The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

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The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
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The Case for New START

The United States and Russia have dramatically reduced their nuclear stockpiles since the end of the Cold War, thanks to bilateral arms control agreements that have won the support of Republicans and Democrats alike. In the bipartisan tradition of earlier agreements negotiated by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) would keep Washington and Moscow on track to reduce their arsenals by about 30 percent below current limits.

Signed April 8, 2010, New START would increase U.S. security by limiting Russia to no more than 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 700 delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers) and re-establishing a robust, up-to-date monitoring system to verify compliance. The United States would retain a modern nuclear force more than sufficient in size to deter nuclear attack by Russia or any other potential adversary.

The original START treaty expired Dec. 5, 2009, and with it went START’s arsenal limits and on-site inspections. General Kevin Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified in June, “If we don’t get the treaty, [the Russians] are not constrained in their development of force structure and... we have no insight into what they’re doing. So it’s the worst of both possible worlds.”

Prompt ratification of New START is the only way to close this “verification gap.” The treaty would establish an updated system of information exchanges and enhanced on-site inspections that would provide more information on the status of Russian strategic forces than was available under the original START accord.

For these and other reasons, a long list of U.S. military leaders, including seven former U.S. strategic commanders and national security leaders from past Republican and Democratic administrations support New START.

Over the last eight months, more than 20 Senate hearings and briefings have been held on the pact, and the Obama administration has answered more than 900 questions from senators. On Sept. 16 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) passed the New START resolution of advice and consent by a bipartisan vote of 14 to 4.

This resolution answered all of the major questions posed by treaty skeptics, and was able to satisfy all 11 Democratic committee members and Republican Senators Richard Lugar (Ind.), Bob Corker (Tenn.), and Johnny Isakson (Ga.).

Below are the top ten reasons why New START deserves prompt Senate approval.

1. New START would cap and reduce Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.

Today, Russia deploys approximately 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads, not counting bomber weapons in storage, according to the Congressional Research Service. New START would reduce this force to 1,550 or less, meaning that hundreds of Russian nuclear warheads would no longer be deployed on ballistic missiles that could be aimed at the United States. Moreover, New START would lock-in these limits for
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The next decade or longer.

At the same time, New START would allow the United States to maintain a devastatingly powerful nuclear arsenal deployed on a “triad” of nuclear delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen said Nov. 11 that New START would leave the United States with nuclear forces that are “more than enough for us to handle our military responsibilities.” Besides Russia, the United States’ only potential nuclear adversary is China, which has fewer than 50 nuclear-armed long-range missiles.

2. New START would resume inspections of Russian strategic forces.

It has been a year since the United States lost the ability to conduct intrusive, on-site inspections of Russia’s nuclear arsenal mandated by the 1991 START accord. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), still in force, contains no verification provisions. The longer New START remains in limbo, the longer this strategic blackout will continue.

New START would reestablish on-the-ground information gathering about Russian strategic forces that the United States could not get any other way. For example, satellites and other intelligence assets cannot look inside Russian missiles to see how many warheads they carry, but New START’s on-site inspection provisions would do just that. The treaty would provide predictability about Russian strategic forces, allowing the United States to make better-informed decisions about investments in nuclear forces and other military capabilities.

Without New START in force, the U.S. intelligence community would not be able to predict with high confidence the status of Russia’s nuclear forces, and both sides would be tempted to engage in more-costly force modernization and hedging strategies.

3. New START is effectively verifiable.

New START would establish an updated system of information exchanges and enhanced on-site inspections that would provide high confidence that Russia is complying with the new, lower limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

- **On-Site Inspections.** New START allows up to 18 on-site inspections per year, including direct monitoring of Russian nuclear warheads, something no treaty has allowed before. Some senators have raised concerns that New START allows fewer annual inspections than did the original START.

  However, for all practical purposes, the number of inspections in New START is the same as START. New START’s “Type One” inspections, which occur at bases for deployed missiles and bombers, can achieve two goals (confirm data on delivery vehicles and warheads) at the same time, and thus ten of these inspections provide the same amount of information as 20 START inspections. Together with the eight “Type Two” inspections of non-deployed systems, the 18 New START inspections are essentially equivalent to the 28 inspections under START.

  Moreover, the original START’s 28 inspections had to cover 70 facilities in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as the Soviet nuclear complex was spread across these four now-independent nations. Today, all former Soviet nuclear weapons and facilities have been...
centralized in Russia, and New START’s 18 inspections need to cover only 35 Russian sites.

- **Telemetry.** Telemetry, or missile flight test information, was needed under START I to determine the maximum number of warheads that might be loaded onto Russian ballistic missiles. Since New START requires data exchanges on the actual warhead loading of each deployed missile and allows direct on-site inspections to confirm this, telemetry sharing is no longer required. Even so, New START provides for telemetry sharing on up to five missile tests per year as a confidence-building measure.

  “Telemetry is not nearly as important for this treaty as it has been in the past,” said Secretary Gates March 26. “In fact, we don’t need telemetry to monitor compliance with this treaty,” he said.

- **Votkinsk.** Although the George W. Bush administration agreed in 2008 to end mobile missile production monitoring at Russia’s Votkinsk plant, under the new treaty Russia must notify the United States 48 hours before a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) leaves Votkinsk and when it arrives at its destination, which will facilitate monitoring by national technical means, such as satellites.

After hearing testimony in closed session from U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) witnesses, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded in its Oct. 1 report that “the New START Treaty is effectively verifiable.” A July 30 letter from Secretary of Defense Gates to the committee reached the same conclusion:

“The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. strategic Command, and I assess that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or breakout under New START, due to both the New START verification regime and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic force structure.”

“If Russia were to attempt to gain political advantage by cheating or breakout, the U.S. will be able to respond rapidly by increasing the alert levels of SSBNs [strategic submarines] and bombers, and by uploading warheads on SSBNs, bombers, and ICBMs. Therefore, the survivable and flexible U.S. strategic posture planned for New START will help deter any future Russian leaders from cheating or breakout from the treaty, should they ever have such an inclination.”

Nevertheless, SFRC member Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho), who voted against the treaty in committee, said Sept. 16 that the IC had revealed “very serious information” that in his view should have held up committee approval of New START. Committee Chairman Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) replied that the new information “in no way alters [the IC’s] judgment, already submitted to this committee, with respect to the [New] START treaty... It has no impact, in their judgment.”

**4. New START bolsters U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts.**

New START helps to demonstrate that the United States and Russia are keeping up their end of the bargain under the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). New START would increase Washington’s leverage in seeking stronger non-proliferation measures, such as more effective nuclear inspections, tougher penalties for states that do not comply with nonproliferation obligations, and faster action to secure the most vulnerable nuclear weapons materials. Improving the NPT
system is essential to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists and additional nations.

The revival of U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue has already improved cooperation in a variety of fields. For example, Russia supported the U.S.-led effort to enact U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran, and Russia has cancelled its sale of the S-300 air-defense system to Iran. New START will help strengthen U.S.-Russian joint efforts to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists, as well as keep pressure on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program.

Without New START, Russian support will be harder to obtain. On Nov. 8, for example, Sen. Lugar said it is unlikely that Moscow would sustain cooperative threat reduction efforts indefinitely without New START coming into force. “The prospects for extending Nunn-Lugar work in Russia after [2013] would be especially complicated without New START’s transparency features that assure both countries about the nuclear capabilities of the other,” Lugar said.

5. New START protects U.S. missile defense options.

Claims that the treaty’s nonbinding language on the “interrelationship” between strategic offenses and defenses will limit U.S. missile defense options do not add up. As Secretary of Defense Gates bluntly said May 18, “the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible.”

Some treaty critics erroneously suggest that Article V, which prohibits both sides from converting launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs into launchers for missile defense interceptors, and vice versa, limits U.S. missile defense plans in the future.

However, the United States has no plans for any such conversions. “It’s a limit in theory, but not in reality,” wrote then-U.S. National Security Adviser James Jones on April 20. “We have no plans to convert any additional ICBM silos. In fact, it would be less expensive to build a new silo rather than convert an old one. In other words, if we were to ever need more missile defense silos in California, we would simply dig new holes, which is not proscribed by the treaty.”

Russia is concerned that future U.S. strategic missile interceptor deployments could undermine its nuclear retaliatory capability, and has made a unilateral statement that it could potentially withdraw from New START if the United States deploys such systems in large numbers.

The SFRC resolution of advice and consent clearly states that it is the committee’s understanding that “the New START Treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missile defenses” other than the treaty’s ban on converting ICBM and SLBM launchers for use by interceptors—which the Pentagon has said it has no intention of doing in any case—and that any further limitations would require Senate approval.

The resolution clarifies that “the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement by the Russian Federation on missile defense does not impose a legal obligation on the United States.” It also reaffirms language in the 1999 Missile Defense Act that it is the policy of the United States to deploy an effective national missile defense system “as soon as technologically possible” and that nothing in the treaty limits future planned enhancements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system or the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Indeed, the Obama administration is going full-bore on its plans to increase SM-3 intermediate-range interceptor deployments in Europe. Some may bemoan the decision to revise the Bush-era plan to deploy unproven strategic interceptors in Poland, but the new plan better addresses the existing Iranian short- and medium-range missile threat, and opens the way for cooperation, not confrontation with Russia on missile defense.
6. New START allows for the maintenance of modern, effective nuclear forces.

The Obama administration has pledged, pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, to spend $85 billion over the next ten years to maintain the nuclear stockpile and modernize the weapons complex. The plan calls for spending another $100 billion over the same period to upgrade strategic nuclear delivery systems.

The administration’s $7 billion request for the weapons complex for FY 2011 was 10 percent higher than the previous year. Linton Brooks, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in the Bush administration, said in April, “I’d have killed for that budget and that much high-level attention in the administration.” As Secretary of Defense Gates wrote in his preface to the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), “These investments, and the NPR’s strategy for warhead life extension, represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation’s deterrent.”

Despite this, some senators are concerned that the administration might not deliver on its commitments.

In response, the SFRC’s resolution of advice and consent states that “the United States is committed to proceeding with a robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities.” To achieve these goals, the resolution says that the United States is committed to providing the necessary resources, “at a minimum at the levels set forth in the President’s 10-year plan.”

The resolution also states that “if at any time more resources are required than estimated in the President’s 10-year plan,” the President shall submit a report detailing: 1) how he proposes to remedy the shortfall; 2) the proposed level of funding required; 3) the impact of the shortfall on the safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear forces; and 4) “whether and why, in the changed circumstances brought about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the national interest of the United States to remain a Party to the New START Treaty.”

Congress passed a Continuing Resolution (CR) Sept. 30 that includes the administration’s $7 billion FY 2011 budget request for weapons activities at NNSA. Sen. Kerry said Sept. 30 that this funding “sends a strong signal about this administration’s commitment to keeping our nuclear arsenal at a viable and suitable level” under New START. The CR runs out on Dec. 3. If the Senate does not approve New START, the administration may not be able to protect the program from cuts.

Senators of both parties should recognize that delaying approval of New START—and reconsideration of the Test Ban Treaty next year—would create uncertainty about U.S. nuclear policy and jeopardize the fragile political consensus to increase funding to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the years ahead.

7. New START allows conventional global strike weapons.

Conventional warheads that the United States may in the future decide to deploy on strategic ballistic missiles would be subject to New START limits. However, there are no firm plans to deploy Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) weapons, and any future deployments are likely to be small in number.
As a result, there is room within the treaty’s limits for future CPGS deployments.

In an answer for the SFRC record, Secretary of Defense Gates stated: “As envisaged by our military planners, the number of such conventionally armed delivery vehicles and the warheads they carry would be very small when measured against the overall levels of strategic delivery systems and strategic warheads. Should we decide to deploy them, counting this small number of conventional strategic systems and their warheads toward the treaty limits will not prevent the United States from maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent.”

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that it saw “no reason to doubt statements by the cognizant civilian and uniformed military officials that, at least over the ten-year duration of the treaty, the treaty’s limits provide sufficient room to accommodate both the strategic nuclear forces and the limited number of CPGS weapons the United States is likely to deploy.”

Moreover, the SFRC resolution clarifies that New START does not limit potential CPGS concepts that would not meet the definitions of ICBMs and SLBMs under the treaty, such as “boost-glide” systems that do not have a ballistic trajectory.

8. New START sets the stage for limits on tactical weapons.

Some complain that New START does not reduce Russia’s tactical nuclear warhead levels, which have never been covered by a treaty. By design, New START addresses strategic nuclear weapons. It does not make sense to risk verifiable reduction in Russia’s long-range nuclear weapons by insisting that the policy for short-range weapons be settled now. New START lays the diplomatic foundation necessary for a future accord on tactical nuclear weapons reductions.

On this question, the SFRC resolution calls on the President “to pursue, following consultation with allies, an agreement with the Russian Federation that would address the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and would secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.”

President Obama has said that he intends to work with Moscow to pursue further nuclear reductions in all types of nuclear warheads—including tactical weapons—after New START is ratified. Moreover, Secretary of State Clinton and Defense Secretary Gates, in a joint answer for the SFRC record, said that:

“Because of their limited range and very different roles from those played by strategic nuclear forces, the vast majority of Russian tactical nuclear weapons could not directly influence the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and Russia... Because the United States will retain a robust strategic force structure under New START, Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons will have little or no impact on strategic stability.”

9. New START is supported by the U.S. military and bipartisan national security leaders.

New START has the support of the U.S. military establishment and former senior national security officials, both Republicans and Democrats, including:

James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence, Nixon and Ford administrations; Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor, Ford and George H.W. Bush administrations; Stephen Hadley, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “The New START treaty is absolutely critical. This December, we are coming up on a full year with no treaty with the Russians, and these treaties have historically been broadly bipartisan.”
former National Security Advisor, George W. Bush administration; James Baker, former Secretary of State, George H.W. Bush administration; Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Nixon and Ford administrations; George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State, Reagan administration; Colin L. Powell, former Secretary of State, George W. Bush administration; former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Carter administration; former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, Reagan administration; and former Republican Senators Howard Baker (Tenn.), John C. Danforth (Mo.), Chuck Hagel (Neb.), Nancy Kassebaum-Baker (Kansas), Warren Rudman (N.H.), Alan Simpson (Wyo.), and William Cohen (Maine), among others.

Seven former U.S. military commanders of Strategic Command announced their support for New START. In a July 14 letter to senators, the five Air Force Generals and two Navy Admirals wrote that they “strongly endorse [New START’s] early ratification and entry into force” because “the treaty will enhance American national security.”

10. New START allows command and control upgrades.

On Oct. 23, a communications failure occurred at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyo., involving 50 nuclear-armed Minuteman III ICBMs. Even though this incident, which lasted one hour, could have prevented officers at the base from launching the missiles, back-up airborne command and control systems could still have launched on orders from the commander-in-chief. An administration official, speaking about the president’s ability to control nuclear forces, said: “At no time did the president’s ability decrease.”

Meanwhile, even without the 50 ICBMs in question, the United States at the time still had over 800 strategic missiles and bombers deployed with 1,900 nuclear warheads in its active force. Moreover, even if this incident had happened after New START had been fully implemented, the United States would still have had over 600 missiles and bombers with 1,500 nuclear warheads ready to go.

Nuclear command and control systems can and will be improved and New START would not in any way prevent such improvements. In fact, the Obama administration has outlined a plan to invest $100 billion to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons delivery systems over the next decade, while New START would be in force. As a result, Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, head of the United States’ new Global Strike Command, said Nov. 9 that the Warren incident “has absolutely no link at all to the START Treaty.”

Stalling New START undermines U.S. security

For all of these reasons, New START deserves the Senate’s prompt support. In particular, given START’s expiration in December 2009, there is currently no bilateral system for monitoring Russia’s nuclear forces. Failure by the Senate to approve New START would not only delay the re-establishment of an effective U.S.-Russian inspection and monitoring system, but it would undermine U.S. nonproliferation leadership and jeopardize U.S.-Russian cooperation, including joint efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program.

It is time for senators on both sides of the aisle to come together to strengthen U.S. and global security by voting in favor of New START ratification.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague by Russia and the United States. New START would replace the 1991 START I treaty, which expired December 2009, and supersede the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which would terminate when New START enters into force.

New START continues the bipartisan process of verifiably reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals begun by former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Once ratified by both nations, New START would be the first verifiable U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control treaty to take effect since 1994.

New START’s Key Provisions

New START includes a main treaty text with a preamble and sixteen articles; a protocol with definitions, verification procedures, and agreed statements; and technical annexes to the protocol. All treaty documents are publicly available here: http://www.state.gov/t/vci/trty/126118.htm

Main Treaty Limits (Article II)

Nuclear warhead limit: Seven years after entry into force, New START limits accountable deployed strategic nuclear warheads and bombs to 1,550, down approximately 30 percent from the 2,200 limit set by SORT and down 74 percent from the START-accountable limit of 6,000. Each heavy bomber is counted as one warhead (see below).

Missile, bomber and launcher limits: Deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers assigned to nuclear missions are limited to 700. Deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and bombers are limited to 800. This number includes test launchers and bombers and Trident submarines in overhaul, and is approximately a 50 percent reduction from the 1,600 launcher-limit set under START (SORT did not cover launchers). The 800 ceiling is intended to limit the ability for “break out” of the treaty by preventing either side from retaining large numbers of non-deployed launchers and bombers.¹

New START does not limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, but it does monitor them and provide for continuous information on their locations and on-site inspections to confirm that they are not added to the deployed force. Non-deployed missiles must be located at specified facilities away from deployment sites and labeled with “unique identifiers” to reduce concerns about hidden missile stocks. Moreover, the strategic significance of non-deployed missiles is reduced given that non-deployed launchers are limited. Both sides agreed under the treaty to prohibit systems designed for “rapid reload” of non-deployed missiles (Fifth Agreed Statement).

Force structure: Each side has the flexibility to structure its nuclear forces as it wishes, within the overall limits of the treaty.
Counting Rules (Article III)

**Warheads**: For deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads counted is the actual number of re-entry vehicles (RVs) on each missile (an RV protects the warhead as it re-enters the atmosphere from space; it can carry only one warhead). START I did not directly count RVs, but instead counted missiles and bombers that were “associated with” a certain number of warheads. New START counts each heavy bomber as one warhead (although the maximum loading is 16-20), the same counting rule that START used for bombers carrying short-range weapons. Neither side typically deploys nuclear bombs or cruise missiles on bombers, but keeps them in storage. Thus inspections of bombers would find no weapons to inspect. The parties agreed to arbitrarily count each bomber as one warhead. (Under SORT, Russia did not count stored bomber weapons at all.)

New START, like START I, does not track or limit warheads or bombs once they have been removed from deployed launchers.

**Delivery vehicles and launchers**: Each deployed ICBM, SLBM and nuclear-capable bomber is counted as one delivery vehicle against the 700 limit. Each deployed and non-deployed missile launcher or bomber is counted as one launcher against the 800 limit. Non-deployed missiles are monitored but not limited in number.

Monitoring and Verification (Article VI, IX, X, XI, Protocol and Annexes)

New START’s verification regime includes relevant parts of START I as well as new provisions to cover items not previously monitored. For example, the new treaty contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions on the use of National Technical Means (NTM); an extensive database on the numbers, types and locations of treaty-limited items and notifications about those items; and inspections to confirm this information. Even so, the verification system has been simplified to make it cheaper and easier to operate than START and to reflect new strategic realities. New START monitoring has also been designed to reflect updated treaty limitations.

For example, the old treaty did not directly limit warheads but instead assigned a certain number of warheads to each launcher; a count of the launchers gave an upper limit on the number of warheads that could be deployed, but not necessarily an actual count. New START includes direct limits on deployed warheads and allows for on-site inspections to give both sides confidence that the limits are being upheld. Under the new treaty, both sides will exchange lists of the number of warheads deployed on individual missiles. During “Type One” inspections, each side can choose one ICBM or SLBM to inspect on short notice and count the warheads. The re-entry vehicles (RVs) can be covered by the host nation to protect sensitive information, but the actual number of RVs must be evident to the inspectors. These inspections are designed to help deter both sides from deploying a missile with more than its declared number of warheads.

For missile-generated flight test data, known as telemetry, START I called for telemetry to be openly shared, with limited exceptions, to monitor missile development. New START does not limit new types of ballistic missiles, and thus the old START formula for extensive telemetry sharing was no longer necessary. New START requires the broadcast of telemetry and exchange of recordings and other information on up to five missile tests per side per year to promote openness and transparency.

Under the new treaty, the United States and Russia will continue to depend on NTM to monitor the other’s strategic forces. To monitor Russian mobile ICBMs, all new missiles are subject to the treaty as soon as they leave a production facility, and each missile and bomber will carry a unique identifier. Russia must notify the United States 48 hours before a new solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM leaves the Votkinsk production facility and when it arrives at its destination, which will facilitate monitoring by national means, such as satellites. The treaty does not prohibit the modernization of strategic forces within the overall treaty limits (Article V).

Verification of treaty limits and conversion or elimination of delivery systems is carried out by NTM and 18 annual short-notice, on-site inspections. The treaty allows ten on-site inspections of deployed warheads and deployed and non-deployed delivery systems at ICBM bases, submarine bases and air bases (“Type One” inspections). It also allows eight on-site inspections at facilities that may hold only non-deployed delivery systems (“Type Two” inspections).
Ballistic Missile Defense (Preamble, Article V, Unilateral Statements)

Current and planned U.S. missile defense programs are not constrained by New START. The preamble acknowledges the “interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” and that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.”

Article V prohibits both sides from converting launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs into launchers for missile defense interceptors and vice versa. This provision does not apply to five U.S. ICBM silo launchers at Vandenberg Air Force Base, in California, that were previously converted to missile defense interceptor launchers. The United States has no plans for any such conversions in the future.

The missile defense launcher provision is designed to address Russian concerns that the U.S. could “break out” of New START by placing ICBMs in silos that once held missile defense interceptors. In practice, the provision will protect U.S. missile defense interceptors from falling under the treaty inspection regime. “If the parties were permitted to convert missile defense silos to ICBM silos, they would also have been able to visit and inspect those silos to confirm that they did not hold missiles limited by the treaty,” states the Congressional Research Service. The ban on silo conversions means that silo inspections are unnecessary and not permitted.

Finally, both sides have made unilateral statements about the relationship between missile defense deployments and the treaty. These statements are not legally binding, and similar statements were issued with previous treaties, including START I. Under START I, the Soviet Union said that U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty would constitute reason for withdrawal. However, when the United States actually did withdraw from the ABM treaty in 2002, Russia did not withdraw from START and, in fact, went on to negotiate SORT.

Conventional Warheads (Preamble, Protocol and Annexes)

New START does not prohibit either side from deploying conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles. Such deployments would be counted under the warhead and missile limitations of the treaty. The preamble states that both sides are “mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.” The U.S. position is that “there is no military utility in carrying nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed reentry vehicles on the same ICBM or SLBM.”

Trident submarines converted to carry conventional cruise missiles would not be counted under the treaty, nor would formerly nuclear-capable bombers that have been fully converted to conventional missions, such as the B-1B.

Duration and Withdrawal (Article XIV)

The treaty’s duration is ten years from entry into force unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement and can be extended for an additional five years. As in START I, each party can withdraw if it decides for itself that “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.” The treaty would terminate three months from a notice of withdrawal. The 2002 SORT agreement would terminate when New START enters into force.

ENDNOTES

3. Ibid., p. 16.
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START

The U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile will change between 2010 and 2018, when reductions under New START would be completed, assuming the treaty takes effect in 2011. Current delivery vehicle numbers and the Pentagon’s plan for reductions under New START were announced May 13, 2010. Warhead numbers as of 2009 were announced by the Department of State April 27. The planned 720 deployed delivery vehicles under New START will need to be reduced to 700 by, for example, moving 20 to nondeployed status to comply with the treaty limit. Under New START, each bomber is counted as one warhead, but in fact can carry up to 20. On May 3, the Pentagon, revealing exact stockpile numbers for the first time, said that as of 2009, the United States had a stockpile of 5,113 strategic and tactical warheads. That number includes active and inactive weapons, but does not include an estimated 4,500 warheads that have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement. Shaded warhead numbers are estimates based on the known number of deployed delivery vehicles, the known total number of deployed warheads, and typical warhead loadings.

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<th>2010 Delivery Vehicles</th>
<th>2010 Warheads</th>
<th>2018 Delivery Vehicles</th>
<th>2018 Warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICBMs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SLBMs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident II D5</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Bombers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52H</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2A</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Deployed</strong></td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1,968</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Stockpile</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,113</td>
<td></td>
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The Case for New START

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements
At a Glance

Over the past four decades, American and Soviet/Russian leaders have used a progression of bilateral agreements and other measures to limit and reduce their substantial nuclear warhead and strategic missile and bomber arsenals. The following is a brief summary.

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

SALT I

Begun in November 1969, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) produced by May 1972 both the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited strategic missile defenses to 200 (later 100) interceptors each, and the Interim Agreement, an executive agreement that capped U.S. and Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces. Under the Interim Agreement, both sides pledged not to construct new ICBM silos, not to increase the size of existing ICBM silos “significantly,” and capped the number of SLBM launch tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did not address warhead numbers, leaving both sides free to enlarge their forces by deploying multiple warheads (MIRVs) onto their ICBMs and SLBMs and increasing their bomber-based forces. The agreement limited the United States to 1,054 ICBM silos and 656 SLBM launch tubes. The Soviet Union was limited to 1,607 ICBM silos and 740 SLBM launch tubes. In January 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty.

SALT II

In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to pursue a follow-on treaty to SALT I. SALT II, signed in June 1979, limited U.S. and Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bomber-based nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles (defined as an ICBM silo, a SLBM launch tube, or a heavy bomber) and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces. The agreement would have required the Soviets to reduce their forces by roughly 270 delivery vehicles, but U.S. forces were below the limits and could actually have been increased. However, President Jimmy Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and consent after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the treaty was not taken up again. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged to adhere to the agreement’s terms despite its failure to enter into force. However, on May 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions on strategic nuclear forces would be based on the threat posed by Soviet forces and not on “a flawed SALT II Treaty.”

START I

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), first proposed in the early 1980s by President Ronald Reagan and finally signed in July 1991, required the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles, carrying no more than 6,000 warheads as counted using the agreement’s rules. The agreement
required the destruction of excess delivery vehicles which was verified using an intrusive verification regime that involved on-site inspections, the regular exchange of information, including telemetry, and the use of national technical means (i.e., satellites). The agreement’s entry into force was delayed for several years because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and ensuing efforts to denuclearize Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus by returning their nuclear weapons to Russia and making them parties to the NPT and START agreements. START I reductions were completed in December 2001 and the treaty expired on Dec. 5, 2009.

START II

In June 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to pursue a follow-on accord to START I. START II, signed in January 1993, called for reducing deployed strategic arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads and banned the deployment of destabilizing multiple-warhead land-based missiles. START II would have counted warheads in roughly the same fashion as START I and, also like its predecessor, would have required the destruction of delivery vehicles but not warheads. The agreement’s original implementation deadline was January 2003, ten years after signature, but a 1997 protocol moved this deadline to December 2007 because of the extended delay in ratification. Both the Senate and the Duma approved START II, but the treaty did not take effect because the Senate did not ratify the 1997 protocol and several ABM Treaty amendments, whose passage the Duma established as a condition for START II’s entry into force. START II was effectively shelved as a result of the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

START III Framework

In March 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to a framework for START III negotiations that included a reduction in deployed strategic warheads to 2,000-2,500. Significantly, in addition to requiring the destruction of delivery vehicles, START III negotiations were to address “the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads...to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.” Negotiations were supposed to begin after START II entered into force, which never happened.

SORT

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) under which the United States and Russia are reducing their strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads each. The warhead limit takes effect and expires on the same day, December 31, 2012. Although the two sides have not agreed on specific counting rules, the Bush administration had asserted that the United States would reduce only warheads deployed on strategic delivery vehicles in active service, i.e., “operationally deployed” warheads, and will not count warheads removed from service and placed in storage or warheads on delivery vehicles undergoing overhaul or repair. The agreement’s limits are similar to those envisioned for START III, but the treaty does not require the destruction of delivery vehicles, as START I and II did, or the destruction of warheads, as had been envisioned for START III. The treaty was approved by the Senate and Duma and entered into force on June 1, 2003. START will terminate when New START enters into force.

New START

On April 8, 2010, the United States and Russia signed New START, a legally binding, verifiable agreement that limits each side’s deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and strategic delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) to 800 deployed and nondeployed, such as submarines in overhaul, with a sublimit of 700 deployed. The treaty-accountable warhead limit is 30 percent lower than the 2,200 upper limit of SORT, and the delivery vehicle limit is 50 percent lower than the 1,600 allowed in START I. The treaty has a verification regime that combines elements of START I with new elements tailored to New START. Measures under the treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. The treaty also provides for the continued exchange of telemetry (missile flight-test data on
Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SALT I</th>
<th>SALT II</th>
<th>START I</th>
<th>START II</th>
<th>START III</th>
<th>SORT</th>
<th>New START</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Expired</td>
<td>Never Entered Into Force</td>
<td>Expired</td>
<td>Never Entered Into Force</td>
<td>Never Negotiated</td>
<td>In Force</td>
<td>To Be Ratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployed Warhead Limit</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3,000-3,500</td>
<td>2,000-2,500</td>
<td>1,700-2,200</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployed Delivery Vehicle Limit</strong></td>
<td>US: 1,710 ICBMs &amp; SLBMs</td>
<td>USSR: 2,347</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>700; 800 including non-deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date Signed</strong></td>
<td>May 26, 1972</td>
<td>June 18, 1979</td>
<td>July 31, 1991</td>
<td>Jan. 3, 1993</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>May 24, 2002</td>
<td>April 8, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratification Vote, U.S.</strong></td>
<td>88-2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>93-6</td>
<td>87-4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>95-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date Entered Into Force</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 3, 1972</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 1994</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>June 1, 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation Deadline</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 2001</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dec. 31, 2012</td>
<td>Seven years after entry into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expiration Date</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 3, 1977</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 2009</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dec. 31, 2012 or when New START takes effect</td>
<td>Ten years after entry into force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

up to five tests per year) and does not meaningfully limit missile defenses or long-range conventional strike capabilities. The treaty limits take effect seven years after entry into force, and the treaty will be in effect for 10 years, or longer if agreed by both parties.

Nonstrategic Nuclear Arms Control Measures

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Signed December 8, 1987, the INF Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to verifiably eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, including on-site inspections, the INF Treaty laid the groundwork for verification of the subsequent START I. The INF Treaty entered into force June 1, 1988, and the two sides completed their reductions by June 1, 1991, destroying a total of 2,692 missiles. The agreement was multilateralized after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and current active participants in the agreement include the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also parties to the agreement but do not participate in treaty meetings or on-site inspections. The ban on intermediate-range missiles is of unlimited duration.
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

On September 27, 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would remove almost all U.S. tactical nuclear forces from deployment so that Russia could undertake similar actions, reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation as the Soviet Union dissolved. Specifically, Bush said the United States would eliminate all its nuclear artillery shells and short-range nuclear ballistic missile warheads and remove all nonstrategic nuclear warheads from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocated on October 5, pledging to eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear landmines. He also pledged to withdraw all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons from deployment. However, significant questions remain about Russian implementation of its pledges, and there is considerable uncertainty about the current state of Russia’s tactical nuclear forces.
Eighteen years after the last U.S. nuclear test, it is abundantly clear that maintaining the reliability of the steadily shrinking U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile does not depend on a program of nuclear test explosions. Over the past decade the U.S. Life Extension Program has successfully refurbished major warhead types, and with sufficient resources can continue to do so indefinitely. Moreover, the delivery systems for U.S. nuclear forces are also reliable, effective, and modern. The United States is already engaged in the process of upgrading all of its strategic nuclear delivery systems, the warheads they carry, and the production complex for the next 20-30 years or more.

Beginning with its fiscal year 2011 budget request, the Barack Obama administration has shown it is committed to making sure that a more than adequate budget is available to support the task.

In February 2010, the administration requested $7 billion for fiscal year 2011 funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which oversees the U.S. nuclear stockpile and production complex. The request is about 10 percent higher than the budget was in the final year of the George W. Bush administration. Linton Brooks, Bush’s former NNSA administrator, said in April, “I’d have killed for that budget and that much high-level attention in the administration.”

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in his preface to the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, “These investments, and the NPR’s strategy for warhead life extension, represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation’s deterrent.”

Then, in May, the administration outlined its $80 billion, 10-year plan for the NNSA nuclear weapons activities, which is almost 15% percent above current spending levels. On November 17, at the request of Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), the Obama administration delivered revised estimates for funding the nuclear weapons complex over the next decade. The plan now totals $85 billion, including an additional $4.1 billion in spending for fiscal years 2012-2016, mainly to cover possible cost increases for two new facilities and a revised estimate of cost for fiscal years 2017-2020. The $85 billion total represents a 21 percent rise above the fiscal year 2011 NNSA weapons activities spending level.

By any common sense definition, the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories have more than enough resources to maintain the effectiveness of the enduring U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile for years to come.
Figure I: Total Number of Warheads in the United States Active Nuclear Arsenal from 1962-2009


Note: The “active” arsenal are those nuclear warheads that need to be maintained for deployment on delivery systems or for the strategic reserve. It does not include warheads that have been retired from service that are awaiting dismantlement.

Figure 2: Past, Current, and Proposed Spending for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, Maintenance Activities by Fiscal Year, 1989-2020


Note: According to Atomic Audit, the Cold War annual average for the years 1948 to 1990 was $5.1 billion for comparable nuclear weapons design, testing, production, and maintenance programs (now designated as the National Nuclear Security Administration “Total Weapons Activities” budget category).
On Veterans Day, Nov. 11, 2010, Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “The New START treaty is absolutely critical... This December, we are coming up on a full year with no treaty with the Russians, and these treaties have historically been broadly bipartisan.” Adm. Mullen’s support for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is broadly shared among senior U.S. military leaders and former national security officials from both sides of the aisle.

Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev signed New START in April. Since then, there has been an extensive public debate on the merits of the treaty. Senate committees have held 18 public hearings and four briefings on New START, and the administration has answered over 900 questions regarding the treaty. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty on Sept. 16, with a bipartisan vote of 14-4. The treaty must now be approved by the full Senate for it to enter into force.

Throughout this eight-month process, one fact has become unmistakably clear: military opinion overwhelmingly supports prompt U.S. ratification of New START. The current U.S. military leadership strongly favors the treaty. Seven former commanders of the U.S. Strategic Command support it as well. Indeed, a Secretary of Defense or State from every administration since Richard Nixon’s is on record in support of New START.

Below is a sample of the most notable statements of support for New START:

**Current U.S. Military Leaders**

Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense; *Wall Street Journal*, May 13, 2010:

- "The New START Treaty has the unanimous support of America’s military leadership—to include the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of the service chiefs, and the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, the organization responsible for our strategic nuclear deterrent. For nearly 40 years, treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons have been approved by the U.S. Senate by strong bipartisan majorities. This treaty deserves a similar reception and result—on account of the dangerous weapons it reduces, the critical defense capabilities it preserves, the strategic stability it maintains, and, above all, the security it provides to the American people."
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Senate Armed Services Committee, June 17, 2010:

- "I am pleased to add my voice in support of ratification of the New START treaty and to do so as soon as possible. We are in our seventh month without a treaty with Russia. This treaty has the full support of your uniformed military . . . the conclusion and implementation of the New START Treaty is the right thing for us to do - and we took the time to do it right."

General Kevin Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2010:

- "If we don't get the treaty, [the Russians] are not constrained in their development of force structure and... we have no insight into what they're doing. So it's the worst of both possible worlds."

Lt. General Patrick O'Reilly, Missile Defense Agency Director; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2010:

- "Throughout the treaty negotiations, I frequently consulted the New START team on all potential impacts to missile defense. The New START Treaty does not constrain our plans to execute the U.S. Missile Defense program."

General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; letter to the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 2, 2010:

- "I believe the treaty limitation of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles imposed by New START provides a sound framework for maintaining stability and allows us to maintain a strong and credible deterrent that ensures our national security while moving to lower levels of strategic nuclear forces."

Lt. General Frank G. Klotz, Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command; Defense Writers Group breakfast, November 9, 2010:

- "My sense is that the START Treaty ought to be ratified and ought to be ratified as soon as possible."

- "I think [the recent missile incident at Warren Air Force Base] has absolutely no link at all to the START Treaty."

Former U.S. Military Leaders

General Larry Welch, General John Chain, General Lee Butler, Admiral Henry Chiles, General Eugene Habiger, Admiral James Ellis, and General Bennie Davis, former commanders of Strategic Air Command and U.S. Strategic Command; letter to the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 14, 2010:

- "We will understand Russian strategic forces much better with the treaty than would be the case without it. For example, the treaty permits on-site inspections that will allow us to observe and confirm the number of warheads on individual Russian missiles; we cannot do that with just national technical means of verification."

- "The New START Treaty will contribute to a more stable U.S.-Russian relationship. We strongly endorse its early ratification and entry into force."

James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence, Nixon and Ford administrations; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 29, 2010:

- "I think that it is obligatory for the United States to ratify [New START]...[F]or the United States at this juncture to fail to ratify the treaty in the due course of the Senate's deliberation would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others with regard
The Case for New START

William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, Clinton administration; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 29, 2010:

• "[T]he New START Treaty is a positive step in U.S.-Russia arms negotiations. This treaty establishes a ceiling on strategic arms while allowing the United States to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. This treaty does not limit America's ability to structure its offensive arsenal to meet current or future threats, nor does it prevent the future modernization of the American nuclear arsenal. Additionally, the treaty puts no meaningful limits on our Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense program, and in fact it reduces restrictions that existed under the previous START treaty. I recommend ratification."

Former Senior Government Officials

Colin L. Powell, former Secretary of State, George W. Bush administration; Howard Baker, former Senator (R-TN); Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense, Carter administration; Frank Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense, Reagan administration; John C. Danforth, former Senator (R-MO); Kenneth M. Duberstein, former White House Chief of Staff, Reagan administration; Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, former Senator (R-KS); Thomas Kean, former Governor and 9/11 Commission Chair (R-NJ); Warren Rudman, former Senator (R-NH); and Alan Simpson, former Senator (R-WY); joint statement, June 24, 2010:

• "Now is the time for a thorough and balanced national discussion about nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. But we must remember that a world without a binding U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons agreement is a much more dangerous world. We, the undersigned Republicans and Democrats, support the new START treaty..."

Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State, Clinton administration; Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor, Clinton administration;

Ambassador Richard Burt, U.S. chief negotiator of START I; Chuck Hagel, former Senator (R-NE); Admiral William Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and George Shultz, former Secretary of State, Reagan administration; joint statement, September 28, 2010:

• "Currently, we have no verification regime to account for Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons. Two hundred and ninety seven (297) days have elapsed since American teams have been allowed to inspect Russian nuclear forces, and we are concerned that further inaction will bring unacceptable lapses in U.S. intelligence about Russia’s strategic arsenal. Without New START, we believe that the United States is less secure.

As part of the vast consensus of national security professionals who have endorsed New START, we respectfully call on the Senate to ratify the New START Treaty in 2010."

James Baker, former Secretary of State, George H.W. Bush administration; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 19, 2010:

• "[New START] appears to take our country in a direction that can enhance our national security while at the same time reducing the number of nuclear warheads on the planet."

Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Nixon and Ford administrations; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 25, 2010:

• "The current agreement is a modest step forward stabilizing American and Russian arsenals at a slightly reduced level. It provides a measure of transparency; it reintroduces many verification measures that lapsed with the expiration of the last START agreement; it encourages what the Obama administration has described as the reset of political relations with Russia; it may provide potential benefits in dealing with the issue of proliferation."
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor, Ford and George H.W. Bush administrations; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 10, 2010:

- "[T]he principal result of non-ratification would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of chaos, and the reason this treaty is important is over the decades we have built up all these counting rules, all these verification procedures and so on, so that each side feels, 'Yes, we can take these steps.' If you wipe those out, you're back to zero again..."

Linton F. Brooks, former START I negotiator and former Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, Bush administration; Arms Control Association briefing, April 7, 2010:

- "[Y]ou'll hear concerns by some that the treaty may or may not be a good idea but you can't possibly accept it because the U.S. nuclear weapons program is in disarray. And I think the administration's answer to that is the fiscal 2011 budget with a very substantial increase for my former home, the National Nuclear Security Administration. And I will say flatly, I ran that place for five years and I'd have killed for that budget and that much high-level attention in the administration and I just - nobody in government ever said 'my program has too much money' and I doubt that my successor is busy saying that. But he is very happy with his program and I think it does put us on a very firm, firm basis."

NATO Allies

NATO heads of state and ministers expressed their strong support for U.S. and Russian ratification of New START at their November 19-21, 2010 summit in Lisbon, Portugal.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi:

- “My country has a very special experience with Russia, and also a special geographic location. We advocate ratification of START. It is in the interest of my nation, of Europe and most importantly for the trans-Atlantic alliance.”

Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nickolay Mladenov:

- “Don’t stop START before it’s started.”

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Azubalis:

- New START is a necessary “prologue, an entrance” to discussions with Russia about other forms of nuclear arms in the region “that are much more dangerous - we who are living in Eastern Europe know this.”

Latvian Foreign Minister Girts Valdis Kristovskis:

- “I want to underline that NATO Atlantic cooperation is very important for the security of my state. START treaty ratification in Congress we support very strongly and also the policy of President Obama and his administration is very important for the security of our region.”

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen:

- “The New START treaty will contribute to an improvement of security in Europe and the whole Euro-Atlantic area, and I would strongly regret if ratification is delayed.”
Additional Resources

www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Pifer

www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_09/Gottemoeller

New START text and official documents
www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c39903.htm

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report: Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Oct. 2010
http://foreign.senate.gov/reports/