Preventing the spread and buildup of nuclear weapons remains one of the highest priority international security challenges. Success depends on a multipronged global strategy, including a verifiable ban on nuclear explosive testing to prevent the emergence of new and more deadly nuclear weapons. U.S. leadership is critical.
Volume 3, Issue 5, March 30, 2012
Today, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released its long-awaited report on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The independent panel of senior scientific and military experts was charged in 2009 with reviewing technical developments related to the U.S. nuclear stockpile and to nuclear explosion test monitoring that have occurred since the 2002 NAS report on the CTBT and the Senate's brief debate and rejection of the treaty in 1999.
Volume 3, Issue 6, March 30, 2012
The March 30 release of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty--Technical Issues for the United States lays out the most compelling case to date, based on the latest classified and intelligence information, that the United States does not need nuclear tests to maintain its arsenal and that the Test Ban Treaty can be verified.
For Immediate Release: March 28, 2012
(Washington, D.C.) The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) will release a major new technical report on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) this Friday March 30. The report will assess the U.S. ability to maintain its nuclear arsenal without nuclear test explosions and the ability of the international monitoring system to detect clandestine tests.
The Indonesian House of Representatives approved the ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on Dec. 6, decreasing the number of states that must ratify the pact before its entry into force from nine to eight.
(Washington, D. C.) Today, the Indonesian parliament approved the ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which bans all nuclear weapons test explosions and establishes a global system for detecting and deterring clandestine test explosions.
Barry H. Steiner is a professor of political science at California State University, Long Beach, where he has taught since 1968. Specializing in war and peace studies, he has worked on nuclear strategy, preventive diplomacy, arms races, and arms control. He gratefully acknowledges the comments of Lawrence D. Weiler on an earlier version of this article.
Volume 2, Issue 14, November 3, 2011
A front-page story in today’s Washington Post (“Supercomputers Offer Tools for Nuclear Testing--and Solving Nuclear Mysteries”) illustrates how far the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program has come since nuclear explosive tests ended in 1992. Scientists at the three U.S. national laboratories now have a deeper understanding of nuclear weapons than ever before.