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"No one can solve this problem alone, but together we can change things for the better." 

– Setsuko Thurlow
Hiroshima Survivor
June 6, 2016
May 2000
Edition Date: 
Monday, May 1, 2000

Russia Ratifies START II, Extension Protocol; ABM-Related Agreements Also Approved

May 2000

By Philipp C. Bleek

More than seven years after signing the treaty, Russia ratified START II on May 4, also approving a package of agreements that extend the treaty's deadline and clarify issues concerning the 1972 ABM Treaty. The ratification puts additional pressure on the United States at a sensitive time for U.S.-Russian relations as Washington tries to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty to permit deployment of a limited national missile defense. The ratification has also eased criticism of Russia at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference for the nuclear-weapon states' lack of progress on disarmament.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's outspoken support for the treaty and the more politically moderate composition of the newly elected Duma were decisive factors in the parliament's approval of the accord. The Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, passed a resolution of ratification April 14 by a vote of 288-131 with four abstentions. The upper house of parliament followed suit April 19, voting 122-15 in favor of the resolution. On May 4, Putin signed the resolution, officially ratifying the treaty. (See the full text of the resolution.)

Following Duma approval of the treaty, which was widely heralded as a demonstration of the newly elected president's strength and apparent commitment to arms control, Putin said that "for Russia, the conclusion of the START II treaty opens the possibility to ensure its security on a parity basis with the U.S.A." In an April 15 telephone conversation with Putin, President Bill Clinton called the Duma's action "an important step towards the reduction of nuclear arms."

Signed in January 1993 by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin, START II reduces the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,000-3,500 deployed warheads each, eliminates multiple warheads on land-based missiles, and limits warheads deployed on submarine- launched ballistic missiles. The deadline for treaty implementation was originally January 1, 2003.

Bush submitted the agreement to the Senate shortly after it was signed, and the Senate approved it in 1996. Yeltsin submitted the treaty to the Duma in 1995, but the original agreement was never brought to a vote due to insufficient support, based in part on the perception that Russia had made too many concessions in the treaty.

To encourage Russian ratification of the treaty, an agreement to update START II was reached at the U.S.-Russian summit held in Helsinki in March 1997. In September 1997, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and then-Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov signed a protocol to START II extending the deadline for completing reductions by five years, to December 31, 2007. Albright and Primakov also agreed that the United States would have more time to remove warheads from its Minuteman III ICBMs, as required by the treaty, and that both states would deactivate by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II (the U.S. MX missile and the Russian SS-18 and SS-24).

At the same time, the United States and Russia, along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) designating Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as successor states to the Soviet Union for the purposes of the ABM Treaty. The five states also signed agreements clarifying the demarcation line between strategic missile defenses, which are limited by the treaty, and theater missile defenses, which are not.

Although the extension protocol was negotiated to facilitate Russian approval of START II, the Duma repeatedly postponed scheduled votes on the treaty. Two postponements followed the initiation of U.S. airstrikes—first against Iraq in December 1998, and then against Yugoslavia in March 1999—which undermined Russian support for the treaty.

 

Entry Into Force Unlikely Soon

The treaty's entry into force now technically depends on the U.S. Senate's approval of the 1997 START II protocol, but Russia has complicated the situation by linking the protocol to the 1997 ABM agreements. Article 9 of the Russian resolution of ratification specifically makes exchange of the instruments of ratification, the final step required to bring the treaty into force, contingent on Senate approval of all the 1997 agreements.

The Clinton administration has yet to submit the 1997 agreements to the Senate largely because Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has indicated that the ABM-related agreements will be rejected. Helms, along with many other conservative Republicans, believes that the ABM Treaty inappropriately constrains U.S. missile defense development and deployment efforts and that it is no longer in effect without Senate approval of the MOU on succession.

The Duma's ratification legislation also reaffirms what Russian officials have repeatedly stated in recent months: if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty to deploy a limited national missile defense, Russia retains the option to withdraw from START II. Putin emphasized this point in his speech to the Duma prior to the START II vote, stating that if "the United States decides to destroy the 1972 ABM Treaty…we will withdraw not only from the START II treaty but also the whole system of treaties on limitation and control of strategic and conventional weapons."

According to State Department spokesman James Rubin, the administration has not made a final decision on when to submit the 1997 package. In recent weeks, Rubin has repeatedly emphasized that the administration will continue to "consult with Congress" on the 1997 documents and related issues.

 

START III Negotiations Expected

The United States had been unwilling to pursue negotiations on START III until Russia ratified START II, agreeing only to hold "discussions" on the topic, but Russia's ratification has opened the door for formal talks on further strategic reductions. In his April 14 press briefing, Rubin said, "Now we can move in an accelerated way to negotiations on START III." In a statement following the Duma vote, Putin stated that "ratification of the START II treaty opens a way to the start of official talks on further reduction of strategic arsenals of Russia and the U.S.A. in the framework of a START III treaty."

Putin went on to call for reducing deployed nuclear arsenals to 1,500 warheads, instead of the 2,000-2,500 level agreed to by Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki. In response to repeated Russian calls for deeper cuts in recent months, U.S. officials have maintained that they are still only seeking reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads, but some senior administration officials have indicated that the United States may be prepared to negotiate deeper cuts in exchange for Russian concessions on ABM Treaty modification. On April 25, after meeting with Clinton at the White House, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reiterated Russia's call for maintenance of the ABM Treaty but also said, "We are ready to listen to any suggestions."

During a joint briefing to journalists two days later, both Ivanov and Albright highlighted the upcoming summit meeting between Clinton and Putin, currently scheduled to take place June 4-5 in Moscow. According to David Stockwell, a spokesman for the National Security Council, the summit will allow the presidents "to have intensive conversations about and seize opportunities on arms control…and non-proliferation." White House spokesman Joe Lockhart emphasized at an April 28 press briefing that while a breakthrough is unlikely, issues relating to the ABM Treaty, missile defense, and the START process are "certainly high on the agenda."

Russia Ratifies START II, Extension Protocol; ABM-Related Agreements Also Approved

Leaked Documents Detail U.S. ABM Strategy; GOP Says Limited NMD Plans Are Not Enough

May 2000

By Wade Boese

Aiming to win Russian acquiescence to a limited U.S. national missile defense (NMD), the Clinton administration provided Russia with a draft protocol for amending the ABM Treaty and "talking points" detailing why the NMD system would not jeopardize Moscow's nuclear deterrent. Though Washington outlined the proposed defense's limited capabilities and Russia's current and future ability to overwhelm the system, top Russian officials continued to reject negotiations to permit deployment of a U.S. NMD, while senior Senate Republicans warned President Bill Clinton that an agreement along the lines he has proposed would not likely win the Senate's approval.

The 1972 ABM Treaty bars defenses capable of protecting a country's entire territory from strategic ballistic missiles, as well as the base for such a defense, though it allows 100 interceptors to be deployed at a single site around a country's capital or an ICBM field. Air-, sea-, space-, and mobile land-based missile defense systems and components are all prohibited. The Clinton administration is seeking to amend the accord to avoid having to withdraw from the treaty if the president opts later this year to deploy the limited NMD, which would violate the treaty.

In January, the United States gave Russian officials a draft ABM Treaty protocol that would permit both Russia and the United States to deploy national missile defenses limited to 100 launchers and 100 interceptor missiles "within one deployment region within their national territory." The protocol would also permit the upgrading of existing attack-warning radar systems to enable them to "perform ABM radar functions" and allow each country to deploy a single additional ABM radar anywhere within its territory. The protocol and associated U.S. talking points were leaked to The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and made public April 28. (See document.)

The protocol would only cover the initial phase of the administration's NMD plans, which calls for deployment of 100 interceptors and the construction of a new radar in Alaska. The administration plans to eventually field a second site of 125 interceptors, presumably in North Dakota, and an additional 25 interceptors in Alaska, as well as additional radar upgrades and deployment of a satellite system for tracking incoming warheads.

To facilitate future NMD expansion, the draft protocol includes an article that allows one party to request further negotiations anytime after March 1, 2001, to "take into account further changes in the strategic situation…which therefore might require deployment of more effective limited national territorial defense systems." In the leaked documents, the United States said that if the ballistic missile threat grows, which Washington said it believes will happen, the United States would seek further negotiations to deploy "more effective" defenses.

Trying to allay Russian concerns that the proposed NMD system would undercut Russia's nuclear deterrent, the U.S. talking points assert that the initial 100-interceptor system would, in the "best case," be able to destroy 20 to 25 warheads accompanied by primitive defense penetration aids. The "bottom line," according to the talking points, is that the proposed NMD "could protect only against a few dozen ICBM warheads accompanied by sophisticated defense penetration aids."

Dismissing the concern that the proposed missile defense would abet a disarming U.S. first strike, Washington argued that Russia would still be capable of an "annihilating counterattack" if Moscow's nuclear forces are kept on constant alert, thereby allowing a Russian response to be launched before U.S. warheads reached Russian soil. Moreover, the U.S. documents contend that the sheer size and diversity of the Russian nuclear arsenal, with its advanced decoys and penetration aids, could easily overcome the planned defense. Washington noted that under Russia's proposal for START III both countries could have some 1,500 to 2,000 warheads and deploy more than 1,000 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles "over the next decade and thereafter."

The United States had not previously indicated that it would consider reducing to a level of 1,500 deployed warheads. Instead, Washington has publicly insisted that a START III agreement cap deployed warheads at a level of 2,000 to 2,500. But National Security Adviser Samuel Berger told The Washington Post at the end of April that the United States might consider lower START III levels within the context of ABM Treaty talks.

 

Russia Remains Resolute in Its Opposition to NMD

Moscow maintains it is not interested in amending the ABM Treaty. In its April 14 approval of START II, which cuts deployed U.S. and Russian strategic forces to no more than 3,500 deployed nuclear warheads each, the Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, linked Moscow's future adherence to the arms reduction accord with Washington remaining party to the ABM Treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that Russia would withdraw from all arms control treaties, strategic and conventional, if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty.

In an April 25 statement to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned that collapse of the ABM Treaty would "undermine the entirety of disarmament agreements concluded over the last 30 years." He further warned that "compliance with the ABM Treaty in its present form without any modifications is a prerequisite for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament."

To counter what Washington considers rising missile threats posed by the so-called rogue states—an assessment not shared by Russia, China, and most other countries—Ivanov repeated a Russian proposal for a global missile confidence-building and non-proliferation regime. (See news story.) In addition, Ivanov and Putin have said that Russia is willing to discuss and cooperate on non-strategic missile defenses not prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Following two days of talks in Washington to prepare for a June 4-5 Moscow summit between Clinton and Putin, Ivanov said on April 27 that he believes "there is a desire to find solutions to the issues where we differ." But Ivanov stated that "there are certain differences of view, sometimes considerable differences" between Moscow and Washington on U.S. NMD plans.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his remarks to the NPT conference, identified "pressure to deploy national missile defenses" as the most recent challenge facing nuclear disarmament. Annan cautioned that this pressure "could well lead to a new arms race...and create new incentives for missile proliferation." France, China, and other nations made strong statements in support of the ABM Treaty at the conference. (See news story.)

 

GOP Senators Warn Against Limited NMD

Based on administration briefings, 25 Republican senators—including Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R-VA), and Senator John McCain (R-AZ)—sent a letter April 17 to Clinton warning that they opposed "in the strongest terms the effort to conclude an agreement that would purchase Russian consent to the U.S. NMD system in exchange for U.S. reaffirmation of a new, very limiting, legally binding accord." Such an agreement, according to the letter, would have "little hope" of winning Senate approval.

A single NMD site, the Senate critics charged, "cannot effectively protect the United States." To defend against anticipated threats, "more than a single site is necessary," they wrote.

The senators criticized the administration's "phased approach" negotiating strategy as establishing a "permanent cycle of confrontation with Russia," and expressed concern that it would prevent deployment of other "promising missile defense technologies," such as space-based sensors, the Airborne Laser, and sea-based systems, all of which the senators believe are "necessary to achieve a fully-effective defense against the full range of possible threats."

Speaking before the Senate on April 26, Helms argued that Clinton's planned NMD will "leave the United States defenseless." Any modified ABM Treaty negotiated by the administration, according to Helms, will be "dead-on-arrival." He concluded by saying, "The Russian government should not be under any illusion whatsoever that any commitments made by this lame-duck administration will be binding on the next administration."

Secretary of Defense William Cohen, as well as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, responded that the administration would continue its efforts to win an ABM agreement. Cohen asserted that the president is "determined to go forward."

Though the leaked U.S. documents included a statement that Clinton is "counting on making the decision to deploy" the NMD system, White House Press Secretary Joe Lockhart insisted April 28 that no decision has been made. Lockhart reiterated that the president will base his decision on four oft-stated criteria: technological readiness, the maturity of the threat, cost, and arms control considerations.

Leaked Documents Detail U.S. ABM Strategy; GOP Says Limited NMD Plans Are Not Enough

Official Projections of NMD Costs Rise by Billions

May 2000

By Wade Boese

With President Bill Clinton scheduled to decide later this year on whether to deploy a limited national missile defense (NMD) system, government estimates released in April show that costs for deploying the proposed defense could total nearly three to five times the amount commonly reported by the Pentagon. The Defense Department publicly announced cost estimates covering the first phase of a limited defense over a 35-year period, while the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) calculated total costs for an expanded defense through 2015.

After months of providing only the $12.7 billion figure budgeted for NMD deployment from 1999 to 2005, a Pentagon spokesman told reporters April 4 that life-cycle costs of the system from 1991 to 2026 for 100 interceptors at a single site will total $30.2 billion. If inflation is taken into account, the estimate rises to $36 billion.

Shortly thereafter, on April 25, the non-partisan CBO estimated the 100-interceptor system would total $29.5 billion through 2015 and that operating costs would subsequently run about $600 million annually. Deploying a second site with 125 interceptors and adding SBIRS-low satellites, to be used in tracking incoming warheads, as well as in discriminating between warheads and decoys, would push projected costs to nearly $60 billion by 2015.

Answering why the Pentagon estimate was half that of the CBO total, Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon on April 25 described the comparison as one between "apples and golden apples." The Pentagon did not calculate costs for a second site or include costs associated with the satellite system. A spokesman for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, which oversees U.S. missile defense programs, explained that the Pentagon estimate did not account for the satellite system because it will be deployed regardless of whether an NMD is deployed.

CBO assumed the system will require 82 additional interceptors (beyond the 100 to be deployed) for testing and spares, whereas the administration assumed only 47 will be needed. In addition, CBO assumed that after initial deployment, 30 operational tests would be needed over the system's first five years, rather than the 10 tests that are planned.

In reviewing similar missile development programs, CBO also found that, on average, actual costs exceeded projections made at this stage in program development by about 20 percent, and made a similar assumption for the NMD program. Using construction costs of the early 1970s Safeguard missile defense site, which is no longer operational, as a base, CBO also estimated that construction costs for the necessary facilities in Alaska will be more than $1 billion higher than administration calculations.

Echoing other reviews of the NMD program, CBO cautioned that having concurrent development and production schedules could cause "significant problems." Noting that a procurement decision on the interceptors is scheduled for 2003, CBO observed that moving the decision back to 2006 would allow program managers to have "information from significantly more developmental test flights."

CBO also observed that NMD program managers have decided on a third path for dealing with flight-test failures. Rather than replacing subsystems that may have caused a failure or fixing the problem and flying the exact same test mission again, NMD managers—after the last intercept attempt missed the target on January 18—have opted to proceed with their planned flight-test schedule but to pay increased attention to quality control. While reserving judgment on this decision, CBO noted other missile programs have historically used one of the first two approaches.

The next NMD developmental flight test, the third intercept attempt of a planned 19, is scheduled for June 26. Shortly after the upcoming test, the Pentagon will make its recommendation to the president on whether to deploy the system.

Official Projections of NMD Costs Rise by Billions

Putin Signs New Military Doctrine, Fleshing Out Security Concept

May 2000

By Philipp C. Bleek

The Russian Security Council approved and President Vladimir Putin signed a new military doctrine April 21 that replaces the doctrine adopted in 1993 and "fleshes out" the military policy elaborated in Russia's 2000 national security concept, formally adopted in January. (See ACT, January/February 2000.) Like the security concept, the new doctrine appears to lower Russia's threshold for using nuclear weapons when attacked with conventional weapons. It also explicitly states that Russia's nuclear deterrent can be used to respond to all "weapons of mass destruction" attacks and reaffirms Russia's negative security assurances to non-nuclear- weapon states. (See document.)

The military doctrine, an 8,000-word document addressing a wide range of military issues, reaffirms the 1993 doctrine's call for a substantial Russian nuclear deterrent and authorizes the use of nuclear weapons to respond to "large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation. " Like the nuclear policy elaborated in the 2000 security concept, this statement appears to permit the use of nuclear weapons in a broader range of circumstances than the previous version of the security concept, which was issued in 1997 and allowed nuclear weapons use only "in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation."

The doctrine also says Russia "reserves the right to use nuclear weapons" when responding "to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against [Russia] and (or) its allies." This statement, which appears to mirror the implied U.S policy for using nuclear weapons, marks the first time Russia has explicitly permitted the use of nuclear weapons to respond to "weapons of mass destruction" attacks. In 1993, Russia abandoned its declared policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict under any circumstances.

In addition to addressing the use of nuclear weapons, the doctrine also includes a statement on negative security assurances, which delineate situations in which nuclear weapons will not be used. The doctrine states that Russia will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) except in the event of an attack on Russia, its armed forces, or a Russian ally that is "carried out or supported" by a non-nuclear-weapon state "jointly or in the context of allied commitments" with a nuclear-weapon state. This statement closely parallels assurances given by the United States in 1995 and reaffirmed in 1997.

Earlier drafts of the doctrine did not contain negative security assurances, which Russia included in its 1993 military doctrine and reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT review and extension conference. A senior Russian official confirmed that the assurances had been intentionally removed from initial drafts of the new doctrine. They appear to have been reinserted into the doctrine following circulation of an earlier draft.

The new military doctrine, like the 1993 doctrine, also extends Russia's nuclear umbrella to Russia's allies. In an April 25 news conference, Colonel General Valery Manilov, senior deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, stated that allies referred to in the doctrine include Belarus and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that have entered into alliance agreements with Russia.

Russian officials have emphasized that the new doctrine is fundamentally defensive. Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov stated in a recent Russian television interview, "If there is no aggression against Russia and its allies, there will be no use of nuclear weapons." However, in an April 24 interview with the Russian Itar-Tass news agency, Chairman of the Duma Committee for International Affairs Dmitry Rogozin stated that under the new doctrine, "Russia will not be waiting for the aggressor to seize a part of its territory or to destroy its nuclear potential. It will deal the necessary strike itself."

U.S. response has been limited, but in an April 21 press conference, State Department spokesman James Rubin said the administration did not believe the new doctrine indicated a shift in Russia's nuclear weapons policy. "So far we've not seen anything that indicates a dramatic new departure," he said.

Putin Signs New Military Doctrine, Fleshing Out Security Concept

Russia Proposes Global Regime On Missile Proliferation

May 2000

By Matthew Rice

Offering an alternative to missile defense as a means to deal with missile proliferation, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov urged consideration of a Russian proposal for a global missile confidence-building and non-proliferation regime April 25 at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in New York. Combined with further reductions in nuclear arsenals, the regime would enhance international security and existing arms control arrangements by offering a "real alternative to the destruction of the ABM Treaty," Ivanov said.

Formally known as the Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS), the proposed regime was initially introduced by then- Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the June 1999 G-8 summit in Cologne, Germany. It was then discussed in Moscow March 16 at an expert-level meeting convened by the Russian government and chaired by Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov. In attendance were representatives from 46 countries and the United Nations, including Iran and large delegations from China, India, and Egypt. The United States sent an observer but did not participate.

The GCS would increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding by requiring nations to provide notification of pending missile or space-launch vehicle (SLV) test-launches. To discourage proliferation, the GCS would offer incentives to members of the regime that forswore the use of missiles as delivery mechanisms for weapons of mass destruction, including security assurances against the use of missile systems and assistance from the UN Security Council if such weapons were used. In addition, referencing Article IV of the NPT, the regime would provide for assistance in the peaceful uses of space for members that gave up missiles as weapons.

Modest international support has emerged for a stronger missile non-proliferation regime. The Russian statement at the NPT conference noted that Australia, Britain, Canada, and France had all made preliminary proposals on the topic throughout the 1990s. As Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy explained April 25, "There exists no treaty, no code of conduct, no set of guidelines defining responsible behavior in these areas. This is a matter that must be addressed."

The only current restrictions on the transfer of missile-related technology are embodied in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), created by the United States and its G-7 allies in 1987 to stem the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Unlike the NPT, the MTCR is a voluntary, non-binding agreement and membership is restricted. The regime currently has 28 members.

Western countries have expressed a preference that preliminary discussions of a broader system take place within the confines of the MTCR. At an MTCR meeting held in Paris April 23-24, the United States, Britain, and France each offered steps to curb missile proliferation that would reinforce MTCR export controls. Proposed measures included increased dialogue with non-MTCR parties, pre-launch notification for missile and SLV launches, and international standards in the missile field. The proposals will be synthesized for discussion at an MTCR meeting in September to prepare for the regime's October plenary session.

U.S. officials responded to the Russian GCS plan during a January trip to Moscow by State Department Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security John Holum, according to documents leaked to The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and first made public April 28. (See document.) While expressing general interest in the proposal, the United States was critical of specific elements in what it said were the proposal's four main points.

First, while supporting the multilateral exchange of test-launch data, Washington expressed concern that the GCS plan could "legitimize the missile programs of rogue states." Second, it maintained that assuring the security of countries that renounce their missile programs is "unfeasible." Third, the United States argued against using "one-size-fits-all" incentives to encourage states to forgo missile programs at the expense of targeted bilateral efforts, and expressed particular concern that aid to peaceful space programs could be readily applied to military missile programs. Finally, the United States said that the MTCR should remain the only forum for discussing such matters. "We do not believe that broad multilateral discussions will be productive at this time," the U.S. documents state.

Both Russia and the United States have expressed interest in continuing discussion on the GCS. While the Russian government has stated its intention to open the proposal for debate at the "millennium session" of the United Nations General Assembly, which begins September 5, it remains to be seen whether it will be on the agenda for the June summit meeting between Presidents Bill Clinton and Vladimir Putin.

Russia Proposes Global Regime On Missile Proliferation

Russian Duma Approves Test Ban Treaty

May 2000

By Philipp C. Bleek

A week after approving START II and only days before the opening of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference, the Russian Duma approved the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by an overwhelming majority. Once it formally ratifies the treaty, Russia will become the third nuclear-weapon state, after France and Britain, to join the test ban. The U.S. Senate rejected the treaty last October, and China has submitted the test ban to the National People's Congress but has not indicated when it might approve the accord.

In a statement on the day of the April 21 vote, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov praised the Duma for taking a "very important first step…in the interests of Russian security and…international stability." The Russian lower house of parliament approved the test ban by a vote of 298-74, with three abstentions. In a necessary but largely symbolic step in the ratification process, the Federation Council, Russia's upper house of parliament, is likely to vote on and approve the CTBT in the coming weeks. President Vladimir Putin is expected to formally ratify the treaty shortly thereafter.

President Bill Clinton said that he was "pleased" that the Duma had approved the treaty. Administration spokesman Joe Lockhart called the vote "an important step," adding, "We hope that as time goes on…our Senate will follow the lead of many other countries around the world and ratify an important treaty."

Completion of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by 1996 was one of the conditions, formalized in a "principles and objectives" document, for indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. The test ban is seen by the non-nuclear-weapon states as a litmus test of the nuclear-weapon states' commitment to eventual nuclear disarmament. The Duma's approval of the CTBT, together with Russia's recent ratification of START II, is likely to deflect criticism of Russia at the NPT review conference, being held in New York April 24-May 19, for the nuclear-weapon states' lack of disarmament progress.

Criticism of the United States for its failure to ratify the test ban last fall resurfaced in the first week of the NPT review conference. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy echoed the concerns of many diplomats in his April 25 opening statement to the conference when he expressed anxiety about a U.S. "drift towards unilateral options," and called the Senate's rejection of the CTBT "a significant step backwards."

Since being opened for signature on September 24, 1996, the CTBT has been signed by 155 countries and ratified by 56. Of the 44 nuclear-capable states that must sign and ratify the treaty before it can enter into force, 41 have signed and 28 have ratified the treaty. The three signatory hold-outs are India, North Korea, and Pakistan.

The treaty's newest state-party is Morocco, which formally ratified the test ban April 17. On April 27 at the NPT conference, Belarus announced its parliament had approved the CTBT, but the instruments of ratification have yet to be deposited with the United Nations. The Chilean Congress approved the CTBT on April 5, and according to press reports, the Chilean government plans to file its ratification document with the UN soon. Belarus and Chile are two of the 44 states whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force.

Russian Duma Approves Test Ban Treaty

Israel Rebuffs U.S. Demand To Cancel China Arms Deal

May 2000

By Wade Boese

Despite strong public opposition from the United States, Israel is proceeding with the sale to China of an advanced airborne early-warning (AEW) radar system, which U.S. officials warn could affect the strategic balance between China and Taiwan. After April meetings with Defense Secretary William Cohen and President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak would say only that Israel would continue discussions on the deal with the United States.

In a 1996 deal with China worth approximately $1 billion, Israel agreed to equip four Russian-supplied aircraft with the Phalcon system, a state-of-the-art, long-range radar capable of simultaneously tracking multiple airborne and surface targets. U.S. government officials believe, and Israeli officials insist, that no U.S. technology is involved.

If delivered, the Phalcon system—previously supplied to Chile—would provide China's first airborne early-warning and control capability. Taiwan's inventory includes four U.S.-made AEW Hawkeye aircraft, and two more are scheduled for delivery in 2004.

Informed of the sale in June 1996, U.S. opposition only became public last fall. State Department and Pentagon officials contend that Washington has voiced its concerns through diplomatic and military channels since 1996. A National Security Council (NSC) spokesperson said the administration has raised the issue "regularly and repeatedly."

Meeting with Barak on April 3 during a 10-nation visit to Africa and the Middle East, Cohen told a joint press conference, held with the Israeli prime minister, that the United States objected to the Phalcon deal because of its "potential of changing the balance" in the Taiwan Strait. A week later, Cohen repeated Washington's strong opposition and described the sale as "counterproductive" because the technology could find its way back to Israeli rivals in the Middle East.

Barak told the April 3 press conference that Israel was "aware of the sensitivity in the United States with regard to China." However, he said Israel was also "aware of [its] commitments in the contracts that [it has] signed." Barak finished by saying Israel understood the need for "close coordination and contact" with the United States. A senior U.S. administration official reported that Barak repeated similar sentiments in an April 11 meeting with President Bill Clinton in Washington and that discussions would continue.

Barak later met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Israel during the first-ever visit to that country by a Chinese head of state. At a joint press conference April 13, Barak intervened twice to answer questions addressed to Jiang about the deal. While again noting U.S. concerns, Barak described Israeli credibility and Israeli relations with China as being of "high importance."

Israel is concerned about canceling the deal and upsetting China, which Israeli officials worry could lead China to increase weapons exports to countries hostile to Israel. In addition, Israel is reluctant to forfeit a profitable deal with a long-time arms customer that could be picked up by British or French companies that competed for the original sale.

An official for BAE Systems, a British company that manufactures AEW systems, said talks with China have been dormant for several months and that BAE is not currently pursuing any deal. The NSC spokesperson remarked that the United States is "prepared to engage other countries in expressing our concerns about issues that could affect the stability of the Asia- Pacific region." When asked, a U.K. government official said he was "not aware of any direct U.S. government lobbying effort on this particular issue."

In his proposed fiscal year 2001 budget, Clinton requested a total of $2.82 billion in military aid and economic support for Israel. Representative Sonny Callahan (R-AL), chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, indicated he would put a hold on $250 million—the value of one Phalcon system—of the proposed aid unless the Pentagon certifies that the Israeli deal does not jeopardize U.S. national security interests. State Department spokesman James Rubin, however, said April 10 that the radar deal should not be tied to U.S. foreign aid.

Israel, the largest recipient of U.S. aid, is also seeking a security package worth approximately $17 billion, involving arms, as well as greater intelligence and early-warning cooperation with the United States, as part of a potential Israeli peace deal with Syria. With the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations currently stalled, talks on the proposed U.S. security package have been put on hold.

Israel Rebuffs U.S. Demand To Cancel China Arms Deal

NPT Review Conference Opens

May 2000

By Matthew Rice

Marking the first assessment of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since it was extended indefinitely in 1995, delegates of the treaty's states-parties gathered April 24 at United Nations headquarters in New York to open the 2000 NPT review conference. The four-week conference will address the progress made during the last five years on a number of divisive issues, including nuclear disarmament and universal adherence to the treaty.

Disarmament was the top item on the agenda in the conference's first week, with virtually every country bemoaning the nuclear-weapon states' lack of progress toward meeting their obligations under Article VI of the treaty. That goal was reinforced at the 1995 treaty review and extension conference in a document on "principles and objectives," which called for "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."

Progress toward this goal was waylaid largely by Russia's slow ratification of START II and seems hindered by the continued reliance of Russian and NATO military doctrines on nuclear weapons. Matt Robson, New Zealand's minister for disarmament and arms control, said that the nuclear-weapon states "sound too tentative when describing [disarmament] as an 'ultimate goal'" and expressed concern that "nuclear weapons are claimed to be required for security into the 'indefinite' future." New Zealand is a member of the New Agenda Coalition, a group of states that has demanded faster progress toward disarmament.

Disappointment was also expressed concerning the other benchmarks laid out in the "principles and objectives" agreement: completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the start of talks on a treaty halting the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. While the CTBT was completed in 1996, it has yet to enter into force, and the treaty's rejection last fall by the U.S. Senate has called its future into question. Negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty have yet to be started at the Geneva-based UN Conference on Disarmament.

The argument of the nuclear-weapon states, notably the United States and Russia, has been that the START process offers the best path toward the eventual goal of disarmament. This claim was bolstered by the Russian Duma's April 14 approval of START II. "The Russian Duma's recent action on START II undercuts the claim that the bilateral strategic arms reductions process has no future," U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said April 24, noting that the United States approved the treaty in 1996.

In addition, Britain and France have taken steps to reduce the size of their nuclear forces. Britain's 1998 Strategic Defense Review substantially reduced its operational nuclear warhead stockpile to under 200 and reduced the warhead load of each strategic missile submarine from 96 to 48. France has also taken steps to eliminate all land-based nuclear forces and to reduce the size of its sea-based nuclear arsenal.

But other parties openly expressed concern that U.S. pursuit of missile defenses at the expense of the ABM Treaty could spell an end to even this slow progress. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan sounded a warning that "the growing pressure to deploy national missile defenses…is jeopardizing the ABM Treaty…and could well lead to a new arms race, setbacks for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and create new incentives for missile proliferation."

The United States came under particular fire from Russia and China. "The collapse of the ABM Treaty would…undermine the entirety of disarmament agreements concluded over the last 30 years," Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said April 25. Sha Zukang, China's representative to the review conference, said April 24 that U.S. development of a missile defense will "impede the international disarmament process, thus shatter[ing] the basis for international nuclear non-proliferation."

International condemnation of U.S. missile defense plans was not unexpected, though U.S. officials have worked to convince states-parties that the NPT review conference is not an appropriate forum to address the ABM issue. "We are…trying to see if we can find an approach that would allow us to leave our differences on this issue outside the conference room," U.S. representative to the conference Norman Wulf said April 21, expressing hope that the issue would not prove to be "a deal buster at the conference itself."

 

Universal Adherence

Renewing a controversial debate, Egypt and other Middle East states have demanded that pressure be brought to bear on Israel to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Several states, including Brazil, have joined the NPT in the past five years, leaving only four countries—Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan—outside the treaty regime.

The 1995 review conference recognized these concerns in its resolution on the Middle East, which called for universal adherence to the treaty in the region and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In its opening statement April 25 and a working paper submitted April 28, Egypt restated these concerns, calling for states-parties to exert influence on Israel to accede. Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt's representative to the conference, argued that universality is required for the continued viability of the treaty. "The NPT cannot have any credibility with the states of the region as long as one state is exempt from its provisions," he said.

But with the 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, the question of universal adherence has grown, extending beyond the immediate concerns of Israel's neighbors. The United States would like to see a consensus statement that encourages universal participation by all parties, not just Israel. "The United States does not oppose attention in this year's conference to universal adherence in the Middle East, [but] we believe it should be fair and balanced within the region and with other serious issues outside the region," Albright said.

 

Moving Forward

As the review conference proceeds through the next three weeks, one issue will be whether it can produce a consensus document—a goal only two of the treaty's five review conferences have achieved. Jayantha Dhanapala, UN undersecretary-general for disarmament affairs and president of the 1995 NPT conference, said in an April 19 telephone briefing that the outcome of the 2000 review conference will be an important indicator of the regime's continuing vitality.

"This conference is an extremely important barometer of the level of satisfaction amongst the states-parties with the performance of the treaty. If we, for example, do not have a consensus document, that would imply that there is some malaise within the treaty, and that augurs badly for the future of the treaty," he said.

NPT Review Conference Opens

Lockheed Martin Charged With Sharing Rocket Data With China

May 2000

By Wade Boese

On April 4, the State Department accused Lockheed Martin of violating arms export control laws by supplying sensitive rocket information to a company partially owned by the Chinese government. Lockheed Martin allegedly provided Asia Satellite Telecommunications Corporation (Asiasat) with a technical assessment of a solid-fueled kick motor that was later used in the launch of the Asiasat-2 communications satellite, which had been purchased from the U.S. aerospace firm.

The satellite was launched in 1995 on a Chinese Long March rocket, a model that had failed twice in 1992 to deliver satellites to their targets. In 1994, at the behest of Asiasat, a Lockheed Martin team visited a test-launch facility in China and conducted an examination of the rocket's kick motor. The State Department contends that the transfer of the technical assessment produced as a result of the visit violated prohibitions on transfers of such information to the Chinese government.

The United States is concerned that the Lockheed report may have identified weaknesses that could help China's ballistic missile development and testing program. "We would be concerned at any…access to technology that we feel could be used against the United States," Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral Craig Quigley explained April 6.

Lockheed Martin claims that Commerce and State Department licenses specifically allowed the transfer of its report to the respective parties. "The actions taken in 1994 were consistent with the licenses in place at that time," said James Fetig, a Lockheed Martin spokesperson.

The State Department maintains that additional licenses were required for technical details contained in the assessment and that Lockheed Martin released the report to Asiasat before the Defense Department had edited it to remove sensitive material. (Pentagon officials reportedly blacked out 45 pages of the 50-page document.) Lockheed Martin is also charged with sharing the edited version of the report with the state-owned China Great Wall Industry Corporation, which produces ballistic missiles for the Chinese military.

A China Great Wall Industry Corporation spokesman denied April 12 that the corporation had received any help from Lockheed Martin. "China has developed the satellite perigee kick motor entirely by relying on its own efforts. We have never acquired from Lockheed Martin or any other party technical assistance of whatever form in this regard," he said.

The State Department action was praised by Representatives Christopher Cox (R-CA) and Norman Dicks (D-WA), who headed a bipartisan select committee in 1998 to investigate similar allegations against two other U.S. companies, Hughes Space and International, Inc. and Space Systems/Loral. The committee's January 1999 report, known as the "Cox Report," argued for stronger controls on satellite exports to China. (See ACT, April/May 1999.)

Unlike the allegations involving Hughes and Loral, the State Department is seeking civil penalties, not criminal sanctions, against Lockheed Martin. The company could face fines of up to $15 million and lose the right to export satellite technology for up to three years. Lockheed Martin has 30 days, until May 4, to formally respond to the charges.

Lockheed Martin Charged With Sharing Rocket Data With China

Progress in Russia Prompts Sanctions Changes

Citing progress in Russia's enforcement of export controls, the Clinton administration announced April 24 that it was lifting sanctions against two Russian companies that had been accused of aiding Iranian missile programs. The administration had sanctioned INOR Scientific Center and Polyus Scientific Production Association (as well as five other Russian entities) in 1998 for their contributions to Iran's ballistic missile development program, but now maintains that the two firms have "ceased proliferant behavior," according to State Department spokesman James Rubin.

The administration also praised "Russia's commitment to stopping the flow of sensitive technologies to Iran," as demonstrated by its crackdown on the Baltic State Technical University (BSTU), which had also been cited in 1998 for training Iranian specialists in missile-related fields. According to Rubin, that training has stopped but sanctions remain in place, and the administration has now imposed sanctions on the university's rector, Yuri Saval'ev.

Responding to the developments, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said April 25, "The U.S. administration has finally appreciated progressive improvement of the national export control and strict compliance with international commitments in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." But the spokesman criticized the continued application of sanctions to BSTU as an "obvious attempt to call into question the efficiency of measures by the Russian authorities taken against the BSTU rector."

 Progress in Russia Prompts Sanctions Changes

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