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"In my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [Arms Control Today] is one and it's the only one my husband and I fight over who gets to read it first."

– Suzanne DiMaggio
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
April 15, 2019
December 2005
Edition Date: 
Thursday, December 1, 2005
Cover Image: 

Subcontinental Nightmares

Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. By Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty

Robert M. Hathaway

 

Although tensions between India and Pakistan have ebbed over the past two years, South Asia remains a brew of festering national, religious, sectarian, communal, and ethnic animosities. India and Pakistan have fought four wars since the two countries achieved independence in 1947, and both tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Periods of “peace” routinely see artillery exchanges, cross-border infiltration, and the sponsorship of insurgency in the territory of the other. Many Pakistanis believe that India has unjustly occupied territory that rightfully belongs to their country. Kashmir remains a flashpoint, which as recently as 2002 contributed to the mobilization of one million heavily armed men along their common border.

It is unsurprising then that President Bill Clinton once famously called South Asia “the most dangerous place in the world.” Many South Asians view remarks such as those of Clinton as condescending and racist, implying that Asians, unlike Americans and Russians during the Cold War, cannot be trusted to manage their nuclear arsenals with restraint and common sense. These criticisms have come even as Pakistan has occasionally sought to play on U.S. nuclear fears to prod Washington into greater activity to help resolve the political disputes— Kashmir above all—that, left unchecked, might lead to war in the subcontinent.

After all, with the exception of the sharp but brief engagement on the heights of Kargil in 1999, India and Pakistan have not fought a full-fledged war since the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. So, how have these two bitter rivals, despite repeated crises and profound mistrust, avoided a major war over the past few decades? How crucial have the United States and other outside powers been in restraining such a conflict? Will this good fortune continue?

In Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty attempt what they describe as “the first comprehensive analysis of Indo-Pakistani crisis [behavior] in South Asia’s nuclear era.” They do not use “comprehensive” in the traditional sense of all-encompassing or exhaustive, but rather to indicate that their purview encompasses all the Indo-Pakistani crises, major and minor—six by their count—over the past 20 years. Short chapters offer concise but useful summaries of each of the six: the brief 1984 flurry when Islamabad (and Washington) worried that India might launch preventive air strikes against Pakistan’s nascent nuclear facilities; the 1987 “Brasstacks” crisis; the April 1990 war scare; the mutual fear of pre-emptive nuclear strikes that followed the May 1998 nuclear tests first of India, then Pakistan; the 1999 Kargil war, which may have resulted in nearly 2,500 battle deaths; and the 2002 standoff that followed the December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament building in New Delhi.

The underlying premise of Fearful Symmetry is that Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons capabilities and the possibility that military conflict might escalate to the nuclear level have been the main deterrent to a major war in the six crises of the past 20 years. The authors quite sensibly place considerable emphasis on the “stability-instability paradox,” which holds that nuclear weapons can be simultaneously stabilizing and destabilizing. At the macro level, nuclear arsenals provide stability because both sides fear that full-scale hostilities could escalate to the nuclear level. However, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons also permits, even encourages, small-scale probes, such as that undertaken by Pakistan in Kargil in 1999, because decision-makers assume that their adversary’s response must of necessity be proportionate.

The study’s finding that nuclear weapons have been a force for peace in South Asia is plausible insofar as it goes, yet leaves the reader unsatisfied. The authors announce that they write from “a theoretical perspective” best described as “mere realism.” Still, one hungers for some tangible proof regarding the efficacy of deterrence, rather than its mere assertion. In this context, proof would probably require access to key internal documents central to the Indian and Pakistani decision-making process or unusually candid interviews with leading political and military actors who actually participated in the key decisions for war and peace. Ganguly and Hagerty are probably correct that a fear of escalation to the nuclear level was a factor in such decision-making. They may even be correct that it was the decisive factor. Nonetheless, they might have tempered their repeated assertions to this effect by conceding that the evidence leading to such a conclusion is lacking and their judgments are necessarily speculative.

Ganguly, a prolific scholar, has elsewhere argued[1] that Pakistani decision-makers have consistently and grossly underestimated Indian military prowess and likely Indian responses to military challenges, a theme to which he and Hagerty return in the current study. Nor has the record of Indian decision-making been exemplary; note the authors’ indictment of the misjudgments that left New Delhi unprepared to detect the Kargil incursion at an early moment. This being the case, then, one can draw little comfort from their confidence that nuclear deterrence, because it has succeeded in the past, can be relied on to save the region from large-scale war, conventional or nuclear. Indeed, the authors concede that India and Pakistan are each years away from adequate safeguards against the accidental launch of a nuclear armed missile. Nor do they give sufficient attention to the nightmarish scenario of a crazed fanatic or group of extremists deliberately throwing the region into nuclear Armageddon, a scenario that, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, one cannot absolutely dismiss.

A new, analytically sophisticated study by Indian scholar Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan, reminds us that no consideration of nuclear deterrence in South Asia is complete if it focuses exclusively on India and Pakistan. China also is an integral element in the security equation of South, or, as Rajain prefers, “Southern,” Asia. To Rajain, this “triangular nuclear competition...is qualitatively different, has far more variables working simultaneously and remains geo-strategically more dangerous” than the Soviet-U.S. nuclear rivalry of the Cold War. Rajain also argues that the psychological attitudes of decision-makers at moments of crisis will perhaps influence their choices in irrational or at least unpredictable ways, which should further erode our confidence in deterrence theory predicated on a rational actor model. Decision-makers in Beijing, Islamabad, and New Delhi, Rajain warns, “should not lull themselves into thinking that a credible minimum deterrent posture would prevent crisis and outbreak of hostilities.” Ganguly and Hagerty would not disagree with this caution, but the tone of their study is considerably less emphatic on this point.

As for U.S. actions, Ganguly and Hagerty judge that in some instances, as during the 1999 Kargil war, the United States has played a constructive role in lowering tensions. On other occasions, however, especially during the 1984 and 1998 crises, Washington has been “inept,” “ineffective,” or “counterproductive.” The United States, they add, can and should do more to encourage forward movement on the contentious Kashmir issue, now as always the most likely trigger for a major Indo-Pakistani war. Washington must move from crisis management to conflict resolution, they contend. The book’s final chapter offers a step-by-step road map for Washington to encourage a more positive Indo-Pakistani relationship.

If all that were required was a more proactive U.S. policy. Yet, Ganguly and Hagerty acknowledge that a resolution of the Kashmir dispute would undermine the dominance, even the legitimacy, of Pakistan’s major power brokers: the army, of course, but also neo-feudal landowners, the business establishment, and “Islamists of various sociopolitical hues.” A splendid new book by Husain Haqqani, Pakistani journalist, scholar, and former adviser to Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, makes much the same point. Continued hostility between India and Pakistan, Haqqani argues in Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, provides the Pakistan army with a justification for retaining the reins of political power.

Haqqani offers a sobering exploration of the unholy alliance, historical and current, between the Islamists and Pakistan’s all-powerful army. Almost from the moment of Pakistan’s creation, he writes, the country’s leaders, not seeing the mullahs as a serious threat and believing they could use an Islamic ideology for their own ends, promoted the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state. Ayub Khan, who seized power in 1958 as Pakistan’s first military ruler, “envisioned Islam as a nation-building tool, controlled by an enlightened military leader rather than by clerics.” The parade of generals who succeeded him, up to and including Pervez Musharraf, have followed the same course. Yet, by embracing the notion of an ideological state, the nation’s civilian and military leadership opened the way for a time when the mullahs would demand a controlling voice in the affairs of that state.

To this day, Haqqani writes, Musharraf views the country’s secular politicians, not the Islamists, as his principal rival for political power and regards the latter as useful political allies. This gives Pakistan’s Islamist parties a greater influence than they could hope to exercise in an open, democratic political system because, when given the opportunity to vote in free elections, Pakistanis have consistently opted for secular rather than religious leadership. Today, as in the past, military rule foments religious militancy in Pakistan with sweeping implications for important U.S. national security objectives. The alliance between mosque and military, Haqqani judges, “has the potential of frustrating antiterrorist operations, radicalizing key segments of the Islamic world, and bringing India and Pakistan yet again to the brink of war.” In the struggle against terrorism, he cautions, Pakistan is a U.S. “ally of convenience, not of conviction.”

The Pakistani army for 50 years has been guided by a national security policy tripod, the three legs of which emphasize Islam as the national unifier, rivalry with India as the principal objective of the state’s foreign policy, and alliance with the United States as the handy means to defray the costs of Pakistan’s massive military expenditures. All three policy legs, Haqqani stresses, have served to encourage extremist Islamism. So long as this policy tripod continues to dominate the mindsets of Pakistan’s leaders, genuine peace with India will remain impossible.

Almost from the beginning, U.S. thinking about Pakistan has been characterized by willful self-delusion. Washington wrongfully assumed a similarity of U.S. and Pakistani aims during the Cold War. A Republican White House and a Democratic Congress thought they could use Pakistan’s intelligence services to unleash jihad in Afghanistan without having to worry about how else Islamabad might employ the jihadis. The United States allowed itself to believe that generous military assistance during the 1980s would give Pakistan the confidence to forgo the development of a nuclear weapons capability. Even in the face of compelling evidence that Pakistani officials at the highest levels have peddled nuclear secrets to anyone with cash, Washington has pretended that Islamabad shares its nonproliferation agenda. Successive U.S. administrations have seen the army as a bulwark against the Islamists and have viewed Pakistan as a force for moderation in the Islamic world. All comforting pipe dreams divorced from reality.

Today, the argument takes the form that abandoning Musharraf opens the door for religious extremism. This line of reasoning fails to recognize how responsible the army is for the rise of religious zealotry in Pakistan. Washington professes to see the army as the only realistic alternative to Islamist radicalism, but given the alliance between mosque and military, sustaining the military’s right to govern Pakistan has the effect of perpetuating the influence of radical Islamists. Continued U.S. support for the Pakistani military, Haqqani warns, “makes it difficult for Pakistan’s weak, secular, civil society to assert itself and wean Pakistan from the rhetoric of Islamist ideology.” The United States, in this analysis, becomes an enabler of the very extremism it opposes.

It is a lamentable fact that Pakistan’s civilian politicians have failed their country badly. Haqqani’s study reminds us, however, that the army has never permitted the politicians to govern nor allowed politics to take its course. Here as well, Washington has been something of a co-conspirator, making but meek protest as the military and the intelligence services manipulate elections, harass civilian politicians, and support Islamic parties that promote extremism and spew anti-American hatred. A senior U.S. official recently observed that Musharraf is a “hero in our eyes.”[2] Little wonder the general does not take Washington’s periodic comments about democracy seriously. Little wonder that the Pakistani man in the street finds it difficult to accept the sincerity of America’s fine words about promoting democracy in the Islamic world.

The United States, Haqqani writes, can no longer afford to ignore “ Pakistan’s state sponsorship of Islamist militants.” This dark picture of Pakistan contrasts starkly with the image of Pakistan as a moderate, tolerant, progressive state that Musharraf evokes when addressing Western audiences. Perhaps closer to the truth were his 2004 remarks to Pakistani editors, when he declared that “ Pakistan has two vital national interests: Being a nuclear state and the Kashmir cause.” Each, notably, brings Pakistan into conflict with the United States and with India.

So, what might be done to reduce the dangers inherent in the region? Rajain worries that deterrence may not suffice and urges all three Southern Asian nuclear powers to negotiate transparent confidence-building measures and to guard against miscommunication, misperception, and misinterpretation. Ganguly and Hagerty display greater faith in the efficacy of deterrence but call on the United States to be more proactive in brokering a political settlement in Kashmir. Haqqani believes that the Kashmir dispute will not be resolved nor peace between India and Pakistan ensured until Washington severs its support for military regimes in Islamabad. For starters, perhaps we can have a little less talk of Musharraf being a “hero in our eyes.”


Robert M. Hathaway is director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.


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ENDNOTES

1. Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 ( New York and Washington, DC: Columbia University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001).

2. Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, “Earthquake Aid for Pakistan Might Help U.S. Image,” The Washington Post, October 13, 2005.

 

A Review of Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons by Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty

Books of Note

Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Effective International Verification
By Berhanykun Andemicael and John Mathiason, Palgrave Macmillan, June 2005, 224 pp.

In this extensive survey, former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UN officials Berhanykun Andemicael and John Mathiason explore a compelling question: Can verification of international nonproliferation agreements actually work? Although their answer is an emphatic “yes,” they are careful to address the many limitations of existing verification bodies, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the IAEA, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. These limits include the failure to win universal membership and budgetary and personnel problems. The authors lay out a plan that can be followed to tackle these issues.



The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation
By Graham S. Pearson, Palgrave Macmillan, October 2005, 352 pp.

Graham S. Pearson examines the international community’s efforts to investigate Iraq’s possession of chemical and biological weapons and efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Pearson focuses on how inspection and verification measures evolved over a 10-year period in Iraq, basing most of his findings on reports produced by the various teams of U.S. and UN inspectors who were in Iraq between 1991 and 2003. Given the success of these efforts, he argues that the latest group of UN inspectors, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), should be preserved and given a mandate beyond Iraq. He also provides a framework for strengthening the regimes for the inspection, verification, and nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons.



Beyond Hiroshima
By Douglas Roche, Novalis, October 2005, 280 pp.

The recent failure of the 2005 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference to agree on any substantive nuclear nonproliferation or disarmament item revealed an increasing divide between states that possess nuclear weapons and states that do not. Douglas Roche, Canada’s former ambassador for disarmament, addresses this divide and offers some suggestions as to how concerns of nuclear-weapon states can be met while eventually achieving nuclear disarmament. He supports following the example set by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention: a nuclear weapons convention would prohibit the production and use of all nuclear weapons in all circumstances. Roche acknowledges, however, that this is not possible without addressing the key legal, political, and technical issues that are of particular concern to nuclear-weapon states. He argues that an incremental-comprehensive approach to disarmament would enable the world both to avoid a future Hiroshima and at the same time achieve increased security against terrorists and breakout states.


Are you interested in purchasing these books? You can help support the Arms Control Association by visiting one of our partners.

 

or 

 

Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Effective International Verification. By Berhanykun Andemicael and John Mathiason, Palgrave Macmillan, June 2005, 224 pp.

The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation. By Graham S. Pearson, Palgrave Macmillan, October 2005, 352 pp.

Beyond Hiroshima. By Douglas Roche, Novalis, October 2005, 280 pp.

December 2005 Bibliography

OF SPECIAL INTEREST

D’Amato, C. Richard, et al., 2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2005, 271 pages.

Drogin, Bob, and John Goetz, “How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of ‘Curveball,’ ” The Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2005.

Gelb, Leslie, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Declare War,” The Atlantic Monthly, November 2005.

Graham, Bob, “What I Knew Before the Invasion,” The Washington Post, November 20, 2005, p. B07.

Sciolino, Elaine, and Elisabetta Povoledo, “ Italy’s Top Spy Names Freelance Agent as Source of Forged Niger-Iraq Uranium Documents,” The New York Times, November 4, 2005, p. A1.

Von Drehle, David, “Wrestling With History,” The Washington Post Magazine, November 13, 2005, pp. 12-30.

I. PROLIFERATION

INDIA

Bagchi, Indrani, “ U.S. Reiterates: Separate Nuke Facilities,” The Times of India, November 16, 2005.

Giacomo, Carol, “ India Envoy Warns on Changes to U.S. Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, November 22, 2005.

Larkin, John, “ India Bets on Nuclear Future,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2005, p. A12.

Mishra, Raja, “2 Sentenced in Case Tied to India’s Nuclear Missiles,” The Boston Globe, November 22, 2005.

IRAN

Agence-France Presse, “ Iran Hands Over Suspected Atom Bomb Blueprint: IAEA,” November 18, 2005.

Agence-France Presse, “ Iran Takes Tough Stance Ahead of UN Nuclear Meeting,” November 20, 2005.

Agence-France Presse, “ Britain Certain Iran Developing Long-Range Weapons,” November 29, 2005.

Agence-France Presse, “Iranian FM Denounces Nuclear Apartheid,” November 30, 2005.

Broad, William, and David Sanger, “The Laptop: Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s Nuclear Aims,” The New York Times, November 13, 2005, p. A1.

Broad, William, and David Sanger, “Bush and Putin Want Iran to Treat Uranium in Russia,” The New York Times, November 18, 2005, p. A5.

Der Spiegel, “ Tehran Lends Pyongyang a Helping Hand,” November 28, 2005.

Fiorill, Joe, “ Iran is Test of IAEA Relevance, Gingrich Says,” Global Security Newswire, November 16, 2005.

Henry, Terrence, “The Covert Option,” The Atlantic Monthly, December 2005.

Sanger, David, “ U.S. and Europe to Give Iranians New Atom Offer,” The New York Times, November 10, 2005, p. 1.

NORTH KOREA

Chi-dong, Lee, “North Korea Nuke Talks End With Limited Success,” Yonhap News Agency, November 11, 2005.

China Daily, “Sense of Urgency Defines Latest Talks,” November 10, 2005.

Faiola, Anthony, “N. Korea Gains Aid Despite Arms Standoff,” The Washington Post, November 16, 2005, p. A15.

Joo-hee, Lee, “Forum Kicks Off Amid New Round of Six-Party Talks,” The Korea Herald, November 12, 2005.

Kahn, Joseph, “ North Korea and U.S. Spar, Causing Talks to Stall,” The New York Times, November 12, 2005, p. A6.

Kessler, Glenn, “ North Korea Rushes to Finish Reactor,” The Washington Post, November 9, 2005, p. A24.

Koch, Andrew, “US Moves to Step Up Pressure on North Korea,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 2, 2005, p. 5.

Kyodo News Agency, “ North Korea Says U.S. Has ‘No Intention to Negotiate,’ – Talks Sources,” November 10, 2005.

Kyodo News Agency, “ North Korea Again Complains about U.S. Sanctions on Firms,” November 11, 2005.

Kyodo News Agency, “ U.S. Negotiator Urges North Korea to Shut Down Reactor ‘Now,’ ” November 10, 2005.

Kyodo News Agency, “ Japan’s Envoy at Six-Party Talks Says North Korea’s Demands ‘Not Constructive,’ ” November 10, 2005.

Lies, Elaine, “ U.S. Wants China to Clean Up North Korea Nuclear ‘Mess,’” Reuters, November 19, 2005.

Sanger, David E., “ U.S. and Seoul Share a Goal but Not a Strategy on North Korea,” The New York Times, p. A8.

Yonhap News Agency, “South Korean Negotiator Admits North Raised ‘Unwanted Issues’ at Six-Way Talks,” November 10, 2005.

Yonhap News Agency, “Japan-North Korea Talks on Ties Likely Early Next Year – Spokesman,” November 15, 2005.

Yonhap News Agency, “ South Korea, China Call for ‘Flexibility’ to Continue North Talks,” November 16, 2005.

RUSSIA

Nolin, Pierre Claude, The Security of WMD Related Material in Russia, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2005, 9 pages.

UK

Agence-France Presse, “ Britain Still Needs Nuclear Arms, Defence Minister Says,” November 1, 2005.

Chuter, Andrew, “ Britain Debates Future of its Nuclear Deterrent,” Defense News, November 7, 2005, p. 3.

Norton-Taylor, Richard, “ Britain Still Needs Nuclear Weapons,” The Guardian, November 2, 2005.

VENEZUELA

Forero, Juan, and Larry Rohter, “Venezuela’s Leader Covets a Nuclear Energy Program,” The New York Times, November 27, 2005, p. A14.

II. MISSILE DEFENSE

Bishnoi, Rati, “Air Force Mulls Revamping SBIRS High Program Once Again, Officials Say,” Inside Missile Defense, November 23, 2005, p. 1.

Bishnoi, Rati, and John Liang, “ U.S., Japan to Build New Missile Defense Radar for East Asia,” Inside Missile Defense, November 9, 2005, p. 1.

Gertz, Bill, “Russian Warhead Alters Course Midflight in Tests,” The Washington Times, November 21, 2005.

Liang, John, “Decision on Europe-Based GMD Interceptor Site Could Come by April,” Inside Missile Defense, November 23, 2005, p. 2.

Mannion, Jim, “ U.S. Discussing Missile Defense Site in Europe with Poland,” Agence-France Presse, November 16, 2005.

Mecheam, Michael, “X Marks the Spot,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 7, 2005, p. 39.

Wolf, Jim, “ U.S. Said Mulling Ending Airborne Laser Project,” Reuters, November 30, 2005.

III. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Hoehn, William, Status Report on Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Appropriations for International WMD Threat Reduction Programs and Activities, The Russian-American Nuclear Security Council, November 2005, 11 pages.

Hanley, Charles, J., “Nightmare of ‘Loose Nukes,’ Still Haunts,” Associated Press, November 1, 2005.

IV. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND ARMS TREATIES

Agence-France Presse, “ Spain Defies U.S., Seals Arms Deal with Venezuela,” November 28, 2005.

Agence-France Presse, “ India Successfully Test Fires Supersonic Cruise Missile,” November 30, 2005.

Masood, Salman, “Focusing on Quake Aid, Pakistan Delays F-16 Purchase,” The New York Times, November 5, 2005, p. A3.

Raghuvanshi, Vivek, “ India Boosts Aircraft Buy, Widens Supplier Options,” Defense News, November 21, 2005, p. 34.

Sprenger, Sebastian, “Lugar, Obama Aim to Expand CTR for Conventional Weapons Destruction,” Inside Missile Defense, November 9, 2005, p. 2.

Zelany, Jeff, “Obama-Lugar Proposal Targets Stockpiles of Conventional Weapons,” The Chicago Tribune, November 2, 2005.

V. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ISSUES

Aldhous, Peter, “The Bioweapon is in the Post,” New Scientist, November 9, 2005.

Schneidmiller, Chris, “OPCW Extends National Implementation Deadline,” Global Security Newswire, November 16, 2005.

VI. U.S. POLICY

Curry, Tom, “Obama Builds Foreign Policy Credentials,” MSNBC.com, November 3, 2005.

Merle, Renae, “A Nervous Eye on Defense Firms,” The Washington Post, November 11, 2005, p. D01.

Ruppe, David, “Nuclear Bunker-Buster Cut, Not Necessarily Killed,” Global Security Newswire, November 4, 2005.

Scott, William B., “Nuclear Course Correction,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 7, 2005, pp. 82-86.

Shane, Scott, “Defense of Phosphorous Use Turns Into Damage Control,” The New York Times, November 21, 2005, p. A14.

Sterngold, James, “ U.S. Alters Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congress Rejects ‘Bunker Busters’ for More Reliable Arms,” The San Fransisco Chronicle, November 28, 2005.

VII. SPACE

Bishnoi, Rati, “DOD Opposes Creating Advisory Committee to Oversee Space Control,” Inside Missile Defense, November 9, 2005, p. 3.

John, Libby, “Air Force Space Command Working on Improving Space Cadre,” Inside Missile Defense, November 9, 2005, p. 5.

VIII. REGIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCES AND ISSUES

Chernyak, Igor, and Yuri Gavrilov, “Baluyevsky: We Do Not Plan to Attack NATO,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, November 1, 2005.

 

 

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