

Nuclear Nonproliferation Standards and Practices Matrix (2006)

The following chart tracks the extent to which key nuclear-weapon states and other states of concern are currently meeting global nonproliferation and disarmament norms. The “standards and practices” listed are derived from: NPT obligations; commitments made in the context of NPT review conferences; UN Security Council resolutions, and other widely supported multilateral standards and practices. See explanatory notes for further discussion. – *D. Kimball & W. Boese, Arms Control Association.*

- ◆ full compliance with standard
- ◊ partial or incomplete compliance
- ◇ no significant compliance
- X noncompliance/opposite action
- N/A not applicable

STANDARD/PRACTICE	NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES (NWS)					NON-NPT NWS			STATES OF CONCERN		NNWS
	U.S.	RUSSIA	CHINA	FRANCE	UK	INDIA	PAKISTAN	ISRAEL	IRAN	DPRK	NNWS
REDUCING NUMBERS AND SALIENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS & DELIVERY SYSTEMS											
• Sign and ratify the CTBT	◊	◆	◊	◆	◆	◇	◇	◊	◊	◇	◊ ¹
• Unilateral test moratorium	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◇	N/A	◇	N/A
• Declared support for verifiable FMCT ²	X	◊	◆	◆	◊	◆	◆	◇	◆	◆	◆
• Halt fissile production for weapons	◆	◆	◊ ³	◆	◆	X	X	◇	?	X	N/A
• Reducing readiness of nuclear forces	◇	◇	X	◇	◊	◇	◇	?	N/A	?	N/A
• Reducing strategic nuclear forces	◊	◊	X	◊	◊	X	X	◇	N/A	X	N/A
• Reducing tactical nuclear forces ⁴	◇	◇	X	◇	◇	X	X	◇	N/A	X	◊
• Pursuing further verifiable and irreversible nuclear reductions ⁵	◇	◊	X	◇	◇	X	X	◇	N/A	X	N/A
• No first use policy	X	X	◆	X	X	◆	X	◇	N/A	?	N/A
• Support existing and new nuclear-weapon-free zones ⁶	◊	◊	◊	◊	◊	◇	◇	◇	◇	X	◊

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PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS, TECHNOLOGIES, & NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MISSILES											
• Compliance with full-scope IAEA safeguards agreements	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	X	X	X	X	X	◆
• Implementing Additional Protocol ⁷	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇
• Abiding by NSG export guidelines	◆	X	◆	◆	◆	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇
• Pledged to refrain from new transfers of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology ⁸	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◇	◆	◇	◇	◇
• Begun implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇
• Abiding by MTCR export guidelines	◆	◇	◇	◆	◆	◇	◇	◆	◇	X	◇
• Signed Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles	◆	◆	◇	◆	◆	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇

¹ While 132 non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) have signed and ratified the CTBT, several NNWS have not yet deposited their instruments of ratification, including four—Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran—needed to achieve the treaty’s entry into force.

² Measured by whether the state has recently and publicly stated support for a verifiable FMCT, declared support for an FMCT, or has expressed its opposition to a verifiable FMCT.

³ France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have publicly declared a halt to fissile production. China is believed to have stopped but has not made a public declaration.

⁴ Aside from implementation of the 1991 U.S.-Soviet Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, Washington and Moscow have done little to eliminate their tactical nuclear warheads. Several European states, including several NNWS, participate in or support the NATO policy that maintains the deployment of over 400 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed at bases in Europe.

⁵ Although some nuclear-weapon states (NWS) profess to support the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament and discussions at the CD on nuclear disarmament, Russia is the only NWS to have recently (in June 2006) called for a new round of negotiations (with the United States) on strategic nuclear reductions, which would succeed the START I agreement, which expires in 2009.

⁶ While numerous NNWS have joined the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and support new zones—including zones in the Middle East and Central Asia—several of these states have not yet joined those that are currently in place. No NWS has fully subscribed to the existing zones and some are posing obstacles to the creation of new ones.

⁷ States have signed but not yet deposited their instruments of ratification are marked “◆.” The NWS recognized by the NPT have voluntary Additional Protocol agreements that are symbolic and not substantive. India has pledged to adopt an Additional Protocol but negotiations with the IAEA have not begun.

⁸ The G-8 pledged in 2004, 2005, and 2006 not to pursue new transfers of such technology. Others have pledged support for the policy.