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“For half a century, ACA has been providing the world … with advocacy, analysis, and awareness on some of the most critical topics of international peace and security, including on how to achieve our common, shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.”

– Izumi Nakamitsu
UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
June 2, 2022
January/February 2004
Edition Date: 
Thursday, January 1, 2004

U.S., UK Devising Plans for Libya Inspections

Paul Kerr

Washington and London are developing specific arrangements for inspectors fully to evaluate Libya’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and to verify its recent agreement to eliminate them. President George W. Bush stated Dec. 19 that such efforts will include inspectors from “international organizations,” but it is unclear what this means because there are no international inspection regimes to verify compliance with agreements involving missiles or biological weapons.

Teams of U.S. and British intelligence experts have completed two initial visits to Libya to assess its weapons programs, but the tasks of assessing the rest of Tripoli’s weapons programs and dismantling its related facilities remain. U.S. officials have said that two existing international organizations—the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—will be involved in future chemical and nuclear disarmament efforts. It is uncertain, however, exactly how the U.S. and British governments will divide the remaining work with these agencies.

A National Security Council (NSC) spokesperson told Arms Control Today that U.S. and British intelligence experts are working with Libya to inventory its weapons programs. In the longer term, the spokesperson said, the OPCW’s role is likely to be limited to its traditional mandate under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): conducting inspections of relevant chemical facilities and monitoring the destruction of chemical weapons. Libya has said it will accede to the CWC but has not yet done so.

The IAEA monitors states-parties’ compliance with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but its role also remains uncertain. A Dec. 22 IAEA press release stated that Libya has agreed to follow “a policy of full transparency and active cooperation” with the agency, as well as conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. Libya already has full-scope IAEA safeguards, but the additional protocol will allow the agency to conduct more intrusive inspections.

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has already visited several Libyan nuclear sites since Tripoli’s announcement and told the Associated Press Dec. 30 that the agency has “the mandate” to verify Libya’s nuclear activities and “intend[s] to do it alone.” Department of State spokesman Adam Ereli stated Dec. 31, however, that “[t]here will be other [U.S. and British-led] teams going back to Libya” to assess its nuclear activities.

Although Libya has agreed to adhere to its existing commitments under the Biological Weapons Convention and destroy missiles with ranges and payloads exceeding the Missile Technology Control Regime’s guidelines, no international inspections regimes exist to ensure Libyan compliance. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said Dec. 22 that Washington and London can “devise…appropriate mechanisms” in the absence of an “international capability.” These could include U.S. and British personnel, as well as other permanent members of the UN Security Council, a senior administration official told reporters. A British official told Arms Control Today Dec. 23 that London is still deciding on what it views as the appropriate mechanism to conduct inspections for missiles and biological weapons.

The NSC spokesperson said that Washington has not considered a role for the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)—the organization formed in 1999 to verify Iraq’s compliance with its UN disarmament obligations, including dismantling its prohibited missile and biological weapons programs. Former Executive Chairman Hans Blix wrote in a Wall Street Journal editorial last May that UNMOVIC’s experience could make it a valuable organization for conducting such inspections.

As of the end of December, the Libyan sites under investigation had not been disclosed, but a senior administration official said that Libya has recently revealed mustard agent it produced at a facility near Rabta. In addition, a 2001 Department of Defense report noted an attempt to build an “underground chemical production facility at Tarhunah” during the 1990s. Libya also has its Tajura Nuclear Research Center, which contains a research reactor under IAEA safeguards.

 

 

 

 

 

Washington and London are developing specific arrangements for inspectors fully to evaluate Libya’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and to verify its recent agreement to eliminate them...

Libya Vows to Dismantle WMD Program

Paul Kerr

Following months of secret meetings with U.S. and British officials, Libya’s Foreign Ministry announced Dec. 19 that it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, disclose all relevant information about those programs, and allow inspectors to verify its compliance. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair praised Tripoli’s decision, and Bush indicated it could pave the way for improved relations with Washington. Plans for conducting inspections are still being developed, Department of State spokesman Adam Ereli stated Dec. 30.

According to a White House fact sheet, Libya has agreed to “eliminate…its chemical and nuclear weapons programs,” as well as destroy ballistic missiles with ranges and payloads exceeding guidelines set by the Missile Technology Control Regime, an export control regime that aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles. Tripoli has also agreed to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and adhere to its commitments under the Biological Weapons Convention and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Furthermore, Libya agreed to conclude an additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. Additional protocols grant the IAEA authority to conduct more rigorous, short-notice inspections at undeclared nuclear facilities to check on suspected clandestine nuclear activities.

Blair said Dec. 19 that Tripoli’s announcement was the result of discussions with U.S. and British officials that began after Libya approached the United Kingdom in March 2003 to resolve concerns it was pursuing WMD development.

On Dec. 19, Libya’s Foreign Ministry said it made the decision to come clean of “its own free will,” but the ministry’s statement failed to quash widespread speculation about the government’s motives. The White House has argued that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq last spring was one factor in changing Libya’s behavior. Indeed, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton issued what may have been a veiled threat last April, saying that Iraq’s fate should signal that “the cost of [Libya’s] pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is potentially quite high.”

Additionally, a State Department spokesperson observed Dec. 31 that an October 2003 interdiction of components for gas centrifuges used in enriching uranium may have influenced Libya’s eventual decision to cooperate. However, a senior U.S. intelligence official told reporters shortly after Libya’s announcement that the interdiction was not the precipitating event because the talks had been ongoing for some time (see page 37).

In a Dec. 20 BBC interview, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stressed the role of diplomacy, stating that Libya has been trying to rejoin the international community after years of isolation and arguing that Libya’s announcement is “a result of painstaking diplomacy…going back for six or seven years where we sought to re-establish a diplomatic relationship.”

Libya’s relations with the international community have gradually improved during the past several years. Most recently, the UN Security Council decided in September formally to lift sanctions imposed in 1992 in response to Libyan involvement in the bombing of two planes in the 1980s. The sanctions were lifted after Libya agreed to take formal responsibility for the attacks and pay compensation. The United Nations had earlier suspended the sanctions following Libyan cooperation with investigations into the attacks. (See ACT, October 2003.)

The United States, however, abstained from the UN vote, declaring that it would maintain its series of bilateral sanctions on Tripoli, noting its WMD programs and “history of involvement in terrorism.” The Bush administration has long expressed concerns about Libya’s weapons program, and intelligence reports claimed that the sanctions suspension had improved Libya’s ability to acquire WMD-related technologies. (See ACT, March 2003.)

There are a number of U.S. sanctions against Libya—some imposed in response to Libya’s suspected support for terrorism—that prohibit a wide range of economic activities. In addition, the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act allows the United States to punish foreign companies for certain investments in Libya’s vital oil and gas industries as well as for providing goods or services that contribute to Libya’s ability to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

Bush implied that this policy could change, stating Dec. 19 that Libya’s “good faith will be returned” with the prospect of “far better” bilateral relations if it follows through on its commitments to forswear weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Bush did not elaborate, however, and a senior administration official said “there has been no specific discussion about lifting sanctions or any other specific benefits.”

Libya’s Weapons Programs

A senior Bush administration official told reporters Dec. 19 that Libya disclosed a great deal of information about its weapons programs and allowed teams of U.S. and British intelligence experts to visit in October and early December. The senior intelligence official told reporters that Libya gave the teams an extraordinary level of access to dozens of sites. Libya’s cooperation has enabled U.S. and British officials to obtain a clearer picture of Libya’s weapons activities, but the investigation continues.

Libya’s chemical weapons program is its most advanced WMD program. The administration official said Libya showed the teams a “significant quantity” of mustard agent produced “more than a decade ago,” as well as unfilled bombs, dual-use precursor chemicals, and stored chemical production equipment. CIA director George Tenet told Congress in February 2003 that “Libya clearly intends to re-establish its offensive chemical weapons capability.”

Libya also disclosed its efforts to develop Scud missiles of longer range with assistance from North Korea and provided access to relevant facilities. The senior intelligence official said the teams were shown a missile with an 800-kilometer range. A November 2003 CIA report stated that, “with continued foreign assistance, Libya will likely achieve a [Medium Range Ballistic Missile] capability.”

There is no public indication that Libya has an active biological weapons program. The administration official said Libya “admitted to past intentions to acquire equipment and develop capabilities related to biological weapons” and gave the teams access to dual-use facilities. According to the same 2003 CIA report, Tripoli was attempting to acquire “dual-use capabilities that could be used to develop and produce [biological weapons] agents.”

Perhaps the most important revelation is that Libya was developing a gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility. Such facilities can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The senior administration official said Dec. 19 that Libya had complete centrifuges and “thousands” of centrifuge components but did not have an operating enrichment facility. The United States has not indicated that Libya actually enriched any uranium.

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said the agency will work to verify Libya’s “past and present nuclear activities,” according to a Dec. 22 press release. The agency also acknowledged that the IAEA had not known about Libya’s enrichment program, which includes a “now dismantled” pilot facility. Although “a Libyan official” told the agency Dec. 20 that it imported both centrifuge components and natural uranium, Tripoli failed to report “some of these activities” to the IAEA as required under its safeguards agreement. The agency did not specify which activities fell into this category.

After visiting Libya a few days later, ElBaradei told CNN Dec. 29 that Libya’s nuclear program “is at a very early stage” and that Libya was several years from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Although the senior intelligence official said the United States had indications of an enrichment program since the late 1990s, previous public U.S. intelligence reports had not mentioned it. A CIA report covering the first half of 2003 expressed concern about Libya’s “continued interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure upgrades” and pointed to Libya’s potential civil nuclear-cooperation deals with Russia as potential opportunities for Libya to obtain dual-use nuclear technologies. A 2001 Pentagon report assessed that “Libya... made little progress” on its nuclear program because the program “[lacked] well-developed plans, expertise, consistent financial support, and adequate foreign suppliers.”

 

 

 

 

 

Following months of secret meetings with U.S. and British officials, Libya’s Foreign Ministry announced Dec. 19 that it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, disclose all relevant information about those programs...

Reality Check: Libya and Iran

Daryl G. Kimball


In the past month, two states long suspected of pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—Iran and Libya—have been persuaded to allow intrusive international inspections. Although some in the Bush administration believe the threat of pre-emptive war forced the issue, the reality is different and more complex. Rather, each case demonstrates the importance of preventive diplomacy, international nonproliferation treaties and inspections, and economic sanctions and incentives designed to compel compliance.

Last year, special International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections revealed that Iran has conducted secret nuclear activities with bomb-making potential. The Bush administration and a tough IAEA report kept the matter on the front burner. Yet, it was French, German, and British diplomats who ultimately persuaded Iranian leaders to agree to an additional protocol allowing tougher IAEA inspections and temporarily stop uranium enrichment activities. In return, the Europeans are offering closer technical and economic ties.

Libya went even further. President Moammar Gaddafi announced December 19 that Libya would verifiably dismantle its biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Gaddafi also agreed to eliminate Libya’s aging Scud missile force, as well as halt suspected nuclear weapons-related activities.

Libya’s announcement is clearly part of a broader effort to end years of suffocating sanctions for its past support for terrorism and WMD ambitions. Early last year, Libya finally settled claims concerning its role in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, prompting the United Nations to lift sanctions. British and U.S. officials deserve credit for closing the deal, but Gaddafi initially contacted officials in London with the hope that discarding his WMD programs might lead to better relations with the United States and Europe.

Both states must now follow through on their important nonproliferation commitments by fully and promptly cooperating with IAEA inspectors. Iran should be pressed further. Even with strict compliance with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran might someday withdraw from the treaty and build nuclear weapons. To remove doubts about the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program, Iran should permanently freeze uranium-enrichment activities, which could be used to make bomb material.

Verifying Libya’s pledge to end its biological and chemical weapons capabilities and ballistic missile work will require a more creative approach. There is no standing inspectorate for ballistic missile control and, due to U.S. opposition, there is no verification system for the 1972 Biological Weapon Convention. Libya has not yet signed the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, which allows for on-site inspections. The UN Security Council should consider giving the job to the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission, which was created to deal with the same types of weapons in Iraq.

The United States should respond with positive measures, including the lifting of remaining WMD-related sanctions, if these states demonstrate that they have indeed chosen to forswear these dangerous, destabilizing, and expensive weapons. Such a course would make it clear to others that compliance with the nonproliferation regime is more beneficial to their security than the pursuit of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

At the same time, U.S. and European policymakers must address weaknesses in their nonproliferation strategies, highlighted by the Iranian and Libyan cases. The IAEA’s investigations will certainly show that the Iranian and Libyan nuclear programs received vital technical assistance from other states, including Pakistan.

Unfortunately, past and current U.S. administrations have chosen not to deal with all proliferators with the same vigor. As Undersecretary of State John Bolton boldly stated to Arms Control Today in a November 14 interview, “There are unquestionably states that are not within existing treaty regimes that possess weapons of mass destruction legitimately. We’re not trying to have a policy that attempts to cover each and every one of those circumstances.” The United States can no longer afford to focus on the WMD programs of its adversaries while ignoring the proliferation behavior of its friends and allies, especially the three nuclear-weapon states that are not NPT members: India, Israel, and Pakistan.

The international community should build on recent progress in Iran and Libya with energetic diplomatic efforts in other areas of tension around the globe. The United States and the international community must also work harder to achieve a more open, transparent, and secure world through tougher inspections everywhere. By promptly ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in its own security policy, and following through with its own NPT disarmament commitments, the United States can help encourage others to join the protocol and turn away from nuclear weapons.

 

 

 


Senators Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and Jack Reed (D-R.I.) are members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee. Levin is the committee’s ranking Democrat.

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China Stresses Common Approach With Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy

Paul Kerr

The Chinese government recently issued a “White Paper” describing its nonproliferation policies that represents a rhetorical progression from earlier Chinese statements. The paper stresses Chinese policies consistent with the U.S. nonproliferation approach and downplays differences between the two, placing special emphasis on export control policies designed to prevent the transfer of materials that can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The paper, made public Dec. 3, portrays China as a country that takes its nonproliferation obligations seriously. It states, “[W]ith its strong sense of responsibility, China has…formulated a whole set of non-proliferation policies and put in place a fairly complete legal framework on non-proliferation and export control. It has taken positive and constructive measures to accelerate the international non-proliferation process with concrete actions.”

According to the paper, these measures include adhering to a variety of international arms control agreements, including the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). China also agreed in November 2000 to act in accordance with guidelines set by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and refrain from assisting states in developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, even though it is not a member of the MTCR.


The majority of the paper is devoted to a comprehensive, detailed description of China’s export control “practices,” which, the paper is careful to emphasize, are consistent with international norms. These include maintaining “control lists” of proliferation-sensitive exports, requiring licenses for such exports, demanding certification that end-users of exported items will not divert them to military purposes, and employing “catch-all” controls which require exporters to apply for export licenses if they “[know] or should know” that the exported item poses “a risk of proliferation.” These controls “form a complete system for the export control of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and…all military products,” the paper adds.

Beijing has been strengthening its export controls during the past decade. For example, China published export control regulations for missiles and related components in August 2002 after agreeing to do so as part of its November 2000 pledge to limit further its missile exports. China also issued new export regulations for chemical and biological materials and related equipment in October 2002.

Washington continues to express concerns that China is not effectively enforcing its export laws. Department of State spokesman Adam Ereli stated Dec. 3 that the United States believes China has “enacted good legislation” but that U.S. “focus is on implementation and enforcement.”

Although the paper states that Beijing’s enforcement record has improved and cites instances where violators have been caught and punished, the United States remains skeptical.

A November CIA report acknowledged improvement in China’s nonproliferation policies but cautioned that “proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern.” The report cites possible Chinese cooperation with Iranian and Pakistani nuclear programs; Iran’s chemical weapons program; and missile programs in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and North Korea. The Bush administration has imposed sanctions on Chinese firms multiple times for illicit technology transfers. (See ACT, September 2003.)

Furthermore, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter not only told Congress in July that China is failing to enforce its export control laws properly, but also implied that China sometimes deliberately allows sensitive technology transfers to occur. (See ACT, September 2003.) DeSutter further stated that China has maintained chemical and biological weapons programs in violation of the CWC and BWC.

A Shift in Tone

In addition to describing China’s progress in enacting export control policies, the paper discusses the role of arms control in international security. Although this discussion does not articulate specific policy changes, its tone and emphasis distinguishes it from past high-level Chinese statements on nonproliferation.

The White Paper’s focus is similar to the Bush administration’s approach to arms control, which places less emphasis on international arms control agreements and stresses “supply-side” efforts to prevent the transfer of WMD materials, particularly the enforcement of export controls.

In contrast, both China’s 1995 White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament and its 2002 Defense White Paper devote much more space to the question of nuclear disarmament and complaints about U.S. policies, such as the U.S. pursuit of missile defenses, although they also portray Beijing as working to curb WMD proliferation and describe improvements in its export control policies.

For example, the 1995 White Paper argued that stemming nuclear proliferation is “part of the process of eliminating such weapons,” alluding to Article VI of the NPT, which commits nuclear weapons states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race…and to nuclear disarmament.” This latest White Paper, however, states that the purpose of nonproliferation is “to safeguard and promote international and regional peace and security,” and it only references disarmament in passing.

Yet, this change in tone and emphasis is not as abrupt as it may first appear. An October 2002 article by China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya struck a tone similar to that of the most recent White Paper.

The most recent statement also articulates differences between the two countries’ approaches. For example, it explains that China stresses “peaceful means” to deal with proliferation threats, adding that “proliferation issues must be settled through dialogue and international cooperation”—an apparent reference to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq last spring.

 

 

 

 

 

The Chinese government recently issued a “White Paper” describing its nonproliferation policies that represents a rhetorical progression from earlier Chinese statements...

Deconstructed: North Korea's Nuclear Programs

Paul Kerr

President George W. Bush has declared that he will only support an agreement with North Korea that contains measures to verify the complete and irreversible end of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs. Yet, implementing such an agreement will be complicated by U.S. officials’ limited intelligence about these programs. North Korea’s closed society and strict control of information, along with an apparent paucity of relevant human intelligence, have forced U.S. officials to make intelligence assessments based on relatively limited information. In fact , these intelligence assessments have sometimes shifted over time without any new public evidence warranting the shift.


Any verification scheme resulting from a new agreement with North Korea will have to account for both its plutonium- and uranium-based nuclear programs. The following is a summary of the best publicly available information about Pyongyang’s nuclear programs.

 

Plutonium Programs

At least some of North Korea’s plutonium facilities are already known to the United States and have been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring under a 1994 agreement—the Agreed Framework—between the two countries.

Pre-1992 Nuclear Activities

The current North Korean nuclear crisis originated in 1992 when the IAEA uncovered evidence that North Korea had separated more plutonium from spent fuel generated by its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon than it had initially declared to the agency. In an attempt to determine how much plutonium North Korea had actually produced, the IAEA demanded “special inspections” in 1993 of two suspected nuclear-waste storage facilities that North Korea had not declared to the agency.

North Korea reacted to the IAEA request by announcing its intention to withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), sparking a diplomatic crisis that was ultimately resolved in October 1994 when the United States and North Korea concluded the Agreed Framework. That agreement charged the IAEA with monitoring a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon as well as approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods. The agreement also mandated that the agency be allowed to finish its inspections after an international consortium had completed a “substantial portion” of the construction of two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors promised to North Korea. The construction of the reactors, however, lagged far behind schedule prior to the project’s suspension at the beginning of December 2003. The IAEA has never been able to conduct full inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. (See ACT, December 2003.)

U.S. intelligence assessments that North Korea has built one or two nuclear devices are believed to be based on estimates of the amount of spent fuel North Korea reprocessed prior to 1992 (approximately 12 kilograms, according to a reported CIA estimate).

Post-January 2003

Since ejecting IAEA inspectors in December 2002 and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, North Korea has restarted the Yongbyon reactor, announced that it has completed reprocessing the spent fuel placed in storage under the Agreed Framework, and implied that it is using the plutonium to fabricate nuclear weapons. Scientists say that such an amount of spent fuel could yield enough fissile material for up to six nuclear weapons, depending on the efficiency of North Korean scientists and technicians.

Consequently, any verification scheme will have to determine how much of the spent fuel, if any, North Korea has reprocessed. Such an investigation would include both the area in which the spent fuel was stored and the reprocessing facility, as well as any hot cells that North Korea possesses. Hot cells are small, shielded rooms that can be used to reprocess small amounts of spent fuel. Inspectors will also need to take into account the possibility that North Korea has clandestine reprocessing facilities.

Additionally, inspectors will have to investigate the status of the five-megawatt reactor, including whether North Korea has reprocessed any spent fuel produced since restarting the reactor in February 2003. That reactor can produce fissile material sufficient for approximately one nuclear warhead per year, according to U.S. estimates.

Investigators will also need to assess the status of two larger, incomplete reactors whose construction was frozen under the Agreed Framework. North Korea has implied that it may resume construction of those reactors. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who helped negotiate the 1994 agreement, estimated that these reactors could produce sufficient fissile material for approximately 30 nuclear weapons per year when finished. These reactors are, however, at least several years from completion.

Uranium Enrichment

North Korea denies U.S. charges that it has a gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program. Little is known about this program, including the location of its related facilities. Clandestine centrifuge facilities are widely believed to be more difficult to detect than plutonium-based nuclear programs.

According to U.S. estimates, North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program appears to be significantly less advanced than its plutonium-based program. North Korea is believed to have procured components for a gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility, but there is no publicly available evidence that it has integrated these components into a functioning system capable of producing uranium.

Public CIA assessments about the program have changed significantly during the past year. The CIA said in November 2002 that North Korea was “constructing a centrifuge facility” capable of producing “two or more nuclear weapons per year,” perhaps as soon as “mid-decade.” Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly told Congress in March 2003 that the facility could start producing fissile material in “months and not years.”

Subsequent CIA reports have been increasingly vague. For example, a November report covering the last half of 2002 says only that North Korea “had begun acquiring material and equipment for a centrifuge facility,” with the apparent “goal” of building a plant. Another November report covering the first half of 2003 says nothing about the program.

 

 

 

 

 

President George W. Bush has declared that he will only support an agreement with North Korea that contains measures to verify the complete and irreversible end of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs.

U.S. and North Korea at Impasse Over Talks

Paul Kerr

More than four months after China hosted the first round of six-party talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, discussions remain stalled as Washington and Pyongyang struggle to reach mutually acceptable terms for resuming them. North Korea has implied that it will not attend the next round unless the talks address Pyongyang’s offer to freeze its nuclear program in return for U.S. concessions. Washington repeatedly insists it has no set “preconditions” for its participation but rejects North Korea’s position and wants future talks to focus solely on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

The Dispute

The current standoff is the latest manifestation of a months-long stalemate between the United States and North Korea that has persisted since the August talks. Pyongyang continues to express dissatisfaction with what it claims are vague U.S. responses to its past proposals for resolving the nuclear crisis.

In particular, North Korea has called on the United States to issue a security assurance, normalize bilateral diplomatic relations, refrain from hindering North Korea’s “economic cooperation” with other countries, and increase food aid. Additionally, Pyongyang has demanded that Washington complete the suspended nuclear reactor project and resume fuel oil shipments that were part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. That agreement froze the North Korean nuclear program in exchange for the construction of two proliferation-resistant light-water nuclear reactors, the provision of heavy-fuel oil, and the normalization of diplomatic relations. (See ACT, October 2003.)

The United States has not publicly responded with a comparable counterproposal. Department of State spokesman Adam Ereli reiterated the U.S. position Dec. 19, stating that the United States is “willing” to offer a written, multilateral security agreement “in the context of North Korea’s complete and verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program.” Washington had previously insisted that North Korea dismantle all of its nuclear facilities before the United States would act but has since signaled flexibility regarding the timing of a security agreement. (See ACT, December 2003.)

The Bush administration has not said what North Korea must do before Washington implements such an agreement. White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan said Dec. 18 that the administration “expect[s]” the North Koreans to “achieve benchmarks toward ending their nuclear program” but did not elaborate.

As for North Korea’s other demands, Bush administration officials continue to insist that the United States will not “reward” North Korea for dismantling its nuclear program but that it may address other North Korean concerns if Pyongyang does so.

North Korea has said it is willing to consider the U.S. security proposal, which falls short of Pyongyang’s previous demand for a formal “nonaggression pact,” but Pyongyang has repeatedly expressed reluctance to dismantle its nuclear facilities and weapons before the United States acts, arguing that Washington will simply pocket any concessions in an attempt to “disarm” North Korea.

The dispute over the next round of talks reflects the sensitivity of the timing issue. According to a Dec. 9 statement from the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that, in addition to a written security assurance, Pyongyang wants the United States to take “practical actions” in return for dismantling its nuclear facilities.

To that end, the spokesman stated that resuming the talks depends on the other parties’ willingness to agree to a “first phase” of North Korea’s larger proposal. He stated that North Korea will “freeze [its] nuclear activities” if the United States removes North Korea from its list of states sponsoring terrorism; lifts “political, economic, and military sanctions;” and provides heavy-fuel oil and other energy assistance.

Still, North Korean Foreign Ministry officials have suggested that these preconditions are negotiable. The spokesman described North Korea’s demands Dec. 9 as a “proposed first-phase step.” Additionally, North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il said the same day in Malaysia that Pyongyang would attend a new round of talks if it “will be a process toward the realization of a package solution based on simultaneous actions we have proposed,” Kyodo News reported.

Although President George W. Bush dismissed Pyongyang’s proposal by stating that the U.S. “goal” is for North Korea to “dismantle,” not freeze, its nuclear program, North Korea has repeatedly offered to dismantle its nuclear program as part of a final settlement. KCNA reported Dec. 28 that a Foreign Ministry spokesman described these steps as a “starting point” for solving the nuclear crisis.

The Way Forward

Although consultations among the parties continue, the evident lack of common ground casts doubt on whether another round of talks will yield progress, especially if there is little advance agreement on the meeting’s objectives.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated Dec. 8 that United States, South Korea, and Japan reached agreement on language designed to form the basis for a joint statement resulting from a next round of talks. China, however, which has taken the lead in arranging the talks, was unsuccessful in obtaining North Korea’s agreement.

U.S. differences with other participants over the appropriate approach also remain evident. On Dec. 23, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman admonished “all sides” to be “flexible and more pragmatic” in their approaches, and South Korea’s Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun said Dec. 4 that Washington should “ease its stance for the momentum of dialogue,” Agence France Presse reported.

 

 

 

 

 

 

More than four months after China hosted the first round of six-party talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis...

U.S. Rebukes Russia for Failing to Withdraw Troops From Georgia and Moldova

Wade Boese

The United States is strongly criticizing Russia for failing to live up to past pledges to withdraw its armed forces from Georgia and Moldova. (See ACT, December 2003.)

Secretary of State Colin Powell Dec. 2 expressed regret that Moscow would not complete a total military withdrawal from Moldova by the end of 2003 nor finalize a timetable for vacating Russian-occupied bases in Georgia.

Speaking at a foreign ministers meeting of the 55-member Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Powell urged Russia to undertake the “earliest possible fulfillment” of these actions.

Although other OSCE members backed the U.S. position, Russia remained defiant. It refused to reaffirm its withdrawal commitments, which Moscow first made in November 1999 at an OSCE summit in Istanbul.

Because the OSCE operates by consensus, the meeting ended without a final statement. However, Dutch Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who served as chairman of the meeting, stated that “most ministers” support Russia’s withdrawal from Moldova “without further delay” and urged the “speedy conclusion of negotiations” on Russia’s continuing presence in Georgia.

Georgia and Moldova expressed displeasure at the meeting’s outcome. Georgia described itself as “deeply disappointed” that no agreed statement could be reached regarding its situation, while Moldova called for the “complete and unconditional withdrawal” of Russian forces from its territory.

Russia is making progress in its withdrawal from Moldova, which was initially supposed to be completed by the end of 2002. Russian and OSCE officials estimate that the ongoing task could be finished within seven to eight months if uninterrupted.

Similar optimism had existed in the first half of 2003. But separatists in the Transdniestria region of Moldova, where the Russian forces are located, blocked shipments of arms and ammunition from leaving the region. Although the separatists, who want financial compensation for Russia’s departure, briefly allowed the withdrawal to resume, theyreneged at the end of the year.

In Georgia, Russia continues officially to control two military bases; its forces occupy a third. The two countries remain divided over how long Russian troops should be allowed to remain. Moscow wants them to stay for at least 11 more years, while Tbilisi says three years are enough.

Reinforcing Powell’s OSCE message, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld traveled Dec. 5 to Georgia, where he described Russia’s future withdrawal as a “pretty good idea.” Rumsfeld’s visit was seemingly designed to signal Russia not to try and take advantage of the shifting political scene in Georgia following the Nov. 23 resignation of longtime President Eduard Shevardnadze.

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov replied coolly to Rumsfeld’s remarks the next day, saying, “We are disposed to work constructively so as to find mutually acceptable solutions.”

Until Russia fulfills its withdrawal commitments, the United States and its NATO allies are refusing to ratify the 1999 adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. The accord is an updated version of an existing treaty that limits the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters deployed in Europe by 30 countries, including the United States and Russia.

The Kremlin wants the revised accord to enter into force soon so Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can accede to it before officially joining NATO. The 19-member alliance invited the three countries, along with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, to become members in November 2002; and NATO expects the process will be completed by its upcoming June 2004 summit in Istanbul. (See ACT, June 2003.) None of the three Baltic countries currently have arms limits, leading Moscow to suggest NATO could stockpile huge amounts of weaponry along Russia’s western border.

At the OSCE meeting, Ivanov charged that the treaty’s ratification was being held up by “artificial pretexts.” He added, “If we do not take serious and timely measures, the gap between the system of arms control and the actual politico-military situation in Europe may become unbridgeable.”

Despite the mutual recriminations of foot-dragging, the OSCE meeting was not marked by total discord. The 55 members issued a handbook of voluntary best practices for countries to control the illegal trade in small arms, endorsed a process by which countries can request assistance to destroy excess ammunition stockpiles, and called upon countries to improve export controls of shoulder-fired missiles. None of the measures were legally binding.

 

 

 

 

 

The United States is strongly criticizing Russia for failing to live up to past pledges to withdraw its armed forces from Georgia and Moldova. (See ACT, December 2003.)

Iran Signs Additional Protocol With IAEA

Paul Kerr

Iran signed an additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement on Dec. 18, less than a month after the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution condemning Tehran for pursuing clandestine nuclear activities. States-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) already have IAEA safeguards agreements to ensure that they do not divert civilian nuclear programs to military purposes, but additional protocols grant the IAEA authority to conduct more rigorous, short-notice inspections at undeclared nuclear facilities to ferret out secret nuclear activities.

The IAEA board acted after Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei presented a report detailing numerous instances in which Iran concealed nuclear activities that it was obligated to report to the agency under its safeguards agreement. (See ACT, December 2003.)

In a press statement Dec. 18, the IAEA hailed Iran’s action as a “confidence-building measure.” The move did not come as a surprise. It was first promised as part of an October agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Iranian government has said it would “act in accordance with the protocol’s provisions” even before it formally signed the agreement. Still, the Iranian parliament must ratify the protocol before it formally enters into force. (See ACT, November 2003.)

ElBaradei pointed out that the agency’s ongoing investigation into Iran’s nuclear program—including inspections—will require continued Iranian cooperation. In addition, the IAEA is trying to determine which foreign suppliers may have assisted Iran’s nuclear programs. (See ACT, December 2003.) ElBaradei is due to provide a progress report on the investigation to the Board of Governors in February.

The United States continues to express skepticism about Iran’s cooperation. Department of State spokesman Adam Ereli stated Dec. 18 that Tehran’s signature is a “useful step” but added that Tehran needs to demonstrate that it will live up to its commitments. One U.S. demand that is likely to prove controversial is the Bush administration’s insistence that Iran “abandon” its nuclear-fuel-cycle activities, including uranium enrichment and spent nuclear-fuel reprocessing.

ElBaradei’s November report described an active uranium-enrichment program as well as decade-old instances where Iran conducted prohibited, clandestine reprocessing experiments. Iran agreed to suspend its uranium-enrichment program as part of the October agreement with the European governments but has not pledged to refrain from enrichment activities permanently.

Although neither spent fuel reprocessing nor uranium enrichment are prohibited under the NPT, they must be conducted under IAEA supervision. They are especially worrisome because they can produce the fissile material—plutonium or highly enriched uranium—needed for nuclear weapons.

A November CIA report to Congress contended that “there is a serious risk that Iran could use its enrichment technology in covert activities,” even with intrusive IAEA inspections. ElBaradei acknowledged Dec. 4 that the agency will probably not be able to find small-scale “research and laboratory activities” in countries pursuing clandestine nuclear programs but added that it could detect “industrial scale” weapons programs, according to Reuters.

 

 

 

 

 

Iran signed an additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement on Dec. 18, less than a month after the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution...

Questions Remain Over Failure to Find Iraqi WMD; U.S. Begins Program to Employ Iraqi Scientists

Paul Kerr

The capture of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein Dec. 13 may yield new clues as to whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq last spring. During interrogations with U.S. officials, however, Hussein has reportedly clung to his pre-war claims that Iraq did not possess such weapons.

Iraqi officials repeatedly told UN weapons inspectors that they had unilaterally destroyed their prohibited weapons after the 1991 Persian Gulf War but never provided conclusive evidence that this was the case. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 required Iraq to account for its past weapons programs, and President George W. Bush and administration officials have cited Iraq’s failure to resolve these discrepancies as grounds for the invasion that toppled Hussein’s government.

Hans Blix, the recently retired executive chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), stated during a Dec. 16 press conference that he did not believe Hussein’s capture would result in new discoveries of prohibited weapons because Iraq probably destroyed most of them in 1991. Furthermore, Blix’s successor, Demetrius Perricos, told the UN Security Council Dec. 8 that the October progress report on the U.S.-led investigation into Iraq’s prohibited weapons programs contained little information that was new to the inspectors.

If proven true, Blix’s argument would counter U.S. speculation that Iraq may have destroyed its weapons just prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Bush has offered this theory as a possible explanation for the investigation’s failure to corroborate the administration’s pre-war claims that Iraq possessed prohibited weapons. (See ACT, May 2003.)

Before their work was halted by the invasion, UN inspectors were attempting to account for Iraq’s missing weapons by requesting further documentation and conducting interviews with Iraqi officials. The inspectors also analyzed soil samples taken from sites where Iraq claimed to have destroyed its biological weapons. A Nov. 26 UNMOVIC report stated that inspectors’ recent analysis of these samples indicates that Iraq did destroy biological weapons in the relevant locations but that the inspectors could not quantify the amount destroyed.

UN inspectors reported just before the invasion that Iraq had failed to resolve the issues surrounding its unaccounted-for weapons but added that inspectors possessed no evidence that Iraq either had weapons of mass destruction or had reconstituted its related programs. (See ACT, April 2003.)

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG), the organization coordinating the U.S.-led inspections efforts, has found little evidence to rebut the UN inspectors’ reports. David Kay, a former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector leading the ISG, reported in October that the current investigation had discovered evidence of some low-level, dual-use biological and nuclear research efforts but had found no actual weapons. (See ACT, November 2003.)

Kay also stated that Iraq had been conducting research and development on several different programs to produce missiles exceeding the 150-kilometer range permitted under relevant Security Council resolutions. Kay’s statement, however, contained no evidence that Iraq was actually producing such missiles. The November UNMOVIC report stated that the inspectors ordered Iraq to destroy its al Samoud missiles because their “design was inherently capable of ranges greater than 150 [kilometers]” but added that no evidence was found that Iraq was actually modifying the missiles to achieve this greater range.

Perricos told the Security Council that Kay’s statement generally contained little new information but added that the United States had not yet provided UNMOVIC with a copy of the full, classified version of the ISG report. Perricos also acknowledged that UNMOVIC had been unaware of allegations included in Kay’s report that Iraq attempted to obtain missile technology from North Korea and had a program to extend the range of a cruise missile to 1,000 kilometers. (See ACT, November 2003.)

Press reports that Kay may resign before the ISG’s work is complete have raised questions about the investigation’s future. White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan did not deny the report but said Dec. 18 that the ISG “will continue and complete its work.”

Despite the lack of weapons discoveries, Bush defended the invasion in a Dec. 16 television interview, saying Kay’s findings proved Iraq had “a weapons program” and was “in material breach of Resolution 1441.” He added that there was no difference between Iraq having a “weapons program” and possessing actual weapons, arguing that the September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated that the “possibility that [Hussein] could acquire [prohibited] weapons” was an intolerable risk.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld previously made this argument to the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, stating that the U.S.-led coalition did not invade Iraq “because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of [weapons of mass destruction]; we acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light—through the prism of our experience on 9/11.”

Iraqi Scientists Program Initiated

Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher officially announced Dec. 18 that the United States will begin a two-year program to support the civilian employment of Iraqi personnel with WMD expertise in an attempt to prevent them from assisting other countries seeking weapons of mass destruction. Arms Control Today obtained a draft proposal in November that sketched out the program’s general parameters. (See ACT, December 2003.)

The State Department will create an Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry that will identify the personnel to be included and “facilitate the development and funding of [employment] projects” designed to aid Iraqi reconstruction efforts. According to a department fact sheet, “Some of these programs will be up and running by February,” Boucher said.

The program will be funded by the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and is initially expected to cost approximately $2 million, Boucher said. He noted that another $20 million may be needed for future projects, although that funding has not yet been decided.

 

 

 

 

 

The capture of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein Dec. 13 may yield new clues as to whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq last spring...

Senate Approves New U.S. Ambassador to CD

Wade Boese

After going all of last year without a formal ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), the United States will be represented in 2004 by newly confirmed Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders. The Senate approved Sanders en bloc Dec. 9 with more than 50 other presidential nominations.

Sanders’ first day representing the United States in Geneva will be Jan. 19, when the CD begins the first of its three annual negotiating rounds. Sanders has spent 20 years in government and last served as deputy assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs.

Sanders’ predecessor, Ambassador Eric Javits, now represents the United States at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Bush administration shifted Javits from the CD to the OPCW in September 2002 in a move designed to show U.S. support for the OPCW and dissatisfaction with the conference. U.S. officials initially said that a replacement for Javits would be in place by the start of 2003, but the Bush administration did not nominate Sanders for the position until June of last year.

The CD operates by consensus and has been unable to negotiate an agreement since completing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. Since that time, the conference’s 66 members have been unable to agree on starting any negotiations, except for a few weeks of formal talks in August 1998 on a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

Over the past decade, negotiating an FMCT has been a top U.S. priority at the conference, but Washington has not made much progress toward this objective. For the past several years, China refused to let such negotiations start unless the United States consented to doing the same on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The United States, which plans to explore space-based missile defense systems, has staunchly rejected this linkage.

Yet, at the close of the conference last year, China proposed a compromise. Beijing said it would be willing to approve FMCT negotiations if the United States could agree to less formal talks on outer space. (See ACT, October 2003.)

Whether Sanders and the United States will seize upon this offer remains unclear because Washington has initiated a review of its policy on an FMCT. (See ACT, November 2003.) U.S. officials have refused to discuss the ongoing review until it is concluded.

More broadly, key Bush administration officials have raised questions about the relevance of the conference, criticizing its lack of productivity. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker told the conference in February 2003 that “[w]e must all recognize that the CD as we have known it will not long survive if this malaise continues.”

 

 

 

 

 

After going all of last year without a formal ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), the United States will be represented in 2004 by newly confirmed Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders...

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