"I actually have a pretty good collection of Arms Control Today, which I have read throughout my career. It's one of the few really serious publications on arms control issues."

– Gary Samore
Former White House Coordinator for Arms Control and WMD Terrorism
Press Releases

NMD Program Again Criticized by Independent Review Panel

Wade Boese

CONCLUDING NEARLY THREE years IN A FOLLOW-UP review to a February 1998 report warning that the national missile defense (NMD) program was on a "rush to failure," an independent panel informed Congress in November that despite a program restructuring that "reduced program risks," NMD efforts are replete with test delays, management problems, hardware shortages and an underestimation of the challenges of intercepting ballistic missiles. Based on its findings, the 12-member review panel, headed once again by retired Air Force General Larry Welch, recommended that the planned June 2000 deployment readiness review be considered a "feasibility" rather than a "readiness to deploy" assessment, which the panel said could not be made until at least 2003. If additional delays occur, the Welch panel advised both reviews be deferred.

President Clinton signed legislation July 22 that calls on the United States to deploy an NMD system against a limited ballistic missile attack as soon as "technologically possible." Clinton, however, has repeatedly stated that a deployment decision, which he will make in July 2000, will be based on four criteria: technological readiness, the maturity of the so-called "rogue nation" ICBM threat, cost factors and arms control considerations.

While describing as "sensible" a January 1999 program restructuring that shifted the target deployment date for an initial NMD operating capability from 2003 to 2005 in order to permit more flight tests before critical decisions, the Welch panel-composed of retired military officers and technical experts in the field-found that delays in ground and flight tests, as well as delays in developing key simulation and testing facilities, "are compressing the schedule." Because the altered schedule is still "highly demanding," any further delays should be accompanied by delays in decision making in order to reduce program risks.

In fact, the panel claims that the resources currently available for simulation development and integrated ground tests are "inadequate to provide the information needed" for a deployment readiness decision in July. The review frankly states that current plans to lower program risks associated with the delays "did not provide much confidence to the panel."

According to the panel, a "demonstration of readiness to deploy will not come until 2003 at the earliest." (Emphasis added.) The system's final configuration will not be determined until 2001 and the first integrated test of the intercept booster and exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) will not take place until 2003.

In general, the Welch panel warns against allowing "calendar milestones" to drive the deployment decision rather than "performance milestones." Program managers were called on to not sacrifice "performance requirements and basic system engineering and design functions...to the calendar since no decision will produce successful deployment until the system can be shown to perform as required." The panel also cautioned against letting concerns of having an "emergency" deployment capability detract from the overall program.

Management of the NMD program is described by the panel as having "unusual fragmentation and confusion about authority and responsibility." In particular, government managers were assessed as not having "authority commensurate with the responsibility of running the program," while Boeing, the company tasked with actual production, did not have firm contracts in place with some of its major subcontractors. Boeing was also regarded as putting too much emphasis on integrating program elements rather than on the performance of those elements.

Perhaps most seriously, the panel judged both government and private program managers as continuing to underestimate the difficulty of developing a reliable hit-to-kill capability, which demands that the interceptor physically hit an incoming ballistic missile in order to destroy it-a task often described as "hitting a bullet with a bullet." The panel noted that such a capability has only been successfully demonstrated twice in comparison with at least eight failures. (The review panel completed its report before a prototype's successful October 2 intercept of an ICBM target. See ACT, September/October 1999.)

The Welch panel singled out the EKV program as lacking adequate spare parts and development articles, a situation that is "driving flight test delays." The lack of a spare for an important part, the inertial measurement unit (IMU), on the EKV caused a delay in one flight test, and may delay an additional test because the manufacturer of the IMU discontinued that line of its business.

Questions were also raised as to whether or not the EKV, being built by Raytheon, would be able to withstand the very high accelerations and severe vibrations of the advanced booster on which the deployed EKV will be mounted, as opposed to the accelerations of the lower-performance surrogate booster that will be used for tests until at least 2003. Though Raytheon's risk management program "appears to be well conceived, well structured and well executed," the company shares the panel's view, according to the report, that the coupling of the EKV to the advanced booster is a "high risk to the program."

The panel also expressed concern that the flight tests encompass "very few geometries and intercept conditions" For example, integrated flight tests 7-13 will be conducted using a single geometry. The data derived from those tests will then be used to "anchor" computer-generated simulations that will assess the system's effectiveness against incoming targets with many trajectories and under a variety of conditions that an NMD system charged with protecting the entire United States would face. The panel indicated that the validity of those simulated tests would be "compromised seriously by the level of extrapolation that will be required to assess capability over the required flight envelope." Finally, the report notes that the NMD Test and Evaluation Master Plan is still in draft form and recommended that it be readied "expeditiously."

The Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, which is responsible for overseeing all U.S. efforts for defenses against ballistic missiles, formulated an internal two-page response to the Welch panel's report that reportedly concurred with most of the panel's findings and recommendations. The response, however, has not been made publicly available.

Pentagon Notifies Congress of $13 Billion in Possible Arms Sales

Wade Boese

IN A SPAN of just three weeks, the Department of Defense notified Congress of more than $13.3 billion in proposed arms sales to 11 countries, including more than $5 billion in weapons to South Korea. This wave of congressional notifications, which began October 28, exceeded last year's total of $12.1 billion in notified sales and raised the value of proposed arms sales through the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program above the $20 billion mark for 1999.

A Pentagon spokesperson said there was nothing "unique" about the timing of the notifications. Typically, the Department of Defense submits a slew of notifications before Congress leaves for recesses, a practice that, in effect can limit the time available for extensive congressional scrutiny, though most sales are discussed informally before official notification. While notifications can be made during congressional recesses, the Pentagon spokesperson remarked that that would not be the best way to "conduct business."

The 1976 Arms Export Control Act requires that all FMS sales, as well as direct commercial sales, of "major defense equipment" on the U.S. Munitions List valued at $14 million or more be reported to Congress. Congress then has 30 days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand) to enact a joint resolution of disapproval to block a sale. Though Congress has never exercised this authority, not all notifications result in final sales as the purchasing country may buy all, some or none of the proposed arms.

South Korea, which suspended and canceled arms buys last year due to a severe economic slump, led all prospective buyers with more than $5 billion in possible purchases, including surface-to-surface missiles, 20 F-16C/D fighter aircraft component kits and 14 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile systems. Seoul's $4 billion buy of the PAC-3, which is being developed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft, has not been finalized because South Korea is considering Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles as an alternative. Washington has warned that such a move could lead to inter-operability problems between U.S. and South Korean forces.

Thailand, another state recovering from an economic depression, requested 18 F-16A/B fighters for $157 million. The proposed buy follows Thailand's March 1998 cancellation of a purchase of eight F/A-18 fighters for which it had already made a partial payment of $75 million. In that case, Washington assumed the more than $250 million in remaining payments and delivered the fighters to the U.S. Marine Corps.

Despite renewed Asian interest in buying arms, Europe accounted for the highest value of the Pentagon's recently notified sales with six nations (Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom) asking for $6.9 billion in weapons. Greece topped the list with a request for up to 70 F-16C/D fighters worth $3.1 billion, and Norway was second with a proposed buy of 30 F-16C/Ds valued at $2.6 billion.

Other proposed deals included Egypt, Israel and Colombia, which is seeking 14 UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters. Helicopter sales to Colombia, intended for use in the U.S.-backed war on drugs, have long been contentious because of the Colombian military's poor human rights record, suspected ties with right-wing paramilitaries and alleged involvement in the drug trade.

CFE Adapted at OSCE Summit in Istanbul

Wade Boese

CONCLUDING NEARLY THREE years of negotiations, the 30 states-parties to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed a treaty adaptation agreement on November 19 that overhauls the outdated, Cold War-era structure of the original treaty. While proclaiming the adapted treaty will "enhance peace, security and stability throughout Europe," President Clinton said he would not submit it for Senate approval until Russia complies with weapons ceilings set out in the revised treaty. Moscow, whose war in Chechnya has only magnified Russia's perennial non-compliance with CFE flank-zone limits, has said it will comply as soon as possible.

Originally signed on November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty imposed equal limits on the tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters that NATO and the former Warsaw Pact could possess between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Aimed at preventing arms build-ups for surprise blitzkrieg-type offensives, the treaty employed a concentric-zone system that mandated smaller deployments of tanks, ACVs and artillery the closer one moved toward the faultline between the alliances. To guard against offensives designed to bypass central Europe, specific "flank zone" limits restricted weapons stationed in northern and southern Europe.

Despite the 1991 break-ups of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the parties continued to implement the treaty, destroying more than 58,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment by May 1996, when the treaty's first review conference was held. However, at the review conference, the parties agreed to start a "thorough process aimed at improving the operation of the treaty in a changing environment." The scope and parameters for the negotiations, which emphasized "taking account of developments since Treaty signature," were agreed to in December 1996, and the actual adaptation negotiations got underway in January 1997.

Negotiators wrapped up the adaptation agreement, which replaces the CFE Treaty's existing bloc and zone limits with a system of national and territorial weapons ceilings, only a week before it was to be signed at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) November 18-19 heads-of-state summit in Istanbul, Turkey. The extensively detailed and technical protocols for inspections and information exchanges were the final pieces to be concluded. One State Department official remarked that NATO "came close to getting everything it wanted."

Russia's offensive in Chechnya and its associated flank limit non-compliance, however, jeopardized signature of the agreement. Last-minute talks securing a package of political commitments by several states-termed the "Final Act"-to reduce weapons levels even further than stipulated in the adapted treaty, as well as Russian pledges to withdraw forces from Georgia and Moldova and to exercise restraint in weapons deployments bordering the Baltic states, made signature of the adaptation agreement possible. The Final Act's preamble also took note of a November 1 statement by Moscow that it was committed to all of its CFE Treaty obligations, including weapons limits. (For an analysis and summary of the adapted treaty, see page 24. An approved consolidated treaty text was not yet available.)

While remaining within its overall limits, Moscow, since the original treaty's inception, has exceeded its flank-zone limits, which cap the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs) and artillery in northern and southern Russia. Even prior to launching its military offensive against Chechnya in September, Russia was more than 260 tanks, 1,500 ACVs and 200 artillery pieces above its reduced flank zone limits. Though the adaptation agreement increases the Russian ACV limit from 1,380 to 2,140 in this reduced zone and eliminates the original zone limits entirely, Moscow's ACV levels are currently still much higher than permitted under the adapted treaty.

Entry into force of the adapted treaty now hinges on ratification by all 30 CFE members, until which point the original treaty will remain in effect. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), who helped orchestrate the Senate's October 13 defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, sent two letters to the White House prior to the OSCE summit advising Clinton not to sign the adaptation agreement.

Senator Helms pointed to Russia's offensive in Chechnya, its non-compliance with the flank limits and its deployment of forces in Georgia and Moldova as reasons for not signing. While admonishing Clinton for failing to seek inspections and implement sanctions against Moscow for its treaty non-compliance, Helms wrote that an adapted treaty that did not "serve to constrain Russia" would be of "zero security benefit to the United States" and would have "little chance of winning the Senate's approval."

NMD System Achieves First Intercept; U.S. Clarifies ABM Negotiating Position

THE PROPOSED U.S. national missile defense (NMD) program achieved a significant milestone in early October when it successfully intercepted an ICBM target for the first time. Russia denounced the test and continued to criticize U.S. efforts to seek amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow for the deployment of a limited NMD system. About one month before the test, the Clinton administration announced that it would pursue a phased approach to negotiating modifications to the ABM Treaty, with the first phase requiring only modest changes.

The Intercept Test

On October 2, a modified Minuteman ICBM launched from Vandenberg Air Force base in California was destroyed by a "prototype" NMD kill vehicle launched from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. This was the NMD system's third overall flight test, but only its first attempt to intercept an ICBM target. The Defense Department plans to conduct about 20 NMD intercepts over the next six years, but only two more such tests will be held before June 2000, when the Clinton administration is expected to decide whether to deploy a limited NMD system based on four main criteria: technological readiness, the maturity of the so-called "rogue nation" ICBM threat, cost factors and arms control considerations.

Pentagon sources hailed the test as a major accomplishment demonstrating the ability of an exoatmospheric kill vehicle to hit and destory on impact a projectile travelling at the speed of an ICBM re-entry vehicle. Critics noted that the test was carefully preprogrammed under ideal conditions against a known target and that except for the prototype kill vehicle itself, all of the components involved were surrogates of the ones that would be used in the actual system.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin denounced the test, saying "This test is a step that runs counter to the 1972 ABM Treaty in which Article I bans the very creation of a basis for such a defense. These actions by the United States in effect undermine the key provisions of the ABM Treaty with all the ensuing negative consequences, the responsibility for which will rest with the United States."

Vladimir Yakovlev, commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, told Nezavisi-maya Gazeta on October 5 that U.S. actions have the potential to upset strategic stability. He warned, "If the United States throws out the 1972 ABM Treaty, they will effectively become the culprit for a disruption of the process of limiting nuclear weapons. All agreements that have been signed or are being prepared will come under threat—namely, START I, START II and consultations on START III."

U.S. ABM Stance

Meanwhile, in early September, the Clinton administration provided significant new information about its plans for seeking modifications to the ABM Treaty. Responding to an article in The Washington Post, State Department spokesman James Rubin confirmed on September 8 that the United States would seek modifications to the treaty in two phases. In his press briefing, Rubin said, "We anticipate that any initial [NMD] deployment would be Alaska-based, and we have made no decisions regarding the location of a second site, but our long-term goal includes a second site along with additional interceptors and radars, and we will address future threats as we project them now." Rubin continued, "It is now clear that deployment would require changes to the ABM treaty."

Never before has the Clinton administration unequivocally stated that amendments to the ABM Treaty would be required. In the past, administration officials said modifications to the treaty might or might not be necessary, depending on the specific architecture of the NMD system. By announcing that the first site will likely be based in Alaska, the United States must negotiate changes to Article I, which bans a defense of the national territory, and Article III, which allows deployment of up to 100 interceptor missiles at a single site around a nation's capital or at an ICBM field. (The United States originally designated Grand Forks, North Dakota as its ABM site, while the Russian site is located in Moscow.) The second phase will most likely require additional modifications to the treaty.

High-level talks between the United States and Russia continued throughout September on the ABM Treaty and START III, but made little progress. The sides began such discussions in mid-August in Moscow, based on their agreement at the June 1999 Cologne summit.

U.S. Intelligence Estimate Warns of Rising Missile Threats

IN A NEW National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), summarized and submitted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) as an unclassified report to Congress, the U.S. intelligence community has concluded that "during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China and North Korea, probably from Iran and possibly from Iraq." While detailing the growing missile capabilities of the so-called rogue states, the report, released on September 9, noted that the Russian threat will remain the "most robust and lethal." Theater and national missile defenses will, according to the report, prompt countries developing missiles to respond by "deploying larger forces, penetration aids and countermeasures."

The NIC identified three key characteristics of the evolving missile threat. First, that the majority of missile proliferation is occurring below the ICBM (5,500-kilometer range) level. Second, many countries developing ICBMs "probably assess that the threat of their use" would deter, complicate or constrain U.S. action, despite Washington's recognized military superiority. Third, the probability of ballistic missile use against "U.S. forces or interests,"including with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, has increased to a level higher than that experienced during most of the Cold War. The report further pointed out that "emerging long-range missile powers do not appear to rely on robust test programs," and may be willing to deploy missiles after a single test, thereby reducing the intelligence community's ability to provide adequate warning of ICBM deployment.

Overall, the NIC described the new missile threats as involving states with "considerably fewer missiles with less accuracy, yield, survivability, reliability, and range-payload capability" than those faced in the past. In comparison with Chinese and Russian ICBM stocks, the estimate emphasized that "initial North Korean, Iranian and Iraqi ICBMs would probably be fewer in number—a few to tens rather than hundreds or thousands."

The Rogue States

North Korea, using technology in its Taepo Dong-1 rocket, which was fired in a failed August 1998 attempt to place a satellite into orbit, is considered most likely to develop an ICBM capable of threatening the United States. With "an operable third stage and a reentry vehicle capable of surviving ICBM flight, a converted Taepo Dong-1 SLV [space launch vehicle] could deliver a light payload to the United States," the NIC report claims. (Emphasis in original.) But the NIC judged that it would be unlikely that the missile could carry a nuclear warhead, though a chemical or biological weapon payload is considered feasible.

Pyongyang's still-untested Taepo Dong-2, however, is more likely to be weaponized than the Taepo Dong-1, and with two stages would be capable of delivering "a several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States." A third stage could enable delivery of the larger payload "anywhere in the United States." Though the report noted a Taepo Dong-2 test was probable, North Korea subsequently announced on September 24 a moratorium on missile tests while engaged in negotiations with Washington to improve bilateral relations. (See story.)

By copying North Korea's example of attempting to use the Taepo Dong-1 to launch a satellite, Iran is thought "likely to test a SLV by 2010 that—once developed—could be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States." The NIC admits, however, that intelligence analysts are divided over the likely timing of Iran's first flight test of an ICBM capable of reaching the United States. Estimates range from "likely before 2010" to "less than an even chance by 2015." (Emphasis in original.)

Despite the loss of much of Iraq's missile program infrastructure during and after the Persian Gulf War, the NIC reported that Iraq could test an ICBM threatening the United States by 2015. Baghdad, according to the report, is likely to try to emulate North Korea by extending the range of Scud-based ballistic missiles by using staging technology to develop an ICBM capability. As with Iran, analysts differ on the likelihood of Iraq testing an ICBM before either 2010 or 2015.

An ICBM capability by both Iraq and Iran could be accelerated through foreign assistance, the NIC warns. Russian missile assistance was cited as continuing to be "significant," while China was charged with continuing to "contribute" to missile programs in other countries. The report concludes that Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to sell "a complete ICBM, SLV, or the technologies tantamount to a complete ICBM."

Russia and China, which are credited with having "developed numerous countermeasures" to ballistic missile defense, are judged, however, as likely to sell technologies related to these countermeasures. The report assesses that North Korea, Iran and Iraq would probably "rely initially on available technology—including separating RVs [re-entry vehicles], spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys—to develop penetration aids and countermeasures." The report concludes that "these countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight-test their missiles."

The NIC further reported that countries could pursue non-missile delivery options to avoid missile defenses. Another factor that could prompt delivery by ship, truck or an airplane, according to the report, is that "initial indigenous nuclear weapons designs are likely to be too large and heavy for a modest-sized ballistic missile." The NIC asserts that covert delivery methods, though less impressive, could offer "reliability advantages" over a missile—an important consideration for countries with few nuclear weapons.

Russia and China

Though focused on emerging threats, the NIC observed that Russia's strategic forces will "remain formidable," but will "decrease dramatically...primarily because of budget constraints" to a level "well short of START I or II limitations." The probability of an unauthorized or accidental Russian launch, in the NIC's assessment, is "highly unlikely so long as current technical and procedural safeguards are in place."

The NIE-based report estimated that China, which currently only has about 20 ICBMs that can target the entire United States, will continue modernizing its strategic nuclear forces, introducing two solid-fuel ICBMs: the 8,000-kilometer DF-31 and a longer-range ICBM (usually termed the DF-41). The DF-31 will primarily be targeted at Russia and Asia, while the DF-41 will be directed against the United States.

While noting that Beijing has had the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for 20 years, the NIC estimates that Chinese deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on "a future mobile missile would be many years off." Ultimately, the NIC predicts Beijing "will likely have tens of missiles targeted against the United States, having added a few tens of more survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads—in part influenced by U.S. technology gained through espionage."

Fresh Controversy Over M-11s

The intelligence community's report produced new controversy over Pakistan's alleged November 1992 acquisition of Chinese M-11 short-range ballistic missiles. Long a red flag for those who believe the Clinton administration has deliberately ignored U.S. non-proliferation laws by not imposing sanctions on China, the report's outright assertion of the Chinese transfer prompted Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC) to threaten to hold up a key U.S. State Department nomination until sanctions are imposed on Beijing. "The administration can adhere to the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] law, which it has been flouting for the past six years, or it can make do without any assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation affairs," Helms said at a September 16 hearing.

The State Department has long insisted that the evidence regarding the M-11 transfer is insufficient to satisfy the high threshold needed to impose sanctions for shipments of whole missiles (so-called Category I transfers). The Clinton administration did impose so-called Category II sanctions on China in August 1993 for missile-related materials and technology transfers, and has urged Beijing to join the MTCR.

China obtained relief from the U.S. sanctions in October 1994 by pledging to observe the MTCR's "guidelines and parameters" and end sales of whole ground-to-ground missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers or more. Subsequently, China has reportedly continued its trade in missile components and technologies, which are covered by MTCR while Beijing considers joining the regime.

North Korea Freezes Missile Tests; U.S. to Lift Sanctions; Perry Report Released

Howard Diamond

THE UNITED STATES and North Korea took limited reciprocal steps in September toward strengthening bilateral ties, ending Pyongyang's development and export of long-range missiles, and improving the security of Northeast Asia. President Clinton announced September 17 that he was suspending the sanctions that have been in place since North Korea's 1950 invasion of South Korea. Seven days later, Pyongyang's official news agency, quoting a foreign ministry official, declared that North Korea "will not launch a missile" while negotiations to comprehensively improve relations are ongoing. The moves followed five days of bilateral talks in Berlin.

At a September 17 briefing on the president's decision to lift sanctions, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said the understanding reached in Berlin, together with a recently completed review of U.S. policy by former Defense Secretary William Perry, had put the United States on "a new and more hopeful road," but she added that U.S. cooperation "is not a one-way street." Albright pointed out that the sanctions could be quickly re-imposed at any time and that the administration was prepared "to go down a different road altogether" to defend U.S. interests if necessary.

The president's waiver of sanctions did not require congressional approval, and will take several months to implement as officials from the departments of Commerce, Transportation and the Treasury work to draft new regulations. The sanctions lifted were imposed under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations. They cover imports of North Korean goods, exports of U.S. goods to North Korea, investment in commercial economic sectors in North Korea, remittances to North Korean nationals, and shipping and commercial flights to and from North Korea.

Still in place are U.S. non-proliferation and counter-terrorism controls, which prohibit trade of all munitions list, dual-use and missile technology-related items; any type of U.S. foreign assistance to Pyongyang; support for loans to North Korea through international financial institutions; and financial transactions between U.S. citizens and the North Korean government. U.S. sanctions imposed on North Korea for missile technology proliferation also remain in place, barring trade with missile-related sectors of the North Korean economy. North Korean assets in the United States remain frozen, and North Korean claims against the United States will remain unsettled.

The official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) applauded the Clinton administration's actions on September 21, describing them as consistent with U.S. obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework, which froze the Yongbyon plutonium production facilities. The KCNA noted, however, that the U.S. lifting of sanctions came "belatedly" and was not "comprehensive." Pyongyang also reiterated its position that peace on the Korean peninsula will require removal of the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and a bilateral peace agreement. Washington expects a visit in the coming weeks by a senior North Korean official to resume discussions on normalization of relations.

Perry Review Completed

Guiding the Clinton administration was William Perry's recently completed review of U.S. policy toward North Korea. After briefing the president, congressional leaders and Japanese and South Korean officials in September, Perry released an unclassified version of his policy review on October 12. Though Perry and other U.S. officials had made some of its contents known in previous weeks, the published report provided a clearer understanding of the rationale for the Clinton administration's actions following the September talks with North Korea in Berlin and Perry's trip to North Korea in May 1999. (See ACT,April/May 1999.)

President Clinton appointed Perry to conduct the policy review in November 1998 following North Korea's August launch of its Taepo Dong-1 rocket and the discovery of an underground construction site in Kumchang-ni thought to be potentially useful for nuclear weapons-related activities. (Inspection by U.S. officials later showed the Kumchang-ni site to be poorly suited to nuclear activities.)

While confirming the importance and accomplishments of the Agreed Framework, Perry's report notes that there have been several important changes in the region since the nuclear agreement was reached in 1994. First, Pyongyang's ballistic missile development and export activities, combined with "possible continuing nuclear weapons-related work," have newly jeopardized regional security. Also, under the leadership of Kim Jong-Il, North Korea's economic and humanitarian crises have greatly worsened.

The South Korean government has opened up new opportunities on the peninsula through President Kim Dae Jung's policy of "engagement" with the North, according to the report. Also, Japan's critical support for the Agreed Framework has weakened because of Pyongyang's August 1998 missile test and the prospect of further North Korean missile tests overflying Japan. Finally, Chinese interests in North Korea have become more closely aligned with those of the United States and its allies because of Beijing's concern that Pyongyang's missile activities could lead to a U.S.-led Asian missile defense system.

Perry's report concludes that while military deterrence on the Korean Peninsula remains strong, continued North Korean nuclear and missile activities could jeopardize the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and even of the United States. The United States and its allies would be able to triumph convincingly in any military confrontation, the report notes, but only at a catastrophic cost in lives and money. Perry asserts that Washington should therefore attempt to advance U.S. interests cooperatively if Pyongyang is willing, and failing that, to strengthen its containment of the North Korean threat.

Perry recommends that Washington adopt "a new, comprehensive and integrated approach to…negotiations with the DPRK" in order to achieve a "complete and verifiable" cessation of North Korea's nuclear weapons- and missile-related activities, including "testing, production and deployment of missiles exceeding the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, [as well as] export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology associated with them."

To win Pyongyang's support for the cooperative approach, the Perry report suggests that the United States and its allies "reduce pressures" on North Korea "in a step-by-step and reciprocal fashion." The report continues, "If the DPRK moved to eliminate its nuclear and long-range missile threats, the United States would normalize relations with the DPRK, relax sanctions that have long constrained trade with the DPRK and take other positive steps that would provide opportunities for the DPRK."

Alternatively, if Pyongyang refuses to cooperate, the United States and its allies should "take firm but measured steps to persuade the DPRK" to pursue the cooperative approach and not upset the regional security balance. The details on what disincentives should be considered are listed in the still-classified version of the review. But Perry's report makes clear that "the U.S. and allied steps should seek to keep the Agreed Framework intact and avoid, if possible, direct conflict."

Russia, China, U.S. Allies Condemn Senate Defeat of Treaty

THE SENATE'S REJECTION of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on October 13 (see story) drew a barrage of criticism from Russia and China, as well as from U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. Although Moscow and Beijing have indicated that they will continue to adhere to the CTBT, which they both signed in September 1996, pressures to resume nuclear testing may intensify in the absence of U.S. ratification. The nuclear weapons establishments in both countries have long opposed the CTBT, presumably because they are more dependent on nuclear testing than the United States, which has a sophisticated stockpile stewardship program.

Russian and Chinese Reactions

In an October 14 statement, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "We express our regret and serious concern about the Senate's refusal to ratify this treaty, at all stages of the development of which the U.S. Administration took the most active part and was the first to sign it. This decision delivers a serious blow to the entire system of agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, [e]specially to the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

One week before the Senate vote, Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin had announced that the Russian government was in the process of finalizing its CTBT ratification documents for the Duma, the lower house of parliament. However, the Duma is unlikely to consider the treaty anytime soon, given its concern over the Senate vote and its need to complete action on START II, which was submitted more than four years ago. Parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1999 may also complicate efforts to make serious progress on CTBT ratification.

On October 14, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said it "deeply regrets" the Senate's rejection of the CTBT, but ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue indicated that Beijing would continue to observe its moratorium on nuclear testing, which has been in effect since 1996, and would intensify its efforts to ratify the treaty.

Allied Reactions

Just days before the vote, French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made a highly unusual plea to the Senate not to reject the CTBT. "Failure to ratify the [CTBT] will be a failure in our struggle against proliferation. The stabilizing effect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, extended in 1995, would be undermined. Disarmament negotiations would suffer," they wrote in an October 8 New York Times op-ed.

Such sentiment was echoed the day after the Senate vote. An aide to Chirac said, "The president expressed his dismay. This decision is a setback to the process of non-proliferation and disarmament." German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said he was "deeply disappointed" by the vote and Defense Minister Rudolph Scharping called it an "absolutely wrong" decision. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy stated, "A world accustomed to U.S. leadership in the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament can only be deeply disturbed by this turn of events, which will be welcomed by those who remain uncommitted to that cause."

George Robertson, the newly appointed secretary-general of NATO and former British defense minister, called the Senate action "very worrying."

"We've got to persuade the American Congress that this is in the interest, not just of international security, but also of the United States, and I hope that we can do that and this is not a permanent position," he said in an October 14 radio interview.

U.S. allies in Asia were equally disapproving of the Senate rejection, with strong criticism coming from the Japanese, South Korean and Philippine foreign ministries. "The adverse effects are inestimable…We had hoped for the U.S.'s leadership in nuclear disarmament and in preventing nuclear proliferation," said Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono. Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon called the U.S. vote "an enormous blow to all our efforts to make the world a safer place to live in."

Of particular concern was the potential reaction from South Asia, where the Senate vote weakens the Clinton administration's ability to persuade India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT and refrain from conducting further nuclear tests. But in an encouraging development before the vote, New Delhi hinted that it might be prepared to sign the treaty once its new parliament was in place. Brajesh Mishra, India's national security adviser, stated October 3, "Consensus is building in the country about our stand on the CTBT, and after the parliament meets, we will be in a position to take concrete steps." Moreover, one day after the vote, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh stated, "India will not stand in the way of entry into force of the CTBT." However, because the treaty cannot come into effect without U.S. ratification, much of the pressure on India and Pakistan to ratify has been lifted for the time being.

Belgrade, KLA Move Forward on Arms Control, Disarmament

THREE MONTHS AFTER the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from the embattled province of Kosovo, Yugoslavia has renewed its implementation of the June 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has been certified as having completed its demilitarization. Also in September, talks on creating a "regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia" were resumed.

A week after the March 24 onset of NATO's 11-week bombing campaign, Belgrade formally suspended its participation in the subregional agreement, which limits the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters that the parties to the agreement can possess. As part of the agreement, Yugoslavia (comprised of Serbia and Montenegro), the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Muslim-Croat federation and the Bosnian-Serb-controlled Republica Srpska) and Croatia annually exchange information on and allow inspections of their military holdings.

At a September 23-24 meeting of the parties, the first under the agreement since Belgrade's unilateral suspension, Yugoslavia agreed to complete its scheduled inspections, including those that had been postponed, by the end of the year. Belgrade will conduct a total of four inspections and will permit five on its forces.

In addition, Yugoslavia provided an updated accounting of its military holdings, which prior to the NATO bombing campaign had equaled Belgrade's ceilings for all five weapons categories (1,025 tanks, 850 ACVs, 3,750 artillery, 155 combat aircraft and 53 attack helicopters). Yugoslavia reportedly claimed its largest reduction, roughly a third, in combat aircraft, while reporting almost negligible changes in holdings for tanks and ACVs and slight reductions in artillery and attack helicopters.

For its part, NATO, in a September 16 press briefing, claimed to have carried out "successful strikes" against 93 tanks, 153 armored personnel carriers, 339 military vehicles and 389 artillery and mortar sites. These figures do not appear to correspond with Yugoslavia's revised holdings reported under the subregional agreement, suggesting that NATO may have overestimated its damage inflicted on Yugoslav forces, that Yugoslavia may have held equipment in excess of its limits, that Yugoslavia may have under-reported its losses, or some combination of the three.

If Yugoslavia wants to replace lost weapons up to its ceilings, Belgrade must provide evidence of each piece of equipment destroyed before a replacement can be acquired under the subregional agreement. Belgrade, however, is currently subject to a UN arms embargo and cannot import any weapons.

KLA Disarmed

On September 20, KFOR Commander General Mike Jackson certified the KLA, the ethnic Albanian separatist group in Kosovo, as having complied with a June 21 agreement to turn over its weapons. The wearing of KLA uniforms and insignia also ceased on midnight September 20 as part of the agreement for the KLA to demilitarize, which was explicitly called for in UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

In an assessment released October 6, KFOR reported that the KLA had voluntarily handed over more than 36,000 weapons. On September 16, Yugoslavia called the KLA disarmament a "farce," charging that only outdated weapons were being turned over. The estimated 17,000-member KLA has only handed over 6,831 rifles and 737 machine guns by KFOR's own accounting. KFOR has confiscated some 1,300 rifles and 300 pistols from KLA members and took more than 300 weapons from Serbs. A KFOR spokesperson said October 12 that the international force was continuing to confiscate weapons on a "daily basis," and explained that KFOR "never pretended that every individual would comply [with the demilitarization agreement]."

To help win the KLA's support for demilitarization, the United Nations agreed to the establishment of a 5,000 man Kosovo Protection Corps, which will initially be composed of a "significant portion" of former KLA members. The Kosovo Protection Corps, which will be permitted a "trust" of 2,000 weapons (only 200 of which can be in use at one time), will be charged with responding to natural disasters and other emergencies. Both Moscow and Belgrade denounced the creation of the Corps.

Regional Talks

Twenty nations, including Yugoslavia, met in Vienna on September 6 to revive discussions on finding "lasting solutions for the stabilization of South-Eastern Europe." The talks, however, made little headway as many of the participating states are preoccupied with completing an adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty by mid-November (See feature).

When resumed in earnest, the talks, which are called for under Article V of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, are not expected to address weapons limits because only four states in the region—Albania, Austria, Macedonia and Slovenia—are currently without such limits.

Security Council Unable to Reach Consensus On Iraq for Genereal Assembly Meeting

DESPITE CONCERTED DIPLOMATIC efforts surrounding the September 22 opening of the 54th session of the UN General Assembly, the permanent five members of the Security Council (P-5) could not reach a consensus on resuming weapons inspections in Iraq or lifting economic sanctions. Senior officials from Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States met in London September 15 and in New York September 20. A September 23 meeting between the P-5 foreign ministers and the UN secretary-general resulted only in a bland statement calling for "the full implementation of the relevant Council resolutions."

UN weapons inspections and verification efforts ceased in December 1998 when Iraq broke off cooperation with the UN after four days of punitive air and missile strikes by the United States and Britain. Prompted by frustration with Baghdad's "cheat-and-retreat" strategy to prevent the elimination of its proscribed weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the U.S.-British strikes fractured the Security Council's 1991 consensus to compel Baghdad to disarm in compliance with Resolution 687 before it would lift the economic sanctions imposed after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

Since the strikes, Baghdad has maintained that it will not consider further UN weapons inspections or verification activities until economic sanctions are eased. UN officials in Iraq have reported an ongoing humanitarian crisis, which they have attributed to the sanctions. A September 13 report by the State Department, however, asserts that under the UN's oil-for-food program Iraq is importing more food than before the Persian Gulf War, and that Baghdad's politically inspired misallocation of food and medicine is responsible for the population's suffering. (To compensate for previous revenue shortfalls due to low oil prices, the Security Council decided October 4 to lift the current half-year ceiling on Iraqi oil sales from $5.256 billion to $8.296 billion.)

Since the December raids, Iraq's case for sanctions relief has been made with increasing vigor by France, Russia and China. Resolutions offered by Paris, Moscow and Beijing have proposed quick relief from most import and all export sanctions for Iraq, together with the creation of a monitoring system to prevent large-scale re-establishment of Baghdad's weapons programs.

The United States continues to insist that demonstrable cooperation from Iraq on revived weapons inspections must precede any sanctions relief; that Iraq must meet the Security Council's existing standards for disarmament; that relief from sanctions should be temporary, requiring regular council re-approval; and that sanctions relief should be limited to exports and investments in Iraq's oil-producing capabilities. Washington backs a proposal sponsored by Britain and the Netherlands, which has reportedly won the support of all Security Council members except France, Russia, China and Malaysia. A resolution of the situation is not expected in the near future.

Congress Approves DOE Reorganization; Clinton Leaves Control With Energy Secretary

UNWILLING TO VETO the fiscal year 2000 defense authorization bill, President Clinton approved the partial separation of the nation's nuclear weapons complex from the Department of Energy (DOE) on October 5, but infuriated congressional advocates of the reorganization by transferring control of the new National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) back to Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. Proposed in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage at U.S. nuclear weapons labs, the reorganization called for in the defense bill would have provided the new nuclear agency substantial independence from DOE in establishing its own safety, security, environmental and counterintelligence policies, contrary to the administration's preference.

Initially opposed to the plan, Secretary Richardson finally gave his support in July after negotiating with the Senate for greater DOE control of the agency, but a House-Senate conference later altered the bill to give the NNSA more independence. When the House and Senate both overwhelmingly passed the revised bill in September, Richardson threatened to recommend the president veto the bill, but reversed his position after the White House indicated that a veto was unlikely because of the legislation's strong bipartisan support and inclusion of a widely popular pay raise for military personnel.

But after signing the bill October 5, President Clinton stunned Congress when he ordered Richardson to "perform all duties and functions" of undersecretary for nuclear security, the position formed to lead the NNSA. In explaining his decision, Clinton warned that the new law would impair Richardson's ability to fulfill his obligations as Energy Secretary and jeopardize changes in security and counterintelligence functions that he had already made.

Richardson was further instructed to assign DOE employees to "a concurrent office within the NNSA" in order to "mitigate the risks to clear chain of command presented by the Act's establishment of other redundant functions by the NNSA." Finally, Richardson was ordered to operate the new NNSA in compliance with existing federal environmental laws and standards. The president's statement also made clear that no candidate for the undersecretary position would be offered for the Senate's approval until Congress had remedied the reorganization plan's "deficiencies."

The president's instructions outraged several members of Congress who had worked to draft the law. In a letter to the president, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Floyd Spence (R-SC) strongly protested the president's signing statement, warning that unless reversed, the president's decision would "certainly serve to strengthen already substantial support for creating an agency entirely independent of DOE to manage the nation's nuclear programs." (Emphasis in original.) Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) also made clear his anger at Richardson and the administration, describing the president's action as "an absolute frontal attack."

UNWILLING TO VETO the fiscal year 2000 defense authorization bill, President Clinton approved the partial separation of the nation's nuclear weapons complex from the Department of Energy (DOE) on October 5, but infuriated congressional advocates of the reorganization by transferring control of the new National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) back to Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. Proposed in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage at U.S. nuclear weapons labs, the reorganization called for in the defense bill would have provided the new nuclear agency substantial independence from DOE in establishing its own safety, security, environmental and counterintelligence policies, contrary to the administration's preference. (Continue)


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