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"The Arms Control Association’s work is an important resource to legislators and policymakers when contemplating a new policy direction or decision."

– General John Shalikashvili
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Fact Sheets

START I at a Glance

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I was signed July 31, 1991, by the United States and the Soviet Union. This was the first treaty that required U.S. and Soviet/Russian reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. It was indispensable in creating a framework that ensured predictability and stability for deep reductions.

In December 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, leaving four independent states in possession of strategic nuclear weapons: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. This caused a delay in the entry into force of the treaty. On May 23, 1992, the United States and the four nuclear-capable successor states to the Soviet Union signed the Lisbon Protocol, which made all five nations party to the START I agreement. 

START I entered into force Dec. 5, 1994, when the five treaty parties exchanged instruments of ratification in Budapest. 

Reductions of nuclear weapons were completed by the deadline of December 5, 2001, seven years after entry into force, and maintained for another eight years. States were verified by on-site inspections and shared missile telemetry. Both the United States and the Russian Federation continued reduction efforts even after reaching the START limits. 

START I expired on Dec. 5, 2009. The United States and Russia signed START II in January 1993, but the treaty never entered into force. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT, or the Moscow Treaty) entered into force in 2003, followed by the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2011.

Basic Terms:

  • 1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy (long-range) bombers for each side, including 154 deployed heavy ICBMs (only the Soviet Union possessed the latter type of missile, the SS-18 Satan)
  • 6,000 "accountable" warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, of which no more than 4,900 may be on ICBMs and SLBMs, 1,540 on heavy ICBMs, and 1,100 on mobile ICBMs (the latter limitation essentially applied only to the Soviet Union with missiles such as the RS-12M Topol as the United States chose not to deploy such missiles after the treaty’s signing)
  • Limited ballistic missile throw-weight (lifting power) to 3,600 metric tons on each side

Counting Rules:

  • Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or an SLBM counts as a single warhead.
  • Heavy bombers equipped only with bombs or short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) are counted as carrying one warhead each.
  • U.S. heavy bombers may carry no more than 20 long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) each. The first 150 of these bombers count as carrying only 10 ALCMs each.
  • Soviet heavy bombers may carry no more than 16 ALCMs each. The first 180 of these bombers count as carrying only eight ALCMs each.
  • No more than 1,250 warheads may be "downloaded" (removed from) and not counted on existing multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.

Inspections and Verification Protocols:

  • The treaty allows for the use of National Technical Means (NTMs) of verification and prohibits any interference with one another’s NTMs.
  • Accompanying the treaty is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which contains data on the numbers and locations of all (deployed and non-deployed) strategic delivery vehicles, plus the locations and diagrams of all facilities associated with strategic delivery vehicles, such as bases and storage and production facilities. The two parties must exchange the entire set of data contained in the memorandum every six months. Each party must notify the other if there is any change in that data shortly after that change occurs.
  • The treaty allows for on-site inspections, both short-notice and planned, and continuous monitoring activities in order to verify the data contained in the memorandum. During the first seven years of START, the United States conducted 335 inspections, and Russia conducted 243.
  • The treaty permits perimeter and portal monitoring of plants for mobile ICBMs. The United States did not deploy such missiles, so these measures applied only to Russia. (The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had already permitted U.S. monitoring of these missiles.)
  • The treaty banned any encryption or jamming of telemetry transmitted from ballistic missiles during test launches.

Other Provisions:

  • START I ran for 15 years with an option to extend for successive five-year periods unless superseded by another agreement. Based on commitments made at the March 1997 Helsinki Summit, the sides agreed in principle to negotiate an agreement making the START treaties unlimited in duration.
  • Separate "politically binding" agreements limit the number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges above 600 kilometers to 880 for each side and the number of Soviet Tu-22M Backfire (Tupolev) medium bombers to 500, including no more than 200 naval Tu-22M bombers.
Strategic Arms Control and Policy

Country Resources:

The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance

March 2021

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

The Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines and Annex

A Russian Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile launcher drives through the Red Square in Moscow, on May 9, 2014, during a Victory Day parade. (Photo: Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty Images)Established in April 1987, the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks. The regime urges its 35 members,1 which include most of the world's key missile manufacturers, to restrict their exports of missiles and related technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers or delivering any type of weapon of mass destruction.2

Since its inception, the MTCR has been credited with slowing or stopping several missile programs by making it difficult for prospective buyers to get what they want or stigmatizing certain activities and programs. Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq abandoned their joint Condor II ballistic missile program. Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan also shelved or eliminated missile or space launch vehicle programs. Some Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, destroyed their ballistic missiles, in part, to better their chances of joining the MTCR.3 The regime has further hampered Libyan and Syrian missile efforts.

Yet, the regime has its limitations. Iran, India, North Korea, and Pakistan continue to advance their missile programs. All four countries, with varying degrees of foreign assistance, have deployed medium-range ballistic missiles that can travel more than 1,000 kilometers and are exploring missiles with much greater ranges. India is testing missiles in the intercontinental range. These countries, which are not MTCR members except India, are also becoming sellers rather than simply buyers on the global arms market. North Korea, for example, is viewed as the primary source of ballistic missile proliferation in the world today. Iran has supplied missile production items to Syria.

In July 2020, the United States announced that it would reinterpret its implementation of Category I controls with regards to drones that travel at speeds below 800 kilometers per hour. This change lifts the strict Category I export restriction on several American-made drones like the Predator and Reaper.

How the MTCR Works

Each MTCR member is supposed to establish national export control policies for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, sounding rockets, and underlying components and technologies that appear on the regime's Material and Technology Annex. Members can add items to or subtract them from the annex through consensus decisions.

The annex is divided into two separate groupings of items, Category I and Category II. Category I includes complete missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicle systems; major sub-systems; and production facilities. Specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets comprise Category II.

Potential exports of Category I and II items are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Approval for Category I exports is supposed to be rare. The regime's guidelines, which set out criteria for weighing possible exports, instruct members that "there will be a strong presumption to deny" Category I transfers. No exports of production facilities are to be authorized. MTCR restrictions for Category II exports are less severe, largely because many items in the category also have civilian uses. Members, however, are still asked to exercise caution in making such deals. No member can veto another's exports.

The MTCR identifies five factors that members should take into account when evaluating a possible export of controlled items:

  • Whether the intended recipient is pursuing or has ambitions for acquiring weapons of mass destruction;
  • The purposes and capabilities of the intended recipient's missile and space programs;
  • The potential contribution the proposed transfer could make to the intended recipient's development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction;
  • The credibility of the intended recipient's stated purpose for the purchase; and
  • Whether the potential transfer conflicts with any multilateral treaty.

MTCR members are asked to obtain an assurance from the intended recipient that it will only use the export for the purpose claimed when requesting the deal. Members are also to secure a pledge from the intended recipient that it will not transfer the requested item or any replicas or derivatives to a third party without permission.

Because the regime is voluntary and the decision to export is the sole responsibility of each member, the MTCR has no penalties for transfers of controlled items. However, U.S. law mandates that Washington sanction entities-individuals, companies, or governments (whether they are MTCR members or not)-exporting MTCR-controlled items to certain countries identified as proliferators or potential threats to U.S. security. Sanctions may also be levied if the United States judges the transfer contrary to the MTCR. Typically, Washington prohibits the charged entity from signing contracts, receiving aid, or buying arms from the U.S. government for a period of two years. Sometimes the penalties can be imposed for longer lengths of time or extended to commercial imports and exports as well.

Outside the MTCR

Several countries have pledged to abide by the MTCR without joining it. Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic have all committed to maintaining export controls consistent with the regime.

After several years of the U.S. curtailing its sale of missiles and missile technologies, China announced in November 2000 that it would not help other countries build ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Beijing, which was a key contributor to Pakistan's missile development, and has in the past provided sensitive technology to countries like North Korea and Iran, also pledged that it would issue a comprehensive list of controlled items requiring government approval before export. That list, however, was not published until August 2002. In 2004, China applied for MTCR membership, and, at the time, voluntarily pledged to follow the regime's export control guidelines. Although China no longer sells complete missile systems and has tightened its export controls, its membership was rejected due to concerns that Chinese entities continued to provide sensitive technologies to countries developing ballistic missiles, such as North Korea.

In 2008 India voluntarily committed to following the MTCR export control guidelines, since that time the United States has been working to secure India's membership in the regime. India's announcement was made shortly before the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted an exemption to India. New Delhi continues to develop its own ballistic missile program. In June 2015, India formally applied for membership in the regime, but Italy blocked consensus on its application during the October 2015 plenary. Nine other countries applied as well in 2015, none of which were admitted into the regime. India was later admitted in June 2016. 

Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

MTCR members spearheaded a voluntary November 2002 initiative, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (formerly known as the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation), calling on all countries to show greater restraint in their own development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their existing missile arsenals if possible. The aim of the initiative is to establish a norm against missiles that could be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. As part of the initiative, participating countries are to annually exchange information on their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programs, as well as provide advance notice of any launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles. The Hague Code of Conduct has 143 member states, including all MTCR members except Brazil. Brazil has expressed concerns about how the initiative might affect its space program.

Notes:

1. MTCR members, followed by the year they joined the regime, are: Argentina (1993), Australia (1990), Austria (1991), Belgium (1990), Brazil (1995), Bulgaria (2004), Canada (1987), the Czech Republic (1998), Denmark (1990), Finland (1991), France (1987), Germany (1987), Greece (1992), Hungary (1993), Iceland (1993), India (2016), Ireland (1992), Italy (1987), Japan (1987), Luxembourg (1990), the Netherlands (1990), New Zealand (1991), Norway (1990), Poland (1998), Portugal (1992), Russia (1995), South Africa (1995), South Korea (2001) Spain (1990), Sweden (1991), Switzerland (1992), Turkey (1997), Ukraine (1998), the United Kingdom (1987), and the United States (1987).

2. Originally, the MTCR was limited to stopping the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, which was defined as a missile able to travel at least 300 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload. Five hundred kilograms was considered the minimum weight of a first generation nuclear warhead, while 300 kilometers was believed to be the minimum distance needed to carry out a strategic strike. Members agreed in the summer of 1992 to expand the regime's objective to also apply to missiles and related technologies designed for chemical and biological weapons. That change took effect in January 1993. The move effectively tasked members with a making a more difficult and subjective assessment about an importer's intentions, as opposed to denying a specific capability (a missile able to deliver a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers), because many more missiles and unmanned delivery vehicles could be adapted to deliver lighter chemical and biological weapons payloads.

3. Prospective MTCR members must win consensus approval from existing members. U.S. policy is that new members that are not recognized nuclear-weapon states must eliminate or forgo ballistic missiles able to deliver a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers. The United States, however, made an exception in 1998 for Ukraine, permitting it to retain Scud missiles. Three years later, Washington also agreed to let South Korea develop missiles with ranges up to 300 kilometers to secure its membership in the MTCR. Seoul previously agreed in 1979 to limit its missile development to those with ranges less than 180 kilometers. South Korea was granted another extension in October 2012. Seoul and Washington reached an agreement allowing South Korea to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to 800 kilometers with a 500 kilogram payload. This extension will allow Seoul to target all of North Korea. South Korea tested a ballistic missile with a range of 500 km in June 2015 and announced in October 2015 that it would deploy systems with an 800 km range in 2017.

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

IAEA Investigations of Iran's Nuclear Activities

December 2022


Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Ali Akbar Salehi (left), the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Yukiya Amano, director-general of the IAEA, sign a framework agreement in Tehran on November 11, 2013. (Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has conducted two investigations into Iran’s past nuclear activities.

The first focused on the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA laid out its evidence and initial assessment of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program in an annex to its November 2011 report to the agency’s Board of Governors.

The IAEA sought cooperation from Iran in clarifying the agency’s outstanding questions about the military dimensions work, but it was not until the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, required Iran to cooperate with the agency’s investigation prior to implementation of that accord, that Tehran provided the IAEA with enough information for the agency to issue a final assessment.

The IAEA’s December 2015 report concluded that Iran conducted a “range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003.” The report further assessed that there were “no credible indications” of activities relevant to weaponization after 2009 or any diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. Following the report, the IAEA’s Board of Governors passed a resolution in December 2015 closing the military dimensions investigation.

The IAEA’s second investigation began in 2018 and is focused on evidence suggesting that Iran failed to declare all nuclear materials and activities from its pre-2003 nuclear program as legally required by its safeguards agreement. As part of the investigation, the IAEA visited three undeclared locations in 2019 and 2020. Environmental samples indicated that processed uranium had been present at all three sites. Iran has yet to provide the IAEA with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at those locations. The IAEA was investigating a fourth location, but said it had no more questions for Iran after assessing in a May 2022 report that Tehran should have declared to the agency activities related to uranium metal that took place at the site. While this safeguards investigation is separate from the JCPOA, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said in August 2022 that the Iran will not return to compliance with the JCPOA until the IAEA’s investigation is closed.


Military Dimensions Investigation (2011-2015):

In November 2011, the IAEA released a report with an annex outlining the agency’s evidence that Iran had engaged in various activities related to nuclear weapons development. The report provided evidence suggesting that Iran pursued a structured nuclear program before the fall of 2003, and that certain weapons-related activities continued after that program was dismantled.

In that report, the IAEA divided its questions and concerns into 12 areas: 1) nuclear program management structure, 2) procurement activities, 3) nuclear material acquisition, 4) possession of nuclear components for an explosive device, 5) detonator development, 6) high explosives and associated experiments, 7) hydrodynamic experiments, 8) relevant modeling and calculations, 9) development of a neutron initiator, 10) preparations to conduct a nuclear explosive test, 11) integration of a nuclear warhead into a missile, and 12) studies looking into a prototype Iranian re-entry vehicle

Additionally, Iran was found to have acquired nuclear weapons development information and documentation from an unnamed clandestine nuclear supply network and to have explored development of an indigenously-designed nuclear weapon. The IAEA’s published November 2011 report omits details about the latter two points, but the nuclear supply network is widely believed to have been that of Pakistani physicist A.Q. Khan.

The report, consistent with a 2007 U.S. intelligence assessment, speculates that Iran’s structured nuclear program (known as the AMAD Plan) “was stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a ‘halt order’ instruction issued in late 2003 by senior Iranian officials,” and that certain research and development activities may have resumed. For more on the IAEA’s November 2011 report, see: The IAEA’s Iran Report: Assessment and Implications.

The agency’s 35-member Board of Governors adopted a resolution Nov. 18, 2011, that expressed “deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program” and called on Iran to provide the agency with “access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material, and personnel.”

The IAEA sought answers from Iran regarding concerns raised in the 2011 report, but there was little progress until Iran and the IAEA reached the Framework for Cooperation in November 2013. The full text of the initial Framework for Cooperation and its accompanying annex is available here.

Under the Framework for Cooperation, Iran and the IAEA committed to resolving the agency's concerns through a step-by-step process. An annex to the framework laid out the first six actions that Iran pledged to take within three months.

 

Iranian Actions to be completed by Feb. 11, 2014

Status

Provide mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas.

Completed. Iran facilitated IAEA access to the Gchine uranium mine on January 29, 2014.

Provide mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.

Completed. The IAEA visited the Heavy Water Production Plant at the Arak site on December 8, 2013.

Provide information on all new research reactors.

Completed. In a February 9 joint statement, the IAEA and Iran announced that Iran completed the actions agreed to on November 11.

Provide information with regard to the identification of 16 sites designated for the construction of nuclear power plants.

Completed. In a February 9 joint statement, the IAEA and Iran announced that Iran completed the actions agreed to on November 11.

Clarification of the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities.

Completed. In a February 9 joint statement, the IAEA and Iran announced that Iran completed the actions agreed to on November 11.

Further clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment technology.

Completed. In a February 9 joint statement, the IAEA and Iran announced that Iran completed the actions agreed to on November 11.

On February 9, 2014, Iran and the IAEA announced a further seven actions that Iran would take by May 15, 2014. Iran completed the initial two sets of actions within the time period specified.

Iranian Actions to be completed by May 15, 2014

Status

Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Saghand mine in Yazd.

Completed. An IAEA team was provided access to the Saghand mine on a May 5-6 visit to Iran.

Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Ardakan concentration plant.

Completed. An IAEA team was provided access to the Ardakan plant on a May 6 visit to Iran.

Submission of an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor (Heavy Water Reactor at Arak).

Completed. In its March 20 report on the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA noted that Iran completed an updated DIQ for the agency on February 12. Iran provided follow-up information in response to the agency's questions about the DIQ on March 29.

Taking steps to agree with the Agency on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the IR 40 Reactor.

Completed. Iran and the IAEA met on May 5 to continue work on the safeguards for the IR-40 reactor at Arak. 

Providing mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Centre.

Completed. The agency was able to visit the center on March 12.

Providing information on source material, which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such material and on Iran’s extraction of uranium from phosphates.

Completed. Iran provided this information to the IAEA in an April 29 letter.

Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran’s stated need or application for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.

Completed. Iran provided the IAEA with information on the detonators at a meeting on April 26 and in subsequent letters on April 30 and an additional May 20 meeting.

A May 20, 2014 meeting resulted in an agreement on an additional 5 actions to be taken by August 25, 2014. Iran completed three of the five actions by the end of August 2014. Two remaining issues related to nuclear weapons development remained unresolved. Iran and the IAEA met several times throughout the spring, and in its May 29, 2015, quarterly report, the IAEA noted that Iran shared information on one of the outstanding issues related to nuclear weapons development. Before all of these actions were completed, this agreement was superseded by a July 2015 agreement that ultimately led to closure of the investigation. 

Iranian Actions to be completed by Aug. 25, 2014

Status

Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.

Completed. In its May 29, 2015, quarterly report, the IAEA noted that Iran shared information on one of the outstanding issues related to nuclear weapons development.

(While Iran did not complete this activity on schedule, it was resolved by Aug. 15, 2015, as part of the new July 14, 2015 roadmap)

Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modeling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.

Completed.In its May 29, 2015, quarterly report, the IAEA noted that Iran shared information on one of the outstanding issues related to nuclear weapons development. (While Iran did not complete this activity on schedule, it was resolved by Aug. 15, 2015, as part of the new July 14, 2015, roadmap.)

Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research and development centre.

Completed. According to the Sept. 5 IAEA quarterly report, IAEA inspectors were able to visit this facility on Aug. 31.

Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops, and storage facilities.

Completed. The Sept. 5 IAEA quarterly report said that the agency was able to access these sites Aug. 18-20.

Concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 reactor.

Completed. The agency and Iran completed the safeguards approach on Aug. 31, six days after the Aug. 25 deadline.


2015 Roadmap for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program

On July 14, 2015, Iran and IAEA announced they reached an agreement to address the agency’s outstanding questions. The agreement, known as the Roadmap for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program, laid out a schedule for Iran to address the IAEA’s concerns and the agency to complete its investigation.

The IAEA announced on August 15, 2015, that Iran met the first deadline for providing documents and written explanations to the agency's questions regarding the 12 main areas for investigation as outlined in the November 2011 annex. The agency submitted follow-up questions to Iran on September 9, and on September 20, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Deputy Director General Tero Varjoranta traveled to Tehran to discuss the investigation and visit the Parchin site. They confirmed that environmental samples were taken at Parchin for analysis in IAEA labs. On October 15, 2015, the deadline for additional responses, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had responded to its follow-up questions and completed all activities under the roadmap.

The completed assessment, released on December 2, 2015, concluded that Iran had pursued a nuclear weapons program prior to 2003, including a coordinated “range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device,” but did not divert nuclear material from its civilian nuclear program as part of its weaponization efforts.

The report found that although Tehran’s organized nuclear weapons program ended in 2003, some activities continued through 2009. According to the assessment, the “activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competencies and capabilities.” The agency said it found “no credible indications” that nuclear material was diverted to the weapons program or that any undeclared activities have taken place since 2009.

In several areas, like nuclear testing preparations and fuzing, arming, and firing a payload, the IAEA did not receive any new information. In other areas, such as Iran’s work at a uranium mine, the IAEA assessed that Tehran’s activities were consistent with its declaration to the IAEA. However, the IAEA assessed that Iran’s program structure, computer modeling of a nuclear explosive device, and certain types of experiments with detonators were part of a nuclear weapons development program prior to 2003.

Mark Toner, a deputy spokesman at the U.S. Department of State, said on December 2 that the IAEA’s conclusion is “consistent with what the United States has long assessed with high confidence.”

Following a meeting on December 15, 2015, the 35-member IAEA Board of Governors voted unanimously to close the investigation into Iran's past weaponization work while continuing to report on Iran's implementation of the July 2015 nuclear deal with the P5+1.

Iran's ambassador to the IAEA Reza Najafi said that Iran "disagreed" with some of the agency's findings, arguing that the “scientific studies of dual-use technologies have always been for peaceful civilian or conventional military uses” rather than nuclear weapons work, he said.

The full text of the "road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program" is available here. Highlights of the IAEA's findings in each of the 12 areas are below:

  1. Program management structure: The IAEA assessed that, prior to 2003, Iran had an organized structure “suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant” to nuclear weapons design. The activities that continued beyond 2003 were not a coordinated program.
     
  2. Procurement activities: The IAEA had “indications” that Tehran attempted to purchase items relevant to developing a nuclear weapon prior to 2007 and information that Iran purchased materials for its fuel cycle activities through companies not affiliated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Iran admitted to looking into procuring a high-speed camera for conventional purposes but said it ultimately did not do so.
     
  3. Nuclear material acquisition: The IAEA assessed that the Gchine uranium mine, previously thought to be a potential source of uranium for undeclared nuclear activities between 2000-2003, would not have produced any substantial amounts of nuclear material before 2006. The IAEA found that the activities at the mine were consistent with Iran’s explanations and declarations. Overall, the IAEA assessed that “any quantity of nuclear material” that would have been available for the nuclear weapons development program “would have been within the uncertainties associated with nuclear material accountancy and related measurements.”
     
  4. Nuclear components for an explosive device: The IAEA had evidence that Tehran had access to documentation on the conversion of uranium compounds to uranium metal, which is part of the weaponization process, and made progress on reducing a uranium compound into a metal form. Tehran denied that it conducted any metallurgical work for weapons purposes. The IAEA’s final assessment found no indication of Iran conducting activities related to the uranium metal document.
     
  5. Detonator development: The IAEA assessed that Iran’s work on explosive bridge wire detonators has “characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device.” The agency found that some of Iran’s explanations, that the detonators were developed as a safer alternative because of explosive accidents, were “inconsistent” and “unrelated” to the IAEA’s timeframe for detonator development.
     
  6. Initiation of high explosives and associated experiments: Iran admitted to the IAEA in August and September 2015 that it conducted work on certain types of explosives, but had a “technical requirement for the development” of multipoint initiation explosive technology for conventional weaponry. The IAEA noted that there are non-nuclear weapons applications for the development, but assessed that the work was “relevant to a nuclear explosive device.”
     
  7. Hydrodynamic experiments: As part of its investigation over the past several months, IAEA officials were able to visit Parchin, a military site where the agency suspected that Tehran conducted hydrodynamic tests in an explosive chamber. Since the IAEA requested access in 2012, Iran conducted extensive construction and renovations. Tehran said in September 2015 discussions with the IAEA that one of the main buildings in question was used for storing chemicals for the production of explosives. An environmental sampling at the site found “chemically man-made particles of uranium” but did not indicate that it was used for long-term storage of chemicals as Iran claimed. The IAEA assessed that its satellite imagery analysis and environmental sampling “does not support Iran’s statements on the purpose of the building” and that Iran’s activities at the site impeded the agency’s investigation. The IAEA did not draw a definite assessment as to what occurred at Parchin.
     
  8. Modeling and calculations: The IAEA assessed that Iran conducted modeling and calculations related to nuclear explosive configurations prior to 2004 and between 2005-2009. During the agency’s investigation between August-October 2015, Iran maintained that it was not in a position to discuss its work on hydrodynamic modeling because it was for conventional military purposes and not an IAEA concern. The IAEA noted in its report that there are conventional applications for such modeling and that the calculations derived from the modeling were incomplete and fragmented, but assessed overall that Iran conducted computer modeling of a nuclear explosive device between 2005-2009.
     
  9. Neutron initiator: The IAEA’s evidence indicated that Iran continued work on neutron initiators after 2004, although the agency assessed prior to the July 2015 agreement with Iran that some of the indicators that Iran undertook work on generating neutrons through shock-compression were “weaker than previously considered.” Iran provided the IAEA with information about its neutron research and let the IAEA visit a research intuition in October 2015. Iran maintained that its research in the area was not related to “shock-driven neutron sources.”
     
  10. Conducting a test: The IAEA noted it has not received any additional information regarding Tehran's plans to conduct a nuclear test since its November 2011 report. The IAEA noted in the November 2011 report that Iran may have undertaken “preparatory experimentation” relevant to a nuclear weapons explosive device and obtained a document on the safety arrangements for explosive nuclear testing.
     
  11. Integration into a missile delivery vehicle: The IAEA assessed that two of the workshops it identified in 2011 as producing components and mock-up parts for engineering of a Shahab-3 (Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile) re-entry vehicle for a nuclear warhead exist and that the capabilities are “consistent with those described” in documentation provided to the agency on Tehran’s work on a re-entry vehicle.
     
  12. Fuzing, arming, and firing system: The IAEA report noted in the Final Assessment report that it had not received any new information since the November 2011 report on development of a prototype firing system for a Shahab-3 payload that would allow the missile’s payload to safely re-enter the atmosphere and then explode above a target or upon impact.

Safeguards Investigation (2018-present)

Overview

In 2018, the IAEA began to investigate evidence that Iran failed to declare all of its nuclear materials and activities as legally required under its safeguards agreement with the agency. Since June 2020, the IAEA has provided regular, quarterly reports to the agency’s Board of Governors regarding the investigation, which focuses on four locations in Iran where evidence suggests Tehran conducted undeclared nuclear activities prior to 2003 and stored equipment and materials from that period. The IAEA visited three of the undeclared locations in 2019 and 2020 and samples taken from the sites indicated the presence of processed uranium. Iran has not provided technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at the sites, even after reaching an agreement with the IAEA in March 2022 on a process for addressing the agencies inquiries. The IAEA concluded in a May 2022 report that activities related to uranium metal at the fourth site should have been declared to the IAEA.

 

The IAEA Board passed three resolutions, in June 2020, June 2022, and November 2022, urging Iran to fully cooperate with the agency’s investigation. In August 2022, Iranian officials insisted that text be added to the draft agreement to restore the JCPOA noting that Iran wants the IAEA’s investigation to be closed prior to reimplementation of the deal.

 

Background

The agency’s safeguards investigation began after Israel stole documents pertaining to Tehran’s past nuclear weapons program from Iran earlier that year and shared the so-called “Atomic Archive” with the agency. Then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also publicly pressed the IAEA to investigate a warehouse in the Turkazabad district of Iran during a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2018.

 

While the IAEA has not publicly discussed the archive, IAEA officials have reiterated that any information provided by member states is subject to the agency’s review and verification process. Additionally, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea Thompson confirmed in March 2019 that the IAEA was evaluating the archival materials.

 

In November 2019, Acting-Director General Cornel Feruta told a special convening of the Agency’s Board of Governors that the IAEA had “detected natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at a location in Iran not declared to the Agency.” It was later confirmed that location was the Turquzabad site, which IAEA inspectors had visited earlier that year to take environmental samples.

 

Seeking to explain the presence of undeclared uranium, Iranian officials have stated that the warehouse was previously owned by a private company that may have used the facility to store equipment from Iran’s uranium mine. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran suggested that the presence of uranium was due to contamination from the equiptment.

 

In March 2020, the IAEA released a report detailing efforts by the Agency over the past year to investigate an additional three sites in Iran for evidence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. The report noted that the IAEA requested access to two of the sites in January 2020, but Iran had refused to allow inspectors to visit the areas in question.

 

In June 2020, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement and cooperate with the Agency. In August 2020, Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement allowing the agency to visit two sites to conduct environmental sampling. It was reported Sept. 30, 2020, that the IAEA completed its inspections of both locations, and that environmental samples were sent to agency labs to test for the presence of nuclear material. The samples confirmed the presence of processed uranium at the two additional sites.

 

In March 2022, Iran and the IAEA reached agreement on a process for concluding the agency’s investigation by the June 2022 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. However, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said in a May 30, 2022 report that Tehran failed to provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at the three locations. Following the report, the IAEA’s Board of Governors passed a resolution censuring Iran for its failure to cooperate and urging the Tehran to provide credible answers to the IAEA’s inquiries. In the May 30 report, the IAEA noted that it had no further questions about one of the four locations. The IAEA assessed that Iran undertook activities related to uranium metal at the site that should have been declared to the agency under Iran’s safeguards agreement.

 

After the IAEA Board passed its resolution in June, Iran did not engage with the agency on the investigation until September, but raised the issue of the investigation during negotiations to restore the JCPOA and pushed for the investigation to be closed as part of that agreement and commitment from the IAEA not to engage in further investigations into Iran's past nuclear work. 

 

On September 26, 2022, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said that he met with Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Elsami in Vienna to resume talks on the safeguards investigation. He said there is "a lot of work" ahead to close the investigation. 

 

The IAEA Board of Governors passes a third resolution on Nov. 17, 2022 censuring Iran for failing to cooperate with the agency's safeguards investigation. The resolution "decides" it is urgentand essential for Iran to cooperate with the agency's inquiries. In a statement introducing the resolution, the E3 and the United States said that "last-minute promises from Iran to hold additional meetings in the future, after years of delay and denial, are late and inadequate." The four countries said Iran "must fulfill its safegaurds obligations" and that the issues are "not historical" but integral to verifying Iran's declarations. 

 

An IAEA team traveled to Iran Dec. 18-19 to continue discussions on the safeguards probe, but did not announce any further steps or actions to advance the investigation. 

 

The Four Locations

In its regular quarterly reports to the IAEA Board of Governors, the IAEA has provided details about its preliminary conclusions as to the nuclear activities that occurred at each location. In May 2022, the IAEA identified the locations under investigation. The following is a summary of the IAEA’s evidence and preliminary assessments of the undeclared activities at each location. Additional information is available in the May 2022 IAEA report.

 

Location 1: Turquzabad

Information available to the IAEA suggests that Iran used the Turquzabad site, previously referred to in agency reports as Location 1, to store nuclear material and equipment, including containers transferred from Varamin (location 3). In January 2019, the IAEA requested that Iran clarify whether the site was used for such purposes. Iran told the IAEA there were no undeclared materials or activities at the location. In February 2019, IAEA inspectors then requested information from Iran about the movement of containers from the site that the agency observed using satellite imagery and requested access to the location. Environmental samples taken indicated the presence of processed uranium.

Iran’s initial responses to the IAEA regarding the presence of the processed uranium were not deemed technically credible. As a result of the March 2022 agreement between the IAEA and Iran, Tehran provided further explanation for the presence of the uranium, saying that there was “the possibility of an act of sabotage by a third party to contaminate the area.” Iran provided no evidence to support that claim, according to the May 2022 IAEA report. Iran also said it could not identify where containers removed from site in 2018 are currently located. The May 2022 IAEA report concluded that the presence of uranium particles at the site “is not clarified.”

Location 2: Lavisan-Shian

The IAEA investigated evidence of an undeclared uranium metal disc that had undergone drilling and processing at Lavisan-Shian, previously identified as Location 2. As part of its investigation, the IAEA visited a declared facility in Iran where uranium metal discs had been produced but was unable to determine if the Lavisan-Shian disc was at that site. The IAEA informed Iran in January 2022 that it “could not exclude that the disc had been melted, recast and was not part of the declared nuclear material inventory.” In its May 2022 report, the IAEA assessed that the activities at Lavisan-Shian “were not declared by Iran to the Agency as required under the Safeguards Agreement.” The IAEA also said it has no further questions about this location.

Location 3: Varamin

Information and evidence available to the IAEA suggests that Iran used Varamin for storing nuclear materials and/or fuel-cycle-related activities. The IAEA’s evidence suggests that materials and equipment from the site were moved to Location 1, Turquazabad, for storage.

The IAEA requested access to Varamin in January 2020, but Tehran denied the request. Inspectors were able to access the site after Iran and the agency reached an agreement in August 2020 and environmental samples confirmed the presence of uranium at the location. The IAEA ask Iran to provide clarifications about the presence of uranium, which Tehran has failed to credibly answer.

In the May 2022 report, the IAEA noted that Iran stated in March 2022 that the location was used for the production of sodium sulphate. The IAEA stated that this explanation does not match the satellite imagery taken from the site and the results of the environmental samples that were collected during an August 2020 visit to the site. Furthermore, it does not explain the presence of the uranium particles. The IAEA reported that Iran offered the additional explanation of third-party sabotage to contaminate the area but provided no evidence to support that claim. In the report, the IAEA offers its assessment of Varamin, that it was an “undeclared pilot-scale facility for the processing and milling of uranium ore and conversion into uranium oxide” and possible UF4 and UF6 at laboratory scale from 1999-2003.

Location 4: Marivan

Informational available to the IAEA suggests that Iran intended to use nuclear materials at Marivan. The IAEA reported that safeguards relevant information suggests that Iran conducted “explosive experiments with protective shielding in preparation for the use of neutron detectors” at one of the areas under investigation at Marivan, previously referred to as Location 4 by the IAEA.

The IAEA requested access to the site in January 2020, which Tehran denied. Inspectors were later able to visit the location and take environmental samples as part of the August 2020 agreement between the agency and Iran. In January 2021, the IAEA requested clarification from Iran regarding the presence of processed uranium found at the site.

In August 2021, Iran provided the agency with some documentation about Marivan and said that one of the areas in question was built to support a mine managed by another IAEA member state until it was abandoned in 1994 and that the bunkers at the site were used for deactivating munitions. The IAEA assessed that some of this documentation was inconsistent with its evidence. As part of the process initiated by the March 2022 process, Iran informed the IAEA that it had never produced the type of material found at the site and that the presence might be accounted for by an act of third party sabotage to contaminate the site. Iran, however, provided no evidence for this claim. During the consultations, Iran also said that some of the photographs of the bunkers were fabricated. The IAEA said in its May 30 report that the presence of the uranium “is not clarified.”

Strategic Arms Control and Policy

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Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance

March 2022

Press Contacts: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

 

What is a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone?

A nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is a specified region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Five such zones exist today, with four of them spanning the entire Southern Hemisphere. The regions currently covered under NWFZ agreements include: Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok) Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

Background

Initial efforts to create an area free of nuclear weapons began in the late 1950s with several proposals to establish such a zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland offered the first proposal-named the Rapacki Plan after the Polish foreign minister-in 1958. The Rapacki Plan sought to initially keep nuclear weapons from being deployed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and East Germany, while reserving the right for other European countries to follow suit. The Soviet Union, Sweden, Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria also floated similar proposals. All these early efforts, however, floundered amidst the U.S.-Soviet superpower conflict, although the Rapacki Plan would serve as a model to the nuclear-weapon-free zones that were eventually set up in other regions of the globe.

Article VII of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, affirms the right of countries to establish specified zones free of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly reaffirmed that right in 1975 and outlined the criteria for such zones. Within these nuclear-weapon-free zones, countries may use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Protocol for Nuclear Weapon States

Each treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone includes a protocol for the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-to sign and ratify. These protocols, which are legally binding, call upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the zones and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty states-parties. Such declarations of non-use of nuclear weapons are referred to as negative security assurances. For more information, see Nuclear Declaratory Policy and Negative Security Assurances.

However, the five nuclear-armed countries have at times signed and ratified a NWFZ protocol and declared conditions reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in certain scenarios against parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. For instance, the United States signed the protocol for the African nuclear-weapon-free zone in April 1996 with a declaration that it would reserve the right to respond with all options, implying possible use of nuclear weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons attack by a member of the zone. None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed the relevant protocol for the treaty creating a zone in Southeast Asia because of concerns that it conflicts with the right of their ships and aircraft to have freedom of movement in international waters and airspace and problems with the definitions of territory, since includes exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. The other three zones do not explicitly rule out the transit of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states through the zones, and the general practice of nuclear-weapon states is not to declare whether nuclear weapons are aboard their vessels.

In addition to nuclear-weapon-free zones, there are treaties and declarations, which are not covered by this fact sheet, banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in Antarctica, Mongolia, on the seabed, and in outer space.

Basic Elements of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties

Duration: The treaties are to remain in force indefinitely. Yet, each treaty includes a withdrawal option for states-parties. With the exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which simply requires three months' advance notice before a withdrawal can take effect, all the NWFZ treaties require 12 months' advance notice for a state-party to end its treaty obligations.

Conditions: None of the treaties can be subjected to conditions by its non-nuclear-weapon states-parties.

Verification: Each state-party adopts comprehensive safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which verifies that states-parties are not pursuing nuclear weapons illicitly. The Central Asian NWFZ goes a step further in requiring that states in the region adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which provides for expanded monitoring.

Territory Covered: Each zone applies to the entire territories of all of its states-parties. Territory is understood to include all land holdings, internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters. The Latin American treaty also extends hundreds of kilometers from the states-parties' territories into the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, but the nuclear-weapon states, citing their freedom at sea, assert that this does not apply to their ships and aircraft that might be carrying nuclear weapons. A dispute also exists over the inclusion of the Chagos Archipelago, which includes the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, as part of the proposed African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom recognizes Diego Garcia as being subject to the Pelindaba Treaty.


The Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Opened for signature: February 14, 1967
Entered into force: October 23, 2002[1]

States-Parties

Signed

Ratified

Antigua and Barbuda

October 11, 1983

October 11, 1983

Argentina

September 27, 1967

January 18, 1994

Bahamas

November 29, 1976

April 26, 1977

Barbados

October 18, 1968

April 25, 1969

Belize

February 14, 1992

November 9, 1994

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

February 14, 1967

February 18, 1969

Brazil

May 9, 1967

January 29, 1968

Chile

February 14, 1967

October 9, 1974

Colombia

February 14, 1967

August 4, 1972

Costa Rica

February 14, 1967

August 25, 1969

Cuba

March 25, 1995

October 23, 2002

Dominica

May 2, 1989

June 4, 1993

Dominican Republic

July 28, 1967

June 14, 1968

Ecuador

February 14, 1967

February 11, 1969

El Salvador

February 14, 1967

April 22, 1968

Grenada

April 29, 1975

June 20, 1975

Guatemala

February 14, 1967

February 6, 1970

Guyana

January 16, 1995

January 16, 1995

Haiti

February 14, 1967

May 23, 1969

Honduras

February 14, 1967

September 23, 1968

Jamaica

October 26, 1967

June 26, 1969

Mexico

February 14, 1967

September 20, 1967

Nicaragua

February 15, 1967

October 24, 1968

Panama

February 14, 1967

June 11, 1971

Paraguay

April 26, 1967

March 19, 1969

Peru

February 14, 1967

March 4, 1969

Saint Kitts and Nevis

February 18, 1994

April 18, 1995

Saint Lucia

August 25, 1992

June 2, 1995

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

February 14, 1992

February 14, 1992

Suriname

February 13, 1976

June 10, 1977

Trinidad and Tobago

June 27, 1967

December 3, 1970

Uruguay

February 14, 1967

August 20, 1968

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

February 14, 1967

March 23, 1970

Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: 

Protocol

Subject

States Ratified

Protocol I

Jurisdictional responsibility

France, United Kingdom, United States

Protocol II

Negative security assurances

China, France, United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union[2]

 

The Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific)

Opened for signature: August 6, 1985
Entered into force: December 11, 1986

States-Parties

Signed

Ratified

Australia

August 6, 1985

December 11, 1986

Cook Islands

August 6, 1985

October 28, 1985

Fiji

August 6, 1985

October 4, 1985

Kiribati

August 6, 1985

October 28, 1986

Nauru

July 17, 1986

April 13, 1987

New Zealand

August 6, 1985

November 13, 1986

Niue

August 6, 1985

May 12, 1986

Papua New Guinea

September 16, 1985

September 15, 1989

Samoa

August 6, 1985

October 20, 1986

Solomon Islands

May 29, 1987

June 27, 1989

Tonga

August 2, 1996

December 18, 2000

Tuvalu

August 6, 1985

January 16, 1986

Vanuatu

September 16, 1995

February 9, 1996

Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: 

Protocol

Subject

States Ratified

Protocol I*

Prohibition on the manufacture, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device

France, United Kingdom

Protocol II

Negative security assurances

China, France, United Kingdom, Soviet Union[2]

Protocol III

Ban on nuclear testing in nuclear-weapon-free zone

Soviet Union[2]

*(open only to France, the United Kingdom and the United States)

 

The Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia)

Opened for signature: December 15, 1995
Entered into force: March 27, 1997

States-Parties

Signed

Ratified

Brunei Darussalam

December 15, 1995

November 22, 1996

Cambodia

December 15, 1995

March 27, 1997

Indonesia

December 15, 1995

April 10, 1997

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

December 15, 1995

July 16, 1996

Malaysia

December 15, 1995

October 11, 1996

Myanmar

December 15, 1995

July 17, 1996

Philippines

December 15, 1995

June 21, 2001

Singapore

December 15, 1995

March 27, 1997

Thailand

December 15, 1995

March 20, 1997

Vietnam

December 15, 1995

November 26, 1996

Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: 

  • None. Five nuclear weapons states and ASEAN members met in July 2012 to sign the treaty protocol. The treaty commission, however, postponed the signing of the protocol until November, requesting more time to review reservations that several of the NWS indicated that they would attach during ratification.

 

The Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa)

Opened for signature: April 11, 1996
Entered into force: July 15, 2009

States-Parties

Signed

Ratified

Algeria

April 11, 1996

February 11, 1998

Angola

April 11, 1996

June 20, 2014

Benin               

April 11, 1996

September 4, 2007

Botswana

June 9, 1998

June 16, 1999

Burkina Faso

April 11, 1996

August 27, 1998

Burundi

April 11, 1996

July 15, 2009

Cameroon

April 11, 1996

September 28, 2010

Cape Verde

April 11, 1996

-----

Central African Republic

April 11, 1996

-----

Chad

April 11, 1996

January 18, 2012

Comoros

April 11, 1996

July 24, 2012

Congo

January 27, 1997

November 26, 2013

Cote D’Ivoire        

April 11, 1996

July 28, 1999

Democratic Republic of the Congo

April 11, 1996

-----

Djibouti

April 11, 1996

-----

Egypt

April 11, 1996

-----

Equatorial Guinea

 

February 19, 2003

Eritrea

April 11, 1996

-----

Ethiopia

April 11, 1996

March 13, 2008

Gabon

April 11, 1996

June 12, 2007

Gambia

April 11, 1996

October 16, 1996

Ghana

April 11, 1996

June 27, 2011

Guinea

April 11, 1996

January 21, 2000

Guinea-Bissau

April 11, 1996

January 4, 2012

Kenya

April 11, 1996

January 9, 2001

Lesotho

April 11, 1996

March 14, 2002

Liberia

July 9, 1996

-----

Libya

April 11, 1996

May 11, 2005

Madagascar

 

December 23, 2003

Malawi

April 11, 1996

April 23, 2009

Mali

April 11, 1996

July 22, 1999

Mauritania

April 11, 1996

February 24, 1998

Mauritius

April 11, 1996

April 24, 1996

Mozambique

April 11, 1996

August 28, 2008

Namibia

April 11, 1996

March 1, 2012

Niger

April 11, 1996

February 22, 2017

Nigeria

April 11, 1996

June 18, 2001

Rwanda

April 11, 1996

February 1, 2007

Sao Tome & Principe

July 9, 1996

-----

Senegal

April 11, 1996

October 25, 2006

Seychelles

July 9, 1996

May 23, 2014

Sierra Leone

April 11, 1996

-----

Somalia

February 23, 2006

-----

South Africa

April 11, 1996

March 27, 1998

Sudan

April 11, 1996

-----

Swaziland

April 11, 1996

July 17, 2000

Togo

April 11, 1996

July 18, 2000

Tunisia

April 11, 1996

October 7, 2009

Uganda

April 11, 1996

-----

United Republic of Tanzania

April 11, 1996

June 19, 1998

Zambia

April 11, 1996

April 6, 1998

Zimbabwe

April 11, 1996

April 6, 1998

 Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: 

Protocol

Subject

States Ratified

Protocol I

Negative security assurances

China, France, Russia, United Kingdom

Protocol II

Ban on nuclear testing in zone

China, France, Russia, United Kingdom

Protocol III*

Jurisdictional responsibility

France

*(open only to France and Spain)

 

Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

Opened for signature: September 8, 2006
Entered into force: March 21, 2009 

States-Parties

Signed

Ratified

Kazakhstan

September 8, 2006

February 19, 2009

Kyrgyzstan

September 8, 2006

July 27, 2007

Tajikistan

September 8, 2006

January 13, 2009

Turkmenistan

September 8, 2006

January 17, 2009

Uzbekistan

September 8, 2006

May 10, 2007

 Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: 

Protocol

Subject

States Ratified

Protocol I*

Negative security assurances

China, France, Russia, United Kingdom

*United States signed but has not ratified


Notes:

1. The treaty specified that the full zone would not enter into force until it was ratified by all states within the zones. That did not occur until Cuba ratified the treaty in 2002. However, the treaty permitted individual states to waive that provision and declare themselves bound by the treaty, which many did beginning in 1968.

2. Russia is recognized as inheriting the Soviet Union's treaty commitments.

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

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Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China

January 2024

China, one of the five nuclear weapons states under the NPT, is estimated, as of January 2024, to possess roughly 500 nuclear warheads, an arsenal that has increased significantly in recent years. It has simultaneously sought to modernize and expand its nuclear delivery systems in pursuit of a robust nuclear triad. China continues to develop road-mobile ICBMs, advance the construction of three new ICBM silo fields, and improve the capabilities of its sea and air-based deterrent. China’s self-stated nuclear policy has been to keep its capabilities at the minimum level required to maintain its national security and deter a potential first strike, and it was the first nation to declare a “No First Use” policy.

Contents

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

  • The Nuclear Arsenal, an Overview
  • Delivery Systems
  • Fissile Material
  • Proliferation Record
  • Nuclear Doctrine

Biological Weapons

Chemical Weapons

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

  • Conference on Disarmament (CD)
  • Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
  • Nuclear Security Summits
  • Six-Party Talks
  • Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

 

Signed

Ratified

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

---

1992

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

1996

---

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

---

1989*

CPPNM 2005 Amendment

____

2009

Chemical Weapons Convention

1993

1997

Biological Weapons Convention

---

1984

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

2005

2010

*China stated that it will not be bound by the dispute settlement procedures in Paragraph 2, Article 17

Back to Top

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Group

Status

Australia Group

Not a member

Missile Technology Control Regime

Not a member.  China, in 2004, applied for membership, but Beijing did not receive the necessary consensus approval of the group because the United States and some other countries continue to find fault with Chinese missile and technology exports. China says it abides by the MTCR guidelines.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

Member

Wassenaar Arrangement

Not a member

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol

Signatory, entered into force in 2002

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Participant

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

Not a participant

Proliferation Security Initiative

Not a participant

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673

China has filed reports on activities to fulfill the resolutions

Back to Top

Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

The Nuclear Arsenal, an Overview
China does not publicly release information about the size of its nuclear arsenal. The independent sources generally assess that China's stockpile has exceeded 400 warheads. The U.S. government estimates that China had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads in May 2023, compared to 400 in 2022, and is an pace to have 1,000 or more by 2030. China's nuclear arsenal increased from 240 in 2011 to 280 in 2018, it is believed to have accelerated nuclear expansion in 2021.

The majority of China’s warheads are thought to be kept in storage under central control during times of peace, though some missile battalions conduct “high alert duty.” It is uncertain whether China possesses a low-yield nuclear arsenal.

China's nuclear policy has been defined by possessing the minimum capabilities needed to deter a first strike from a potential aggressor.

Delivery Systems

Nuclear Modernization

  • China’s nuclear delivery systems are undergoing modernization programs, keeping with the modernization efforts of its People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Chinese leaders consider these efforts essential for advancing national interests and meeting growing national security requirements as the country transitions.
  • Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris report that, “The modernized force is more mobile, responsive, and accurate, and can overwhelm a limited US ballistic missile defense system." 
  • According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), China continues to field new and more advanced nuclear delivery systems with improved range and destructive capability.
  • China’s decision to switch some of its missiles from liquid to solid fuel has improved their capabilities, in both range and promptness of launch. 

 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)

  • Estimates place China as having around 382 nuclear-capable land-based missiles capable of delivering approximately 318 warheads. A 2024 Federation of American Scientists report estimates that around 140 of these land-based missiles are ICBMs, whereas the DOD’s 2023 China Military Power Report estimates 350 ICBMs in China’s arsenal. Up to 130 of China’s ICBMs can target the continental United States. 
  • China has embarked on its largest-ever expansion of new ICBM facilities, building approximately 320 new silos for solid-fueled ICBMS across three missile fields, while also modernizing and expanding its road-mobile ICBM force. 
  • The silo fields near the northwest city of Yumen (120 individual silos), Hami (110 individual silos) in Eastern Xinjiang, and Yulin (90 individual silos) in Inner Mongolia are located deep inside the Chinese mainland, beyond the reach of U.S. cruise missiles. 
  • U.S. Strategic Command asserts that the combined number of operational and under-construction Chinese mobile, silo, and training launchers exceeds 450. However, none of the silo fields have yet been loaded with missiles, and independent researchers estimate that they are likely several years from full operational capability. 
  • The DOD report in 2023 estimates that China "probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos."
  • The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) controls China’s conventional and nuclear land-based missiles.

Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)

  • As of March 2023, China has a fleet of 6 Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Originally designed to carry JL-2 SLBMs, they are now equipped with new, longer-range JL-3 SLBMs.
  • China possesses two SLBM types:
    • JL-2 (CSS-NX-14): a modified version of the DF-31 ICBM; estimated range of 7,000+ km but some estimates place the number at 8,000-9,000 km.
    • JL-3 (CSS-N-20): likely MIRV-capable, with an estimated range of 10,000 km that enables targeting of the continental United States from the safety of waters near the Chinese coast.
  • The DOD assessed in 2023 that China “has six operational TYPW 094 JIN-class SSBNs, and these submarines are conducting at sea deterrent patrols. The PLAN's JIN SSBNs are equipped to carry up to 12 sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); JL-2 (CSS-N-14) and JL-3 (CSS-N-20) representing the PRC's first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent."

Strategic Bombers

  • China continues to update its outdated nuclear-capable bomber fleet.
  • The PLA air force was assigned a “strategic deterrence” mission in 2012.
  • China’s fleet of nuclear-capable bombers consists of about 20 Hong-6 (H-6) bombers based on Soviet designs, with a range of only 3,100+ km. A variant of the H-6 capable of air-to-air refueling known as the H-6N, has been operationally deployed. China may intend to equip the H-6N with a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) to achieve a “viable” nuclear triad for the first time. 
  • The H-6 bombers are also capable of delivering an unspecified number of gravity-based bombs.
  • Media reports suggest that China may be developing a new strategic stealth bomber, the H-20. U.S. officials believe the bomber will have both conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Fissile Material

  • Although China has not publicly declared a halt to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium, general speculation is that Beijing has stopped its production. China is reported to have last produced HEU in 1989 and last produced separated plutonium in 1991.
  • The International Panel on Fissile Material's 2015 report estimates that China maintains a stockpile of 18 ± 4 metric tons of military HEU and 1.8 ± 0.5 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. 
  • At present, the limited size of China’s military stockpile restricts its ability to produce more warheads. China may be able to double its arsenal size using current stocks but would have to divert fissile material from two civilian breeder reactors currently under construction to acquire over 1000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030 forecast by the DOD. 
  • China has not declared a civilian HEU stockpile and, as of 2016, maintains an estimated civilian plutonium stockpile of only 25.6 kg.

Proliferation Record

  • China has a record of assisting states with nuclear and missile programs in the past, but in 2000, China made a public commitment not to assist “in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons.”
  • China has aided Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs among other states. Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia have also been identified as recipients of sensitive technologies and materials from China.
  • The China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC)—with government authorization—has exported Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) to Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Ghana, and Nigeria. These reactors run on highly enriched uranium fuel, albeit a fraction of what is necessary for a nuclear warhead, which has been supplied by China to recipient states.
  • There have been efforts made by China to work with those states to convert these reactors to use low enriched uranium fuel, including a 2010 agreement between the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory and the China Institute of Atomic Energy for a new facility in China to produce LEU replacement cores in MNSR's.
  • Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) members, including the United States, saw enough improvement in China’s nuclear export behavior that they extended membership to China in 2004.
    • Nonetheless, China has sold reactors to Pakistan, as was revealed in a 2010 agreement between the two nations. This trade, however, contravenes NSG guidelines.
  • China’s bid to join the Missile Technology Control Regime failed in 2004, due to continuing concerns about Chinese missile and missile technology transactions. China, however, maintains that it voluntarily abides by the regime’s guidelines.

Nuclear Doctrine
China was the first nuclear-weapon state to declare publicly that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Beijing has emphasized that this vow stands "at any time or under any circumstances." China reaffirmed its no-first-use policy in its 2015 and 2019 white papers. The 2019 report also states,

"China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for maintaining its national security. China will optimize its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China."

Regardless, some theorize that the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal, its intent on increasing its nuclear warfare capabilities, and its posturing demonstrate a doctrine of counter-nuclear coercion or limited deterrence. The dramatic expansion in ICBM launchers challenges the claim that China keeps its deterrent at a "minimum level," though Beijing’s nuclear buildup can be interpreted as a means of safeguarding Chinese retaliatory capability in the event of a surprise first strike. Scholars remain divided over the reasons for China’s nuclear buildup (see ACT, June 2023).

China has conducted 45 nuclear tests. The first test occurred Oct. 16, 1964, and the last test took place July 29, 1996.

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Biological Weapons

  • China contends it is in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) despite U.S. allegations asserting the contrary. U.S. State Department compliance assessment reports have said that China possessed an offensive biological weapons capability prior to joining the BWC in 1984.
  • The 2015 report indicates that China "engaged during the reporting period in biological activities with potential dual-use applications. However, the information did not establish that China is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC." The 2017 compliance report does not cite any Chinese violations.

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Chemical Weapons

  • China has declared that it has destroyed all chemical weapon agent production facilities and solely conducts defensive chemical warfare research.
  • Beijing’s official position emphasizes the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In the past, the U.S. government has alleged that China may be violating its Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) commitments by secretly pursuing chemical weapons programs.
  • China inherited approximately 700,000 abandoned chemical weapon (ACW) munitions from the Imperial Japanese Army at the end of World War II. Many of these ACWs are not easily located or properly stored; many of them are buried.
  • Japan, as of 2017, continues to jointly work with China to destroy these ACWs. The destruction began in March 2010. In November 2014, the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged Japan to speed up the destruction process. As of December 2014, 50,800 ACWs had been recovered in China, of which 37,373 were verifiably destroyed. 

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Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

Conference on Disarmament (CD)
At the 65-member CD, China expressed support for the negotiation of an “effectively verifiable” fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) while declaring its top priority to be the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Chinese insistence that the conference take some action on the outer space issue in parallel with any negotiations on a cutoff treaty and the U.S. opposition to that approach has, as of 2017, contributed to the stalemate of the conference over the past several years. In 2003, China said it would accept discussions on outer space rather than formal negotiations, but that formulation remained unacceptable to the United States. China, however, did not agree to a 2007 compromise formula, including talks on outer space, which the United States said it would not oppose. China refused to participate in Australian and Japanese-led side meetings at the CD in 2011, insisting that the CD was the only proper conduit for FMCT negotiations. The U.S. has stated that the lack of support by China and other key countries resulted in the failure of the side meetings to make progress. China believes that a FMCT should not restrict the use of existing fissile material for weapons purposes.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
China has ratified additional protocols to the Latin American and Caribbean, South Pacific, African, and Central Asian nuclear weapons free zone treaties pledging not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the treaty’s member states. However, China maintains a reservation to Additional Protocol II of the South Pacific nuclear weapons-free zone. It has not ratified the Southeast Asia nuclear weapons-free zone treaty.   

Nuclear Security Summits
China participated in all four Nuclear Security Summits. China played an active role in these summits and in the 2014 NSS, President Xi Jinping put forward a Chinese approach to nuclear security for the first time.

Six-Party Talks
China played a key role in hosting and helping mediate the so-called six-party talks to achieve North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. Although those talks broke down in 2008 and have yet to resume, China maintains that they remain an effective mechanism for achieving disarmament in North Korea.  However, amidst mounting pressure and criticism from U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration for China to take charge of the North Korean threat, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang stated, in February 2017, that “we have said many times already that the crux of the North Korean nuclear issue is the problem between the United States and North Korea,” and that “the Trump White House needs to make the first move and talk to Pyongyang.”

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
China took part in the negotiation of the July 2015 JCPOA, which limits and rolls back Iran’s nuclear program. Despite being a “quiet negotiator” in these talks, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed, at the conclusion of the negotiation, that “at some important points when the negotiation met with the difficulties and reached the deadlocks, China had actively explored ideas and approaches to resolve the problems and put forward its own solutions from a perspective taking into consideration of the common interests of all parties.”

U.S.-China Strategic Stability Dialogue 
The United States has repeatedly urged China to engage in arms control talks over its nuclear expansion through bilateral and trilateral U.S.-Russia-China frameworks and to restart military dialogue, citing concerns over conflict escalation. However, China has resisted U.S. overtures on both issues. Beijing has been more receptive to multilateral formats for diplomacy, with the P5 being one of its preferred venues for discussing nuclear arms reduction. In January 2022, China welcomed a joint statement with France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” 

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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical Nuclear Weapons at a Glance

July 2017

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy, (202) 463-8270 x104

Near the Cold War’s end, leaders in Washington and Moscow made reciprocal unilateral pledges to substantially limit and reduce their nuclear weaponry, most notably their tactical or “battlefield” nuclear weapons, such as nuclear artillery shells. President George H.W. Bush initiated these commitments, collectively known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), in September 1991 in recognition of the break up of the Eastern bloc and out of concern for the Kremlin’s ability to maintain control of its vast nuclear arsenal as political changes swept the Soviet Union. By pledging to end foreign deployments of entire categories of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, Bush hoped that leaders in Moscow would follow suit; and they did, at least in part. All Soviet nuclear weapons were reportedly successfully consolidated on Russian soil. Still, Washington alleges Moscow has not yet fulfilled all of its PNI destruction commitments. Meanwhile, Russia opposes the continued stationing of U.S. tactical nuclear gravity bombs in Europe, which the PNIs did not cover. Despite lingering concerns about each other’s tactical nuclear weapons, the two sides have not negotiated further reductions or transparency measures for these arms since the early 1990s.

U.S. Presidential Nuclear Initiatives:

On Sept. 27, 1991, Bush announced a raft of unilateral initiatives to limit and reduce the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. Specifically, he pledged to:

  • withdraw to the United States all ground-launched short-range weapons deployed overseas and destroy them along with existing U.S. stockpiles of the same weapons; and
  • cease deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft during “normal circumstances.” Implicitly, the United States reserved the right to redeploy these arms in a crisis.

Soviet/Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives:

On Oct. 5, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded to Bush’s speech with reciprocal Soviet measures. Specifically, Gorbachev committed to:

  • eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear mines;
  • remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and multipurpose submarines. These weapons would be stored in central storage sites along with all nuclear arms assigned to land-based naval aircraft; and
  • separate nuclear warheads from air defense missiles and put the warheads in central storage. A “portion” would be destroyed.

On Jan. 29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed Gorbachev’s commitments and expanded on them in response to a second round of unilateral U.S. nuclear weapons cutbacks focused on strategic forces. (Following the Soviet Union’s Dec. 25, 1991 collapse, Russia assumed responsibility for the Soviet Union’s nuclear complex and arms control commitments.) Yeltsin said Russia would:

  • eliminate a third of its sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and half of its ground-to-air nuclear missile warheads; and
  • halve its airborne tactical nuclear weapons stockpile. Pending reciprocal U.S. action, the other half of this stockpile would be taken out of service and placed in central storage depots.

Implementation:

A precise accounting of U.S. and Soviet/Russian fulfillment of their tactical nuclear weapons PNIs is difficult because of ambiguity, then and now, surrounding the composition, size, and location of these arms. By 1991, the United States had nearly 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas, most of which were assigned to NATO. Estimates on the size of the Soviet tactical nuclear arsenal at that same time ranged widely from 12,000 to nearly 21,700 weapons.

The United States completed its proposed reductions and withdrawals of deployed tactical nuclear weapons in 1992. The elimination process was finished in 2003.

As a result of the PNIs, the U.S. withdrew and destroyed around 2,000 ground-launched nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles, all TNWs on navy surface ships and attack submarines, and on land-based naval aircraft, destroyed all nuclear depth bombs, de-alerted strategic bombers, and cancelled planned nuclear systems. By the mid-1990s, the stockpile of TNWs fell to below 1,000 warheads. Between 1990 and the end of 1994 (when the START Treaty entered into force), the U.S. nuclear stockpile of active and inactive warheads fell from 21,392 to 10,979, a 50 percent reduction.

At a Dec. 21, 1991 conference at Alma-Ata, the Soviet Republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine pledged to return all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons on their territories to Russia by July 1, 1992. All three states met their commitments despite the Soviet Union’s breakup four days after these pledges were made. Otherwise, Russia has released little information substantiating its PNI activities. At the May 2005 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, Moscow announced that all Russian tactical nuclear weapons “are now deployed only within the national territory and are concentrated at central storage facilities of the Ministry of Defense.” In 2007, Colonel-General Vladimir Verkhovtsev remarked, “Russia particularly committed itself to removing tactical nuclear weapons from the ground forces completely. Those weapons were also cut by 50 percent in the Air Force, by 60 percent in missile defense troops and by 30 percent on nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy,” the general said.

 Still, the Department of State has publicly questioned Russia’s PNI record. Specifically, it noted in June 2005, “Russia has failed to state publicly the status of the elimination of its nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for air defense missiles, nuclear mines, or nuclear weapons on land-based naval aviation.” These concerns were not expressed in the 2017 State Department Compliance Report, however.

Current Status:

As of 2016, the United States possesses about 500 B61 gravity bombs, 150-200 of which deployed in five European countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). As of 2017, Russia retains approximately 1850 nonstrategic weapons, all of which are stored on Russian territory.

Since the PNIs, the United States and Russia have not agreed on additional measures to share information on or limit their tactical nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed in March 1997 to explore measures relating to tactical nuclear weapons, but nothing came of this effort. In June 2005, Russia conditioned additional talks on tactical nuclear weapons to the U.S. withdrawal of its remaining nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States has said these weapons are deployed as part of NATO policy and that a decision to withdraw them would need to be taken by all alliance members. In 2005, Congress passed legislation calling on the Bush administration to investigate measures to help Russia account for and secure its tactical arms and assess whether tactical nuclear reductions with Russia should be pursued.

In 2010, the Barack Obama administration stated that it was the goal of the United States to seek further reductions in all types of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons—strategic and nonstrategic, deployed or nondeployed—following the conclusion of the 2010 New START talks. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept states that the goal of the alliance is to "seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members." officials insist that the U.S. should first withdraw all of its tactical nuclear weapons to its national territory. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama Administration announced a unilateral retirement of the Navy’s stockpile of nuclear-armed submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). 

In April 2010, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the U.S. could remove nuclear weapons from Europe in exchange for a reduction in the size of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons arsenal. In 2013, Obama gave a speech advocating for the U.S. to work with European allies and Russia to negotiate future reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

However, to date the United States and Russia have not commenced talks regarding additional cuts on nonstrategic weapons, and a range of arms control disputes threatens to continue to obstruct progress on the matter. Russia is unlikely to discuss cuts to its nonstrategic nuclear weapons arsenal until the United States removes nonstrategic nuclear forces from Europe and agrees to limitations of its ballistic missile defense program. 

Strategic Arms Control and Policy

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The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) At a Glance

March 2022

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: March 2022

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a voluntary, multilateral effort initiated by U.S. President George W. Bush in May 2003 to strengthen the nonproliferation architecture. Specifically, PSI seeks to enhance interdiction capabilities and increase coordination between states to disrupt trade in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), delivery systems, and related materials.

Several factors motivated the Bush administration to create PSI. In the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, the administration recognized the important role that interdicting technologies and materials plays in disrupting proliferation. The strategy concluded that “we must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.”

The Bush administration also viewed PSI as responding to a gap made evident by the December 2002 So San incident. The So San was a North Korean ship carrying Scud missiles bound for Yemen when it was intercepted by Spanish authorities acting on intelligence provided by the United States. The United States and Spain, however, could not seize the missile parts because there was no legal basis to do so. The So Sanwas released and continued on to Yemen, after Yemenis authorities provided assurances that the country would not transfer the missiles to any third party.

Mission:

PSI aims to disrupt and deter shipments of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, and the illicit transfer of dual-use goods that could be used to produce such weapons. It also seeks to enhance cooperation between states to promote intelligence and information sharing about suspected shipments of proliferation concern.

Then-Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton indicated in November 2003 that participants would be targeting shipments to non-state actors or states pursing WMDs in violation of international law.

The original PSI member states emphasized that the initiative is “an activity not an organization,” thus it has never had a formal implementing body or secretariat. PSI also does not receive dedicated funding from participating states. An informal 21-member body, known as the Operational Experts Group (OEG), serves a coordinating function and plans exercises and activities.

The list of states that comprise the OEG is available here.

Principles and Participation:

Ten countries—Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom—worked with the United States to shape the initiative and craft its interdiction principles.

In September 2003, the 11 original PSI participants released the Statement of Interdiction Principles, the non-binding document that lays out the mission of PSI and the expectations for membership. Any state can join PSI by endorsing the principles.

The principles call on PSI participants, as well as other countries, to not engage in WMD-related trade with countries of proliferation concern and to permit their own vessels and aircraft to be searched if suspected of transporting such goods.

The principles also include commitments to: 

  • develop measures to interdict transfers of WMDs, and related materials and technologies of proliferation concern,
  • strengthen national legal authorities and frameworks for interdictions,
  • adopt procedures for sharing information with other states about suspected proliferation activities, and
  • support interdiction efforts, including by negotiating ship boarding consent agreements and stopping and searching suspected shipments in territorial waters and airspaces.

As of 2019, 107 states have endorsed the Statement of Principles.

Legal Status: 

PSI does not create new law, but rather relies on existing international law to conduct interdictions in international waters or airspace. For example, a ship can be stopped in international waters if it is not flying a national flag or properly registered.

States can also conduct interdictions when directed to do so by UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Section VII of the UN Charter. For example, after the UN Security Council passed two resolutions on North Korea in 2017, a group of PSI participants issued a press releasein 2018 expressing support for the interdiction provisions in the resolutions. The press release also drew attention to the complimentary actions participating states are encouraged to take that support enforcement of the resolutions.

PSI participants are encouraged to develop their national laws and join international treaties that criminalize WMD related trafficking, such as the 2005 protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation(SUA Convention). The SUA convention’s 2005 protocol prohibits maritime shipment of WMDs and related technologies outside of legitimate trade under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The protocol allows ships to be boarded, with the consent of the flag state, if they are suspected of carrying illicit cargo, thus strengthening the legal basis for interdictions.

PSI member states also seek to expand their legal authority to interdict shipments by signing bilateral boarding agreements with select countries to secure expedited processes or pre-approval for stopping and searching their ships at sea.

Activities and Meetings:

To build capacity and best practices, participating states can participate in exercises and workshops convened by PSI members. Between 2003-2018 more than 85 workshops and exercises were hosted by PSI member states. Some groups of states have taken the initiative to hold more regular activities designed to counter regional threats, including:

  • The Mediterranean Initiative: During PSI’s high-level political meeting in 2013, France and Germany proposed creating a dedicated channel to focus on challenges in the Mediterranean region. The objectives of the initiative are to discuss risks specific to region, strengthen cooperation amongst PSI and non-PSI stakeholders, and increase capacity. Activities have included seminars to discuss counter-proliferation strategies for the region, table-top exercises, and live exercises that include interdiction best practices.
  • The Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore and the United States committed to rotate hosting yearly exercises focused on the Asia-Pacific region.

A list of PSI activities from 2003-2018 is available here.

On May 28, 2013, representatives from seventy-two PSI member states held a High Level Political Meeting in Warsaw on the 10th anniversary of the PSI’s formation. Attending states affirmed four joint statements pledging to conduct “more regular and robust” PSI exercises; promote international treaties criminalizing WMD-related trafficking; share expertise and resources to enhance interdiction capabilities; and to expand “the influence of the PSI globally through outreach to new states and the public.”

A mid-level meeting took place in Washington, DC in January 2016 that included representatives from 71 countries. Thomas Countryman, U.S. assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, said that participants discussed topics such as trends in proliferation, tactics that networks use to ship sensitive materials and technologies, and options to control proliferation financing. Countryman also said that countries shared expertise and resources that should contribute to building countries’ ability to carry out interdictions.

Successes: 

It is difficult to assess how effective the initiative has been since its inception in 2003. Given that PSI utilizes shared intelligence and interdictions may be conducted based off of multiple streams of information, successes are rarely credited directly to the initiative.

U.S. officials have acknowledged that PSI played an important role in a number of successful interdictions, including seizing centrifuge components that the A.Q. Khan network was shipping to Libya in 2003. In a June 2006 speech, then-Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph claimed that between April 2005 and April 2006 the United States had cooperated with other PSI participants on “roughly two dozen” occasions to prevent transfers of concern. Ulrik Federspiel, Denmark’s ambassador to the United States, asserted at a May 2005 event that “the shipment of missiles has fallen significantly in the lifetime of PSI.”

At a 2008 conference for PSI participants, the United States provided a briefing paper outlining five interdictions where PSI played a significant role.

  • February 2005: A European government denied an export license for coolers U.S. intelligence assessed were intended for Iran’s nuclear program.
  • November 2006: A state stopped the transfer for chromium-nickel steel plates to Iran that could have been used for that country’s ballistic missile program and returned the materials to the country of origin.
  • February 2007: Shared intelligence led authorities in a state to interdict U.S. origin equipment bound for Syria that could have been used for ballistic missile development.
  • April 2007: An Asian country stopped a shipment of sodium perchlorate, which can be used for making solid rocket motors, that was en route to Iran.
  • June 2007: A country denied overflight to a Syrian aircraft making a trip to North Korea based on shared intelligence that the cargo was carrying ballistic missile related components.
 

 

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

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Editorials Supporting an Iran Nuclear Deal, January - September 2015

A wide-range of newspaper editorials from across the country have noted the challenges facing the nuclear negotiations between the United States, its allies, and Iran over Iran’s nuclear program. 

The P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany) and Iran have agreed on a framework for a comprehensive nuclear agreement that will ensure Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful.  

A wide-range of newspaper editorials from across the country have noted the challenges facing the negotiations, some of which have been dealt with and some of which remain—and the vast majority have expressed support for the emerging agreement. Below is a selection of recent editorials on the issue. 

America’s Role: U.S. Leadership is Maintained With the Iran Deal—“All in all, senators who worked to keep the Iran deal on track acted clearly in America’s interests.”—Pittsburg Post-Gazette [9/13/2015]

An Iran Agreement Worth Testing—“This agreement is a diplomatic advance worth testing. And if it fails as critics predict? A supportive United States will be in a much stronger position to lead the response.”—Akron Beacon Journal [9/11/2015]

Iran Deal is a Victory for Effective Global Diplomacy—"If the deal had been blocked in Congress, the sanctions regime likely would have unraveled, and Iran would have continued to be months, not years, from being able to develop a nuclear weapon."—Star Tribune [9/10/2015]

Iran Deal Warrants Approval—"Opponents claim they don't want war. Instead, they say, a rejection by Congress would force everyone back to the negotiating table for a "better deal." Let's get real. That simply won’t happen. America's negotiating partners — Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia — have warned that they won't return to the talks. And why would they, when Congress could simply reject any new deal all over again?"—USA Today [9/09/2015]

Peace Has a Chance With Iran Nuclear Deal—"What opponents have failed to do is consider what would happen if they did succeed in blocking the deal. If the deal fell apart now, the international sanctions regime — painstakingly put in place over years — would collapse as it became clear that the United States was not a serious negotiator."—St. Louis Post-Dispatch [9/09/2015]

A Senseless Delay on the Iran Deal—"The debate has been vitriolic and raw, with opponents waging a multimillion-dollar campaign that relied heavily on distortions and made supporters of the strong and worthy deal out to be anti-Israel or worse."—The New York Times [9/09/2015]

A Cautious ‘Yes’ on the Iran Deal—“It’s not a perfect deal by any means, but it’s better than any alternative that opponents have been able to cite. Congress should support it.“—Montgomery News [9/08/2015]

Sen. Heitkamp Makes Right Call on Iran Accord—“Opponents of the deal have offered no credible alternative (war?). Heitkamp said her decision ‘is about seeking diplomacy rather than conflict.’ She’s got it right.”—The Forum of Fargo-Moorhead [9/06/2015]

Good News on Iran Deal—"Even if President Obama hasn’t tended well to congressional egos, he’s certainly due credit for engineering a political victory on the Iran treaty that’s good for the country. He has ensured the affirmation of a multi-nation nuclear deal with Iran that will prevent that nation from developing a nuclear weapon for years to come."—The News & Observer [9/04/2015]

Deal Assured: The Iran Accord is the Best Option for the Future—"Although squashing for the time being Iran’s nascent nuclear weapons ambitions was the immediate objective of the accord, it and Iran’s resulting contact with other countries should also open up opportunities for that nation to rejoin a world that it left to a great degree in 1979 when the revolution took place. One result could be Iran’s playing a more positive role in the Middle East. All in all, this was the right outcome."—Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [9/04/2015]

Let's Get on With the Iran Nuclear Deal—"But something else has become clear in the weeks of debate about whether Congress should approve this deal. There is not an alternative that would better protect U.S. interests. Rejection of the deal by Congress would likely isolate the U.S. and carry significant risks for this nation's security."—Chicago Tribune [9/03/2015]

Don't Bunker-Bust the Nuclear Deal With Iran—"The international nuclear deal achieved with Iran avoids Plan W — a future declaration of war by the United States in response to an Iran that might be developing nuclear weapons."—The Montclair Times [9/03/2015]

Good Luck, Mr. Biden, Selling Nuke Deal—"It's also worth noting that a majority of American Jews support the deal, 49 percent to 31 percent, according to a poll by the Los Angeles Jewish Journal. We support the deal, too, just as we have always supported Israel's right to defend its people. We know Israel has the most to lose if Iran develops nuclear capability. But we strongly believe this deal will make it more difficult for Iran to achieve that goal."—The Sun Sentinel [9/02/2015]

Casey Right on Iran Deal—"Iran knows how to make a nuclear weapon and there is no scenario where it will lose that knowledge. Mr. Casey’s exhaustive analysis has led him to the correct conclusion: The agreement is the best course available to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions."—Scranton Times-Tribune [9/02/2015]

Follow Merkley's Lead—"Wyden should join Merkley in announcing support for the deal and provide the Obama administration with what could prove the final vote it needs to protect the pact in Congress."—The Register Guard [9/01/2015]

Susan Collins Should Choose the Responsible Path on Iran—"A headline in The Hill newspaper last week called Collins 'Obama’s last hope for GOP support on Iran.' Collins’ vote might not determine the deal’s fate in either direction — President Barack Obama likely has enough support to veto a vote of disapproval and have his veto sustained — but the Maine senator has the chance to send a powerful message when everybody’s listening. That message should be that the deal negotiated with Iran, while not perfect, is the most responsible course of action available both in terms of containing the nuclear capabilities of a state sponsor of terrorism and preserving the United States’ position of leadership in the world."—Bangor Daily News [8/31/2015]

Weighing the Iran Nuclear Deal: Far From Perfect, but the Alternatives are Worse—"We urge members of Congress to vote against the resolution and, if it passes anyway, to support President Obama when he vetoes it, as he almost certainly would do. After that, Congress should press the administration to make good on its promises to counter Iran's dangerous meddling in the affairs of its neighbors and to respond decisively if Iran is found to have cheated on this agreement."—The Los Angeles Times [8/30/2015]

A Cautious "Yes" on the Iran Nuclear Deal—"It's not a perfect deal by any means, but it's better than any alternative that opponents have been able to cite. Congress should support it."—The Denver Post [8/29/2015]

Casey Should Support Deal—"The agreement has been endorsed by leading U.S. nuclear scientists, retired military leaders, several former U.S. ambassadors to Israel, Catholic bishops, many Christian leaders, a majority of American Jews and — despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bellicose opposition — much of the Israeli security establishment. Mr. Casey should join that group in supporting the agreement."—Scranton Times Tribune [8/25/2015]

Don't Toss Aside Iran Deal Lightly—"Reaching an agreement with Iran — not to mention Russia and China — was no small achievement, and the deal should not be lightly tossed aside."—Norwich Bulletin [08/24/2015]

Menendez Opposition to Iran Pact Risks War—"Menendez is no hawk. But he has his blinds spots. He's unreasonable on Cuba, opposing a détente even after a half century of futile sanctions. Derailing the Iran deal could have far more deadly consequences. Our fervent hope is that Sen. Cory Booker does not make a historic mistake by following his lead. Because Obama is right -- rejecting this agreement could put the United States and Iran on a path towards war."—New Jersey Star-Ledger [8/20/2015]

South Florida's Congressional Delegation Should Back Iran Deal—"But sensitive or not, a critical choice is coming up, and the votes of South Florida's delegation could very well affect the result. Elected officials must vote their consciences, but unless they can offer what President Obama calls a "plausible" alternative — and no, we haven't heard one — we urge the undecided members of our delegation to support the deal."—Sun Sentinel [8/18/2015]

The Case for the Iran Deal—“The deal in hand may not be perfect — what agreement ever is? — but it's far better than the alternatives. Those who think we can simply sit back and wait for Iran to come up with a better offer are dreaming.”—The Baltimore Sun [8/12/2015] 

Voices of Expertise and Reason for the Iran Deal—“Hard bargaining produced the agreement. Now the deal should be tested, leading scientists and engineers making a persuasive case that it is well worth trying.”—Akron Beacon Journal [8/10/2015]

As Obama Promotes Iran Deal, Hiroshima Echos Still—"The world has to remember and learn and choose a path that might lead to a diplomatic solution in Iran -- and not the destructive alternative."—Newsday [8/5/2015]

Obama Takes on Opponents of the Iran Deal—"President Obama on Wednesday made a powerful case for the strong and effective nuclear agreement with Iran."—The New York Times [8/5/2015]

Iran Deal Critics Sell A Fantasy: Our View"But those who insist there’s a better deal to be had, if only Congress rejects this one, are gambling that an international coalition, which joined the U.S. to place tough economic sanctions on Iran, can be reassembled. The odds of that happening are about the same as winning the lottery. As President Obama put it in his speech Wednesday, 'Those who say we can just walk away from this deal and maintain sanctions are selling a fantasy.' The fact is, the deal on the table took a decade of painstaking work."—USA Today [8/5/2015]

Republican Hypocrisy on Iran—“The exaggerations and half-truths that some Republicans are using to derail President Obama‘s important and necessary nuclear deal with Iran are beyond ugly.”—The New York Times [8/1/2015]

Iran Nuclear Deal is Better Than Status Quo—“Does the deal improve our ability to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon as compared to the status quo? Clearly it does. Unless critics can offer something better — something that is acceptable to the other nations participating in the imposition of sanctions — they should embrace the agreement as being beneficial, if not perfect.”—Decatur Daily [7/30/2015]

Heated Rhetoric on Iran Deal Does Nothing but Enrich the Few—“There are scads of money to be made anytime the United States wages war on another nation. If Iran is allowed to develop a nuclear bomb, there is no question that Israel will find a way to strike and that action could lead to a conflagration that makes the current upheavals in the Middle East seem petty by comparison. Are we ready to step back into that fray? Or are we willing to let this deal spin out? We choose the latter.”—Bennington Banner[7/29/2015]

Rigorously Enforce the Iran Nuclear Deal“If Congress kills the deal or significantly alters its terms, America would be blamed for the accord's failure and draw the ire of nations that joined the United States in hammering out an exhaustive pact only to see it crumble. The strong sanctions alliance would unravel and Iran would revive its bomb effort — and Washington's prestige and ability to marshal a global response to Tehran's renewed weapons push would be diminished."—Defence News [7/20/15]

Iran Deal a Gamble, but No Deal Would Be Worse—Without an agreement, however, Iran already is pursuing its aggression and terror. It is acting outside the sphere of responsible states. This agreement creates a scenario in which that fundamentalist dynamic might change. Is it guaranteed? Not at all. But none of the doubters have offered a better idea. This is what we've got.”—El Paso Times [7/20/15]

The Nuclear Deal With Iran is Better Than the Alternatives—War or No Deal at All—“A country of Iran’s size and sophistication will get a bomb if it really wants one. Nothing can change that. But this pact offers the chance of holding Iran back and shifting its course. The world should embrace it, cautiously.”—The Economist [7/18/15] 

Negotiations Produced Nuclear Agreement, Not Iranageddon“Sanctions brought Iran to the table. An agreement required accepting that the perfect is not possible. Now, Congress should read the agreement, debate the issues involved seriously, and make a final decision in the real world.”—Idaho Mountain Express [7/17/15]

Iran Nuclear Deal is a Path Away From War“The pact with Iran announced Tuesday is about diminishing the chances of the United States going to war to stop Iran from deploying a nuclear weapon. To that end, the U.S. and its negotiating partners forged a sound deal. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry should be hailed for a historic achievement."—Savannah Morning News [7/17/15]

Utah Politicians Attack Iran Deal With No Alternative—“If Iran cheats, the very unpleasant question of whether to attack that nation's nuclear facilities will still be before us. But even if the bombers do fly — now or 10 years from now — that would be no guarantee of a nuclear-free Iran. So the pact is well worth trying, if only because it stands to at least delay the threat of another costly and almost certainly pointless war in the Middle East.”—The Salt Lake Tribune [7/17/15]

Agreement Should be Given a Chance to Prevent Iran from Building Nuclear Weapons“Failure to craft an agreement all but guarantees that Iran will continue to seek nuclear weapons, perhaps igniting a war as the United States and Israel make good on pledges to prevent that nation from achieving nuclear capability. Only two paths are available, neither of them guaranteed to work: military or diplomatic. The Obama administration and other countries involved in the negotiations have chosen diplomacy. It was the right decision – really, the only decision – even given Iran’s behavior.”—The Buffalo News [7/17/15]

Iran Deal a Lesson in the Value of Diplomacy“Yet even so, here is a profound piece of evidence in favour of talking, of being willing to extend a hand, as US President Barack Obama once put it, if another country was "willing to unclench their fist". It tells us that violent enmities can be improved, and that common interests can be found. It tells us that nothing is pre-ordained – not the antagonisms we presume will last forever, or the conflicts that seem to replay themselves over and over.”—The Dominion Post [7/17/15]

Nukes Deal a Triumph for Iran and US“The deal agreed this week by Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany is, therefore, a triumph of perseverance and diplomacy. In one swoop, the prospect of Tehran developing nuclear weaponry has been largely eliminated and the chance of it playing a more constructive role in world, and especially Middle Eastern, affairs has been much enhanced.”—The New Zealand Herald [7/17/15]

Diplomacy, Not War, Goal of Iran Nuclear Deal“War is the ultimate failure of diplomacy, British politician Tony Benn once said. Right now, diplomacy holds the greatest promise of success.”—Detroit Free Press [7/16/15]

Enough With Netanyahu's Iran Deal Hysteria“Netanyahu’s pretention to teach the world history has no basis. His previous assessments regarding the materialization of the Iranian threat have proved false. Only five years ago, he objected to the same sanctions whose removal today he calls “a historic mistake.” Had he been given his wish at the time and had Iran’s nuclear facilities been bombed, either by Israel or the United States, the reactors would have been rehabilitated by now and Iran would be closer than ever to obtaining nuclear weapons.”—Haaretz [7/16/15]

Looking at Iran Nuclear Deal“Perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind is that without a deal, Iran will be free to develop its nuclear program without any restrictions. Iran has everything it needs, including skilled scientists. Informed guesses range from months to years on how quickly Iran could create a nuclear weapon.”—Journal Star [7/16/15]

Iran Deal: Congress Should Think and Listen, ­Then Maybe Even Read the Agreement“Republicans understandably oppose the president on many fronts, which reflects honest philosophical differences, as well as party politics. But Obama’s support for something does not automatically constitute a logical reason to endorse its opposite. The Iran agreement is supposed to help keep nukes out of the hands of crazies. Denouncing it without actually knowing what is in it or hearing from military and foreign-policy experts about how it might work is irresponsible and dangerous.”—The Durango Herald [7/16/15] 

Diplomacy Creates Hope of a Responsible Iran“Mr Obama's Republican rivals insist they will tear up the agreement in given the chance. But what is the alternative to a deal? The Herald believes there isn't a viable one. Engagement at least offers some optimism, where before there was none.”—The Sydney Morning Herald [7/16/15]

Iran Deal: the World Becomes a Safer Place“The agreement, signed after 20 months of negotiations, offers real hope on at least two fronts. First, there are verifiable measures to contain and reduce the threat of Iran's nuclear capabilities for more than a decade. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran will dismantle much of its nuclear infrastructure. The country's capacity to enrich uranium will be be reduced by two-thirds, while its stockpile of enriched uranium will be reduced by 96 per cent. UN inspectors will be able to enter sites where they suspect any undeclared nuclear activity may be occurring. The impact of a successful containment of Iran's nuclear threat in a volatile Middle East cannot be overstated.”—The Age [7/16/15]

Few Seem Happy With U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal — and Rightfully So“Yes, it’s a terrible deal, but breaking off negotiations and letting Iran run wild would be even more terrible. It would also likely lead to war, which is the most terrible alternative imaginable. With that perspective, this deal can be viewed as the least-worst of a number of very bad options.”—Desert News [7/16/15]

A Deal With Iran: The Accord Promises a Decade of Containment“Is the agreement perfect? Certainly not, but it is far better than allowing Iran to fester in dangerous isolation.”—Pittsburgh Post Gazette [7/15/15]

Despite GOP, Israeli Critics, the Iran Deal is a Good One“But the truth is, this is a good deal. It is not perfect, and it is time-limited (Iran will not be able to build beyond a limit on enriched uranium for 10 years) but it is preferable to war, which seems to be the Republican alternative.”—The News & Observer [7/15/15]

Congress Should Support Deal With Iran—“The Iran agreement helps America's national security, protects Israel and contains Iran's nuclear ambitions. It is a compromise, but that is not a criticism. Nothing except a compromise was possible.”—Sun Sentinel [7/15/15]

Better to See Iran Back Away From Nuclear Weapons“The president made a choice, one of those difficult calls that arrive in the White House. Worth adding is that he is not alone. Germany, France and Britain joined in the agreement, along with Russia and China. All concluded the greater danger resided in Iran becoming a nuclear power. To their credit, the partners (for this endeavor [sic]) gained a deal that puts clear and formidable obstacles in the path of Iran.”—Akron Beacon Journal [7/15/15]

Iran Deal is Better Than No Deal at All“After two years of grueling negotiations, the Obama administration has finally pulled off a historic deal with Iran that resolves — at least for the time being — one of the most pressing foreign policy challenges facing the world: concerns that Iran could be building a nuclear bomb.”—The Boston Globe [7/15/15]

Examine Iran Deal Carefully Before Deciding“So let's not rush to judgment. Before we allow cable news mavens of whatever stripe tell us what to think, let's spend time investigating and having an honest discussion with the goal of giving our government guidance on how to proceed.”—Contra Costa Times [7/15/15]

Outcomes Uncertain on Iran Deal, Political Future“The historic agreement announced by the United States and its partners with Iran on Tuesday offers the welcome prospect that, for the next 15 years, the Islamic republic will be restrained from producing a nuclear weapon.”—Santa Cruz Sentinel [7/15/15]

Iran Nuclear Agreement Imperfect but Realistic“Critics have offered no alternative other than a Middle East nuclear arms race among Iran and its rival Sunni states and Israel, and the prospect of a massive regional war. The agreement is realistic, more akin to President Richard Nixon’s outreach to China more than 40 years ago than to appeasement. China remains, in many ways, an adversary. But it is part of the global community and less dangerous than it might have been in isolation. The same prospect now arises relative to Iran.”—PA Citizen Voice [7/15/15]

A Historic Accord on Iran’s Nuclear Program“Yes, this agreement should be closely vetted. But until opponents come up with a realistic strategy, it is the best option available.”—The Fresno Bee [7/15/15]

Question but Give Fair Hearing to Iran Pact“Reaching agreement to freeze Iran’s march toward nuclear capability without resorting to war is a credit to the Obama administration’s persistence.”—Miami Herald [7/15/15]

Diplomacy Over War“[T]he Obama administration has won a victory that prevents another bloodbath. The treaty negotiated by Secretary of State John Kerry will let international inspectors verify that Iran’s nuclear power program is doing nothing that might put an atomic bomb into the hands of suicidal terrorists, or governments.”—Charleston Gazette [7/15/15]

The Iran Deal Cuts the Risk of Another Mideast War“But critics of the deal tend to ignore two hard realities. One is that Iran is well along on the path to building nuclear weapons, and will surely acquire them if this agreement is rejected. Even if sanctions are kept in place, a nuclear Iran would be far more dangerous.”—The Star-Ledger [7/15/15]

Proponents Need to Sell Iran Nuclear Agreement“With the next step in the process soon to begin – congressional review of the pact – there'll be plenty of time for questions, but as a start, one should trump all others: Is an imperfect agreement better than no pact at all? That question is at least based in reality. It judges this deal against an actual alternative, not as opposed to some imagined perfect pact.”—The Republican [7/15/15]

The Nuclear Deal With Iran“To evaluate the agreement, let's keep in mind that the alternatives are not many and that there aren't more favorable [sic] ones if the goal is to control Iran's nuclear ambitions.”—Los Angeles Opinion [7/15/15]

Iran Deal Best One Available“But anyone who thought that Iran was going to abandon its nuclear capability was unrealistic. This agreement commits Iran to reducing its potential nuclear material stockpile by 98 percent and diminishing its capacity to produce that fuel by about two-thirds, and to allow independent inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The provisions increase the period that it would take to produce a weapon from about three months to about a year.” The Times-Tribune [7/15/15]

Iran Nuclear Deal Needs Careful Study, Not a Political Pie Fight“Still, an agreement with a reasonable shot at success is worth trying because the alternative is another war, and that should be a last resort.”—San Jose Mercury News [7/15/15]

Is the Iran Deal Good Enough?—“Our preliminary assessment is that, if its terms are strictly enforced, the deal is likely to put nuclear weapons beyond Iran's reach for a decade or more, a significant achievement and probably the best outcome available.”—Los Angeles Times [7/15/15]

For Iran Nuclear Deal, Implementation Will Be Key“Which is scarier: An unconstrained Iran that already has enough fissile material to build ten to 12 nuclear bombs within two to three months? Or an Iran that's agreed to give up all of its highly-enriched uranium, all of its plutonium and key elements of the technology for achieving a bomb, while accepting intrusive and far-reaching international safeguards and inspections?”—Cleveland Plain Dealer [7/15/15]

Global Effort Needed to Prevent Iran Nuclear Deal From Fizzling Out“With Iran agreeing to shrink the program, the nightmare of Iran going nuclear has receded. And with the lifting of sanctions by Europe and the United States, Iran will emerge from its isolation that began with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and start rejoining the international community. The possibility of the United States and Iran working together to bring stability to the Middle East has become more real.”—The Asahi Shimbun [7/15/15]

An Historic Deal to Curb Iranian Nuclear Ambitions“The long-awaited Iranian nuclear deal finalized on Tuesday appears to be the very best — and most certainly the only realistic — shot at preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.”—Chicago Sun-Times [7/14/15]

The Importance of Iran Deal“If the deal stops "the spread of nuclear weapons in this region," as Obama insisted Tuesday, it will be a magnificent achievement.”—The Denver Post [7/14/15]

Good Faith Needed on Iran Deal“Given this, Tuesday’s announcement that a U.S.-led effort to strike a deal limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions is welcome news if — and it’s a big if — all parties can stick to the terms of the accord. Count as a positive anything that puts off full-scale war and offers at least a chance of a more peaceful world.”—The Anniston Star [7/14/15]

An Iran Nuclear Deal That Reduces the Chance of War“The final deal with Iran announced by the United States and other major world powers does what no amount of political posturing and vague threats of military action had managed to do before. It puts strong, verifiable limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon for at least the next 10 to 15 years and is potentially one of the most consequential accords in recent diplomatic history, with the ability not just to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon but also to reshape Middle East politics.”—The New York Times [7/14/15]

Iran Nuclear Deal Appears Promising“A seriously flawed agreement is worse than no agreement. But the initial overview of this deal is positive for the nation and for the world. As Congress wades into the details, it should measure them against the present and the possible — not against the perfect.”—Tampa Bay Times [7/14/15]

Is Iran Nuclear Deal Better Than no Deal? Yes: Our View“So what has been won by these arduous negotiations? First, an option other than war to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions, one that positions the U.S. as a leader in making the world a safer place with a stroke of a pen rather than at the tip of a sword.”—USA Today [7/14/15]

The Guardian View on the Iran Nuclear Deal: a Triumph of Diplomacy—“Instead of politicians opting for military solutions, this has been a triumph for diplomats and pragmatists, working hour after hour on the detail of a deal that secures a peaceful compromise – and which represents a heartening success in the global quest to halt nuclear proliferation.”—The Guardian [7/14/15]

Pushing Back Iran’s Nuclear Threat—“They may want to nudge back the hands of the Doomsday Clock. U.S. President Barack Obama and other world leaders have managed to rein in Iran’s worrisome nuclear program, granting the Middle East a reprieve from the spectre of war.”—The Star [7/14/15] 

Bargaining With Tehran—“Republicans are right that we can't trust Iran, and we shouldn't. That's why the U.S. is insisting on a robust inspection and monitoring regime that can respond promptly to evidence of Iranian cheating.”—The Baltimore Sun [7/14/15]

Give the Iran Nuclear Agreement a Chance“The nuclear agreement signed Tuesday between Iran and the six world powers is an incredible diplomatic achievement and a historic milestone in the West’s relations with Iran since that country’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.”—Haaretz [7/14/15]

Iran Nuclear Deal is a Path Away From War“But if Congress succeeded in clearing the high bar needed to reject the pact, our nation would be left with only one viable option for deterring a nuclear Iran. That option is war. And we know where that leads. The pact announced Tuesday is a path away from conflagration.”—The Kansas City Star [7/14/15]

Congress Must Fully Vet Iran Deal“On Tuesday, the U.S., its international colleagues and Iran reached an agreement that purports to bar Iran from developing nuclear weaponry. Sanctions against Iran will be lifted in return for Iranian promises to be nice. Congress will have an opportunity to assess the agreement. It would be presumptuous to pass immediate judgment when Congress will devote two months to the debate.” Richmond Times-Dispatch [7/14/15]

Give Iran Deal a Chance to SucceedThis deal wasn’t slapped together with little thought given to the consequences — it was reached after two years of negotiations involving six world world powers with vastly disparate views on Iran. That’s not appeasement, it’s pragmatism.”—The Ottawa Citizen [7/14/15]

A Historic Accord on Iran’s Nuclear Program“When you listen to the critics, ask yourself: Are they offering any kind of plausible alternative? Without this pact, we’re left with what? More economic sanctions that hurt the civilian population as much as Iran’s leaders? A military strike that may or may not completely wipe out Iran’s nuclear capability, but could spark a wider war in the Middle East, where there is more than enough bloodshed already?”—The Sacramento Bee[7/14/15] 

Deeper Opportunities in Iran Nuclear Pact“Its nuclear program was just one of many strategic aims to enable Iran to lead the Islamic world’s 1.6 billion believers, or 23 percent of the world’s population. Iran (the country) claimed geopolitical reasons for needing to acquire advanced nuclear know-how. But perhaps Iran (the religious revolutionary) decided its secretive, militarized nuclear program was hurting its reputation as the leader of all Muslims. After all, a violent and political version of Islam has lost much support since 9/11 in favor of an Islam that is peaceful.” The Christian Science Monitor [7/14/15]

Carefully Consider All Aspects of Iran Deal—“[I]t is precisely the nature of the regime that makes this accord so important. President Obama, who in his statement said the deal was “not built on trust, it is built on verification,” offered “extensive briefings” to members of Congress. They should take him up on that.”—Star Tribune [7/14/15]

No Need to Rush on Iran Nuclear Deal“It has always been a long shot, the hope that the U.S. could reach an accord with Iran that would keep that country from building nuclear weapons for many years. Yet the goal is attractive enough to justify the Obama administration's pursuit of such a deal.”—The Denver Post [7/9/15]

Take Time for Verifiable Iran Nuclear Deal“It’s true that Iran already is fomenting conflict in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and across the region. Iran, however, would be even more of a regional menace – and a global threat – if it were armed with nuclear weapons. Done right, a negotiated deal can stop that from happening for years to come.”—The Sacramento Bee [6/30/15]

Ayatollah Khamenei’s Fateful Choice“Compromises are part of any negotiation. Any agreement can really be judged only when the text is signed and details are made public. The April framework accord was a solid basis on which to build a credible final deal. Ayatollah Khamenei must decide whether he and his government can live with the economic and political consequences if he sabotages this deal.” —The New York Times [6/24/15]

Rubio on Wrong Side of Iran Deal“While nothing is perfect, we were disappointed to see Rubio try to scuttle the deal with political gamesmanship. As [Deputy National Security Advisor Ben] Rhodes said, ‘this deal is a far better choice than a military confrontation or a world in which Iran exists as a nuclear weapon state.’ Amen to that.”—Sun Sentinel [5/7/15]

Among Iran Options, One Makes Sense—"To put it simply, Wilkerson believes that it’s important for the good of the world that the United States cultivates a meaningful relationship with Iran. ...The art of diplomacy has marked the forward progress of mankind since the first victim of the first weapon of war fell dead to the ground. Be skeptical of any politician who claims the path to peace must run through fields of blood.”—Concord Monitor [4/21/15]

A Reckless Act in the Senate on Iran“Congress has formally muscled its way into President Obama’s negotiations with Iran, creating new and potentially dangerous uncertainties for an agreement that offers the best chance of restraining that country’s nuclear program.”—The New York Times [4/14/15]

Israel’s Unworkable Demands on Iran—“[Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s] government made new demands that it claimed would ensure a better deal than the preliminary one that Iran, President Obama and other leaders of major powers announced last week. The new demands are unrealistic and, if pursued, would not mean a better deal but no deal at all.”—The New York Times [4/7/15]

Iran Deal Better Than Expected—“The agreement falls short of achieving the goals initially spelled out by the White House. But it does place enough restrictions on Iran's nuclear program to offer at least some hope its ambitions to produce a weapon will be significantly delayed, if not completely deterred.”—The Detroit News [4/4/15]

Nuclear Deal With Iran is Worth a Try—"Congress and others are correct to be wary of Iran and its intentions. Yet that is no reason not to attempt to negotiate a workable agreement. Who trusted the Soviet Union when Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan both negotiated arms control agreements with the Soviet regime? On both of those occasions, the Soviet Union had many nuclear weapons in place ready and targeted upon the United States and vice versa.”—West Central Tribune [4/4/15]

Critics of Iran Deal are Off-BaseIf a nuclear agreement were a reward for Iranian good behavior across the board — or if it were a clear first step toward a full rapprochement with the Islamic Republic — the critics might have a point. But that's not what the agreement is. Rather, it is more narrowly designed to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, a goal that (if it can be achieved) would serve the interests of the whole world.”—The Los Angeles Times [4/3/15]

Negotiating With IranMonths more of hard bargaining will be needed to work out the details of how those principles translate into a final agreement acceptable to both sides. But the fact that negotiators appear to have cleared this first major hurdle is a hopeful sign that the goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons through diplomatic means is achievable.”—Baltimore Sun [4/3/15]

Warmongers Aren't Happy About Iran Nuke Deal, the Rest of Us Should Be—“A nuclear Iran was not an option, and the Obama Administration has succeeded in outlining a comprehensive framework to defang the problem. Yet early criticisms of the plan seem to be rooted in a stubborn ignorance over the level of enriched uranium that is required to build a nuclear weapon.”—Star Ledger [4/3/15]

A Promising Step Toward an Iran Deal—“[T]his framework significantly reduces the risk of Iran covertly acquiring a nuclear weapon. It drastically reduces the number of Iran's centrifuges and the size of its uranium stockpile, dismantles or repurposes some of its most problematic nuclear facilities, places limits on its development of nuclear technology, and imposes a regime of surveillance and inspections that in some cases will continue for 25 years.”—Metro-West Daily News [4/3/15]

In Judging Iran Nuclear Deal Consider the Alternatives—“Would another war have been preferable? That's the simple, straightforward question that must be answered by those who'd dismiss the outline of a pact limiting Iran's nuclear capabilities.”— The Republican [4/3/15]

The Guardian View on the Iranian Nuclear Agreement: Diplomacy Shows Its Worth—“There are stronger reassurances on weaponisation, because – as a condition of getting sanctions relief – Iran has to provide the International Atomic Energy Authority with access to sites and people of interest. All told, it kicks the can down the road. It makes it almost impossible for Iran to go for a bomb in the next decade…”—The Guardian [4/3/15]

Give the Iran Nuclear Deal a ChanceBut Thursday, Iran and the so-called P5+1 — the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany — announced "parameters" for an agreement that were highly specific and, frankly, somewhat reassuring. At a minimum they justify continued negotiations with the aim of producing a final compact by the end of June. In the meantime, Congress should refrain from aggressive actions that could undermine the delicate process.”—The Los Angeles Times [4/3/15]

A Big Step to Stop Iran’s Nuclear Bomb Ambitions“[M]oving forward on the tentative framework announced Thursday is far more promising than the alternatives – giving up on diplomacy and increasing sanctions, or launching a military strike that could lead to a wider war in the Middle East.”—Sacramento Bee [4/3/15]

 A Promising Iran AgreementAll that said, the framework's scope and strength are promising. Congress should refrain from passing any legislation that would impose additional sanctions and mandates on the talks, or otherwise seek to tie the president's hands.”—Bloomberg [4/2/15]

A Promising Nuclear Deal With Iran—“Over the long run, an agreement could make the Middle East safer and offer a path for Iran, the leading Shiite country, to rejoin the international community.”—The New York Times [4/2/15]

Iran Accord May Be the Real Deal—“The real naivete is among those who think Iran can be pressured into eliminating its nuclear program altogether or say the U.S. must never negotiate with an untrustworthy regime.”—Denver Post [4/2/15]

Outline of Iran Deal Offers the Best Chance to Thaw Relations“…[T]he concessions made by Iranian diplomats, and the level of specificity offered to the public, show that all sides were negotiating in good faith. It is now up to Congress to give the negotiators the time they need to finalize the deal — and they should do so by refraining from proposing more sanctions that could jeopardize months of hard work.”—Boston Globe [4/2/15]

Iran Deal Watchwords: Distrust and Verify—“…[T]he deal is crafted to block all pathways to a bomb. Iran would not be allowed to enrich uranium to weapons grade and would have to abandon its push toward plutonium production.”—Newsday [4/2/2015]

Give Nuclear Deal With Iran a Chance“The agreement the United States, other major world powers and Tehran announced Thursday for containing Iran's nuclear program could set the stage for peacefully resolving one of the longest-running threats to global security.”—Tampa Bay Times [4/2/15]

Gazette Opinion: Daines Was Wrong on Iran Letter“[Montana Sen. Steve Daines’] participation in this half-baked scheme doesn’t just make him look foolish; it has a destabilizing effect on the world and undermines U.S. credibility. In other words, he’s done just the opposite of what should be expected from our leaders: His actions make the world less safe, not more.”—Billings Gazette [3/17/15]

Letter to Iran—“Even in the current Washington environment, writing letters to hostile foreign governments at a time when the State Department is trying to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough seems well beyond the pale. The Republican senators did not serve their country or their party well with this stunt.”—Providence Journal [3/16/15]

With Letter to Iran, GOP Senators Place Spite Before Diplomacy“[The senators] said as much in a duplicitous, disrespectful letter to Iranian leaders that sought to undermine delicate international negotiations and the authority of the White House.”—The Kansas City Star [3/15/15]

Constitutional Lesson Lost in Letter to Iran—“To the 47 Republican senators who sent that letter to the Islamic Republic of Iran downplaying the significance of any nuclear development deal they might make with President Obama: Boy, did you whiff it.”—Daily Miner [3/15/15]

GOP Senators Demean Office With Letter“This extreme example of congressional interference in diplomatic negotiations begins with the condescending assertion that the leaders of Iran ‘may not fully understand our constitutional system.’ After providing a brief lesson in American civics, the senators make clear that they ‘will consider any agreement regarding your nuclear-weapons program that is not approved by the Congress as nothing more than an executive agreement between President Barack Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei.’”—The Press Democrat [3/14/15]

Who Needs the Civics Lesson: Ayatollahs or GOP Senators?“In reality, the letter was an orchestrated attempt to undermine U.S. efforts to negotiate an agreement with Iran on a critically important issue: the use of nuclear materials by one of America's most volatile foreign adversaries.”—The Des Moines Register [3/14/15]

Senate Republicans Should Not Interfere With Iran Negotiations“…[I]t is astounding that Sen. Marco Rubio and nearly all of his fellow Republican senators would send a letter to Iran looking to scuttle a potential diplomatic deal that could freeze Iran's nuclear program for at least a decade.”—Tampa Bay Times [3/13/15]

Capito Unwisely Joined ‘Rush to War’“The White House called these actions ‘a partisan strategy to undermine the president’s ability to conduct foreign policy and advance our national security.... The rush to war or at least the rush to the military option that many Republicans are advocating is not at all in the best interest of the United States.’ In other words, Republicans would rather unleash military strikes on Iran and sink America into another Mideast war, instead of letting international inspectors verify that Iran isn’t building nukes.”—Charleston Gazette [3/13/15]

Senators' Iran Stunt Takes Disrespect to New Level“It’s one thing to criticize the administration’s actions, or try to impede them through the legislative process. But to directly communicate with a foreign power in order to undermine ongoing negotiations? That is appalling. The only direct precedent I can think of for this occurred in 1968, when as a presidential candidate Richard Nixon secretly communicated with the government of South Vietnam in an attempt to scuttle peace negotiations the Johnson administration was engaged in. It worked, and the war dragged on for another seven years.”—The Journal Gazette [3/12/15]

Republican Idiocy on Iran—“Senator John McCain, a former Republican presidential candidate, is now sort of acknowledging his error. ‘Maybe that wasn’t exactly the best way to do that,’ he said on Fox News on Tuesday. He was referring to the disgraceful and irresponsible letter that he and 46 Senate colleagues sent to Iran’s leaders this week that generated outrage from Democrats and even some conservatives.”—The New York Times [3/12/15]

Interfering With Obama on Iran Comforts Our Foes“The letter sent by 47 Republican senators to Iran's leaders — saying that any agreement the U.S. reached with them without congressional approval could be reversed by the next president "with a stroke of a pen" — is wrong on so many levels that it is hard to know where to start.”—The Commercial Appeal [3/12/15]

GOP Letter to Iran Diminishes World Standing“The freelance foreign policy overture to Iran's clerics by 47 Republican senators was not quite the treason proclaimed by tabloid headlines this week. Nor was it the first time the party out of presidential power tried to scuttle a foreign policy initiative. But it was a stunning display of arrogance, and it may well have doomed the only chance of peacefully resolving Iran's nuclear status. That is bad enough.”—San Jose Mercury News [3/12/15]

47 GOP Senators Have Wrong Strategy on Iran“One has to wonder exactly what the Republicans were trying to accomplish. If they were trying to gain support of American opinion, this was a classic fail. If the hope was to derail the negotiations completely, they have likely only offended five other nations who also are working in earnest to control Iranian nuclear aspirations.”—Longview News-Journal [3/12/15]

47 GOP Senators Send Open Letter to Iran“The 47 Republican Senators who brazenly issued an open letter Monday to Iran’s leaders not only undermine President Barack Obama’s attempts to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran, but they undercut their whole purpose of writing the letter in the first place — to achieve Congressional buy-in of any accord.”—Canton Repository [3/12/15]

Our View: Risch, Crapo Antagonize Iran—"This isn’t about good policy. This isn’t about facing the challenges posed when desperate groups with desperate agendas have an interest in the same turf. The 47 Senate Republicans want only the status quo with Iran: continued isolation, which could culminate in escalating hostility and a nuclear state."—Times-News [3/11/15]

Corker, Alexander Refused to Sign Iran Letter. Good.—“The new Senate leadership has decided that instead of allowing experienced professional diplomats to try to negotiate a nuclear disarmament deal with America’s longtime enemy Iran, it should let a freshman senator lead an amateurish and unprecedented effort to undermine U.S. foreign policy.”—The Tennessean [3/11/15]

Senators’ Iran Stunt Off Base“But [Arizona Republican Sen. Jeff Flake] also recognizes the executive branch has the responsibility for negotiating such agreements: ‘I’m not very bullish on the chance of these negotiations resulting in a good agreement, or an agreement at all, but we ought to explore it. We ought to give it every opportunity to succeed.’ That kind of maturity and restraint is too often missing today in a Washington where vicious sound bites and partisan one-upmanship are valued more than governance.”—The Tampa Tribune [3/11/15]

Republican Letter to Iran Puts Politics Above Nation“Just seven of 54 GOP senators had the good sense not to sign the letter. The others acted rashly and allowed their passions to rule the day. They imprudently and shamefully put politics above our national interest,”—The Republican [3/11/15]

Outrageous Senators"The American people do not want to find themselves engaged in a new ground war in the Middle East. Preventing Iran from having nuclear capabilities is a priority for U.S. officials and an imperative for Israel's security.”—The Record [3/11/15]

Republican Senators go Nuclear With Missive to Iran—“But what is most objectionable about the senators' letter is neither its condescending tone nor its legal analysis. It's the fact that the letter injects the senators into ongoing international negotiations that are properly the prerogative of the executive branch — with the obvious intention of subverting those negotiations.”— The Los Angeles Times [3/11/15]

GOP Letter to Iran was Outrageous“Senate Republicans hit a new low with their group letter to Iran’s leaders encouraging them to reject current nuclear talks with the United States and five other nations. It was a dumb move both in terms of its own cynical partisan goals and, more importantly, in how it might undermine national and global security.”—The Herald [3/11/15]

‘Dear Iran’ Letter Subverts Nuclear Talks“It’s not every day that you see U.S. senators pressing leaders of a hostile power to help them kill off American-led negotiations aimed at removing a potential nuclear threat to the United States and its allies. In fact, nothing quite like that had ever happened until Monday, when 47 Republican senators wrote a letter to the leaders of Iran warning that any agreement they reach with President Barack Obama to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapons program might be reversed by a future president.”—The Daily Journal [3/11/15]

An Ignorable Letter From 47 SenatorsAn open letter to the 47 U.S. senators who signed a letter addressed to Iran’s political leaders: We are struck by your letter that condescendingly attempts to lecture Iran’s leadership on the fine points of the U.S. Constitution while at the same time blatantly trampled on the constitutionally defined roles in foreign affairs of presidents and members of Congress.”—The Anniston Star [3/11/15]

GOP's Political Posturing on Iran Could Ostracize the U.S.“[Senator Tom Cotton] has since been denounced by members of his own party. Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) said it best: ‘We ought to support the negotiations going on,’ he said, ‘and this effort does not do that.’”—New Jersey Star Tribune [3/11/15]

GOP Senators' Dumb, Destructive Letter“The sanctions that convinced Iran to roll back and freeze its nuclear program and join the talks are enforced by all the parties to the negotiations. The U.S., which has nearly no trade with Iran, depends on those who do – principally Russia and China – to apply the pressure. If these talks fall apart, Russia and China could make the sanctions effectively disappear, and there would be nothing to stop Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Is that what the Senate Republicans want?”—Metro-West Daily News [3/11/15]

Where's Issue in Iran Deal?“There are, in fact, too many mysteries involving federal lawmakers, presidents and judges to list in this space. But now, we can add another mystery to the list — why would mostly Republicans in Congress not want Iran to agree to forego building a nuclear weapon?”—Lampoc Record [3/11/15]

GOP Senators Need Lessons in Both Civics and Politics—“Everyone wants to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If diplomacy can delay the day of reckoning for a decade, that is far preferable than a military strike that could spark a wider war in the Middle East.”—Fresno Bee [3/11/15]

A Deeply Misguided Senate Letter to the Leaders of Iran“The signatories, who sadly include the usually rational Sens. Rob Portman of Ohio and John McCain of Arizona, have lost sight of national interest -- and of how their letter is undercutting it.”--Cleveland Plain Dealer [3/11/15]

Hate Mail: Senators Seek to Sabotage Obama’s Foreign Policy“America’s partners in the talks are among the world’s most important nations — China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. They can only be appalled at seeing Secretary of State John Kerry and the president, who are charged with making the nation’s foreign policy, hit from behind by one house of the federal legislature. The senators who signed the letter should be ashamed.”—Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [3/11/15]

47 Senators Stomp on the Constitution—“A member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Flake acknowledges he is "not very bullish on the chance of these negotiations resulting in a good agreement." But Congress nevertheless must give them every opportunity to succeed.”—Arizona Republic [3/11/15]

Burr, Tillis Add Their Names to Outrageous Letter to Iran—“This is one of the most horrid and tangible examples of pure partisanship run amok in modern times. So much do Republicans resent the fact that President Obama has won two terms they’ll now resort to blowing up a negotiation aimed at preventing war in the Middle East.”—The News & Observer [3/10/15]

'Dear Iran' Letter Subverts Nuclear Talks—“It's not every day that you see U.S. senators pressing leaders of a hostile power to help them kill off American-led negotiations aimed at removing a potential nuclear threat to the United States and its allies.”—USA Today [3/10/15]

Republicans Fumble Their Chance to Focus Attention on an Iran Deal“Congressional republicans are trying to obstruct President Obama from concluding a nuclear agreement with Iran, but the only tangible result of their efforts has been to impede serious debate about the legitimate issues arising from the potential deal.”—Washington Post [3/10/15]

GOP Senators Need a Civics Lesson and Should Stop Meddling in Iran Nuclear Deal“Everyone wants to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If diplomacy can delay the day of reckoning for a decade, that is far preferable than a military strike that could spark a wider war in the Middle East.”—Sacramento Bee [3/10/15]

A Stunning Breach of Protocol“If the treaty is scuttled, there will be no inspection regime to make sure Iran is not cooking up a nuclear weapon. One gets the impression that Netanyahu and his fellow hard-liners want to proceed straight to a bombing campaign without any diplomatic do-si-do preceding it. If bombs fell on Iran, it would likely only forestall the development of a nuclear program there for a few years and further inflame passions in the Middle East.”—Observer-Reporter [3/10/15]

The Real Key to Any Nuclear Deal With Iran“The risk, however, is sabotaging the multination negotiations and leaving Iran unrestrained in building nuclear weapons. That's a bad path that could lead to use of military force to stop Iran's pursuit of a bomb.”—Newsday [3/10/15]

GOP Senators Play Dangerous Game With U.S. Foreign Policy“The 47 senators seem to be blithely ignoring necessary perspectives from London, Paris, Berlin, Beijing and Moscow, as well as other capitals influenced by these powers. If Iran is able to claim that it was Washington, not Tehran, that torpedoed the talks, the sanctions regime may well unravel without Iran having to compromise on its nuclear program.”—Minneapolis Star Tribune [3/10/15]

Letter of Intent“The letter is little more than a mischievous attempt to throw a monkey wrench into a years-long, multinational effort to obtain a secure, verifiable agreement with Iran to stop its nuclear-weapons program through diplomacy, rather than war.”—Miami Herald [3/10/15]

Was Iran Letter Traitorous or Just Treacherous for GOP Sens. Blunt, Roberts and Moran?“Obama and the leaders of several other nations are trying to find ways to get Iran to stop its efforts to obtain a nuclear bomb. It’s a reasonable quest. Properly so, even some in the GOP didn’t agree to sign the letter, saying it could backfire on the party. It could make Iran more likely to sign a deal with Obama — one that the Republicans might not like at all.”—Kansas City Star [3/10/13]

GOP Letter to Iran Disgraces America“America looks weakest when its internal arguments spill over into its international diplomacy — something that has been rare in the nation's history. That it is happening now is a blot on the 114th U.S. Senate; specifically, on the 47 Republican senators who signed an open letter to the Islamic Republic of Iran, a missive whose sole purpose is to end President Barack Obama's ongoing nuclear negotiations with that country.”—Detroit Free Press [3/10/15]

Senate Saboteurs“A blatant attempt to sabotage the discussions to limit Iran’s nuclear capacity, the letter is signed by by (sic) 47 GOP senators, aligning themselves — President Obama noted ironically — with hardliners in Iran who oppose any deal with the United States.”—Courier-Journal [3/10/15]

Ayotte Signs Up for a Dangerous Political Game—“The Iran nuclear situation is complex and worthy of vigorous debate. In fact, there are plenty of Democrats who are not thrilled with the goal of the talks, namely a 10-year pact that would reduce but not eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. But what they and seven Republican senators who didn’t sign the letter understand is that diplomacy is a fragile art that doesn’t happen in a vacuum.”—Concord Monitor [3/10/15]

GOP Letter to Iran is a Reckless Intrusion Into Nuclear Talks“Under the guise of an American civics lesson pointedly but also pointlessly aimed at Iran’s already isolated, mistrustful, hostile-to-the-United States leadership, Senate Republicans may sabotage highly delicate negotiations to persuade Tehran to curb its nuclear development program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions.”—Boston Globe [3/10/15]

The GOP's Poison Pen Note“That Senate Republicans are so intent on denouncing anything that could possibly come out of the talks — even if it ultimately benefits the U.S. and its allies — suggests they are all too inclined to let the national interest take a back seat to partisan politics.”—Baltimore Sun [3/10/15]

GOP Senators Play Dangerous Game With U.S. Foreign Policy“The 47 senators seem to be blithely ignoring necessary perspectives from London, Paris, Berlin, Beijing and Moscow, as well as other capitals influenced by these powers. If Iran is able to claim that it was Washington, not Tehran, that torpedoed the talks, the sanctions regime may well unravel without Iran having to compromise on its nuclear program. If so, the next step could include military action, which could spiral into yet another major Mideast war. The GOP senators should be as blunt about this possibility as they are about their opinions on Obama’s diplomacy.”—StarTribune [3/10/15]

The Real Key to Any Nuclear Deal With Iran“In addition to flexing for their political base, the senators may be gambling that their intransigence will result in a better deal. The risk, however, is sabotaging the multination negotiations and leaving Iran unrestrained in building nuclear weapons. That’s a bad path that could lead to use of military force to stop Iran’s pursuit of a bomb.”—Newsday [3/10/15]

GOP Senators Need a Civics Lesson and Should Stop Meddling in Iran Nuclear Deal—“Everyone wants to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If diplomacy can delay the day of reckoning for a decade, that is far preferable than a military strike that could spark a wider war in the Middle East.”—The Sacramento Bee [3/10/15]

Sabotaging a Deal With Iran—“After more than a year of negotiations, the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany can take credit for an interim deal that has sharply limited Iran’s nuclear activities, and they are on the verge of a more permanent agreement that could further reduce the risk of Iran’s developing a nuclear weapon. Congress needs to think hard about the best way to support a verifiable nuclear deal and not play political games that could leave America isolated, the sanctions regime in tatters and Iran’s nuclear program unshackled.”—The New York Times [3/7/15]

Let's Hope Netanyahu Loses“Netanyahu is it making it impossible to reach a peace deal with the Palestinians by relentlessly expanding housing settlements on the West Bank. He is using Israel's military superiority not just to secure the nation's borders, but to answer the demands of religious zealots and others who are determined to hold onto land that is essential to building a Palestinian state.”—New Jersey Star-Ledger [2/26/15]

Bipartisan Supporters of Israel Should Skip Netanyahu Speech“In a bald breach of protocol, Republican House Speaker John Boehner invited Netanyahu without informing the Democrat in the White House, who sees negotiations with Iran as the best hope for preventing that country from obtaining a nuclear bomb. The alternative is military action. Like President Obama, we’d rather take a shot at peace first.”—Chicago Sun Times [2/26/15]

An Emerging Nuclear Deal With Iran“The agreement must be judged on the complete package, not on any single provision. Even if the deal is not perfect, the greater risk could well be walking away and allowing Iran to continue its nuclear activities unfettered.”—The New York Times [2/25/15]

Boehner's Netanyahu Ploy Runs Onto the Rocks“Even if the ploy succeeds in torpedoing the arms negotiations, it would be a costly win, raising troubling questions about the degree of control Netanyahu has over decisions that could cost American lives. There is no more sensitive task — or a more hazardous one — than trying to keep nuclear weapons out of Iran's hands. Throughout the talks, the six nations negotiating with Iran have shown remarkable unity. It would be a shame if all that effort was lost because of political gamesmanship here or in Israel. Politics, as they used to say, should end at the water's edge.”—USA Today [2/1/15]

Menendez Steps Back From Fight With Obama Over Iran—“If Obama is right about the political dynamic in Iran, Menendez's bill could scuttle a deal. And without a deal, pressure will build for air strikes against Iran's dozens of nuclear facilities. Military experts say such a campaign would require weeks of repeated bombings and lead to significant civilian casualties, since many of the targets are in cities and densely populated suburbs.”—Newark Star Ledger [1/28/15]

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Background and Key Resources: Iran Nuclear Negotiations

Body: 

Top diplomats from the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran are working to finalize a comprehensive, long-term nuclear deal to block Iran’s potential pathways to a nuclear weapon.  Negotiators have made significant progress toward a final deal since the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action was reached. On April 2 in Lausanne, Iran and the P5+1 agreed on key parameters for a final, comprehensive nuclear deal. Both sides aim to finalize a comprehensive deal by June 30, 2015.

Below are must-read resources to better understand the issues at state and the anticipated Iran deal. If you are a member of the media and would like to speak to one of our experts, contact Communications Director Timothy Farnsworth at 202-463-8270, ext 110 or email [email protected].

Analysis

“Iran Nuclear Policy Brief: An Effective, Verifiable Nuclear Deal with Iran,” Arms Control Association, Iran Nuclear Policy Brief, UPDATED: July 23, 2015.

Addressing Iran’s Ballistic Missiles in the JCPOA and UNSC Resolution," Arms Control Association, Issue Brief, July 27, 2015.

Iran Nuclear Brief: Iranian Missiles and the Comprehensive Nuclear Deal,” Arms Control Association, Threat Assessment Brief, May 7, 2014.

"IAEA Verification of the Iran Nuclear Deal: 10 Hot Issues," by Thomas E. Shea, Arms Control Now, July 23, 2015.

Under a Microscope: Monitoring and Verification in an Iran Deal,” Arms Control Association, Issue Brief, April 29, 2015.

Articles

The Verification Challenge: Iran and the IAEA,” by Thomas E. Shea, Arms Control Today, June 2015.

A Win-Win Solution for Iran's Arak Reactor,” by Ali Ahmad, Frank von Hippel, Alexander Glaser, and Zia Mian, Arms Control Today, April 2014.

Fact Sheets

Implementation of the Iran-IAEA Framework at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet, June 2015.

Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet, February 2015.

UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran,” Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet, August 2015.

Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet, May 2015.

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Brief Chronology of START II

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Nearly a decade of efforts to bring the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II into force ended in June 2002, a month after the United States and Russia concluded negotiations on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)

SORT stipulates a 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warhead ceiling for both countries' nuclear arsenals. The SORT limit effectively supersedes START II's cap of 3,000-3,500 warheads for each side. For more detailed information on the START II agreement, see: START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance.

Chronology

Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin signing START II in Moscow on 3 January 1993. (Photo: Susan Biddle/National Archives)

January 3, 1993: Presidents George H.W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin sign START II in Moscow.

January 15, 1993: President Bush submits START II to the Senate for advice and consent.

June 22, 1995: President Yeltsin submits START II to the Duma for ratification.

January 26, 1996: The Senate overwhelmingly approves START II by a vote of 87-4.

March 20-21, 1997: Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin address a number of arms control issues during their summit meeting in Helsinki. In a "Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces," the presidents agree to extend the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under START II by five years and to immediately begin negotiations on a START III treaty once START II enters into force (subsequently modified to occur once START II is ratified). They also agree that START III negotiations will include four basic components: (1) a limit of 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each side by the end of 2007, (2) measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and to the destruction of strategic warheads, (3) extension of the current START agreements to unlimited duration, and (4) deactivation of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II by the end of 2003.

September 26, 1997: Codifying commitments made at Helsinki, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov sign a protocol in New York extending the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under START II from January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2007. In an exchange of letters, Albright and Primakov also agree that once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under the treaty by December 31, 2003, "by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps." Primakov's letter also states that Russia expects that START III will "be achieved" and enter into force "well in advance" of the START II deactivation deadline.

April 13, 1998: President Yeltsin submits the START II extension protocol to the Duma.

December 25, 1998: In response to the December 16-19 U.S.-British air strikes against Iraq, the Duma postpones a scheduled vote on START II ratification.

April 2, 1999: The Duma postpones a scheduled vote on START II ratification to protest NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, which started March 24 after Serbia refused to halt military actions against Kosovar Albanians seeking autonomy. (Moscow has historically allied itself with Serbia.)

April 14, 2000: The Russian Duma (lower house of parliament) overwhelmingly approves the START II ratification legislation 288-131 with four abstentions.

May 4, 2000: Putin signs the resolution of ratification for START II and its extension protocol. The legislation makes exchange of the instruments of ratification (required to bring the treaty into force) contingent on U.S. ratification of the 1997 extension protocol and ABM-related agreements.

December 13, 2001: U.S. President George W. Bush issues a six-month notice to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, stating, "I have concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks."

May 24, 2002: Russia and the United States sign SORT, which calls for each country to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads.

June 13, 2002: U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty takes effect.

June 14, 2002: Russian President Vladimir Putin declares that Russia is no longer bound by its signature of START II, ending his country's efforts to bring the treaty into force.

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