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"ACA's journal, Arms Control Today, remains the best in the market. Well focused. Solidly researched. Prudent."

– Hans Blix
Former IAEA Director-General
Missile Proliferation

U.S., North Korea Meet for Missile Discussions

More than a year after the United States and North Korea initiated talks aimed at limiting Pyongyang's missile development programs and missile exports, U.S. and North Korean officials held a second round of talks June 11-13 in New York. The talks produced no agreements, but a senior administration official described the talks as businesslike, and said "they provide a good basis for further discussions," and possibly additional talks this summer. North Korea has been developing medium-range (about 1,000 kilometer) missiles that would allow it to strike all of South Korea and nearly all of Japan, and has sold Syria and Iran improved Scud missiles capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads.

The two sides first met to discuss the issue in April 1996, however, intervening events such as the submarine incident of September 1996 kept additional rounds of talks from being scheduled. The United States has linked North Korean performance on the missile issue with the improved political and economic relations mandated by the 1994 U.S.North Korean Agreed Framework that froze North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

The U.S. delegation was led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation Robert Einhorn; his North Korean counterpart was Li Hyongchol, director of American affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A senior administration official said the U.S. goal was to get Pyongyang to practice restraint in its missile activities, but did not comment on specific options being discussed. Topics in the first round of talks included a request by Pyongyang for compensation for forgone missile sales, which was denied by the United States. Also discussed in April was the possibility of North Korea joining the Missile Technology Control Regime, a voluntary arrangement of nations who have adopted a common policy proscribing the sale of ballistic missiles and their components and technology, for systems capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers or more or for any system (other than manned aircraft) intended to carry weapons of mass destruction.

UNSCOM Head Says Iraq Has 'Operational' Missile Force


Howard Diamond

IRAQ HAS MANAGED to retain an operational force of ballistic missiles in violation of UN prohibitions against possessing such weapons with ranges above 150 kilometers, according to Rolf Ekeus, head of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNSCOM has long suspected Iraq of possessing missile capabilities beyond those permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. Ekeus' assessment, offered during a January 29 luncheon speech sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, indicates that Baghdad may have an operational force of between 18 and 25 Scud or Scud variant missiles.

"Every piece of what is necessary to constitute an operation[sic] force is available in Iraq," Ekeus said, including transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles, rocket fuel and "an organization to operate these missiles." The missiles, whose range of up to 650 kilometers would allow Iraq to reach targets in Israel and Iran, are of particular concern because of Iraq's past use of ballistic missiles against neighboring countries and the missiles' potential to deliver weapons of mass destruction. According to Ekeus, Iraq has used a variety of deceptive methods used to hide the missiles and related equipment.

During the past several months, Ekeus said Baghdad has become increasingly uncooperative in response to UNSCOM's ongoing effort to establish a "material balance" of Iraq's past ballistic missile programs. In November 1996, Iraq refused to permit UNSCOM to take 150 destroyed rocket engines, which Baghdad claims it destroyed and buried in the summer of 1991, to the United States for metallurgical analysis by a Department of Defense laboratory. UNSCOM inspectors want to confirm whether the engine metal matches that of the old Soviet produced rocket motors, because it believes Iraq destroyed inferior, indigenously produced engines instead of operational Soviet produced motors.

Under Resolution 687, Iraq is permitted to possess ballistic missiles with ranges under 150 kilometers, but the Gulf War cease fire resolution mandates destruction of Iraq's longer range Scud and Scud variant missiles. In April 1991, Iraq gave 48 missiles to UNSCOM for destruction and claimed to have destoyed and buried 85 others without UNSCOM supervision. While the sites identified by Iraq did appear to hold the declared number of destroyed missiles, further investigation by UNSCOM showed that Iraq had, in some cases, simply transferred "buried" missiles from one site to another so they would be double counted. UNSCOM also found that some of the sites did not actually contain operational missiles systems, but training missiles. Iraq is also believed to have removed and stored critical missile components, such as turbo pumps, which they are unable to produce domestically.

Iraq's refusal to comply with the UN resolutions persists even in the face of economic sanctions, which have cost Iraq more than $100 billion in lost oil revenue. Ekeus claims that Iraqi obstruction of UNSCOM's mission has gotten worse as Baghdad perceives Security Council support for UNSCOM to be waning. As a case in point, Ekeus cited Security Council inaction after the Iraqi refusal to allow analysis of the destroyed rocket motors. Instead of approving a resolution demanding Iraqi compliance, the Security Council issued a statement that "deplores" Iraq's non cooperation, and notes "that such action complicates the implementation by the Special Commission of its mandate." The result, according to Ekeus, is that UNSCOM is now facing "serious obstructions" by Iraq for simple document requests and for the removal from the country of chemical munitions for analysis.

Panel Upholds NIE Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to U.S.


Craig Cerniello

ON JANUARY 23, the CIA released the unclassified version of the independent panel review of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95 19—the controversial assessment that concluded that no countries, other than the declared nuclear weapon states, will develop a ballistic missile capable of threatening the contiguous 48 states or Canada in the next 15 years. The panel, headed by former CIA Director Robert Gates, rejected the claim made by congressional conservatives that NIE 95 19 was politically influenced by the Clinton administration in order to downplay the longer range missile threat to U.S. territory. Although acknowledging several deficiencies in the intelligence estimate, the panel reaffirmed the estimate's conclusion that the United States is unlikely to face a limited missile threat from any "rogue" country before 2010. Congressional critics of the NIE have now taken aim at the panel's findings.

 

Gates Panel Review

One of the most hotly contested issues in the current national missile defense (NMD) debate is the nature of the threat to the United States posed by longer range ballistic missiles. When the NIE was released in November 1995, it posed a significant challenge to congressional Republicans who advocated the early deployment of an NMD system to defend against what they claim is an emerging missile threat to U.S. territory. In subsequent months, several congressional members challenged the NIE's findings and argued that the estimate was politically influenced by the administration in order to justify its decision not to commit to the early deployment of an NMD system.

As a result of the controversy generated by NIE 95 19, Congress, in its fiscal year 1997 defense authorization bill, required the director of the CIA to convene a panel of "independent, nongovernmental individuals with appropriate expertise and experience" to review the underlying assumptions and conclusions of the estimate. Then CIA Director John Deutch appointed Gates to chair the independent panel, which included Ambassador Richard Armitage, Sidney Drell, Arnold Kanter, Janne E. Nolan, Henry S. Rowen and retired Air Force General Jasper Welch. The conclusions reached by the seven panel members were unanimous.

The Gates panel dismissed the charge that NIE 95 19 was politically influenced. "The Panel found no evidence of politicization and is completely satisfied that the analysts' views were based on the evidence before them and their substantive analysis," the report stated. Moreover, it concluded that, "unsubstantiated allegations challenging the integrity of Intelligence Community analysts by those who simply disagree with their conclusions, including Members of Congress, are irresponsible."

The Gates panel noted that there were several deficiencies with respect to the process in preparing the NIE and the manner in which it was presented. The panel said those in senior management positions were not sufficiently involved in the preparation of the estimate, especially given the controversial nature of the issue being addressed. "The result was not a politicized Estimate but one that was politically naive," the report said. The panel also claimed that the estimate lacked a clear scope and was "rushed to completion."

The Gates panel pointed out that one of the most serious problems in NIE 95 19 was that its main conclusion on the missile threat to the United States was based on "a stronger evidentiary and technical case than was presented in the Estimate." The panel's report illustrates several examples of how the NIE's key judgment could have been strengthened. For instance, the panel stated that the estimate could have analyzed the length of time it took countries with successful missile programs, such as China, to develop an ICBM capability. Such an analysis, they claimed, would have revealed that it took China more than 20 years to develop its 4,750 kilometer range CSS 3 ICBM—a clear indication that states with much less resources (e.g. North Korea) have a long way to go before successfully developing an ICBM capable of reaching U.S. territory.

The panel also identified several analytical shortcomings in NIE 95 19. Most important, the panel claimed that the intelligence estimate failed to thoroughly address the motives and objectives of those states seeking an ICBM capability. The panel's report said insufficient attention was devoted to the potential threat to the United States posed by land attack cruise missiles and shorter range, sea based ballistic missiles. Other deficiencies included the failure to ask whether potential adversaries could acquire an ICBM capability through channels not considered by the intelligence community, and an overemphasis on the Missile Technology Control Regime as a means of slowing ballistic missile proliferation.

In the final analysis, however, the Gates panel concluded that "the Intelligence Community has a strong case that, for sound technical reasons, the United States is unlikely to face an indigenously developed and tested intercontinental ballistic missile threat from the Third World before 2010, even taking into account the acquisition of foreign hardware and technical assistance. That case is even stronger than presented in the NIE."

Clearly dissatisfied with the panel's findings, Representative Curt Weldon (R PA) argued in a January 17 letter to Gates that the independent review failed to adequately refute the charge that NIE 95 19 was politically influenced by the administration. "Not once did your panel provide an opportunity for Members who charged politicization to be heard. Given your harsh condemnation, I believe you had a responsibility to explore those allegations and to offer a detailed rebuttal of them," Weldon wrote. The letter also rejected the notion that Congress was responsible for rushing the estimate to completion.

Ekeus Says Iraq Still Hiding Ballistic Missiles

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The New Politics of Missile Proliferation

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Egypt Received Scud Missile Parts From North Korea, Report Says

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Description: 

This treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union requires destruction of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with certain ranges, and associated equipment within three years of the Treaty entering into force.

Body: 
 

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty required that both the United States and the Soviet Union destroy their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with the range of 500 to 5000 kilometers, as well as the missiles’ launchers and support structures. This was to be met three years after the Treaty gets entered into force. As the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the United States and started vamping up the qualitative element of their missiles, this Treaty helped pacify the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Several proposals were made between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States sought full implementation of the INF Treaty with twelve former Soviet republics.

Opened for Signature: 8 December 1987

Entry into force: 1 June 1988

Official Text: http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#text

Status and Signatories: http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#narrative

ACA Backgrounder: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty

Country Resources:

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

Description: 

This limits the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems used for chemical, biological and nuclear attacks by encouraging its 35 member states to restrict their exports of technologies capable of delivering any type of WMD.

Body: 
 

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal association of governments with common interests in missile, unmanned air vehicle, and related technology nonproliferation. It began with France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States with an interim agreement to control nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Its goal is to limit risks of proliferation by controlling transfers to delivery systems capable of weapons of mass destruction. States must follow laws and procedures which include information-sharing. There is no formal mechanism to ensure compliance.

Opened for Signature: 16 April 1987

Entry into force: 1987

Information: http://mtcr.info

ACA Backgrounder: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr

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