minister Excludes Nuclear Cooperation with India,” August 30, 2006.

Fox, Jon, “U.S. Nonproliferation Official Draws Committee’s Fire,” Global Security Newswire, July 21, 2006.

Gollust, David, “ U.S. Defends Indian Non-Proliferation Record Despite Sanctions,” VOA News.com, August 7, 2006.

Indo-Asian News Service, “ India to Continue Weapons Programme—Deal or No Deal: Envoy,” August 29, 2006.

Krepon, Michael, Update on the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, The Henry L. Stimson Center, August 21, 2006.

Lee, Barbara, “Exception Should Not Be the Rule for India Nuclear Deal,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 25, 2006, p. B7.

Mufson, Steven, “New Energy on India,” The Washington Post, July 18, 2006, p. D1.

Reuters, “Probe Sought on Delayed U.S. Report on India,” July 28, 2006.

Sanger, David E., “House Approves Nuclear Deal with India,” The New York Times, July 27, 2006, p. A10.

Squassoni, Sharon and Parillo, Jill Marie, U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side Comparison of Current Legislation, Congressional Research Service, August 28, 2006, 21 pp.

Vayas, Neena, “Nuclear Deal: BJP Questions ‘No Testing’ Commitment,” The Hindu, June 30, 2006.


Albright, David and Shire, Jacqueline, Better Carrots, Not Centrifuges: Why Iran Must Halt Enrichment and How the U.S. Can Make It Happen, Institute for Science and International Security, July 10, 2006, 5 pp.

Cooper, Helene and David E. Sanger, “ U.S. Drafting Sanctions as Iran Ignores Deadline,” The New York Times, August 31, 2006, p. A1.

Cooper, Helene, “ Iran Sanctions Could Fracture Coalition,” The New York Times, August 23, 2006, p. A6.

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Al-Rodhan, Khalid R., Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2006, 366 pp.

Dareini, Ali Akbar, “ Iran Ready for ‘Serious’ Nuclear Talks,” Associated Press, August 22, 2006.

Fackler, Martin, “Japanese Company Suspected of Selling Nuclear Equipment to Iran,” The New York Times, August 29, 2006, p. A12.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, “Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Survival, vol. 48 no. 3, Autumn 2006, p. 5.

Freilich, Chuck and Rosecrance, Richard, “Confronting Iran: A U.S. Security Guarantee for Israel?” Middle East Roundtable, July 6, 2006.

Hamilton, Walter, “U.N. Sets Deadline on Iran’s Nuclear Work,” Los Angeles Times, August 1, 2006, p. A5.

Heinrich, Mark, and John, Mark, “ Iran Ignored Incentive Offer at EU Talks, Diplomats,” Reuters, July 13, 2006.

Herzog, Michael, Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program: A Potential Asset for the International Community, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2006.

House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States, August 23, 2006, 29 pp.

Ignatius, David, “Ahmadinejad's High-Stakes Game,” The Washington Post, August 30, 2006, p. A19.

Khan, Adnan R., “The Back Door to Tehran,” Maclean’s, July 31, 2006, p. 38.

Leopold, Evelyn, “UN Gets Iran Incentive Deal,” Reuters, July 14, 2006.

Linzer, Dafna, “ U.S. Spy Agencies Criticized on Iran,” The Washington Post, August 24, 2006, p. A1.

Linzer, Dafna, “ Iran Pushes for Talks without Conditions,” The Washington Post, August 23, 2006, p. A1.

Linzer, Dafna, “ Iran Rejects Offer for Nuclear Talks; Demand for Immediate Freeze Cited,” The Washington Post, August 22, 2006, p. A11.

Lowe, Robert and Spencer, Claire, eds., Iran, Its Neighbors and the Regional Crises, Chatham House, 2006, 52 pp.

Lynch, David J., “ Nuclear Program a Source of Pride for Iranians,” USA Today, August 28, 2006, p. A1.

Maleki, Abbas, and Afrasiabi, Kevah L., “ Iran's Diplomacy in Action,” Agence Global, August 23, 2006.

Mazzetti, Mark, “Some in G.O.P. Say Iran Threat is Played Down,” The New York Times, August 24, 2006, p. A1.

Myers, Steven Lee, “ Russia Says it Opposes U.N. Sanctions on Iran,” The New York Times, August 26, 2006, p. A7.

Parsi, Trita and Porter, Gareth, Influencing Iran’s Nuclear Options, The National Iranian American Council, August 7, 2006.

Perkovich, George, “Diplomacy: For Now,” The Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2006, p. A10.

Perkovich, George and Goldschmidt, Pierre, Why Iran Should Suspend First, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 13, 2006.

Rubin, Alissa J., “ Iran Declares Another Nuclear Advance,” Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2006, p. A5.

Sagan, Scott D., “How to Keep the Bomb from Iran,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 45.

Slackman, Michael, “ Iran Won’t Give Promise to End Uranium Effort,” The New York Times, August 23, p. A1.

Slackman, Michael, “ Iran Defiant as Nuclear Program Deadline Nears,” The New York Times, August 22, 2006, p. A12.

Smyth, Gareth and Turner, Mark, “Security Council sets Iran Deadline,” The Financial Times, August 1, 2006, p. A4.

Spiegel, Peter, “ Iran Rebuff of U.N. Likely, U.S. Official Says,” Los Angeles Times, August 18, 2006, p. A4.

Zenko, Micah, “Share the Evidence on Iran,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2006, p. A15.


Katz, Yaakov, “ Israel buys 2 German subs,” The Jerusalem Post, August 22, 2006.

North Korea

Associated Press, “ North Korea Says It Will Bolster Its Nuclear Weapons Program,” July 26, 2006.

Auslin, Michael R., “ North Korea’s Marshall Plan,” The Wall Street Journal Asia, August 15, 2006, p. 13.

Aversa, Jeannine, “ Banks Said Severing Ties with N. Korea,” Associated Press, August 29, 2006.

Boustany, Nora, “Even on an Easy Day, Negotiating the Hard Line,” The Washington Post, July 21, 2006, A14.

Demick, Barbara, “In N. Korea, Weapons Are Key Instrument of Power,” Los Angeles Times, July 30, 2006, p. A6.

Demick, Barbara, “ U.S., Allies Try to Prod N. Korea to the Table; But Pyongyang Responds to Threats of Sanctions with Defiant Talk of Retaliation and War,” Los Angeles Times, July 27, 2006, p. A5.

Eberstadt, Nicholas, Nuclear Shakedown, American Enterprise Institute, July 14, 2006.

Fairclough, Gordon, “ Pyongyang Deepens Tehran Ties with Suspected Arms Exports,” The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2006, p. A4.

Fitzgerald, Alison, “ U.S. to Treat All North Korea Transactions as Suspect,” Bloomberg, August 25, 2006.

Graham, Allison, “Hold North Korea Accountable for Its Nuclear Arms,” The Baltimore Sun, July 23, 2006, p. A19.

Hayes, Peter, Stop Hyperventilating, Start Talking, Nautilus Institute, July 7, 2006.

International Crisis Group, After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead? August 9, 2006, 16 pp.

International Herald Tribune, “ North Korea Linked to Asian Banks,” August 20, 2006.

Knox, Olivier, “ China, Japan, US Call for Resuming N. Korea Talks,” Agence France-Presse, July 16, 2006.

Kralev, Nicholas, “ Pyongyang Visit Tied to Nuclear Reactor,” The Washington Times, July 20, 2006, p. A1.

Kwanwoo, Jun, “Stubborn North Korea Alienating Even Its Few Friends: Analysts,” Agence France-Presse, July 29, 2006.

Kyodo News Agency, “ Japan to Impose Additional Sanctions on North Korea: Foreign Minister,” July 28, 2006.

Kyodo News Agency, “ Japan Working on Financial Transfer Sanctions on North Korea,” July 18, 2006.

Mihm, Stephen, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” The New York Times Magazine, July 23, 2006, p. 36.

Reuters, “Senate Backs North Korea Nonproliferation Act,” July 25, 2006.

Reuters, “ Russia Urges Caution in UN action Toward N. Korea,” July 5, 2006.


Broad, William J. and Sanger, David E., “ U.S. Disputes Report on New Pakistan Reactor,” The New York Times, August 3, 2006, p. A6.

Kemp, Danny, “ Pakistan Says New Nuclear Reactor ‘Safe in Our Hands,’” Agence France-Presse, July 31, 2006.

Nelson, Dean, “ Pakistan Upgrades Nuclear Arsenal,” The Sunday Times, July 30, 2006.

Warrick, Joby, “ U.S. Says It Knew of Pakistani Reactor Plan,” The Washington Post, July 25, 2006, p. A11.

Warrick, Joby, “ Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program,” The Washington Post, July 24, 2006, p. A1.

III. Nonproliferation

Bender, Bryan, “A Pledge to Track Uranium Fades,” Boston Globe, July 17, 2006.

Bond, Richard, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Three Years On, British American Security Information Council, August 2, 2006, 8 pp.

Chuen, Cristina and William C. Potter, The Oslo Symposium: On The Road To HEU Minimization, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 22, 2006.

Fox, Jon, “ U.S. Needs More Work to Trace Nuclear Blasts, Experts Say,” Global Security Newswire, July 31, 2006.

Gottemoeller, Rose, “U.S.-Russia: Holding the Line Against Nukes,” International Herald Tribune, August 25, 2006.

Heber, H. Josef, “U.S.-Russian Plutonium Deal Flounders,” Associated Press, July 22, 2006.

ITAR-TASS, “ Russia Takes Back Uranium from Polish Research Reactor,” August 11, 2006.

Kempe, Frederick, “The New Atomic Age Requires New Nonproliferation Strategy,” The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2006, p. A6.

Nuclear Weapons and Materials Monitor, “ROSATOM Head Says Russia No Longer Willing to Accept U.S.-Origin Spent Fuel,” July 17, 2006.

Reuters, “More Nuclear Fuel Removed from Libya, U.S. Says,” July 26, 2006.

Reuters, “ U.S. Converts Surplus Weapons Uranium into Power Fuel,” July 13, 2006.

RIA Novosti, “ Russia Says 137 Nuclear Submarines Scrapped Under Global Program,” July 12, 2006.

Ruppe, David, “Details Sought on Nuclear Counterterrorism Plan,” Global Security Newswire, July 19, 2006.

Sanger, David E., “ U.S. and Russia Will Police Potential Nuclear Terrorists,” The New York Times, July 15, 2006, p. A8.

Saudabayev, Kanat, “ Kazakhstan’s Example: Denuclearization is the Way to Go,” The Washington Times, August 21, 2006, p. A17.

Schneider, Barry R. and Davis, Jim A., eds., Avoiding the Abyss: Progress, Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat, Praeger Security International, August 2006, 430 pp.

Shchedrov, Oleg, “ Russia Sees Non-Proliferation Cooperation Slowing,” Reuters, June 30, 2006.

Sokolski, Henry, ed., Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats, U.S. Army War College, June 2006, 173 pp.

IV. Missiles and Missile Defense

Associated Press, “ Japan, U.S. Find 6 of 7 North Korean Missile Tests Successful,” August 6, 2006.

Baluyevsky, Yuri, “ U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense: Now What?: Who Needs the Missile Umbrella and What For?,” Defense and Security, July 28, 2006.

Bermudez, Joseph, “Agni III IRBM Fails in Test Launch,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 19, 2006, p. 30.

Buckley, Chris, “ China Low Key in Outcry over North Korea Missiles,” Reuters, July 5, 2006.

Burns, Robert, “Rumsfeld Urges Russia to Join U.S. Plan to Convert Some Nuclear Weapons to Conventional Role,” Associated Press, August 28, 2006.

Butler, Amy, “Staying Power: Decades-Old Minuteman ICBM’s to Serve Longer Than Anticipated,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 3, 2006, p. 29.

Cloud, David S., “Rumsfeld Sees Some Progress in Missile Plan ,” The New York Times, August 28, 2006, p. A10.

Griffith, Stephanie, “ Iran Present at North Korea Missile Launch Says US,” Agence France-Presse, July 20, 2006.

Hoge, Warren, “U.N. Council, In Weakened Resolution, Demands End to North Korean Missile Program,” The New York Times, July 16, 2006, p. A8.

Holly, John, “Missile Defence: A Necessity Not a Luxury,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 19, 2006, p. 50.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, Summer 2006, 122 pp.

Kim, Jack, “ Iran Working with N. Korea on Missiles: Institute,” Reuters, August 3, 2006.

Kirgis, Frederic L., North Korea’s Missile Firings, American Society of International Law, July 24, 2006.

Kueter, Jeff and Plieninger, Andrews, “A Path Forward for Missile Defense,” Marshall Institute Policy Outlook, June 2006.

Litovkin, Viktor, “Russian General Slams BMD,” United Press International, July 31, 2006.

Lynch, Colum, “Security Council Rebukes N. Korea; Nations Agree to Demand End of Missile Program,” The Washington Post, July 16, 2006, p. A13.

Mannion, Jim, “General to Recommend U.S. Missile Defense Sites in Europe Soon,” Agence France-Presse, August 15, 2006.

Onishi, Norimitsu and Sanger, David E., “6 Missiles Fired by North Korea; Tests Protested,” The New York Times, July 5, 2006, p. A1.

Poland Business Newswire, “ Russia to Respond if U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in Europe, Former Russian Chief of Staff Says,” July 19, 2006.

Priest, Dana and Faiola, Anthony, “N. Korea Test-Fires Long-Range Missile,” The Washington Post, July 5, 2005, p. A1.

Reuters, “N. Korean Missile Broke Up Soon After Launch: Reports,” July 29, 2006.

Rumsfeld, Donald H., “ U.S. Needs Ability to Intercept Missiles,” The Chicago Sun-Times, August 31, 2006, p. A33.

Ruppe, David, “ U.S. Senate Committee Cuts Bush Plan to Arm Strategic Missiles with Conventional Warheads,” Global Security Newswire, July 24, 2006.

Sieff, Martin, “U.S. Navy to double BMD ships,” United Press International, August 22, 2006.

Sieff, Martin, “ Japan’s Long Road on BMD,” United Press International, August 17, 2006.

Spiegel, Peter, “ Israel Says Syria, Not Just Iran, Supplied Missiles to Hezbollah,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2006, p. A1.

White, Jeffrey, “ U.S. Mission: Missile Defense Base in Europe,” Christian Science Monitor, July 18, 2006.

V. Chemical and Biological Arms

Associated Press, “Wanted: Youths to Help Disarm Weapons,” August 6, 2006.

The Baltimore Sun, “Under a Microscope,” August 1, 2006.

Eilperin, Juliet, “Problems Plague Army Weapons-Burning,” The Washington Post, July 4, 2006, p. A5.

Global Security Newswire, “ U.S. Biodefense Laboratory May Have Been Infiltrated During Cold War, Scientists Say,” July 31, 2006.

Mauroni, Al, Where are the WMDs? The Reality of Chem-Bio Threats on the Home Front and the Battlefront, 2006, Naval Institute Press, 2006, 333 pp.

McClatchy News Service, “$28B Helps, But Bioterror Still a Threat,” August 8, 2006.

Randerson, James, “No Action on Bio-Terrorism Loophole,” The Guardian, August 1, 2006.

Schollmeyer, Josh, “Under the Sea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2006, p. 11.

Teterin, Nikolai, “ Russia Confirms Obligations to Eliminate 8 Tons of Chemical Weapons,” ITAR-TASS, July 5, 2006.

Warrick, Joby, “Custom-Built Pathogens Raise Bioterror Fears,” The Washington Post, July 31, 2006, p. A1.

Warrick, Joby, “The Secretive Fight Against Bioterror,” The Washington Post, July 30, 2006, p. A1.

Wong, Edward, “As Trial Begins, Poison Attack Haunts Kurds,” The New York Times, August 21, 2006, p. A1.

VI. Conventional Arms

Bolkcom, Christopher, Richard F. Grimmett, and Alan K. Kronstadt, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications, Congressional Research Service, July 6, 2006, 9 pp.

Brown, Drew, “Ammo Anxiety: Finding, Destroying Hidden Arms Caches Challenges U.S. Teams,” Detroit Free Press, August 31, 2006.

Bruno, Michael and Doyle, John M., “Don’t Hold Your Breath: Even if Leadership in Congress Changes Next Year, There’s Little Appetite for Big Reforms in Export Control Laws,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 17, 2006, p. 100.

Cloud, David S., “Inquiry Opened Into Israeli Use of U.S. Bombs,” The New York Times, August 25, 2006, p. A1.

Cloud, David S., “ Israel Asks U.S. to Ship Rockets with Wide Blast,” The New York Times, August 11, 2006, p. A1.

Cloud, David S. and Cooper, Helene, “ U.S. Speeds Up Bomb Delivery for Israelis,” The New York Times, July 22, 2006, p. A1.

Cullison, Alan, “ Russia Reaches Out to Venezuela,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2006, p. A6.

Department of State, To Walk the Earth in Safety, June 2006, 54 pp.

Government Accountability Office, Defense Technologies: DOD’s Critical Technologies Lists Rarely Inform Export Control and Other Policy Decisions, July 2006, 26 pp.

Government Accountability Office, Export Controls: Improvement’s to Commerce’s Dual-Use System Needed to Ensure Protection of U.S. Interests in the Post-9/11 Environment, June 2006, 76 pp.

Harvey, Benjamin, “Missiles Neutralizing Israeli Tanks,” Associated Press, August 4, 2006.

Kassianova, Alla, Enter Rosoboronexport, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2006, 6 pp.

Matthews, William, “ U.S. Lawmakers ‘Vent’ About Pakistan F-16 Deal,” Defense News, July 24, 2006, p. 3.

Merle, Renae, “As U.S.-Indian Alliance Grows, Defense Firms Seek to Profit,” The Washington Post, August 31, 2006, p. D1.

Monaghan, Elaine, “Lawmakers Raise Concerns About Lack of Notice on Aircraft Sale to Pakistan,” CQ Today, July 12, 2006.

Raghuvanshi, Vivek, “Indian Air Force Wants More Jets,” Defense News, July 17, 2006, p. 28.

Raghuvanshi, Vivek, “ India to Build 1,000 T-90 Tanks,” Defense News, July 17, 2006, p. 64.

Spiegel, Peter and King, Laura, “ Israel Says Syria, Not Just Iran, Supplied Missiles to Hezbollah,” TheLos Angeles Times, August 31, 2006, p. A1.

Stohl, Rachel and Rhea Myerscough, “Anti-Terror Ally or Not, Pakistan Doesn’t Deserve Our F-16s,” The Baltimore Sun, August 16, 2006, p. A13.

Wayne, Leslie, “British Arms Merchant with Passport to the Pentagon,” The New York Times, August 16, 2006, p. C1.

Weinberger, Sharon, “Here We Go Again: Industry and Government Revisit U.S. Export Controls. But Will the Second Time be a Charm?” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 17, 2006, p. 82.

VII. U.S. Policy

Dickinson, Tim and Stein, Jonathan, “Chronicle of a War Foretold,” Mother Jones, September/October 2006, p. 61.

Hersh, Seymour M., “Watching Lebanon: Washington’s Interest in Israel’s War,” The New Yorker, August 21, 2006, p. 28.

Hersh, Seymour M., “Last Stand: The Military’s Problems with the President’s Iran Policy,” The New Yorker, July 10, 2006, p. 42.

Lee, Christopher, “Cold War Missiles Target of Blackout,” The Washington Post, August 21, 2006, p. A1.

Norris, Robert S. and Kristensen, Hans M., “ U.S. Nuclear Threats: Then and Now,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2006, p. 69.

Wayne, Leslie, “Late and Costly: Pentagon Still Pays; Spending More for Less is Frequent in Weapons Projects Since 9/11,” The New York Times, June 11, 2006, p. C1.

VIII. Space

Cooper, Henry F. and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Robert L., “Lost in Space,” The Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2006, p. A12.

Ottoboni, Julio, " Russia and Brazil Seek to Make VLS Development Partnership
Official," Sao Paulo Gazeta Mercantil, August 28, 2006.

Reid, T.R., “Military to Idle NORAD Compound,” The Washington Post, July 26, 2006, p. A2.

Taylor, Jessica, “Experts Debate Space-Based Missile Defense Assets,” United Press International, July 26, 2006.

IX. Other

Antidze, Margarita, “Georgian Parliament Demands Russian Troops Leave,” Reuters, July 18, 2006.

Arkin, William M., “The Continuing Misuses of Fear” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2006, p. 42.

Baker, Peter, “ U.S. and Russia to Enter Civilian Nuclear Pact,” The Washington Post, July 8, 2006, p. A1.

Cormier, Bill, “ Argentina to Expand Peaceful Nuclear Program to Meet Energy Needs,” Associated Press, August 24, 2006.

Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons to Improve Oversight of Other Sites’ Cleanup Activities, July 2006, 117 pp.

Lewis, John Wilson and Xue, Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War, Stanford University Press, July 2006.

Linzer, Dafna, “Report on Prewar Intelligence Lagging,” The Washington Post, July 30, 2006, p. A7.

Lumetta, Gregg J., Kenneth L. Nash, Sue B. Clark, and Judah I. Friese, eds., Separations for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in the 21 st Century, American Chemical Society, 2006, 348 pp.

Mazzetti, Mark, “Senator Faults Bid to Classify Report on Iraq,” The New York Times, August 4, 2006, p. A6.

Wald, Matthew L., “Slow Start for Revival of Reactors; Even the Utilities Differ Over Whether Nuclear is the Energy Answer,” The New York Times, August 22, 2006, p. C1.



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