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former IAEA Director-General

Missile Proliferation

Pentagon Sees Chinese Missile Advances

Pentagon Sees Chinese Missile Advances


The U.S. Defense Department annual report on China’s military power says that Beijing is developing new nuclear weapons delivery systems and is moving to deploy a new missile defense interceptor. The report, released Aug. 16, said China is developing two air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may be nuclear weapons capable. That missile has been flight-tested five times, according to an April report in The Diplomat. This development is significant because air-launched ballistic missiles cannot be intercepted in the boost- or midcourse phase.

China displayed the DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), an enhanced version of the DF-31A, for the first time in 2017 at the People’s Liberation Army’s 90th anniversary parade, the Defense Department report notes. China “appears to be considering” additional launch options for the DF-41 ICBM, which is still under development after being tested 10 times, including rail-mobile and silo-based launch options, the report notes. The report also cited Chinese development work on a new nuclear-capable bomber, with an estimated range of at least 8,500 kilometers (5,300 miles), that could debut within a decade.

The HQ-19 midcourse missile defense interceptor, which was still being tested in 2016, “may have begun preliminary operation in [w]estern China,” the report states. The system is designed to intercept medium-range missiles, likely from regional countries such as India and North Korea.—ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE

Posted: October 1, 2018

India’s Agni-5 ICBM Advances

India’s Agni-5 ICBM Advances


India's Agni-5 missile is displayed during a dress rehearsal for the Indian Republic Day parade in New Delhi on January 23, 2013. (Photo: Raveendran/AFP/Getty Images)India’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), still under development, is expected to be inducted into the strategic arsenal after one more test, which could occur as soon as October. The Agni-5 has been tested six times, most recently in June. (See ACT, March 2018.) It is a three-stage, road-mobile missile able to carry a 1,500-kilogram payload a distance of 5,000 kilometers. India reportedly has been working to develop multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) for the missile, Franz-Stefan Gady wrote in The Diplomat, which would provide India with a second-strike capability. Analysts believe India is developing the long-range missile to bolster its nuclear deterrence with China. The Agni-5 will need to be tested several more times after it has been inducted before it can be operationally deployed.—ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE

Posted: October 1, 2018

ACA Board Chair on Pathways to a Nuclear Weapon Free World

Sections:

Description: 

Remarks by Thomas Countryman to the International Symposium for Peace in Nagasaki, Japan

Body: 

Pathways to a Nuclear Weapon Free World

Remarks by Thomas Countryman
Chairman of the Arms Control Association
to the International Symposium for Peace 
Nagasaki, Japan
July 28, 2018

Introduction

Panelists discuss working toward sustainable peace at the International Symposium for Peace “The Road to Nuclear Weapons Abolition” held on July 28 in Nagasaki. (Photo: Kengo Hiyoshi/Asahi Shimbun) Let me thank the organizers of today’s conference for bringing me again to Japan. In my current focus outside the government of the United States, continuing to push for real progress on nonproliferation and arms control measures, it's always a special pleasure to come to Japan. The Japanese role in leading the international diplomatic challenge to create the highest standards in arms control and nonproliferation is unparalleled. Not only as a partner of the United States but in its own leadership role, Japan has done much to create the modern nonproliferation regime that has greatly reduced but not yet eliminated the threat that weapons of mass destruction pose to all of us.

It is especially moving to be here in Nagasaki. Visiting the memorial yesterday, a sacred place, brought back to me what President Abraham Lincoln said at the site of the bloodiest battle America ever witnessed: that those who have fallen on this site “have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract”. I sensed on this spot what no book can convey: the enormous challenge and the risk that humanity continues to face in the presence of 15,000 nuclear weapons in this world. Here I want to commend the very special role the hibakusha have played in preserving vital lessons for the memory of humanity. For 70 years, they have spread the simple truth that a human being is not just a statistic. They will touch future generations long after their own has passed from this world. I wish that every American and every world leader would have the opportunity to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki as I have.

Current Challenges

It is much easier to talk about the challenges to nuclear disarmament than it is to describe a simple path to a world free of nuclear weapons. So let me dwell first on the current challenges that we face.

First, the two major nuclear powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, have passed a turning point in their nuclear doctrines and nuclear arsenals. After about 40 years of a steady decrease in the size and diversity of their nuclear arsenals and the mission that each assigned to their nuclear weapons, both Washington and Moscow have turned a corner towards expanding the size and variety of arsenals and the circumstances for their use.

U.S. 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

The U.S. administration’s Nuclear Posture Review from this February is not a radical change from the previous nuclear posture but it is a significant change in direction. In calling for the development of new low-yield nuclear weapons, the United States is thinking more actively and – in my view - making more thinkable the use of low-yield nuclear weapons in the context of a conventional conflict. As so many have pointed out, there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war once that threshold has been crossed. “A nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon," George Shultz, who served as President Ronald Reagan's top diplomat, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in January. "You use a small one, then you go to a bigger one. I think nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons and we need to draw the line there."

Secondly, the Nuclear Posture Review describes with more specificity than before circumstances under which the United States would consider the use of nuclear weapons to encompass not only first use by an opponent but also a response to a devastating attack by cyber or other means. Just two years ago, the Obama administration considered carefully the possibility of proclaiming a no-first-use doctrine for U.S. nuclear weapons. That U.S. policy has now shifted towards a broader definition of possible first use is of deep concern to me.

Finally, I am most disappointed in the Nuclear Posture Review in that it effectively renounces the traditional leadership that the U.S has exercised on non-proliferation and arms control issues. It makes no mention of America’s binding legal obligation under Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue a reduction in arsenals. It makes no new proposals for how the U.S. will move forward in negotiations with Russia and others. And it defers any meaningful action until security conditions in the world have improved. This retreat from global leadership, whether in arms control, in climate policy or in free trade agreements is unworthy of a nation that claims to be a superpower.

Russia

As concerned as I am about the direction of U.S. policy, I am even more concerned about the continuing development by Russia of new weapons and new delivery methods. Russia seems driven by an exaggerated fear, in fact, a paranoia, about the future capabilities of U.S. missile defense. I call these fears exaggerated because I believe that missile defense can never provide an impenetrable shield. Russia is building not only new generations of ICBMs but even more dangerous weapons systems that seem to step out of the pages of a science fiction comic book, including a nuclear torpedo of unlimited range and a nuclear-powered cruise missile. Russia seems intent on probing the boundaries of existing arms control agreements, particularly the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty which laid the basis for the next 25 years of successful arms limitations. Even more than the uninformed statements by the U.S. president, the rhetoric of the Russian president - increasingly defining Russia’s national power as a function of its nuclear arsenal - erodes both the prospect of future arms control and the moral taboo against initiating the use of nuclear weapons. The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is due to expire in 2021 and although President Putin has raised the prospect of extending the treaty, President Trump has so far rebuffed such proposals.

Joint Comprehensive Program Of Action

In the shorter term, I am especially concerned about the U.S. decision to withdraw from, that is to violate, the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action with Iran. This agreement is unprecedented, both in its inspection and verification requirements, and it prevented the risk of a tenth state breaking into the nuclear weapons club. I do not believe that Iranian development of a nuclear weapon is imminent but I am deeply concerned about the follow-on effects of this decision, that is the undermining of U.S. credibility and commitment to any agreement, the creation of a serious dispute between the U.S. and its best allies in Europe and Asia, the erosion of the international rules-based order and a resurgent radicalism in Iran.

North Korea

I am less pessimistic but still deeply concerned about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. President Trump did the right thing, trading in violent rhetoric for an opportunity for dialogue. There are dozens of reasons to distrust North Korea’s approach to negotiations and to doubt the capability of the Trump administration to negotiate a meaningful, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. But the pursuit of negotiation is far preferable to simply sleepwalking towards war, as we seemed to be doing a year ago.

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty remains central to our shared global ambition to prevent the development of new nuclear weapons and to reduce existing arsenals. On the surface, the deliberations at NPT conferences often seem utterly divorced from the real world. In fact, all the concerns I’ve just listed have a real effect on the degree of consensus you can reach among NPT parties and on the commitment that other parties show to the treaty.

For the 2020 Review Conference, I can foresee the worst but I am determined to work for the best. The RevCon can easily be upset either by the U.S. and Russia sniping at each other or by the continued inability of the states in the Middle East to sit down together and begin the process of discussing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East. But the most severe threat to the unity of states-parties is the growing frustration of non-nuclear weapon states with the pace of nuclear disarmament. Seeing no new U.S.-Russian agreements since 2010 and the new threatening developments in Washington and Moscow that I’ve already described, the majority of the world’s non-nuclear weapon states have made clear that they will demand more urgent progress in 2020.

Moving Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World

So what can we do to move towards a world free from nuclear weapons?

Near-Term Steps

There are a number of steps that the United States and Russia could take right now that would change the current trajectory. First and most simply, to hear President Trump and President Putin repeat what Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan said in 1985 - that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought - would be of value, would provide some reassurance that these two leaders understand their responsibilities to humanity. Secondly, the United States and Russia need to extend New START. Third, they need to make a political decision to work harder on resolving the dispute about compliance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty. And fourth there needs to be a more regular dialogue between Moscow and Washington on both the military and political level, to pursue risk reduction measures that would prevent a conventional conflict from escalating to a nuclear one and to explore other steps that would allow each to maintain security at a lower level of armament. Finally, the United States should reassert the leadership it showed after 2010 when it led an intensive dialogue among the P5 nuclear-weapon states to give the world greater transparency, to reduce nuclear risks, and to lay the groundwork for future multilateral arms control.

It’s not easy to get either Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin to do something that reminds them of Mikhail Gorbachev or Barack Obama. In fact, it’s not easy to get them to do something unless you can convince them that it was their own brilliant idea. But it is an obligation of the rest of the world to continue to press for this. I know from my own experience with bilateral diplomacy that meetings with either Russian or American leaders always have an agenda filled with urgent items and that concerns about long-term items such as arms control simply fall out of the conversation. It is crucial that not only Japanese leaders but all world leaders press both Presidents to take serious action.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Beyond Moscow and Washington, what can non-nuclear weapon states do for themselves to move us towards a nuclear-weapon-free world? Many non-nuclear weapon states have sought to answer that question by negotiating a new treaty banning nuclear weapons, adopted last July.

The drafting of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons last year was historic. Some would like to see it as simply an expression of frustration on the part of the non-nuclear weapon states. It’s a lot more than that. It is a strong moral and ethical statement. And more than that, it is something tangible, something that can be touched by the hibakusha and the citizens of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. It is a statement of reality that the risk of nuclear war is not born only by the nuclear-weapon states but by the entire world. And it is intended to serve as an impulse for further action globally on nuclear disarmament. I’m well aware of its limitations. The TPNW will not by itself immediately eliminate any nuclear weapons. And it does not provide a pathway for Washington and Moscow to overcome their current impasse.

I don’t see the discussion between advocates and skeptics of the TPNW as being an argument about practicalities or about whether this treaty can work. It is - or it should be - a respectful discussion about deterrence. Nations that face no immediate military threat tend to underestimate the importance that military alliances and military deterrence play for those states that do face actual military threats. Similarly, those states whether in Europe or in Asia that feel reassurance under the nuclear umbrella of the United States tend not to appreciate how strongly concerned other states are about the disastrous humanitarian effects that a nuclear war would cause.

What is needed now is a multi-sided discussion on a topic that is easy to define and extremely difficult to resolve: how to guarantee the security of the world and of each nation without resort to nuclear deterrence. This is a discussion that has to bring together not only the idealists and social activists who helped to bring about the TPNW but also the security experts and military leaders who have the responsibility of providing for their nations’ security. It has to bring together not only nuclear-weapon states but those who are allies of nuclear-weapon states and those who feel themselves to be far from any military threat. Given my own experience with the ineffectiveness of the United Nations as a place to discuss such difficult issues, I think it has to start smaller than a conference of 190 countries.

UN Secretary-General’s Disarmament Agenda

Washington and Moscow are not going to lead this discussion. What can the rest of the world do? The UN Secretary General has laid out a comprehensive blueprint on what needs to be done on disarmament issues to provide genuine security for our citizens. I love the document. I’d like to focus in particular on what he says about nuclear disarmament.

He calls on the United States and Russia to resolve INF compliance concerns, extend New START and pursue additional reductions. He encourages all states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty, establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, pursue nuclear risk reduction measures, and develop nuclear disarmament verification standards and techniques. He warned that the international community is moving backward on disarmament. “Let us all work together to bring new urgency to achieve the universal goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world,” he said while unveiling his agenda at the University of Geneva in late May.

So how do we take forward an idea on which not only everyone in this room but most of the world is united upon?

Joint Enterprise

Now is the time to convene a high-level summit approach to help overcome the impasse on nuclear disarmament. Leaders from a core group of states can invite their counterparts - 20 to 30 heads of states of nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon countries - to join a one or two day summit on steps to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. This could be a starting point for ongoing regular disarmament discussions at the expert and ministerial level. As the former foreign minister Kishida argued, this dialogue must be based both on a clear understanding of the devastating impact of nuclear weapon use and an objective assessment of the security concerns of states.

This is not a new idea. Four of the best American thinkers on such issues - George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn - have been arguing for several years for a Joint Enterprise, a new multilateral effort that would take concrete, practical steps to create the conditions that would make possible genuine nuclear disarmament. As outlined by the “four horsemen,” a Joint Enterprise summit would be supplemented by a joint communique from all participating states and national commitments to work towards disarmament. Unfortunately, the leadership of such an effort will not come from either Washington or Moscow. When the long-time ‘leader of the free world’ is deliberately stepping away from leadership, the other democratic nations of the world must take up the challenge. It’s up to Japan, to Germany, to Canada, to other nations that still believe in multilateralism to get this effort started.

Discussion of the conditions that would help achieve a nuclear weapons-free world must become as common among world leaders as discussions about tariffs or immigration. The constant raising of this topic is the responsibility of Presidents and Prime Ministers, and it is the duty of citizens of all nations to remind their leaders of this responsibility.

It is written in Pirkei Avot, a well-known Jewish text, that “you are not obligated to complete the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.” Here in Nagasaki, we say again that all of us – elected leaders, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens – “we will not desist from this duty.”

Thank you and God bless you!

 

 

Country Resources:

Posted: July 28, 2018

China Develops, Deploys New Missiles

China Develops, Deploys New Missiles


China is advancing its missile capabilities, with the official deployment of an intermediate-range ballistic missile and the reported development of a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile. Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian told reporters on April 26 that China had deployed its first intermediate-range ballistic missile, the DF-26. The missile has a range of 4,000 kilometers and was first unveiled in September 2015. (See ACT, June 2016.) The U.S. Defense Department said that China had deployed the missile in a 2017 report on Chinese military developments. (See ACT, July/August 2017.)

Military vehicles carrying China’s DF-26 ballistic missiles are displayed at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on September 3, 2015 during a military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II. (Photo: Greg Baker/AFP/Getty Images)China tested the air-launched ballistic missile, designated as CH-AS-X-13 by the United States, five times between 2016 and January 2018, according to an April report in The Diplomat. The U.S. intelligence community assesses that the missile will be ready for deployment by 2025, according to a source who spoke to The Diplomat. No other country has deployed this missile type, although others have developed it. In March, Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced the Kinzhal missile, which some analysts have characterized as an air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.—ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE

Posted: June 1, 2018

Pakistan Advances Sea Leg of Triad

Pakistan Advances Sea Leg of Triad


Pakistan’s conducted its second test of the Babur-3 nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) in late March, more than a year after its first test, in January 2017. The continuing Pakistani development of the sea-based nuclear deterrent is a response to India’s triad of land-, sea-, and air-launched nuclear weapons. A Pakistani military statement, without citing India by name, states that the Babur-3 will provide a “credible second-strike capability, augmenting existing deterrence” especially in light of “provocative nuclear strategies and posture being pursued in the neighborhood through induction of nuclear submarines and ship-borne nuclear missiles.”

As with the 2017 test, the Babur-3 was reported by the Pakistani military to have an estimated range of 450 kilometers and to have “successfully” hit its target with “precise accuracy.” (See ACT, March 2017.) Slight differences include the military reporting that the missile launched from a “dynamic” underwater platform, rather than a “mobile” one, and video released by the military seems to confirm the missile ejecting horizontally, which could eventually lead to deployment through submarine torpedo tubes rather than a vertical launch system. The Babur-3 SLCM is widely expected to be carried on Pakistan’s diesel-powered Agosta 90B submarine.—SHERVIN TAHERAN

Posted: June 1, 2018

Putin Says New ICBM Set for 2020

Putin Says New ICBM Set for 2020


Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia’s new, heavy, long-range missile, capable of carrying up to 15 independently targetable nuclear warheads, will be operational in 2020, the Russian state news agency Tass reported May 18. The RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has been under development since the 2000s to replace the R-36M2 Voevoda ICBM operational since 1988, Tass said. The missile system is one of the weapons Russia is advancing to reduce the impact of U.S. missile defenses on Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Putin told the same meeting of military and defense sector officials that Russia will deploy the Avangard hypersonic-glider warhead beginning in 2019, according to Russia’s RT news service. RT described the Avangard as able to carry a nuclear warhead through the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds, making it virtually impossible to intercept.—TERRY ATLAS

Posted: June 1, 2018

Qatar Displays Chinese Missile

Qatar Displays Chinese Missile

Qatar riled its Persian Gulf neighbors when it displayed a previously unseen, Chinese-made short-range ballistic missile system at a military parade. The sale of the missiles had not been public knowledge until they were spotted on transporter-erector launchers in a Dec. 17 rehearsal for the Qatar National Day Parade. Joseph Dempsey, a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, recognized the missiles, which he highlighted in a series of Twitter posts. In an observation confirmed by other analysts, he noted that the two eight-axle launcher vehicles in the parade appeared to be configured to carry BP-12A ballistic missile canisters, although they could alternatively carry eight canisters for the smaller, related SY-400 missile.

Members of Qatar's armed forces march in national day celebrations December 18, 2017. The parade reportedly included a previously unseen, Chinese-made short-range ballistic missile system.  (Photo: STRINGER/AFP/Getty Images)Officials from the China National Precision Machinery Import/Export Corp. marketed the BP-12A at an international arms show in 2012 as having a range up to 280 kilometers (173 miles) and a payload capability of 480 kilograms. The SY-400 is believed to have a similar or slightly shorter range and roughly half the payload capability. The sale of the BP-12A does not appear to violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which urges its 35 members to restrict exports of missile technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload a distance of at least 300 kilometers.

China’s bid to join the MTCR was rejected in 2004 due to concern that Chinese entities were continuing to provide missile technology to North Korea, although at the time Beijing voluntarily pledged to follow the regime’s export control guidelines and has since generally tightened its export controls. In recent years, China has increasingly marketed and sold the SY-400 and other missile systems to foreign customers, particularly in the Middle East.

The reveal of the missile sale comes amid a months-long dispute between Qatar and other gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where media outlets complained that Qatar’s new missiles potentially could strike targets in their countries. Saudi Arabia also has secretly purchased ballistic missiles from China.—MACLYN SENEAR

Posted: March 1, 2018

Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories

December 2017

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: December 2017

The following chart lists 31 countries, including the United States and its allies, which currently possess ballistic missiles. For each country, the chart details the type of missile, its operational status, and the best-known public estimates of each missile’s range.

Only nine (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) of the 31 states below are known or suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. These nine states and Iran have produced or flight-tested missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. China and Russia are the only two states that are not U.S. allies that have a proven capability to launch ballistic missiles from their territories that can strike the continental United States. This factsheet does not list countries' cruise missiles.

Ballistic Missile Basics

Ballistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then they follow an unpowered, free-falling trajectory toward their targets. They are classified by the maximum distance that they can travel, which is a function of how powerful the missile’s engines (rockets) are and the weight of the missile’s payload. To add more distance to a missile’s range, rockets are stacked on top of each other in a configuration referred to as staging. There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles:

  • Short-range ballistic missiles, traveling less than 1,000 kilometers (approximately 620 miles);
  • Medium-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 1,000–3,000 kilometers (approximately 620-1,860 miles);
  • Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 3,000–5,500 kilometers (approximately 1,860-3,410 miles); and
  • Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), traveling more than 5,500 kilometers.

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are referred to as theater ballistic missiles, whereas ICBMs or long-range ballistic missiles are described as strategic ballistic missiles. Missiles are often classified by fuel-type: liquid or solid propellants. Missiles with solid fuel require less maintenance and preparation time than missiles with liquid fuel because solid-propellants have the fuel and oxidizer together, whereas liquid-fueled missiles must keep the two separated until right before deployment.

Country

System[1]

Status

Range[2]

Propellant

Afghanistan

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Scud-B

Unknown[3]

300 km

Liquid

Armenia

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Scud-B[4]

Operational

300 km

Liquid

SS-21 Scarab-C

Operational

70-120 km

Liquid

SS-26 Stone (Iskander E)

Operational

280 km

Solid

Bahrain

ATACMS Block 1 (MGM-140)

Operational

165 km

Solid

Belarus

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

SS-21 Scarab B

Operational

120 km

Solid

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

China

B611 (CSS-X-11)

Operational

250 km

Solid

M-7 (CSS-8)

Operational

190-250 km


Liquid

DF-4 (CSS-3)

Operational

5,500+ km


Liquid

DF-5 (CSS-4, Mod 1)

Operational

12,000 km


Liquid

DF-5A (CSS-4, Mod 2)

Operational

13,000+ km


Liquid

DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3)

Operational

12,000 km

Liquid

DF-5C

Tested/Development

13,000 km

Liquid

DF-11 (CSS-7)

Operational

280 km


Solid

DF-11A (CSS-7)

Operational

350 km

Solid

DF-15A (CSS-6)

Operational

900 km


Solid

DF-15B (CSS-6)

Operational

50-800 km

Solid

DF-15C (CSS-6)

Development

Unknown

Solid

DF-16 (CSS-11)

Operational

800-1000 km

Solid

DF-21 (CSS-5, Mod 1)

Operational

1750+ km


Solid

DF-21A (CSS-5, Mod 2)

Operational

1,770+ km


Solid

DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 4)

Operational

2,150-2,500 km


Solid

DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) ASBM variant

Operational

1,500 km


Solid

DF-26

Operational

4,000 km

Solid

DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1)

Operational

7,000+ km


Solid

DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2)

Operational

11,000+ km

Solid

DF-41 (CSS-X-20)

Development

12,000-15,000 km

Solid

Julang (JL) 1 (CSS-N-3) (SLBM)

Retiring

1,000+ km


Solid

Julang (JL) 2 (CSS-N-14) (SLBM)

Operational

7,000+ km

Solid

Julang (JL) 3 (SLBM)

Development

unknown

Solid

Egypt

R-300 (SS-1-C Scud-B)

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Project-T (Scud B-100)

Operational

450 km

Liquid

Scud-C

Operational

550 km

Liquid

R-70 Luna M (Frog-7B)

Operational

70 km

Solid

Sakr-80

Operational

80+ km

Solid

France

M45 (SLBM)

Operational (Will be replaced by M51)

4,000-6000 km


Solid

M51.1 (SLBM)

Operational

6,000+ km


Solid

M51.2 (SLBM)

Tested/Development

6,000+ km


Solid

M51.3 (SLBM)

Development

unknown

Solid

Georgia

Scud B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Greece

ATACMS Block 1 (MGM-140)

Operational

165 km

Solid

India[6]

Prithvi-I

Operational

150 km

Liquid

Prahaar

Tested/ Development

150 km

Solid

Prithvi-II

Operational

250-350 km

Liquid

Prithvi-III

Development

350 km

Solid

Dhanush (ship-launched)

Operational

400 km

Liquid

Sagarika/K-15 (SLBM)

Tested/Development

700 km

Solid

Agni-I

Operational

700-1,200 km

Solid

Agni-II

Operational

2,000+ km

Solid

Agni-III

Operational

3,200+ km

Solid

Agni-IV

Tested/Development

3,500+ km

Solid

Agni-V

Tested/Development

5,200+ km

Solid

Agni-VI

Development

8,000-10,000 km

Solid

K-4 (SLBM)

Tested/Development

3,500 km

Solid

K-5 (SLBM)

Rumored Development

6,000+ km

Solid

Iran

 

Mushak-120

Operational

130 km

Solid

Mushak-160

Operational

160 km

Solid

Qiam-1

Operational

500-1,000 km

Liquid

Fateh-110

Operational

200-300 km

Solid

Fateh-313

Operational

500 km

Solid

Tondar-69 (CSS-8)

Operational

150 km

Solid

Scud-B (Shahab 1)

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Scud-C (Shahab 2)

Operational

500 km

Liquid

Zolfaghar

Operational

700 km

Solid

Shahab-3 (Zelzal-3)

Operational

800-1,000 km

Liquid

Ghadr 1/Modified Shahab-3/Kadr Ghadr 110

Tested/Development

1,000-2,000 km

Liquid

Ashura/Sejjil/Sejjil-2

Operational

1,500-2,500 km

Solid

BM-25/Musudan (Suspected)

Unclear

2,500+ km

Liquid

Khoramshahr

Tested/Development

2,000 km

Liquid

Emad-1

Tested/Development

1,750-2,000 km

Liquid

Iraq[7]

Al Fat’h (Ababil-100)

Operational

160 km

Solid

Al Samoud II

Operational

180-200 km

Liquid

Israel

LORA

Operational

280 km

Solid

Jericho-2

Operational

1,500-3,500 km

Solid

Jericho-3

Operational

4,800-6,500 km

Solid

Kazakhstan

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Tochka-U (SS-21 Scarab-B)

Operational

120 km

Solid

R-300 (SS-1-C Scud-B)

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Libya[8]

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Al Fatah (Itislat)

Tested/Development (on hold)

1,300-1,500 km

Liquid

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

North Korea

KN-02 (Toksa/SS-21 variant)

Operational

120-170 km

Solid

Scud-B variant/Hwasong 5

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Scud-C variant/Hwasong 6

Operational

500 km

Liquid

Scud-C variant/Hwasong 7

Operational

700-1,000 km

Liquid

No-Dong-1

Operational

1,200-1,500 km

Liquid

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Taepo Dong-1[9]

Tested

2,000-5,000 km

Liquid

Taepo Dong-2 (2-stage) [10]

Tested/Development

4,000-10,000 km

Liquid

Taepo Dong-2 (3-stage)/Unha-2 SLV

Tested/Development

10,000-15,000 km

Liquid

No-Dong-2(B)/ Musudan/BM-25/Hwasong-10 [11]

Tested/Development

2,500-4,000 km

Liquid

KN-17/Hwasong-12

Tested/Development

4,500 km

Liquid

KN-08/Hwasong-13 

Development

5,500-11,500 km

Liquid

KN-14/Hwasong-13/KN-08 Mod 2

Tested/Development

8,000-10,000 km

Liquid

KN-11/Pukkuksong-1/Polaris-1

Tested/Development

1,200 km

Solid

KN-15/Pukkuksong-2

Tested/Development

1,200-2,000 km

Solid

KN-20/Hwasong-14

Tested/Development

10,000+ km

Liquid

KN-22/Hwasong-15

Tested/Development

13,000 km

Liquid

KN-18/ Scud variant

Tested/Development

450+

Liquid

Pakistan

Hatf-1

Operational

70-100 km

Solid

Hatf-2 (Abdali)

Operational

180-200 km

Solid

Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)

Operational

290 km

Solid

Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4)

Operational

750 km

Solid

Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4)

Tested/Development

900 km

Solid

Ghauri-1 (Hatf-5)

Operational

1,250-1,500 km

Liquid

Ghauri-2 (Hatf-5a)

Tested/Development

1,800 km

Liquid

Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6)

Operational

1,500-2,500 km

Solid

Ghauri-3 [12]

Development

3,000 km

Liquid

Nasr (Hatf-9)

Development

60 km

Solid

Ababeel

Development

2,200 km

Solid

Romania

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Russia

RS-20V (SS-18 Satan)

Operational

10,200-16,000 km

Liquid

RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto)

Operational

10,000 km

Liquid

SS-21 Scarab A

Operational

70 km

Solid

SS-21 Scarab B/ Tochka U

Operational

120 km

Solid

SS-24

Operational

10,000 km

Solid

RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle)

Operational

10,500-11,000 km

Solid

RS-12M1 Topol-M (SS-27) [13]

Operational

11,000 km

Solid

RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod-X-2) (silo)

Operational

11,000 km

Solid

RS-24 Yars (mobile and silo versions) (SS-27 Mod 2)

Operational

10,500 km

Solid

RS-26 Rubezh/Yars M (SS-27)

Tested/Development

5,800 km

Solid

SS-26 Iskander

Operational

400-500 km

Solid

SS-N-8 (R-29) (SLBM)

Operational

8,000 km

Liquid

RSM-50 Volna (SS-N-18) (SLBM)

Operational

6,500-8,000 km

Liquid

SS-N-20 Sturgeon (R-39) (SLBM)

Retiring

8,300 km

Solid

RSM-54 Sineva (SS-N-23 or R-29RM) (SLBM)

Operational

8,300 km

Liquid

RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32) (SLBM)

Operational

8,300 km

Solid

SS-26 Tender (Iskander-M)

Operational

500 km

Solid

SS-26 Stone (Iskander-E)

Operational

280 km

Solid

Saudi Arabia

DF-3 (CSS-2)

Operational

2,600 km

Liquid

DF-21 East Wind (CSS-5)

Operational

2,100+ km

Solid

Slovakia

SS-21

Operational

120 km

Solid

South Korea

NHK-1 (Hyonmu-1)

Operational

180 km

Solid

NHK-2 (Hyonmu-2)

Operational

180-250 km

Solid

NHK-2B (Hyunmoo-2B)

Operational

500-800 km

Solid

NHK-2C (Hyunmoo-2C)

Development

800 km

Solid

ATACMS Block 1

Operational

165 km

Solid

Syria

SS-21-B (Scarab-B)

Operational

120 km

Solid

SS-1-C (Scud-B)

Operational

300 km


Liquid

SS-1-D (Scud-C)

Operational

500-700 km

Liquid

SS-1-E (Scud-D)

Tested/Development

700 km

Liquid

CSS-8 (Fateh 110A)

Operational

210-250 km

Solid

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

Taiwan

Qing Feng

Operational

130 km

Liquid

Tien Chi

Operational

120 km

Solid

ATACMS Block 1

Operational

165 km

Solid

Turkey

ATACMS Block 1 (MGM-140)

Operational

165 km

Solid

J-600T Yildirim I and II

Operational

150-300 km

Solid

Turkmenistan

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

United Arab Emirates

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

ATACMS Block 1A

Operational

300 km

Solid

 

United Kingdom

D-5 Trident II (SLBM)

Operational

7,400-12,000 km

Solid

United States

ATACMS Block I

Operational

165 km

Solid

ATACMS Block IA

Operational

300 km

Solid

Minuteman III (LGM-30G)

Operational

9,650-13,000 km

Solid

D-5 Trident II (SLBM)

Operational

7,400-12,000 km

Solid

Vietnam

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

Scud-C variant

Operational

500 km

Liquid

 

Yemen

Scud-B

Operational

300 km

Liquid

SS-21 (Scarab)

Operational

70-120 km

Solid

Scud C variant

Operational

600 km

Liquid

Frog-7

Operational

70 km

Solid

ENDNOTES:

1. All missiles are surface-to-surface unless otherwise noted. SLBM is an acronym for a submarine-launched ballistic missile and ASBM is an acronym for an anti-ship ballistic missile.

2. The ranges, given in kilometers (km) are estimates based on publicly available sources. These figures, however, do not all necessarily reflect the missile’s maximum range, which may vary with its payload. Equipping a missile with a lighter payload would increase its range. Similarly, a heavier payload would diminish a missile’s range.

3. A January 15, 2001 report by the UN Monitoring Group on Afghanistan concluded that, prior to the October 2001 U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan, there were approximately 100 Scud-B missiles and at least four Scud mobile launchers in Afghanistan. The current distribution and operational capability of the missiles are unknown, although the UN Monitoring Group speculated that up to 30 of the missiles might be under control of the Northern Alliance.

4. According to a 1997 report by Lev Rokhlin, then-Chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on Defense, Russia transferred eight Scud-B ballistic missiles and 24 Scud launchers, along with other military hardware, to Armenia between 1993-1996. Responding to publication of the report in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta and to formal requests by the Azerbaijan government, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered an investigation into the claims. They were subsequently confirmed in April 1997 by Aman Tuleyev, then-Russian minister for relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States.

5. According to the Department of Defense’s 2009 report on China’s military power, Beijing is investing in conventionally-armed ASBMs based on the CSS-5 airframe which could employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-munitions” in order to hold surface ships at risk.

6. India and Pakistan claim that their missiles are not deployed, meaning that the missiles are not on launchers, aimed at particular locations, or kept on a high state of alert. The missiles are in a state of “induction” with the nuclear warheads stored in facilities separate from the missile units and airfields. Pakistan and India, however, have deployed their missiles on a number of occasions, such as the Kargil crisis in July 1999.

7. Because of lack of current documentary evidence and inconsistencies in source reporting, the status of Iraq’s ballistic missile arsenal is unclear. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) determined in 2003 that the Al Samoud II and the Al Fat’h missiles exceeded the range permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. That resolution prohibited Iraq from possessing missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers. UN inspectors began the destruction of these missiles on March 1, 2003, but the inspectors were withdrawn before all of the missiles had been eliminated. According to UNMOVIC’s 13th Quarterly Report, only two-thirds of the Al Samoud II missiles declared by Iraq had been destroyed. The 2004 Iraq Survey Group Report by the United States asserted that a “full accounting of the Al Fat’h missiles may not be possible.”

8. According to a CIA Report, Libya privately pledged to the United States in 2003 that it would eliminate all missiles classified as Category I systems by the MTCR. Category I pertains to missiles capable of traveling 300 kilometers or more with a payload of at least 500 kilograms, the presumed minimum weight for a first-generation nuclear warhead. Libya, however, still maintains a missile development program for systems that fall below the Category I threshold capability. Given Libya's obligations under its 2003 WMD renunciation, development of its Al-Fatah missile is on hold until it can meet MTCR requirements. Additionally, Libya's Scud-B arsenal is of questionable utility due to poor maintenance and testing record.

9. The Taepo Dong-1 was first flight-tested August 31, 1998. Its first two stages worked but a third stage failed. The missile has not been flight-tested again and is widely believed to have been a technology demonstrator rather than a missile system intended for deployment.

10. North Korea has carried out two flight tests of what is believed to be its Taepo Dong-2 missile. The test of a two-stage version failed about 40 seconds into its flight on July 5, 2006. The missile is assessed to have used a cluster of No Dong missiles for its first stage and a Scud or No Dong-based second stage. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched what it called its Unha-2 space launch vehicle, widely believed to be a three-stage variant of its Taepo Dong-2. The first two stages of the rocket were successful and fell in the splashdown zones previously announced by North Korea. U.S. Northern Command said the day of the launch that the third stage and its payload both landed in the Pacific Ocean. Independent analysts assess that the second stage of the Taepo Dong-2 is based on a variant of the Soviet SS-N-6.

11. Although North Korea has never flight-tested the intermediate-range Musudan, a variant of the SS-N-6, Washington alleges that Pyongyang has deployed the missile. The SS-N-6 originally was a Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, but North Korea is reportedly deploying it as a road-mobile missile. There also is speculation that North Korea has transferred this missile to Iran.

12. Development of the Ghauri-3 missile was reportedly abandonded for unknown reasons.

13. The SS-27 (Topol-M/RS-12M) is deployed in both road-mobile and silo-based configurations.


Sources: Arms Control Association; Missile Defense Agency; U.S. Department of Defense; Congressional Research Service; National Air and Space Intelligence Center; U.S. Department of State; Federation of American Scientists; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Nuclear Threat Initiative

-Research assistance by Brianna Starosciak

 


 

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

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