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“For half a century, ACA has been providing the world … with advocacy, analysis, and awareness on some of the most critical topics of international peace and security, including on how to achieve our common, shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.”

– Izumi Nakamitsu
UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
June 2, 2022
Press Releases

Democrats Withdraw Missile Defense Restrictions

Wade Boese

Seeking to show solidarity with the president after the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, congressional Democrats largely shelved legislative efforts to limit the Bush administration’s ballistic missile defense plans.

Although Democrats sought in early September to put conditions on and cut funding for the Bush administration’s nearly $8.3 billion request for missile defense spending, it now appears that the administration’s request will survive virtually unscathed. The Senate is on the verge of approving the full request, while the House passed September 25 a $400 million cut. The funding is included as part of the two houses’ fiscal year 2002 defense spending bills, which must be reconciled in conference and then sent to the president for signature.

Democrats began targeting missile defense funding in July, after the administration announced its proposed missile defense programs would conflict with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty “in months, not years.” President George W. Bush has said that, if the United States does not reach an agreement with Russia to “move beyond” the treaty, the United States will unilaterally withdraw from the accord, which prohibits the two countries from building nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles.

Led by Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI), in a straight party vote of 13-12 the Senate Armed Services Committee approved a revised version of the administration’s missile defense request on September 7. The bill redistributed $1.3 billion from the request to other Pentagon programs and barred funds for missile defense activities “inconsistent” with the ABM Treaty.

To conduct tests or other activities banned by the ABM Treaty, the bill required the president to certify to Congress that any such action was in the United States’ national security interest. Congress would then have 30 days to vote on whether to fund the activity. According to Levin, this requirement would have applied even if Washington unilaterally withdrew from the treaty. Republicans vowed they would fight this restriction and funding cut.

However, eight days after the terrorist attacks, Levin offered a new version of this bill. The new bill still redistributed $1.3 billion from the administration’s request, but it did not include the controversial missile defense-related limitation. Instead, Levin chose to incorporate this restriction into another new bill that could be debated at a “later and more appropriate time.” Explaining the changes, Levin said, “This is the wrong time for divisive debate on issues of national defense.”

Two days later, Levin and Senator John Warner (R-VA) cosponsored an amendment that restored the $1.3 billion in funding for missile defense, although the amendment gave the president the option to use these funds for anti-terrorism programs. The Senate adopted the amendment September 21 and is expected to pass the full bill in early October.

Although ultimately going along with Levin, a number of Democratic senators were not pleased with removing the ABM language from the defense bill because they feared the move would give Bush too much leeway on missile defense, according to Democratic Senate aides. One of the aides, however, noted that Levin’s action was “understandable,” contending the “politics are overwhelming on this.”

Although he acknowledged in a September 24 speech on the Senate floor that “this is not time to debate the [ABM] language” contained in the original version of the bill, Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) warned the administration against withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. He said such an action would be “counterproductive” because the United States needs help from the international community, including Russia and China, in combating global terrorism. Both Moscow and Beijing oppose U.S. missile defense plans and want to preserve the ABM Treaty.

House action on missile defense funding also changed following the terrorist attacks. Prior to September 11, Representatives Ike Skelton (D-MO) and John Spratt (D-SC) had filed an amendment to cut $918 million from the president’s missile defense request. The cut would have concentrated on plans to build missile defense facilities and silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, beginning in April 2002.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, however, Skelton and Spratt agreed to compromise on the cut because Republican and Democratic leaders wanted to pass the defense bill as quickly as possible with the least possible amount of contentious debate. The party leaders agreed that the full House would consider the defense bill, as passed by the House Armed Services Committee August 1, with only one amendment consisting of several compromises on controversial issues.

One of the compromises was to transfer a total of $400 million from missile defense to counter- and anti-terrorism activities. The reduction largely came from the Space Based Laser and sea-based midcourse interceptor programs and will not affect funding for Fort Greely. Speaking September 25 on the House floor, Spratt described the compromise as “good” and explained that the Fort Greely issue was set aside in the interest of bipartisanship. But Spratt said that he expected the issue would be revisited in the next budget cycle.

Explaining their views on the current climate in Congress, several House and Senate Democratic aides agreed that both missile defense proponents and skeptics felt the terrorist attacks reinforced their positions. Missile defense supporters have said the unexpected nature of the attacks reaffirms that the United States is vulnerable and must be prepared to defend itself against all kinds of attacks. Critics say the attacks underscore that a ballistic missile attack is not the most urgent threat and that funding should be devoted to countering more probable threats.

One House aide predicted that the terrorist attacks would probably make those congressmen who did not feel strongly about missile defense more likely to support missile defense as part of a broader homeland defense and anti-terrorism strategy. The aide, however, added that the most important factor at this time is that nobody wants to oppose the president.


CD Negotiating Session Concludes Without Progress

Wade Boese

Concluding its third straight year without negotiations, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) met July 30-September 14 in Geneva and closed the last third of this year’s negotiating session. The current CD president, Ambassador Roberto Betancourt-Ruales of Ecuador, warned September 13 that all 66 conference members were greatly concerned about an erosion of the CD’s credibility as the sole forum for disarmament negotiations.

Since its 1996 completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the conference has been unable to agree on which issues to negotiate next. The United States, along with its European and Asian allies, has sought negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty, which would ban the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes. Other countries, led by India, have pressed for nuclear disarmament negotiations, and China has made preventing an arms race in outer space its top priority. All CD delegations must reach consensus before any negotiations can begin.

During the past year, all members publicly supported a fissile material cutoff treaty, but China and Russia tied beginning work on the cutoff treaty with starting negotiations on outer space. The United States opposed this linkage, claiming it would only conduct “exploratory discussions,” but not negotiations, on outer space issues. Neither side would compromise, cementing the deadlock.

Many CD delegations feel that the conference’s stalemate reflects the wider international security climate, in which many countries—particularly China and Russia—have objected to U.S. ballistic missile defense plans and have voiced concern about perceptions of growing U.S. unilateralism and hegemony. In the conference, these concerns are seen as leading countries to adopt more rigid negotiating stances.

In a September 13 farewell address, retiring U.S. Ambassador Robert Grey blasted the CD for doing “nothing that would justify its existence” during the past three years. He warned that the “business of disarmament will shift to other venues” if the CD continues to be “irrelevant.” A U.S. government official interviewed September 20 said Washington is “not actively considering” moving to new venues, explaining that Grey was underscoring the need for the conference to “get down to work” at some point.

Other CD ambassadors expressed similar, but not quite as dire, concerns during the last weeks of the negotiating session. Speaking the same day as Grey, German Ambassador Gunther Seibert, who was also concluding his CD service, offered a more optimistic view of the conference, saying that it “has not outlived its days” and that “its greatest tasks may still lie ahead.” The conference will meet again January 22, when it starts its 2002 negotiating session.


Washington to Sanction China, Pakistan for Missile Cooperation

Alex Wagner

The Bush administration announced September 1 that it will levy sanctions on a Chinese company for shipping missile equipment to a Pakistani firm in violation of a pledge Beijing made last November.

China’s privately owned Metallurgical Equipment Corporation will be sanctioned for selling missile components covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex, which will also be sanctioned. The MTCR is a voluntary regime of 33 states that restricts exports of missiles (and their components) capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers. China is not a member of the MTCR but agreed last year to adhere to its guidelines. (See ACT, December 2000.)

Effective for two years, the sanctions, which are mandatory under U.S. law but can be waived by the president, will prohibit U.S. entities from transferring a variety of missile- and space-technology-related equipment to the two firms. However, they will have little effect against the Pakistani firm, which has been under U.S. sanctions since 1998.

Chinese missile transfers have long been a cause of concern to Washington, but in November 2000, the two countries reached an agreement under which China pledged that it would not help states develop “ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons.” Although the Chinese statement did not mention the MTCR, the document defined nuclear-capable missiles as those that can deliver a 500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers, the same limits outlined in the MTCR.

In exchange for the pledge, the United States agreed to resume processing U.S. companies’ applications to use Chinese space-launch providers. According to an administration official, the application process had been suspended in February 2000 to pressure China to stem its missile exports.

But the United States has challenged Chinese adherence to the pledge, and Secretary of State Colin Powell raised the issue with Chinese leaders July 28 during a trip to Beijing. Days earlier, Powell had characterized Beijing’s recent record on missile export controls as “mixed.”

On August 23, the topic was taken up again at expert-level talks held between the United States and China, but the day after the August meeting, China’s foreign ministry spokesman maintained that “the relevant policies have been carried out to the letters,” signaling that the sides continued to differ on whether China had been continuing its missile exports.

Although an administration official denied that the late August talks and sanctions are linked, it appears likely that an agreement might have allowed the administration to waive the sanctions. At an August 6 press briefing, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher had said that imposing sanctions on China “is certainly not our preferred course, although we would certainly follow U.S. law if it came to that.” He had added that the administration would like to see China abide by the November 2000 agreement and effectively implement new export controls.

Despite levying the sanctions, the United States plans to continue consulting with China on the issue. At an August 23 briefing after the experts’ meeting, State Department spokesman Phillip Reeker said that the administration “will need to do additional work to clarify China’s willingness to implement fully the terms of the November 2000 missile agreement.” No additional talks specifically on this matter have yet been scheduled, but Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan will visit Washington in September and may take up the subject.

Recent allegations charging China with transferring missile components to Pakistan first surfaced July 27 in The Washington Post. Citing diplomatic sources, the newspaper said the Bush administration had lodged a “formal protest” with China for continued missile-related exports throughout 2001.

Citing “intelligence officials,” an August 6 Washington Times report then claimed China had supplied missile components for Pakistan’s 750-kilometer Shaheen-1 and 2,000-kilometer Shaheen-2 ballistic missiles. The paper said 12 transfers of missile technology had taken place between the two countries since the beginning of 2001.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson blasted The Washington Times August 9, saying that such “intelligence” was “fabricated out of thin air in an attempt to exert pressure on other countries.” The spokesperson also reiterated China’s commitment to implementing the November 2000 agreement with a “serious, earnest and responsible approach.”

Responding to the sanctions, the Pakistani foreign ministry released a statement on September 3 calling the move “regrettable and without any justification,” and Pakistan’s foreign secretary, Inam-ul Haque, said that there had been no transfer of missile technology from China to Pakistan “in recent years” during an August 17 speech in Washington.


Russia Approves New Chemical Weapons Destruction Plan

Seth Brugger

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov approved a resolution July 5 to overhaul Moscow’s existing 1996 plan to destroy its chemical weapons. The new scheme would require an extension of the Chemical Weapons Convention’s (CWC) deadlines but could reduce demilitarization costs by 30-50 percent. (See text of new plan.)

Kasyanov approved the resolution after it was initially reviewed by several government agencies in mid-June and subsequently modified by the Russian Munitions Agency (RMA), the civilian body heading chemical weapons destruction. According to an RMA official, the Russian government does not need to take further action for the plan to come into force.

Under its new plan, Russia would finish destroying its chemical weapons stockpile by 2012, missing the final convention deadline in 2007, by which member states must have completely eliminated their chemical weapons arsenals. This schedule would force Moscow to seek approval from CWC’s oversight body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to take advantage of a CWC provision that allows extension of the deadline by up to five years. Moscow will “most likely” submit its new plan this fall to the OPCW, the RMA official said.

The plan’s destruction schedule also misses all intermediate convention deadlines for destroying certain percentages of Russia’s “Category 1” (the highest “risk” category) chemical weapons. Russia missed the first intermediate CWC deadline in April 2000 for destroying these weapons, which the OPCW extended by two years.

Russia had previously planned to build seven facilities to eliminate its chemical weapons, one at each of its chemical weapons storage locations. To save money, the new plan will scale back the number of destruction facilities to three, which will be located at Gorny, Shchuch’ye, and Kambarka, the official said.

Moscow plans to operate the Gorny facility from 2002 to 2005 and the Shchuch’ye and Kambarka sites from 2005 to 2011. Rather than construct a demilitarization facility at the Kizner storage site, under the new resolution Russia will transport weapons stored at Kizner to Shchuch’ye for destruction before 2012.

According to the RMA official, this last provision is in response to demands placed on Russia by the U.S. Congress. Led by the House, Congress has blocked new U.S. funding for the Shchuch’ye facility for the past two fiscal years. Last year, even though it did not resume funding, Congress said future appropriations should be conditional upon Russia meeting five requirements, including a demand that Moscow use only one site to destroy its entire nerve-agent stockpile, which is stored at several locations, including Kizner.

In a significant step toward renewing U.S. funding for Shchuch’ye, on August 1 the House Armed Services Committee matched the Bush administration’s $35 million request for the project for the upcoming fiscal year, also conditional upon the same five requirements.

In addition to constructing demilitarization facilities, Russia’s new plan also allows Moscow to construct facilities at the Pochep, Leonidovka, and Maradykovsky sites to neutralize chemical agents stored at these locations. But the official said that a final decision on building these facilities will depend on “the outcome of the operation” of the destruction facilities. Whether agents would be transported to Shchuch’ye for destruction after neutralization also remains undetermined.

The resolution also calls for Russia to destroy its chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) that are not converted for civilian use by April 29, 2007, as required by the convention. Of its 24 declared CWPFs, six have been destroyed, and seven have been converted.

The revised plan is the latest in a series of steps to improve Russia’s struggling chemical demilitarization effort. On May 4, President Vladimir Putin approved the creation of a new commission, headed by former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, to “ensure cooperation” between federal and regional bodies dealing with chemical weapons destruction and to help oversee the demilitarization process. Additionally, last December, Russia boosted demilitarization funding six fold to approximately $105 million for the current fiscal year, according to the RMA official.


Russia Has Mixed Success With CFE Implementation

Wade Boese

Russia showed mixed success in July toward meeting commitments under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and related agreements, missing a July 1 deadline to vacate a military base in Georgia but reducing the number of weapons located in Moldova.

In November 1999, Russia committed to closing two of its four military bases in Georgia by July 1, 2001, and to withdraw all its CFE-limited weaponry from Moldova by the end of 2001. The CFE Treaty caps the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that its 30 states-parties can deploy and store between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains.

Although it officially handed over control of a Russian military base in Vaziani, Georgia, to Tbilisi on June 29, Russia failed to vacate a base at Gudauta by the July 1 deadline. Moscow claimed the local population had blocked Russian efforts to leave the base and that Georgia had failed to take necessary steps to ensure a safe withdrawal of Russian forces from the region.

Georgia dismissed Russia’s claims, contending that it had proposed alternative ways for Moscow to complete its withdrawal, including destruction of weaponry located at the base, but that Russia had rejected these suggestions. In a July 2 statement released by its Foreign Ministry, Georgia called on Russia to “take immediate and exhaustive measures for timely and complete fulfillment” of its withdrawal obligations.

The two governments are now holding talks to find a compromise, including the possibility of allowing a few hundred Russian troops to remain at the base. They are also trying to negotiate terms for Russia’s withdrawal from two other Georgian bases, which Tbilisi wants done within a three-year period, while Moscow is seeking a time frame of up to 14 years.

In Moldova, Russia is facing a more immediate deadline for complete withdrawal of all of its weapons and forces by the end of 2002. Although Moscow is generally perceived to be dragging its feet on meeting this overall commitment, it made substantial progress in July and August on its obligation to reduce its CFE-limited weaponry by the end of this year. Of the108 T-64 battle tanks and 131 ACVs Russia had in Moldova, just 25 tanks and 57 ACVs remain as of August 28, according to a spokesperson of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is monitoring Russia’s reduction activities in Moldova. Moscow is scheduled to start eliminating 125 heavy artillery pieces in October.

Within its borders, Russia is abiding by its overall CFE Treaty limits but it continues to deploy tanks and ACVs above sub-limits that cap its weapons deployments in its northern and southern regions, according to data from a recent treaty information exchange. The Kremlin claims its non-compliance is necessary to combat “terrorism” in Chechnya.

Russia’s excess is relatively small, numbering not more than 20 tanks and some 130 ACVs above the sublimits, which were outlined in a November 1999 overhaul of the treaty that has yet to enter into force. The United States and its fellow NATO members have conditioned their ratification of the agreement on all states-parties being in compliance with its provisions.

There is speculation that, even though Russia is close to compliance, it is unlikely to reduce its weapons holdings below the sublimits for some time because it may want to send additional forces into Chechnya. The Kremlin may be calculating that it would face less international condemnation and scrutiny by further exceeding the limits than by coming into compliance and then exceeding the limits again.


U.S.-Russian Differences Remain On Missile Defenses, ABM Treaty

Wade Boese

Despite a flurry of summer meetings between top U.S. and Russian officials on offensive and defensive strategic forces, Moscow remains unconvinced by U.S. arguments to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which proscribes nationwide defenses against long-range ballistic missiles.

U.S. officials have tried unsuccessfully since May to sell Russia on the idea of developing a new bilateral strategic framework that would involve, among other things, scrapping the 1972 ABM Treaty, building strategic missile defenses, and lowering offensive nuclear force levels. President George W. Bush first articulated the proposal in a May 1 speech and discussed it with Russian President Vladimir Putin during their first meeting in June. But Moscow has continued to support maintaining the ABM Treaty, though over the past few months it has hinted that it would consider amending the accord.

Meeting July 22 in Genoa, Italy, on the sidelines of the G-8 summit, Bush again lobbied Putin to back his new strategic framework. Putin demurred, but the presidents issued a joint statement saying their countries would “begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems.” At a post-meeting press conference, Putin said the two matters would be discussed as a “set,” and Bush said, “The two go hand-in-hand.”

Nonetheless, there was confusion about what had been agreed. Later that day, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice insisted that the presidents had not agreed to link the issues of offense and defense formally and that Washington would go it alone if Russia refused to work with the United States.

Rice traveled to Moscow a few days later to craft a timetable for continuing the talks and to discuss the strategic framework proposal further with the Kremlin. Although she left Russia with a schedule for consultations, Rice made no headway in getting Russian leaders to accept the U.S. proposal. “We did not hear from Mrs. Rice any new arguments to cause us to review our fundamental approach to the 1972 treaty,” a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said July 27.

An August 13 visit to Moscow by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld yielded similar results. When asked whether Rumsfeld had persuaded him that the ABM Treaty had outlived its usefulness, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov answered, “I’m afraid not.” Later that day, Ivanov stated, “We feel no compunction to leave one or any other treaty or accord which we currently have signed.”

Throughout these high-level talks and after August meetings of government experts in Washington and Moscow, Russia repeatedly said that it had not received enough detailed information about U.S. plans. Putin, who also met with Rumsfeld August 13, said Moscow wants to be told of the “military and technical parameters of the [missile defense] proposals” and to know how low the United States would be willing to reduce its nuclear forces, along what timeframe, and how such reductions would be verified.

Washington says that it cannot yet answer these questions, asserting that future missile defense deployments will be based on what technologies pan out during research and testing and that the Pentagon is still conducting a review of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Rumsfeld, however, told various Moscow audiences that he should know the future size of U.S. nuclear forces within the next couple of months.

Russia and the United States are currently implementing START I, which caps each country’s arsenal at 6,000 deployed strategic warheads. START II, which has not yet entered into force, would lower this cap to 3,500 warheads. Although the two countries agreed in March 1997 to pursue an additional follow-on treaty, START III, that would reduce their arsenals to no more than 2,500 strategic warheads each, Russia has since proposed going down to 1,500 warheads. The Bush administration, however, has not yet indicated whether it would go as low as or below the proposed START III numbers.

Russia appears to favor codifying in a formal document any agreements it reaches with the United States. On August 13, Ivanov declared a need for “a system of controllable restraints” and “a series of limits.” But Washington has said it is not seeking a formal agreement on offenses or defenses. A senior defense official explained August 10 to reporters, “We are not seeking a Cold War-style arms control negotiation or treaty in these talks.”

Part of the administration’s rationale is that it does not have time for such an approach because its ballistic missile defense testing program will “bump up against” the ABM Treaty within months. Pentagon plans call for starting construction in April 2002 on a new Alaskan missile defense test site, which officials also claim will be available for operational use in an emergency. “Time is of the essence,” Bush emphasized July 23.

Claiming it does not want to violate the treaty or slow its testing program, the Bush administration states it would like to reach an agreement soon with Russia to mutually withdraw from the treaty, but failing that outcome, Washington warns it will withdraw unilaterally. Six months’ notice is required to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Responding August 22 to news stories that the United States had set out a November deadline for concluding the talks—six months before the April construction date—at the Moscow meeting of experts, a State Department spokesperson stated, “There is no deadline.” The next day, Bush also denied any deadlines had been set but left no doubt about U.S. plans, declaring, “We will withdraw from the ABM Treaty on our timetable at a time convenient to America.” He added that Putin is “aware of [U.S.] desires to move beyond the ABM Treaty and we will.”

Russian officials are skeptical of Washington’s abbreviated timeframe. “I don’t see any possible way that we can take something that complicated and do it only in a couple of months,” Ivanov said after meeting with Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell are expected to meet with their Russian counterparts again in September to continue the talks. The two presidents will also meet in October in Shanghai, China, and again in November at Bush’s Texas ranch. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, who led the U.S. expert group in Moscow, said August 21 that he believed “the two presidents would be disappointed in us if we didn’t have something for them to consider when they get together in Texas.”


Despite a flurry of summer meetings between top U.S. and Russian officials on offensive and defensive strategic forces, Moscow remains unconvinced by U.S. arguments to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which proscribes nationwide defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. (Continue)

Russia Blocks Reform of Iraq Sanctions Regime

Alex Wagner

In a major setback for the Bush administration, a Russian veto threat in late June forced the UN Security Council to set aside a sweeping reform of the Iraq sanctions regime. Instead, on July 3, the council unanimously approved a five-month extension of the oil-for-food program, which allows Baghdad to sell, under UN supervision, unlimited amounts of oil to purchase humanitarian and infrastructure supplies.

Iraq resumed its participation in the program July 10 after terminating its involvement following a June Security Council decision to work to overhaul the sanctions regime.

The Bush team had hoped to use the program’s July 3 expiration as an opportunity to introduce a new sanctions policy that would alleviate international concerns over the humanitarian crisis in Iraq while increasing the effectiveness of efforts to prevent Baghdad from reacquiring the ability to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Since early June, the administration had worked to convince both the Security Council and Iraq’s neighbors to support a British draft resolution that would have lifted international sanctions on most trade with Iraq while strengthening controls on items that could be used for weapons development. (See ACT, June 2001 and July/August 2001.)

In the weeks preceding the July deadline, one of the most contentious issues among the permanent members of the Security Council involved the composition of a U.S.-proposed list of “dual-use” items, whose export to Iraq would have required UN authorization. On June 29, the U.S. representative to the UN, James Cunningham, announced that China and France had agreed to the U.S. list. But Russia could not be persuaded to support any elements of the British draft resolution.

Addressing the Security Council on July 3, Cunningham criticized Russia, saying that the council should have “done better” and that “we all know why that was not possible.”

Revitalizing the international sanctions against Iraq had been one of President George W. Bush’s foreign policy priorities. Explaining why the United States agreed to the five-month extension instead of substantial reform, Cunningham said that, if the resolution had been vetoed, it would have effectively prevented the issue from being raised again. “A veto would bring our work to a halt and thus would be a victory for Iraq,” he said.

The British ambassador to the UN, Jeremy Greenstock, implied that Russia was allowing its financial relationship with Iraq to interfere with overhauling the sanctions regime. Addressing the council June 26, Greenstock argued, “None of us, on this issue in particular, can allow national economic self-interest to hold up positive measures for the Iraqi people.”

At a July 11 joint press conference with his British counterpart, Jack Straw, Secretary of State Colin Powell vowed to remain vigilant in pursuit of sanctions reform. Washington will continue over the next five months to “work with the frontline states” and with Russia to find a way to accommodate both Moscow’s interests and those of the Iraqi people, Powell said.

 


Administration May Abandon Plutonium Disposition Project

Philipp C. Bleek

The Bush administration is reportedly considering pulling out of a troubled U.S.-Russian project to make substantial quantities of military plutonium unusable for weapons purposes.

Citing unnamed sources, The New York Times reported August 21 that the National Security Council is likely to recommend abandoning the plutonium disposition program. A former Clinton administration official substantiated that account during an interview but emphasized that the issue remains undecided due, in large part, to resistance from both the Department of Energy and Congress. The Energy Department did not return calls seeking comment.

At an August 21 press briefing, State Department spokesman Phillip Reeker said that an administration review of the project had “recently” concluded and that the administration plans to “consult with Congress prior to making any decisions.”

Washington and Moscow agreed in June 2000 to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-origin plutonium. Russia plans to convert its plutonium into mixed-oxide fuel, which it will irradiate in nuclear reactors, while the United States plans to irradiate 25.5 tons of material and immobilize another 8.5 tons in ceramic and glass. (Washington also intends to immobilize about 18 additional tons of non-weapons-grade plutonium.)

The initiative’s substantial and rising cost is one key factor apparently driving the administration to reconsider the project. A March 2001 Energy Department analysis projects the total cost of implementing the U.S. half of the project at $6.6 billion, up from a previous estimate of approximately $4 billion. The more than 50 percent increase results largely from the irradiation component’s rising costs.

The Energy Department analysis projected the cost of the Russian half of the initiative at about $1.8 billion, only slightly above previous estimates. But another March 2001 analysis by a joint U.S.-Russian working group places that figure between $1.8 billion and $2.8 billion, the broad range due in large part to technical uncertainties.

Concerns about costs led the administration to suspend design work on a plutonium immobilization plant earlier this year. John Gordon, head of the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration, told a House Armed Services subcommittee in June that the suspension was required to spread program costs over a longer period of time. But Gordon assured lawmakers that, despite the suspension, the department “continues to pursue” both irradiation and immobilization.

The Energy Department has reassigned program staff involved in the immobilization project and is dismantling key infrastructure, signaling that the suspension is unlikely to be short term.

The situation has alarmed South Carolinian officials, who are concerned that the immobilization track’s suspension will require their state to store some of the processed material on a long-term basis. The state’s Savannah River nuclear site is due to begin processing plutonium to prepare it for both irradiation and immobilization in the coming months, but a substantial portion of the plutonium is not readily suitable for irradiation.

State officials have indicated they intend to hold the entire disposition program hostage until their concerns are addressed. South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges has repeatedly pledged to use all means at his disposal, including state police roadblocks, to prevent plutonium from entering the state without an agreement on long-term disposal plans. In an August 27 letter to the Energy Department, Hodges insisted on an agreement that is “legally binding” and includes a “definite timetable for shipping plutonium out of South Carolina after processing for disposition.”

At Hodges’ request, Representative John Spratt (D-SC) added language to the fiscal year 2002 defense authorization bill that bars shipments of plutonium to Savannah River absent an Energy Department report on plutonium disposal options. Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) has added language to the Energy appropriations bill requiring the department to consult with South Carolina and to also prepare a report.

Energy Undersecretary Robert Card responded August 27, providing written assurances to Hodges that shipments would be postponed, provided “good faith discussions” begin “rapidly.” He added that the department believes agreement can be reached “before mid-October.” It remains unclear, however, how Energy officials intend to meet the state’s concerns without a near-term resumption of work on the immobilization track.

The Russian Program

Although the U.S. program has experienced difficulties, Russia’s disposition effort has essentially failed to get off the ground. When the initiative was launched, Washington agreed to contribute $200 million to the Russian program, pledged to seek an additional $200 million at a later time, and called on other developed countries to help finance the program. However, additional international financial pledges to date—including about $100 million from the United Kingdom, approximately $60 million from France, and roughly $34 million from Japan—are far from sufficient.

Participants at last year’s Group of Eight summit pledged to agree on an international financing plan for the project by this year’s summit in Genoa, Italy. But the Genoa summit, held July 20-22, appeared to yield no substantial progress, raising questions about the initiative’s viability.

Further dimming prospects for the project’s implementation, Siemens, a German technology conglomerate, announced in late August that it will begin to dismantle a plant it had offered to Russia for the disposition effort. In an interview, Helmut Rupar, Siemens’ director for the project, said that, because the Genoa summit failed to yield enough progress on financing the plant’s move to Russia, his company felt no further obligation to maintain the facility.

Building a new plant would likely cost far more than moving the already-constructed Siemens plant, substantially raising costs for the cash-strapped initiative. However, Rupar indicated that Russia would likely buy some of the plant’s components, once the facility is dismantled.


U.S. Continues to Lead in World Arms Exports

Wade Boese

The United States remained the pre-eminent seller in the global arms market last year, according to data in an annual arms-export report released August 16 by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). During 2000, the United States accounted for more than half the value of all new arms agreements signed and nearly half the value of weapons delivered worldwide.

Global arms sales agreements rose in 2000 for the third consecutive year since 1997, when they fell to their lowest level in the eight-year period covered by the CRS report, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000. The value of agreements in 2000 equaled nearly $36.9 billion, marking almost a $3 billion expansion from 1999 and the second highest total for the period after the 1993 high of $41 billion. (All figures, unless noted, are in constant 2000 dollars.)

With a $6.4 billion sale of 80 F-16C/D fighter aircraft to the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), the United States had sales totaling $18.5 billion, far more than other suppliers. Russia ranked second with $7.7 billion in agreements, almost doubling its 1999 total of $4 billion. Major sales to its main customers, India and China, accounted for much of Moscow’s total. France had the third-highest sales amount, signing $4.1 billion in agreements.

While new global arms sales agreements grew, actual weapons deliveries continued to decline. After reaching a high point of $45 billion in 1997, arms exports dropped each subsequent year, falling to $29 billion in 2000. Typically, a time lag exists between an agreement’s signing and implementation, which helps explains why the highest mark for arms deliveries occurred four years after the peak for agreements and why the lowest level for deliveries came three years after the fewest agreements were concluded.

In 2000, U.S. deliveries dropped by $4.5 billion from the previous year to $14 billion. The United Kingdom, which ranked second for the second consecutive year behind the United States, tallied $5.1 billion in deliveries. Russia trailed with $3.5 billion in weapons shipments, and France followed with $1.5 billion.

Developing countries continued to lead in weapons purchases and imports, accounting for roughly two-thirds of arms deals and shipments. Richard Grimmett, author of the CRS report, classified all countries as developing, except the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and European states.

Because of its F-16 fighter purchase, the U.A.E. topped all buyers from developing countries in 2000 with $7.4 billion in new deals, while its neighbor, Saudi Arabia, took delivery of $7.3 billion in weapons, making it last year’s top recipient. Over the entire eight-year period, Saudi Arabia imported weapons worth nearly $66 billion (current dollars), which is more than three times the second biggest recipient, Taiwan.

Although the purchasing power of countries in the Near East and Asia, the two regions that account for roughly 90 percent of the developing world’s arms market, has started to rebound with rising oil prices and recovery from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Grimmett predicted that the market will “remain generally static for the foreseeable future.” But if demand grows, Grimmett ventured, “the United States seems best positioned to lead in new arms agreements.”


BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following U.S. Rejection

Rebecca Whitehair and Seth Brugger

International negotiations in Geneva to conclude a protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) collapsed this summer after the United States rejected the protocol in late July, casting uncertainty over the talks’ future.

BWC states-parties had been meeting since 1995 under a body known as the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate the protocol—a legally binding agreement to strengthen the BWC, which outlaws biological weapons but does not contain verification measures.

In a highly anticipated speech July 25, Ambassador Donald Mahley, the head of the U.S. Ad Hoc Group delegation, said the United States would not support the draft protocol or endorse a continuation of the negotiations because the “current approach” is “not capable of achieving the mandate set forth for the Ad Hoc Group.” The United States would therefore be “unable to support the current text, even with changes,” Mahley said.

Mahley explained Washington’s reasoning in detail, contending that the draft text would “do little” to deter countries from seeking biological weapons and that it would not improve the United States’ ability to verify BWC compliance.

He added that the protocol’s on-site inspection measures could jeopardize U.S. commercial proprietary information while having “almost no chance of discovering anything useful to the BWC” in “less-than-innocent” facilities in other countries. Mahley said the protocol could therefore “serve to misdirect world attention into non-productive channels.”

The ambassador also said that, although the protocol would not “provide sufficient protection” for U.S. biodefense programs, which would also be subject to on-site activity, the draft would still “permit a potential proliferator to conceal significant efforts in legitimately undeclared facilities.”

Mahley also attacked other countries’ efforts to use the negotiations to undermine international export control regimes, such as the Australia Group, of which the United States is a member.

However, Mahley stressed the United States’ continued commitment to the BWC and said that Washington would pursue alternative approaches to strengthening the convention during the next several months.

In a press conference following his speech, Mahley outlined some broad possibilities, such as reinvigorating the Australia Group and pursuing “codes of ethics” that would “remind people of the fact that biological weapons are not things to do.” Mahley said the Bush administration would also explore strengthening the international community’s ability to respond to disease outbreaks, thus lowering the chances of a successful biological weapons attack and reducing the “desirability of biological weapons.”

In his speech, Mahley emphasized that the administration’s position is not new, saying that “many, if not all, of the difficulties” he outlined had been “repeatedly” heard by other delegations over the course of the negotiations.

Indeed, the negotiations have long been plagued by bitter disagreements between delegations, and reports dating as far back as April have indicated that Washington would not back the latest draft of the protocol. Despite the reports, the United States refused to make its official position known until the Bush administration had completed a review of its protocol policy. During a July 25 briefing in Washington, a senior State Department official said the review had found 37 problems with the draft protocol.

At a July 29 press conference, Secretary of State Colin Powell added, “We didn’t just pull out” of the negotiations. He went on to claim that the Clinton administration “probably would have come to the same conclusion” as the Bush team had.

However, Elisa Harris, who coordinated U.S. biological weapons policy for the Clinton administration’s National Security Council, refuted Powell’s assertion. Writing in The Christian Science Monitor August 24, Harris said the Clinton administration would have “embraced” the protocol and that Powell’s comments “seriously misrepresent the Clinton administration position and the value of the agreement itself.”

Moving Forward

The United States was the only country that did not support the protocol at the recent talks, held July 25 to August 17, according to an official in Geneva close to the negotiations, and its rejection has jeopardized the accord’s future. Negotiators had aimed to complete the protocol before an upcoming BWC review conference in November, but that will now be impossible because no further talks are scheduled before the conference.

Most countries were unwilling to continue talks on the protocol after the U.S. announcement, so the remainder of the negotiating session turned to the task of writing a procedural report describing the Ad Hoc Group’s progress since the 1996 BWC review conference, the last time the group reported to a BWC body.

However, delegations were unable even to negotiate a final report. According to the official in Geneva, although states-parties were able to reach agreement on most items in the report, including the continued validity of the Ad Hoc Group’s mandate, they disagreed over whether the United States should be blamed, even indirectly, for the talks’ collapse.

Without a report, the group’s future is uncertain, and according to the official, “really is in the hands of the states-parties” at the review conference.


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