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"In my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [Arms Control Today] is one and it's the only one my husband and I fight over who gets to read it first."

– Suzanne DiMaggio
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
April 15, 2019
Kelsey Davenport

The P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, February 5, 2017

P5+1, Congress Respond to Trump’s Demands to Change the Iran Nuclear Deal Officials from the United States and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) gathered Jan. 25 in London for a working group meeting to discuss the multilateral nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Iran’s ballistic missile program. The meeting came after U.S. President Donald Trump renewed sanctions waivers required to keep the United States in compliance with the accord Jan. 12, but threatened to withhold the next round of waivers, due May 12, if Congress and...

Trump’s Cynical Gambit on the Iran Nuclear Deal

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Volume 10, Issue 2, January 17, 2018

President Donald Trump’s Jan. 12 decision to waive sanctions on Iran keeps the United States in compliance–for the time being–with its obligations under the multilateral nuclear deal with Tehran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Trump’s ultimatum that Congress pass legislation to unilaterally address what he describes as “flaws” in the agreement is based on flawed assumptions. His demands are unrealistic and put the future of the accord in doubt.

US President Donald J. Trump delivers his first address to a joint session of Congress from the floor of the House of Representatives in Washington, DC, USA, 28 February 2017. (Photo: JIM LO SCALZO/AFP/Getty Images)Trump’s Jan. 12 statement announcing the United States would waive sanctions reiterated the threat from his October Iran policy speech: “fix the deal’s disastrous flaws, or the United States will withdraw.” In the Jan. 12 statement, however, Trump put a deadline on the “fix,” declaring that he would not waive sanctions again unless Congress passes legislation to address the “flaws” and almost certainly violating the JCPOA. Before the next sanctions waivers are due on or around May 12, Trump specifically called for legislation addressing four factors:

1) It must demand that Iran allow immediate inspections at all sites requested by international inspectors.

2) Second, it must ensure that Iran never even comes close to possessing a nuclear weapon.

3) Third, unlike the nuclear deal, these provisions must have no expiration date.

4) Fourth, the legislation must explicitly state in United States law—for the first time—that long-range missile and nuclear weapons programs are inseparable, and that Iran’s development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe sanctions.

Under the nuclear deal, the United States committed to “implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit, and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation.” (See Section C.)

Conditioning continued U.S. participation in the agreement on achieving changes through unilateral action is not a good faith implementation of the JCPOA and sets the United States up to violate the agreement.

Thus far, Congress has wisely refrained from pursuing legislation that would violate the deal. In response to Trump’s ultimatum, it is critical that Congress does not kill the deal under the guise of saving it. Legislation that violates the agreement by unilaterally attempting to extend or alter the nuclear restrictions on Iran poses just as great a risk as Trump revoking the waivers, which would put the United States in material breach of its JCPOA commitments.

Moreover, any U.S. attempt to make changes to the multilateral accord will be staunchly opposed by Washington’s P5+1 negotiating partners, (China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom) and would be rejected by Iran.

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif quickly responded to Trump’s Jan. 12 statement by saying the JCPOA is “not renegotiable” and that the U.S. announcement amounts to a desperate attempt to “undermine a solid multilateral agreement.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Jan. 15 that Trump’s approach is unacceptable and Moscow would work to preserve the existing agreement.

Federica Mogherini, the European Union’s foreign policy chief and head of the P5+1 group made similar comments last year, noting Sept. 21 that reopening an agreement that is working is unnecessary. Mogherini also called out Trump on his threat to blow up the deal. She warned that the JCPOA “does not belong to any single country and it is not up to any single country to terminate it.”

Clearly, pursuing Trump’s approach will only isolate the United States at a time when Washington needs to keep Iran’s nuclear program in check. Worse still, threats to pull out of the JCPOA unless other parties accede to U.S. demands will undermine cooperation on sanctions and negotiations to produce a deal to halt and reverse North Korea’s far more advanced nuclear and missile programs.

Trump’s Unrealistic Renegotiation Demands

A closer look at Trump’s four conditions for new legislation on the JCPOA show them to be unnecessary and unrealistic:

1) “It must demand that Iran allow immediate inspections at all sites requested by international inspectors.”

Additional inspections authorities dictated by Congress are unnecessary and risk undermining the independence and integrity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Under the JCPOA, key nuclear activities in Iran are subject to continuous monitoring to verify Iran is abiding by the deal. The IAEA also has timely access to both declared and undeclared sites. Declared sites can be visited on short notice and key sites can be inspected on a daily basis if requested by the agency.

If the IAEA has questions about illicit nuclear-related activities at any undeclared site (either civilian or military) that Iran does not address, the agency can request access. If Iran does not comply or fails to provide sufficient access in 14 days, the Joint Commission set up by the JCPOA can require Iran to comply with the IAEA’s request. This process is outlined in Annex I, Section Q of the JCPOA. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano noted Oct. 13 that agency inspectors have had all the access to sites they have requested and that the verification regime is the “world’s most robust.”

The JCPOA does not allow “anytime, anywhere” inspections–but that is not necessary for a strong agreement. Nor is likely that Iran–or any other country–would agree to give inspectors carte blanche access to any site, particularly military facilities. The current measures, combined with U.S. national intelligence means, provide high confidence that any deviations from the provisions allowed in the JCPOA would be quickly detected.

Additionally, the United States cannot and should not dictate the terms of international inspections. The IAEA is an independent organization and the credibility of the agency’s work depends on that perception. For the United States or any other country to try to legislate the agency’s access risks undermining the independence and integrity that is so critical to the IAEA’s work.


2) “It must ensure that Iran never even comes close to possessing a nuclear weapon.”

It is unclear how Trump thinks legislation can or should be crafted to address this vague demand. A bill that seeks additional barriers based on a unilateral and arbitrary understanding of what constitutes "close to possessing a nuclear weapon" would be outside the scope of the JCPOA and would certainly be rejected by Iran and the United States' partners.

While some of the core restrictions under the JCPOA will expire, a shorter breakout time is not necessarily indicative of pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Currently, the breakout, or time it would take for Iran to obtain enough fissile material for one bomb, is approximately 12 months. That timeline will drop after the first 10 years of the JCPOA when restrictions begin to expire. However, a shorter breakout alone does not indicate by itself that Iran has chosen to pursue nuclear weapons. For instance, if Tehran begins producing enough enriched uranium for its Bushehr power reactor, its breakout time would be shorter, but its activities would be legally permissible under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Additionally, key restrictions on Iran are permanent under the JCPOA. The enhanced inspections and monitoring under the additional protocol do not expire, nor does the prohibition on certain weaponization activities (Annex I, Section T). As a result, inspectors have more access than in prior years and Iran cannot claim that certain activities relevant to developing a nuclear explosive device are for conventional military purposes as it has in the past. The combination of restrictions, enhanced IAEA monitoring and access, and national intelligence means puts the United States in the best possible place to quickly detect covert nuclear activity, or a dash to nuclear weapons using declared nuclear facilities.

There are legitimate concerns about what happens in 10-15 years when some of the core nuclear limits mandated by the JCPOA are due to expire. But it is far better to sustain the current deal and look for opportunities, in conjunction with the P5+1 partners, to build on it in a way that strengthens nonproliferation in Iran and regionally, rather than risk the agreement immediately.


3) “Unlike the nuclear deal, these provisions must have no expiration date. My policy is to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon—not just for ten years, but forever. If Iran does not comply with any of these provisions, American nuclear sanctions would automatically resume.”

Unilaterally demanding an extension of JCPOA restrictions under threat of reimposing sanctions would violate the deal. Under the terms of the JCPOA, full implementation of the JCPOA results in Iran being treated like any other non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT. The State Department itself stated in the 2016 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments that with the implementation of the deal, “previous issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”

Additionally, 10 years from adoption day, barring the reimposition of sanctions on Iran by the United Nations Security Council, that body will no longer be “seized” of the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. At this point, if Iran is in compliance with its international treaty obligations and the United States has no intelligence suggesting that Iran is pursuing a covert nuclear program, there is no legitimate basis to subject Iran’s nuclear program to arbitrary restrictions under threat of sanction.

The United States is also obligated in the JCPOA to seek the statutory lifting of sanctions eight years after adoption day. If Washington intends to threaten automatic reimposition of sanctions in perpetuity if Iran resumes certain nuclear activities, Congress cannot make a good faith effort to statutorily lift the measures.

The United States does not need to seek a basis now in order to respond to future, hypothetical Iranian actions. If national intelligence or evidence obtained by the IAEA were to emerge in the future that Iran had resumed nuclear-weapons related activities in violation of its NPT commitments, the United States should work multilaterally, as it did leading up to the JCPOA, to pursue a response supported by the international community.


4) “Legislation must explicitly state in United States law—for the first time—that long-range missile and nuclear weapons programs are inseparable, and that Iran’s development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe sanctions.”

Formally linking Iran’s long-range missile program to its nuclear weapons program under U.S. law risks putting in place conditions that would disrupt the JCPOA because of activities outside the scope of the agreement.

While the JCPOA does not cover Iran’s ballistic missile activities, the UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorses the deal, calls upon Iran to refrain from testing ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear-capable. While this is a nonbinding condition, the eight-year prohibitions on selling or purchasing certain ballistic missiles and related technologies without prior approval from the Security Council are absolute.

Since the Iran nuclear deal was implemented in January 2016, the UN secretary-general has issued four reports assessing the implementation the resolution. Several of the reports, including the most recent in December 2017, call into question Iran’s compliance with the restrictions, noting several allegations of illicit transfer of ballistic missile systems.

Iran’s flouting of UN Security Council restrictions is troublesome, but the United States has a number of tools to address Iran’s ballistic missile activities. The JCPOA did not waive or prohibit additional U.S. sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile activity and the United States has responded to Iran’s ballistic missile activities by passing new measures and designating individuals and entities.

In the past six months, the administration targeted additional entities assessed as involved in Iran’s ballistic missiles program as recently as Jan. 12, and Congress passed additional sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile activity in August 2017. Implementation of these measures, as well as UN restrictions, should be the focus of U.S. efforts at this point.

Given Iran’s security concerns and the current US-Iranian tensions, an agreement limiting ballistic missiles may be unlikely in short term, particularly if the JCPOA’s future is in doubt, and because of the central role that Iran’s ballistic missiles play in its national security. But the United States can and should do what it can to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and encourage Iran to abide by its announced range restriction. Iran has stated it will limit its ballistic missiles to a range of 2,000 kilometers. While this commitment is voluntary and nonbinding, it has been reiterated by the Supreme Leader, and a June 2017 report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee found that Iran’s current ballistic missile inventory includes systems with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers, but did not discuss any missiles that exceed that range.

The United States should also work with its EU allies, which have stated in October a willingness to work cooperatively to address Iran’s ballistic missiles–separate from the JCPOA. That could include discussions on a regional ballistic missile limitation mechanism and greater information sharing to ensure that the existing UN restrictions, as well as U.S. sanctions, are abided by. Training on Resolution 2231 and export controls could also be beneficial to enhance compliance with existing restrictions. Given the broad authorities already on the books, a focus on implementation, rather than additional sanctions, may be the best path forward.

Going Forward

Responsible legislators should understand Trump’s demands to “fix” the deal for what they are: an attempt to force Congress to unilaterally push changes that other parties won’t accept, or allow him to reimpose sanctions in violation of U.S. commitments.

Even if the Congress proposes “fixes” to the JCPOA that do not violate the terms of the agreement outright—and it is difficult to conceive of legislation that would meet Trump’s conditions without violating the deal—there is no guarantee that Trump will not move the goalposts again in the future and demand additional concessions for continued U.S. participation in the accord.

From a nonproliferation perspective, the JCPOA can continue to block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons for more than a decade if fully implemented. With top U.S. policymakers like Secretary of Defense James Mattis affirming that Iran is meeting its commitments and that the deal benefits U.S. national security interests, there is no reason for Washington to pull out of the deal, demand additional changes, and risk a new proliferation crisis now.

The Trump administration must recognize that the best path forward to address Iran’s nuclear program is to fully implement the agreement at hand and look for opportunities to build on its unique nonproliferation value.—KELSEY DAVENPORT, director for nonproliferation policy

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Trump’s ultimatum that Congress pass legislation to unilaterally address what he describes as “flaws” in the agreement is based on flawed assumptions and puts the future of the accord in doubt.

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Trump Decision to Respect Iran Deal Obligations Averts Self-Made Crisis, for Now.

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Nuclear Agreement is a Nonproliferation Success that Must Not Be Squandered

For Immediate Release: January 12, 2018

Media Contacts: Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, (202) 463-8270 ext. 102; Thomas Countryman, chair of the board of directors, (202) 463-8270 ext. 110

(Washington, D.C.)—The Trump administration announced Friday that it will continue to waive sanctions on Iran in accordance with U.S. commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal between the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran, known as known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

“Meeting the U.S. obligation to continue sanctions relief is a common-sense decision that helps ensure that the tough restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program and intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency measures will continue to block Iran’s pathways to the bomb for years to come,” said Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy.

"The deal dodged a bullet today, but Trump is setting up the United States to violate it down the road," warned Davenport. "Threatening to withhold future sanctions waivers in an attempt to force unilateral changes to the deal is dangerous, jeopardizes the future of the agreement, and creates a schism between the United States and its allies."

“The vast majority of nonproliferation and security experts agree that the successful implementation of the JCPOA has effectively neutralized the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapons program,” said Thomas Countryman, the chairman of the board of directors of the Arms Control Association and the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation.

“It would have been foolish for President Trump to disrupt a successful nonproliferation agreement that blocks the emergence of a significant new nuclear threat in a tension-filled region and contributes to strengthening the global nonproliferation regime,” Countryman argued.

“Trump continues to disparage the deal and is pressuring Congress to “fix” what it sees as flaws in the agreement,” noted Davenport. “In the weeks ahead, the administration and the Congress must refrain from imposing new sanctions that violate the JCPOA or seek to unilaterally alter the nuclear restrictions on Iran.”

“For example, legislative efforts by the U.S. Congress that automatically reimpose sanctions if Iran does not indefinitely abide by core nuclear restrictions that the JCPOA phases out over time would violate the accord and are strongly opposed by Washington’s negotiating partners,” she said.

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Nuclear Agreement is a Nonproliferation Success that Must Not Be Squandered

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North Korea Tests New Long-Range Missile

January/February 2018
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea tested a new ballistic missile capable of targeting the entire continental United States, a move that considerably extends Pyongyang’s missile flight range.

This December 12, 2017 photo from North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang presenting awards to scientists for their successful work on the Hwasong-15 intercontinental-range ballistic missile. (Photo: AFP/Getty Images)The Nov. 29 test took place just before 3 a.m. in North Korea, and the missile flew on a lofted trajectory for 53 minutes before splashing down in the Sea of Japan about 1,000 kilometers from the launch site. The test, which violates UN Security Council resolutions, was firmly condemned by the international community and escalated concerns about a potential pre-emptive or preventative strike by the United States in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances.

North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) heralded the test of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), designated the Hwasong-15, as a success and described the missile as “capable of carrying super-heavy nuclear warhead and attacking the whole mainland of the U.S.”

David Wright, co-director of the Global Security program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, estimated that the missile would have a range of 13,000 kilometers if flown on a standard trajectory, which would put the entire continental United States within its range. U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis confirmed the range capability on Nov. 28 when he told reporters that the missile could hit “everywhere in the world.”

North Korea did test an ICBM, the Hwasong-14, twice in July, but the estimated range of that system is 10,500 kilometers. (See ACT, September 2017.) At that range, Washington, D.C., would likely have been just out of range, and experts assess that the weight of a nuclear warhead would further reduce that missile’s range.

Like the Hwasong-14, the Hwasong-15 is a two-stage, liquid-fueled system. The Hwasong-15, however, has a number of different characteristics, including a pair of rocket engines powering the first stage, unlike the single-engine Hwasong-14.

Michael Elleman, senior fellow at the International Institute for Security Studies, concluded in a Nov. 30 analysis for the website 38 North that the Hwasong-15 could “deliver a moderately-sized nuclear weapon to any city on the U.S. mainland.” Further, the missile is large and powerful enough to carry decoys or countermeasures that would complicate U.S. missile defense efforts, he said.

Elleman also noted improvements on the Hwasong-15 that would give the North Korean weapon additional accuracy. The missile could be fitted with a postboost control system that could be used to adjust the payload’s velocity and positioning, he said.

When asked about the test, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters on Nov. 28 that the United States “will deal with it.”

The KCNA announcement said that the test accomplished the “historic cause of completing the state nuclear force” and that North Korea had attained its goal of “completing the rocket weaponry system development.”

A South Korean official told Arms Control Today on Dec. 19 not to read too much into the use of the word “complete.” The official said that North Korea is likely directing that comment at a domestic audience because leader Kim Jong Un set the goal of completing the nuclear arsenal in his Jan. 1, 2017, speech. The officials said that “completion” should not be interpreted as an end of tests.

Many experts and officials assess that North Korea will need to conduct additional tests to demonstrate the reliability of the ICBM. There are continuing doubts about whether North Korea has the technology to ensure that a warhead would survive re-entry into the atmosphere.

Mattis told reporters on Dec. 15 that the Hwasong-15 “has not yet shown to be a capable threat against us right now.” Yeo Suk-joo, South Korean deputy minister for defense policy, said on Dec. 1 that North Korea still needs to prove re-entry and warhead activation.

Elleman made a similar point, noting that more testing is necessary to validate the missile’s performance and verify the re-entry system to ensure that the warhead survives re-entry into the atmosphere. If North Korea is willing to accept “low confidence in the missile’s reliability,” Kim Jong Un could declare the Hwasong-15 combat ready after two or three additional tests, he said.

South Korea responded to the missile test by launching its own precision-strike missiles six minutes after the North Korean test. The South Korean response included army, navy, and air force systems, likely demonstrating that the country’s intelligence agencies detected preparations for the test.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in described the North Korean test as a “reckless provocation” and warned that Pyongyang’s actions may drive the United States to consider a pre-emptive strike against North Korea.

Moon’s concerns about a pre-emptive or preventative strike were reinforced by several U.S. policymakers. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said that the test brought “the world closer to war” and although the United States does not seek a military conflict, “if war does come, it will be because of continued acts of aggression,” such as the ICBM test.

North Korea tested a new ballistic missile capable of targeting the entire continental United States, a move that considerably extends Pyongyang’s missile flight range.

North Korea Holds Talks With Seoul

January/February 2018
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un opened the door for talks with South Korea in his annual New Year’s address while warning the United States that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal should deter Washington from starting “an adventurous war.”

South Korean Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon (L) shakes hands with the head of the North Korean delegation Ri Son Gwon after their meeting at the border village of Panmunjom on January 9.  (Photo: Korea Pool/Getty Images)Although talks between North Korea and South Korea have the potential to reduce tensions and lead to further communications, an improved relationship between the two countries could stress the U.S.-South Korean alliance and put Seoul and Washington at odds over the strategy on dealing with Pyongyang’s nuclear program.

U.S. officials were quick to point out that addressing the threat posed by the North’s ongoing nuclear weapons development, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of striking as far as New York and Washington, is the dominant issue for the United States. Kim, in his address, said his country would continue and even accelerate production of nuclear warheads and missiles in 2018, leaving U.S. officials skeptical about his new overture to South Korea.

“We won't take any of the talks seriously if they don't do something to ban all nuclear weapons in North Korea,” Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said on Jan. 2. “We consider this to be a very reckless regime, we don't think we need a Band-Aid, and we don't think we need to smile and take a picture.”

The Trump administration has worked to tighten international sanctions on North Korea to increase diplomatic leverage, even as reports surfaced of Chinese and Russian entities covertly supplying oil to North Korea. President Donald Trump has said he is disappointed that China has not done more to force North Korea to curtail its nuclear activities.

In his Jan. 1 remarks, Kim wished South Korea success with hosting the Winter Olympics and offered to send a delegation of athletes to participate in the event. He said that authorities from the two countries “may meet together soon” to discuss the details, a shift from past responses that largely ignored South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s calls for dialogue since Moon’s election in May.

South Korea responded the next day with an offer to talk, and the two sides met Jan. 8 at the border town of Panmunjom. To facilitate a meeting, North Korea restored a hotline between the two countries that it shut down nearly two years ago when South Korean President Park Geun-hye closed a joint industrial complex.

In photo provided by the South Korean Unification Ministry, a South Korean official checks the direct communications hotline being re-activated to talk with the North Korean side at the border village of Panmunjom on January 3. (Photo: South Korean Unification Ministry via Getty Images)In his remarks, Kim seemed to be implying that the North and South could work together to reduce tensions while casting the United States as a warmongering country that threatened the peninsula. Kim said in his speech that the United States is “wielding the nuclear stick and going wild for war” and that “when the north and the south are determined, they can surely prevent the outbreak of war and ease tension on the Korean peninsula.” He further called for “improved inter-Korean relations” in order to “avoid acute military confrontation.”

Any talks between Pyongyang and Seoul are unlikely to focus on North Korea’s nuclear program, but decreased tensions between the two countries might lessen South Korean support for the current U.S. pressure-based approach, particularly if the Trump administration continues to increase tensions.

White House spokesperson Sarah Sanders did not directly respond to a question about whether the United States supports South Korea’s decision to engage in dialogue, but said on Jan. 2 that U.S. policy toward North Korea has not changed and Washington “will still continue to put maximum pressure on North Korea to change and make sure that it denuclearizes the peninsula.”

Trump tweeted on Jan. 2 about Kim’s offer for talks with South Korea, saying “perhaps that is good news, perhaps not—we will see!”

Although this was not overtly negative, Trump adopted a more belligerent tone toward North Korea later in the day when he responded to Kim’s reference to having a “nuclear button” on his desk and weapons that can strike the entire U.S. mainland. Trump tweeted that he too has a nuclear button that is “much bigger and more powerful” than Kim’s and that his button works.

Further, the Trump administration may oppose South Korea conceding too much to North Korea to ensure stability during the Winter Olympics, set for Feb. 9-25.

Seoul expressed an interest in postponing annual U.S.-South Korean military exercises that are normally held around the time of the Olympics to try and mitigate any provocations by North Korea in response.

After initial U.S. resistance to a delay, Trump agreed Jan. 4 to Moon’s request to postpone the joint military exercises until after the Olympics. Moon asked for the delay so South Korea can focus on “ensuring the security” of the games, according to a White House statement. It is unclear whether Trump agreed for that reason, or whether his administration saw the move as a way to reduce tensions with Pyongyang.

Trump has consistently undermined signals from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea, and a number of U.S. officials have sent mixed messages about the actions Pyongyang would need to take for Washington to start talks.

Tillerson said on Dec. 12 at the Atlantic Council that the United States is “ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk” and willing to “have the first meeting without precondition.” The White House quickly walked back Tillerson’s comment, saying on Dec. 13 that North Korea must refrain from provocations and take “sincere and meaningful actions toward denuclearization” before talks can begin.

Kim indicated that North Korea intended to continue its nuclear and missile activities in 2018. He described “perfecting the national nuclear forces” over the past year as “an outstanding success.” Kim said the country would emphasize the mass production of nuclear warheads and missiles to “spur the efforts for deploying them for action.”

In line with the U.S. strategy, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a new sanctions resolution Dec. 22 in response to North Korea’s Nov. 29 ICBM test (see page 30). North Korea is prohibited from conducting missile launches by previous Security Council resolutions.

Resolution 2397 further reduced the amount of refined petroleum products that North Korea can legally purchase and bans additional North Korean exports, including food and agricultural products. The resolution requires states to seize illicit goods on ships caught evading sanctions and to expel North Korean workers by the end of 2019.

Haley said on Dec. 22 that “leveling these unprecedented sanctions is a reflection of the international outrage” over North Korea’s actions. She said the measures in the resolution “cut deeper” and reiterated the U.S. call for all states to“sever diplomatic and trade relations with North Korea.”
 

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un opened the door for talks with South Korea in his annual New Year’s address while warning the United States that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal should deter Washington from starting “an adventurous war.”

Iran Talks Focus on Sanctions Relief

January/February 2018
By Kelsey Davenport

Sanctions relief was a key topic of discussion at a regular meeting between Iran and six countries on implementation of the nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

With missile remains as a backdrop, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley accuses Iran of violating Security Council Resolution 2231 by providing the Houthi rebels in Yemen with arms. She spoke at Joint Base Anacostia near Washington on December 14, 2017. (Photo: JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images)The quarterly meeting of the Joint Commission, the body set up by the JCPOA to oversee the nuclear deal and comprised of representatives from all seven states and the European Union, was chaired by Helga Schmid, secretary-general of the European External Action Service, and held on Dec. 13.

Ahead of the meeting in Vienna, Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that banks and companies are “afraid” of doing business with Iran because of U.S. actions and that this issue would be a main point of discussion. In a statement following the meeting, Schmid said the participants “extensively reviewed progress” on lifting sanctions and noted that a working group on sanctions had met the previous day.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, who headed Iran’s delegation to the meeting, told reporters that the body needs to deal “more assertively” with what he described as U.S. noncompliance with the nuclear accord. All members of the Joint Commission raised concerns about the United States “very explicitly” and stressed the importance of Washington continuing to meet its commitments, he said.

Schmid’s public statement did not specifically mention the United States, saying that all participants “recalled the need for continued implementation of sanctions lifting to allow for the effective realization of the benefits envisioned under the JCPOA.” Her statement also noted the value of addressing challenges related to sanctions relief in forums set up by the accord.

Washington has continued to waive sanctions as required, but Iran has argued that certain U.S. actions have violated the “spirit” of the deal. (See ACT, September 2017.) The Trump administratizon will need to waive sanctions again in mid-January to remain in compliance.

Schmid’s statement said that the states welcomed the news that the International Atomic Energy Agency, in its quarterly report in November, again “confirmed Iran’s continued adherence” to its nuclear-related commitments. The parties also welcomed the work done to advance implementation of Annex III, which lays out recommendations for cooperation between Iran and other states on civil nuclear activities, according to the statement.

Although her statement did not reference specific activities, EU and Iranian representatives met in Isfahan on Nov. 21-22 for the second high-level seminar on nuclear cooperation.

A joint statement released on Nov. 22 said that Iran and the EU discussed the latest developments in nuclear governance, including nuclear safety, nuclear liability, and spent fuel management, and agreed to hold a workshop on nuclear liability and insurance in 2018. The statement noted the cooperative projects that were underway, including stress tests at the Bushehr reactor and a feasibility study on the establishment of a nuclear safety center in Iran.

At a Dec. 12 meeting of the EU Parliament, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, called attention to the importance of civil nuclear cooperation. Mogherini said the civil nuclear cooperation projects make the nuclear deal “more solid through increased transparency.”

UN Report on Resolution 2231

UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued a report tied to the nuclear deal on Dec. 13.

The biannual report is required under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the nuclear deal and laid out restrictions on Iran’s missile and conventional weapons activities.

The report noted that Saudi Arabia, in a letter to the Security Council president and UN secretary-general, said that Iran had a role in manufacturing the missiles launched at its territory from Yemen in July and November 2017 in “flagrant violation” of council resolutions. Under Resolution 2231, Iran is prohibited from selling or transferring ballistic missiles or certain missile-related items without the prior approval of the Security Council. Iran denied the allegations as “baseless and unfounded.”

The report noted that the UN Secretariat examined the debris from the missiles and concluded that the diameter was “consistent” with that of the Scud models and that components bore a logo similar to an Iranian entity designated by Resolution 2231. The report said that the secretariat is still analyzing the information and material and will report back to the council.

U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley displayed at the UN on Dec. 14 what she said were parts of the missile launched at Riyadh and remarked on similarities to Iran’s Qiam missile. She said that there are “many pieces of evidence that tell us of this missile’s Iranian origins.” The U.S. intelligence community has concluded “unequivocally” that the missile was supplied by the Iranian regime in violation of Resolution 2231, she said.

According to the report, the secretariat is also investigating possible violations of Resolution 2231 requirements that prohibit Iran from transferring certain conventional armaments without prior approval from the Security Council. The report encouraged all states to continue to support and implement the nuclear deal and specifically called on the United States to “maintain its commitments.”

Sanctions relief was a key topic of discussion at a regular meeting between Iran and six countries on implementation of the nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

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