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“For half a century, ACA has been providing the world … with advocacy, analysis, and awareness on some of the most critical topics of international peace and security, including on how to achieve our common, shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.”

– Izumi Nakamitsu
UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
June 2, 2022
November/December 1997
Edition Date: 
Saturday, November 1, 1997

'Canning,' Fuel Deliveries On Track in North Korea

PROGRESS IMPLEMENTING the 1994 U.S. North Korean denuclearization accord continued in the last months of 1997 with the Energy Department topping the 95 percent mark for the "canning" of the North's spent fuel and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) meeting its commitment—after a two month delay—to supply Pyongyang with its annual shipment of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. The lag in completing the deliveries arose from both KEDO's continuing scarcity of resources and the poor facilities in North Korea for offloading and storing the fuel oil.

Although the last of the 1996 1997 fuel arrived in North Korea in early December the delivery cycle should have ended October 21), several weeks may be required to remove the oil from the supply ships. Perhaps due to its own role in delaying the completion of the deliveries, Pyongyang's public reaction to the missed October deadline has been limited to a stiff reminder to KEDO of its obligations.

KEDO was founded in 1995 by the United States, South Korea and Japan to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework, under which Pyongyang agreed to freeze operations at its 5 megawatt (electric) graphite moderated reactor and an accompanying spent fuel reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, and halt construction of two similar but larger reactors in exchange for annual shipments of heavy fuel oil and construction of two 1,000 megawatt (electric) proliferation resistant light water reactors (LWRs) as replacements.

KEDO's operations are funded by its 19 member states, but funding shortfalls have forced the consortium to borrow funds for more than one third of the total $120 million in oil purchases since 1995. In 1997, KEDO added a spot to its Executive Board for the European Union, which bolstered the oil purchasing budget with a contribution of $6 million that will be supplemented by five additional annual contributions of about $18 million. The United States has been the main financial supporter of the heavy fuel oil program, contributing $51 million since 1995, with an additional $30 million promised for 1998.

In August 1997, KEDO broke ground for the LWR project at the Kumho site near Sinpo City in North Korea, and has since continued preparing the site for the thousands of workers who will eventually be coming to complete the project. Preliminary work, which will cost $45 million, continued throughout the fall and early winter on construction infrastructure, delivery of equipment, and movement of one million cubic meters of dirt to level the site. KEDO has also been engaged in negotiations with the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) over the terms of the prime, or "turn key" contract. KEDO hopes to conclude negotiations with KEPCO early in 1998 and to have site preparation finished by mid fall 1998.

'Canning,' Fuel Deliveries On Track in North Korea

Russia Clarifies Yeltsin Statement on Nuclear Cuts

During a December 2 news conference in Sweden, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia would unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal by one third, a statement that was quickly "clarified" by his aides. Presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky explained that Yeltsin had meant that Russia was willing to accept nuclear force reductions below the START III level of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic warheads agreed to last March in Helsinki. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev told concerned members of the Duma, the lower house of parliament, that Russia had no plans to make unilateral reductions in its nuclear arsenal. "Neither the president, nor, for that matter, we, have proposed any unilateral reductions. Everything will be done on the basis of parity," Sergeyev said December 5.

Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov met with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott December 3 4 in Washington to discuss a range of security and arms control issues, including START III. Although the United States and Russia are currently holding a series of expert level discussions on START III, the Clinton administration maintains that official negotiations on a follow on treaty cannot begin until the Russian Duma approves START II.

The U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control Agenda

Between March and September 1997, the United States and Russia concluded a series of critical agreements designed to help ease the START II agreement through a fractious Duma. Both countries recognized that the complex of national security issues raised by the treaty, by the development and deployment of highly capable theater missile defense (TMD) systems, and by the imminent expansion of NATO into Central Europe had to be addressed if there was to be any hope of continuing the strategic arms reduction process.

With regard to the problems posed by START II, the United States and Russia agreed to shift the treaty's final implementation date by five years—from January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2007. The leaders of the two countries also committed to the prompt negotiation of a follow-on treaty (START III) which would lower deployed weapons levels by another 1,000 warheads (from 3,000-3,500 to 2,000-2,500) by the end of 2007.

To address concerns over the U.S. deployment of highly capable TMD systems, the two nations agreed to ban the testing of such systems against ballistic missile targets with speeds above 5 kilometers per second or ranges that exceed 3,500 kilometers. The two sides also agreed to exchange information on TMD plans, programs and production, and not to develop, test or deploy space-based TMD interceptors. And, together with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the two sides agreed to a multilateralization of the ABM Treaty.

Finally, to help reassure Russia that NATO expansion is neither exclusionary nor hostile, the NATO alliance and Moscow concluded the Founding Act establishing a NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. Intended to mitigate the sting of including former Warsaw Pact nations such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in NATO, the Council will provide a forum for discussion and potential action on issues of common interest in Europe. This controversial pact notwithstanding, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, on the eve of the Founding Act's signature, warned that NATO would "fully undermine" its relations with Russia if it expanded to include any of the former Soviet republics (meaning the Baltics and Ukraine).

 

START II Ratification

The key question remaining after conclusion of the START II extension protocol, the TMD accords and the Founding Act is whether the Yeltsin administration will vigorously press for, and the Russian Duma act favorably on, START II. In mid-September, Yeltsin sent his foreign and defense ministers, Yevgeniy Primakov and Igor Sergeyev, respectively, to the Duma to signal his determination to energize the START II ratification process. Then, in November, both houses of the Russian parliament ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with an overwhelmingly favorable vote. Russian government officials and arms control community were jubilant at the outcome, claiming that the Yeltsin administration had learned how to "pump flesh" in the Duma (the Federation Council, the upper chamber, is a more predictable and less unruly body) and that CWC ratification had generated useful momentum on arms control. At the end of 1997, Russian officials seemed moderately confident that the Open Skies treaty would be approved shortly and that START II could be brought to a vote in the first half of 1998, prior to—and a U.S. condition for—a Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Moscow.

Despite this cautiously optimistic message, Russian ratification of START II is by no means assured. Yeltsin's health continues to be a major concern and Russian domestic issues (especially the budget, taxes and corruption), plus the Duma's own profound ambivalence toward START II, continually threaten to push strategic arms control off the parliamentary agenda. If START II fails to be approved, if (as is almost certain) Russian conventional forces remain weak and its defense resources scarce, if U.S. TMD and national missile defense (NMD) programs proceed apace, and if NATO continues its "open door" expansion policy, then undoubtedly Russia—and subsequently the United States—will be forced to reappraise its political and strategic relationship with the other nation.

This reassessment is likely to take place at a time when the legislatures in both countries are dominated by conservative forces, and at a time when Russia is deeply concerned that the long-term geostrategic tides are running strongly against it. Consequently, failure to ratify START II is likely to have an adverse impact across a broad range of issues affecting both U.S. and Russian security: on the chances for further strategic and tactical nuclear force reductions and other arms control initiatives such as nuclear deactivation (removing from operational service) and de-alerting (reducing operational readiness); on congressional support for "Nunn-Lugar" security assistance to the former Soviet Union; and on continued restraint in ballistic missile defense deployments.

A more likely—some would say overly optimistic—scenario, however, barring any major political perturbations, is that START II will be ratified by the Duma in the first half of 1998. Following Russian action, the START II extension protocol and the TMD documents will be submitted to the U.S. Senate for its approval (which will require a determined effort by the Clinton administration) before the 1998 election break. Under this scenario, START II could enter into force by the end of 1998 leaving nearly two years of both the Clinton and Yeltsin administrations for the negotiation of a START III agreement.

 

The Future Agenda

Even under the most optimistic of scenarios, however, a great deal of work remains to be done to ensure that START II is implemented and that START III continues the steady decrease in the number of deployed nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals. This future strategic arms control agenda includes;

 

  • negotiating START III;
  • devising mutually acceptable means of deactivating weapons;
  • exploring the possibility of de-alerting all or part of the remaining missile forces;
  • taking the first steps toward greater transparency in nuclear infrastructures; and
  • adopting measures dealing with tactical nuclear weapons and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Negotiating START III

Last March, as part of the package negotiated at the U.S.-Russian summit in Helsinki to obtain Russian ratification of START II, the United States and Russia agreed that the START III negotiations would include four basic components:

 

  • a lower aggregate level of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each party;
  • deactivation by December 31, 2003, of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) scheduled to be eliminated under START II (such as Russia's SS-18 and SS-24 ICBMs and the U.S. MX ICBM);
  • conversion of the current START agreements from a fixed 15-year term with five-year renewal periods to unlimited duration; and
  • measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads.
In addition, the United States and Russia agreed to explore (as separate issues) possible measures relating to tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear long-range SLCMs, including appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures, and measures relating to transparency in nuclear materials.

 

Warhead Levels

A START III level of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed warheads as agreed to at Helsinki would reduce significantly the resources required by Russia to maintain strategic numerical parity with the United States in the next decade and beyond. Two issues are presented, however, by the lower warhead numbers. The first is whether the START III warhead level is separable from the other basic components of a follow-on agreement—and thus quickly insertable into the START II agreement—or whether the agreement on lower warhead levels is contingent on the successful negotiation of some other measure or measures. Will the United States, for example, insist that final agreement to lower levels of deployed systems be linked to additional measures relating to stockpile transparency, or will Russia link START III to provisions relating to warhead destruction or to revision of out-dated and "onerous" START I verification measures?

A second, perhaps more fundamental issue is whether the Yeltsin administration and the Duma would actually be satisfied with a 2,000-to-2,500-warhead level for START III (even though this had been the original Russian proposal at the beginning of the START II negotiations in 1992 and was put forward again by Yeltsin at Helsinki). Russian analysts and government officials are now indicating that these levels may be too high for Russia by at least 500 warheads. Because Russian deactivation and elimination costs are relatively constant, driven as they are by the requirement to eliminate multiple-warhead ICBMs, the lower the START III warhead number, the lower the costs will be for any projected modernization and replacement program.

With Yeltsin's change of defense ministers in May 1997—from General Igor Rodionov, who was not known as a friend of START II, to Sergeyev, who comes from the Strategic Rocket Forces and is a strong supporter of START—and a more sober appraisal of budgetary resources actually available for modernization, the Russians are now seeking a warheadlevel in START III of 1,500. This figure has reportedly been put forward by the Russians in the on-going "strategic stability" discussions with the United States and is openly discussed by senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Moscow.<1>

With the United States already prepared to accept a 2,000-warhead level, the sides are, in effect, talking about a START III agreement with between 1,500 and 2,000 warheads. This could be expressed either as a range, as in START II, or, as is more likely, a fixed figure—say, 1,750—as in START I.

 

Deactivation and De-alerting

Originally agreed to in principle by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in their joint statement issued at the Washington summit in 1994, the United States and Russia exchanged letters in September 1997 committing the two countries to begin work—as soon as START II enters into force—on an agreement to deactivate by the end of 2003 all the SNDVs scheduled to be eliminated under the treaty. The Clinton administration has stressed that, although the final START II implementation date has been shifted by five years, all the systems to be eliminated will be made non-operational at roughly the same time (2003) as the elimination called for under the original START II schedule.

Sensing the importance of this provision to the United States, and attempting to protect its own interest in obtaining lower overall warhead levels, in the September 1997 exchange of letters on deactivation, Moscow cautioned that "[t]aking into account the supremenational interests of the country, the Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that well in advance of the above deactivation deadline the START III Treaty will be achieved and will enter into force." (Emphasis added.)<2>

The current U.S. proposal for deactivation calls for the removal of nuclear reentry vehicles (warheads) from those missiles destined to be eliminated. Russia, for its part, has statedthat it prefers other deactivation measures. According to a recent report, Russian experts argue that they do not have adequate safe storage facilities for those missile warheads that would have to be removed under a deactivation program.<3> Consequently, the Russians have put forward in talks with the United States a deactivation option that would involve removing batteries that operate the missile guidance systems. There are indications that Russia may have other suggestions in the future, such as disablinglid-opening mechanisms of ICBM silos to prevent a missile launch, and there have been reports that on the U.S. side the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an interagency group have begun exploring a range of other deactivation and de-alerting alternatives.<4>

While the two countries may differ somewhat on the specifics of deactivation, there is no strategic reason—although there may be political ones—why a deactivation agreement need be "symmetric" in terms of the methods employed to remove a system from operational status. But an agreement would probably have to be symmetric in terms of its ease of verifiability and its potential reversibility, that is, the time required to restore a deactivated system to operational status.

Much of the work done on designing a program for deactivating systems scheduled to be eliminated under START II could be of value if the United States and Russia decide to de-alert their nuclear forces. De-alerting refers to reducing the alert status of operational forces by methods such as eliminating the "hair-trigger" launch procedures and extending the time required to respond to a launch command. As Senator Thomas Daschle (D-SD)noted recently, "the most frightening example of the disconnect between our nuclear force posture and post-Cold War reality is the hair trigger alert status of thousands of our strategic nuclear weapons."<5>

Although not formally on the START III agenda, de-alerting has many supporters in the non-governmental community, including former Senator Sam Nunn. On the other hand, General Eugene Habiger, commander-in-chief of U.S. Strategic Command has spoken critically of the impact of de-alerting on the survivability of U.S. forces and de-alerting has yet to find a strong bureaucratic champion within the Clinton administration.

The administration's apparent lack of enthusiasm notwithstanding (which is more than matched, incidentally, by the Russians), de-alerting could be of significant value in reducing the potential for launch-on-warning or for inadvertent, accidental or autonomous nuclear release. Also, it is seen by its supporters as a direct and useful way to address some of the concerns about the fragility of the Russian command and control system. De-alerting might also provide some additional negotiating flexibility in START. For example, if the United States were to agree to de-alert the land-based portion of its "launch-ready" missile forces (strategic bombers have been off alert since 1991), this might help bridge any potential gap (of, say, 500 warheads) between U.S. and Russian deployments in START III.

 

Transparency and Dismantlement

The United States and Russia have already taken some elementary steps toward outlining a warhead destruction regime in connection with their agreement for the U.S. purchase of 500 tons of "downblended" Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) derived from nuclear weapons. In addition, Washington and Moscow had been discussing a cooperative agreement that would permit the exchange of restricted data relating to nuclear weapon stockpiles. These talks broke off in November 1995, however, without having made much progress, largely as a consequence of Russian unwillingness to agree to declassify and exchange the necessary information.

The issue of stockpile transparency and warhead dismantlement is of particular interest for several reasons. First, there have never been any reliable figures on the size of the Russianstockpile of weapons or weapons-grade fissionable material. According to one estimate, the former Soviet Union possessed more than 27,000 nuclear warheads in 1991, including more than 11,000 strategic and over 15,000 tactical weapons.<6> However, some observers believe that the margin of error in U.S. estimates of the Soviet-Russian stockpile may be as much as 10,000.

Second, there is considerable concern in the West that some Russian nuclear weapons, particularly those that are transportable and in poorly protected storage areas, are susceptible to theft, misuse or misappropriation. A thorough-going transparency and dismantlement regime will presumably improve the accounting and security arrangements and eliminate a number of surplus, non-deployed, but nonetheless potentially dangerous, weapons.

Another argument for such a regime is that, particularly as deployed warhead numbers get smaller, the size of the non-deployed stockpile becomes more relevant to the potential for "breakout"—a rapid increase in force size. This is particularly true when reductions are achieved through "downloading" (the removal of warheads from multiple-warhead systems) as the United States and Russia will do in START II, because downloading leaves empty spaces on operational missiles to which stored warheads can be quickly redeployed to reconstitute the force.

Despite the obvious importance of a transparency and warhead dismantlement regime, it is unclear whether the Russian nuclear and security establishment is prepared—as the United States seems to be—to open up its "books" and participate in a highly intrusive monitoring arrangement. To date, in the official strategic stability talks as well as in discussions with non-governmental groups in Moscow, the Russians have displayed no interest in a nuclear stockpile transparency regime. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), which assembles new nuclear weapons and dismantles older or surplus ones, and the 12th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for the management of the nuclear arsenal, appear to be opposed to a transparency regime.Despite the lack of Russian enthusiasm for stockpile transparency, the issue is likely to remain on the table at U.S. insistence with the hope of at least beginning the process of opening up hitherto closed nuclear infrastructures, perhaps starting with data exchanges or "shadow visits."<7>

Because stockpile transparency and warhead destruction provisions could take quite some time to elaborate, it will be important to avoid linking progress in this area to the warhead reductions under START III. This issue is particularly relevant because of the connection the Russians have made, in their unilateral statement on deactivation, noted above, between the conclusion of a START III agreement and the conclusion of any deactivation process called for under START II.

 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and SLCMs

Tactical nuclear weapons represent a serious potential proliferation problem (as illustrated by the claim last year of retired Russian General Alexander Lebed that some 100 "suitcase-sized" nuclear weapons may be unaccounted for)<8> and could become a more significant component of national arsenals as the number of strategic nuclear warheads shrinks. To begin to address the issues connected with tactical nuclear weapons, and at Russia's request, the related issue of nuclear-armed SLCMs, the Helsinki "Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces" called for the creation of a separate forum in the START III framework to discuss "possible measures" related to these systems, including "appropriate" confidence-building and transparency measures. There is no explicit mention, however, of "limits" on tactical nuclear weapons or SLCMs.

At Helsinki, the United States and Russia agreed to keep the tactical nuclear weapon and SLCM discussions separate from START III. This was a fortunate decision, as the negotiations on this issue are likely to be lengthy and difficult. All indications are that Russia is not prepared to relinquish tactical nuclear weapons at this time. In fact, Russia's strategy is moving in the opposite direction. Perceiving a deteriorating security situation,Moscow has abandoned its long-standing nuclear "no-first-use" policy and is in the midst of a debate over whether, given the deplorable state of its conventional forces, the lack of budgetary resources and NATO's creep toward its border, it should place "increasing weight on nuclear weapons" to deter aggression.<9>

Russia's reluctance to limit tactical nuclear weapons is mirrored by NATO's attachment to U.S. tactical systems (Britain and France are both phasing out their tactical nuclear weapons). The NATO allies do not seem in the least prepared to forgo the "linkage" to the United States represented by the hundreds of air-delivered U.S. tactical nuclear weapons which remain deployed in Europe and dedicated to the defense of the alliance. At the time of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon concluded that there was no military requirement for U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The NATO allies, however, insisted that a small but credible number of weapons remain to demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to European security.

During the NATO expansion debate, the allies had an opportunity to respond to Russian concerns over the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in the new member-states by agreeing to freeze current deployments. NATO refused to adopt a non-nuclear status for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland claiming—erroneously, given the non-nuclear status of Norway, Denmark and the eastern one-third of Germany (following unification)—that it would make the new member-countries second-class NATO citizens.

Barring a major change in current policy by both sides, it is unlikely that the tactical nuclear weapon and SLCM negotiations will succeed in placing meaningful limits on these systems—much less a ban—in the next two to three years. Historically, the United States has staunchly resisted explicit constraints on SLCMs in START and Russia has refused to ban nuclear-armed ballistic missile interceptors in the TMD negotiations. Moreover, the antipathy shown by the Russians to strategic stockpile transparency carries over into the tactical stockpile as well.

Despite the initial resistance to dealing forthrightly with tactical nuclear weapons, the sides might well be able to negotiate basic confidence-building and transparency measures for tactical weapons and/or SLCMs. These measures might include a freeze (or a START I-like cap) on deployments; storage of all tactical weapons well away from and out of the control of operational units; basic data exchanges and/or mutual visits to key installations; verified dismantlement of excess systems; and/or other incremental measures.

 

Ballistic Missile Defenses

The future of missile defenses, both tactical and strategic, is probably the most contentious issue on the strategic arms control agenda. Most observers of the U.S.- Russian arms control process agree that a continuation of major strategic offensive force reductions by these two countries will be possible only if the 1972 ABM Treaty remains a viable cornerstone of the strategic relationship. Indeed, Russian adherence to START I and START II has been specifically linked by the Yeltsin government to the future of the ABM Treaty.

Although the Russians sought explicit constraints, the two countries did not establish any limitations on land-, sea- or air-based TMD interceptor performance (the limits are only on target vehicles), or impose any other restrictions on TMD development or deployment. The sides did agree, however, to ban space-based interceptor missiles and space-based components based on other physical principles capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

The parties left to each side the responsibility of determining whether that nation's high-speed, highly capable TMD systems comply with the ABM Treaty. Thus, to the degree that highly capable TMD systems are deployed and threaten to circumvent the ABM Treaty, a sustained discussion by the United States and Russia of a range of critical TMD issues—such as space-based tracking and battle-management sensors and land- and air-based laser weapons—will remain a key element on the future strategic arms control agenda.

At the September signing ceremony for the TMD "demarcation" and ABM multilateralization documents, both Russian Foreign Minister Primakov and the foreign minister of Ukraine, Hennadiy Udovenko, indicated that they considered the TMD discussions to be an on-going process. Primakov noted that "[t]he drawn up agreements reflect the current state of affairs with the problem of delimiting the strategic and non-strategic ABM [TMD]. However, the technologies of the non-strategic ABM are yet at an early stage of development and they will presumably be perfected. Hence, it will probably be necessary to hold more consultations in the future in order to deal with possible problems and concerns which may arise in the ABM nations during the formation of a system to combat non-strategic ballistic missiles."

The TMD-NMD issue is likely to be at the fore in the near future if, as is hoped, the Russian parliament ratifies START II and the accompanying—and, in the eyes of the Russians, linked—TMD documents in early 1998. The Clinton administration has also linked its submission of the TMD settlement to the Congress to Russian ratification of START II, sensing that Senate opposition to placing any limits on TMD can only be overcome by arguing that some very loose "rules of the game" for TMD testing are in the interest of both the United States and Russia. They are also the price for Russian agreement to eliminate multiple-warhead ICBMs under START II and undertake significant—and verifiable—overall reductions in strategic forces.

Some in the Senate, however, may attempt to de-link ratification of the START II extension protocol from approval of the TMD agreements and seek to defeat the so-called "Second Agreed Statement" (which covers higher-velocity TMD systems and bans space-based interceptors) and the Memorandum of Understanding (which multilateralizes the ABMTreaty and makes future amendments to the treaty more difficult). The opponents of multilateralization also make the legally dubious argument that defeating the MOU will kill the ABM Treaty since there will be no agreed successor states.<10> If this effort to scuttle the TMD settlement eventuates, the administration will have a serious battle on its hands but one in which it will have important allies—the JCS, informed strategic analysts, the budget balancers, and powerful public and media voices. In addition, opponents to the TMD package will have to buck the highly popular—and highly publicized—momentum created by the START process for significantly smaller strategic nuclear forces on both sides.

One additional item related to ballistic missile defense may force its way onto the strategic arms control agenda: the congressionally favored mandate to renegotiate the terms of the ABM Treaty to permit larger-scale deployment of an NMD system (say with 400 to 600 interceptors). If enacted by the Congress, this would, of course, derail the START reduction process.

To date, the administration has postponed any decision on whether to deploy even a treaty-compliant NMD until 2000 (or beyond) and the Russians have never shown the slightest interest in an expanded NMD system. To the contrary, they have made it abundantly clear they like the ABM Treaty just as it is and, as noted above, consider it key to continuing the strategic arms reduction process.

 

The Next Two Years

Whether all the protocols, letters, acts, memoranda and agreed statements negotiated and signed at Helsinki, Paris and New York between March and September of 1997 will succeed in their purpose should become evident within the next six to 12 months and set the tone for the balance of both the Clinton and Yeltsin administrations. It is reasonably evident right now, however, that unless START II is ratified by the Duma, unless the threat to the ABM Treaty is checked by the TMD discussions and U.S. NMD deployment policy remains on "hold," and unless the NATO-Russia Founding Act succeeds in taking the sting out of NATO's expansion, the prospects for meaningful progress in strategic nuclear arms control will be very poor indeed.

 

NOTES

1. The strategic stability talks, a precursor to the actual START III negotiations, which the U.S. insists must await Duma ratification of START II, have been conducted primarily at the level of the undersecretary of state/deputy foreign minister. [Back]

2. Russia's statement makes it clear, as do its statements in the strategic stability talks, that Moscow seeks a prompt follow-on agreement to avoid a costly buildup of strategic forces. [Back]

3. See Blair, Bruce G., Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel, "Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert," Scientific American, November, 1997, pp. 74-80. [Back]

4. Gertz, Bill. "Pentagon Panel Weighs Lower Nuclear Alert Status," The Washington Times, December 12, 1997, p. A1. [Back]

5. Introductory remarks to a December 11, 1997, Committee on Nuclear Policy Forum on nuclear security and de-alerting held at the U.S. Capitol. [Back]

6. Congressional Research Service Brief for Congress, "Nuclear Weapons in the former Soviet Union: Location, Command and Control," Updated September 24, 1997, Amy F. Woolf. [Back]

7. Shadow visits involve officials of one country "shadowing" their counterparts from another nation during the latter's normal work day. [Back]

8. This rather alarming claim was later slightly modified by Lebed from "missing" to currently "unaccounted for" which seemed to make the problem more one of management than misappropriation. In any case, Lebed's claims were vigorously denied by senior Russian officials. [Back]

9. Gertz, Bill. "Russia to Slash Ground Forces, Rely on Nukes," The Washington Times, October 17, 1997, p. A1. [Back]

10. In reality, the debate between the Senate and the White House over multilateralization has as much to do with legislative-executive rights (which branch has the authority to recognize successor states) as it does with missile defenses. [Back]


Jack Mendelsohn, Arms Control Association (ACA) deputy director and member of the ACA Board of Directors, was on the U.S. SALT II and START I delegations. [Email] [Back]

U.S.-Russian HEU Deal Still on Track

In mid December, news sources inaccurately reported that Russia had decided to withdraw from the 1993 highly enriched uranium (HEU) purchase agreement, which requires the United States to buy over a period of 20 years Russian low enriched uranium (LEU) that has been blended down from 500 metric tons of HEU removed from dismantled former Soviet nuclear warheads. According to a December 12 statement issued by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the U.S. government's executive agent for the purchase agreement, press reports had confused the U.S. Russian HEU deal with a separate 10 year agreement reached in August 1997 between Russia and three Western companies—CAMECO (Canada), COGEMA (France) and NUKEM (Germany)—involving the purchase of Russian natural uranium. It is this latter agreement that Russia has decided to terminate.

Implementation of the U.S. Russian HEU deal is moving forward. By the end of 1997, the USEC is scheduled to have received a total of 1,038 metric tons of LEU that has been blended down from 36 metric tons of HEU—the equivalent of more than 1,600 former Soviet nuclear warheads according to USEC estimates. The USEC is expected to receive the LEU equivalent of an additional 24 metric tons of HEU in 1998.

NDP Report Says Wait on NMD, But Not on Nuclear Reductions

November/December 1997

By Craig Cerniello

The congressionally mandated National Defense Panel (NDP) submitted its report analyzing U.S. defense and security requirements through the year 2020 to Secretary of Defense William Cohen on December 1. As part of this comprehensive analysis, the nine-member panel, chaired by Philip Odeen, president and chief executive officer of BDM International, recommended that the United States and Russia move to a START III agreement "as rapidly as possible," reaffirmed the Clinton administration's national missile defense (NMD) policy and warned of U.S. vulnerabilities in outer space.

The NDP report, entitled Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, said, "The key task for U.S. nuclear policy in the first decades of the twenty-first century will be to deter attacks against the United States and its allies, discourage the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons, and promote efforts to achieve balanced and stabilizing reductions in nuclear arsenals." The report noted that achieving deeper reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals is "currently stalled" because the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, has not yet ratified START II, which will limit each side to no more than 3,500 deployed strategic warheads.

In this connection, the NDP report stated that "retaining nuclear arms at current levels for an extended period is not in the U.S. interest." Presently, the United States is prohibited by law from reducing its nuclear arsenal below START I levels (6,000 "accountable" warheads) until Russia has ratified START II. The panel initially voiced its concern about maintaining such a costly force level during its assessment of the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). At that time, the NDP said the move to START II force levels "should proceed even if the Duma fails to act on START II this year." (See ACT, May 1997.)

In its discussion of further strategic force reductions, the NDP report said, "Effective deterrence of potential adversaries can be maintained at the reduced levels envisioned by START III and beyond." The United States and Russia are currently holding a series of expert-level discussions on START III, which will limit each side to no more than 2,500 deployed strategic warheads, in anticipation of the Duma's approval of START II. Following such approval, the United States and Russia will begin official negotiations on the new treaty.

As for U.S. missile defense policy, the report stated that "Given the evolving threat and continued improvement of our missile defense technology, a hedging strategy, rather than immediate deployment of a missile defense system, is a sensible approach." This recommendation is consistent with the administration's "3-plus-3" program, which calls for the development of the initial elements of an NMD system by 2000, at which point the United States will assess the ballistic missile threat to its territory and be in a position to deploy such a system by 2003 if necessary. If a long-range missile threat has not been identified by 2000, the United States will continue to develop and refine its NMD system until such a threat does emerge, while maintaining a rolling three-year deployment capability. In contrast to this approach, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) introduced a bill (S.7) last January that would require the United States to deploy a NMD system by the end of 2003 regardless of the ballistic missile threat at that time, but the bill has not yet reached the Senate floor.

In its examination of space operations, the NDP report emphasized that "Unrestricted use of space has become a major strategic interest of the United States." However, the panel cautioned that several vulnerabilities exist in the U.S. space program, such as the small number of U.S. launch installations, and that potential adversaries will have greater access to space in the future. "Therefore, we must take steps now to ensure we have the capability to deny our enemies the use of space," the report said. This recommendation has been interpreted by some observers as an endorsement of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, the development of which has been opposed by the Clinton administration on the grounds that there is no threat justifying their deployment and that such programs would encourage other states to pursue similar activities contrary to U.S. security interests.

On December 15, Secretary Cohen submitted his comments on the NDP report to Congress. In his letter to Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), Cohen said "I believe the Panel recommends the correct path for pursuing a national missile defense system. I also agree that we should seek further reductions in nuclear forces, and we intend to do so upon ratification of the START II treaty." Addressing space policy, Cohen stated that "I share the Panel's concern about the vulnerabilities of our space systems.... Military competitors, enabled by commercially available space systems, will obviously seek to reduce our current advantages in space. This challenge requires that we have adequate space control capabilities and better integration of our defense and intelligence community operations."

NDP Report Says Wait on NMD, But Not on Nuclear Reductions

IAEA Begins Monitoring of HEU Conversion from U.S. Nuclear Stockpile

THE INTERNATIONAL Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began monitoring the conversion of weapon usable uranium from the U.S. nuclear stockpile on December 1 at the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio. Although the international monitoring body is safeguarding the downblending of 600 kilograms of Soviet highly enriched uranium (HEU) brought in 1994 to the United States from Kazakhstan in "Operation Sapphire," it has never before overseen the demilitarization of fissile material produced for the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Using video cameras, sealed measurement devices, tamper resistant seals and isotopic scanning devices, as well as random inspections, the agency will verify the conversion of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), a form suitable for use in civilian power plants, but which cannot be used to produce a nuclear explosion.

Since 1995, DOE has been monitoring the downblending of Russian HEU that is being purchased for resale by the U.S. government owned (soon to be privatized) United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and has been adding verification measures to insure the Russian HEU actually comes from dismantled weapons. The new U.S. IAEA program—started at Washington's initiative—will provide a less intrusive method of verifying the elimination of a small portion of U.S. excess HEU on an international basis, but will not determine the origin of the material.

The HEU conversion at Portsmouth is carried out by blending highly enriched uranium hexaflouride gas with gas of lesser enrichment until a level of 3 to 5 percent uranium 235 is reached. The IAEA's role is first to verify the quantity of weapon grade material that goes into the process and then second to ensure the quality—in terms of enrichment—of what comes out. Once the blending process is completed, agency monitoring of the LEU output ends.

Energy Secretary Federico Peña announced the start of the agency's verification activities on December 1 at the National Press Club in Washington. The IAEA is already monitoring the material balance of 12 tons of excess U.S. weapon usable material at three DOE facilities, and the Clinton administration has declared its intention to eventually place all 226 tons of excess U.S. fissile material (HEU and plutonium) under agency safeguards.

 

Larger Goals

Energy and IAEA officials hope the program will accomplish more than just diluting a few tons of fissile material. At the program's announcement, Secretary Peña stated the IAEA monitoring will prove to other countries that the United States is adhering to President Clinton's pledge to make the elimination of excess fissile material irreversible, and will complement negotiations underway since September 1996, among Moscow, Washington and the IAEA on a trilateral accord to allow the agency to monitor U.S. and Russian stocks of excess nuclear weapons material.

According to Berhan Andemicael, the IAEA's chief liaison to the UN, the Portsmouth program will enable the agency to try out new techniques and procedures that may be applicable for use in its international safeguards activities, provide new experience in monitoring enrichment plant operations, and offer the agency a foothold in the field of monitoring disarmament in nuclear weapon states.

Some observers have noted that, unlike the U.S. Russian blending arrangement, the U.S. IAEA program provides no way of knowing whether the HEU being converted at Portsmouth comes from nuclear weapons, and cannot prevent the substitution of HEU from reserves or other sources. In response, DOE has argued that all the excess HEU being converted to LEU is from defense stocks and is suitable for use in nuclear weapons, even though not all of it actually comes from dismantled warheads.

Of the total 174 tons of U.S. excess HEU, 161 tons is in the form of metal, oxide or beryllium alloy, and will probably be downblended at commercial facilities other than Portsmouth, pending arrangement of contracts between commercial LEU dealers, USEC and DOE. The IAEA will be invited by Energy to monitor these additional operations, with DOE offering to pick up the agency's costs, as it is doing with the Portsmouth program.

Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

THE CLINTON a dministration quietly made a significant change in U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine in November by formally abandoning guidelines issued by the Reagan administration in 1981 that the United States must be prepared to fight and win a protracted nuclear war. The new presidential decision directive (PDD), details of which were first reported in The Washington Post on December 7, operates from the premise that the primary role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era is deterrence. In a December 23 interview, Robert Bell, senior director for defense policy and arms control at the National Security Council, provided additional information about the PDD and clarified some misperceptions in the press with respect to the Clinton administration's policy on "launch on warning" and the use of nuclear weapons against a chemical or biological weapons attack.

 

New Guidelines

Due to its highly classified nature, many specific details about the PDD have not been made public. Nevertheless, Bell confirmed that "We have made an important change in terms of strategic nuclear doctrine in reorienting our presidential guidance away from any sense that you could fight and win a protracted nuclear war to a strategic posture that focuses on deterrence."

The administration made the decision to rewrite the old nuclear guidelines early in 1997. At that time, General John Shalikashvili, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained to President Clinton that the United States could not reduce its nuclear arsenal to the level that was being discussed for START III (2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic warheads) and carry out the objectives of the 1981 nuclear guidelines. Bell pointed out that this assumed that the goals of the old guidelines could ever have been realized—a skepticism that has been voiced by former Reagan administration officials. Hence, one key factor influencing the administration's decision to rewrite the old guidelines was that they were not compatible with the U.S. objective of achieving further strategic force reductions with the Russians.

Moreover, the administration viewed the 1981 guidelines as an anachronism of the Cold War. The notion that the United States still had to be prepared to fight and win a protracted nuclear war today seemed out of touch with reality given the fact that it has been six years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this connection, Bell said the 1981 directive "reads like a document you would expect to have been written at the height of the Cold War, not something that you would want operative today...."

 

Launch on Warning

Bell said the press had incorrectly indicated that the PDD "still allows" the United States to launch nuclear weapons upon receiving warning of an attack. Bell emphasized that "there is no change in this PDD with respect to U.S. policy on launch on warning and that policy is that we do not, not rely on it." In fact, Bell said "in this PDD we direct our military forces to continue to posture themselves in such a way as to not rely on launch on warning—to be able to absorb a nuclear strike and still have enough force surviving to constitute credible deterrence."

Bell pointed out that while the United States has always had the "technical capability" to implement a policy of launch on warning, it has chosen not to do so. "Our policy is to confirm that we are under nuclear attack with actual detonations before retaliating," he said.

 

Negative Security Assurances

Bell also dispelled the published report that the PDD expands U.S. nuclear options against a chemical or biological weapons attack. "This PDD reaffirms explicitly, virtually verbatim, the policy of this administration as we stated it the last four or five years, including during the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], the negotiation of the CTB [Comprehensive Test Ban] and the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention," he said.

Specifically, the PDD reaffirms the 1995 statement on negative security assurances issued by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on behalf of President Clinton at the time of the indefinite extension of the NPT. This statement reiterated in a slightly more restrictive form the 1978 statement on the non-use of nuclear weapons issued by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on behalf of President Carter.

In this context, Bell explained that it is U.S. policy not to use nuclear weapons first against any state except in three cases. First, "if a state that we are engaged in conflict with is a nuclear-capable state, we do not necessarily intend to wait until that state uses nuclear weapons first—we reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict whether its CW [chemical weapons], BW [biological weapons] or for that matter conventional [weapons]," he said. Under the second scenario, Bell said the United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first "if a state is not a state in good standing under the Non-Proliferation Treaty or an equivalent international convention." Finally, he said if a state attacks the United States, its allies or its forces "in alliance" with a nuclear-capable state, then the United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first, even if that state is not a nuclear-capable state and is in good standing under the NPT. Because these three exceptions have existed for some time, Bell said "there is no policy change whatsoever in this PDD with respect to fundamental U.S. position on no first use of nuclear weapons."

Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

NATO Proposes Lower CFE Ceilings Not Requiring Actual Force Cuts

AFTER NEARLY three months of intra alliance discussions, NATO members on December 2 presented notional figures for national and territorial ceilings on heavy weapons which would be established under an adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

According to U.S. officials, the initiative would reduce aggregate NATO entitlements by approximately 10 percent, but because actual NATO holdings of treaty limited equipment (TLE) are already 29 percent, or approximately 22,200 items, below its current entitlement of 75,912 items, the alliance would not be required to destroy or remove any TLE. Reluctance by potential NATO members—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland—to lower their current entitlements and Russian insistence on alliance wide limitations that NATO deems unacceptable are hampering progress in the adaptation process.

Negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty, which imposes equal numerical limits on five categories of weapons—tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—that NATO and the former Warsaw Pact may deploy and store between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, have not advanced much beyond the "basic elements" guidelines endorsed in July 1997. Under those guidelines, the 30 parties agreed in principle to replace the treaty's bloc to bloc structure and concentric zone limits with a system of national and territorial ceilings. National ceilings will limit the TLE each party can possess, while territorial ceilings will cap the total amount of ground TLE (national plus foreign stationed forces) allowed on each party's territory.

According to U.S. government officials, the United States and Germany accepted the largest reductions, while France refused to cut its entitlements. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, despite signing NATO accession protocols on December 16, are hesitant to accept lower limits until they are full members of NATO. But both Moscow and NATO want an adapted treaty in place before the three states join NATO in April 1999.

Analysis of returns from the most recent CFE information exchange on December 12, shows that when the three prospective NATO member's current enti tlements (13,114 TLE) are combined with NATO's proposed reduced entitlement levels, the total exceeds current aggregate NATO entitlements by more than 5,500 TLE, an outcome Russia is sure to oppose, as it has sought an alliance wide limit to forestall any increase in entitlements for NATO as the alliance expands eastward.

One element in NATO's strategy to diminish Russian opposition to NATO expansion is the creation of a "stabilization" zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia would have their future territorial ceilings set equal to their current national entitlements. This would necessitate a reduction in national holdings to accommodate any foreign forces which might be stationed there in the future. Sub limits would also be established for TLE deployed in Russia's Kaliningrad military district and western Ukraine.

Securing territorial ceilings on aircraft remains a central Russian objective, but NATO continues to reject the concept of applying territorial limits to air power. The alliance contends that the adapted treaty should adhere to the precedent set in the original treaty's concentric zones, which only limits ground TLE, since air power is considered too mobile to effectively constrain and verify.

Further complicating the issue of territorial ceilings are outstanding questions such as how to define exemptions for military exercises and temporary deployments and how to create mechanisms for revising or reallocating the ceilings once they are in force. Moscow is pressing for stricter definitions to limit NATO's presence and flexibility in new NATO member states.

In a surprise move that could influence the Vienna negotiations, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced on December 3 a unilateral 40 percent reduction of armed forces in Northwestern Russia, but Western government officials have not yet determined whether the initiative pertained solely to troops or also included equipment. Western officials are also uncertain whether this is a new initiative or if it represents anticipated reductions under Russia's military reform program, which calls for a reduction in manpower from 1.7 million to 1.2 million troops.

CWC Parties Hold 2nd Conference; Membership Reaches 106 States

STATES-PARTIES TO the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) met for the Second Conference of States Parties (CSP) December 1-5 in The Hague to review the implementation of the treaty since it entered into force on April 29, 1997, to approve operations for 1998 and to consider some of the challenges the CWC will face in the year ahead. As of the end of December, 106 states had joined the convention; 62 other signatories have yet to ratify the accord. The December conference was convened following a decision by the first CSP in May 1997 to hold the treaty-mandated annual CSP in the same year.

During the conference, Russia and Iran became formal members to the treaty and were among the 81 states-parties in attendance. Both countries, whose participation in the CWC is viewed as important to improving world-wide confidence in the treaty, ratified the CWC in early November, in part to assure their formal participation in the CSP under treaty rules and deadlines. Each also became eligible for representation on the Executive Council and on the staff and inspector corps of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the treaty's implementing body.

OPCW Director-General José Bustani said the main achievement of the conference was "the determination of states-parties to resolve all outstanding issues in a cooperative fashion." The CSP approved by consensus an OPCW operating budget for 1998 totaling $83 million. The conference also adopted a revised scale of assessment for the 1997 and 1998 budget years that set a maximum rate (25 percent) and minimum rate (.01 percent) on the percentage of the budget a state-party should be responsible for. Previously the United States had been assessed at a rate of approximately 27 percent.

States-parties elected 20 new members to the 41-seat Executive Council, which is responsible for the day-to-day monitoring of the treaty, whose tenure will begin May 12, 1998. The council has the authority to block short-notice "challenge" inspection requests by a three-fourths majority vote, a matter that may be of particular concern for Russia and Iran, both of which gained two-year seats on the council. During the ratification debate in the U.S. Senate, Iran and Russia were cited as likely candidates for challenge inspections.

In a precedent-setting move, the conference also approved plans for the conversion of two former chemical weapon facilities, one in the Van Nuys, California, (where componenets of binary munitions were produced for the U.S. Army) and one in the United Kingdom, to peaceful purposes. The CSP's approval and the criteria by which the requests were approved, will prove important to any future Russian requests for conversion. During their address to the CSP, Russian officials asked that the OPCW conversion policy be "rational." Lastly, in addition to a number of other decisions on implementation, the conference scheduled the third CSP, to be held November 16-20, 1998, in The Hague.

As of December 31, the OPCW had completed or was still in the process of conducting 125 inspections in 22 countries. In addition, 73 of 106 states-parties had submitted their initial data declarations by the end of December, of which not all were complete. The treaty requires that the data declarations include the history and present scope of any chemical weapons programs and any facilities that fall under the treaty authority, including private industry.

The United States has so far been unable to submit a complete data declaration because the legislation required to complete the industry section of the declaration has been held up in the House of Representatives since June. At the same time, U.S. officials have indicated that accurate and timely submission of other countries' declarations would be a major factor in determining whether a request for a challenge inspection would be necessary to address compliance concerns. Prompt consideration of the implementing legislation is the Clinton administration's highest CWC-related priority in 1998.

At the CSP, Bustani emphasized the difficulties associated with incomplete or missing declarations, saying, "[I]f this situation of technical non-compliance continues at its current level in 1998, this may have serious implications.... [T]he absence of a declaration, or an incomplete declaration, could precipitate a challenge inspection."

Under the CWC, any party may request a short-notice, on-site inspection to verify compliance concerns, although the Executive Council can vote to block a request. In his speech, Bustani asked states-parties to consider whether a treaty member in non-compliance could request a challenge inspection of another party. Several countries voiced their concern over the number of incomplete data declarations before the CSP, but the conference took no substantive decisions on the link to challenge inspections.

A U.S. official said there were no current plans for issuing a challenge inspection on Iran. The official said the United States was waiting to see how well intelligence estimates correlated with the Iranian declaration, due in early January, "before passing judgment."

Divisions Still Impede Wassenaar Export Control Regime at Plenary

THE 33 COUNTRIES of the Wassenaar Arrangement concluded their December 9-10 plenary meeting in Vienna without resolving outstanding differences over the evolution and operation of the export control regime. As a result of persistent disagreements, members failed to act on initiatives to expand reporting categories, address existing imbalances in reporting requirements and appoint a permanent head for the Vienna-based Secretariat.

Wassenaar, comprised of most industrialized arms exporters with the notable exception of China, aims to facilitate the coordination of members' national export control policies, promote transparency in the export of conventional weapons and dual-use equipment and prevent their destabilizing accumulation. Members are expected to provide information semi-annually on exports to non-Wassenaar members of weapons and "sensitive" dual-use goods that appear on the regime's two control lists: the Munitions List and the Dual-Use Goods and Technologies List, which is divided into basic and sensitive tiers. Denials of "basic" dual-use goods are also to be reported semi-annually, while denials of "very sensitive" dual-use goods and approvals of transactions that were previously denied by another Wassenaar member within the preceding three years are to be notified to the Secretariat within 60 days.

Unlike its Cold War predecessor, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), Wassenaar members cannot veto exports by another member. While Wassenaar's mandate does not target specific states (as COCOM did), members have agreed to refrain from deals with states in areas of tension and heavily armed regions or those countries that generate concern among members.

 

Differences Remain

At the plenary, members reaffirmed earlier decisions not to export to any recipient in Afghanistan and to "exercise maximum restraint" in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. The plenary's sole public statement warned of "potentially destabilizing accumulations of armaments in certain regions," but did not identify any region by name. According to a U.S. official involved with Wassenaar matters, a confidential summary report also called on members to complete their information submissions, indicating that full participation remains a problem.

At Vienna, the United States and Britain proposed additional reporting categories for the regime's Munitions List beyond the current seven (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missile systems) to include power-projection equipment such as transport helicopters and aerial refueling vehicles, but France and Russia blocked this initiative, arguing that the current reporting categories are adequate. Another U.S. official familiar with the plenary meeting indicated that Russia claimed the proposal was designed to deny markets to Moscow and limit its exports.

Members also discussed the creation of a so-called correspondence list that would increase reporting requirements for items appearing on the Munitions List (which now fall outside the seven reporting categories), but are similar to goods on the Dual-Use List and must be reported if exported. For example, night vision equipment on the Dual-Use List exported for a civilian end-user must be reported, while similar night vision equipment on the Munitions List sent to a military end-user does not. Exporters of primarily dual-use goods, such as Japan and Switzerland, pushed for the correspondence list as a means to redress this imbalance, but the initiative failed as some members refused to accept new reporting obligations.

After more than a year of operation, Wassenaar members remain divided over how intrusive the arrangement should be. Some members, particularly France and Russia, do not want Wassenaar to evolve beyond the current information exchanges, while the United States and others have advocated developing a stronger regime that relies on more than solely national discretion to control exports. However, French insistence to wait until the regime's first review conference, scheduled for 1999, to assess Wassenaar's operation will likely stymie any changes in the near future.

Perhaps reflective of the gap between members, the plenary closed without appointing a permanent head of the Secretariat, which has been led by an acting head since Wassenaar became operational in November 1996.

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