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“The Arms Control Association and all of the staff I've worked with over the years … have this ability to speak truth to power in a wide variety of venues.”
– Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
June 2, 2022
Fact Sheets

START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) on January 3, 1993.

START II established a limit on strategic weapons and required that reductions be implemented in two phases. This treaty would remain in force for the duration of START I, which entered into force in 1994, and would expire in 2009.

The United States ratified the original START II agreement in January 1996 but never ratified a 1997 protocol or the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty succession, demarcation, and confidence-building agreements. The protocol shifted the deadline for completion of START II reductions from January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2007, due to the delay in ratification. The succession agreement formalized the former Soviet republics' status as parties to the ABM Treaty. The demarcation agreements clarified the demarcation line between strategic and theater ballistic missile (TBM) defenses.

On May 4, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the resolution of ratification for START II, its extension protocol, and the 1997 ABM-related agreements. Russia's ratification legislation made the exchange of START II's instruments of ratification (required to bring it into force) contingent on U.S. approval of the extension protocol and the ABM agreements. Congress never voted to ratify the entire package.

Russia announced on June 14, 2002, that it would no longer be bound by its START II commitments, ending almost a decade of U.S.-Russian efforts to bring the 1993 treaty into force. Moscow's statement came a day after the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and a few weeks after the two countries concluded a new nuclear arms accord on May 24.

The new agreement, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), required the United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads apiece by December 31, 2012, effectively superseded START II's requirement for each country to deploy no more than 3,000-3,500 warheads by December 2007. However, other key START II provisions, such as the prohibition against deploying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), were not addressed in the SORT agreement.

Basic Terms:

  • Deployment of no more than 3,800 to 4,250 strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy (long-range) bombers by December 31, 2004. This includes no more than 2,160 warheads deployed on SLBMs, 1,200 warheads deployed on ICBMs with MIRVs, and 650 warheads deployed on heavy ICBMs.
  • Deployment of no more than 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers by December 31, 2007. This includes no more than 1,700 to 1,750 warheads deployed on SLBMs, as well as the elimination of heavy ICBMs and the prohibition of MIRVs on ICBMs.
  • "Deactivation" of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles slated for elimination under the treaty by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles (warheads) or taking other jointly-agreed steps by December 31, 2003.

Additional Provisions:

  •  START I definitions, limits, procedures, and counting rules applied to START II, except where explicitly modified.
  • Unlike START I, which substantially undercounts weapons deployed on bombers, the number of weapons counted for bombers would be the number they are actually equipped to carry for START II. Provided they were never equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, up to 100 heavy bombers could be "reoriented" to conventional roles without physical conversion, which would not count against the overall limits. The reoriented bombers could be returned to a nuclear role, but thereafter could not be reoriented and exempted from limits.
Strategic Arms Control and Policy

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The 1997 START II/ABM Package at a Glance

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

In September 1997, representatives from the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine signed a package of agreements in New York designed to enhance the prospects for Russian ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and to clarify issues pertaining to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Efforts to bring the package into force were terminated, however, following the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between Moscow and Washington in May 2002, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, and Russia's subsequent announcement that it would no longer be bound by its START II commitments.

The package consisted of the START II extension protocol and associated agreements, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on ABM Treaty succession, the first and second agreed-upon statements on ABM-theater missile defense (TMD) demarcation, a confidence-building measures agreement related to TMD systems, and an agreement updating the regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission, a body composed of treaty party representatives that discusses implementing issues.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin transmitted these agreements to the Duma in April 1998. The Clinton administration stated that it would submit the START II documents, MOU on succession, and both demarcation agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent on ratification after Russia ratified START II. The Senate failed to do so after Russia approved START II and the 1997 agreements in early 2000.

A chronology of events related to START II can be found here: “Brief Chronology of START II.”

START II Protocol and Associated Agreements

  • START II Protocol: Extended the time period for the completion of START II reductions from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007.
  • Albright-Primakov letters on early deactivation: Upon START II's entry into force, the United States and Russia would deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles slated for elimination under the treaty (e.g. SS-18, SS-24, and MX missiles) by December 31, 2003 by "removing their nuclear re-entry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps." Primakov's letter also contained a unilateral statement: "Taking into account the supreme national interests of the county, the Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that well in advance of the above deactivation deadline the START III Treaty will be achieved and enter into force." Albright's letter took note of Russia's position.
  • Joint Agreed Statement: Allowed the United States to "download" (remove warheads from) Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) under START II any time before December 31, 2007, the deadline for all START II-mandated reductions. Previously, the United States was required to download its Minuteman IIIs by December 5, 2001, seven years after START I's entry into force.

MOU on Succession to the ABM Treaty

  • Designated the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as the parties of the ABM Treaty. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would assume the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union under the treaty. Thus they collectively would be limited to ABM deployment at a single site and a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges.
  • Broadened the ABM Treaty's membership because a number of ABM-related facilities required to operate Russia's ABM system were located outside Russian territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also regarded ABM Treaty membership as a key element of their independent status. The United States viewed the MOU as important because it recognized the ex-Soviet states as bound by the treaty.
  • Although the Clinton administration argued that the ABM Treaty was in force because the power to determine succession lies within the executive branch, it agreed in May 1997 to submit the MOU to the Senate for approval in connection with the ratification of an unrelated agreement associated with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. However, the MOU was never submitted.

First Agreed Statement on Demarcation

  • Permitted the deployment of "lower-velocity" theater missile defense (TMD) systems (those with interceptor velocities of 3 kilometers per second or less) provided that they would not be tested against ballistic missile targets with velocities above 5 kilometers per second or ranges that exceeded 3,500 kilometers.
  • Enabled the United States to deploy the Army's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, as well as the Navy's Area Defense system. Previously, the United States had reviewed these systems and declared them to be treaty-compliant.

Second Agreed Statement on Demarcation

  • Prohibited the parties from testing "higher-velocity" TMD systems (those with interceptor velocities above 3 kilometers per second) against ballistic missile targets with velocities above 5 kilometers per second or ranges that exceeded 3,500 kilometers.
  • Prohibited the development, testing, or deployment of space-based TMD interceptor missiles or space-based components based on other physical principles (such as lasers) which could be capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.
  • Allowed each side to determine its own compliance with respect to higher-velocity TMD systems. The United States had determined that the Navy's Theater-Wide Defense (NTWD) system was compliant with ABM Treaty requirements.

Confidence-Building Measures Agreement (CBMA)

  • Ninety days after entry into force, the parties would conduct an initial exchange of information about TMD systems and components covered by the CBMA: U.S. THAAD and NTWD systems, as well as the Russian, Belarussian, and Ukrainian SA-12 systems. (Kazakhstan does not possess the SA-12.). This information would be updated annually.
  • Prior to testing, parties would notify one another of the test ranges that would be used to test a system governed under the CBMA. Ten days' advance notification was required prior to a TMD system test using ballistic missile targets.

Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

  • The United States and Soviet Union established operating regulations for the SCC in 1973. These regulations were revised after Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to assume the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union under the ABM Treaty.
Strategic Arms Control and Policy

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The START III Framework at a Glance

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

After President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) on May 24, 2002, it seemed unlikely that a START III agreement would be negotiated.

SORT called for each country to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads. START III proposed a limit of 2,000-2,500. The Bush administration maintained that SORT specified limits on "operationally deployed" strategic nuclear forces, a term excluding warheads on bombers and submarines under refurbishment. Since those warheads were included under START counting rules, the ceiling specified in SORT and that proposed for START III were similar. SORT did not, however, address strategic nuclear warhead destruction or tactical nuclear weapons limits, both ground-breaking arms control measures that were suggested for inclusion in START III.

During their March 1997 summit meeting in Helsinki, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on a framework for START III negotiations. At the Moscow Summit in September 1998, Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their commitment to begin formal negotiations on START III as soon as Russia ratified START II.

Ultimately, negotiations on START III were not successful, and a treaty was never signed.

Basic Elements:

  • By December 31, 2007, the United States and Russia would each deploy no more than 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. Russian officials stated that they were willing to consider negotiated levels as low as 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads within the context of a START III agreement.
  • The United States and Russia would negotiate measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, as well as other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions.
  • The United States and Russia would resolve issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration. 

Other Issues:

  • The United States and Russia agreed that in the context of START III negotiations, their experts would explore (as separate issues) possible measures related to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, including appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures.
  • The United States and Russia would also consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.
Strategic Arms Control and Policy

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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)

Description: 

These negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union slowed the arms race in strategic ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons by curbing the manufacture of strategic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Body: 
 
Begun in November 1969, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) produced two agreements by May 1972:
 
  • the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited strategic missile defenses to 200 (later 100) interceptors each, and
  • the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement or SALT I), an executive agreement that capped U.S. and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces.

Under the Interim Agreement, both sides pledged not to construct new ICBM silos and not to increase the dimensions of existing ICBM silos “significantly,” and capped the number of SLBM launch tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did not address warhead numbers, leaving both sides free to enlarge their forces by deploying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) onto their ICBMs and SLBMs and increasing their bomber-based forces. 

The agreement froze the number of launchers the United States and the Soviet Union could maintain, with Washington limited to its existing 1,054 ICBM silos and Moscow to its 1,618 silos. The agreement also capped the number of SLBM launch tubes for each side and allowed for an increase in launchers if done alongside the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM launchers. The United States was limited to 710 SLBM launch tubes, from its base level of 656 SLBM launch tubes, and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union was limited to 950 SLBM launch tubes, from its base level of 740 SLBM launch tubes, and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

In June 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty.

Official Text: https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4795.htm 

More U.S.-Russian Nuclear Agreements: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements

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