Login/Logout

*
*  
“[My time at ACA] prepared me very well for the position that I took following that with the State Department, where I then implemented and helped to implement many of the policies that we tried to promote.”
– Peter Crail
Business Executive for National Security
June 2, 2022
October 1998
Edition Date: 
Thursday, October 1, 1998

U.S. Interests and Priorities at the CD: Interview with Robert T. Grey, Jr.

Named U.S. permanent representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in October 1997, Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr. completed his first year as head of the U.S. CD delegation on September 9, the close of the 1998 negotiating session. On November 20, Arms Control Association Research Analyst Wade Boese met with Ambassador Grey to discuss the CD's progress during 1998 and its prospects for the 1999 session, scheduled to begin January 18.

Ambassador Grey joined the Foreign Service in 1960 and held positions including executive assistant to the under secretary of state for political affairs and deputy office director in the Office of Military Sales and Assistance, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. He has also served as acting deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1981–1983) and counselor for political affairs to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (1989–1994). Prior to his CD appointment, Grey led the State Department UN Reform Team.

The following is an edited version of the interview.

 


Arms Control Today: After a disappointing 1997 session of the conference, the CD took some positive steps this year, in particular, agreement to begin work on a fissile material cutoff treaty. What do you attribute as the cause for the CD's success this year as opposed to last year?

Robert Grey: I think basically there was a little bit of fatigue in 1997. The CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, completed in 1996] negotiation was long and protracted. Then folks took a pause; they wanted to take a look at which way to proceed at the following year's session. The obvious thing to work on was the FMCT, the fissile material cutoff treaty, but there was resistance on the part of India and Pakistan. Then the [Indian and Pakistani nuclear] testing took place [in May] and there was renewed pressure from the rest of the international community. Ultimately, at the last week of this year's CD, we got a week's work in on the FMCT, and I hope we can pick up where we left off on that and a number of other subjects when we reconvene on January 18.

ACT: Do you feel there was a sense of urgency among the delegations of the CD this year—that they had to do something or risk losing the CD's credibility as a multilateral negotiating forum?

Grey: I think there's always a sense in the CD that we're not perceived to be working actively on what we've set out to do. There's a risk that people will begin to consider the conference irrelevant; so yes, that's a concern. It's always there; I don't think it's any more urgent or less urgent than at any other time.

ACT: The 1997 deadlock was widely attributed to a standoff over negotiating priorities within the conference—the nuclear-weapon states and West European states favored negotiations on a cutoff treaty, whereas the non-aligned movement linked such talks to a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament. What broke this particular impasse this year? How much did the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan contribute to this shift in the non-aligneds' position?

Grey: There has been an evolution, and there is an interest on the part of a number of delegations, as you can see by the recently passed resolution in the [UN General Assembly's] First Committee on nuclear disarmament, in which a number of countries, both Western and G-77 [the non-aligned group], want to discuss nuclear disarmament in the CD. Some want to negotiate it, some only want to discuss it, but there's pressure to do something. So it's not just a North-South issue, if you will, or a West-versus-the-others type of proposition. It's a more widely felt sentiment. Some of our own allies would be interested in having the CD look at nuclear disarmament in a way that didn't have a negative impact on the ongoing U.S.-Russian bilateral negotiations.

So there's been an evolution from a timebound framework to something less than a timebound framework on the part of the G-77, and a push from some Western delegations to at least discuss nuclear disarmament without impeding or impacting negatively on U.S.-Russian negotiations. But I do think the Indian-Pakistani tests were a wake-up call for the entire community that we had to get on with our work; 47 members of the CD formally expressed concern and dismay at the tests when they occurred. And that was across a broad spectrum of CD membership.

Our own view is very clear: we don't think it is helpful or useful to discuss nuclear disarmament or negotiate nuclear disarmament in a multilateral context. We are prepared to keep people abreast of where we are in the negotiations with the Russians. But we don't think it would be productive, given the track record we have by proceeding step by step, to take nuclear disarmament and throw it into a multilateral context. The clear multilateral job to do in the future is the FMCT, and we will continue to push for progress there.

ACT: What impact do you feel that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests had on the conference in general?

Grey: As I said, I think they were a wake-up call to all of us that we have to get on with our work. The resolution in this year's First Committee, in which a strong majority deeply deplored the Indian and Pakistani tests, was a clear sign that the international community is very, very concerned and upset about them. There were a number of "killer" amendments attached to that resolution by Pakistan and India, and they all were voted down; this is an indication that the world is deeply concerned and entirely serious about trying to keep the NPT [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] regime in place and to make progress toward disarmament. There's been a sort of sea change here, this being the biggest threat to the effectiveness of the NPT in many years. This is because the tests represent the most serious challenge to the non-proliferation regime as anchored by the NPT. We don't want the world to think that the NPT is hollow.

ACT: The United States will assume the rotating presidency of the conference for the first four working weeks of the 1999 session. What will be your goals as the president of the conference? What do you hope will be accomplished during that period?

Grey: What I would like to do is to get the conference up and running, as early and quickly as possible, on all the subjects that were being discussed and along the same general lines that prevailed when the session ended in September: two ad hoc committees, one on negative security assurances and one on FMCT, and special coordinators to deal with the other items that were being considered—membership expansion, the form of the agenda, outer space, APLs [anti-personnel landmines], transparency in armaments, and improving the functioning of the conference. In addition, the troika of the past, present and future CD presidents were responsible for working on ways in which the conference might usefully address nuclear disarmament.

In general, I would like to see us begin in January where we ended up in September. It's not an unreasonable ambition but one that, given the curious nature of the CD, would probably take at least month to accomplish.

ACT: Can you explain what you mean by the curious nature of the CD?

Grey: Everyone has a different agenda, and in any negotiation, people sometimes advance maximalist positions even though they have already compromised and reached a satisfactory outcome the year before. That's especially true when the Americans are in the chair.

ACT: In August the CD decided to start negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty, but this mandate will have to be renewed in 1999. Do you foresee any problems winning the necessary consensus next year to resume these negotiations?

Grey: I'm confident that we will resume work on an FMCT. I can't predict when. My own hope and expectation would be that we can do it very early—that we can agree to continue the work program on which we had agreed at the end of September, and continue it into the new year. But that is always subject to negotiation.

A vast majority of the non-aligned want to do nuclear disarmament in the CD. That is not our position and it's not the position of the French, the British, the Russians, the Chinese, and many others. So, the [non-aligned] G-21 will push for more on nuclear disarmament and we will have to respond in our own interest. We can't agree on nuclear disarmament but we can agree on the program we agreed on last year, and over time, it will fall into place. It took a lot of skilled work by my Swiss colleague last year to get this program of work established. If it hadn't been for his very, very skillful diplomatic tactics we could still be at loggerheads. I give Ambassador [Erwin] Hofer of Switzerland a great deal of credit for getting us as far as we are now.

ACT: Do you think the deadlock over negotiating priorities could reappear?

Grey: It's always a possibility, but my expectation would be that since we made such good progress last year, we should build on that and not get down into burdensome deals about package arrangements. We should look at each issue on its merits and decide whether or not to pursue it. That's the ideal world; I must say that sometimes in diplomacy you don't live in ideal worlds. But you've got to be prepared to work on that basis.

ACT: With regards to the FMCT ad hoc committee that was formed last year, there was some disagreement over naming a chair for the committee. Would you explain the reasons why? Will this issue be revisited to a more significant degree this year?

Grey: It's hard to say at this time. The Canadians have been staunch advocates of an FMCT for more than 40 years, in one form or another; they're closely identified with it. There's a concern on the part of some countries that having a Canadian in the chair might give too positive a push to the issue, given the well-known Canadian national position. In the course of discussions, it emerged that there would be a Western chair during the first year of the committee's deliberations. We didn't really have deliberations last session, so my anticipation would be that a Western chair would be reappointed, and my hope would be that it would be Ambassador [Mark] Moher of Canada, who is a very skilled and very able diplomat. There is a little fallout from the First Committee, where the Canadians and the Australians and the New Zealanders took the lead on a resolution that deeply deplored the testing of India and Pakistan, and one doesn't know whether there's any ill will after that or not. Our hope and expectation is that our Canadian colleague will be reappointed.

ACT: Many states, led by Pakistan and Egypt, are calling for a fissile material treaty that goes beyond merely a cutoff and extends to the issue of stockpiles or past production. Why does the United States oppose this move?

Grey: Our view is that it's impossible to get into existing stocks at this stage, and that is a view shared by many in the international community. We approach things a step at a time, and we feel that this is the logical way to get progress on an FMCT.

Everyone knows that some time in the future, the question of existing stocks will have to be addressed. But I can assure you we would not have a successful negotiation on FMCT at this time if we tried to address existing stocks. In practice, the five nuclear-weapon states will have to address existing stocks during the long-term process of arms reductions that currently involves bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Russia. I think that most people, on reflection, would agree with that. In addition, inserting existing stocks into the FMCT negotiations would give the two states that recently tested a sort of nuclear status, because the proposed provisions on existing stocks would implicitly put them in the same box as the five nuclear states, given that no one but the five NPT-defined nuclear-weapon states are supposed to have such stocks. I don't think that is something the rest of the international community wants to do.

But it is a sensitive issue, and we are working hard, bilaterally and unilaterally with the other nuclear states, to reduce these stocks. We recently agreed with Russia to place 50 tons of plutonium under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards. I went down to Savannah River the other day and they are indeed digging the hole and getting ready to build the facility in which some of this material will be stored and monitored. So we are already spending big bucks to get ready for this.

ACT: Does the issue of existing fissile material stockpiles have the same potential for blocking conference progress as the issue of nuclear disarmament has in the past?

Grey: It is a possibility. One can never predict with any degree of accuracy what is going to happen. But one could debate this endlessly, and if we start on the question of scope it could quickly degenerate into people making maximalist statements without looking for a way forward. My expectation and hope is that this isn't going to happen. This is a very complicated and very difficult treaty, and we would be best advised to get started on all the issues in which we can see ways forward, such as identifying the key choke points in the production cycle and developing appropriate methods for ensuring compliance. There cannot be an FMCT if we try to include existing stocks. The nuclear states and India will not play. And I am sure the Israelis will not play. It is a very sensitive and delicate issue.

ACT: What elements would the United States like to see in a fissile material cutoff treaty?

Grey: Well, I don't want to tip my hand completely. It's quite clear that we want to see a system in place—and there are many ways to do this—in which there is no production of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices, as well as a verification regime in which people can clearly see that production has ceased. We have several ways to do that, which we are now discussing. We are laying our propositions on the table and have been working very hard with a number of states to come up with positions that meet our common concerns. But it's a major challenge.

One of the elements that we have to consider is the cost factor. The more intrusive, the more rigid the verification regime, the more costly this whole thing becomes. It's going to be very, very expensive, even with the kinds of safeguards we'd be interested in. If you want perfect safeguards, it becomes untenable.

ACT: What kinds of cost estimates are we looking at?

Grey: Each person you ask will give you a different answer, so I'm not going to give you one. It varies from the ridiculous to the sublime, but it's going to be a substantial increase in the cost of the inspection process. And how you do it—some people have reservations about the role of the IAEA, for example—those are matters that have to be addressed in the conference.

ACT: Do you foresee safeguards being placed on maintenance and dismantlement facilities in addition to reprocessing and enrichment facilities?

Grey: Our preference would be for reprocessing and enrichment. There are obviously other elements that will have to be considered, but we think that with those two you capture most of the problem.

ACT: Will the verification regime include confirming that past production facilities are not operational?

Grey: That's part of it. We believe that can be done. As a matter of fact, everyone under the IAEA safeguards—every non-nuclear state—has agreed to set up a regime that's much more intrusive and covers the full fuel cycle, so it probably wouldn't be a concern. If previous production facilities have been stripped of key equipment or otherwise put into mothballs, it should be very easy to verify that. It's not a complicated thing. The reality is that when a reprocessing or enrichment plant has been shut down, especially in our country, you couldn't simply start it up again even if you wanted to; it'd take several years and billions of dollars.

ACT: The other negotiating priority of the United States has been a transfer ban on anti-personnel landmines. Many states consider that work on such a treaty would duplicate work already done through the Ottawa Convention, which will soon enter into force for those states that have ratified it. How do you respond to such criticism?

Grey: It seems to me sort of silly. Most of the countries that export landmines have ceased doing it, but the major producers of landmines, and the exporters in the past, are all in the CD. As a complement to the Ottawa process, a simple export ban, in which people take a collective pledge to do what they're already individually committed to do, would be a useful step forward and would reinforce Ottawa. Some countries, frankly, will not be in a position to sign the Ottawa Convention in the near term or indefinite future and they have made that very clear. Why not get them to sign on to something they can sign?

There are two kinds of opposition to an export ban on APLs in the CD. There are those who signed on to Ottawa and think it's perfection. They wouldn't vote on any attempt to buttress it or to encourage other people to do anything but sign on to it; it'd be a sort of heresy. The others are dependent on landmines for their own self-defense and are suspicious of signing anything. We think an export ban is a sensible way to go for the short term.

We've made very clear our commitment to sign on to Ottawa ultimately. We have made it very clear to the Canadians and others that we don't see any contradiction between what we are seeking in the CD and ultimately signing on to the Ottawa Convention. We're not prepared to do anything that would affect in any way the kinds of terms and conditions of the Ottawa Convention.

In our view, a transfer ban is a step to move other countries which have not signed the Ottawa Convention in the direction of getting rid of these kinds of weapons. The fact of the matter is that people who haven't signed on to Ottawa still have the right to export mines. We think a transfer ban is a good interim step.

ACT: Will the United States seek to go beyond the transfer ban in the context of the CD?

Grey: No. We've made that pretty clear.

ACT: The Chinese ambassador, Li Changhe, made a very strong call for establishing an ad hoc committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but the United States opposes this move. Why?

Grey: In our view, it's not an issue that deserves a major share of the time and effort the CD has available for negotiating arms control agreements. Outer space work is certainly not one of our priorities in the CD. There is no arms race in outer space. We have an unprecedented degree of international cooperation in outer space. And we think that rather than concentrating on getting involved in an issue that's not a problem now, we should concentrate on the real problem, the real job that we've been trying to get done for the last several years in the CD, which is the FMCT. That's our priority. And our second priority is APLs, because we think that's something that can be solved quickly, is a positive step forward, and addresses a real issue.

As long as there is no threat of an arms race in outer space, it is far from clear what the CD would gain by addressing it. Work on outer space would divert the attention of the CD from other things. Speaking personally, I have the view that given the resource limitations—both in terms of personnel and in terms of time—a step-by-step approach in the CD is probably all that can be expected. It can take on one big issue at a time. I think the way the CTBT was negotiated illustrates that.

ACT: If there is no arms race in outer space, wouldn't it be in the U.S. interest to negotiate a treaty that would freeze the status quo so there would be no possibility of an arms race?

Grey: We've got an agreement that bans the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. We think that's enough; we don't anticipate any other problems.

ACT: A lot of countries have raised the concern of militarization of outer space, rather than an arms race in outer space.

Grey: The commercial and other civilian uses of outer space have long outpaced military uses such as communications, early warning and self-defense. It is therefore strange to hear talk about militarization occurring in outer space, and the prospect seems quite unlikely in the near future or the far future, for that matter. Our time could be more usefully spent dealing with the real emerging problem, and that is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the threat posed to the NPT regime by the Indian and Pakistani testing. You're not going to get significant arms control, in terms of nuclear arms reductions, in the future unless we have a lid on the production of fissile material, and that's in all our interest to do. When we get START III, and we're going to get it, the fact of an FMCT in force will make it significantly less difficult to negotiate even deeper reductions. At some point you have to capture the production of fissile material, and that's what we're trying to do.

ACT: The conference also started discussions regarding negative security assurances. However, the United States, among others, has opposed the negotiation of a treaty on negative security assurances. Why, and what does the United States advocate as an alternative?

Grey: We think the best way to do it is to continue to work on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones [NWFZs]. I think we've captured about 99 countries under those regimes now. If we can get the Southeast Asian zone and the Central Asian zone in satisfactory terms, we will capture well over a hundred. We think that's the way to go. It's a more productive way; it's a more effective way. That is a view shared by three of the other nuclear-weapon states as well.

ACT: Why does the United States reject the proposal put forth by China that negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states should also include a "no-first-use" declaration by all nuclear-weapon states?

Grey: We don't think that's a good way to go. As long as you have a deterrent, you have to be prepared to exercise it. It's fundamental to our national security policy. When the happy day comes that we don't have to rely on nuclear deterrence, we're in a new world. But until then, it makes no sense. Arms control is basically an element of our national security policy, and we're not going to do things in the CD that call into question or alter in any fundamental way our own commitments to our allies and to our own people. We've made that abundantly clear, so many times and in so many places that it would bore your readers, who know the litany and probably wrote the instructions themselves.

ACT: Are there any other issues, besides an FMCT and a transfer ban on APLs, that the United States would like to see addressed by the conference?

Grey: The question of transparency in armaments and the issue of small arms are things that a number of people are concerned about. There is some reluctance on the part of others to address these right now, but these are issues, I think, that will keep coming back. We are sympathetic to that and will work constructively within the conference to see what we can do.

That having been said, if you look at the more urgent matters, we've been wrangling about FMCT for almost a decade. Now's the time to get working on it. That's where we're going to focus our efforts.

ACT: Will the United States continue to oppose moves within the conference to convene a body to discuss nuclear disarmament?

Grey: We're not totally negative. We have some ideas that could create a dialogue on nuclear disarmament within the conference without getting into negotiations. It's something that we've discussed at length with other people. We don't think the conference should set up an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, but we're prepared to examine methods and approaches in which we could have a dialogue, as we did during the START process, and in which we could perhaps tell people where we've been, what we've accomplished, and where we're going.

ACT: How does that relate to negative security assurances?

Grey: As I said, our preference is to negotiate negative security assurances in the NWFZ context. That said, I'll agree to setting up the ad hoc committee, but the reality is that a global treaty will be far more difficult to reach in view of our known preference for another way of solving this problem.

ACT: Do you think the troika construct of past, present and future CD presidents created earlier this year and tasked with pursuing consultations with delegations on nuclear disarmament has been successful in meeting some countries' demands for work on this issue?

Grey: It's a useful vehicle because it gives them the potential to have something develop out of this. I'm prepared to see what recommendations develop out of this, and also to hold open the possibility, the very real possibility, that you'll get some kind of dialogue going, but not a negotiation.

ACT: What do you believe are the most important steps the nuclear-weapon states can take to assure CD members that the nuclear powers are indeed moving in the right direction with regard to nuclear disarmament?

Grey: The first thing is to keep them informed of what we are doing. We gave them a very comprehensive briefing, both in the NPT context and in the CD, about what we are actually doing with the Russians, and the degree to which we are sawing up weapons, dismantling things, turning stuff over to the IAEA, the fact that we're spending a billion dollars or so to help the Russians dismantle a number of their weapons. This is real; we have a very good track record. A hundred nuclear weapons being sawed up and thrown away every month is not insubstantial.

ACT: An initiative to increase the 61-member CD by five members was blocked by Iran in September. Does the United States support the continued expansion of the conference? Given the rule of consensus, does expansion not make it increasingly difficult to make decisions and accomplish work?

Grey: The expansion to 61 made it increasingly difficult to get the conference to function effectively. I think an expansion of five wouldn't make any difference one way or the other. Beyond that, we're agnostic. Once we achieve an FMCT successfully, maybe we'd be prepared to take another look. Until then, wherever we are when that negotiation starts, that's where we should stay, whether 61 or 66.

ACT: Is there an alternative to the mandate for consensus? Are there any options that the United States would consider worthwhile exploring?

Grey: Not as long as I am there.

ACT: Despite its successes, the CD has found it increasingly difficult to begin formal negotiations on a broad spectrum of issues. What are the principal factors that work against the CD functioning as a multilateral forum?

Grey: The principal difficulty is the perverse practice of packaging things, so that if I don't get "A," you don't get "B." I think it's imperative that we all look at issues in terms of what we're prepared to do collectively to achieve something positive. Our views on certain subjects, like negative security assurances or outer space, are well known. The reservations of other people on progress in transparency in armaments or small arms are well known. Where we have a convergence of interests, however, is in FMCT. Where there's a consensus, where there's a real need for it in the international community, where it's an appropriate subject for the conference to address, I think we should address that issue. If we're successful on that, others will emerge.

ACT: Do you believe there is an alternative approach to multilateral arms control other than the current patchwork of agreements, in which states often pick and choose the treaties they will adhere to and their conditions for participation?

Grey: As Bismarck said, drafting legislation and sausage-making are things you don't want to watch when they're happening. Whether you do it in the CD context or some other context, whenever you have different view on things it's a messy procedure; this is sort of like legislating for the international community. I can see a lot of other ways to do it, but would they be any less messy, or less confusing, or less piecemeal? Probably not.

ACT: Is there anything that you would like to say in general terms about the conference's operation or what you'd like to achieve?

Grey: The conference was conceived and set up and functioned for 40 years in basically a Cold War environment. One of the things I would like to see changed is this whole question of an Eastern group, a Western group, and a non-aligned group. The Western group is not unanimous; we have differences of opinion on lots of things. In a political sense, there is no Eastern group: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will be joining the Western group shortly, and a number of other Eastern countries want to join NATO, the European Union, etc. The non-aligned are no longer a unified group, if they ever were. Indian and Pakistani testing clearly was not supported by the non-aligned; you can see it in the voting in the UN First Committee. And an Eastern group that consists of two or three countries doesn't make much sense to me.

My hope would be that we could evolve the conference to reflect today's realities and not the realities of the Cold War. Perhaps the way to do business is to create like-minded groups addressing particular subjects. We've had a like-minded group on APL exports, covering a broad spectrum from the West and the East and the non-aligned, with about 20 countries trying to get progress on it. I think that's the wave of the future. The idea that to get a committee working you have to have one chairman from the East and one from the West and one from the G-21 is ridiculous. We should try to get chairmen, and friends of the chair, and coordinators, on the basis of their interests and their merits and their capabilities, not on the basis of what group they're from, especially when the groups no longer function as groups. It's a real frustration. Arms control is pretty rarefied stuff to begin with, especially multilateral arms control, with all the ideological baggage and yearnings and things people bring to it. It's even more unreal when you're dealing as if there were three blocs in a world when there are no blocs.

ACT: Going back to an earlier point that you mentioned, that APLs are a priority of the United States. Is it possible to do work both on the FMCT and APLs?

Grey: A number of the non-aligned would say that means that they are being forced to accept the U.S. agenda. Therefore, they probably won't let us have both.

ACT: Do a lot of the delegations have the resources to work on two issues simultaneously?

Grey: Negotiations would be much easier to manage if there were 18 delegations doing this, as in the 1960s. But at the end of the day, when you're working these things, it's only about 15 or 20 delegations that make a major effort to stay actively involved. If delegations want to be active, they will find the resources to do so.

ACT: Do you think the non-aligned will be even less effective as a bloc now that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear tests?

Grey: They've been quite effective in terms of beating up on a couple of their own. But it's one thing to beat up on one of your own, or a country that is perceived to be one of your own. Scolding the United States, however, comes naturally to them.

India, Pakistan Commit to Sign CTB Treaty by September 1999

SPEAKING AT the United Nations on September 23 and 24, respectively, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said their nations were prepared to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty prior to September 1999. While both states declared unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing following their nuclear tests in May, the international community, and especially the United States, have pressured Islamabad and New Delhi to sign the CTB without conditions or delay. The speeches at the opening of the UN General Assembly are the most explicit commitments to signing the treaty that either leader has made to date.

Sharif, referring to the Conference of States Parties that may be convened in September 1999 if the treaty's entry into force provisions have not been met, stated that "Pakistan is…prepared to adhere to the CTBT before this Conference."

Sharif insisted, however, that "Pakistan's adherence to the Treaty will take place only in conditions free from coercion or pressure." He cited "restrictions imposed on Pakistan by multilateral [financial] institutions" and the "discriminatory sanctions" of the 1985 Pressler amendment, which precludes U.S. military assistance or sales to Pakistan as long as the president cannot certify that it does not have a "nuclear explosive device."

Vajpayee, noting that India is engaged "with key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTB," said that India was "prepared to bring those discussions to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed…." Of the 44 nations whose ratification is necessary for the treaty to enter into force, only India, Pakistan and North Korea have failed to sign the treaty.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright gave a modest endorsement to the two UN speeches, stating on September 24 that the commitments to the CTB were "important steps," but noting that "there are many steps that still need to be taken." On September 30, White House spokesman Mike McCurry confirmed that President Clinton had decided to postpone his planned trip to South Asia indefinitely. Clinton is "still eager to make the visit when we have had further significant progress with our respective security concerns," said McCurry.

The administration, which imposed sanctions mandated by U.S. law on the two South Asian states, has been holding bilateral meetings with both countries since July. The United States is pushing India and Pakistan to adopt an international agenda that includes regional arms control proposals and measures to support the global non-proliferation regime, such as signing the CTB and participating in negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty.

In return, New Delhi and Islamabad have insisted that U.S. and international sanctions be dropped. India is also reported to be pressing Washington to remove restrictions on exports of dual-use technology. Specifically, New Delhi would like access to nuclear power and space technologies currently controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Eager to develop its space and civil nuclear power sectors for economic reasons, New Delhi also wishes to be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state, entitled to commerce in sensitive technologies with the other nuclear powers. Pakistan, meanwhile, is said to be inquiring about future military sales and assistance to help redress its conventional military imbalance with India.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott is expected to hold a new round of meetings with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed on November 4 and with the Indian prime minister's special envoy, Jaswant Singh, on November 19. Chances for progress in the talks may have improved following adoption into law on October 21 of a one-year waiver authority for the test-related sanctions. The waiver, which would allow the president to suspend all of the non-military-related sanctions, could give the Clinton administration the bargaining flexibility needed to produce a deal.

U.S.-Israel Fighter Sale; Buyer for Pakistani F-16s?

The October 22 deadline passed without action by Congress to block a proposed $2.5 billion sale of U.S. fighters to Israel. The Pentagon had notified Congress on September 22 that Israel is seeking to buy 60 F-16C/D fighters or 30 F-15I fighters from Washington; under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress has 30 days following notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand) to block a proposed sale.

Currently, Israel is incorporating a 1994 buy of 25 F-15I fighters into its inventory, estimated at more than 200 F-16s and 60 to 100 F-15s. An Israeli announcement on the purchase, which is likely to be a combination of both fighters, is expected early next year.

In other fighter news, New Zealand has expressed interest in purchasing the 28 F-16 fighters that Pakistan paid $658 million for in a 1989 deal, but never received. Washington stopped delivery of the aircraft in 1990 in accordance with the 1985 Pressler Amendment, which proscribes delivery of U.S. military equipment or assistance to Pakistan if the president cannot certify that Islamabad does not possess a "nuclear explosive device." Since an April 1995 pledge by President Clinton to resolve the issue, the United States has been seeking a way to repay Pakistan and avoid a possible court case. Washington has already paid back $157 million to Islamabad, which has until February 1999 to file suit.

U.S., North Korea Meet on Missiles; Japan, S. Korea Press on Defense

LITTLE PROGRESS was reported in the third round of U.S.-North Korean missile talks, held in New York on October 1. As in the previous talks in April 1996 and June 1997, the Clinton administration tried to persuade North Korea to cease the development and export of ballistic missiles and technologies controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in exchange for a substantial loosening of U.S. economic sanctions.

Pyongyang, which has made clear its willingness to accept financial compensation for lost missile export revenues, has resisted the U.S. proposal, claiming that Washington is already obligated to loosen sanctions as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The text of that agreement, which froze Korea's nuclear weapons program, calls for the two sides to "move toward full normalization of political and economic relations." But U.S. officials insist that Pyongyang has to meet U.S. concerns on the missile and other issues before progress can be made on the political and economic fronts.

Additionally, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin warned North Korea following the October 1 talks that any future testing or export of long-range missiles, such as the three-stage Taepo Dong-1, which Pyongyang tested on August 31, would have "very negative consequences."

 

Japanese, South Korean Initiatives

North Korea's August 31 missile test has also bolstered initiatives in Japan and South Korea to augment their security with new weapons that are likely, in turn, to concern Russia and China. On September 20, the United States and Japan announced that the two nations would proceed with joint feasibility studies on theater missile defense. On October 23, Japanese Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga announced that the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) will request roughly $8 million for Japan's 1999 fiscal year to fund joint research with the United States. The JDA reportedly plans to spend about $175 million to $250 million on the joint research program over the next five years. Tokyo has expressed interest in the U.S. Navy's Theater Wide Defense system, which would utilize Japan's fleet of Aegis-radar-equipped destroyers.

Additionally, the Kyodo News Service reported on October 23 that the government will propose development of a "'multipurpose' satellite system with reconnaissance capabilities within three years." Since Japan launched its first commercial satellite in 1970, Tokyo has abided by a Diet resolution mandating the exclusively peaceful use of space.

Jarred by North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 missile launch over Japan, however, some Japanese officials have concluded that a reconnaissance or early warning satellite for "defensive" purposes could be considered a peaceful use of space.

 

South Korea and the MTCR

Although the Taepo Dong-1 is unlikely to be used against South Korea—Pyongyang's 500-kilometer-range Scud C missiles can already hit any target in the South—defense officials in Seoul have used the "new" North Korean threat to justify their own missile and space-launch ambitions. In particular, South Korea has been campaigning to end its 1979 agreement with the United States, which prevents Seoul from acquiring ground-to-ground missiles with a range of more than 180 kilometers. (See ACT, August/September, 1998.)

Following U.S.-South Korean missile talks in August, the State Department is reportedly close to consenting to South Korea joining the MTCR and acquiring missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers—the regime's threshold for control.

According to Seoul's semiofficial Yonhap news agency, South Korea has accepted the MTCR limits for military systems. Seoul, however, is pushing for the right to build commercial space launch systems without any range or payload limits, which the 1979 agreement with the United States does not permit. The Korea Herald reported that Washington is insisting that Seoul accept U.S. monitoring to ensure that commercial space technology is not misused. In an effort to clarify, a State Department official said on October 27 that U.S. policy on MTCR membership does not preclude states wishing to join the regime from keeping their ground-to-ground missile programs as long as the retained systems fall within the regime's threshold for control.

U.S., Russia Sign 'Nuclear Cities' Agreement

Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov signed an agreement September 22 to create commercial enterprises that will provide peaceful employment for displaced weapons scientists and technicians in Russia's 10 closed "nuclear cities." Unlike past efforts to provide employment opportunities for Russian weapons workers, through the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the Department of Energy's Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, the new program, called the Nuclear Cities Initiative, will focus exclusively on the closed nuclear cities. In fiscal year 1999, DOE expects to spend a total of $30 million to support activities in these cities. The agreement responds to growing U.S. concerns that former Soviet weapons scientists may be tempted to sell their expertise abroad due to deteriorating economic conditions at home.

Iraq's Reconstitution of Its Nuclear Weapons Program

October 1998

By David Albright and Khidhir Hamza

Iraq has provided few credible indications that its nearly three-decade quest for nuclear weapons has ended. Since its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, however, Iraq has had an extremely difficult time making any progress in building nuclear weapons. The economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council after the invasion disrupted many vital imports, particularly for Iraq's uranium enrichment program. The allied bombing campaign destroyed many of its key nuclear facilities.

The subsequent, highly intrusive inspections mandated by the Security Council and carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Action Team in cooperation with the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) exposed and destroyed vast amounts of nuclear equipment and materials. In the process, the inspections uncovered a long-standing and determined clandestine nuclear weapons program, despite Iraqi denials until 1995 that such a program existed. Currently, essentially all of Iraq's pre-Gulf War nuclear facilities and equipment have been eliminated or converted to non-proscribed purposes under periodic Action Team inspections. But Iraq retains its nuclear cadres and its extensive knowledge and experience built up before the Gulf War. Moreover, some key unanswered questions remain about Iraq's effort to build the nuclear weapon itself—called "weaponization" here—and to build a gas centrifuge enrichment program to enrich uranium for weapons purposes.

Since the war, Iraq is suspected of having made progress on a number of bottlenecks in its weapons program, at least those which could be done with little chance of detection by inspectors. These activities include design work, laboratory efforts, subcomponent production, and the operation of test machines. If the inspection system becomes ineffective, Iraq could reconstitute major aspects of its nuclear weapons program that would likely be discovered under the current inspection regime, a combination of historical investigations and an on-going monitoring and verification (OMV) system. Even under the OMV regime, Iraq's illicit acquisition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the former Soviet Union would be very difficult to detect. Because of this and other weaknesses, the OMV system needs improvement to be effective in deterring and detecting Iraq's banned activities.

There are few alternatives. A nuclear-armed Iraq would be extremely dangerous. Nuclear weapons would aid Saddam Hussein in ensuring his own survival and increasing his regional power. If he detonated a nuclear explosive underground, the international community, and in particular the United States, may not risk intervention, particularly if definitive information about the size of Iraq's nuclear arsenal is lacking.

Essential to any discussion about about Iraq or the OMV system are estimates of the time needed for Iraq to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. Such an assessment requires a thorough understanding of Iraq's pre-war program and reasonable inferences about its activities after the war. This article attempts to summarize this discussion and outline some of the most important scenarios of how Iraq may reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. In addition, this article looks at a neglected part of the entire inspection process, namely improving methods to reduce the risk posed by the Iraqi nuclear scientists. There is wide agreement about their central importance to any Iraqi attempt to reconstitute its nuclear program. Yet, little has been done to reduce the threat they pose.

 

Acquiring a Safeguarded Fuel Cycle

Since its inception in the early 1970s, Iraq's nuclear weapons program has depended on deception and determination. Originally, the plan, which one of us (Hamza) authored, was to acquire a complete nuclear fuel cycle able to produce and separate plutonium. The plan focused on the foreign acquisition of complete nuclear facilities with training in their use conducted in the supplier country.

During the 1970s, Iraq concentrated on acquiring nuclear facilities overseas that would have been under IAEA safeguards, since Iraq had signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Nonetheless, Iraq reckoned it could defeat the safeguards at these facilities or secretly build undeclared duplicate facilities.

In 1976, Iraq succeeded in buying from France a 40-megawatt materials test reactor called the Tammuz-1 reactor, or Osiraq reactor, that ran on weapons-grade uranium fuel. In 1979, Iraq established a radiochemical laboratory, equipped through a contract with the Italian company SNIA-Techint, suitable for laboratory research on reprocessing. It also acquired a fuel fabrication plant from Italy that was suitable for making natural uranium targets for secret irradiation in the Osiraq reactor.

Iraqi teams calculated that the Osiraq reactor could conservatively produce about 5 kilograms to 7 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year. This value could be higher or lower depending on how the targets were arranged in the reactor; it also depended on the frequency of visits by IAEA inspectors and French personnel. The Iraqis believed that the safeguards on the reactor, which would have included periodic inspections and surveillance cameras, could have been defeated. Prior to visits by IAEA inspectors and French personnel, Iraq planned to pull out the unsafeguarded targets. Iraq had also developed plans to defeat the cameras.

Before Iraq could illicitly produce any plutonium and put the IAEA's safeguards to the test, however, Israel bombed the reactor in June 1981, shortly before the reactor was scheduled to go into operation. The radiochemical laboratory and fuel fabrication plant were not bombed. Later, the fabrication facility was used to produce unsafeguarded targets which were irradiated in a Russian-supplied research reactor to produce plutonium. The reactor also irradiated bismuth targets to make polonium-210, a material used in beryllium-polonium neutron initiators which trigger the nuclear explosion. Material from the targets was extracted in the Italian radiochemical laboratory, which was expanded in the early 1980s.

 

Iraq Goes Underground

Following the bombing of the Osiraq reactor, Iraq decided to: (1) replace the Osiraq reactor or to develop a heavy water or enriched uranium reactor and associated plutonium separation capability; and (2) develop a uranium enrichment production capacity.

Iraq tried to replace the Osiraq reactor, but by 1985, it realized that it could not buy a replacement. Before the bombing, Iraq had developed plans and purchased some minor items for a 20- to 40-megawatt heavy water natural uranium reactor. After delays in buying a replacement reactor, Iraq decided to pursue this reactor project again. In the late 1980s, however, it put its plans on hold, facing resource limitations. But Iraq continued its efforts to learn how to separate plutonium from irradiated fuel and to make heavy water. Depending on the success of the enrichment programs, Iraq may have reconstituted the nuclear reactor project.

Even before the Israeli bombing of the Osiraq reactor, Iraqi scientists had been evaluating the development of uranium enrichment technologies. However, Iraq has declared that a decision by the Iraqi leadership to pursue these options came after the June 1981 bombing. An Iraqi evaluation finished in 1981 concluded that electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) was the most appropriate technology for Iraq and that gaseous diffusion was the next most appropriate option. Gaseous diffusion was planned to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) which could be used as a feedstock for EMIS, dramatically increasing overall HEU production in EMIS separators. If EMIS was unsuccessful, the plan called for expanding the gaseous diffusion facility to produce HEU directly. At the time, gas centrifuge technology was viewed as too difficult to accomplish. (See below.)

 

EMIS

The goal of the EMIS program was to build two production units, each able to achieve 15 kilograms per year of weapons-grade uranium using natural uranium feed. Iraqi estimates of the HEU output using LEU feed (enriched to 2.5 percent uranium-235) vary between roughly 25 kilograms and 50 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium per year. The variation reflects different plant designs and performance uncertainties.

After several years of research and development work of mixed success, Iraq nonetheless started in 1987 to build its first EMIS production facility at Tarmiya, north of Baghdad. Also in late 1987, Iraq decided to build a replica of Tarmiya at Al Sharqat, about 200 kilometers northwest of Baghdad. This facility, which was built by Iraqis only, was originally viewed as a second production site that would come into operation roughly at the same time as Tarmiya. In the late 1980s, this plan was modified to one where Al Sharqat would operate after Tarmiya was finished. Iraq also sought unsafeguarded LEU on the international market during the late 1980s. However, it has declared that its search was half-hearted and unsuccessful. Whether this declaration is complete is unclear. As of 1997, the Action Team had not pursued this issue further.

The EMIS program faced repeated delays and technical problems, and by the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Tarmiya was at least a year behind schedule. At that time, Tarmiya was not expected to produce its first goal quantity of weapons-grade uranium, or 15 kilograms, until at least 1992, assuming that the plant would function well and that a stock of LEU would be used. If natural uranium was used, the date for the production of the first goal quantity would have been 1993 or later.

Because of the large size of EMIS facilities, few expect Iraq to try to secretly rebuild its EMIS production facilities. In addition, it still has to overcome several technical problems, including problems in vacuum technology and ion sources, before its separators would work properly. Armed with a stock of LEU, however, Iraq could produce 15 kilograms per year of weapons-grade uranium with a facility about one-third the size of Tarmiya.

 

Enrichment Options

By 1987 or 1988, when it became apparent to the Iraqi leadership that the gaseous diffusion program was not progressing well, Iraq decided to de-emphasize this effort. It instead concentrated on chemical enrichment as a source of LEU feedstock for the EMIS program. By 1990, Iraq had made little progress in building a chemical enrichment plant. However, both programs could be reconstituted, although substantial technical challenges would need to be overcome before Iraq could operate production-scale facilities.

After the cancellation of the gaseous diffusion program, the team started to work on gas centrifuges. The team had already been transferred from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center to a new site on the northern edge of Baghdad near Rashdiya, later named the Engineering Design Center (EDC). This change reflected a change of authority from the Atomic Energy Establishment to the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization.

This group managed to acquire extensive overseas cooperation in designing and building gas centrifuges, so much so that inspectors have characterized the assistance as key to progress in the centrifuge program.

Despite such help, at the time of the Gulf War, Iraq was still a few years from an operating plant able to produce goal quantities of weapons-grade uranium, declared by the centrifuge program as 1,000 centrifuges producing 10 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium per year. Because of the relatively small size of a gas centrifuge program and the extensive progress made before the war, Iraq is viewed as likely to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program.

 

Weaponization

Iraq's effort to produce a nuclear explosive started in the mid-1980s. Under a 1988 plan, Iraq intended to have its first weapon by the summer of 1991, based on an implosion design. Iraq had worked on developing the capability to make fissile material for many years prior to this date, and Iraq has explained that the decision at that particular time reflected the expectation that domestically produced HEU would become available within a few years. Iraq intended that its nuclear weapons would be put on ballistic missiles. Iraq faced many problems in trying to reduce and ruggedize its design to fit on top of a ballistic missile.

Questions remain about the status of Iraq's weaponization program at the time of the allied bombing campaign in January 1991, when most activities were halted. Nevertheless, the Action Team inspectors have concluded that with the accelerated effort under the crash program, Iraq could have finished a nuclear explosive design by the end of 1991, if certain technical problems were overcome. However, it would have needed longer to prove a design for the Al Hussein missile. This missile, for example, would have required a warhead with a diameter of 70 centimeters to 80 centimeters, much smaller than the diameter of the design nearing completion that had a diameter of about 120 centimeters.

Iraq was also planning to build a nuclear test site, called the Al Sahara Project. At the time of the allied bombing campaign, Iraq had picked candidate sites in southwest Iraq but it had not performed a site investigation. In addition, according to a senior Iraqi nuclear official, Iraq did not plan to conduct a test before it had accumulated a few nuclear weapons. Iraq has stated that it planned to develop confidence in its weapon designs through an extensive experimental testing program that stopped short of a full-scale nuclear test.

 

Crash Program

By the time Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq still lacked an indigenous source of fissile material; its enrichment plants were still far away from producing HEU. In mid-August 1990, the Iraqi leadership ordered the diversion of its stock of safeguarded HEU fuel. Iraq's initial plan was to extract the HEU from the fuel, further enrich a portion of it, and build a nuclear weapon. The goal was to execute this plan within six months, although by the time of the allied bombing campaign in mid-January 1991 which stopped the effort, Iraq had fallen several months behind. A nuclear warhead for a ballistic missile would have taken significantly longer.

Reconstitution

Iraq has denied trying to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program after the Gulf War, although Iraqi documents suggest otherwise, at least for the period right after the war. Documents dated early June 1991 but finished several weeks earlier, called for salvaged equipment for processing safeguarded HEU fuel to be moved from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center to Tarmiya. Only in late May did the first inspection team show up at Tarmiya, unknowingly halting any Iraqi effort to reconstitute these projects there.

Determining whether Iraq has conducted any proscribed nuclear activities since the Gulf War remains a thorny problem for the Action Team and UNSCOM. Little evidence has surfaced since the defection in August 1995 of General Hussein Kamel, then head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (and Saddam Hussein's son-in-law), suggesting that Iraq has been conducting secret nuclear weapons work. Given the nature of the Iraqi regime, however, few accept that it has given up its nuclear weapons ambitions. Iraq's persistence in weakening inspections and hiding equipment, information and materials over the past seven years at great cost in lost oil revenue has only intensified suspicions about its intentions.

There is no simple answer to how much Iraq has accomplished in its nuclear weapons program since 1991 or how quickly Iraq could obtain nuclear weapons in the future. Below, we consider several important scenarios by which Iraq could build nuclear weapons. These estimates assume that the activities are carried to fruition without being discovered by the inspectors.

 

What Iraq Still Has

Iraq has demonstrated many times in the past seven years that it will make great sacrifices to preserve its basic resources for its weapons program. Nonetheless, vast amounts of equipment, materials and facilities have been destroyed by the inspectors. There are no known facilities working on nuclear weapons. The IAEA routinely says it has no evidence that banned activities are happening. However, an IAEA statement that it found "no evidence of any activity" does not mean that it has "evidence for no activity." This distinction is important.

Iraq is known to have kept its nuclear weapon teams together following the Gulf War. These teams are kept together by force and intimidation. They appear not to be significantly reduced in size or number from before the Gulf War. Many of these scientists are now in "unreal career paths," according to one Action Team inspector, and could be quickly redirected to nuclear weapons activities, if a decision were made to do so. Iraq has a relatively complete set of documents, despite its frequent protestations to the contrary. It has undoubtedly continued since the war collecting relevant data, reports and information throughout the world. Travel by Iraqis and Internet access have continued.

Following the Gulf War, Iraq established a program at its universities to train a new generation of nuclear scientists and provide more advanced instruction to members of the program. The new scientists are viewed as more loyal to the regime and may apply their expertise only in Iraq, further inhibiting defections. Many key nuclear scientists also gained experience and confidence after the war by rebuilding Iraq's civil industries. Nuclear scientists were instrumental in putting oil refineries, telephone exchanges and power stations back into operation under adverse conditions.

We believe that Iraqi scientists have been conducting theoretical design work and small-scale research and development in a wide range of proscribed areas since inspections began. Iraq may have also modified non-banned items that would be useful for small-scale research and development (R&D) and manufacturing work. Small numbers of such items may have been smuggled from abroad. Nonetheless, extensive progress by Iraqi scientists has been likely hampered by poor working conditions and the IAEA's and UNSCOM's intense scrutiny of the Iraqi program and facilities (and the difficulty in smuggling in key items, or items in sufficient quantity, from abroad).

However, these hardships should not disguise an important cultural shift in the nuclear program. In a new era of international sanctions, intense scrutiny and a lack of funds, new and more ruthless management teams are likely to emerge. The lack of accomplishments prior to the Gulf War, frequently exposed by the inspectors, will drive the new program to correct old mistakes and be more self-reliant and productive. Iraq's core asset is its seasoned and well-experienced cadre. These scientists can be expected to create more focused and productive programs at a reduced cost, size and visibility.

 

Post-War Weaponization

Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was unable to achieve its goal of making a nuclear explosive or weapon. This weakness inhibited its ability to take advantage of the safeguarded HEU fuel before the start of the allied bombing campaign. Iraq probably has focused on making sure it would not be so limited again, if it were presented with a new supply of plutonium or HEU. It is difficult to detect small-scale weaponization work, such as high explosive lenses, uranium metallurgy and neutron initiators—even under the most intrusive inspection regimes. Based on our own assessment conducted in mid-1997, we concluded that in early January 1991 Iraq was within a few months to a year of building a nuclear explosive. Building a weapon able to be mounted to a ballistic missile would have required more time.

After the war, scientists in the weaponization program worked six days a week, eight hours per day. They had time to resolve several theoretical design issues they could not properly evaluate during the crash program. They conducted a range of theoretical activities, such as computer simulations of the atomic explosion. They also worked on more advanced explosives for the device. These activities led to a much better understanding of nuclear explosives and their behavior.

Iraq worked on small-scale experiments to improve its knowledge of particular components. It may have smuggled in subcomponents, machine tools and other items. Technicians could have continued to improve their skills in making uranium components by using surrogate materials. Iraq has worked on improving the design of high-explosive lenses and its ability to make them.

A special problem for Iraq is the neutron initiator. Its pre-war design was based on beryllium and polonium-210, a highly radioactive material with a half-life of about one year. Any polonium-210 Iraq may have successfully hidden from inspectors would have decayed away by now. Because Iraq obtained its polonium by irradiating bismuth targets in its research reactor, which is now defunct, it cannot produce more. Thus, Iraq needs a new type of neutron generator, and one likely candidate is a pulsed neutron generator based on tritium and deuterium. Iraq obtained several pulsed tritium-deuterium generators that are used in the oil exploration industry. One of the "oil well logging" devices could be suitable to trigger a nuclear explosive. Iraq also had established a program before the war to build its own pulsed neutron generator, but this program did not progress very far.

One of us (Hamza) was involved in an attempt in 1991 to create an off-shore company in Jordan to produce tritium-deuterium generators. The company would have produced these generators for the oil industry, but in secret; it would also have produced miniaturized neutron generators for use in Iraqi nuclear weapons. The company would have depended on the involvement of an East European expert with long experience in building such devices. This expert was not told the true purpose of the company, but he said that a civilian endeavor could no longer be done in Iraq because of the UN sanctions. Hamza pulled out of the project when Iraq stated that he could not take his family with him to Jordan. He believes that the company was never built in Jordan.

Assuming that Iraq has done nothing on weaponization since the Gulf War, we estimate that Iraq may need more than a year to reconstitute its program and finish a device, absent the fissile material. However, this scenario appears unlikely. The more likely scenario is that Iraq has made progress since the war, although the extent of progress is difficult to judge. Our conclusion is that Iraq could make a nuclear device within two to 12 months after deciding to do so, assuming it acquired sufficient fissile material. We also believe that the more probable time is closer to two months if HEU is obtained. The lower bound of two months includes the time needed to make components out of HEU and conduct any final testing of the device. The design would probably be an implosion system. However, Iraq was working on a gun-type device before the war, but it did not emphasize this design because of an anticipated scarcity of HEU. After the war, this design could have been perfected. If plutonium were obtained, Iraq would likely need more time, but still less than 12 months, to build a modified implosion device. Because the estimated time to complete a device is less than a year, likely considerably less than a year, the emphasis must remain on preventing Iraq from acquiring fissile material.

Our assessment appeared to be confirmed by Scott Ritter, an UNSCOM inspector who resigned in August 1998. He said that UNSCOM had intelligence information which indicates that Iraq has components necessary for three nuclear weapons, lacking only the fissile material. However, Ritter's statement has been challenged as unsubstantiated by UNSCOM, IAEA and U.S. officials. At least three of the four sources Ritter cited as the basis for his information have disputed Ritter's account, according to IAEA and U.S. officials.

 

Procurement of Fissile Material

Iraq denies ever making any attempt to procure fissile material abroad after the war. It also denies any serious attempt to do so before the war. Iraq has readily admitted, at least after Kamel's defection, that it received many offers for fissile material from abroad. One senior official said in 1996 that in the last 10 years, Iraq had received over 200 offers of everything from red mercury to fissile material to complete nuclear weapons. He insisted that Iraq had turned down every offer.

One offer, however, is being investigated by the Action Team. This offer, described in summary in a one-page document found at Kamel's farm after his defection, was purported to be by A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's gas centrifuge program. An intermediary approached Iraqi intelligence in October 1990 with the following offer: Khan was prepared to give Iraq project designs for a nuclear bomb and to provide assistance in enriching uranium and building a nuclear weapon. He would also ensure any requirements of materials from Western European countries through a company Khan owns in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. He requested a preliminary technical meeting to discuss the documents that he was willing to sell.

However, a meeting with Khan directly was not possible at that time, given the situation. An alternative of setting up a meeting with an intermediary, who had good relations with the Iraqi intelligence agents, was mentioned as a possibility. Iraqi intelligence officials believed the motive was money. Both the Pakistani government and Khan vehemently deny any such offer. Whether or nor Khan was involved, the Iraqis took this offer as genuine. Iraq's statement that it rejected this offer appears credible.

One of us (Hamza) knew of this offer at the time, and believes Iraq would not have pursued it. This type of offer would have given those involved too much knowledge and control over highly secret nuclear programs. What if they talked? Pakistan has had close relations with the United States. If the offer was a scam, large amounts of money could be at risk.

Despite these cases, we know of no evidence that Iraq has procured plutonium or HEU overseas since the war. But concern remains that Iraq may have already attempted to do so in the former Soviet Union. We cannot exclude the possibility that it has already obtained fissile material there. Nonetheless, preventing Iraq from acquiring nuclear explosive material abroad, particularly in Russia and former Soviet republics, remains a difficult but absolutely essential goal.

 

Gas Centrifuge Program

The gas centrifuge enrichment process is the most critical of the technologies Iraq pursued to make fissile material domestically. This type of activity is difficult to detect under the current OMV system. Before the war, Iraq made substantial progress in mastering the operation and construction of a variety of gas centrifuge designs. It also acquired illegally a large number of highly classified gas centrifuge design, operation and manufacturing documents from German centrifuge experts.

Suspicions remain that gas centrifuge activity resumed after the war at Rashdiya. Little verified information exists for activities at Rashdiya after the war. It was not bombed at all during the war, and it was not inspected until the summer of 1991, and then only in a cursory manner. Iraq has declared that in March 1991, it started bringing evacuated equipment and materials back to Rashdiya, but had not finished reconstituting its program by the time it accepted the UN Security Council Resolution 687 (the Gulf War cease-fire resolution) in April. Iraq says that it did not resume any centrifuge work at Rashdiya or elsewhere after the war.

Nevertheless, questions remain about why Iraq decided to hide Rashdiya's existence. Although Iraq chose to tell the inspectors about many of the centrifuge program's accomplishments and the existence of other unknown centrifuge sites, it decided not to reveal Rashdiya or the extent of foreign assistance. Iraq continued to deny the importance of Rashdiya even after defectors had identified the site in 1991. Iraq came clean about Rashdiya and the extent of foreign assistance only after Kamel's defection in 1995, when exposure was certain.

Iraq also continues to maintain that all centrifuge program reports and progress reports were destroyed during the bombing or after the war. This statement is viewed by the Action Team as non-credible because documents from the rest of the Iraqi nuclear programs continue to surface. The collection of papers from Kamel's farm also included several tons of maraging steel and large quantities of carbon fiber, both key materials in making gas centrifuges. The inspectors did not know that Iraq still had this material. Whether some was used in small-scale R&D activities is unknown. In addition, Iraq may have acquired more such materials. An Iraqi official has bragged to inspectors that overseas procurement of maraging steel is no problem.

Iraq could have made progress in the following areas. It could have improved its ability to make centrifuge components to high tolerances, an absolute must for the successful operation of centrifuges and a difficult problem for Iraqi industry. Centrifuge experts could have expanded their theoretical and "hands-on" knowledge of single machines or a few hooked together by pipes into a cascade. Iraq may have also procured illicitly more machine tools to make centrifuge components. Despite this progress, Iraq would still face formidable challenges in making significant progress toward building a facility able to make kilograms of weapons-grade uranium annually. It would also need to acquire a stock of uranium hexafluoride, a demanding task.

We consider two cases, which both assume that Iraq has not started to build a centrifuge facility, whose goal capacity is taken as 10 kilograms per year of weapons-grade uranium. These cases also assume that Iraq may opt for a simpler centrifuge design that is easier to build and requires materials and equipment that are less controlled internationally.

The first case posits that Iraq needs to procure manufacturing equipment, build a manufacturing plant, conduct additional testing of the centrifuge design, produce uranium hexafluoride and manufacture 1,000 to 2,000 centrifuges. We estimate that Iraq would need about three to seven years to accomplish this set of tasks and produce its first 10 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium. The second case assumes that Iraq just needs to manufacture the centrifuges in sufficient number, having finished all necessary testing and procurement of materials and equipment. In this case, Iraq would need an estimated two to three years to bring the plant into operation and produce its first 10 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium. In brief, Iraq would need at least a few years to construct and operate a clandestine gas centrifuge enrichment plant. Because Iraq would need to procure several key items abroad, the inspection system needs to have a strong export-import focus in order to have a better chance of detecting Iraq's procurement efforts.

 

Focus on Iraqi Scientists

The Action Team realized soon after inspections started the importance of identifying and interviewing key Iraqi nuclear scientists. Most key scientists have been identified. Over a hundred are periodically interviewed by the Action Team. However, this process is inadequate in obtaining necessary information or ensuring early warning if these scientists are engaged in prohibited activities.

Most of the scientists are virtual prisoners. They live in fear of their government's punishments if they do or say anything outside the limits imposed by it. Even if they manage to leave, their families are held hostage with the possibility of terrible reprisals against them if they reveal any significant information. Currently, Iraqi scientists are interviewed in the presence of government security officials. This arrangement gives the Iraqi regime control over what the scientists can say and provides an easy way to control the information flowing to the inspectors. One of us (Hamza) was told that in case the inspectors found out his former role as head of the weaponization program, he was not to make himself available to inspectors. If he was forced to talk to them, he was instructed to claim not to remember anything about what he did.

On one inspection, the other author (Albright) was able to interview Iraqi scientists only in groups or in the presence of a "minder." One-to-one contacts usually involved pleasantries or being pulled aside to be "fed a line." In one case, the head of the gas centrifuge program tried to convince him that the first gas centrifuge facility would have taken years to finish.

Typically, the interviews are video-taped by the Iraqis. These tapes provide the Iraqis with a means to analyze in detail the information that is revealed in those sessions, any mistakes that are made, and the underlying knowledge and strategy of the inspectors. The genesis of this interviewing process dates to the beginning of inspections. One inspector said that it did not occur to the inspectors to do it any other way. "We just did not think about it," he added.

At least, the inspectors need to have the right to interview the scientists without their "minders," particularly under the OMV program. Ideally, such interviews should be conducted in another country. An alternative is to conduct the interviews in a secure room, which for example exists at the Baghdad Verification and Monitoring Center.

 

Getting the Scientists Out

A better solution is to create a method to allow Saddam's cadre of knowledgeable nuclear weapon scientists and their families to leave Iraq safely. With years of valuable experience before the war, Iraq's nuclear weapon experts are both a valuable and necessary asset to implement a decision to seek nuclear weapons. If the key scientists leave, Iraq may be unable to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program.

A practical method to implement this proposal is for the United States to link its support for lifting sanctions to Iraq agreeing to allow certain scientists and their families to leave Iraq. Such a method would avoid the need for Security Council agreement and permit the United States to name the scientists it wants out.

Would any scientists leave Iraq voluntarily? There is a growing recognition that many of the nuclear experts are not committed to remaining in this highly repressive police state. Most of the experts were arbitrarily assigned to the nuclear weapons program after returning from overseas education. After suffering years of hardships created by sanctions, many scientists and their families could be expected to leave. As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of the former nuclear weapon scientists have been identified through captured Iraqi documents and Action Team inspections. The resettlement of just a few dozen key scientists would devastate Saddam's ability to rebuild his nuclear weapons program.

Key to the success of this initiative is protecting the scientists and their families from retaliation. The United States would be a possible resettlement country, because it can provide adequate protection against Saddam's agents if he decides to violate Security Council resolutions. The Security Council would also need to assign the Action Team and UNSCOM the task of investigating any suspected retaliation against family members in Iraq. In the event of retaliation, the Security Council must be ready to punish Iraq decisively.

The scientists would need to be provided economic support until they could find adequate employment. Any costs during this resettlement process could be collected from Iraq, just as the costs of UNSCOM and Action Team inspections are taken from proceeds of Iraqi oil sales. For their part, these experts would commit not to work in any weapons of mass destruction program and agree to host government or Action Team monitoring to ensure that they are not violating their commitment or secretly helping Saddam to rebuild his military programs.

Time is running out to deprive Saddam of his most valuable remaining nuclear weapons asset. If successful, this initiative could nip an Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the bud. The alternative is letting the nuclear cadre, intimidated by Saddam, remain in Iraq, awaiting the inevitable orders to reconstitute the nuclear weapons program or train the next generation of nuclear weapons experts.

 

Conclusion

Ensuring that Iraq does not build nuclear weapons will require vigilance. The chance of Iraq building nuclear weapons in secret depends critically on the effectiveness of the OMV system. If inspections become ineffective, even if sanctions remain, Iraq's chance of success will be unacceptably high. Iraq has developed a deep understanding of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the entire inspection system. It appears to have a strategy to weaken inspections at will. Although a robust and constantly improving inspection system is necessary to detect and thwart Iraq's proscribed nuclear activities, Security Council enforcement of the inspections, backed up by U.S. and British willingness to use military force, will remain vital to the future effectiveness of inspections.

The OMV needs improvement, including a more system-wide approach to its design and deployment. More environmental monitoring in Iraq is needed. Improved cooperation on detecting illicit imports into Iraq is also increasingly vital, as the sanctions become less effective. International efforts to improve controls over fissile material in the former Soviet Union must receive a higher priority. With a strengthened, enforced OMV program, Iraq is far less likely to build nuclear weapons in secret. If key Iraqi scientists are brought to the West, Saddam Hussein may find it difficult to succeed in building nuclear weapons for many years.

Ultimately, the goal of the inspections in Iraq is to buy time, in hopes that the regime will either change or give up its ambitions for nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. A highly confrontational inspection system has little chance of lasting for decades in any country. It is a tribute to the Security Council, and in particular the United States, that the inspections have lasted this long. But the system of stringent inspections must remain effective at least as long as the current regime persists on its noncooperative path. The stakes are high. A nuclear-armed Iraq could haunt the world for decades, and make the accomplishment of Middle East peace a dream of the past.


Iraq's Reconstitution of Its Nuclear Weapons Program

Iraq Blocks UNSCOM Monitoring; Security Council Calls for Review

ESCALATING ITS standoff with the UN Security Council, Iraq announced on October 31 that it would no longer allow inspectors from the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to monitor sites in Iraq for prohibited weapons activities. On August 5, Baghdad suspended inspections by UNSCOM, which oversees chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile programs, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which handles nuclear issues, into Iraq's past weapons activities. Iraq's announcement specified only UNSCOM's monitoring activities, but will likely affect IAEA's monitoring work as well, since the IAEA depends heavily on UNSCOM for logistical support. Iraq's action may have been prompted by the Security Council's approval on October 30 of a plan for a "comprehensive review" of Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations that was not to Baghdad's liking. The review, provided for in Security Council Resolution 1194 (approved September 9), can only proceed after Baghdad revokes its August 5 decision to suspend UNSCOM and IAEA investigations. Initially supported by states sympathetic to Iraq as means of narrowing the remaining disarmament issues and thus hastening the end of sanctions, the final review plan does not appear to provide Baghdad much leeway.

The Security Council issued a statement on October 31 condemning Iraq's action and demanding that Baghdad "rescind immediately and unconditionally" the bans on both monitoring and inspections. While the United States has taken a decidedly low-key approach to Iraq's August blockage of UNSCOM inspections, the latest interference with monitoring activities is likely to provoke a more robust response. (See ACT, August/September, 1998.) President Clinton termed the Iraqi decision "a clear violation of the UN Security Council Resolutions" and stated, "From my point of view we should keep all our options open."

 

UNSCOM & IAEA Reports Presented

Amid the Security Council's deliberations on the nature of the comprehensive review, UNSCOM and the IAEA presented their latest biannual reports on Iraq on October 6 and 7, respectively. The IAEA report stated—as did the previous IAEA report—that "no indication of prohibited materials, equipment or activities" had been found in the last six months, but cautioned that without inspections, the agency is unable "to ensure that prohibited activities are not being carried out in Iraq." The report also reiterated past concerns about missing information on Iraq's nuclear weaponization and centrifuge development efforts, offers of foreign assistance, and documents showing Baghdad has officially ended its nuclear weapons program.

Similarly, UNSCOM's report recalled previous submissions to the Security Council documenting significant gaps and discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations of its ballistic missile, biological and chemical weapons holdings and production capabilities. Highlighting the relatively small number of outstanding issues in the missile and chemical areas, UNSCOM concluded that its disarmament work in those areas "is possibly near its end" if Iraq chooses to cooperate.

 

BW Concerns Remain

Efforts to verify the destruction of Iraq's biological weapons program have been much less successful, and the UNSCOM report listed gaps in Iraq's declarations on biological weapons munitions, stocks of biological agents, and growth media. The report noted that a panel of international experts asked in July to verify Iraq's latest declarations recommended that no further "expert level" verification efforts be made "until Iraq commits itself to provide substantive, new information."

Another international group of experts assembled by UNSCOM reported to the Security Council on October 26 that Iraq had, contrary to its claims, weaponized the nerve agent VX for delivery by ballistic missiles. The VX panel confirmed the validity of tests (performed by a U.S. laboratory on missile warhead fragments unearthed in May at a warhead destruction site) that found degraded VX and a VX stabilizing agent. Other samples later analyzed by French, Swiss and American labs did not show VX, but revealed the presence of a chemical compound and a decontamination agent that should not have been present had Iraqi claims of the warheads' contents been accurate.

 

Review in Limbo

With the three reports in hand, and with Iraq continuing to refuse access for inspections, the Security Council adopted on October 30 a plan for the comprehensive review that is slightly at odds with Secretary-General Kofi Annan's original October 5 proposal. Instead of asking UNSCOM and the IAEA to provide evidence to demonstrate that Iraq has not complied with its disarmament obligations, the review plan calls on the two agencies to report on Iraqi compliance with the UN disarmament resolutions and to identify "any tasks which still need to be undertaken."

Pointing out that it cannot "prejudge the outcome of the review," the Security Council nevertheless suggested the process would conclude with the creation of a list of "remaining steps" to be taken by Iraq and a "likely time-frame for this purpose, assuming full Iraqi cooperation." The council also agreed that the review could only take place once the secretary-general has received reports from UNSCOM and the IAEA confirming that they are receiving "full cooperation from Iraq."

  

Congress Returns Export Control Over Satellites to State Department

PRIMARY CONTROL over the export of commercial satellites will return from the Commerce Department to the State Department under a provision in the fiscal year 1999 defense bill signed by President Bill Clinton on October 17. The president had shifted control over commercial satellite exports from State to Commerce in March 1996 following an interagency review. Though the move was made for chiefly commercial reasons, the Clinton administration has sought to use the lucrative "carrot" of commercial space cooperation as an incentive for China to tighten its controls on missile technology exports.

The legislative reversal was prompted in part by revelations over the summer that two U.S. space firms—Loral Space & Communications and Hughes Electronics—may have provided unauthorized assistance to China in the reconstruction and analysis of a failed satellite launch. (See ACT, May 1998.) Although the Loral-Hughes incident occurred before the transfer of commercial satellite exports to the Commerce Department, critics of the administration's engagement policy with China have used the satellite export issue to attack the administration as being soft on China. Critics contend that U.S. involvement in China's commercial space sector benefits Beijing's military space and missile development efforts.

The effect of the new law, which reclassifies commercial satellites as Munitions List items rather than dual-use items, will be felt chiefly by domestic space firms accustomed to the Commerce Department's faster, more business-friendly review process. Commerce reviews of dual-use items consider economic and trade interests as well as U.S. national security concerns, proceed on the basis of published regulations and have a 90-day timeline for action. State Department reviews of Munitions List items primarily consider the proposed sale's effect on national security and foreign policy, are open ended and tend to take longer since State assigns fewer people to the process.

The shift in satellite jurisdiction marks the second time that Congress has used the annual defense spending bill to roll back a liberalization by the Clinton administration of U.S. high-tech export controls. In 1998, Congress tightened controls on exports of high-performance computers, which the Clinton administration had eased in 1996, following the discovery of U.S. supercomputers in Russian and Chinese military labs.

Although Commerce Department officials had warned of a presidential veto of the defense bill over the satellite issue, the White House chose to accept the bill after a House-Senate conference committee weakened the satellite provisions. Initially, for example, the House wanted to ban all satellite exports to China. The new legislation, however, only requires the president to certify, 15 days before a commercial satellite export is made to China, that the sale will neither hurt the U.S. space launch industry nor "measurably improve the missile or space launch capabilities" of China.

In a statement accompanying his signature of the legislation, President Clinton objected that the change in jurisdiction for satellite export controls "is not necessary… and could hamper the U.S. satellite industry." Referring to the effective date of March 15, 1999, for the transfer of export control authority, the president urged the Congress to pass "remedial legislation" before the change in jurisdiction is made effective.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Created

On October 1, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced the merger of several Pentagon agencies to form the new Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), whose mission is to combat the danger of weapons of mass destruction. "At least 25 countries are in the process of developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the means to deliver them," warned Cohen at DTRA's headquarters near Dulles International Airport. "We must confront these threats in places like Baghdad before they come to our shores."

The formation of DTRA, recommended by the 1997 Defense Reform Initiative, consolidates the Defense Technology Security Agency, Defense Special Weapons Agency, and On-Site Inspection Agency. DTRA's eight directorates include Nuclear Support, On-Site Inspection, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Technology Security, Special Weapons Technology, Chem-Bio Defense, Counterproliferation, and Force Protection. DTRA Director Dr. Jay C. Davis, former associate director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, will report to the under secretary of defense for acquisition and technology. The new agency has roughly 2,100 employees and a fiscal year 1999 budget of about $1.9 billion.

START I Cuts on Track; U.S. Violations Charged

On October 5, Ambassador Steven Steiner, U.S. representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have gone below START I numerical limits for deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles more than three years ahead of schedule. The four states "have verifiably eliminated more than 300 former Soviet ICBMs, 290 [ICBM] launchers, 170 submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], 130 SLBM launchers and 47 heavy bombers," said Steiner. According to the latest START I memorandum of understanding, these four states have collectively deployed 1,577 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (23 fewer than the treaty's 1,600 limit) and 7,540 strategic warheads (1,540 more than the treaty's 6,000 limit).

According to Russian press accounts in late August, however, Russia has accused the United States of violating START I. Moscow has reportedly raised a series of complaints regarding the number of warheads attributed to Trident II SLBMs, the U.S. unwillingness to allow complete inspections of Trident IIs to verify their actual loadings and the U.S. refusal to allow inspections of certain facilities at the Silverdale submarine base in Washington. Russia has also charged the United States with improperly destroying MX ICBMs under the treaty and with making repairs to B-1B bombers at operational bases rather than designated repair depots.

A U.S. official familiar with the issue would not comment on the specific accusations, but did say that the United States believes it is in compliance with START I. Russia has raised its compliance concerns at the JCIC, where they remain under discussion.

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - October 1998