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– Hans Blix,
former IAEA Director-General

Missile Proliferation

Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories

September 2017

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: September 2017

The following chart lists 31 countries, including the United States and its allies, which currently possess ballistic missiles. For each country, the chart details the type of missile, its operational status, and the best-known public estimates of each missile’s range.

Only nine (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) of the 31 states below are known or suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. These nine states and Iran have produced or flight-tested missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. China and Russia are the only two states that are not U.S. allies that have a proven capability to launch ballistic missiles from their territories that can strike the continental United States. This factsheet does not list countries' cruise missiles.

Ballistic Missile Basics

Ballistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then they follow an unpowered, free-falling trajectory toward their targets. They are classified by the maximum distance that they can travel, which is a function of how powerful the missile’s engines (rockets) are and the weight of the missile’s payload. To add more distance to a missile’s range, rockets are stacked on top of each other in a configuration referred to as staging. There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles:

  • Short-range ballistic missiles, traveling less than 1,000 kilometers (approximately 620 miles);
  • Medium-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 1,000–3,000 kilometers (approximately 620-1,860 miles);
  • Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 3,000–5,500 kilometers (approximately 1,860-3,410 miles); and
  • Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), traveling more than 5,500 kilometers.

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are referred to as theater ballistic missiles, whereas ICBMs or long-range ballistic missiles are described as strategic ballistic missiles. Missiles are often classified by fuel-type: liquid or solid propellants. Missiles with solid fuel require less maintenance and preparation time than missiles with liquid fuel because solid-propellants have the fuel and oxidizer together, whereas liquid-fueled missiles must keep the two separated until right before deployment.

Country

System[1]

Status

Range[2]

Propellant

Afghanistan

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Scud-B

Unknown[3]

300 km

Liquid

Armenia

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Scud-B[4]

Operational

300 km

Liquid

SS-21 Scarab-C

Operational

70-120 km

Liquid

SS-26 Stone (Iskander E)

Operational

280 km

Solid

Bahrain

ATACMS Block 1 (MGM-140)

Operational

165 km

Solid

Belarus

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

SS-21 Scarab B

Operational

120 km

Solid

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

China

B611 (CSS-X-11)

Operational

250 km

Solid

M-7 (CSS-8)

Operational

190-250 km


Liquid

DF-4 (CSS-3)

Operational

5,500+ km


Liquid

DF-5 (CSS-4, Mod 1)

Operational

12,000 km


Liquid

DF-5A (CSS-4, Mod 2)

Operational

13,000+ km


Liquid

DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3)

Operational

12,000 km

Liquid

DF-5C

Tested/Development

13,000 km

Liquid

DF-11 (CSS-7)

Operational

280 km


Solid

DF-11A (CSS-7)

Operational

350 km

Solid

DF-15A (CSS-6)

Operational

900 km


Solid

DF-15B (CSS-6)

Operational

50-800 km

Solid

DF-15C (CSS-6)

Development

Unknown

Solid

DF-16 (CSS-11)

Operational

800-1000 km

Solid

DF-21 (CSS-5, Mod 1)

Operational

1750+ km


Solid

DF-21A (CSS-5, Mod 2)

Operational

1,770+ km


Solid

DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 4)

Operational

2,150-2,500 km


Solid

DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) ASBM variant

Operational

1,500 km


Solid

DF-26

Operational

4,000 km

Solid

DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1)

Operational

7,000+ km


Solid

DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2)

Operational

11,000+ km

Solid

DF-41 (CSS-X-20)

Development

12,000-15,000 km

Solid

Julang (JL) 1 (CSS-N-3) (SLBM)

Retiring

1,000+ km


Solid

Julang (JL) 2 (CSS-N-14) (SLBM)

Operational

7,000+ km

Solid

Julang (JL) 3 (SLBM)

Development

unknown

Solid

Egypt

R-300 (SS-1-C Scud-B)

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Project-T (Scud B-100)

Operational

450 km

Liquid

Scud-C

Operational

550 km

Liquid

R-70 Luna M (Frog-7B)

Operational

70 km

Solid

Sakr-80

Operational

80+ km

Solid

France

M45 (SLBM)

Operational (Will be replaced by M51)

4,000-6000 km


Solid

M51.1 (SLBM)

Operational

6,000+ km


Solid

M51.2 (SLBM)

Tested/Development

6,000+ km


Solid

M51.3 (SLBM)

Development

unknown

Solid

Georgia

Scud B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Greece

ATACMS Block 1 (MGM-140)

Operational

165 km

Solid

India[6]

Prithvi-I

Operational

150 km

Liquid

Prahaar

Tested/ Development

150 km

Solid

Prithvi-II

Operational

250-350 km

Liquid

Prithvi-III

Development

350 km

Solid

Dhanush (ship-launched)

Operational

400 km

Liquid

Sagarika/K-15 (SLBM)

Tested/Development

700 km

Solid

Agni-I

Operational

700-1,200 km

Solid

Agni-II

Operational

2,000+ km

Solid

Agni-III

Operational

3,200+ km

Solid

Agni-IV

Tested/Development

3,500+ km

Solid

Agni-V

Tested/Development

5,200+ km

Solid

Agni-VI

Development

8,000-10,000 km

Solid

K-4 (SLBM)

Tested/Development

3,500 km

Solid

K-5 (SLBM)

Rumored Development

6,000+ km

Solid

Iran

 

Mushak-120

Operational

130 km

Solid

Mushak-160

Operational

160 km

Solid

Qiam-1

Operational

500-1,000 km

Liquid

Fateh-110

Operational

200-300 km

Solid

Fateh-313

Operational

500 km

Solid

Tondar-69 (CSS-8)

Operational

150 km

Solid

Scud-B (Shahab 1)

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Scud-C (Shahab 2)

Operational

500 km

Liquid

Zolfaghar

Operational

700 km

Solid

Shahab-3 (Zelzal-3)

Operational

800-1,000 km

Liquid

Ghadr 1/Modified Shahab-3/Kadr Ghadr 110

Tested/Development

1,000-2,000 km

Liquid

Ashura/Sejjil/Sejjil-2

Operational

1,500-2,500 km

Solid

BM-25/Musudan (Suspected)

Unclear

2,500+ km

Liquid

Khoramshahr

Tested/Development

2,000 km

Liquid

Emad-1

Tested/Development

1,750-2,000 km

Liquid

Iraq[7]

Al Fat’h (Ababil-100)

Operational

160 km

Solid

Al Samoud II

Operational

180-200 km

Liquid

Israel

LORA

Operational

280 km

Solid

Jericho-2

Operational

1,500-3,500 km

Solid

Jericho-3

Operational

4,800-6,500 km

Solid

Kazakhstan

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Tochka-U (SS-21 Scarab-B)

Operational

120 km

Solid

R-300 (SS-1-C Scud-B)

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Libya[8]

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Al Fatah (Itislat)

Tested/Development (on hold)

1,300-1,500 km

Liquid

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

North Korea

KN-02 (Toksa/SS-21 variant)

Operational

120-170 km

Solid

Scud-B variant/Hwasong 5

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Scud-C variant/Hwasong 6

Operational

500 km

Liquid

Scud-C variant/Hwasong 7

Operational

700-1,000 km

Liquid

No-Dong-1

Operational

1,200-1,500 km

Liquid

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Taepo Dong-1[9]

Tested

2,000-5,000 km

Liquid

Taepo Dong-2 (2-stage) [10]

Tested/Development

4,000-10,000 km

Liquid

Taepo Dong-2 (3-stage)/Unha-2 SLV

Tested/Development

10,000-15,000 km

Liquid

No-Dong-2(B)/ Musudan/BM-25/Hwasong-10 [11]

Tested/Development

2,500-4,000 km

Liquid

KN-17/Hwasong-12

Tested/Development

4,500 km

Liquid

KN-08/Hwasong-13 

Development

5,500-11,500 km

Liquid

KN-14/Hwasong-13/KN-08 Mod 2

Tested/Development

8,000-10,000 km

Liquid

KN-11/Pukkuksong-1/Polaris-1

Tested/Development

1,200 km

Solid

KN-15/Pukkuksong-2

Tested/Development

1,200-2,000 km

Solid

KN-20/Hwasong-14

Tested/Development

10,000+ km

Liquid

KN-18/ Scud variant

Tested/Development

450+

Liquid

Pakistan

Hatf-1

Operational

70-100 km

Solid

Hatf-2 (Abdali)

Operational

180-200 km

Solid

Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)

Operational

290 km

Solid

Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4)

Operational

750 km

Solid

Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4)

Tested/Development

900 km

Solid

Ghauri-1 (Hatf-5)

Operational

1,250-1,500 km

Liquid

Ghauri-2 (Hatf-5a)

Tested/Development

1,800 km

Liquid

Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6)

Operational

1,500-2,500 km

Solid

Ghauri-3 [12]

Development

3,000 km

Liquid

Nasr (Hatf-9)

Development

60 km

Solid

Romania

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Russia

RS-20V (SS-18 Satan)

Operational

10,200-16,000 km

Liquid

RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto)

Operational

10,000 km

Liquid

SS-21 Scarab A

Operational

70 km

Solid

SS-21 Scarab B/ Tochka U

Operational

120 km

Solid

SS-24

Operational

10,000 km

Solid

RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle)

Operational

10,500-11,000 km

Solid

RS-12M1 Topol-M (SS-27) [13]

Operational

11,000 km

Solid

RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod-X-2) (silo)

Operational

11,000 km

Solid

RS-24 Yars (mobile and silo versions) (SS-27 Mod 2)

Operational

10,500 km

Solid

RS-26 Rubezh/Yars M (SS-27)

Tested/Development

5,800 km

Solid

SS-26 Iskander

Operational

400-500 km

Solid

SS-N-8 (R-29) (SLBM)

Operational

8,000 km

Liquid

RSM-50 Volna (SS-N-18) (SLBM)

Operational

6,500-8,000 km

Liquid

SS-N-20 Sturgeon (R-39) (SLBM)

Retiring

8,300 km

Solid

RSM-54 Sineva (SS-N-23 or R-29RM) (SLBM)

Operational

8,300 km

Liquid

RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32) (SLBM)

Operational

8,300 km

Solid

SS-26 Tender (Iskander-M)

Operational

500 km

Solid

SS-26 Stone (Iskander-E)

Operational

280 km

Solid

Saudi Arabia

DF-3 (CSS-2)

Operational

2,600 km

Liquid

DF-21 East Wind (CSS-5)

Operational

2,100+ km

Solid

Slovakia

SS-21

Operational

120 km

Solid

South Korea

NHK-1 (Hyonmu-1)

Operational

180 km

Solid

NHK-2 (Hyonmu-2)

Operational

250-500 km

Solid

ATACMS Block 1

Operational

165 km

Solid

Syria

SS-21-B (Scarab-B)

Operational

120 km

Solid

SS-1-C (Scud-B)

Operational

300 km


Liquid

SS-1-D (Scud-C)

Operational

500-700 km

Liquid

SS-1-E (Scud-D)

Tested/Development

700 km

Liquid

CSS-8 (Fateh 110A)

Operational

210-250 km

Solid

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Taiwan

Qing Feng

Operational

130 km

Liquid

Tien Chi

Operational

120 km

Solid

ATACMS Block 1

Operational

165 km

Solid

Turkey

ATACMS Block 1 (MGM-140)

Operational

165 km

Solid

J-600T Yildirim I and II

Operational

150-300 km

Solid

Turkmenistan

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

United Arab Emirates

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

ATACMS Block 1A

Operational

300 km

Solid

 

United Kingdom

D-5 Trident II (SLBM)

Operational

7,400-12,000 km

Solid

United States

ATACMS Block I

Operational

165 km

Solid

ATACMS Block IA

Operational

300 km

Solid

Minuteman III (LGM-30G)

Operational

9,650-13,000 km

Solid

D-5 Trident II (SLBM)

Operational

7,400-12,000 km

Solid

Vietnam

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Scud-C variant

Operational

500 km

Liquid

 

Yemen

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

SS-21 (Scarab)

Operational

70-120 km

Solid

Scud C variant

Operational

600 km

Liquid

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

ENDNOTES:

1. All missiles are surface-to-surface unless otherwise noted. SLBM is an acronym for a submarine-launched ballistic missile and ASBM is an acronym for an anti-ship ballistic missile.

2. The ranges, given in kilometers (km) are estimates based on publicly available sources. These figures, however, do not all necessarily reflect the missile’s maximum range, which may vary with its payload. Equipping a missile with a lighter payload would increase its range. Similarly, a heavier payload would diminish a missile’s range.

3. A January 15, 2001 report by the UN Monitoring Group on Afghanistan concluded that, prior to the October 2001 U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan, there were approximately 100 Scud-B missiles and at least four Scud mobile launchers in Afghanistan. The current distribution and operational capability of the missiles are unknown, although the UN Monitoring Group speculated that up to 30 of the missiles might be under control of the Northern Alliance.

4. According to a 1997 report by Lev Rokhlin, then-Chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on Defense, Russia transferred eight Scud-B ballistic missiles and 24 Scud launchers, along with other military hardware, to Armenia between 1993-1996. Responding to publication of the report in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta and to formal requests by the Azerbaijan government, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered an investigation into the claims. They were subsequently confirmed in April 1997 by Aman Tuleyev, then-Russian minister for relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States.

5. According to the Department of Defense’s 2009 report on China’s military power, Beijing is investing in conventionally-armed ASBMs based on the CSS-5 airframe which could employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-munitions” in order to hold surface ships at risk.

6. India and Pakistan claim that their missiles are not deployed, meaning that the missiles are not on launchers, aimed at particular locations, or kept on a high state of alert. The missiles are in a state of “induction” with the nuclear warheads stored in facilities separate from the missile units and airfields. Pakistan and India, however, have deployed their missiles on a number of occasions, such as the Kargil crisis in July 1999.

7. Because of lack of current documentary evidence and inconsistencies in source reporting, the status of Iraq’s ballistic missile arsenal is unclear. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) determined in 2003 that the Al Samoud II and the Al Fat’h missiles exceeded the range permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. That resolution prohibited Iraq from possessing missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers. UN inspectors began the destruction of these missiles on March 1, 2003, but the inspectors were withdrawn before all of the missiles had been eliminated. According to UNMOVIC’s 13th Quarterly Report, only two-thirds of the Al Samoud II missiles declared by Iraq had been destroyed. The 2004 Iraq Survey Group Report by the United States asserted that a “full accounting of the Al Fat’h missiles may not be possible.”

8. According to a CIA Report, Libya privately pledged to the United States in 2003 that it would eliminate all missiles classified as Category I systems by the MTCR. Category I pertains to missiles capable of traveling 300 kilometers or more with a payload of at least 500 kilograms, the presumed minimum weight for a first-generation nuclear warhead. Libya, however, still maintains a missile development program for systems that fall below the Category I threshold capability. Given Libya's obligations under its 2003 WMD renunciation, development of its Al-Fatah missile is on hold until it can meet MTCR requirements. Additionally, Libya's Scud-B arsenal is of questionable utility due to poor maintenance and testing record.

9. The Taepo Dong-1 was first flight-tested August 31, 1998. Its first two stages worked but a third stage failed. The missile has not been flight-tested again and is widely believed to have been a technology demonstrator rather than a missile system intended for deployment.

10. North Korea has carried out two flight tests of what is believed to be its Taepo Dong-2 missile. The test of a two-stage version failed about 40 seconds into its flight on July 5, 2006. The missile is assessed to have used a cluster of No Dong missiles for its first stage and a Scud or No Dong-based second stage. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched what it called its Unha-2 space launch vehicle, widely believed to be a three-stage variant of its Taepo Dong-2. The first two stages of the rocket were successful and fell in the splashdown zones previously announced by North Korea. U.S. Northern Command said the day of the launch that the third stage and its payload both landed in the Pacific Ocean. Independent analysts assess that the second stage of the Taepo Dong-2 is based on a variant of the Soviet SS-N-6.

11. Although North Korea has never flight-tested the intermediate-range Musudan, a variant of the SS-N-6, Washington alleges that Pyongyang has deployed the missile. The SS-N-6 originally was a Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, but North Korea is reportedly deploying it as a road-mobile missile. There also is speculation that North Korea has transferred this missile to Iran.

12. Development of the Ghauri-3 missile was reportedly abandonded for unknown reasons.

13. The SS-27 (Topol-M/RS-12M) is deployed in both road-mobile and silo-based configurations.


Sources: Arms Control Association; Missile Defense Agency; U.S. Department of Defense; Congressional Research Service; National Air and Space Intelligence Center; U.S. Department of State; Federation of American Scientists; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Nuclear Threat Initiative

-Research assistance by Brianna Starosciak

 


 

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Subject Resources:

Posted: September 25, 2017

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The P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, June 2017

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India Tests Two Missiles

India Tests Two Missiles

India conducted two missile tests last month, with the super­sonic Brahmos cruise missile recording a success but the Agni-2 ballistic missile test aborted. The tests were on May 2 and 4, respectively.

The Brahmos, jointly developed by India and Russia, has several variants. The May 2 test was a land-attack version with a range of 450 kilometers, which is longer than the 290-kilometer range of the original system. The missile was launched from a mobile launcher and tested in steep-dive mode. Indian officials said the test was a success and noted that the missile hit its target with the desired precision. The nuclear-capable Agni-2 is a two-stage, solid-fueled system. It is capable of delivering a 1,000 kilogram payload over a range of 2,000 kilometers. An Indian official was quoted in The Times of India as saying “things went awry” during the May 4 test after half a kilometer and was aborted. The Agni-2 is deployed, but has not been tested for several years.—DANIELLE PRESKITT

Posted: May 31, 2017

Japan Considers Cruise Missile Purchase

Japan Considers Cruise Missile Purchase

Japan is considering whether to buy cruise missiles due to the increasing threat posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile development, according to officials quoted in The Japan Times on May 6. The government may include funds in the fiscal year 2018 budget for studying the feasibility of purchasing U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles, according to the report. The missiles would likely be deployed on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force Fleet.

North Korea’s ballistic missiles are capable of reaching Japan, and several North Korean ballistic missiles have splashed down in Japan’s territorial waters during tests. Although the purchase of Tomahawks may be viewed as contrary to Tokyo’s defensive military posture, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said in January that striking North Korean launch sites would be self-defense. Japan would need to revise its five-year plan for a defensive buildup and its 10-year defense program guidelines, both set in 2013, before any purchase. The United States uses Tomahawk cruise missiles for conventional strikes, but has deployed several Tomahawk variants armed with nuclear warheads.—KELSEY DAVENPORT

Posted: May 31, 2017

New Leadership, Opportunities on the Korean Peninsula

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Posted: March 31, 2017

India, Pakistan Escalate Missile Rivalry

Missile advances may destabilize an already dangerous region.

March 2017

By Kelsey Davenport

India and Pakistan are pursuing the development of new nuclear-capable missiles that risk further escalating tensions in South Asia and increasing the chance of a nuclear exchange.

Pakistani protesters shout anti-Indian slogans during a demonstration in Peshawar on October 4, 2016, after Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged fire across their border. (Photo credit: A Majeed/AFP/Getty Images)In the past several months, both countries have tested and refined systems for deployment. Although their nuclear ambitions and advancing capabilities should not be considered in isolation or solely as bilateral, there is an action-reaction dynamic between the two states that drives their advances. China is also a factor, particularly in India’s military planning, as New Delhi pursues longer-range ballistic missiles that are more relevant to deterring Beijing than Islamabad. 

This creates a complex nuclear geometry in Asia, in which developments intended to provide stability often have the opposite effect. Indeed, some of the recent developments raise serious concerns about control of nuclear missiles in the field and an increased risk of an unauthorized nuclear attack. 

Sea-Based Capabilities 

Pakistan’s Jan. 9 test-firing of a sea-launched cruise missile, the first for that missile, is one of Islamabad’s responses to India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent and advancing ballistic missile defense system. The missile was tested from an undisclosed location in the Indian Ocean and hit its target with “precise accuracy,” according to a statement from the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media arm of the Pakistani military.

The nuclear-capable missile, known as the Babur-3, has an estimated range of 450 kilometers. It is a variant of the ground-launched Babur-2 cruise missile, which has an estimated range of 700 kilometers and was last tested in December 2016. The Babur-3 gives Islamabad “a credible second strike capability, augmenting deterrence,” the military statement said. 

That judgment might be premature, given that the Babur-3 was tested from an underwater mobile platform and is not likely ready for deployment on Pakistan’s diesel submarines. But Pakistan’s decision to pursue a sea-based deterrent is not a surprise. Evidence, such as Pakistan’s decision to stand up a Naval Strategic Force Command in 2012, pointed toward its pursuit of a sea-based deterrent. 

India was not cited by name as the reason for pursuing a sea-based deterrent, but the Pakistani military statement alluded to Indian developments as a motivation, saying that the missile is a “measured response to nuclear strategies and postures being adopted in Pakistan’s neighborhood.” The reference likely included India’s recent deployment of a nuclear-capable, submarine-launched ballistic missile to ensure the survivability of its deterrent and complete New Delhi’s nuclear triad. 

India’s first ballistic missile submarine, the Arihant, completed sea trials in 2016 and is widely believed to have been inducted into the Indian navy. The Arihant-class submarines can carry India’s nuclear-capable K-4 or K-15 ballistic missiles. 

In the days following the Babur-3 test, India announced it would test-fire a K-4 ballistic missile, but there has been no subsequent announcement of a test taking place. The K-4 is an intermediate-range ballistic missile assessed to have a range of approximately 3,500 kilometers, as opposed to the K-15, which has a range of approximately 750 kilometers. The K-15 reportedly was tested twice in March 2016 and is now in production. 

The decisions by India and Pakistan to pursue sea-based nuclear weapons systems, although presented in terms of strengthening deterrence, raises concerns about the actual impact on stability in the region. 

Both countries currently are believed to keep warheads separated from missiles. Sea-based deterrents, however, require mating the warheads and missiles prior to deployment. If India and Pakistan view their submarine forces as the survivable leg of the nuclear deterrence forces, waiting to deploy a submarine until a crisis scenario is not an attractive option.

This raises questions about the management of the nuclear warheads at sea and the reliability of the communications systems. If submarine commanders have the ability to fire nuclear-armed missiles, it could increase the chances of an unauthorized or accidental launch. 

New Land-Based Capabilities

The concern about delegating command-and-control authority also applies in the case of some ground-based systems, such as Pakistan’s short-range tactical ballistic missile, the Nasr. The Nasr has a range of approximately 60 kilometers, and the ISPR has described the system as filling a gap to “deter evolving threats,” which includes India’s conventional military superiority. 

To use the Nasr as a deterrent against conventional attacks, it may be necessary in certain situations to transfer command and control of these tactical nuclear weapons to commanders on the ground. Some experts view the development of the Nasr, with possible pre-delegation of authority, as potentially destabilizing and increasing the likelihood of use against a conventional attack by India. 

Pakistan also tested a second new system in January, a medium-range ballistic missile equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The ISPR said that the Jan. 24 test was a success and that the missile, called the Ababeel, has an estimated range of about 2,000 kilometers, “the capability to engage multiple targets with high precision,” and the ability to evade radar. The missile will ensure the “survivability of Pakistan’s ballistic missile defense environment.”

Pakistan conducts its first successful test firing of the nuclear-capable Babur-3 cruise missile January 9 from an undisclosed location in the Indian Ocean. The missile, intended for submarine deployment, was fired from an underwater, mobile platform. (Photo credit: Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations)

Pakistan’s development of the Babur-3 and MIRV capability on the Ababeel comes as India makes advances with its ballistic missile defense system. The Indian Ministry of Defence announced Feb. 12 that it “successfully conducted a test wherein an incoming ballistic missile target was intercepted by an exo-atmospheric interceptor missile off the Bay of Bengal.” The statement described this as an “important milestone in building its overall capability” to defend against incoming ballistic missile threats. 

MIRV-capable and cruise missiles, however, can make it more difficult for missile defenses to intercept incoming warheads. The Babur-3 “features terrain hugging and sea skimming flight capabilities to evade hostile radars” and air defenses, the ISPR said in its statement.

India’s Missile Developments

While Pakistan is orienting its new delivery systems based on developments in India, India is considering China as it deploys new ballistic missiles. 

India’s pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles further destabilizes the region’s complicated strategic geometry. These missiles, primarily the Agni-4 and Agni-5, are clearly directed toward China. 

For example, the Agni-5, with a range of more than 5,000 kilometers, is not necessary for targeting Pakistan. But it does put all major Chinese cities within India’s range. India tested the Agni-5 in December 2016 and the Agni-4 on Jan. 2. (See ACT, January/February 2017.) The Agni-4 is an intermediate-range ballistic missile that has an estimated range of 4,000 kilometers. (See ACT, January/February 2012.

China often does not respond to Indian ballistic missile tests, but the most recent Agni-5 launch drew a quick, negative response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman the next day. Hua Chunying recalled a UN Security Council Resolution in 1998 that urged India and Pakistan not to pursue nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, after both countries tested nuclear devices, and said China takes the position that “preserving the strategic balance and stability in South Asia is conducive to peace and prosperity of regional countries.”

During the Chinese New Year, Beijing posted a video of its new medium-range ballistic missile, the DF-16. This system, first displayed in September 2015, is assessed by the Pentagon in an annual report on China’s military in 2016 as improving China’s ability to strike at “regional targets.”

Although it is doubtful that China’s decision to display the missile again is directed at India alone, it does highlight China’s regional nuclear capabilities that likely concern India.

Posted: March 1, 2017

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Table of Contents

Posted: November 21, 2016

BOOK REVIEW: Why More Warheads Bring Less Security

The focus of this collection of essays is the nuclear-warhead technology for placing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles on a ballistic missile...

September 2016

Reviewed by James E. Doyle

The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age
Edited by Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason, Stimson Center, 2016, 204 pp.

Embracing theories of nuclear war-fighting and deploying capabilities to attack the nuclear forces of a potential adversary provide nations with little security advantage and obligate them to spend vast defense resources on nuclear forces for decades. Such reliance on this expansive approach to nuclear deterrence can also hinder the improvement of political relations and increase the chances of unintended nuclear war during a crisis. China, India, and Pakistan should be mindful of this as they structure their future nuclear forces. Further, the security interests of the two dominant nuclear-weapon powers, the United States and Russia, would be served by disavowing theories of victory in nuclear warfare. 

That is the basic message of “The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age,” an important recent study edited by Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason and published by the Stimson Center. This study fills a gap and breaks new ground in the scholarship on the technology of the nuclear arms competition.

The focus of this collection of six essays is the technology for placing multiple nuclear warheads on a single ballistic missile and providing those warheads the ability to attack the protected nuclear forces of an adversary. Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China have adopted this innovation, pioneered by the United States in the 1960s. India and Pakistan are developing this capability and are likely to deploy such missiles in the near future. 

This report makes a vital contribution to international security research and provides detailed history of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Through the writings of regional security experts and former military officials, it also analyzes the emerging nuclear forces and doctrines in China, India, and Pakistan.

The study cautions decision-makers in China, India, and Pakistan that if they wish to “avoid repeating the missteps of the United States and the Soviet Union during the first nuclear age,” they must limit the extent to which multiple warheads are placed atop missiles and proceed at a slow pace. Most importantly, they should reject nuclear counterforce targeting strategies and war-fighting doctrine. Such nuclear war-fighting strategies during the first nuclear age resulted in heightened insecurity and a prolonged nuclear arms race.

The advent of MIRVs combined with increases in missile accuracy enabled the targeting of opponents’ nuclear forces by means of prompt hard-target-kill capabilities. The authors correctly conclude that “when deterrence of nuclear attack is predicated on the ability to attack opposing forces quickly, it becomes very hard for national leaders to stabilize political relations and proceed with arms control.”

MIRVs propelled vertical proliferation more than any other technological advance during the first nuclear age and gave rise to pyrrhic notions of prevailing in a nuclear war. This lesson is drawn from the solid research on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race of the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s. This study comes at a critical time because the United States and Russia are entering a new round of this competition and other nuclear powers appear to be following suit.

Perceived Advantages

MIRV technology combined with greater missile accuracy enables ballistic missiles to target hardened missile silos, airfields, submarine bases, and command centers. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union placed up to 10 or more nuclear warheads on a single missile so that a force of 50 missiles could destroy 500 or more separate targets. The United States made extensive deployments of MIRVs first, rapidly expanding the number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal. This was considered to have several important advantages. 

Most importantly, it was thought to provide a nuclear force superior to the Soviet Union. Although deterrence theory holds that nuclear war will be avoided because each side is equally vulnerable to destruction by the other, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union (or Russia today) has been satisfied with this condition. Each side sought nuclear forces that would provide some measure of advantage over the other. The United States, in particular, believed during the Cold War that the perception of nuclear superiority was vital to its entire national security and foreign policy strategies, as this study demonstrates with meticulous evidence from official documents, memoirs, and declassified sources.

This refusal to accept mutual vulnerability was expressed in many ways and drove the development of expanded nuclear doctrine and nuclear forces with ever-increasing capabilities. As Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long explain in the book’s first essay, “The Geopolitical Origins of US Hard-Target-Kill Counterforce Capabilities and MIRVs,” U.S. “[p]olicymakers believed that the nuclear balance would shape the political choices of other states—the Soviet Union, NATO allies, and third parties.... American leaders also believed that perceptions of the strategic balance abroad might influence international politics to the detriment of US national and international security.”

International Perceptions

Because U.S. policymakers believed that international perceptions of the balance were of pivotal importance for U.S. interests, they supported superiority in MIRVs and other measures of nuclear competition. It was considered essential that U.S. nuclear forces conveyed military strength and political resolve in order to reassure friends and induce caution among potential adversaries. Arcane metrics for assessing the nuclear balance such as missile payload weight, the number of deliverable warheads, their ability to defeat missile defenses, and their explosive power were valued and painstakingly assessed by strategic analysts. 

It did not matter that asymmetries in these categories of nuclear strength had dubious efficacy on the outcome of war if deterrence failed and a major exchange of nuclear weapons occurred. The perception of advantage was thought to be more important than actual advantage. This belief system sets up an endless cycle of nuclear weapons competition that endures and is intensifying between the United States and Russia today. 

The authors drive this point home with quotes from key U.S. statesmen of the Cold War era. For example, President Richard Nixon said of the nuclear balance, “Our view of our advantages or disadvantages will determine whether we can pursue an aggressive or timid foreign policy.”

James Schlesinger, U.S. secretary of defense from 1973 to 1975, argued that the United States might need large numbers of MIRVs with hard-target-kill capabilities “[j]ust so they [the Soviets] don’t think they are ahead.” Henry Kissinger, who served as Nixon’s secretary of state and national security adviser, also acknowledged that nuclear perceptions could be decisive. “Our [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II] agreement can’t result in serious inequalities,” he argued, “if for no other reason than that other countries will look at these differences and assume we are inferior. Therefore, it will affect our foreign policy.” Stansfield Turner, CIA director from 1977 to 1981, also warned of the political consequences of letting the Soviets have a nuclear force that could attack U.S. land-based missiles and still have weapons in reserve: “I personally do not believe that [increasing U.S. missile vulnerability] means that the Soviets would be likely to be tempted to launch a strategic attack against us…. But I do believe that the perception of superiority that will give to the Soviets, and perhaps to our allies and others, is unacceptable to us.”

MIRV technology was also thought to provide the United States with several nuclear war-fighting advantages should deterrence fail. The first was so-called damage-limitation capability. The best way to limit an adversary’s ability to inflict damage on the United States was to promptly destroy as much of that nation’s nuclear arsenal as possible before it could be used. MIRVs allow an adversary’s nuclear arsenal to be heavily damaged by only a portion of an attacker’s overall force, leaving the attacker a potentially larger reserve of nuclear weapons to deter a weakened response. In the case of the Soviet Union, which deployed the vast majority of its nuclear forces on vulnerable silo-based missiles, this doctrine permitted one U.S. theory of victory in nuclear war. Following warning of an attack or pre-emptively, the United States could destroy much of the Soviet arsenal and national infrastructure and face only limited retaliation or possibly even termination of the conflict on favorable terms.

Of course, this theory also worked in reverse. Once the Soviets acquired a large force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with MIRV capability, they too had the option to strike first. When both nations possessed such capabilities, the incentives to launch on warning of an attack increased. Because early-warning systems are imperfect and prone to false alarms, this raised the risks of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, a situation that persists today. 

An undated U.S. Air Force photograph of LGM-118A Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile re-entry vehicles during a flight test. The 50 deployed Peacekeepers, the most powerful U.S. missile from 1986 to 2005, were deactivated following the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia. [Photo credit: U.S. Air Force]Another military advantage offered by MIRV technology was the ability to implement limited nuclear strikes over a protracted period of time. U.S. strategists embraced such limited nuclear options as a plausible alternative to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons. Green and Long explain that these were conceptualized as attacks “with a limited number of weapons to cause pain, demonstrate US resolve, and incentivize the Soviet Union to stand down in the early stages of a nuclear war.” They quote a 1973 U.S. National Security Memorandum that asserts that limited nuclear options “could potentially also provide a capability to conduct discrete limited attacks on enemy forces in an immediate area to deny a local objective.” The cost-effectiveness of MIRVs, where one missile can carry several warheads, made acquiring these capabilities more feasible and provided wider targeting options.

MIRVs made another theory of nuclear victory possible. This was a limited pre-emptive strike designed to “decapitate” the Soviet command-and-control system and its most vulnerable nuclear forces, thus preventing it from marshaling even a ragged, weak retaliation. Targets to be struck by the fastest-arriving U.S. weapons (missiles with MIRV capability on submarines near the Soviet borders) included the Soviet political and military leadership, launch control centers and communications links, missile fields, and submarine pens. This threat from U.S. forces eventually led the Soviets to deploy a system called “perimeter” or “dead hand,” which could be predelegated to automatically launch nuclear retaliation against the United States without requiring authorization from the Soviet command authority, most or all of whom would have died in the U.S. attack.1

Hardened Targets

The embrace of nuclear war-fighting concepts such as damage-limiting first strikes, limited nuclear options, and decapitation all required accurate MIRVs capable of destroying hard targets because most militarily critical targets, including missile silos and command bunkers, were hardened to survive nuclear strikes that did not land very close to their aimpoints. When the capability to place the target within the crater caused by the nuclear explosion was acquired, these strategies became possible. 

Ironically, as the authors point out, “the strongest advocates of MIRVing in the United States and the Soviet Union were the quickest to question the motives behind each other’s programs: Why go to such lengths—and to the high launch-readiness associated with vulnerable and lucrative targets—if not to signal a commitment to nuclear warfighting in the event of a breakdown in deterrence?”

This key observation leads to another negative consequence of nuclear counterforce strategies, which is highlighted in the report’s second chapter, “The Impact of MIRVs and Counterforce Targeting on the US-Soviet Relationship,” by Russian scholars Alexey Arbatov, a member of the Scientific Council of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Advisory Council of the Russian Prime Minister, and retired Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, who had served as an expert for the preparation of key U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear treaties.

That consequence is mutual misperception, fear, and distrust in military relations that spills over to the political dimension. Arbatov and Dvorkin convincingly argue that had diplomatic efforts to constrain MIRVs succeeded in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S.-Soviet nuclear rivalry would have been far less intense and dangerous. The authors rightly contend, “The interaction of ballistic missiles and MIRVs with strategic doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union deeply affected the military relations of the two powers for at least a quarter-century and precipitated two rounds of a highly expensive and threatening arms race—with dire implications for international security.”

The dynamics of the U.S.-Soviet arms race were clear: the deployment of accurate ballistic missiles with MIRV capability gave the United States the theoretical ability to deliver a disarming strike against Soviet strategic nuclear forces. 

The Soviet Union responded by deploying MIRVed ballistic missiles of its own to achieve parity in the number of warheads and to increase its ability to penetrate the anti-ballistic missile system that the United States was expected to develop. This development placed at risk the United States’ silo-based missiles and command centers. The United States then hardened its command and control and MIRVed hundreds of ballistic missiles aboard submarines that were relatively invulnerable to a first strike. The Soviets then deployed missiles on mobile launchers; created mobile command centers; built reserve airfields for its strategic bombers; and increased the number of nuclear ballistic missile submarines on sea patrol.

Both sides failed to acknowledge that some of the characteristics and capabilities of these weapons systems constrained options and compressed the timescale for decisions in a crisis, outcomes that made war by miscalculation more likely. Assessing the impact of force postures on war probability was not a priority for either side until after the Cold War was over. Unfortunately, it appears that the lessons of this history remain unlearned and classic nuclear stability is again taking a back seat to U.S.-Russian nuclear muscle-flexing, especially in the realm of nonstrategic nuclear forces. Indeed, the current controversy over launch-on-warning strategies that allow a U.S. president only several minutes to decide to retaliate for an attack indicated by error-prone early-warning systems is a legacy of the U.S.-Soviet competition in MIRVs.2

The U.S.-Chinese strategic relationship now equals or exceeds that with Russia in terms of its consequences for international stability. Beijing maintains strategic capabilities far below those of Washington and Moscow, but is modernizing its nuclear forces and appears to have equipped its DF-5 ICBM with MIRVs. As author Jeffrey Lewis makes clear, there is little evidence “to conclude that this is driven by military requirements associated with the pursuit of a counterforce targeting strategy.” Rather, the primary reason for China placing MIRVs on the DF-5 is to ensure that some warheads could penetrate U.S. missile defenses, therefore deterring U.S. aggression.

As Lewis makes clear, the chances that nuclear war-fighting strategies will enter the U.S.-Chinese strategic balance are growing. China has deployed anti-satellite weapons on the ground and in space that could eliminate the surveillance and intelligence on which the United States depends to attack mobile targets and cue missile defense systems. These systems would be lucrative targets for the United States in any future regional conflict with China and could be attacked early with long-range conventional weapons. 

The MK-21 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles for the LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile on display at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio. [Photo credit: U.S. Air Force]The recessed nature of the Chinese nuclear deterrent might also increase classic forms of deterrence instability. Most Chinese warheads that can reach the United States are deployed on mobile missiles that remain in their garrisons and increasingly on submarines that spend most of their time in port. In this configuration, they are vulnerable to a first strike by U.S. MIRVs. Lewis observes that if both sides judged that war was about to break out, incentives would be high for China to disperse its nuclear forces and for the United States to strike them before this could be achieved. Moreover, Chinese strategists are beginning to highlight the potential benefits of alerting their nuclear forces to signal resolve and avoid nuclear coercion by the United States. The United States might perceive such alerts as preparation for launch and consider pre-emptive attacks, sharply increasing crisis instability.

MIRV technology would also introduce instabilities to the Chinese-Indian and Indian-Pakistani nuclear balances. Most Indian strategists agree that any increase in China’s nuclear strength requires a response from India. India suspects China of developing ballistic missile defenses. If it does so, India would have greater incentives to use MIRVs on its ballistic missile force. Other incentives exist, such as cost-effectiveness and the desire for India to be seen as possessing a technologically “modern” nuclear force. In fact, authors Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath Sankaran posit in their essay “India’s Slow and Unstoppable Move to MIRV” that making use of MIRVs in India may not even require political approval “because it is not viewed as a new weapon system, but one that is an extension of an existing (missile) technology.”

MIRVs or multiple warheads without independent targeting capability are not seen in India as inconsistent with its recessed deterrence forces. They could be developed for ballistic missiles that remain in a low state of day-to-day readiness. India does not possess the tracking or command-and-control capabilities to support counterforce targeting today, but will develop such capabilities over time. 

Pakistani nuclear doctrine differs fundamentally from Chinese and Indian doctrines. Pakistan sees nuclear weapons and the option to use them first as necessary to offset conventional force disparities with India. So, India’s pursuit of MIRVs and missile defenses challenge the effectiveness of Pakistani strategic deterrent. If India introduces MIRVs, Pakistan is likely to do so as well. This is the conclusion by Feroz Khan and Mansoor Ahmed in their chapter. Other priorities for Pakistan would be to increase the survivability of its nuclear forces through completion of a triad of delivery vehicles, the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles, and improvements to command, control, surveillance and targeting.

China, India, and Pakistan remain well behind the Unites States and Russia in counterforce nuclear capabilities, and their doctrines currently reflect these limitations. Over time, however, this study warns that “[t]he cascading effects of competitive MIRVing, flowing from the United States (and Russia) to China to India and finally Pakistan, have created a multidimensional security dilemma that appears to be leading inexorably to a new and complex problem in Asian security.” This dynamic will increase incentives for arms races, increased alert postures, and greater counterforce targeting capability—outcomes that decrease strategic stability in East and South Asia.

This report counsels that such negative developments are not inevitable but will flow from deliberate choices made by Asian nuclear powers. So far, China has exercised the most nuclear restraint, including the very limited size of its nuclear forces, its lack of counterforce capability, and the recessed nature of Chinese nuclear doctrine. In stark contrast to beliefs in the West that robust nuclear forces and war-fighting doctrine are essential enablers of successful foreign policy, China’s rise in world affairs has hardly been hindered by its modest nuclear strategy. Indeed, China may provide an example of strategically wise management of nuclear policy and resources. Although controversy surrounds China’s ambitions in the South and East China seas, its actions there have not been linked to expansive nuclear deployments or doctrine. India has also taken a measured pace to enlarging its nuclear arsenal and maintains a retaliatory doctrine. 

Whether this restraint will endure has grave implications for global security and depends on many unpredictable factors worthy of constant analysis. “The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age” is a powerful resource for scholars and policymakers concerned with these questions. Its global scope, as well as its intricate details of the technical and political dimensions of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War arms race, provides valuable reference material that is accessible, well organized, and well documented with primary sources. This book advances understanding of the dynamics of nuclear arms competitions, the forces that trap nations in endless counterforce strategies, and the burdens and dangers that result. 

ENDNOTES

1.   Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Dead Hand,” Arms Control Wonk, podcast audio, March 8, 2015, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5263/putins-dead-hand/.

2.   Jeffrey Lewis, “Our Nuclear Procedures Are Crazier Than Trump,” Foreign Policy, August 5, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/05/our-nuclear-procedures-are-crazier-than-trump/.


James E. Doyle is is an independent nuclear security specialist. He was a technical staff member at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1997 to 2014.

Posted: September 1, 2016

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