The Arms Control Association is an "exceptional organization that effectively addresses pressing national and international challenges with an impact that is disproportionate to its small size." 

– John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
January 19, 2011
January/February 1997
Edition Date: 
Wednesday, January 1, 1997

The Wassenaar Arrangement

By the time COCOM dissolved on March 31, 1994, negotiations on a successor regime had been underway for a year. The new group of 28 countries, known as the "New Forum," reached agreement on principles for export controls on September 11-12, 1995. It then developed into "The Wassenaar Arrangement for Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies," deriving its name from The Hague suburb where it was agreed on December 18, 1995. The "Initial Elements" foundation document was adopted on July 12, 1996, and the Secretariat opened in the fall of 1996. The first review conference will be held in 1999.

Member States

South Korea
Czech Republic
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States

The Wassenaar Arrangement

Wassenaar Members End Plenary; First Data Exchange Falls Short

Sarah Walkling

DESPITE THEIR December 1996 deadline for enacting new export control guidelines for conventional arms and dual use goods and technologies, members of the so called Wassenaar Arrangement concluded their December 12 13 plenary meeting in Vienna with the regime far from fully operational. While the 33 participating countries agreed on a budget and program of work for the coming year, the impasse continued as to who would head the new Secretariat in Vienna. More important, however, the results of the regime's first data exchange suggest its emphasis on promoting transparency is not yet shared by all members.

Formally titled the Wassenaar Arrangement for Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies, the group seeks to avoid destabilizing transfers of weapons and sensitive technologies through the coordination of national export control policies. As the successor regime to the Cold War era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the arrangement includes many of the countries once targeted by the former NATO member based organization. Unlike COCOM, however, Wassenaar members have no veto power over other members' weapons deliveries or technology transfers and the regime is not directed against a particular group of states. Rather, it targets regions or states whose behavior is a cause of concern to participants. The United States has identified Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea as "rogue" states that should be included in that category.


Cloudy Transparency

The regime's first voluntary exchange of data, which was initiated in September 1996, covered four categories of arms and dual use technology transfers to non members: actual weapons deliveries; license denials for "basic" dual use items; license approvals for "sensitive" dual use equipment; and license denials for "very sensitive" dual use items such as encryption and supercomputer technology.

Thirty Wassenaar members submitted data on their transfers of seven categories of conventional weapons (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, combat aircraft, warships, heavy artillery, and missiles and missile launchers) that correspond to the categories in the UN Conventional Arms Register. State Department officials, emphasizing the confidentiality of the new regime, declined to identify the non participating states. In the most recent reporting period for the UN register (covering calendar year 1995), all Wassenaar members submitted data on their weapons transfers. (See ACT, November/December 1996.) However, in the Wassenaar exchange, only half of all members submitted data on their dual use transfers to non members. Several countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia and Bulgaria, reportedly failed to pass the necessary national implementing legislation in time to participate in the exchange. (Russia and Ukraine passed the necessary legislation in October and December 1996, respectively.) Other countries are expected to have passed the necessary legislation before the next exchange, scheduled to begin March 31.

For 1997, the budget for Wassenaar Secretariat operations will total $1 million to $2 million, with contributions assessed on a scale similar to that used by the United Nations. Under this formula, the U.S. assessment is expected to cover nearly 25 percent of the total budget. In addition, members agreed to hold at least one plenary meeting in 1997, an expert group meeting February 24 25 and a working group meeting June 2. These groups will monitor implementation progress and discuss information exchange procedures and deadlines.

Without ongoing consultations or veto power for its members, however, it is unclear whether the Wassenaar Arrangement can effectively serve as a forum for resolving disputes over transfers of conventional weapons and dual use technology. During the December plenary, participants reportedly did not discuss several of the most controversial arms sales involving regime members, such as Russia's proposed sale of S 300 anti aircraft missiles to the Greek Cypriot government, a transfer which the United States and Turkey have described as "destabilizing." In their only public statement issued following the plenary, a 10 sentence press statement, Wassenaar members addressed only one conflict: Afghanistan. The statement declared that "as a matter of national policy," no Wassenaar member transfers arms or ammunition to the parties involved in the conflict.

UNSCOM Head Says Iraq Has 'Operational' Missile Force

Howard Diamond

IRAQ HAS MANAGED to retain an operational force of ballistic missiles in violation of UN prohibitions against possessing such weapons with ranges above 150 kilometers, according to Rolf Ekeus, head of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNSCOM has long suspected Iraq of possessing missile capabilities beyond those permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. Ekeus' assessment, offered during a January 29 luncheon speech sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, indicates that Baghdad may have an operational force of between 18 and 25 Scud or Scud variant missiles.

"Every piece of what is necessary to constitute an operation[sic] force is available in Iraq," Ekeus said, including transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles, rocket fuel and "an organization to operate these missiles." The missiles, whose range of up to 650 kilometers would allow Iraq to reach targets in Israel and Iran, are of particular concern because of Iraq's past use of ballistic missiles against neighboring countries and the missiles' potential to deliver weapons of mass destruction. According to Ekeus, Iraq has used a variety of deceptive methods used to hide the missiles and related equipment.

During the past several months, Ekeus said Baghdad has become increasingly uncooperative in response to UNSCOM's ongoing effort to establish a "material balance" of Iraq's past ballistic missile programs. In November 1996, Iraq refused to permit UNSCOM to take 150 destroyed rocket engines, which Baghdad claims it destroyed and buried in the summer of 1991, to the United States for metallurgical analysis by a Department of Defense laboratory. UNSCOM inspectors want to confirm whether the engine metal matches that of the old Soviet produced rocket motors, because it believes Iraq destroyed inferior, indigenously produced engines instead of operational Soviet produced motors.

Under Resolution 687, Iraq is permitted to possess ballistic missiles with ranges under 150 kilometers, but the Gulf War cease fire resolution mandates destruction of Iraq's longer range Scud and Scud variant missiles. In April 1991, Iraq gave 48 missiles to UNSCOM for destruction and claimed to have destoyed and buried 85 others without UNSCOM supervision. While the sites identified by Iraq did appear to hold the declared number of destroyed missiles, further investigation by UNSCOM showed that Iraq had, in some cases, simply transferred "buried" missiles from one site to another so they would be double counted. UNSCOM also found that some of the sites did not actually contain operational missiles systems, but training missiles. Iraq is also believed to have removed and stored critical missile components, such as turbo pumps, which they are unable to produce domestically.

Iraq's refusal to comply with the UN resolutions persists even in the face of economic sanctions, which have cost Iraq more than $100 billion in lost oil revenue. Ekeus claims that Iraqi obstruction of UNSCOM's mission has gotten worse as Baghdad perceives Security Council support for UNSCOM to be waning. As a case in point, Ekeus cited Security Council inaction after the Iraqi refusal to allow analysis of the destroyed rocket motors. Instead of approving a resolution demanding Iraqi compliance, the Security Council issued a statement that "deplores" Iraq's non cooperation, and notes "that such action complicates the implementation by the Special Commission of its mandate." The result, according to Ekeus, is that UNSCOM is now facing "serious obstructions" by Iraq for simple document requests and for the removal from the country of chemical munitions for analysis.

The Fourth BWC Review Conference:

Graham S. Pearson

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which was opened for signature nearly 25 years ago, is a key if often unappreciated element in international efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The first arms control treaty to seek the elimination of an entire class of weapons, the BWC established a strong legal norm against the development, possession, stockpiling and use of biological agents and toxins for offensive purposes. As of January 1997, 140 countries had become states parties to the treaty; an additional 18 states have signed but not yet ratified the accord. (See Factfile.)

Despite the comprehensive nature of the treaty, the specter of biological warfare has assumed a new urgency during the past several years. The United States believes that twice as many states now have or are actively pursuing offensive biological weapons capabilities as when the convention entered into force in 1975.1 The growing threat posed by biological weapons proliferation has focused increasing attention on the operation of the BWC and highlighted the convention's key weakness: the absence of an effective verification regime. From November 25 through December 6, 1996, the states parties to the BWC held their fourth review conference in Geneva to review the operation of the convention. Although BWC parties have not completed the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to strengthen the treaty, the fourth review conference nonetheless provided important impetus to the convention's evolution into an effective component of international non proliferation efforts.


A Changing World

The fourth BWC review conference was a particularly important meeting as there had been significant progress in international arms control since the third review conference in September 1991. In May 1995, more than 170 states parties to the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed without dissent to indefinitely extend the accord. In September 1996, after an overwhelming vote of approval by the UN General Assembly, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature and signed by all five declared nuclear weapon states. (As of February 1, 1997, 140 countries had signed.) On October 31, 1996, Hungary became the 65th signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to deposit its instrument of ratification, starting the clock ticking for the treaty's entry into force on April 29, 1997.

In contrast to these positive developments, the principal shortcoming of the BWC—its lack of effective verification provisions—was thrown into sharp focus by a growing awareness during the past five years that biological weapons remain a real concern.

In early 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin acknowledged that the former Soviet Union, despite being one of three depositary states along with the United States and the United Kingdom, had continued an offensive biological weapons program through March 1992. In September 1992, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia issued a joint statement, initiating a process aimed at building confidence that Russia's offensive biological warfare program had been terminated. However, in its July 1996 compliance report to Congress, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) said, "[W]hile there had been progress towards achieving the openness intended in the Joint Statement, the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns," and that the United States remains "actively engaged in efforts to work with the Russian leadership to ensure complete termination of the illegal program ..." The United Kingdom has closely similar views.

The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), tasked with ensuring the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and its proscribed ballistic missile activities, had by October 1995 determined that Baghdad—although a 1972 signatory of the BWC—had produced and weaponized large quantities of biological warfare agents. In addition, Iraq had deployed aerial bombs and Scud missile warheads filled with biological agents to four locations prior to the 1991 Gulf War, and had predelegated authority to launch these weapons if Iraq had been attacked with nuclear weapons. Iraq was also working on a 3,000 kilometer range missiles that was reportedly capable of delivering biological warheads to most European capitals.2

In Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo sect, which launched attacks in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 using the nerve gas Sarin, had initially worked on biological weapons. According to some analysts, it appears that biological agents were the group's preferred weapon of choice.

These vivid instances of the threat posed by biological weapons proliferation highlighted the urgent need to address the limitations of the BWC. In his September 1996 address to the UN General Assembly, President Bill Clinton underscored this important objective, saying, "[W]e must better protect our people from those who would use disease as a weapon of war, by giving the Biological Weapons Convention the means to strengthen compliance ..."


An Evolutionary Process

The fourth review conference represented yet another marker along the path of the BWC's evolution. In the five years since the last review conference, states parties have engaged in a series of steps aimed at strengthening the convention. The third review conference had mandated the establishment of an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (commonly referred to as VEREX, for "verification experts") to examine possible verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint. VEREX, which met four times in 1992 and 1993, evaluated 21 possible on site and off site measures.

The final VEREX report emphasized that "declarations" were the most frequently identified measure for application in combination with other measures. The most frequently identified on site measure for application with other measures was "inspections" (including interviewing, visual inspection, identification of key equipment, sampling and auditing).

The VEREX report was considered by a special conference in September 1994, which mandated the convening of another Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to consider appropriate measures to strengthen the BWC to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument. Building on the work of VEREX, the Ad Hoc Group has, through four "Friends of the Chair," produced papers that reflect the discussions that have so far taken place but without prejudice to the positions of delegations. Some these papers have gone through several iterations. The AHG had held four substantive meetings—two in 1995 and two in 1996—and produced a progress report that was considered by the fourth review conference. The next step is to start negotiations on an integrated text so that unresolved issues can be debated. The principal area requiring resolution is the precise nature of the on site visits/inspections, how such visits/inspections will be triggered and what measures will be available to the inspectors. Given the political will demonstrated at the review conference for the strengthening of the BWC, the AHG should be able to make rapid progress toward completing its work within the next year or two.

Seventy seven states parties participated in the fourth review conference. Three countries (Egypt, Morocco and Myanmar) which have signed but not ratified the BWC also attended, and Algeria, Kazakhstan, Israel and Macedonia were granted observer status. The United Kingdom's ambassador to the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD), Sir Michael Weston, served as president of the review conference, and Ogunsola Ogunbanwo served as secretary general.

Although this fourth review conference had a two week duration, unlike the previous review conferences which lasted three weeks, the approach adopted paralleled that of previous years, with a general debate followed by detailed consideration of each of the convention's 15 articles. The conference's Committee of the Whole, chaired by Ambassador Jorge Berguno of Chile, reviewed the operation of the convention and the work of the Ad Hoc Group and addressed other relevant issues. The Drafting Committee, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary, prepared the final document for consideration by the conference.

One valuable innovation of the fourth review conference was the adjournment of the Committee of the Whole on the final day of its meetings to enable representatives from non governmental organizations (NGOs) to make statements to the conference in an informal session. Eleven of the 16 NGOs that attended the conference made statements, including the Federation of American Scientists, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute.

During the general debate, 31 states parties as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was granted observer status, made statements. The U.S. statement was given by John Holum, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It was evident at the review conference that there existed a clear political will to strengthen the convention, as every state which spoke in the general debate expressed support for the work of the Ad Hoc Group. The United Kingdom's minister of state for foreign affairs, David Davis, neatly summed up the task before the conference:


...Biological weapons have for 25 years remained something of a Cinderella in international efforts to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction ... A general perception held that the biological weapons problem was solved; that it did not present a real risk or threat ... But over the last decade, we have seen these comfortable assumptions overturned ... The conference would be failing in its duty if it did not do all it could to ensure that—well before the millennium—there is in place a verification system which will consolidate and strengthen the ... convention's total ban on biological weapons.


Key Issues

The key issues at the fourth review conference related to four of the treaty's articles: Article I, which defines the basic prohibitions, or the "scope," of the convention; Article IV, which addresses national implementation measures; Article V, which deals with the consultative process for problems arising from treaty implementation; and Article X, which concerns cooperation among states parties for peaceful purposes.

The conference, in its Final Declaration, (BWC/CONF.IV/9), adopted important new language regarding the scope of the convention, moving beyond that approved at the third review conference. The new declaration stated:


The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic engineering and any applications resulting from genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. [Emphasis added.]


The language regarding developments in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology reiterated that contained in the final declaration of the previous review conference. However, the fourth review conference's addition of "molecular biology" and "any applications resulting from genome studies" makes it clear that any misuse of genome information for the design of weapons targeted against specific ethnic or racial groups would be a clear contravention of the convention. This point was made in the background paper prepared for the conference on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the treaty.3

The Final Declaration also reaffirmed that the convention "unequivocally covers all microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production ..." [Emphasis added.] The inclusion by the conference of "as well as their components" represents a significant extension of the BWC's scope because it avoids any possibility of ambiguity as to whether components of living micro organisms or toxins— an area in which rapid progress has been made in understanding how they may be produced and how they may act—are included in the prohibition of the convention.


Non Compliance

...The final language adopted by the conference on treaty non compliance was weaker than some states had hoped for. In the general debate, Australia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States all named Iraq and the former Soviet Union as being in non compliance with the BWC. In his statement to the conference, the representative from the United Kingdom referred to "The existence of a massive offensive biological weapons programme conducted illegally for years in the Soviet Union [that] has recently come to light."

However, the negotiations leading to the Final Declaration were difficult. Although both Iraq and Russia had openly acknowledged, since the third review conference, having had offensive biological weapons programs, neither country wanted to see any specific mention of these treaty violations. The United States had proposed relatively mild language with regard to the issue of non compliance:


...The Conference notes the efforts of UNSCOM to address some of these concerns and expresses its support for the early and satisfactory completion of UNSCOM's important work. The Conference also notes the important decree by the President of the Russian Federation in April 1992 indicating that his country would accomplish its obligations under the Convention. The Conference expressed the hope that the objectives outlined in that decree would rapidly be fulfilled.


But in the final debate even this was rejected and the Final Declaration made no mention of UNSCOM, Iraq or the Russian Federation. Rather, it simply stated:


...The Conference emphasizes, once more, the vital importance of full implementation by all States of all the provisions of the Convention, especially Articles I, II and III. The Conference agrees that the application by States Parties of positive approaches in accordance with the provisions of the Convention is in the interests of all States Parties and that any non compliance with its provisions would undermine confidence in the Convention. Non compliance should be treated with determination in all cases, without selectivity or discrimination.


A Debate Over Use'

An unexpected development arose during the first day of the fourth review conference when Iran put forward a formal proposal to amend the convention by adding the word "use" to the title of the treaty and to the prohibition in Article. In the general debate, the Iranian delegation said it remained "a major oversight for the Convention not to prohibit the use of biological weapons expressly and categorically." The Iranians argued that there is a need for a total ban that is explicit and devoid of judgmental interpretations, and that the lack of explicit reference in the convention itself and the persistence of reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol can leave the door ajar for those states that may hold a different opinion on the question of use. The Iranians viewed such an amendment as a way of ending any inconsistency in interpretations of the convention's prohibitions.

The Iranian proposal was discussed at length during the meetings of the Committee of the Whole.4 Many participants held the opinion that Article I's prohibition on developing, producing, stockpiling or otherwise acquiring or retaining biological weapons implicitly and effectively prohibits any use of such weapons. They also suggested that the final declarations of previous review conferences had clearly restated this view. In addition, some delegations expressed caution about the idea of amending the BWC, noting that an amendment to one article would open up the convention for possible amendments to other provisions, thereby weakening the regime. Moreover, they said, such an amendment might create a two tier regime under which states parties that had not accepted the amendment would appear to condone the use of biological weapons.

In the end, the review conference's Final Declaration made two strong statements with respect to Article I, making it very clear that the use of biological weapons is prohibited by the convention. The first statement said:


...The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention.


The declaration also stated:


The Conference reaffirms the undertaking in Article I never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, in order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use.


In light of this clear and strong prohibition against use, states parties will be considering whether there is indeed any need to modify the convention as proposed by Iran, bearing in mind what such a modification could entail. Nevertheless, the conference's Final Declaration concerning Article XI (which deals with the amendment process) notes that Iran has formally presented a proposal to amend Article I and the title of the convention, and that the depositary states are notifying all parties of the proposal. In addition, states parties have been encouraged to convey their views to the depositaries regarding the need to amend the treaty to explicitly prohibit the use of biological weapons. The review conference also requested that the depositary states take such measures as may be requested by a majority of states parties, including the option of convening an amendment conference open to all parties.


Combatting Terrorism

As expected, following the June 1996 meeting of the leaders of the Group of Seven (G 7) industrialized states and a subsequent ministerial meeting the following month, the conference Final Declaration language on Article IV gave added emphasis to the importance of national measures for effective BWC implementation.

Surprisingly, during the general debate only six states parties (Brazil, Canada, France, Romania, the Slovak Republic and the United States) mentioned the possible terrorist use of biological materials and the relevance of national measures to prevent their use for terrorist purposes.

The Final Declaration stated:


...The Conference ... reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to take the necessary national measures under [Article IV] ... to ensure the prohibition and prevention of the production, development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery ... anywhere within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes contrary to the Convention. The States Parties recognize the need to ensure, through the review and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfillment of their obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity.


Confidence Building

The fourth review conference addressed two principal issues with respect to Article V's call for consultation and cooperation for treaty implementation: confidence building measures (CBMs) and the ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Group. Beginning with the second review conference, BWC parties have sought to enhance transparency through a series of politically binding declarations, data exchanges and other CBMs addressing a broad spectrum of treaty relevant activities. Unfortunately, participation in these measures has remained limited.

During the most recent review, several states parties emphasized the importance of CBMs in the general debate, but two countries (Brazil and India) referred to the problem of the resources needed to complete such measures. Two other parties (Nigeria and the Slovak Republic) said the CBMs should be further modified and improved, while Australia said it would be a mistake to consider any amendment before the Ad Hoc Group concluded it work. Disappointingly, there was little recognition that BWC parties regarded current confidence building efforts to be of continuing importance up to the entry into force of the proposed verification protocol and beyond. There were, in fact, no agreements to modify the modalities of existing CBMs and an attempt to clarify what the existing measures required failed.

The Final Declaration simply declared:


...The Conference welcomes the exchange of information carried out under the confidence building measures, and notes this has contributed to enhancing transparency and building confidence. The Conference recognizes that participation in the confidence building measures since the last Review Conference has not been universal, and that not all responses have been prompt or complete. In this regard, the Conference also recognizes the technical difficulties experienced by some States parties with respect to preparing CBM responses. In this regard, the Conference urges all States Parties to complete full and timely declarations in future.


With respect to the work of the Ad Hoc Group, every country that offered a statement during the general debate spoke in favor of the work of the panel and the need to strengthen the BWC. However, a South African proposal for Final Declaration language outlining the elements of a new protocol failed to find consensus, even though several countries had all mentioned similar elements during the general debate. Among the elements included in the South African proposal were comprehensive annual declarations; on site measures, including investigations on non compliance concerns; voluntary confidence building measures; and measures to implement Article X (cooperation for peaceful purposes).

In addition, a proposal calling on the Ad Hoc Group to complete its work by 1998 also failed to generate a consensus despite strong support by the United States, European Union countries, Australia, New Zealand, Romania and the Slovak Republic. Russia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh, among other states, argued against setting such a deadline.

To some extent, this reluctance to set a deadline stemmed from the experience of the CD in negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) against a deadline during 1995 and 1996. It is likely that Indonesia's representative had this in mind when he told the conference, "Recent developments the Conference of Disarmament has gone through teach us a very valuable lesson."

During the general debate, the statements of five states (Australia, Canada, South Africa, South Korea and Russia) addressed the need for the Ad Hoc Group to move on to a new form of negotiation based on a "rolling text." The Australian statement said, "To date the papers produced by the Friends of the Chair have served us well in consolidating and developing the ideas put forward by delegations. However, we believe that the usefulness of this form of negotiations has run its course and that we should be looking to move to some form of text based negotiations at the March session."

This view was agreed to by the conference and reflected in the Final Declaration, which endorsed the work of the Ad Hoc Group and encouraged it to move on to a negotiating format:


The Conference welcomed the decision of the Ad Hoc Group, in order to fulfil its mandate, to intensify its work with a view to completing it as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference and submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus, to the States Parties, to be considered at a Special Conference. The Conference encourages the Ad Hoc Group to review its method of work and to move to a negotiating format in order to fulfil its mandate.


There appears to be growing recognition that no new measures are needed for an enhanced BWC verification regime—the necessary measures currently exist as part of other agreed arms control regimes. What the AHG needs to do is to integrate and tailor the essential measures to meet the requirements of the BWC. Given the political will demonstrated at the review conference, there is a real opportunity for the Ad Hoc Group to make substantial progress when it resumes its negotiations in Geneva in March 1997.

It would be a real service to the Ad Hoc Group if participants at the March meeting arrived in Geneva with draft language that draws upon the deliberations of the AHG to date. Indeed, it is possible that a party such as South Africa, which put forward excellent proposals at the review conference, could table a draft text for a verification protocol at the outset of the meeting. It would be even better if South Africa were able to do this in consultation with other states that had also made clear their wish to see the AHG talks move on to text based negotiations.


Peaceful Cooperation

Since the third review conference, the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Earth summit) and the signing and entry into force of the conventions on biological diversity and on climate change meant that the developed world had acknowledged to a much greater extent the needs of the developing world. Consequently, at the fourth review conference there was an appreciation that there is no strong argument for BWC parties to duplicate actions being taken in other fora for environmental and health reasons. Instead, the states parties emphasized the potential synergy between such actions and the increased transparency and confidence being sought through the BWC for improved international security.

As a result, the review conference took note of the significant steps to promote cooperation in the biological field taken at the Rio summit (including the adoption of "Agenda 21" and the Rio declaration) and through the Convention on Biological Diversity, and underlined their importance in the context of implementing Article X of the BWC. The conference also shared the worldwide concern about new, emerging and re emerging infectious diseases and considered that the international response to them offered opportunities for increased cooperation in the context of Article X.

There was also much discussion by BWC parties of the relationship between Article X and Article III (under which states parties undertake not to transfer or to assist any state in manufacturing or acquiring any of the agents, toxins, weapons or means of delivery specified in Article I). It is this relationship that lies at the heart of the perceived tension between developing and developed countries, with the former seeking to emphasize Article X while the latter are conscious of their obligations under Article III to counter proliferation. The developing countries are arguing for multilaterally agreed guidelines to counter proliferation. This debate will clearly continue into the future. However, the review conference usefully agreed that states parties should consider ways and means to ensure that individuals and subnational groups are effectively prevented from acquiring, through transfers, biological agents and toxins for other than peaceful purposes, thereby helping to counter possible terrorist use of such materials.


Next Steps

The fourth review conference took an important step forward in reaffirming the importance of the BWC and the norm against biological warfare. The language in the Final Declaration making it clear that all advances in molecular biology and any applications of genome studies are covered by the regime, and the strong statements that use of biological weapons—at any time and under any circumstances—is prohibited represent valuable advances.

In the wake of the Japanese experience with nerve gas attacks, the importance of national measures to exclude use of biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity was rightly emphasized. The need to strengthen the convention was clearly recognized by the widespread support for the work of the Ad Hoc Group, as was the continued importance of providing full and timely declarations under the agreed confidence building measures.

There is consequently no doubt that biological weapons are totally prohibited and that there are no loopholes resulting from advances in biotechnology and related sciences over the years since the BWC entered into force. The weakness of the convention—its lack of verification provisions—was universally recognized, and the political will by states parties to strengthen the regime was demonstrated by encouraging the Ad Hoc group to intensify its work to negotiate a legally binding instrument. In its meetings this year, the AHG should make good progress in developing the text of the instrument as nothing novel is required for strengthening the BWC. Rather, measures already internationally accepted in other arms control regimes need to be tailored and integrated into a verification regime for the BWC. The developments since the third review conference make it clear that the strengthening of the BWC is an urgent task, and as President Clinton said in September 1996, "We should aim to complete this task by 1998." The time for action is now.

Graham S. Pearson is honorary senior visiting research fellow in peace studies at the University of Bradford in Bradford, England. He was formerly director general and chief executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, Wiltshire, England.



  1. Statement of John D. Holum, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Fourth BWC Review Conference, November 26, 1996.
  2. UN Security Council Document S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, paragraph 42.
  3. BWC/CONF.IV/4, Add.1; Add.2.
  4. A useful summary of the debate is provided in Annex I to the Report of the Committee of the Whole, BWC/CONF.IV/COW/CRP.1 and Corr.1.

NMD Debate in Congress Heats Up As Lott, Lugar Introduce New Bills

Craig Cerniello

AS THE 105th session of Congress began in January, the debate about whether the United States should deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system intensified. On January 21, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R MS) and Assistant Senate Majority Leader Don Nickles (R OK) announced that the Republican agenda in the Senate this legislative session would consist of national missile defense along with 10 domestic policy initiatives. The "National Missile Defense Act of 1997," introduced that day by Lott and 25 co sponsors, requires the United States to deploy an NMD system by the end of 2003—a similar, though scaled down, version of last year's highly contentious "Defend America Act."

The Clinton administration's so called "3 plus 3" program, on the other hand, requires the United States to develop the elements of an NMD system by 2000, at which time it will evaluate the ballistic missile threat to its territory and be in a position to deploy a system by 2003 if necessary (see ACT, March 1996). If the missile threat has not materialized by 2000, then the United States will continue developing and refining its NMD system, maintaining a rolling three year deployment capability, until a rogue nation threat justifying such a decision has been identified.

In an attempt to bridge the gap between Lott's NMD proposal and the administration's program, Senator Richard Lugar (R IN) introduced the "Defend the United States of America Act of 1997" on January 21. The bill requires the United States to develop an NMD system which is capable of being deployed by the end of 2003. It also calls for a congressional vote in 2000 on whether to deploy the system.


The Lott Bill

The National Missile Defense Act states that it is U.S. policy to deploy an NMD system by the end of 2003 that "is capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)," and that "could be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats if they emerge." This language is similar to that contained in the "Defend America Act of 1996," sponsored by former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R KS) and House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R GA). The Dole Gingrich bill was withdrawn from House consideration in May 1996 when the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the NMD system would incur acquisition costs between $31 billion to $60 billion through 2010 (see ACT, May/June 1996).

Aware of the influence the CBO estimate had in shaping last year's debate, the National Missile Defense Act deliberately tones down some of the key language contained in the Defend America Act in an attempt to reduce costs. Whereas the Dole Gingrich bill called for the deployment of a NMD system that could provide a "highly effective" defense against "limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks," the Lott bill only requires that the system be capable of defending against limited missile attack. Furthermore, the Lott bill only states that the NMD system "could" rather than "will" be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against more sophisticated missile threats.

The National Missile Defense Act also scales down the elements of the NMD system. Under the Lott bill, the NMD system will consist of an interceptor system; fixed, ground based radars; space based sensors; and battle management, command, control and communications. The Dole Gingrich bill, however, envisioned a much more elaborate interceptor system that included one or a combination of ground based and sea based interceptors; space based, kinetic energy interceptors; and space based, directed energy systems.

Nevertheless, the National Missile Defense Act retains some important provisions that were included in the 1996 Defend America Act. For instance, Lott's legislation "urges" the president to pursue negotiations with the Russians to amend the ABM Treaty to permit deployment of the NMD system, and requires the United States to consider withdrawing from the treaty if these negotiations have not succeeded within one year of the bill's enactment. Moreover, the Lott bill states that it is U.S. policy "to seek a cooperative transition to a regime that does not feature an offense only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability."


The Lugar Bill

Lugar's legislation attempts to find a middle ground between the administration's NMD approach and the more ambitious Republican proposals. During his January 21 remarks to the Senate in which he introduced the bill, Lugar said, "I hold the view that the ABM Treaty does have, or can be made to have, sufficient flexibility or elasticity to accommodate certain kinds of national missile or theater missile defense systems. By the same token, I reject the notion that we can only achieve the types of theater missile defense or national missile defense we need by outright abrogation of the ABM Treaty."

The Lugar bill directs the secretary of defense to conduct a "research and development program" to develop a single site NMD system that can be deployed by the end of 2003. The system will be "designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or attacks by Third World countries."

In addition, the bill requires Congress to make a decision concerning deployment of the NMD system during 2000. The deployment decision will be based on five factors: the projected ballistic missile threat to the United States in 2000 and beyond; the projected cost and effectiveness of the system based on available technology and testing results; the projected cost and effectiveness of the system if deployment were deferred for one to three years while additional development continued; arms control factors; and an assessment of U.S. preparedness in defending against an attack involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

The Lugar legislation also mandates that the NMD system be compliant with the ABM Treaty. In this connection, the system will consist of fixed, ground based battle management radars; up to 100 ground based interceptor missiles; as necessary, space based adjuncts permitted under the treaty; and, as necessary, large phased array radars that are located on the periphery of the United States and oriented outward. The bill also urges the president to pursue discussions with Russia on possible amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow for more effective defenses, such as a return to the original treaty provision permitting ABM deployment at two sites. However, it does not require the United States to consider withdrawing from the ABM Treaty if these negotiations do not succeed within one year.

Panel Upholds NIE Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to U.S.

Craig Cerniello

ON JANUARY 23, the CIA released the unclassified version of the independent panel review of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95 19—the controversial assessment that concluded that no countries, other than the declared nuclear weapon states, will develop a ballistic missile capable of threatening the contiguous 48 states or Canada in the next 15 years. The panel, headed by former CIA Director Robert Gates, rejected the claim made by congressional conservatives that NIE 95 19 was politically influenced by the Clinton administration in order to downplay the longer range missile threat to U.S. territory. Although acknowledging several deficiencies in the intelligence estimate, the panel reaffirmed the estimate's conclusion that the United States is unlikely to face a limited missile threat from any "rogue" country before 2010. Congressional critics of the NIE have now taken aim at the panel's findings.


Gates Panel Review

One of the most hotly contested issues in the current national missile defense (NMD) debate is the nature of the threat to the United States posed by longer range ballistic missiles. When the NIE was released in November 1995, it posed a significant challenge to congressional Republicans who advocated the early deployment of an NMD system to defend against what they claim is an emerging missile threat to U.S. territory. In subsequent months, several congressional members challenged the NIE's findings and argued that the estimate was politically influenced by the administration in order to justify its decision not to commit to the early deployment of an NMD system.

As a result of the controversy generated by NIE 95 19, Congress, in its fiscal year 1997 defense authorization bill, required the director of the CIA to convene a panel of "independent, nongovernmental individuals with appropriate expertise and experience" to review the underlying assumptions and conclusions of the estimate. Then CIA Director John Deutch appointed Gates to chair the independent panel, which included Ambassador Richard Armitage, Sidney Drell, Arnold Kanter, Janne E. Nolan, Henry S. Rowen and retired Air Force General Jasper Welch. The conclusions reached by the seven panel members were unanimous.

The Gates panel dismissed the charge that NIE 95 19 was politically influenced. "The Panel found no evidence of politicization and is completely satisfied that the analysts' views were based on the evidence before them and their substantive analysis," the report stated. Moreover, it concluded that, "unsubstantiated allegations challenging the integrity of Intelligence Community analysts by those who simply disagree with their conclusions, including Members of Congress, are irresponsible."

The Gates panel noted that there were several deficiencies with respect to the process in preparing the NIE and the manner in which it was presented. The panel said those in senior management positions were not sufficiently involved in the preparation of the estimate, especially given the controversial nature of the issue being addressed. "The result was not a politicized Estimate but one that was politically naive," the report said. The panel also claimed that the estimate lacked a clear scope and was "rushed to completion."

The Gates panel pointed out that one of the most serious problems in NIE 95 19 was that its main conclusion on the missile threat to the United States was based on "a stronger evidentiary and technical case than was presented in the Estimate." The panel's report illustrates several examples of how the NIE's key judgment could have been strengthened. For instance, the panel stated that the estimate could have analyzed the length of time it took countries with successful missile programs, such as China, to develop an ICBM capability. Such an analysis, they claimed, would have revealed that it took China more than 20 years to develop its 4,750 kilometer range CSS 3 ICBM—a clear indication that states with much less resources (e.g. North Korea) have a long way to go before successfully developing an ICBM capable of reaching U.S. territory.

The panel also identified several analytical shortcomings in NIE 95 19. Most important, the panel claimed that the intelligence estimate failed to thoroughly address the motives and objectives of those states seeking an ICBM capability. The panel's report said insufficient attention was devoted to the potential threat to the United States posed by land attack cruise missiles and shorter range, sea based ballistic missiles. Other deficiencies included the failure to ask whether potential adversaries could acquire an ICBM capability through channels not considered by the intelligence community, and an overemphasis on the Missile Technology Control Regime as a means of slowing ballistic missile proliferation.

In the final analysis, however, the Gates panel concluded that "the Intelligence Community has a strong case that, for sound technical reasons, the United States is unlikely to face an indigenously developed and tested intercontinental ballistic missile threat from the Third World before 2010, even taking into account the acquisition of foreign hardware and technical assistance. That case is even stronger than presented in the NIE."

Clearly dissatisfied with the panel's findings, Representative Curt Weldon (R PA) argued in a January 17 letter to Gates that the independent review failed to adequately refute the charge that NIE 95 19 was politically influenced by the administration. "Not once did your panel provide an opportunity for Members who charged politicization to be heard. Given your harsh condemnation, I believe you had a responsibility to explore those allegations and to offer a detailed rebuttal of them," Weldon wrote. The letter also rejected the notion that Congress was responsible for rushing the estimate to completion.

U.S. Favors CD Negotiations To Achieve Ban on Landmines

Sarah Walkling

AFTER MONTHS of indecision, the Clinton administration announced January 17 that it will initially pursue negotiations for a comprehensive global ban on anti personnel landmines at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, instead of through the Canadian led effort to negotiate and sign an international treaty by December 1997. (See ACT, October 1996.) The administration also declared that the current U.S. export moratorium on anti personnel mines, which was to continue until 1999, would become permanent.

By opting for the CD, the administration has chosen the slower path for implementing a ban. The CD, which opened its first session of 1997 on January 21, may not decide whether a landmine ban will be on its agenda until the summer of 1997 or later. Meanwhile, the Canadian led effort, also known as the "Ottawa Process," will begin reviewing an Austrian draft treaty text during a February 12 14 conference in Vienna. The United States is expected to attend the Vienna meeting.

The administration favors the 61 member CD because Russia and China—top producers of anti personnel landmines and opponents of a landmine ban—have said they will not participate in the Ottawa Process. Both countries are members of the CD. Without their participation, administration officials say, a treaty would not halt the use, production, export or stockpiling of anti personnel mines. However, White House spokesman Mike McCurry said January 17 the CD negotiations would be "mutually reinforcing" of the Canadian initiative. If China and Russia join the Canadian effort, the United States has said it will also participate. Regardless of the forum, the United States will seek an exception for its mines deployed on the Korean Peninsula.

Other states that favor negotiating a ban at the CD include Australia, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. On January 23, the French representative to the CD, Ambassador Joelle Bourgois, said, "France prefers an efficient treaty, even if the result took time, to a hastily concluded but useless agreement." Some members of the non aligned movement (NAM) that oppose conducting the negotiations at the CD say the landmine talks might overshadow the comprehensive nuclear disarmament negotiations which several NAM states hope to initiate. If the CD agenda does include a landmine ban, the ad hoc committee that would be established for negotiating a ban will likely focus on reaching agreement on an export ban first.

According to Bob Bell, National Security Council senior director for defense policy and arms control, "[O]ur best shot at this in terms of achieving the president's goal of a global ban—not just a ban among some countries but a ban that really touches the countries that are causing the problem on different continents around the world—is to take it to the CD where we have a proven track record." Acknowledging that achieving a ban "is going to be tough," Bell said, "we think we can get a landmines agreement out of the CD ..."

However, Senator Patrick Leahy (D VT), the leading congressional advocate for a global ban, expressed disappointment in the administration's decision. In a January 17 press release, Leahy said the Canadian initiative offers "the best opportunity" for rapid progress because it establishes "a moral and tactical imperative" for bringing holdout countries aboard. "It is doubtful that the CD will produce an agreement to achieve a ban," Leahy said. "The CD process requires step by step consensus that rewards holdout states, who effectively have a veto that retards or prevents strong agreements." Last year, India alone was able to block consensus on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the CD. The otherwise agreed treaty was taken directly to the UN General Assembly by Australia and was opened for signature in September 1996 despite Indian opposition.


Finding Alternatives

The day after the White House announced its decision to push for negotiation of a ban in the CD, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported on its efforts to end its military reliance on anti personnel landmines. Clinton ordered the assessment as part of a landmine initiative announced in May 1996. (See ACT, May/June 1996.) The Pentagon has since reviewed its war plans and has begun to revise its doctrine and training manuals to eliminate requirements for anti personnel landmine use. According to a DOD official, the changes represent "a fundamental shift in the way we go to war."

While the Defense Department has not found a single alternative to landmines, the official said, "[T]here appear to be a number of systems, when used in combination, which offer some very promising prospects for us." Specifically, a combination of "new killing mechanisms and mix of new intelligence sensors" would allow the U.S. military to decrease its reliance on statically emplaced non self destruct mines.

As part of his 1996 initiative, Clinton ordered the U.S. military to immediately discontinue use of so called "dumb" mines, which remain active until detonated or cleared, except for training purposes or on the Korean Peninsula and to destroy all non essential stockpiles by 1999. According to the Pentagon, the United States will still possess approximately one million such mines.

Nuclear Deal With North Korea Back on Track After Sub Incident

Howard Diamond

IMPLEMENTATION of the 1994 U.S. North Korean agreed framework resumed in January following Pyongyang's December 29 expression of regret over the grounding of one of its reconnaissance submarines on the South Korean coast. On January 8, the "canning" of spent fuel at North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility resumed after having stopped in November. That same day, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea signed two protocols in New York that will allow KEDO to begin site preparation work on the $5 billion light water reactor (LWR) project, the central component of the agreed framework.

KEDO is the international consortium founded by the United States, Japan and South Korea to implement the 1994 denuclearization accord. The agreement requires North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons program in exchange for the construction of two proliferation resistant 1,000 megawatt (electric) LWRs and the delivery of heavy fuel oil while the reactors are being built.


Canning' Resumes

The canning operation, which entails transferring the spent fuel rods from a cooling pond where they are currently stored into steel containers suitable for transhipment, was suspended in early November after North Korean workers failed to return from a scheduled work stoppage. At that point, more than half of the Yongbyon reactor's 8,000 spent fuel elements had been placed in "dry storage" by the U.S. Department of Energy and its private contractor.

North Korea removed the spent fuel from its 5 megawatt (electric) experimental reactor at Yongbyon in 1994. The fuel remains a serious proliferation hazard because it contains enough plutonium to build several nuclear bombs. As part of the 1994 deal, North Korea shut down the Yongbyon reactor, with the promise to dismantle it and send its spent fuel out of the country without being reprocessed. U.S. officials hope to complete the canning operation by the end of 1997.

With the submarine incident resolved, KEDO has resumed activity on a number of fronts, according to KEDO spokesman Jason Shaplen. The two protocols signed January 8 by KEDO and Pyongyang represent an important milestone in the LWR project's development, clearing the way for KEDO to begin site preparation near Sinpo in North Korea. Arrangements for KEDO to contract for services in North Korea and KEDO's access to the proposed construction site are covered in the agreements.

KEDO's seventh site survey team is preparing to visit North Korea to conduct a detailed geological investigation and some additional preliminary site preparation work. South Korea indefinitely postponed a planned October trip by the mostly South Korean team of engineers due to concerns over their safety while working in North Korea. The submarine incident delayed the site preparation, but the effect on the overall LWR project schedule is uncertain. The 1995 KEDO North Korean supply agreement calls for completion of the first reactor by 2003 on a "best efforts" basis, and KEDO hopes to be able to make up some of the lost time.

In addition to sending the first shipment of heavy fuel oil for the current year supply schedule, which began on October 31, 1996, KEDO has reached an agreement in principle on accession to KEDO by EURATOM, the nuclear regulatory body of the European Union (EU). The EU is expected to make "an immediate contribution of $13 million and an annual contribution of $20 million in the future" according to Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord. The EU contribution would nearly equal the annual level of U.S. financial support ($22 million for 1996), and would pay for approximately one third of the annual $60 million cost of fuel deliveries to North Korea.

KEDO and Pyongyang have not yet begun to negotiate a protocol on penalties if either party fails to meet its obligations as called for in the supply agreement. Shaplen said talks on the non payment protocol will begin as soon as is practicable.


The Submarine Incident

The resumption of activity implementing the framework accord as of January 31, 1997, came after three and a half months of escalating tension, carefully phrased threats, and intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts. On September 18, the North Korean sub was discovered grounded 100 yards off the South Korean coast.

South Korean President Kim Young Sam called the incident a provocation and demanded a sincere apology from the North. On October 9, South Korea suspended the signing of two KEDO North Korean protocols and a trip by KEDO's site survey team to the North.

Lord flew to Seoul the next day to mend U.S. South Korean relations damaged by Secretary of State Warren Christopher's initial call for restraint from "all parties." After meeting with South Korean leaders, Lord confirmed Washington's and Seoul's support for the agreed framework, but added that there would be "a pause in the pace of our activities."

In response, North Korea warned on October 15 that another delay in work on the reactors might prompt the North to reconsider its nuclear freeze. North Korean preparations to test an intermediate range ballistic missile were reported by the Japanese press the next day. The cancellation of the missile test was announced by the State Department on November 8, after several meetings in New York between U.S. and North Korean diplomats.


U.S. South Korean Disagreement

On November 9, South Korean President Kim reiterated his demand for a "sincere apology" in an interview with The Washington Post. At the time, U.S. officials asked the North to make "an acceptable gesture." Subsequently, the United States and South Korea settled their differnces at the November 24 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila. In the reportedly heated exchange, President Clinton prevailed on President Kim to support American diplomatic efforts to negotiate a resolution of the crisis. The final negotiations went on through December between U.S. and North Korean diplomats in New York.

The result was a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement read over the radio on December 29 that recognized Pyongyang's responsibility for the incident, offered "deep regret," and promised to prevent a recurrence of similar events. South Korean Foreign Minister Yoo Chong Ha termed the North's statement an acceptable apology, thus clearing the way for continued South Korean participation on the agreed framework.

The Arms Control Agenda at the UN: Breaking New Ground or Breaking Old Habits?

Rebecca Johnson

Every year the UN General Assembly adopts a host of resolutions on disarmament without really expecting that most of them will be acted on. Some, however, convey important signals. For many years, the General Assembly had overwhelmingly endorsed resolutions calling for an end to nuclear testing. When the resolution achieved consensus in December 1993, it meant that the nuclear weapon states were finally ready to give a test ban a chance. The result was the long awaited Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that was opened for signature in September 1996.

In 1993, the General Assembly also unanimously agreed on a resolution calling for a global ban on the production of fissile materials for weapon and explosive purposes. But in 1995 and 1996, the General Assembly did not vote on any so called "fissban" resolution, and this too sent a strong, but more somber, message. In this case, the main players at the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD) were so divided over what kind of fissile material cutoff regime they wanted that they would not risk putting a fissban resolution to a vote at the United Nations. Advocates of such a treaty were afraid that a split vote in the assembly would undermine the authority of the consensus endorsement achieved in 1993. At the same time, opponents of a cutoff regime rejoiced in the absence of a UN vote.

During the 51st session of the United Nations, a number of important debates and resolutions on disarmament issues were addressed by the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, which met in New York in October and November 1996. All 46 draft resolutions and decisions adopted by the First Committee also obtained majority support in the General Assembly on December 10, 1996. However, although every UN member state has an equal vote in the General Assembly, some votes are more equal than others.

There is inevitably a handsome majority for disarmament resolutions, especially nuclear disarmament. But to assess a resolution's significance, it is more important to look at which countries co sponsored it; whether a resolution did better or worse in previous sessions; and the balance of power on the vote, particularly which states registered votes against. Consensus at the United Nations can be an indication of a significant breakthrough in support of a resolution, which could lead to negotiations and ultimately a new security enhancing arms control treaty. Alternatively, a UN consensus may simply reflect widespread endorsement of diplomatic rhetoric on an issue that no one wants to be seen as being against, but which is not likely to move forward.

Among the many resolutions considered during the 51st session, only a handful stand out as significant or with the potential to break new ground. Malaysia and its colleagues in the non aligned movement (NAM) laid the first foundation stone for a nuclear weapons convention that would ban all such weapons, just as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are intended to ban other types of weapons of mass destruction. The United States, backed by 112 others countries, called for a complete ban on anti personnel landmines, although it did not specify how or where this should be negotiated. The United States and Russia co sponsored a resolution on bilateral arms control which not only underlined the high priority to be accorded to further bilateral reductions, but also urged Russia to ratify START II, a singling out that was unusually strong and significant. The United States and Israel were isolated in opposing a special session of all UN member states, which the vast majority of countries—including the European Union—want to be convened in 1999 to discuss a disarmament and security agenda for the 21st century.

The United Nations strongly endorsed the CWC and exhorted both the United States and Russia to ratify it before it enters into force on April 29, 1997. For many delegates, the biggest disappointment was the failure for the second consecutive year to adopt a resolution supporting a ban on the production of fissile materials.


Nuclear Weapons Convention

Malaysia's resolution built on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), delivered on July 8, 1996, in response to a request by the United Nations in 1994. Underlining the unanimous conclusion of the court that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control," the resolution "calls upon all states to fulfill that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination."

In introducing the resolution, Malaysia's ambassador, Hasmy Bin Agam, backed U.S. Russian arms control efforts such as the START accords and called the views of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons "particularly pertinent." However, he said, the existence of "tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states, 28 years after the signing of the NPT [nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty], is a sobering reminder that the negotiations on nuclear disarmament ... have been carried out neither in good faith nor in earnest." Exhorting that the present window of opportunity must not be lost, he said it was now necessary to start negotiations leading to the con clusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

Four of the five nuclear powers led the opposition, objecting that the resolution "selectively quoted" from the NPT. The United States complained that the resolution omitted the commitment to complete and general disarmament, "distorting the meaning" of treaty Article VI, which requires states "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." Russia protested that the resolution was silent on the question of the use of nuclear weapons, about which the judges on the ICJ had been unable to agree. Several European delegations echoed these concerns, but the resolution had widespread support from the developing countries. Chile argued that it was appropriate for the resolution to quote verbatim from the part of the court's advisory opinion about which the 14 judges had been unanimous, since the ICJ's judgment on the question of use had been hedged with caveats and potential ambiguity. However, in its unanimous judgment, the ICJ was not merely repeating Article VI obligations under the NPT, but intended to provide an interpretation of the legal situation, informed by the NPT and other relevant treaties and international legal instruments.

Stressing the importance of the ICJ opinion, Iceland feared that the resolution would "subordinate bilateral nuclear arms negotiations to the work of the Conference on Disarmament." The United States and Britain argued that the resolution was not really about the ICJ at all, but repeated calls "for immediate multilateral negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention." In fact, the Malaysian resolution puts the demand for a nuclear weapons convention into the international arena for the first time. Importantly, the resolution did not call for a nuclear weapons convention to be immediately negotiated, but called for commencement of negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention. (Emphasis added.)

The breakdown of votes on the Malaysian resolution was interesting, with the NAM generally solidly in support and cracks showing among European, NATO and allied countries. There was considerable switching in the three votes covering two particular paragraphs and the whole resolution, with some U.S. allies voting "for" while others were resolutely opposed. Russia abstained on both paragraphs but voted against the resolution as a whole. The United States, Britain and France voted "no" throughout, while China voted "yes" on all parts. Canada had requested one of the paragraph votes so that it and other Western countries would be seen as endorsing the unanimous opinion of the ICJ on the legal obligation to bring nuclear disarmament negotiations to conclusion.

With 139 for, seven against (the United States, Britain, France, Latvia, Monaco, Romania and Turkey) and 20 abstentions, the vote clearly reflected the influence of public opinion on these issues. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Ukraine joined the NAM and China in endorsing the ICJ opinion. Russia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and various Eastern European countries abstained, including Belarus and Kazakstan, which until recently stored large numbers of former Soviet nuclear weapons on their territories. Only 110 states voted for the specific paragraph calling for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention to begin in 1997. There is some evidence indicating that had the date 1997 been omitted from the call to commence multilateral negotiations, there would have been a higher number voting in support.

In the General Assembly vote on the full resolution, 115 countries voted in favor, 22 states voted against and 32 members abstained. The resolution was supported by the NAM states, China, New Zealand, Sweden and Ireland. Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Turkey joined the Western nuclear powers, Canada and Russia in voting against the resolution. Australia, Austria, Denmark and Finland joined Israel, Japan, Norway and several Eastern European countries in abstaining.

While no one imagines that this resolution will result in negotiations next year, Malaysia's call for a nuclear weapons convention received surprisingly solid support on the first vote, clearly reflecting a shift in perceptions. Whereas just five years ago the idea of a treaty banning nuclear weapons would have been regarded as too idealistic, there is now a growing body of international public opinion, including retired military officers as well as scientists and politicians, which views a nuclear weapons convention as something reasonable to aspire to and achievable with sufficient political will.

With four nuclear weapon states opposed (and China's support lacking practical credibility), negotiations on a convention could not be successfully undertaken until much more has been achieved to reduce these states' nuclear arsenals and their reliance on nuclear weapon based security policies through unilateral initiatives, further U.S. Russian agreements and the involvement, sooner rather than later, of Britain, China and France. For this reason, several countries which consider that a nuclear weapons convention could play an important role in achieving nuclear disarmament worldwide tried to persuade Malaysia to omit the reference to 1997. The non aligned states privately say the date was not important; the point of the resolution was to start the ball rolling.

They recognize that it could take years before a nuclear weapons convention is truly on the negotiating agenda, but they wanted to serve notice on the nuclear powers that what is possible for chemical weapons is even more necessary where nuclear weapons are concerned. They intend for the call for a nuclear weapons convention to become an annual resolution both in the First Committee and General Assembly, and expect that the resolution will gather new votes each year until the momentum is unstoppable.


U.S. Russian Arms Control

In 1996, the First Committee and General Assembly also conveyed some interesting messages on U.S. Russian arms control efforts. As in previous years, there were two resolutions on this subject. The resolution supported by the NAM noted the "significant nuclear arsenals" remaining and argued that the responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies primarily with the nuclear weapon states with the largest arsenals. By contrast, the United States introduced a resolution (co sponsored by Russia, Britain and France) which welcomed "significant reductions" in the nuclear arsenals. This resolution focused on the START process, explicitly expressing the hope that Russia will soon ratify START II. With Russian co sponsorship, this departure from the usual rule against singling out particular states is clearly intended to encourage the Russian Duma to ratify START II.

Ratification of START II by the Duma is currently held up for five principal reasons: funding for dismantlement; a perceived imbalance in the provisions of START II in favor of the United States; the vigorous campaign to expand NATO; efforts by the United States to undercut the 1972 ABM Treaty; and internecine conflict and disarray in the Duma, compounded by lack of effective leadership on this issue from the Yeltsin government. With both START II and CWC ratification now held up by the Duma, democrats in Russia will need to take greater initiative and responsibility to pilot these important measures through the ratification process. The United States could do much more to alleviate the first four concerns. For example, the initiative started by the Nunn Lugar security assistance program should be expanded. The sooner that Russian missiles and facilities can be dismantled, the safer the world will be.

Leaders of the Duma argue that full compliance with START II will leave Russia at a strategic disadvantage and force it to manufacture new land based missiles to bring it up to the levels permitted by the treaty. Senior Russian diplomats and Duma members have told U.S. officials that Russian ratification of START II would be easier if the United States would enter into negotiations on the next phase of reductions—a START III accord, bringing warhead levels down more equally to 1,000 to 2,000 each. So far, the U.S. response seems to be: "Ratify START II first and then we'll talk."

The proposed expansion of NATO is probably the ultimate example of a short sighted policy that could create the very threat that it presumably is intended to defend against. NATO's existing advantage in nuclear and conventional forces should deter any possible future attack without making present day Russia, which is not a threat, feel surrounded and threatened. Already there is growing support in Moscow for the argument that rather than reduce its nuclear weapons, Russia should compensate for its conventional weakness by ensuring that it has sufficiently flexible and convincing nuclear force to deter attacks by potential foes. In this context, it is imperative that the United States move quickly to help Russia safely dismantle its nuclear weapon systems and aging facilities so that the substantial arms reduction already underway becomes irreversible. That cannot happen if the United States pursues policies which increase Russia's sense of vulnerability, such as initiating a new race for missile defenses and expanding NATO to Russia's borders. Reducing Russia's huge nuclear arsenal can only be achieved bilaterally, with the United States showing that it is willing to undertake equivalent cuts and assisting an impoverished Russia so that dismantlement becomes a priority.

In addition, Russia has for some years expressed growing concern about U.S. plans to develop theater and strategic ballistic missile defenses. Many in Russia fear that the rationale for the ABM Treaty is being undermined by the United States. As a consequence, there are a growing number of voices objecting to further arms reductions on the grounds that Russia's deterrence posture will require all the weapons it has to overwhelm such defenses. The hard liners are using these arguments to erode Russian support for START II and now the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), both of which must be ratified by the Duma to enter into force.

U.S. efforts to expand NATO to Russia's borders and undercut the ABM Treaty will not enhance U.S. security. If these U.S. policies lead to a negative decision by the Duma on START II, the CWC or the CTBT, this will have a disastrous impact on the General Assembly's agenda calling for major steps in nuclear disarmament.

By voting for a General Assembly resolution with such an explicit criticism of Russia's failure to ratify START II, the Yeltsin government sent a brave message to the Duma. This resolution was endorsed by 160 countries, with just 11 abstentions; no country voted against it. By contrast, most NATO members and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) countries voted against the NAM resolution, or abstained from voting, viewing it as a vehicle to push for "timebound" nuclear disarmament.


Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

A similar voting pattern could be discerned with two more traditional resolutions on nuclear disarmament. A NAM sponsored resolution urged the nuclear weapon states to stop immediately the qualitative improvement and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, and called on them to undertake phased reductions with a view to their total elimination "within a timebound framework." This resolution garnered 110 votes in favor, 39 votes against (mostly NATO and OSCE countries) and 20 abstentions.

A more moderate resolution introduced by Japan, entitled "Nuclear Disarmament With a View to the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," received 159 votes in favor, with 11 abstentions. The United States, Russia, Britain and France were among those in favor; China abstained. Intended to capture the middle ground but maintain moral pressure on the nuclear weapon states, Japan's resolution focused on the commitments and program of action adopted by NPT parties when they made the treaty permanent in May 1995. Calling for "best efforts for a smooth start of the strengthened review process," the resolution also urged the nuclear weapon states to reduce their arsenals with the ultimate goal of eliminating them. Though moderate by comparison with the NAM sponsored call for timebound nuclear disarmament, the language of Japan's resolution is stronger than that proposed in previous years, indicating growing pressure by U.S. allies for further practical commitments to nuclear disarmament. The fact that the United States, Russia, Britain and France felt obliged to vote in favor of this resolution indicates the unacceptability of old intransigence on this issue.

Significantly, this focus on the NPT was underscored during a December 1996 conference hosted by Japan in Kyoto that was attended by Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director John Holum as well as several key disarmament ambassadors. The chair's summary of the proceedings, which was made public, emphasized that there had been general agreement "that the review process starting in 1997 should place particular emphasis on substantive matters, and thus be dynamic and different from past practice of the reviews." Clearly, there are concerns on the part of some countries that, having achieved the indefinite extension of the NPT, the nuclear powers will prove the non aligned correct by placing political or procedural barriers in the way of further progress on nuclear disarmament. Japan and other countries with a vested interest in international stability are anxious that such an attitude by the nuclear weapon states could undermine the non proliferation regime, with disastrous consequences in the future.


Cutoff' Divisions Continue

One significant arms control failure during the 51st session of the General Assembly was the withdrawal of a resolution supporting a worldwide ban on the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Canada had earlier circulated a draft resolution that called for the "prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The Canadian draft recalled the December 1993 consensus resolution by the General Assembly, welcomed the negotiating mandate adopted by the CD in March 1995 and called for "the immediate commencement and early conclusion" of cutoff negotiations. However, early on in its consultations with other delegations, Canada decided that it would be impossible to achieve consensus. Considering that a split vote could polarize states even further, the resolution's supporters decided not to risk taking the resolution any further.

This failure confirms the growing view that the CD will not be able to convene an ad hoc committee for cutoff talks and get the negotiations underway early in 1997. It is now clear that the international community needs urgently to reconsider the options for initiating cutoff talks including, if necessary, abandoning the CD mandate and seeking a more viable route toward controlling production and reducing the proliferation threat from fissile materials. The main problems remain whether and how to address existing stockpiles and the relationship of a fissile material cutoff to nuclear disarmament. The CD has been deadlocked on this issue for nearly two years. Even if negotiations were to get started in Geneva, prospects for agreement are slim.

For many non nuclear weapon states, a cutoff regime that does not address existing stockpiles of fissile materials would simply freeze the nuclear status quo. For Pakistan and Egypt, looking toward the nuclear weapons potential of India and Israel, respectively, the status quo is not acceptable. Four of the five nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, Britain and France) have already declared a voluntary halt on their production of plutonium and HEU for weapons, and the United States and Russia are now awash with fissile material from dismantled weapons. China is now believed by some observers to have stopped its production as well. For many countries, putting this de facto moratorium into law should be done by the five major nuclear powers themselves. Negotiations at the CD would not, in their view, guarantee agreement by India, Israel and Pakistan and is not therefore a sufficient priority to spend much time or money on.

A number of non aligned states are also concerned that the fissban issue will be used to tie up the resources and work of the CD for a long time, making further negotiations on nuclear disarmament impossible. Their anxiety could be alleviated if the nuclear weapon states were willing to put a target date on a first step cutoff treaty, in return for an acceptance from the non aligned to keep the controversial and more complicated issue of fissile material stockpiles for a later measure. Providing that there were some assurance that stockpiles and the larger issue of the production of all weapon useable plutonium and HEU could be considered as further steps, with preliminary discussion in an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, for example, such a trade off might shift the logjam.

This kind of trade off also stands a good chance of winning the support of the bulk of non aligned countries, including Egypt. Despite wanting stockpiles addressed, Cairo is especially interested in involving Israel in the process of negotiating fissile material controls. Whether such a deal would bring India and Pakistan on board is open to question, and there is certainly no guarantee that the final stages of cutoff talks at the CD would not replicate the fiasco that nearly derailed the CTBT. Once again, some of the declared nuclear weapon states will insist on having the signature and ratification of the so called "threshold" states (Israel, India and Pakistan) as a binding condition before such a treaty would enter into force. And once again, India is likely to balk, demanding (as it already has) that the cutoff regime should be linked with nuclear disarmament. That does not necessarily mean that the measure is doomed. But if the United States is going to continue to demand that this treaty be negotiated at the CD, it should at least acknowledge the likely scenario. However, this time the CD should be better prepared to let the General Assembly adopt a cutoff treaty if consensus is blocked in Geneva.

Considerable diplomatic finesse may be required to overcome the opposition of Pakistan to a cutoff treaty that does not address existing stockpiles, or the political hostility of India to a regime that is not linked to "timebound" nuclear disarmament. The establishment of a CD ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament may be the price these countries set for allowing a cutoff initiative to go forward. Presently, the United States, Britain and France are not yet willing to pay that price, even if the non aligned states are persuaded to accept a non negotiating role for the committee to begin with. If the nuclear powers are unwilling to go further than a basic cutoff, they should seriously consider alternative ways of making it legally binding among themselves. Refusing to do so implies that they do not regard a cutoff among the five most advanced nuclear weapon states to be intrinsically valuable. That sends all the wrong signals to the rest of the world.


Breakthrough On Landmines

Once again there were two resolutions related to anti personnel landmines, though both came from the Western side. Sweden introduced a resolution on the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) that was adopted by consensus. The resolution supported the work already underway on strengthening the CCW and commended the recently amended landmine protocol to the CCW (Protocol II) and the new protocol (Protocol IV) on blinding laser weapons, as agreed by the 1996 review conference.

The United States and more than 110 co sponsors went much further with their resolution calling for "an effective, legally binding, international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti personnel (AP) landmines with a view to completing the negotiations as soon as possible." This resolution was overwhelmingly endorsed by 155 countries in the General Assembly, with no votes against and only 10 abstentions. Because the U.S. sponsored resolution did not specify a forum for negotiations, it steered clear of the controversy generated by the so called "Ottawa Process," a Canadian initiative to negotiate and sign, at a special conference, a global ban in 1997.

On January 17, 1997, the White House issued a statement calling for negotiations on a worldwide treaty banning anti personnel mines, and expressing the Clinton administration's view that the CD "offers the most practical and effective forum for achieving our aim of a ban that is global." This U.S. move has raised the stakes in Geneva. Although Britain and France moved swiftly to back the U.S. initiative, other countries were less comfortable. Advocates of a global landmines ban are concerned that 1) the CD could slow down and possibly derail the Ottawa Process; 2) at best, the CD would only be able to manage a "step by step" progress and, at worst, the landmine issue could become hopelessly bogged down in Geneva's arcane procedures; and 3) negotiations on landmines could become all consuming, thereby preventing the CD from addressing nuclear weapons issues. Mexico, which in New York supported a landmines ban but declared "Any other forum but not the CD," has continued its vehement opposition to this approach. Other advocates of a total ban, such as Austria, Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, have decided not to block the establishment of landmines negotiations at the CD but are skeptical of its chances of success. These states prefer that the Ottawa process continue as well.

A special conference of concerned states could likely negotiate and sign a formal ban in less than a year, thereby establishing an international legal basis for the prohibition of anti personnel landmines. However, against this backdrop is the concern that such a conference, by excluding some of the world's biggest producers (namely Russia and China), would simply become a club for the virtuous, with little political impact on the widespread problem. Negotiations at the CD, on the other hand, would involve all the players, but with the drawback that talks could be prolonged and possibly unsuccessful, thereby delaying actual progress on the issue.

Advocates of the Ottawa approach argue that once a global legal norm has been established, international pressure will be more effectively brought to bear on landmine producers. They contend that, all things considered, the Canadian initiative would be a speedier and surer way to get Russia, China and others on board than through lengthy, multilateral negotiations at the CD, which some now regard as the kiss of death for arms control endeavors. A twin track approach appears acceptable to the White House, which mentioned support for the Ottawa process in its statement calling on the CD to commence negotiations. However, as Russia has been quick to point out, if the Ottawa process concludes a total ban this year, the two approaches may find themselves on a collision course.

Russia and China are the strongest opponents of a landmines ban and among the 10 states to abstain on the U.S. resolution at the General Assembly. Both countries have said the CCW is the appropriate forum for discussing landmines. While China said it supported "reasonable restrictions" on landmines, it claimed the weapons were a legitimate means of military defense. Russia, which called the Ottawa initiative a "road leading nowhere," said discussions at the CD were feasible. However, Moscow raised questions over the scope of the proposed accord and its verifiability, and argued that emphasis should instead be on intensifying international mine clearance efforts and maintaining the moratoria on exporting anti personnel mines.

In addition to Mexico, several non aligned countries remain to be convinced to back landmines negotiations at the CD. Their fear that this is a ploy by the United States to prevent the CD from addressing nuclear issues could be allayed if the United States, Britain and France withdrew their objections to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Only time will tell whether their other concern—that the CD will paralyze further progress on getting a landmines ban—is legitimate.


The Disarmament Agenda

The United States was almost totally isolated in its opposition to the convening in 1999 of a UN special session devoted to disarmament. (The United Nations has convened such sessions in 1978, 1982 and 1988.)

With the exception of a few countries, the entire UN membership backed the non aligned states' call for a fourth special session in 1999, primarily because they believe that there is a clear need for a new security and disarmament agenda as the world enters the 21st century. The United States did not argue against the idea of a special session but rather it opposed the proposed date, wanting the session to be held no earlier than 2001. Washington's arguments ranged from fear of failure (and the possible consequences for the NPT review conference in 2000), to worry that it would be used exclusively to put pressure on the nuclear weapon states for nuclear disarmament, to concern that India could manipulate the 1999 special session.

Inevitably, the UN session will be used to exert pressure for nuclear disarmament. The disappearance of the Cold War has caused many more people to question the utility and morality of nuclear weapons. Providing that there is continued progress on reducing the vast U.S. Russian nuclear arsenals and the other nuclear weapon states are at least engaging in multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament, the United States has little to fear. But if progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons has been blocked or reversed, then it is legitimate for the international community to try to get it on track again. The United States appears troubled by the possibility that an unsatisfactory UN special session in 1999 could harm the NPT review in 2000. However, delaying a UN special session until after 2000 could result in the non nuclear weapon states venting their frustration at the NPT review conference, which the United States says it wants to avoid.

It is inconceivable that the fourth UN special session would ignore the importance of conventional arms issues such as landmines and light weapons. Not only are these issues becoming increasing salient in the international court of public opinion, but by 1999 it will be clear whether the General Assembly's resolve on banning landmines is being fulfilled either by the CD or through the Ottawa Process.

While the U.S. concern that India may try to use the session as a platform is realistic, such an event could also be utilized by the international community to pressure hold out states that have refused to sign the CTBT. Of 44 designated countries whose accession is necessary before the test ban treaty can take effect, only three—India, Pakistan and North Korea—have not yet signed. Applying pressure on India at a UN special session would likely be more effective than criticizing its non accession to the test ban at a specially convened CTBT conference or through the NPT regime, from which India and Pakistan are excluded as non members.

All things considered, the U.S. opposition to debating a new international disarmament agenda for the coming decade seems ill considered. The United States should withdraw its opposition to holding a special session in 1999 and engage positively in UN discussions scheduled for April and May that will determine the scope and agenda for the session. The fourth UN Special Session on Disarmament, if carefully planned for and utilized wisely by UN member states, can codify new thinking on arms control and disarmament issues and contribute to constructive solutions. Surely the United States would welcome that.

Rebecca Johnson is director of the Disarmament Intelligence Review in London.

1996 ACT Index




Ahearne, John F., John P. Holdren, Richard L. Garwin, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, John J. Taylor and Matthew Bunn:
"Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger," Nov./Dec., pp.3 9.


Boulden, Laurie H.:
"India May Build Turnkey' Chemical Plant in Iran," Jul., p.26; "Pentagon Says Some U.S. Troops in Gulf May Have Been Exposed to CW Agents," Jul., p.26; "CIA, DIA Provide New Details on CW, BW Programs in Iran and Russia," Aug., pp.32 33.


Bunn, George:
"Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non Use Pledges?" May/Jun., pp.7 10. Bunn, George and John B. Rhinelander, "U.S. Should Lead Effort to Enforce Legal Norm Against Testing," Oct., p.30 (Letter to the editor).


Bunn, Matthew, John P. Holdren, John F. Ahearne, Richard L. Garwin, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky and John J. Taylor:
"Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger," Nov./Dec., pp.3 9.
Carnahan, Burrus M.:

"World Court Delivers Opinion On Legality of Nuclear Weapons Use," Jul., p.24.


Cerniello, Craig:

"India Links Timebound' Disarmament To CTB Support as CD Talks Resume," Feb., p.22; "START II Resolution of Ratification: Resolution Conditions, Declarations Highlight Senate Concerns," Feb., p.30; "Senate Finally Approves START II, Prospects for Duma Vote Uncertain," Feb., pp.20,27; "CD Ends First Session of 1996 With No Progress on CTB Issues," Mar., p.21; "Clinton BMD Program Reorientation Opens Debate On Defense Priorities," Mar., p.22; "Clinton Yeltsin Summit in Moscow Yields Gains On Arms Control Issues," Apr., p.20; "G 7, Russia Make Modest Progress During Nuclear Summit in Moscow," Apr., pp.19,25; "CD Nears Deadline on CTBT, Entry Into Force Still Unresolved," May/Jun., pp.17,24; "Push for National Missile Defense Stalled by CBO Report on Costs," May/Jun., pp.23,27; "Ukraine Completes Final Transfer Of Nuclear Warheads to Russia," May/Jun., p.22; "CD Weighs Draft CTB Treaty; U.S., Russia to Push for Signature," Jul., pp.18,27; "Senate Approves Nunn Lugar II' to Counter Domestic WMD Threats," Jul., pp.23,28; "U.S., Russia Near Agreement On Lower Velocity TMD Systems," Jul., pp.19,27; "Dole, Republican Platform Criticize Clinton Arms Control Policies," Aug., p.32; "India Blocks Consensus on CTB, Treaty May Still Go to UN," Aug., p.31; "CTB Treaty Opened for Signature After Approval by United Nations," Sep., pp.21,23; "France, Britain Retire Aging Nuclear Weapon Systems," Sep., p.22; "CIA Report Renews Concerns Over Russian Nuclear Control," Oct., p.22; "Perry Urges Russian Lawmakers to Ratify START II, Move to START III," Oct., pp.19,27; "U.S., Russia Cancel Signing of TMD Demarcation' Agreement," Oct., p.20; "Belarus Completes Transfer of Nuclear Warheads to Russia," Nov./Dec., p.18; "Retired Generals Reignite Debate Over Abolition of Nuclear Weapons," Nov./Dec., p.14; "U.S., Russia Amend HEU Deal, Accelerating Implementation Pace," Nov./Dec., p.16; "U.S. Withholds Approval for Computer Exports to Russia," Nov./Dec., p.17. Cerniello, Craig and Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., "The CTB Treaty: A Historic Opportunity to Strengthen the Non Proliferation Regime," Aug., pp.15 16.


Cirincione, Joseph:

"The Signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Sep., pp.8 14 (ACA briefing).


Clinton, Bill:

"ACA Candidates' Forum: The Questions in 1996," Sep., pp.3 7. Davis, Zachary S.: "The Spread of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones: Building a New Nuclear Bargain," Feb., pp.15 19.


Dhanapala, Jayantha:

"Fulfilling the Promise of the NPT: The CTBT and Beyond," May/Jun., pp.3 6 (June 12 address before ACA annual dinner).


Diamond, Howard:

"DOE Resumes Program to Accept Spent Fuel From Foreign Reactors," Oct., p.23; "U.S. Moving Toward Implementation of 1985 Sino U.S. Nuclear Accord," Nov./Dec., p.19.


Garwin, Richard L.:

"The Signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Sep., pp.8 14 (ACA briefing). Garwin, Richard L., John P. Holdren, John F. Ahearne, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, John J. Taylor and Matthew Bunn: "Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger," Nov./Dec., pp.3 9.


Gill, Bates and Matthew Stephenson:

"Search for Common Ground: Breaking the Sino U.S. Non Proliferation Stalemate," Sep., pp.15 20.


Goose, Stephen D.:

"In Pursuit of a Global Ban On Landmines: New Landmine Protocol Is Vital Step Toward Ban," Jul., pp.9,14 17.


Graham, Thomas, Jr.:

"The CFE Treaty Review Conference: Strengthening the Cornerstone' of European Security," Apr., pp.3 6 (Interview).


Holdren, John P.:

"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft In the Former Soviet Union," Mar., pp.14 20. Holdren, John P., John F. Ahearne, Richard L. Garwin, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, John J. Taylor and Matthew Bunn: "Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger," Nov./Dec., pp.3 9.


Holum, John D.:

"The Administration's Arms Control Agenda: Gaining Ground Under Fire," Feb., pp.3 6 (March 8 address before ACA annual luncheon).


Isaacs, John:

"The Signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Sep., pp.8 14 (ACA briefing); "Arms Control and the 105th Congress," Nov./Dec., pp.10 13.


Johnson, Rebecca:

"Endgame Issues in Geneva: Can the CD Deliver the CTBT in 1996?" Apr., pp.12 18; "The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hanging in the Balance," Jul., pp.3 8.


Karp, Aaron:

"The New Politics of Missile Proliferation," Oct., pp.10 14.


Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr.:

"A Step Toward Sanity," Feb., p.2; "To CTB Or Not to CTB?" Mar., p.2; "U.S. Arms Control Policy: Progress and Prospects," Mar., pp.7 13 (ACA briefing); "Nuclear Policy in Disarray," Apr., p.2; "CTBT: The Best vs. the Good," May/Jun., p.2; "CTB: Too Soon to Declare Victory," Aug., p.2; "CWC: Election Year Casualty?" Sep., p.2; "The Signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Sep., pp.8 14 (ACA briefing); "START III Now," Oct., p.2; "Your Move, Mr. President," Nov./Dec., p.2. Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr. and Craig Cerniello, "The CTB Treaty: A Historic Opportunity to Strengthen the Non Proliferation Regime," Aug., pp.15 16.


Lacey, Edward J.:

"The UNSCOM Experience: Implications for U.S. Arms Control Policy," Aug., pp.9 14.


Leklem, Eric J.:

"BWC Review Conference Ends Without Compliance Protocol," Nov./Dec., p.16.


Matheson, Michael J.:

"In Pursuit of a Global Ban On Landmines: New Landmine Protocol Is Vital Step Toward Ban," Jul., pp.9 13.


Medeiros, Evan S.:

"KEDO, UNSCOM Financial Woes May Undermine Watchdog' Efforts," Feb., p.24; "U.S. Considers Sanctions on China For Weapons, Technology Transfers," Feb., pp.21,25; "U.S., North Korea May Hold Talks On North's Missile Sales, MTCR Status," Feb., p.25; "U.S., Russia Enhance Nuclear Security Cooperation During Washington Talks," Feb., p.23; "Senate Hearings Focus Spotlight On Real' Threat of Nuclear Smuggling," Mar., p.24; "U.S. EURATOM Nuclear Accord Enters Into Force, Trade Resumes," Mar., pp.25,28; "African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Signed By 43 Countries," Apr., pp.22,25; "Pentagon Releases Annual Report On Global Proliferation Threats," Apr., p.24; "China Offers U.S. New Pledge On Nuclear Exports, Avoids Sanctions," May/Jun., p.19; "Russian Iranian Reactor Contract Restarts Work at Bushehr Complex," May/Jun., p.25; "U.S. Warns Russia, Ukraine on Missile Related Sales to China," May/Jun., p.24; "Egypt Received Scud Missile Parts From North Korea, Report Says," Jul., p.25; "Gore Chernomyrdin Commission Expands Nuclear Security Cooperation," Jul., pp.25,29; "Iraq Denies UNSCOM Access to Suspect Sites Despite Pledge," Jul., p.21; "KEDO, North Korea Sign Protocols As Funding Crisis Continues," Jul., p.22.


Mendelsohn, Jack:

"U.S. Arms Control Policy: Progress and Prospects," Mar., pp.7 13 (ACA briefing); "The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review," Apr., pp.7 11; "Kilometers Apart on Missile Defense," Jul., p.2; "START II and Beyond," Oct., pp.3 9.


Mendlovitz, Saul and Peter Weiss:

"Judging the Illegality of Nuclear Weapons: Arms Control Moves To the World Court," Feb., pp.10 14; "Nuclear Weapons and the World Court," Mar., p.27 (Response to letter to the editor).


Moodie, Michael:

"Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention: Past Time for Action," Feb., pp.3 9.


Murray, Lori Esposito:

"U.S. Arms Control Policy: Progress and Prospects," Mar., pp.7 13 (ACA briefing).


O'Hanlon, Michael:

"Arms Control and Military Stability in the Balkans," Aug., pp.3 8.


Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., John P. Holdren, John F. Ahearne, Richard L. Garwin, John J. Taylor and Matthew Bunn:

"Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger," Nov./Dec., pp.3 9.


Parachini, John:

"Landmine Free Zones Will Advance Goal of Global Ban," Aug., p.34 (Letter to the editor).


Perkovich, George:

"India's Nuclear Weapons Debate: Unlocking the Door to the CTBT," May/Jun., pp.11 16.


Perry, William:

"Taking the START II Debate to Moscow," Oct., pp.15 18 (October 17 speech to Russian Duma members).


Pfeiffer, Tom:

"CWC Opponents Succeed in Delaying Senate Vote," Sep., pp.22 23; "Hungary Sets Clock Ticking for CWC Entry Into Force," Oct., p.21.


Pike, John:

"U.S. Arms Control Policy: Progress and Prospects," Mar., pp.7 13 (ACA briefing).


Podlich, Heather:

"Senate Panel Completes Hearings On Chemical Weapons Convention," Mar., p.23; "Senate Foreign Relations Committee Passes CWC Ratification Resolution," Apr., p.21; "Pentagon Says Libya Has Stopped Construction at Suspected CW Plant," May/Jun., p.26.


Rhinelander, John B.:

"Nuclear Weapons and the World Court: ICJ Should Adopt Political Question Doctrine," Mar., pp.26,27. Rhinelander, John B. and George Bunn, "U.S. Should Lead Effort to Enforce Legal Norm Against Testing," Oct., p.30 (Letter to the editor).


Stephenson, Matthew and Bates Gill:

"Search for Common Ground: Breaking the Sino U.S. Non Proliferation Stalemate," Sep., pp.15 20.


Stone, Jeremy:

"Nuclear Weapons and the World Court: Court Should Consider Ban On First Use," Mar., p.26 (Letter to the editor).


Taylor, John J., John P. Holdren, John F. Ahearne, Richard L. Garwin, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky and Matthew Bunn:

"Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger," Nov./Dec., pp.3 9.


van der Vink, Gregory E.:

"The Signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Sep., pp.8 14 (ACA briefing).


Walkling, Sarah:

"Balkan Arms Control Efforts Focus On Transparency, Arms Limitations," Feb., p.26; "CCW Negotiators Make Headway On Strengthening Of Landmine Protocol," Feb., p.27; "Wassenaar Regime Plenary Meeting Adjourns Following Disagreements," Apr., p.23; "CCW Negotiators Set New Limits On Landmine Use, Transfer," May/Jun., pp.20,21,27; "CFE Treaty Review Completed, Parties Agree on Flank Resolution," May/Jun., pp.18,30; "Clinton Landmine Initiative Draws Criticism," May/Jun., p.20; "OAS Seeks Ban On Landmines For Hemisphere," May/Jun., p.21; "Balkan War Parties Sign CFE Style Accord Limiting Offensive Arms," Jul., pp.20,27; "Wassenaar Members Resolve Most Differences During July Plenary," Jul., pp.23,28; "U.S. Arms Sales Continue Decline, Russia Top Exporter in 1995," Aug., p.33; "NATO Paper Outlines Approach to CFE Treaty Modernization,'" Oct., p.25; "Pro Landmine Ban States Meet in Ottawa, Set Strategy for Global Effort," Oct., p.21; "United States Regains No. 1 Position on UN Conventional Arms Register," Oct., p.24; "OSCE Summit Stresses Cooperation, CFE States Set Out Adoption Plan," Nov./Dec., p.21; "UN Approves Resolution Calling for Mine Ban As Soon As Possible,'" Nov./Dec., p.20.


Ware, Alyn:

"New Zealand SPNFZ Policy Anti Nuclear, Not Anti American," Apr., p.27 (Letter to the editor).


Weiss, Peter and Saul Mendlovitz:

"Judging the Illegality of Nuclear Weapons: Arms Control Moves To the World Court," Feb., pp.10 14; "Nuclear Weapons and the World Court," Mar., p.27 (Response to letter to the editor).




"U.S. Arms Control Policy: Progress and Prospects," with Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Jack Mendelsohn, John Pike and Lori Esposito Murray, Mar., pp.7 13.

"The Signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," with Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Joseph Cirincione, Richard L. Garwin, Gregory E. van der Vink and John Isaacs.




  • START II Resolution of Ratification of January 26, plus summary of conditions and declarations, Feb., pp.30 33.


  • Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers Statement of Principles, Apr., pp.28 29.
  • Chairman's Draft Text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and executive summary, Aug., pp. 17 30.


  • Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Executive summary), Aug., pp.35 37.


  • START II speech by William Perry before members of the Russian Duma, October 17, Oct., pp.15 18.


  • Joint Statement on Reduction of Nuclear Weapons Arsenals: Declining Utility, Continuing Risks, by Generals Andrew J. Goodpaster and Lee Butler, Nov./Dec., p.15.


  • Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals, Nov./Dec., pp.15,18.


  • Document Adopted by CFE Treaty Parties on the Scope and Parameters of Treaty Modernization, Nov./Dec., pp.22 23.




  • "U.S. Unitary and Binary Chemical Stockpiles," Feb., p.34.


  • "Theater Ballistic Missile Systems and Capabilities," Mar., pp.29 30.


  • "U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces," Apr., p.30.


  • "U.S. 1995 Data for the UN Conventional Arms Register," May/Jun., pp. 28 29.


  • "Current and Past Producers and Exporters of Anti Personnel Landmines," Jul., pp.32 33.


  • "Fifty One Years of Nuclear Testing: The Final Tally?" Aug., p.38.


  • "U.S. Security Assistance to the Former Soviet Union," Sep., pp.25 26.


  • "U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Past, Present and Projected," Oct., pp.28 29.


  • "1995 UN Conventional Arms Register," Nov./Dec., pp.25 26.



Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.: Apr., pp.3 6.



ABM Treaty: Helms seeks U.S. withdrawal, Feb., p.29; U.S. Russian demarcation talks, Jul., p.2; U.S., Russia near TMD agreement, Jul., pp.19,27; U.S., Russia reaffirm TMD agreement, Sep., p.24; U.S., Russia cancel signing ceremony, Oct., p.20. (See also BMD, NMD, TMD, U.S. Russian Relations.)

African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANWFZ): Signed by 43 countries, Apr., pp.22,25. (See also NWFZs, U.S. Nuclear Use Policy.)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA): Report on arms expenditures and transfers, Jul., p.31.

Balkans: Arms control efforts, Feb., p.26; Parties sign CFE style agreement, Jul., pp.20,27; Arms control and military stability, Aug., pp.3 8.

Ballistic Missiles: Theater ballistic missile systems and capabilities, Mar., pp.29 30 (Factfile); Politics of proliferation, Oct., pp.10 14. (See also China, Egypt, India, MTCR, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea.)

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): Administration's reorientation of program positive step, Feb., p.2; Reorientations opens debate on defense priorities, Mar., p.22. (See also NMD, TMD, U.S. Arms Control Policy, U.S. Russian Relations.)

Belarus: Transfer of warheads, Nov./Dec., p.18. (See also START I.)

Biological Weapons: U.S. assessment of programs in Russia and Iran, Aug., pp.32 33. (See also BWC, Iraq.)

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): Fourth review conference, Nov./Dec., p.16. (See also Biological Weapons.)

Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra Commission): Final report executive summary, Aug., pp.35 37 (Document). (See also Nuclear Abolition.)

Chemical Weapons: U.S. stockpiles of unitary and binary weapons, Feb., p.34 (Factfile); Pentagon report on Libyan plant, May/Jun., p.26; Pentagon addresses Gulf War exposure, Jul., p.26; U.S. assessment of programs in Russia and Iran, Aug., pp.32 33. (See also CWC, India, Iran, Libya.)

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): Analysis of treaty, prospects for implementation, Feb., pp.3 9; Senate panel completes hearings, Mar., p.23; Senate Foreign Relations Committee passes CWC ratification resolution, Apr., p.21; Senate sets deadline for CWC vote, Jul., p.30; Senate's failure to act may reflect election year politics, Sep., p.2; Opponents succeed in delaying Senate vote, Sep., pp.22 23; Hungary sets implementation clock ticking, Oct., p.21. (See also U.S. Arms Control Policy.)

China: U.S. considers sanctions for weapons, technology transfers, Feb., pp.21,25; Offers U.S. new pledges on nuclear exports, May/Jun., p.19; Conducts 44th nuclear test, May/Jun., p.30; U.S. clears sale to Chinese ring magnet producer, Jul., p.30; Sino U.S. non proliferation relations, Sep., pp.15 20; U.S. moves toward implementing 1985 Sino U.S. nuclear accord, Nov./Dec., p.19. (See also Ballistic Missiles, CD, CTBT, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Non Proliferation Policy.)

Clinton, Bill: Signs FY96 defense authorization bill, Feb., p.29; Clinton Yeltsin Moscow summit, Apr., p.20; Approves arms for Pakistan, Apr., p.26; Landmine initiative draws criticism, May/Jun., p.20; Responses to ACA candidates' forum questionnaire, Sep., pp.3 7; Signs FY97 defense authorization bill, Sep., p.24; Needs to set arms control agenda in second term, Nov./Dec., p.2. (See also U.S. Russian Relations.)

Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers: Statement of principles, Apr., pp.28 29 (Document).

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): India links timebound disarmament to support, Feb., p.22; Key issues remain unresolved, Mar., p.2; CD ends first session with no progress, Mar., p.21; Prospects for second CD session, Apr., pp.12 18; U.S. should accept chairman's text, May/Jun., p.2; Assessment of remaining issues, May/Jun., pp.3 6; Assessment of second CD session, Jul., pp.3 8; CD considers draft treaty; Jul., pp.18,27; Work remains after signing, Aug., p.2; Analysis and summary of chairman's draft text, Aug., pp.15 18; Chairman's draft, Aug., pp.19 30 (Document); India blocks concensus on treaty, Aug., p.31; Analysis of signing, Sep., pp.8 14; Opened for signature, Sep., pp.21,23; Signature update, Oct., p.26; Signed by 137 states, Nov./Dec., p.24. (See also CD, NPT, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Arms Control Policy, U.S. Non Proliferation Policy.)

Conference on Disarmament (CD): India links timebound disarmament to CTBT support, Feb., p.22; First session ends with no progress on CTBT, Mar., p.21; Prospects for second session, Apr., pp.12 18; CTBT negotiating deadline nears, May/Jun., pp.17,24; Assessment of second CD session, Jul., pp.3 8; Considers draft treaty, Jul., pp.18,27; India blocks concensus, Aug., p.31. (See also CTBT.)

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW): Progress made on strengthening landmine protocol, Feb., p.27; Review conference sets new landmine limits, May/Jun., pp.20,21,27; Review conference positive step, Jul., pp.9 13; Conference a failure, Jul., pp.9,14 17. (See also Landmines.)

Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS): Enters into force, Oct., p.27.

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty: Assessment of review conference, Apr., pp.3 6 (Interview with Thomas Graham, Jr.); Analysis of treaty and review conference, Apr., pp.7 11; Review conference completed, May/Jun., pp.18 30; NATO paper outlines approach to treaty modernization, Oct., p.25; Parties agree to adoption process, Nov./Dec., p.21. (See NATO, Russia, U.S. Russian Relations.)

Conventional Arms Transfers: GAO report says offsets increasing, Apr., p.27; Senate rejects arms sales code of conduct, Jul., p.31; ACDA reports on expenditures, transfers, Jul., p.31; U.S. sales continue decline, Aug., p.33; U.S. announces new sales to Taiwan, Sep., p.24; U.S. helicopter transfer to Colombia, Sep., p.24; International code of conduct gains support, Oct., pp.26 27; Peru acquires Belarus MiGs, Nov./Dec., p.24. (See also Pakistan, UN Conventional Arms Register, U.S. Arms Control Policy.)

Dole, Robert: Criticizes administration's arms control policies, Aug., p.32.

Egypt: Receives Scud missile parts from North Korea, Jul., p.25.

European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM): Agreement with U.S. enters into force, Mar., p.25.

Export Controls: U.S. withholds approval for computer exports, Nov./Dec., p.17. (See also China, MTCR, U.S. Non Proliferation Policy, Wassenaar Arrangement.)

France: Chirac says nuclear testing program finished, Feb., p.29; Signs SPNWFZ protocol, Mar., p.28; Nuclear cooperation agreement reached with U.S., Jul., p.31; Retires nuclear weapons systems, Sep., p.22. (See also Nuclear Testing.)

Germany: Garching reactor project proceeds, Feb., p.29.

Gore Chernomyrdin Commission: Results of sixth meeting, Feb., p.23; Results of seventh meeting, Jul., pp.25,29. (See also U.S. Russian Relations)

India: Prithvi missile tested, Feb., p.29; Domestic debate on nuclear weapons policy, May/Jun., pp.11 16; May build turnkey chemical plant in Iran, Jul., p.26. (See also Ballistic Missiles, CD, CTBT, Nuclear Testing.)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Says Iraq has advanced centrifuge design, Feb., p.29.

International Court of Justice (ICJ): Analysis of ruling on nuclear weapons, Feb., pp.10 14; Court should consider ban on first use, Mar., p.26 (Letter to the editor); Court should adopt political question doctrine, Mar., pp.26 27 (Letter to the editor); Delivers opinion, Jul., p.24.

Iran: Nuclear cooperation with Russia, May/Jun., p.25; Chemical plant may be built by India, Jul., p.26; U.S. assessment of biological and chemical weapons programs, Aug., pp.32 33.

Iraq: Ekeus says may possess BW armed missiles, Mar., p.28; Denies UNSCOM access to sites, Jul., p.21; Ekeus says still hiding ballistic missiles, Oct., p.26; Accepts oil deal, Nov./Dec., p.24. (See also Ballistic Missiles, IAEA, UNSCOM.)

Israel: Expands TMD cooperation with U.S., Apr., p.26.

Kazakhstan: (See also START I.)

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO): Financial troubles, Feb., p.24; Signs protocols with North Korea, Jul., p.22. (See also North Korea.)

Landmines: CCW protocol focus of negotiations, Feb., p.27; Shalikashvili favor ban on anti personnel mines, Mar., p.28; Clinton initiative draws criticism, May/Jun., p.20; CCW review conference sets new limits, May/Jun., pp.20,21,27; OAS seeks hemispheric ban, May/Jun., p.21; Current and past producers and exporters of anti personnel mines, Jul., pp.32 34 (Factfile); Value of landmine free zones, Aug., p.34 (Letter to the editor); Ottawa strategy conference, Oct., p.21; UN approves ban resolution, Nov./Dec., p.20. (See also CCW.)

Libya: Pentagon report on chemical weapons plant, May/Jun., p.26.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): U.S. holds talks with North Korea on membership, Feb., p.25. (See also Ballistic Missiles.)

National Missile Defense (NMD): CBO reports stalls Republican push, May/Jun., pp.23,27; Nunn offers alternative bill, Jul., p.30.

NATO: Offers approach to CFE Treaty modernization, Oct., p.25. (See also CFE Treaty, Russia, U.S. Arms Control Policy, U.S. Russian Relations.)

North Korea: Holds talks with U.S. on missile transfers, MTCR status, Feb., p.25; Canning of fuel rods begins, Apr., p.26; Begins missile talks with U.S., Apr., pp.26 27; Signs protocols with KEDO, Jul., p.22; Sends Egypt Scud missile parts, Jul., p.25. (See also Ballistic Missiles, KEDO.)

Nuclear Abolition: Retired generals reignite debate, Nov./Dec., p.14; Joint Statement on Reduction of Nuclear Weapons Arsenals: Declining Utility, Continuing Risks by Generals Andrew J. Goodpaster and Lee Butler, Nov./Dec., p.15 (Document); Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals, Nov./Dec., pp.15,18 (Document). (See also Canberra Commission.) Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A): DOE completes upgrades in Uzbekistan, Oct., p.26. (See also Gore Chernomyrdin Commission, Nuclear Safety and Security Summit.)

Nuclear Non Proliferation: Reducing the threat of nuclear theft from the former Soviet Union, Mar., pp.14 20; Senate hearings focus on nuclear smuggling, Mar., p.24. (See also KEDO, Nuclear Abolition, Nuclear MPC&A, Plutonium, Russia, UNSCOM, U.S. Non Proliferation Policy.)

Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Assessment of review and extension conference, May/Jun., pp.3 6. (See also CTBT.)

Nuclear Safety and Security Summit: G 7 states, Russia make progress, Apr., pp.19,25.

Nuclear Testing: Chirac says testing program finished, Feb., p.29; China conducts 44th test, May/Jun., p.30; DOE postpones subcritical tests, Jul., pp.30 31; Nuclear weapon states totals, Aug., p.38 (Factfile); U.S. should lead effort to enforce legal norm against testing, Oct., p.30 (Letter to the editor). (See also CD, China, CTBT, France.)

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs): Factors and implications of wider application, Feb., pp.15 19. (See also ANWFZ, SPNWFZ, U.S. Nuclear Use Policy.)

Nunn Lugar II: Senate approves, Jul., pp.23,28.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): Lisbon summit, Nov./Dec., p.21.

Organization of American States (OAS): Landmine ban, May/Jun., p.21. Pakistan: Clinton approves release of arms, Apr., p.26; U.S. government at odds over status of M 11 missiles, Jul., p.30.

Perry, William: October 17 speech to Russian Duma members, Oct., pp.15 18 (Document).

Plutonium: Case for dual track approach to disposition of excess weapons plutonium, Nov./Dec., pp.3 9.

Russia: Prospects for START II ratification, Feb., pp.20,27; Reducing the threat of nuclear theft, Mar., pp.14 20; Strategic nuclear forces under START I, Apr., p.30 (Factfile); Nuclear cooperation with Iran, May/Jun., p.25; U.S. assessment of biological and chemical weapons programs, Aug., pp.32 33; CIA report on nuclear control, Oct., p.22; Past, present and projected nuclear forces, Oct., pp.28 29 (Factfile). (See also Belarus, CD, CFE Treaty, Conventional Arms Transfers, CTBT, Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Nuclear Testing, START I, START II, Ukraine, U.S. Russian Relations.)

South Korea: Continues missile talks with U.S., Mar., p.28. (See also Ballistic Missiles, KEDO, North Korea.)

South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SPNWFZ): U.S., Britain and France sign protocols, Mar., p.28; New Zealand policy not Anti American, Apr., p.27 (Letter to the editor). (See also NWFZs, U.S. Nuclear Use Policy.)

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I: U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces, Apr., p.30 (Factfile). (See also START II.)

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II: Senate approves resolution of ratification, prospects for Russian ratification, Feb., pp.20,27; Senate resolution of ratification, Feb., pp.31 33 (Document); Analysis of resolution, Feb., p.30; U.S. START III proposal could help rescue START II, Oct., p.2; START II and beyond, Oct., pp.3 9; Perry urges Duma members to ratify, Oct., pp.19,27. (See also William Perry, Russia, START I, U.S. Arms Control Policy, U.S. Nuclear Weapons.)

Theater Missile Defense (TMD): Administration's reorientation of program positive step, Feb., p.2; U.S., Israel expand cooperation, Apr., p.26; U.S., Germany and Italy move forward on MEADS, Apr., p.26; U.S. Russian demarcation talks, Jul., p.2; U.S., Russia near TMD agreement, Jul., pp.19,27; Russia reaffirm TMD agreement, Sep., p.24; U.S., Russia cancel signing ceremony, Oct., p.20. (See also ABM Treaty, BMD.)

Ukraine: Completes transfer of nuclear warheads, May/Jun., p.22; U.S. issues warning on missile related sales to China, May/Jun., p.24. (See also Russia, START I.)

UN Conventional Arms Register: U.S. data for 1995, May/Jun., pp.28 29 (Factfile); Data released for 1995, Oct., p.24; 1995 data, Nov./Dec., pp.25 26 (Factfile).

UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM): Financial troubles, Feb., p.24; Ekeus says Iraq may possess BW armed missiles, Mar., p.28; Denied access by Iraq, Jul., p.21; Lessons learned and impact on U.S. policy, Aug., pp.9 14; Ekeus says Iraq still hiding missiles, Oct., p.26. (See also Iraq.)

United Kingdom: Signs SPNWFZ protocol, Mar., p.28; Retires nuclear weapons systems, Sep., p.22. (See also Nuclear Testing.)

United Nations: Approves landmine ban resolution, Nov./Dec., p.20. (See also CD, CTBT. UN Conventional Arms Register, UNSCOM.)

U.S. Arms Control Policy: Address by John D. Holum, Mar., pp.3 5; Status and prospects, Mar., pp.6 13 (ACA briefing); Lessons learned from UNSCOM experience, Aug., pp.9 14; Criticized by Dole, Republican platform, Aug., p.32. (See also Bill Clinton, BMD, Conventional Arms Transfers, NMD, Nuclear Abolition, Plutonium, TMD, START I, START II, U.S. Congress, U.S. Non Proliferation Policy, U.S. Nuclear Use Policy, U.S. Russian Relations.)

U.S. Congress: Senate approves START II resolution of ratification, Feb., pp.20,27; Senate panel completes CWC hearings, Mar., p.23; Senate hearings on nuclear smuggling, Mar., p.24; Senate Foreign Relations Committee passes CWC ratification resolution, Apr., p.21; Senate approve Nunn Lugar II, Jul., pp.23,28; Senate sets deadline for CWC vote, Jul., p.30; Senate rejects arms sales code of conduct, Jul., p.31; Senate passes FY97 defense authorization bill, Jul., p.31; Senate's failure to act on CWC may reflect election year politics, Sep., p.2; Opponents succeed in delaying Senate vote on CWC, Sep., pp.22 23; Arms control and the 105th Congress, Nov./Dec., pp.10 13.

U.S. Non Proliferation Policy: Administration considers sanctions on China, Feb., pp.21,25; U.S. North Korean talks on North's missile transfers, MTCR status, Feb., p.25; Signs SPNWFZ protocol, Mar., p.28; U.S. South Korean missile talks continue, Mar., p.28; Pentagon releases report on global threats, Apr., p.24; Missile talks with North Korea begin, Apr., pp.26 27; U.S. warns Russia, Ukraine on missile related sales to China, May/Jun., p.24; Sale cleared for Chinese ring magnet producer, Jul., p.30; U.S. government at odds over status of M 11 missiles, Jul., p.30; Lessons learned from UNSCOM experience, Aug., pp.9 14; Sino U.S. non proliferation relations, Sep., pp.15 20; DOE resumes program to accept spent fuel from foreign reactors, Oct., p.23; Case for dual track approach to disposition of excess weapons plutonium, Nov./Dec., pp.3 9; U.S., Russia amend HEU deal, Nov./Dec., p.16; U.S. moves toward implementing 1985 Sino U.S. nuclear accord, Nov./Dec., p.19; U.S. withholds approval for computer exports, Nov./Dec., p.17. (See also CD, China, CNS, CTBT, CWC, EURATOM, Gore Chernomyrdin Commission, Iran, KEDO, Libya, North Korea, Nuclear Abolition, Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, NWFZs, Pakistan, South Korea, SPNWFZ, UNSCOM, U.S. Arms Control Policy, U.S. Nuclear Use Policy, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Security Assistance, Wassenaar Arrangement.)

U.S. Nuclear Use Policy: Criticism of administration's policy on negative security assurances, Apr., p.2; Analysis of U.S. policy, May/Jun., pp.7 10. (See also ANWFZ, NWFZs, SPNWFZ.)

U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Strategic nuclear forces under START I, Apr., p.30 (Factfile); DOE postpones subcritical tests, Jul., pp.30 31; Cooperation agreement reached with France, Jul., p.31; Past, present and projected nuclear forces, Oct., pp.28 29 (Factfile); DOE proposes downsized weapons complex, Nov./Dec., p.24. (See also Nuclear Testing, Plutonium, U.S. Non Proliferation Policy, WIPP.)

U.S. Russian Relations: Clinton Yeltsin summit, Apr., p.20; Strategic nuclear forces under START I, Apr., p.30 (Factfile); U.S. issues warning on missile related sales to China, May/Jun., p.24; Past, present and projected nuclear forces, Oct., pp.28 29 (Factfile); U.S., Russia amend HEU deal, Nov./Dec., p.16; U.S. withholds approval for computer exports, Nov./Dec., p.17. (See also ABM Treaty, CFE Treaty, Gore Chernomyrdin Commission, NATO, Plutonium, TMD, U.S. Arms Control Policy, Wassenaar Arrangement.)

U.S. Security Assistance: DOD funding to former Soviet Union through September 1996, Sep., pp.25 26 (Factfile). (See also Nunn Lugar II.)

Wassenaar Arrangement: First plenary meeting highlights disagreements, Apr., p.23; Resumed plenary resolves most differences, Jul., pp.23,28. (See also Export Controls.)

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): NRC panel endorses use, Oct., p.26.


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