Register for Email Updates
 
 

Login/Logout

*
*  
“[My time at ACA] prepared me very well for the position that I took following that with the State Department, where I then implemented and helped to implement many of the policies that we tried to promote.”
– Peter Crail
Business Executive for National Security
June 2, 2022
September/October 1999
Edition Date: 
Wednesday, September 1, 1999

Pakistani Prime Minister Ousted in Bloodless Coup

Pakistan's democratically elected government fell October 12 as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was ousted by Army Chief General Pervaiz Musharraf in a bloodless coup. Sharif and most of his government ministers were placed under house arrest as the Pakistani military took control of airports and state-run television stations, which broadcast the news of the coup to the public. Musharraf declared a state of emergency October 15 and subsequently named himself chief executive.

While refusing to set a timetable for Pakistan's return to democracy, Musharraf did announce the creation of a seven-member National Security Council on October 25. The council includes military leaders and bureaucrats, who will have power over the newly appointed governors of Pakistan's four provinces. Musharraf has also created an army-appointed body to investigate corruption in the Sharif government and has promised a return to democracy as soon as Pakistan's economy is under control.

The United States at first condemned the coup but then adopted a more conciliatory tone and proceeded with a planned waiver of nuclear testing-related sanctions for both Pakistan and India. However, the United States did say it would deny Pakistan various forms of assistance until Musharraf returns Pakistan to a civilian-ruled democracy. The IMF said it would cut off all aid to Pakistan until democracy was re-established, and the Commonwealth of Britain and its ex-colonies suspended Pakistan's membership on October 18. NATO, the European Union and the UN also appealed to Musharraf to reinstate democratic rule.

India's army went on alert after the coup, and the newly elected government immediately held a Cabinet Security meeting to discuss the situation. Musharraf is known to be a hard-liner on India policy, although he did move troops back from the Indian border on October 18 in a gesture of goodwill. But tensions continued to rise between the two nuclear powers as four Pakistani soldiers were killed October 27 when they tried to seize two posts along the India-Pakistan border in Kashmir.

Russia, China, U.S. Allies Condemn Senate Defeat of Treaty

THE SENATE'S REJECTION of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on October 13 (see story) drew a barrage of criticism from Russia and China, as well as from U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. Although Moscow and Beijing have indicated that they will continue to adhere to the CTBT, which they both signed in September 1996, pressures to resume nuclear testing may intensify in the absence of U.S. ratification. The nuclear weapons establishments in both countries have long opposed the CTBT, presumably because they are more dependent on nuclear testing than the United States, which has a sophisticated stockpile stewardship program.

Russian and Chinese Reactions

In an October 14 statement, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "We express our regret and serious concern about the Senate's refusal to ratify this treaty, at all stages of the development of which the U.S. Administration took the most active part and was the first to sign it. This decision delivers a serious blow to the entire system of agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, [e]specially to the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

One week before the Senate vote, Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin had announced that the Russian government was in the process of finalizing its CTBT ratification documents for the Duma, the lower house of parliament. However, the Duma is unlikely to consider the treaty anytime soon, given its concern over the Senate vote and its need to complete action on START II, which was submitted more than four years ago. Parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1999 may also complicate efforts to make serious progress on CTBT ratification.

On October 14, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said it "deeply regrets" the Senate's rejection of the CTBT, but ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue indicated that Beijing would continue to observe its moratorium on nuclear testing, which has been in effect since 1996, and would intensify its efforts to ratify the treaty.

Allied Reactions

Just days before the vote, French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made a highly unusual plea to the Senate not to reject the CTBT. "Failure to ratify the [CTBT] will be a failure in our struggle against proliferation. The stabilizing effect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, extended in 1995, would be undermined. Disarmament negotiations would suffer," they wrote in an October 8 New York Times op-ed.

Such sentiment was echoed the day after the Senate vote. An aide to Chirac said, "The president expressed his dismay. This decision is a setback to the process of non-proliferation and disarmament." German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said he was "deeply disappointed" by the vote and Defense Minister Rudolph Scharping called it an "absolutely wrong" decision. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy stated, "A world accustomed to U.S. leadership in the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament can only be deeply disturbed by this turn of events, which will be welcomed by those who remain uncommitted to that cause."

George Robertson, the newly appointed secretary-general of NATO and former British defense minister, called the Senate action "very worrying."

"We've got to persuade the American Congress that this is in the interest, not just of international security, but also of the United States, and I hope that we can do that and this is not a permanent position," he said in an October 14 radio interview.

U.S. allies in Asia were equally disapproving of the Senate rejection, with strong criticism coming from the Japanese, South Korean and Philippine foreign ministries. "The adverse effects are inestimable…We had hoped for the U.S.'s leadership in nuclear disarmament and in preventing nuclear proliferation," said Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono. Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon called the U.S. vote "an enormous blow to all our efforts to make the world a safer place to live in."

Of particular concern was the potential reaction from South Asia, where the Senate vote weakens the Clinton administration's ability to persuade India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT and refrain from conducting further nuclear tests. But in an encouraging development before the vote, New Delhi hinted that it might be prepared to sign the treaty once its new parliament was in place. Brajesh Mishra, India's national security adviser, stated October 3, "Consensus is building in the country about our stand on the CTBT, and after the parliament meets, we will be in a position to take concrete steps." Moreover, one day after the vote, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh stated, "India will not stand in the way of entry into force of the CTBT." However, because the treaty cannot come into effect without U.S. ratification, much of the pressure on India and Pakistan to ratify has been lifted for the time being.

North Korea Freezes Missile Tests; U.S. to Lift Sanctions; Perry Report Released

Howard Diamond

THE UNITED STATES and North Korea took limited reciprocal steps in September toward strengthening bilateral ties, ending Pyongyang's development and export of long-range missiles, and improving the security of Northeast Asia. President Clinton announced September 17 that he was suspending the sanctions that have been in place since North Korea's 1950 invasion of South Korea. Seven days later, Pyongyang's official news agency, quoting a foreign ministry official, declared that North Korea "will not launch a missile" while negotiations to comprehensively improve relations are ongoing. The moves followed five days of bilateral talks in Berlin.

At a September 17 briefing on the president's decision to lift sanctions, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said the understanding reached in Berlin, together with a recently completed review of U.S. policy by former Defense Secretary William Perry, had put the United States on "a new and more hopeful road," but she added that U.S. cooperation "is not a one-way street." Albright pointed out that the sanctions could be quickly re-imposed at any time and that the administration was prepared "to go down a different road altogether" to defend U.S. interests if necessary.

The president's waiver of sanctions did not require congressional approval, and will take several months to implement as officials from the departments of Commerce, Transportation and the Treasury work to draft new regulations. The sanctions lifted were imposed under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations. They cover imports of North Korean goods, exports of U.S. goods to North Korea, investment in commercial economic sectors in North Korea, remittances to North Korean nationals, and shipping and commercial flights to and from North Korea.

Still in place are U.S. non-proliferation and counter-terrorism controls, which prohibit trade of all munitions list, dual-use and missile technology-related items; any type of U.S. foreign assistance to Pyongyang; support for loans to North Korea through international financial institutions; and financial transactions between U.S. citizens and the North Korean government. U.S. sanctions imposed on North Korea for missile technology proliferation also remain in place, barring trade with missile-related sectors of the North Korean economy. North Korean assets in the United States remain frozen, and North Korean claims against the United States will remain unsettled.

The official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) applauded the Clinton administration's actions on September 21, describing them as consistent with U.S. obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework, which froze the Yongbyon plutonium production facilities. The KCNA noted, however, that the U.S. lifting of sanctions came "belatedly" and was not "comprehensive." Pyongyang also reiterated its position that peace on the Korean peninsula will require removal of the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and a bilateral peace agreement. Washington expects a visit in the coming weeks by a senior North Korean official to resume discussions on normalization of relations.

Perry Review Completed

Guiding the Clinton administration was William Perry's recently completed review of U.S. policy toward North Korea. After briefing the president, congressional leaders and Japanese and South Korean officials in September, Perry released an unclassified version of his policy review on October 12. Though Perry and other U.S. officials had made some of its contents known in previous weeks, the published report provided a clearer understanding of the rationale for the Clinton administration's actions following the September talks with North Korea in Berlin and Perry's trip to North Korea in May 1999. (See ACT,April/May 1999.)

President Clinton appointed Perry to conduct the policy review in November 1998 following North Korea's August launch of its Taepo Dong-1 rocket and the discovery of an underground construction site in Kumchang-ni thought to be potentially useful for nuclear weapons-related activities. (Inspection by U.S. officials later showed the Kumchang-ni site to be poorly suited to nuclear activities.)

While confirming the importance and accomplishments of the Agreed Framework, Perry's report notes that there have been several important changes in the region since the nuclear agreement was reached in 1994. First, Pyongyang's ballistic missile development and export activities, combined with "possible continuing nuclear weapons-related work," have newly jeopardized regional security. Also, under the leadership of Kim Jong-Il, North Korea's economic and humanitarian crises have greatly worsened.

The South Korean government has opened up new opportunities on the peninsula through President Kim Dae Jung's policy of "engagement" with the North, according to the report. Also, Japan's critical support for the Agreed Framework has weakened because of Pyongyang's August 1998 missile test and the prospect of further North Korean missile tests overflying Japan. Finally, Chinese interests in North Korea have become more closely aligned with those of the United States and its allies because of Beijing's concern that Pyongyang's missile activities could lead to a U.S.-led Asian missile defense system.

Perry's report concludes that while military deterrence on the Korean Peninsula remains strong, continued North Korean nuclear and missile activities could jeopardize the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and even of the United States. The United States and its allies would be able to triumph convincingly in any military confrontation, the report notes, but only at a catastrophic cost in lives and money. Perry asserts that Washington should therefore attempt to advance U.S. interests cooperatively if Pyongyang is willing, and failing that, to strengthen its containment of the North Korean threat.

Perry recommends that Washington adopt "a new, comprehensive and integrated approach to…negotiations with the DPRK" in order to achieve a "complete and verifiable" cessation of North Korea's nuclear weapons- and missile-related activities, including "testing, production and deployment of missiles exceeding the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, [as well as] export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology associated with them."

To win Pyongyang's support for the cooperative approach, the Perry report suggests that the United States and its allies "reduce pressures" on North Korea "in a step-by-step and reciprocal fashion." The report continues, "If the DPRK moved to eliminate its nuclear and long-range missile threats, the United States would normalize relations with the DPRK, relax sanctions that have long constrained trade with the DPRK and take other positive steps that would provide opportunities for the DPRK."

Alternatively, if Pyongyang refuses to cooperate, the United States and its allies should "take firm but measured steps to persuade the DPRK" to pursue the cooperative approach and not upset the regional security balance. The details on what disincentives should be considered are listed in the still-classified version of the review. But Perry's report makes clear that "the U.S. and allied steps should seek to keep the Agreed Framework intact and avoid, if possible, direct conflict."

Russia Admits CFE Violation

In connection with its military offensive against Islamic militants in Dagestan, which has now spilled over into neighboring Chechnya, Russian defense officials admitted in early October that their forces in the Caucasus exceed arms limitations set by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin later explained on October 12, according to Itar-Tass, that Russian deployments were of a "temporary and perforce character" and that Moscow did not want the current Caucasus situation to negatively affect ongoing CFE Treaty negotiations.

Moscow's announcement did not surprise the United States because Russia has been in violation of CFE flank limits, which cap the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs) and artillery pieces in the northern and southern flanks of Europe, since May 31. (See ACT, July/August 1999.) However, State Department spokesman James Rubin noted October 8 that Washington is concerned about the fact that Russian ACV deployments exceed not only the CFE's current limit (1,380), but also the higher limit (2,140) proposed under the yet-to-be-completed adapted treaty. Rubin said Washington plans to "take up" the issue with Moscow.

Negotiations to alter the 1992 treaty from bloc and zone limits to one of national and territorial weapon ceilings have been underway in Vienna since January 1997. Negotiators from the 30 CFE states-parties are aiming to unveil an adapted treaty for signature by heads of state at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's November 18-19 summit in Istanbul, Turkey.

U.S. HPCs to Be Moved to Russian Civilian Center

The Department of Energy (DOE) and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) have resolved a dispute over 16 IBM supercomputers that Russia acquired in 1996 by circumventing U.S. export controls. According to the new DOE-MINATOM agreement, announced September 30 by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, the computers have been moved from nuclear weapons labs in Sarov (formerly known as Arzamas-16) to a civilian "open computing center."

IBM pleaded guilty in July 1998 to making the sale and agreed to pay the maximum-possible criminal and civil penalty of $8.67 million. (See ACT, August/September 1998.) Former MINATOM chief Victor Mikhailov said in January 1997 that Russia intended to use the computers for assuring the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal.

Russia has maintained that during negotiations on the comprehensive test ban U.S. officials promised Moscow access to U.S. supercomputers if Russia signed the treaty. Clinton administration officials insist that no such promise was ever made, and U.S. export controls on high performance computers (HPCs) continue to distinguish between civilian and military end-users in countries of security or proliferation concern, such as Russia.

In 1995 the Clinton administration liberalized export controls on HPCs, but the subsequent acquisition of supercomputers by Russia and China prompted Congress to reverse part of the administration's decision in November 1997. In July, President Clinton announced revised control thresholds for HPCs, which would allow civilian end-users in Russia to buy computers capable of 12,300 million theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) and military end-users to purchase machines capable of 6,500 MTOPS. The changes will not take effect until a 180-day congressional review period expires. The IBM computers illicitly acquired by Sarov are believed to be capable of 10,000 MTOPS.

Security Council Unable to Reach Consensus On Iraq for Genereal Assembly Meeting

DESPITE CONCERTED DIPLOMATIC efforts surrounding the September 22 opening of the 54th session of the UN General Assembly, the permanent five members of the Security Council (P-5) could not reach a consensus on resuming weapons inspections in Iraq or lifting economic sanctions. Senior officials from Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States met in London September 15 and in New York September 20. A September 23 meeting between the P-5 foreign ministers and the UN secretary-general resulted only in a bland statement calling for "the full implementation of the relevant Council resolutions."

UN weapons inspections and verification efforts ceased in December 1998 when Iraq broke off cooperation with the UN after four days of punitive air and missile strikes by the United States and Britain. Prompted by frustration with Baghdad's "cheat-and-retreat" strategy to prevent the elimination of its proscribed weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the U.S.-British strikes fractured the Security Council's 1991 consensus to compel Baghdad to disarm in compliance with Resolution 687 before it would lift the economic sanctions imposed after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

Since the strikes, Baghdad has maintained that it will not consider further UN weapons inspections or verification activities until economic sanctions are eased. UN officials in Iraq have reported an ongoing humanitarian crisis, which they have attributed to the sanctions. A September 13 report by the State Department, however, asserts that under the UN's oil-for-food program Iraq is importing more food than before the Persian Gulf War, and that Baghdad's politically inspired misallocation of food and medicine is responsible for the population's suffering. (To compensate for previous revenue shortfalls due to low oil prices, the Security Council decided October 4 to lift the current half-year ceiling on Iraqi oil sales from $5.256 billion to $8.296 billion.)

Since the December raids, Iraq's case for sanctions relief has been made with increasing vigor by France, Russia and China. Resolutions offered by Paris, Moscow and Beijing have proposed quick relief from most import and all export sanctions for Iraq, together with the creation of a monitoring system to prevent large-scale re-establishment of Baghdad's weapons programs.

The United States continues to insist that demonstrable cooperation from Iraq on revived weapons inspections must precede any sanctions relief; that Iraq must meet the Security Council's existing standards for disarmament; that relief from sanctions should be temporary, requiring regular council re-approval; and that sanctions relief should be limited to exports and investments in Iraq's oil-producing capabilities. Washington backs a proposal sponsored by Britain and the Netherlands, which has reportedly won the support of all Security Council members except France, Russia, China and Malaysia. A resolution of the situation is not expected in the near future.

NMD System Achieves First Intercept; U.S. Clarifies ABM Negotiating Position

THE PROPOSED U.S. national missile defense (NMD) program achieved a significant milestone in early October when it successfully intercepted an ICBM target for the first time. Russia denounced the test and continued to criticize U.S. efforts to seek amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow for the deployment of a limited NMD system. About one month before the test, the Clinton administration announced that it would pursue a phased approach to negotiating modifications to the ABM Treaty, with the first phase requiring only modest changes.

The Intercept Test

On October 2, a modified Minuteman ICBM launched from Vandenberg Air Force base in California was destroyed by a "prototype" NMD kill vehicle launched from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. This was the NMD system's third overall flight test, but only its first attempt to intercept an ICBM target. The Defense Department plans to conduct about 20 NMD intercepts over the next six years, but only two more such tests will be held before June 2000, when the Clinton administration is expected to decide whether to deploy a limited NMD system based on four main criteria: technological readiness, the maturity of the so-called "rogue nation" ICBM threat, cost factors and arms control considerations.

Pentagon sources hailed the test as a major accomplishment demonstrating the ability of an exoatmospheric kill vehicle to hit and destory on impact a projectile travelling at the speed of an ICBM re-entry vehicle. Critics noted that the test was carefully preprogrammed under ideal conditions against a known target and that except for the prototype kill vehicle itself, all of the components involved were surrogates of the ones that would be used in the actual system.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin denounced the test, saying "This test is a step that runs counter to the 1972 ABM Treaty in which Article I bans the very creation of a basis for such a defense. These actions by the United States in effect undermine the key provisions of the ABM Treaty with all the ensuing negative consequences, the responsibility for which will rest with the United States."

Vladimir Yakovlev, commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, told Nezavisi-maya Gazeta on October 5 that U.S. actions have the potential to upset strategic stability. He warned, "If the United States throws out the 1972 ABM Treaty, they will effectively become the culprit for a disruption of the process of limiting nuclear weapons. All agreements that have been signed or are being prepared will come under threat—namely, START I, START II and consultations on START III."

U.S. ABM Stance

Meanwhile, in early September, the Clinton administration provided significant new information about its plans for seeking modifications to the ABM Treaty. Responding to an article in The Washington Post, State Department spokesman James Rubin confirmed on September 8 that the United States would seek modifications to the treaty in two phases. In his press briefing, Rubin said, "We anticipate that any initial [NMD] deployment would be Alaska-based, and we have made no decisions regarding the location of a second site, but our long-term goal includes a second site along with additional interceptors and radars, and we will address future threats as we project them now." Rubin continued, "It is now clear that deployment would require changes to the ABM treaty."

Never before has the Clinton administration unequivocally stated that amendments to the ABM Treaty would be required. In the past, administration officials said modifications to the treaty might or might not be necessary, depending on the specific architecture of the NMD system. By announcing that the first site will likely be based in Alaska, the United States must negotiate changes to Article I, which bans a defense of the national territory, and Article III, which allows deployment of up to 100 interceptor missiles at a single site around a nation's capital or at an ICBM field. (The United States originally designated Grand Forks, North Dakota as its ABM site, while the Russian site is located in Moscow.) The second phase will most likely require additional modifications to the treaty.

High-level talks between the United States and Russia continued throughout September on the ABM Treaty and START III, but made little progress. The sides began such discussions in mid-August in Moscow, based on their agreement at the June 1999 Cologne summit.

U.S. and EU Suspend Military Ties With Indonesia

Reacting to the mass violence engulfing East Timor, an island-nation invaded in 1975 and subsequently annexed by Indonesia, the United States and the 15-nation European Union (EU) suspended all military ties with Indonesia in early September. Violence broke out following an August 30 vote by East Timor to reject a proposed autonomy plan from Indonesian President B.J. Habibie, who had pledged that a no-vote would give East Timor independence. The Indonesian military ignored, and in some cases participated in, post-election violence carried out by pro-Indonesia militia and gangs.

In response, President Clinton suspended all military ties (both arms sales and military training programs) with Indonesia on September 9. Sandy Berger, the president's national security adviser, explained two days later that what had not already been delivered of about $40 million in outstanding U.S. government-to-government sales through the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and some $400 million in commercial arms sales would be put on hold. A Defense Department official subsequently said the suspension would halt $7 million in undelivered FMS items. The Council of the European Union, the EU's decision-making body, followed suit on September 16 by announcing an embargo on all arms, munitions and military equipment to Jakarta until at least January 17, 2000. Bilateral military cooperation was also suspended.

Indonesia, racked by economic recession, had slowed recent arms purchases, even postponing a 1997 buy of 12 Su-30K fighter aircraft and eight Mi-17 helicopters from Russia. In its latest UN Register of Conventional Arms report, Indonesia did claim receiving 39 armored combat vehicles from Britain in 1998.

On September 12, President Habibie bowed to international pressure and invited an international peacekeeping force to East Timor. The mission, led by Australia, arrived on September 20.

U.S. Intelligence Estimate Warns of Rising Missile Threats

IN A NEW National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), summarized and submitted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) as an unclassified report to Congress, the U.S. intelligence community has concluded that "during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China and North Korea, probably from Iran and possibly from Iraq." While detailing the growing missile capabilities of the so-called rogue states, the report, released on September 9, noted that the Russian threat will remain the "most robust and lethal." Theater and national missile defenses will, according to the report, prompt countries developing missiles to respond by "deploying larger forces, penetration aids and countermeasures."

The NIC identified three key characteristics of the evolving missile threat. First, that the majority of missile proliferation is occurring below the ICBM (5,500-kilometer range) level. Second, many countries developing ICBMs "probably assess that the threat of their use" would deter, complicate or constrain U.S. action, despite Washington's recognized military superiority. Third, the probability of ballistic missile use against "U.S. forces or interests,"including with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, has increased to a level higher than that experienced during most of the Cold War. The report further pointed out that "emerging long-range missile powers do not appear to rely on robust test programs," and may be willing to deploy missiles after a single test, thereby reducing the intelligence community's ability to provide adequate warning of ICBM deployment.

Overall, the NIC described the new missile threats as involving states with "considerably fewer missiles with less accuracy, yield, survivability, reliability, and range-payload capability" than those faced in the past. In comparison with Chinese and Russian ICBM stocks, the estimate emphasized that "initial North Korean, Iranian and Iraqi ICBMs would probably be fewer in number—a few to tens rather than hundreds or thousands."

The Rogue States

North Korea, using technology in its Taepo Dong-1 rocket, which was fired in a failed August 1998 attempt to place a satellite into orbit, is considered most likely to develop an ICBM capable of threatening the United States. With "an operable third stage and a reentry vehicle capable of surviving ICBM flight, a converted Taepo Dong-1 SLV [space launch vehicle] could deliver a light payload to the United States," the NIC report claims. (Emphasis in original.) But the NIC judged that it would be unlikely that the missile could carry a nuclear warhead, though a chemical or biological weapon payload is considered feasible.

Pyongyang's still-untested Taepo Dong-2, however, is more likely to be weaponized than the Taepo Dong-1, and with two stages would be capable of delivering "a several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States." A third stage could enable delivery of the larger payload "anywhere in the United States." Though the report noted a Taepo Dong-2 test was probable, North Korea subsequently announced on September 24 a moratorium on missile tests while engaged in negotiations with Washington to improve bilateral relations. (See story.)

By copying North Korea's example of attempting to use the Taepo Dong-1 to launch a satellite, Iran is thought "likely to test a SLV by 2010 that—once developed—could be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States." The NIC admits, however, that intelligence analysts are divided over the likely timing of Iran's first flight test of an ICBM capable of reaching the United States. Estimates range from "likely before 2010" to "less than an even chance by 2015." (Emphasis in original.)

Despite the loss of much of Iraq's missile program infrastructure during and after the Persian Gulf War, the NIC reported that Iraq could test an ICBM threatening the United States by 2015. Baghdad, according to the report, is likely to try to emulate North Korea by extending the range of Scud-based ballistic missiles by using staging technology to develop an ICBM capability. As with Iran, analysts differ on the likelihood of Iraq testing an ICBM before either 2010 or 2015.

An ICBM capability by both Iraq and Iran could be accelerated through foreign assistance, the NIC warns. Russian missile assistance was cited as continuing to be "significant," while China was charged with continuing to "contribute" to missile programs in other countries. The report concludes that Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to sell "a complete ICBM, SLV, or the technologies tantamount to a complete ICBM."

Russia and China, which are credited with having "developed numerous countermeasures" to ballistic missile defense, are judged, however, as likely to sell technologies related to these countermeasures. The report assesses that North Korea, Iran and Iraq would probably "rely initially on available technology—including separating RVs [re-entry vehicles], spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys—to develop penetration aids and countermeasures." The report concludes that "these countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight-test their missiles."

The NIC further reported that countries could pursue non-missile delivery options to avoid missile defenses. Another factor that could prompt delivery by ship, truck or an airplane, according to the report, is that "initial indigenous nuclear weapons designs are likely to be too large and heavy for a modest-sized ballistic missile." The NIC asserts that covert delivery methods, though less impressive, could offer "reliability advantages" over a missile—an important consideration for countries with few nuclear weapons.

Russia and China

Though focused on emerging threats, the NIC observed that Russia's strategic forces will "remain formidable," but will "decrease dramatically...primarily because of budget constraints" to a level "well short of START I or II limitations." The probability of an unauthorized or accidental Russian launch, in the NIC's assessment, is "highly unlikely so long as current technical and procedural safeguards are in place."

The NIE-based report estimated that China, which currently only has about 20 ICBMs that can target the entire United States, will continue modernizing its strategic nuclear forces, introducing two solid-fuel ICBMs: the 8,000-kilometer DF-31 and a longer-range ICBM (usually termed the DF-41). The DF-31 will primarily be targeted at Russia and Asia, while the DF-41 will be directed against the United States.

While noting that Beijing has had the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for 20 years, the NIC estimates that Chinese deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on "a future mobile missile would be many years off." Ultimately, the NIC predicts Beijing "will likely have tens of missiles targeted against the United States, having added a few tens of more survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads—in part influenced by U.S. technology gained through espionage."

Fresh Controversy Over M-11s

The intelligence community's report produced new controversy over Pakistan's alleged November 1992 acquisition of Chinese M-11 short-range ballistic missiles. Long a red flag for those who believe the Clinton administration has deliberately ignored U.S. non-proliferation laws by not imposing sanctions on China, the report's outright assertion of the Chinese transfer prompted Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC) to threaten to hold up a key U.S. State Department nomination until sanctions are imposed on Beijing. "The administration can adhere to the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] law, which it has been flouting for the past six years, or it can make do without any assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation affairs," Helms said at a September 16 hearing.

The State Department has long insisted that the evidence regarding the M-11 transfer is insufficient to satisfy the high threshold needed to impose sanctions for shipments of whole missiles (so-called Category I transfers). The Clinton administration did impose so-called Category II sanctions on China in August 1993 for missile-related materials and technology transfers, and has urged Beijing to join the MTCR.

China obtained relief from the U.S. sanctions in October 1994 by pledging to observe the MTCR's "guidelines and parameters" and end sales of whole ground-to-ground missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers or more. Subsequently, China has reportedly continued its trade in missile components and technologies, which are covered by MTCR while Beijing considers joining the regime.

The CTB Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature at the United Nations on September 24, 1996. President Clinton was the first to sign the treaty that day, followed by the representatives of 70 other nations, including Britain, France, Russia and China. To date, 155 states have signed the CTBT and 51 have ratified.

The CTBT will formally enter into force after 44 nuclear-capable states, specified in Annex 2 of the treaty, have deposited their instruments of ratification with the secretary-general of the United Nations. Those 44 states include the five declared nuclear powers, India, Israel, Pakistan and 36 other states that are recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power and/or research reactors.

The near-term prospects for entry into force were dealt a severe blow October 13 when the United States Senate voted against ratification of the treaty, prompting harsh international criticism and raising fears that some states might resume nuclear testing. (See press conference, and news article.) The vote came just days after states that have already ratified the CTBT held a conference in Vienna to consider measures to bring the treaty into force.

Of the 44 specified nations, all except India, Pakistan and North Korea have signed, but only 26 have ratified the treaty. Britain and France are the only declared nuclear-weapon states to have ratified. The following chart identifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's signatories and ratifiers as of October 31, 1999. States whose ratification is required for entry into force are in bold.

Country Signature Ratification
Albania 9/27/96  
Algeria 10/15/96  
Andorra 9/24/96  
Angola 9/27/96  
Antigua and Barbuda 4/16/97  
Argentina 9/24/96 12/4/98
Armenia 10/1/96  
Australia 9/24/96 7/9/98
Austria 9/24/96 3/13/98
Azerbaijan 7/28/97 2/2/99
Bahrain 9/24/96  
Bangladesh 10/24/96  
Belarus 9/24/96  
Belgium 9/24/96 6/29/99
Benin 9/27/96  
Bolivia 9/24/96 10/4/99
Country Signature Ratification
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9/24/96  
Brazil 9/24/96 7/24/99
Brunei Darussalem 1/22/97  
Bulgaria 9/24/96 9/29/99
Burkina Faso 9/27/96  
Burundi 9/24/96  
Cambodia 9/26/96  
Canada 9/24/96 12/18/98
Cape Verde 10/1/96  
Chad 10/8/96  
Chile 9/24/96  
China 9/24/96  
Colombia 9/24/96  
Comoros 12/12/96  
Congo 2/11/97  
Congo Republic 10/4/96  
Cook Islands 12/5/97  
Costa Rica 9/24/96  
Cote d'Ivoire 9/25/96  
Croatia 9/24/96  
Cyprus 9/24/96  
Czech Republic 11/12/96 9/11/97
Denmark 9/24/96 12/21/98
Djibouti 10/21/96  
Dominican Republic 10/3/96  
Ecuador 9/24/96  
Egypt 10/14/96  
El Salvador 9/24/96 9/11/98
Equatorial Guinea 10/9/96  
Estonia 11/20/96 8/13/98
Country Signature Ratification
Ethiopia 9/25/96  
Fiji 9/24/96 10/10/96
Finland 9/24/96 1/15/99
France 9/24/96 4/6/98
Gabon 10/7/96  
Georgia 9/24/96  
Germany 9/24/96 8/20/98
Ghana 10/3/96  
Greece 9/24/96 4/21/99
Grenada 10/10/96 8/19/98
Guatemala 9/20/99  
Guinea 10/3/96  
Guinea-Bissau 4/11/97  
Haiti 9/24/96  
Holy See 9/24/96  
Honduras 9/25/96  
Hungary 9/25/96 7/13/99
Iceland 9/24/96  
Indonesia 9/24/96  
India    
Indonesia 9/24/96  
Iran 9/24/96  
Ireland 9/24/96 7/15/99
Israel 9/25/96  
Italy 9/24/96 2/1/99
Jamaica 11/11/96  
Japan 9/24/96 7/8/97
Jordan 9/26/96 8/25/98
Kazakhstan 9/30/96  
Kenya 11/14/96  
Kuwait 9/24/96  
Kyrgyzstan 10/8/96  
Laos 7/30/97  
Country Signature Ratification
Latvia 9/24/96  
Lesotho 9/30/96 9/14/99
Liberia 10/1/96  
Liechtenstein 9/27/96  
Lithuania 10/7/96  
Luxembourg 9/24/96 5/26/99
Macedonia 10/29/98  
Madagascar 10/9/96  
Malawi 10/9/96  
Malaysia 7/23/98  
Maldives 10/1/97  
Mali 2/18/97 8/4/99
Malta 9/24/96  
Marshall Islands 9/24/96  
Mauritania 9/24/96  
Mexico 9/24/96 10/5/99
Micronesia 9/24/96 7/25/97
Moldova 9/24/97  
Monaco 10/1/96 12/18/98
Mongolia 10/1/96 8/8/97
Morocco 9/24/96  
Mozambique 9/26/96  
Myanmar (Burma) 11/25/96  
Namibia 9/24/96  
Nepal 10/8/96  
Netherlands 9/24/96 3/23/99
New Zealand 9/27/96 3/19/99
Nicaragua 9/24/96  
Niger 10/3/96  
North Korea    
Norway 9/24/96 7/15/99
Oman 9/23/99  
Country Signature Ratification
Pakistan    
Panama 9/24/96  
Papua New Guinea 9/25/96  
Paraguay 9/25/96  
Peru 9/25/96 11/12/97
Philippines 9/24/96  
Poland 9/24/96 5/25/99
Portugal 9/24/96  
Qatar 9/24/96 3/3/97
Romania 9/24/96 10/5/99
Russia 9/24/96  
Saint Lucia 10/4/96  
Samoa 10/9/96  
San Marino 10/7/96  
Sao Tome and Principe 9/26/96  
Senegal 9/26/96 6/9/99
Seychelles 9/24/96  
Singapore 1/14/99  
Slovakia 9/30/96 3/3/98
Slovenia 9/24/96 8/31/99
Solomon Islands 10/3/96  
South Africa 9/24/96 3/30/99
South Korea 9/24/96 9/24/99
Spain 9/24/96 7/31/98
Sri Lanka 10/24/96  
Suriname 1/14/97  
Swaziland 9/24/96  
Sweden 9/24/96 12/2/98
Switzerland 9/24/96 10/1/99
Tajikistan 10/7/96 6/10/98
Country Signature Ratification
Thailand 11/12/96  
Togo 10/2/96  
Tunisia 10/16/96  
Turkey 9/24/96  
Turkmenistan 9/24/96 2/20/98
Uganda 11/7/96  
Ukraine 9/27/96  
United Arab Emirates 9/25/96  
United Kingdom 9/24/96 4/6/98
United States 9/24/96  
Uruguay 9/24/96  
Uzbekistan 10/3/96 5/29/97
Vanuatu 9/24/96  
Venezuela 10/3/96  
Vietnam 9/24/96  
Yemen 9/30/96  
Zambia 12/3/96  
Zimbabwe 10/13/99  

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - September/October 1999